FISA Court Affirmative - DDI 2015 SWS

FISA Court AFF
Notes
People assigned to this file: Ruby, Sarah, Adam,
Samantha, Joe, Jake, and Ani
1AC
See separate file for now
CARDS TO BE ORGANIZED
FISA Inherency
NSA lawyers do not protect civil liberties, but uphold the
law.
Schlanger 2015 (Margo Schlanger, Proffesor of Law at Michigan
University specializing in civil rights issues and civil and criminal detention;
Harvard National Security Journal, http://harvardnsj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/Schlanger.pdf. AGY)
Within a particular organization such as the NSA, the impact of a rights and
compliance frame is to allocate decision-making to lawyers . If those lawyers
have a civil libertarian orientation, this could be a channel by which rights
and compliance serve civil liberties interests. That is, one could imagine that agency
lawyers might systematically exercise a pro-liberty orientation, which could fill gaps that might otherwise
multiplying accounts of lawyers in the Intelligence Community

suggest otherwise. A growing shelf-full of articles and books document and even celebrate the
exist. However,
lawyers who now populate the military, the CIA, and the Department of Justices National Security Division.
Jack Goldsmith, for example, has labeled these lawyers a key part of something new and remarkable,
describing giant distributed networks of lawyers, investigators, and auditors, both inside and outside the
executive branch, that rendered U.S. fighting forces and intelligence services more transparent than ever,
Might all these

lawyers push the intelligence enterprise towards appropriate balancing of
liberty and security, even in the absence of specific law or doctrine declaring
the required outcome? I think not. Rather, when lawyers (in an office where they are
understood to be practicing law) are given policy roles, those lawyers legal sign-off
frequently stands in as sufficient justification to undertake the policy. To quote Goldsmith one last
and that enforced legal and political constraints, small and large, against them.312
time, describing the Bush administrations aggressive stance on a variety of national security topics, the
role of lawyers was part of why What should we do? . . . often collapsed into What can we lawfully do?
national security agency counsel are

implementers of two major sets of valuesfiduciary/counselor, and rule of lawbut
not civil liberties. Judge James E. Bakers book-long defense and explication of the role of
lawyers in the national security state barely mentions the key civil liberties
values of freedom of speech or religion, the right to travel, or due process, but repeatedly emphasizes the
centrality of building a society and a government bound by law , and respect for law.314
313 The emerging evidence suggests that
Consider one last time that 2005 speech to the NSAs lawyers and their colleagues, by then-Deputy
Attorney General James Comey, in which he praised the NSAs lawyers as custodian[s] of our constitution
and the rule of law. Comey did not exhort his audience of intelligence lawyers to ask the should
the commitment he attempted to bolster

was to legal compliance, not to individual liberty . To quote his revealing phrase again, he
question, rather than the can question. Rather,
pleaded for yes when it can be, . . . no when it must be.315
Freedom Act didnt do a whole lot the government can

still access metadata records and request large amount of
information from private companies
Dyer, journalist covering US foreign policy, former China and Brazil bureau
chief for the Financial Times, 6/3/15 (Geoff, Financial Times, Jun 3, 2015,
Surveillance bill fails to curtail bulk of NSA activities proquest; accessed
7/14/15 JH @ DDI)
The passage of the first bill since 9/11 to curtail government surveillance
represents a dramatic shift in the politics surrounding terrorism in the US, but
a much less significant change in the way the intelligence community
actually operates. The USA Freedom Act, which has been comfortably approved by both the
Senate and the House, bars the government from collecting the phone records of
millions of US citizens, a programme which became the focus of public fears about overbearing
electronic surveillance. The surveillance legislation reform still leaves the US
intelligence community with formidable legal powers and tools to collect data
and other online information for terrorism-related investigations, however.
Despite the tidal wave of revelations and public anger towards the N ational
Security Agency following the 2013 leaks by Edward Snowden, congressional efforts to
rein in the agency have so far not curtailed the bulk of its activities . "The more
savvy members of the intelligence community have been saying for some time, 'If this is the hit that we
have to take, then so be it'," says Mieke Eoyang at the centrist Third Way think-tank in Washington,
referring to the bulk telephone data collection programme. The very first Snowden leak was a secret court
order requiring Verizon to hand over the call records of its customers, in the process revealing an official
dragnet that was capturing details about tens of millions of Americans. Amid the many Snowden
documents about the NSA that followed, it was this programme that crystallised public fears in the US that
The Freedom Act

is designed to tackle those concerns about the bulk collection programme.
The legislation calls for telephone companies and not the government to
store the information and requires a court order before the call data can be
searched. Supporters of the reform celebrated two further conditions in the bill. It limits the scope of
government inquiries, so that officials cannot ask, for instance, for all calls in the 212 area code. And it
requires that the secret foreign intelligence court publish legal opinions that
change the scope of information that can be collected. Beyond the specifics, the
the government was abusing privacy rights in its zeal to monitor terrorist threats .
passage of the bill represents a landmark in the underlying politics of national security. Before the
Snowden revelations, the political climate over terrorism would have made it routine to renew the sections
of the post-9/11 Patriot Act that have now been replaced by the USA Freedom Act. Yet the reality is that for
the past 18 months, the administration has been making a tactical retreat from the call records
A panel of experts appointed by the White House, which included

former senior intelligence officials, said in December 2013 that the programme
was "not essential" for preventing terrorist attacks . In early 2014, President Barack
programme.
Obama called for many of the changes to the programme contained in the new legislation. "This is
something we can live with," says a former senior intelligence official of the USA Freedom Act. Moreover,
even the bill's biggest supporters among privacy advocates acknowledge that it leaves much of the
intelligence collection conducted by the US untouched. "We have now addressed the excesses from the
very first Snowden story, so for that I am lifting a glass," says Julian Sanchez at the libertarian Cato
In terms of the total scope of surveillance

conducted by the NSA, this is a tiny corner." The bulk of the electronic data scooped up by
Institute in Washington. "But there is a lot left.
the NSA comes from overseas and is based on separate legal authorities not touched by the USA Freedom
Act -- most notably Section 702 of the FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance) Amendments Act and the
Critics of the NSA in Congress, such as Michigan representative

worry that the new reform still leaves areas that the intelligence
agencies can exploit. Some privacy activists fear that while the new law bans
bulk collection, the government will still find ways to secure what they call
"bulky" requests that involve large quantities of data , especially by using
National Security Letters issued by the FBI which can compel the handover of a range of records
Reagan-era Executive Order 12333.
Justin Amash,
without the approval of a judge.
***SOLVENCY
Public Advocates
Public advocate is very popular- Congress needs to
appoint the advocates.
Schlanger 2015 (Margo Schlanger, Proffesor of Law at Michigan
University specializing in civil rights issues and civil and criminal detention;
Harvard National Security Journal, http://harvardnsj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/Schlanger.pdf. AGY)
A reform proposal endorsed by nearly everyone 354 (with some cavil by former FISA
presiding Judge John Bates355) is to adjust FISA proceedings by introducing some kind
of public advocate with a systematic role. In the Presidents Review Group formulation:
create a Public Interest Advocate to represent privacy and civil liberties
interests in the FISA Court, allowing the Court to invite participation, but also
allowing the Advocate to intervene on her own initiative .356 The President
agreed, calling on Congress to authorize the establishment of a panel of
advocates from outside government to provide an independent voice in
significant cases before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.357 This was included in the Senate
version of the USA Freedom Act.358
FISA Courts play a critical role in SQ of curtailing

surveillance.
Medine et. al, 1/7/15 (David Medine, Rachel Brand, Elisebeth Collins
Cook, James Dempsey, Patricia Wald; Members of the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board; http://perma.cc/FA8U-6RFJ. AGY)
FISA court) is a critical component of
the system of checks and balances that our nation has created around the
exercise of national security powers. When Congress created the court in 1978 in response to
concerns about the abuse of electronic surveillance,597 it represented a major restructuring
of the domestic conduct of foreign intelligence surveillance, with
constitutional implications. Until then, successive Presidents of both parties had authorized
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC or
national security wiretaps and other searches solely on the basis of their powers under Article II of the
(FISA) of 1978 provided a procedure under

which the Attorney General could obtain a judicial warrant authorizing the use of
electronic surveillance in the United States for foreign intelligence purposes.598 As the House
Constitution. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence explained in its 1978 report recommending adoption of FISA:
The history and law relating to electronic surveillance for "national security" purposes have revolved
around the competing demands of the Presidents constitutional powers to gather intelligence deemed
necessary to the security of the nation and the requirements of the fourth amendment. The U.S. Supreme
Court has never expressly decided the issue of whether the President has the constitutional authority to
authorize warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. Whether or not the
President has an inherent power" to engage in or authorize warrantless electronic surveillance and, if
such power exits, what limitations, if any, restrict the scope of that power, are issues that have troubled
constitutional scholars for decades.599 v= In essence, FISA represented an agreement between the
executive and legislative branches to leave that debate aside600 and establish a special court to oversee
foreign intelligence collection. While the statute has required periodic updates, national security officials
that judicial
review provides an important mechanism regulating the use of very powerful
and effective techniques vital to the protection of the country .601
have agreed that it created an appropriate balance among the interests at stake, and
PCLOB recommends a special advocate is put into place to

curtail surveillance.
Congress should enact legislation enabling the FISC to hear
independent views, in addition to the governments views, on novel and significant applications and
Recommendation 3.
in other matters in which a FISC judge determines that consideration of the issues would merit such
the FISC continues to review applications for

individualized FISA warrants, in the past decade it has also been called upon
to evaluate requests for broader collection programs , such as the 215 telephony
metadata program, and to review extensive compliance reports regarding the implementation of
the surveillance authorized under Section 702 . This expansion of the FISCs jurisdiction
additional views. Although
has presented it with complex and novel issues of law and technology. Currently, these issues are
adjudicated by the court based only on filings by the government, supplemented by the research and
Our judicial system thrives on the

adversarial presentation of views. As Judge Robertson noted: [A]nybody who
has been a judge will tell you that a judge needs to hear both sides of a case
before deciding. Its quite common, in fact its the norm to read one sides
brief or hear one sides argument and think, hmm, that sounds right, until we
read the other side.635
analysis of the judges and their experienced legal staff.
The ex parte system is not enough- public advocate is key

to boost public trust.
there is a growing consensus that the ex parte approach is not the
right model for review of novel legal questions or applications involving broad surveillance
programs that collect information about the communications of many people
who have no apparent connection to terrorism . 636 The Board believes that, when FISC
judges are considering requests for programmatic surveillance affecting numerous individuals or
applications presenting novel issues, they should have the opportunity to call for
thirdparty briefing on the legal issues involved. In addition to assisting the court, a
mechanism allowing FISC judges to call upon independent expert advocates for a broader
range of legal views could bolster the publics trust in its operations and in
the integrity of the FISA system overall. Accordingly, the Board recommends that Congress
However,
amend FISA to authorize the FISC to create a pool of Special Advocates who would be called upon to
present independent views to the court in important cases. Even in the absence of such legislative
authority, the Board believes the court has discretion to call upon outside lawyers, if they have the
necessary national security clearances, to offer analysis of legal or technical issues, and the Board would
urge the court to amend its rules to allow for such advocacy. However, it would be preferable to have a
statutory basis for such a system.
The Public advocate would have the ability to curtail

surveillance that has already been accepted and is
happening in the status quo.
However, the circumstances prescribed in FISC Rule 11 are not the only
circumstances where participation by the Special Advocate might be
appropriate. FISC judges should also consider inviting Special Advocate
participation for applications to renew already approved programs or
implementations of techniques. This may be appropriate in matters that
raised issues that were novel or significant at the time the original application
was filed but were not fully considered at that time; matters in which
intervening circumstances have raised issues that did not exist at the time of
the original application; or in other matters where the judge concludes that it
would be helpful to have a more thorough briefing with a diversity of views
presented.
Circumvention arguments are wrong
Prakash and Ramsey 12 (Saikrishna B, David Lurton Massee, Jr. Professor of Law
and Sullivan and Cromwell Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law and Michael D,
Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law, review of The Executive Unbound, Texas
Law Review (2012) 90:973, http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/Prakash-Ramsey90-TLR-973.pdf)
Yet we doubt the books central claim that we live in a post-Madisonian republic. First, the U.S. Executive is very
much boundby the Constitution, Congresss laws, and the courts. Though we cannot peer into the many minds
populating the Executive Branch, we do not believe that executive officials regard themselves as above the law and
the courts, answerable only to the people via elections and polls. The Executive Branch does not act this
way, and most of its actions are consistent with its own sense of what the law requires and
forbids (although, like most actors, it often reads the law to maximize its discretion). To be sure, the Executive
Branch takes advantage of gaps and ambiguities in the law, as well as its speed, decisiveness,
and access to information, all as The Executive Unbound describes.5 But the Executive does not
systematically disregard orders from Congress or the courts nor does it usually exercise core
powers that the Constitution assigns elsewhere; the Executive does not impose criminal
punishments, spend money without authorization, or rule by decree. Second, while we agree with
Posner and Vermeule that public opinion colors Executive Branch decision making, we also believe that the public
favors an executive bound by the law. So long as the public expects the law to constrain the
Executive, the Executive will take into account this expectation and the publics sense of the
law, even under Posner and Vermeules own light. In other words, the public has a taste for the rule of
law, a taste that the Executive Branch ignores at its peril. We think the legal constraints on the
modern Executive are so manifest that we wonder whether Posner and Vermeules real project is more
aspirational than descriptive. Perhaps their ultimate objective is to persuade us that we should have an unbound
executive, not that we already have one. We hedge here because the book seems of two minds. In keeping with the
title, most of the book forcefully argues that the Executive faces no material legal constraints. For instance, Posner
and Vermeule write that the legally constrained executive is now a historical curiosity6 and that the Madisonian
separation of powers has collapsed.7 There is no equivocation here. Yet Chapter 6 argues that irrational fear of
executive tyranny has prevented the Executive from obtaining powers needed to handle
modern emergencies.8 Obviously this complaint assumes that there are constraints on the Executive. And the
conclusion in particular appears to admit that the courts and Congress check the Executiv ethat the
Executive is bound and that the Madisonian republic lives on.
Adding a public advocate curtails surveillance.

Poorbaugh, 5/22/15, (Kate Poorbaugh, Illinois Law Review,
http://illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/ilrcontent/articles/2015/3/Poorbaugh.pdf. AGY)
the adversarial process is an
essential component of our legal system .181 The adversarial process, and specifically the
sharp clash of proofs presented by opposing advocates,182 creates an engine of truth.183
Judges are in a better position to accurately and confidently decide a case
when they have heard competing views on the issue .184 This idea is represented in
Supporters of creating a public advocate position argue that
our legal systems case or controversy requirement, which requires some type of concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult . . . questions . . . .185 There are rare exceptions, however, to the adversarial process in our legal
system which one side is allowed to address the court unopposed in ex parte proceedings.186 Opponents
FISC proceedings are consistent with the

federal proceedings for issuing a warrant , which creates the foundation that FISA was
originally built upon.187 Traditional warrant proceedings, however, differ from FISC proceedings
in fundamental ways. For example, the officer conducting a traditional warrant
search must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt of property taken to the
target of the search.188 Additionally, the target of a warrant has the opportunity
to contest the results through a judicial process and may request a return of his
property.189 Conversely, targets of FISA orders are often unaware they are being
targeted, have no available avenue of arguing the FISCs determination, and
the property taken from themtheir private communicationsremains in the governments
hands.190 Further, much has changed since FISA was enacted. The FISC was initially intended
to resolve routine and individualized questions of fact .191 As technology and the law
evolved, so too did the issues brought before the FISC.192 Today FISC judges are called upon
to make novel and significant legal determinations regarding important
constitutional rights,193 such as the legality of the bulk metadata program.194 When analyzing
these complex and sensitive issues, the FISC would be able to make a better decision if
it had heard the arguments of both sides .195 Supporters also point to the FISCs
overwhelming approval rate of over ninety-nine percent of surveillance
requests as an additional reason why a public advocate is needed .196 They argue
that the FISC is unable to properly scrutinize the governments argument for
surveillance under the current regime,197 and that they are just simply rubber
stamping approvals.198 These statistics, however, can be misleading because, as FISC Presiding
of a public advocate solution point to the fact that
Judge Reggie Walton explained, those numbers do not reflect the fact that many applications are altered
prior to final submission or even withheld from final submission entirely, often after an indication that a
judge would not approve them.199 Moreover, the FISC has a staff of five full-time legal assistants with
foreign intelligence expertise who work with the governments attorneys when an application is brought
before the FISC.200 This process only implies that the governments attorneys are well prepared to make
their arguments for surveillance and the court still does not consider arguments against surveillance. Thus,
adding a public advocate to FISC proceedings would ensure that legal

developments at FISC do not suffer from unbalanced advocacy .201
Public advocates fall under the federal government

Lederman and Vladeck 13 (Marty, professor at the Georgetown
University Law Center - He was Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the
Department of Justices Office of Legal Counsel; Steve is co-editor-in-chief of
Just Security. Steve is a professor of law at American University Washington
College of Law, and is also a senior editor of the Journal of National Security
Law & Policy The constitutionality of a FISA Special Advocate //RItt)
Reform of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts: Introducing a Public Advocate (Mar. 21, 2014) (The
public advocate can potentially be viewed as an agent of the government and may act as a principal or
The public advocate would be subject to the Article

II Appointments Clause mandates. Under Article III, it is questionable whether such an
advocate has standing to argue the "case" or "controversy" before the FISC due to the
requirement that they have been injured, are threated to suffer injury by
putatively illegal conduct, or are authorized to represent such an injured party. Likewise, Article III
inferior officer of the United States.
generally prohibits the government from litigating against itself, and allowing the advocate to seek relief
on national security issues could invade core executive branch powers. Last, as the advocate would not be
a party or representative of a party, they may not have standing to appeal FISC orders.); see also Andrew
Nolan, Richard M. Thompson II, & Vivian Chu, Cong. Research Serv., Oct. 25, Introducing a Public Advocate
into the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance act's Courts: Select Legal Issues (2013); cf. Marty Lederman &
Steve Vladick, The Constitutionality of a FISA "Special Advocate," Just Security (Nov. 4, 2013, 1:34 PM),
http://justsecurity.org/2873/fisa-special-advocate-constitution/ (arguing that Appointments Clause
arguments may be rendered moot if the position were not permanent and the advocate was selected on a
even if they were a government employee, they would not

exercise significant government authority, and thus not fall under
Appointments Clause requirements. Likewise, the standing issue would be abrogated with
case-by-case basis, and
properly drafted legislation by precluding the advocate from being a party to the case, but merely having a
lawyer present, possibly for third parties whose metadata and communications are at issue. As to appeals,
they propose legislation denoting the advocate in a role akin to a guardian ad litem, so that they could be
representative of absent third parties).
A new Congressional Research Service report

raises some constitutional questions about such a reform. As we explain in
the post that follows, however, most of those questions are insubstantial or
inappositeor at the very least can be avoided by using appropriate statutory language. On the other
hand, one of those questions is substantialnamely, whether the special advocate would have the
constitutional authority to appeal a FISC ruling. Even so, it is not clear such an authority would be
Accordingly,
whatever one thinks of the merits of a special advocate as a policy matter,
we dont believe there is any fundamental constitutional impediment to
legislation that would authorize a role for such an advocate .
necessary in order to ensure more frequent appellate review in appropriate cases.
Public advocate is constitutionally feasible and solves

FISC best
Lederman and Vladeck 13 (Marty, professor at the Georgetown
University Law Center - He was Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the
Department of Justices Office of Legal Counsel; Steve is co-editor-in-chief of
Just Security. Steve is a professor of law at American University Washington
College of Law, and is also a senior editor of the Journal of National Security
Law & Policy The constitutionality of a FISA Special Advocate //RItt)
I. Would the Special Advocate be an Officer of the United States Subject to the Appointments Clause?
The CRS Report begins with an extended analysis of purported Appointments Clause issues surrounding
the special advocate, including whether she would be a principal officer (who could therefore only be
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate), or an inferior officer (who could
The CRS Report

appears to assume that the special advocate would not be appointed in a
manner allowed under the Appointments Clause. That assumption may well be
be appointed by the President, by the head of a Department or by a court).
mistaken, depending on the bill in question. More fundamentally, however, the CRS Reports analysis
depends upon a fundamental, mistaken assumption that the special advocate would be an officer of the
For one thing, the advocate would not

necessarily be someone appointed to a position of employment within the
federal governmentshe could instead be someone assigned on a case-by-case basis to file briefs
before the FISC, or a federal contractor, in which case she would not be an officer
subject to the Appointments Clause. (See subsections II-B-1-a and II-B-1-c of this OLC memo.)
United States in the first place. But she would not.
In any event, even if the legislation provided that the advocate were to be appointed to a position of
she would not exercise significant government

authority pursuant to federal law, and thus would not be an officer for
Appointments Clause purposes. (See subsection I-B-1-b of that 1996 OLC memo.) The role of
the advocate would be solely to present legal arguments to the FISC , as an
employment in the federal government,
attorney does when appointed as an amicus by the Supreme Court to represent an undefended position in
a case before the Court. (See Martys discussion of the Courts practice.) Nothing the advocate would do
would have any binding effect upon any entity. (And even if the particular legislation in question provided
that the special counsel was to be a representative of third parties affected by the proposed order (such
as the U.S. persons whose metadata were collected under section 215, or the U.S. persons whose
communications are collected in a section 702 surveillance), that would not give the special advocate the
power to exercise significant governmental authority.) The CRS Report reaches the contrary conclusion by
referring to the Supreme Courts holding in Buckley v. Valeo that Federal Election Commissioners were
officers, in part because they were assigned the authority to bring suit against private parties, on behalf of
the federal government, to compel compliance with federal election laws. See 424 U.S. at 138.
But the
special advocate would have no such authority. She would not be

empowered to commence a lawsuit to compel compliance with federal law, let
alone to do so on behalf of the government; instead, she would merely be allowed to participate as an
Accordingly, legislation
providing for a special advocate would not raise any Appointments Clause
issue.
attorney in cases already filed in the FISC by the government itself.
Public Advocate solve best

Ombres 15 (Devon;.D. 2006 from Stetson University College of Law; L.L.M.
2013 from American University Washington College of Law; admitted in
Florida, District of Columbia, United States Court of Appeals for the 11th
Circuit, and United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. NSA
DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE FROM THE PATRIOT ACT TO THE FREEDOM ACT:
THE UNDERLYING HISTORY, CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS, AND THE EFFORTS AT
REFORM//Ritt)
Reform of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts: Introducing a Public Advocate (Mar. 21, 2014) (The
public advocate can potentially be viewed as an agent of the government and may act as a principal or
inferior officer of the United States .
The public advocate would be subject to the Article

II Appointments Clause mandates. Under Article III, it is questionable whether such an
advocate has standing to argue the "case" or "controversy" before the FISC due to the
requirement that they have been injured, are threated to suffer injury by
putatively illegal conduct, or are authorized to represent such an injured party. Likewise, Article III
generally prohibits the government from litigating against itself, and allowing the advocate to seek relief
Last, as the advocate

would not be a party or representative of a party, they may not have
standing to appeal FISC orders.); see also Andrew Nolan, Richard M. Thompson II, & Vivian Chu,
on national security issues could invade core executive branch powers.
Cong. Research Serv., Oct. 25, Introducing a Public Advocate into the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance act's
Courts: Select Legal Issues (2013); cf. Marty Lederman & Steve Vladick, The Constitutionality of a FISA
"Special Advocate," Just Security (Nov. 4, 2013, 1:34 PM), http://justsecurity.org/2873/fisa-special-
Appointments Clause arguments may be rendered

moot if the position were not permanent and the advocate was selected on a caseadvocate-constitution/ (arguing that
by-case basis, and even if they were a government employee, they would not exercise significant
government authority, and thus not fall under Appointments Clause requirements .
Likewise, the standing issue would be abrogated with properly drafted legislation by precluding the
but merely having a lawyer present, possibly

for third parties whose metadata and communications are at issue . As to appeals,
they propose legislation denoting the advocate in a role akin to a guardian ad litem , so that they
could be representative of absent third parties ). n136. See generally S. 2685, 113th
advocate from being a party to the case,
Cong. (2014).
A public advocate would ensure the FISC meets standards

and prevent future abuses
Peter Margulies, Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of
Law. B.A. 1978, Colgate University; J.D. 1981, Columbia Law School,
December 2014, Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in
Metadata and Foreign Content Collection After Snowden, HASTINGS LAW
JOURNAL Vol. 66: 1, JL @ DDI
A more institutionalized public voice at the FISC would be even more valuable
than reliance on amici curiae for two reasons.325 First, a public advocate would enhance
the reasoning in FISC decisions. Although the FISC was correct in extending a measure of
deference to the executive on the contours of the section 215 relevance standard in place at the time of
Snowdens disclosures, the FISCs reasoning left much to be desired. The 2006 FISC opinion, in particular,
The absence of analysis is

problematic. The deliberation that Hamilton extolled in Federalist No. 78 as judicial reviews hallmark
is truncated and conclusory, offering virtually no analysis.326
requires statements of reasons.327 The statement of reasons sends a useful signal to audiences for the
judges decision, conveying the judges seriousness and ongoing vigilance. In contrast, especially in the
secret loop of the pre-Snowden metadata program, a conclusory approval may send a signal to those who
have sought judicial authorization that they have more license than the court actually intends. This
dynamic may have played a role in the compliance issues that the FISC was forced to deal with in 2009.
The presence of a public advocate would prod the FISC to provide reasons for
its decisions. The advocate would receive all government requests. It would
be empowered to intervene when it believed that a matter raised novel legal
issues, or when it certified to the FISC that there was a reasonable possibility
(ten percent or greater) that the governments request failed to meet the statutory
standard. The public advocate would present the best legal and factual
arguments against the government. The court would then have to weigh the
arguments, and explain why it selected one side . The entire process also
signals to the government that compliance is a serious matter . Second, the
seriousness imposed by a public advocate would compensate for an even
bigger blind spot in the current process: the barely adequate disclosure that
the government has provided to Congress. The rogue robot explanation for
noncompliance furnished by the Justice Department in its December 2009 letter did not supply the
comprehensive self-appraisal that Congress has a right to expect.328 While the Leahy bill provides for
more transparency, the cabined deliberation characteristic of Title 50 oversight may not prove sufficiently
robust over the long haul. The work of the PCLOB, while exceptionally valuable, may also fail to completely
An institutional advocate at the FISC would supplement legislative

oversight, hedging against future deficits in disclosure to Congress . The FISC has
close the gap.
asserted that an institutionalized advocate would make section 215 authorizations too cumbersome.329
That risk is real, but manageable. The Leahy bill includes a provision permitting the government to request
information on an emergency basis without court approval,330 which the FISC also permitted pursuant to a
Over time, an advocate should fit

efficiently into FISC proceedings, minimizing delay . An advocate would not appear in the
request after President Obamas January 2014 speech.
great bulk of FISC cases, but only in those that raise important legal issues, or where the public advocate
certified to the FISC that a nonfrivolous factual question had surfaced. In those cases, the familiar analogy
to the ex parte nature of warrant requests breaks down. In the section 215 context, legal issues have
arisen precisely because the government does not have to make the showing of particularized probable
cause that it must make to obtain a warrant. The mere process of obtaining a warrant in an ordinary
criminal case eliminates the issues that have proven most controversial under section 215. In addition, if a
judge issues a warrant in an ordinary criminal case that raises substantial legal issues, that decision will be
subject to review at a criminal trial, when the defendant moves to suppress the evidence obtained
Finally, the prophylactic

effect of a public advocate would make up for any modest inconvenience .
After all, an agency that does not address compliance with the requisite
diligence ultimately causes far greater inefficiency , as the FISC discovered when it
pursuant to the warrant. In contrast, review of FISC decisions is rare.331
placed the NSA on a stern remedial regime in 2009. If the presence of an advocate deters another
compliance meltdown like the one the FISC addressed in 2009,
this innovation will be well
worth any modest inefficiencies that ensue .
Introducing a privacy advocate solves

Cetina 14 (John Cetina, Balancing Security and Privacy in 21st Century
America: A Framework for FISA Court Reform, John Marshall Law Review, h
tt p://r e posit or y . jml s . e du/l a w r e v ie w/v o l47/i s s4/15,
Summer 2014)
The first remedy involves appointing a privacy advocate whose sole duty
would be to argue against the governments warrant requests, in essence
acting as a quasi-public defender or guardian of privacy rights. 101 Such an idea is already
percolating in the House of Representatives. 1? Retired Judge James Robertson, who
formerly presided over the FISA Court, claims this is a necessary step13
because the Court has frequently been merely a proverbial rubber stamp for
surveillance requests. 104 Indeed, available literature suggests that the FISA
Court grants over 90% of the governments requests . 15 Introducing a privacy
advocate would efi'ectively force the FISA Court to consider individual
requests from both perspectives: on the one hand, the government would present
important security arguments, while the privacy advocate would focus on
potential or actual dangers to cognizable privacy interests. This system would
thereby promote equity in FISA Court proceedings and enable the public at large to
have a representative promote privacy.
Congressional Authority
Increasing Congressional authority solves
Cetina 14 (John Cetina, Balancing Security and Privacy in 21st Century
America: A Framework for FISA Court Reform, John Marshall Law Review, h
tt p://r e posit or y . jml s . e du/l a w r e v ie w/v o l47/i s s4/15,
Summer 2014)
The second proposed remedy requires additional scrutiny of judges selected to
serve on the FISA Court. The current Chief Justice of the United States , John
Roberts, selects the other eleven FISA Court judges while also sitting at the head
of that surreptitious body as its twelfth member. 16 A pending bill, the FISA Court Accountability Act
(FCAA), would fimdamentally alter FISA Court appointment and decisional
procedures. 1? The FCAA would strip the Chief Justice of some appointment power
and, instead, enable the four main congressional leaders Senate majority leader and
minority leader, House speaker and House minority leader to make some appointments. 13 The
FCAA would also grant congressional authority over certain matters, including
requiring a sixtypercent supermajority consensus on FISA Court rulings . 109 A
similar proposal would subject FISA Court judges to additional senatorial
confirmation proceedings. 11 The FCAA and the related suggestionlll
requiring a second round of senatorial confirmation would insert an attractive
balancing element that comports with the spirit of the United States government.112 With Congress
playing a more active role, the FISA Court would likely not acquiesce to every
request from the executive. Enhancing Congress's role would also make the
FISA Court indirectly accountable to public opinion and theconsequences of intervallic
democratic elections.
Transparency
Increased transparency Solves
Blum 09 (Stephanie Blum, WHAT REALLY IS AT STAKE WITH THE FISA
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 AND IDEAS FOR
FUTURE SURVEILLANCE REFORM,
http://128.197.26.36/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/pilj/vol18no2/docu
ments/18-2BlumArticle.pdf)
(Note: FAA refers to the FISA Amendments in 2008)
Law professor Banks argues that FISA was a compromise allowing secret
electronic surveillance to collect foreign intelligence, while subjecting such
applications to judicial warrants and Congressional oversight. 290 According to Banks,
this central premise of FISA has been lost by the cumulative complexi- ty of
the statute, challenges of new technology, the Bush administrations TSP program, and
the efforts to amend and curtail FISAs provisions. 291 Yet, FISAs situation
does not appear to be as dire as Banks might suggest. FISA was generally not
intended to cover international communications, even those involving U.S.
persons, if the intent was to target a foreign national overseas. It seems simply irrelevant to privacy
and liberty concerns whether the communications occur via fiber optic cable or wireless communication,
While the FAA has corrected

some of these technological anomalies with FISA, other areas are in need of
reform, such as surveillance of mere contacts with terrorists. While it is certainly
or whether the acquisition takes place domestically or overseas.
understandable that the ACLU and others fear that the FAA could result in the acquisition of vast amounts
suggests that the real issue

posed by the FAA is not so much the substantive provisions of the FAA but
rather the lack of trust in the executives who will be implementing its
provisions. If true, then, ironically, the best strategy for improving secret
surveillance may be to create a more transparent government.
of innocent communications made by U.S. persons, this Article
FISA is not transparent and not even Congress has access to all the info
Butler 13 (Alan Butler, Standing Up to Clapper: How to Increase
Transparency and Oversight of FISA Surveillance, New England Law Review,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2397949, 2013)
Congres s plays an important role in the intelligence oversight process as
well, but its oversight of FISA activity authorized under Section 702 and Section 215 is
severely limited by procedural rules imposed by the Department of Justice ( DOJ ) and
inadequate pub lic reporting. The law requires that the Attorney General keep the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 48 the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, 49 and the Senate Judiciary Committee
fully inform[ed] concerning the Government s use of FIS A. 50 However, reports
sent from the DOJ to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees impose strict rules
on the dissemination of the governme nt s legal interpretation of these
programs. 51 For example, the detailed reports on the use of Section 215 were on ly available in
Intelligence Committee offices for a limited time period, no photocopies or notes could be taken
Similar
rules likely apply to the Attorney General s r eports on significant FISA
legal interpretations 53 and the use of Section 702 authorities. 54 Public reports
regarding the extent of FISA surveillance activity give a bare minimum of
information, including only the number of applications for electronic surveillance, the number
out of the room, and only certain congressional staff members were allowed to attend. 52
granted, modified, or denied, 55 and the same information regarding reque sts for orders compelling
Unlike the Wiretap Reports issued by the Administrative

which provide a comprehensive overview of the cost, duration,
and effectiveness of surveillance in criminal invest igations, 57 the FISA reports do not
provide sufficient detail. 58 As a result, Members of Congress and the
public do not have the information they need to evaluate the efficacy and
legality of these programs.
production of business records. 56
Office of the U.S. Courts,
***ECON ADVANTAGE
I/L
Foreign Investor Loss/Data Pullout

NSA surveillance kills US companiesforeign investor
loss, data pullout
Enderle 6/12/15
(Rob, 6/12/15, CIO, US surveillance programs are killing the tech industry,
Rob is the president and principal analyst of the Enderle Group, he has
worked for IBM, Dell, Microsoft, Siemens, and Intel, MBA @ California State
University, Long Beach, http://www.cio.com/article/2934887/privacy/u-ssurveillance-programs-are-killing-the-tech-industry.html, 7/13/15, SM)
The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation , ranked as the most authoritative
science and technology think tank in the U.S. (second in the world behind Max Planck Institutes of
Germany), has just released its latest report on the impact of the existence and disclosure of the broad
initially reported that the revenue

loss range would be between $21.5 billion and $35 billion , mostly affecting U.S. cloud
service providers. However, they have gone back and researched the
impact and found it to be both far larger and far broader than
originally estimated. In fact, it appears the surveillance programs could cause a
number of U.S. technology firms to fail outright or to be forced into bankruptcy as
NSA national and international spying programs. It was
they reorganize for survival. The damage has also since spread to domestic aerospace and telephony
service providers. The programs identified in the report are PRISM; the program authorized by the FISA
Amendments act, which allowed search without the need for a warrant domestically and abroad, and
Bullrun; the program designed to compromise encryption technology worldwide. The report ends in the
following recommendations: Increase transparency about U.S. surveillance activities both at home and
abroad. Strengthen information security by opposing any government efforts to introduce backdoors in
software or weaken encryption. Strengthen U.S. mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs). Work to
establish international legal standards for government access to data. Complete trade agreements like the
Trans Pacific Partnership that ban digital protectionism, and pressure nations that seek to erect
25 percent of
companies in the UK and Canada plan to pull data out of the U.S. Of those
protectionist barriers to abandon those efforts. The 2014 survey indicates that
responding, 82 percent indicated they now look at national laws as the major deciding factor with regard to
where they put their data. Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) company Birst indicated that its European
customers are refusing to host information in the U.S. for fear of spying. Salesforce, another SaaS
Salesforce
faced major short-term sales losses and suffered a $124 million deficit in the
fiscal quarter after the NSA revelations according to the report. Cisco, the U.S. firm that
leads the networking market, reported that sales was interrupted in Brazil, China and
Russia as a result of the belief that the U.S. had placed backdoors in its networking products.
Ciscos CEO, John Chambers, tied his revenue shortfall to the NSA disclosure. Servint, a U.S. Web
company, revealed that its German insurance client pulled out of using the firm. In fact,
Hosting company, reported losing half of its international clients as a result of the NSA Disclosure.
Qualcomm, IBM, Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard have all reported significant adverse revenue impact in
Cisco, McAfee/Intel, Apple

and Citrix Systems were all dropped from the approved list for the Chinese
government as a result of the NSA disclosure. But it isnt even just tech companies that have
lost significant customers and revenues. Boeing lost a major defense contract to Saab
AB to replace Brazils aging fighter jets due to the disclosure. Verizon was dropped
by a large number German government facilities for fear Verizon would open
them up to wiretapping and other surveillance.
China from the NSA disclosure. A variety of U.S. companies including
Laundry list of companies leaving the US because of

concerns about NSA surveillance
Sprigman 14
(Christopher, 9/20/14, NYU School of Law, We Dont Hire The NSA or Federal
Prosecutors To Make U.S. Internet Policy (And Thats a Good Thing),
Christopher Sprigman is a professor of law @ New York University School of
Law, http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Christopher
%20Sprigman.pdf, 7/13/15, SM)
The American governments hunger for easy access to emails, chats and other Internet data is driving
Internet users around the world away from American Internet product and service providers. These are
Foreigners comprise nearly

70% of the users of Googles email service, Gmail. Nearly 85% of Facebook users reside
outside the U.S. And increasingly, foreigners are wary of keeping their data with U.S.-based
some of Americas most successful companies. And theyre worried.
technology companies. Were hearing from customers, especially global enterprise customers, that they
care more than ever about where their content is stored and how it is used and secured, John E. Frank,
deputy general counsel at Microsoft, told The New York Times earlier this year. Those consequences have
already started to hit home, in ways that hurt U.S. companies and destroy U.S. jobs. Back in January,
IBM said that it would be spending more than a billion

dollars to build 15 new data centers overseas. Salesforce.com announced
similar plans back in May. And, in conversations with foreign customers, U.S. computer giant
Microsoft, in its marketing to business customers, emphasizes that they can choose to
store data in Microsoft facilities located outside the U.S . The decision of IBM, Microsoft
American technology giant
and other U.S.-based tech companies to try keep their foreign users data at facilities located outside the
U.S. is motivated in part by the desire to reduce latency that is, improving the speed and responsiveness
of the service provided to foreign users by storing data closer to the customer. But the move is also
prompted at least in part, by foreign customers concerns that storing their data inside the U.S. enables
Concern over U.S. mass spying has been picked up and amplified by
foreign governments, who are eager to capitalize on the privacy concerns of
their citizens, while improving their own surveillance capabilities and
advancing the competitive interests of the EU-based technology companies
that compete with their dominant American counterparts . In June, the German
government cancelled a network infrastructure contract with Verizon , citing
U.S. spying.
fears that sourcing network infrastructure from a U.S. company would facilitate NSA spying on German
Brazil and the European Union, which had used American undersea
cables for intercontinental communication, recently decided to build their
own cables between Brazil and Portugal, and project planners shunned
American technology companies in favor of Brazilian and Spanish firm s.
Brazil also announced plans to abandon Microsoft Outlook for its own email
system that uses Brazilian data centers . Telenor, Norways largest telecom provider,
halted its plans to move its customers to a U.S.-based cloud provider. The Wall
citizens.
Street Journal recently reported that AT&Ts desired acquisition of the European company Vodafone is in
danger due to the companys seemingly willing cooperation with the NSAs data-collection programs. And
last year, leading Internet infrastructure provider Cisco Systems reported a 12 percent slump in its sales in
the developing world that the company suggested was connected to the NSA revelations.
NSA surveillance costs US companies more than expected and

serves a justification for protectionist policies
Walker 6/9/15 (Lauren, staff writer and reporter at Newsweek covering
technology, national security and foreign affairs, previously worked on award winning
teams at Al Jazeera English and Al Jazeera America, NSA Surveillance May Cost U.S.
Tech Companies More than $35 Billion, http://www.newsweek.com/nsa-surveillancemay-cost-us-tech-companies-more-35-billion-341168// rck)
the NSAs massive surveillance machine it didnt

just make Americans distrust the U.S. governmentit also impelled foreigners to shy away
from U.S.-made technologies. The result appears to be costly. In fact, a new report
Two years ago, when Edward Snowden exposed
from the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), a Washington, D.C., think tank, says the
agencys pervasive digital surveillance will likely cost U.S. companies more than $35 billion in foreign
business by 2016. The report says Snowdens revelations about surveillance and subsequent reports about
government spying have caused the U.S. tech industry to underperform. It also
says that U.S. policymakers made things worse by advocating for weaker information security practices
instead of moving to quell consumers fears. The
economic impact of U.S. surveillance

practices will likely far exceed ITIFs initial $35 billion estimate, the report says. Foreign
companies have seized on these controversial policies to convince their customers that
keeping data at home is safer than sending it abroad, and foreign
governments have pointed to U.S. surveillance as justification for
protectionist policies that require data to be kept within their borders. The U.S.
tech sector is a massive, immensely profitable industry. But the loss of business is likely part of the reason
why U.S. tech giants such as Apple and Google added stronger encryption technology to their services. To
lessen the blow to sales, ITIF has a series of recommendations for policymakers, including increasing
government transparency about surveillance, adding better information security policies and strengthening
international agreements on government access to data.
NSA surveillance hurts the economy and undercuts

relations it scares away foreign customers and justifies
protectionism.
Chang 15 (Lulu; 6/10; tech reporter; Digital Trends, NSAs surveillance programs may be costing
the tech industry up to $35 billion in lost revenue http://www.digitaltrends.com/web/spying-is-expensivensa-surveillance-program-may-cost-more-than-35-billion/)
If privacy rights werent reason enough to curb the NSAs surveillance program, the economic implications
According to the Information

Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), a Washington DC-based think tank, the
NSAs programs is hitting the country where it really hurts its collective
of the program may offer an even more compelling argument.
pocketbook, by costing U.S. tech companies up to $35 billion in foreign business by 2016. This may be the
most persuasive ammunition to date for critics of the NSAs programs. According to the report, The
economic impact of U.S. surveillance practices will likely far exceed ITIFs
initial $35 billion estimate. Foreign companies have seized on these
controversial policies to convince their customers that keeping data at home
is safer than sending it abroad, and foreign governments have pointed to U.S.
surveillance as justification for protectionist policies that require data to be
kept within their borders. This is particularly concerning considering the
current profitability and success of the American tech industry, with
companies like Facebook, Google, and Apple leading the way . Of course, Facebook
and Google have come under intense scrutiny of their own when it comes to data protection and privacy
rights, but problems at the federal level still outpace those of individual corporations. ITIF also included a
number of recommendations in its report on how to avoid these potentially catastrophic losses for the tech
industry, urging the American government to step up transparency when it comes to surveillance,
implementing improved information security policies, and strengthening international agreements that
seek to protect consumer privacy. Study authors Daniel Castro and Alan McQuinn warned, When
historians write about this period in US history it could very well be that one of the themes will be how the
United States lost its global technology leadership to other nations.
To protect not only
American soft power, but our wallets as well, ITIF is urging the NSA to make a
change.
NSA surveillance kills econChina

Whittaker 15 (Zack Whittaker, It's official: NSA spying is hurting the US
tech economy, February 25th, 2015, http://www.zdnet.com/article/anotherreason-to-hate-the-nsa-china-is-backing-away-from-us-tech-brands/)
China is no longer using high-profile US technology brands for state
purchases, amid ongoing revelations about mass surveillance and hacking by
the US government. A new report confirmed key brands, including Cisco, Apple, Intel, and McAfee
-- among others -- have been dropped from the Chinese government's list of authorized brands, a Reuters
report said Wednesday. The number of approved foreign technology brands fell by a
third, based on an analysis of the procurement list. Less than half of those companies with security
products remain on the list.Although
a number of reasons were cited, domestic

companies were said to offer "more product guarantees" than overseas rivals
in the wake of the Edward Snowden leaks. Some reports have attempted to
pin a multi-billion dollar figure on the impact of the leaks.In reality, the figure
could be incalculable The report confirms what many US technology companies have been saying
for the past year: the activities by the NSA are harming their businesses in crucial
growth markets, including China. The Chinese government's procurement list changes coincided
with a series of high profile leaks that showed the US government have been on an international mass
surveillance spree, as well as hacking expeditions into technology companies, governments, and the
Concerned about backdoors implanted by the

NSA, those revelations sparked a change in Chinese policy by forcing Western
technology companies to hand over their source code for inspection . That led to
personal cellphones of world leaders.
an outcry in the capital by politicians who in the not-so-distant past accused Chinese companies of doing
The fear is that as the China-US cybersecurity standoff

continues, it's come too late for Silicon Valley companies, which are already
suffering financially thanks to the NSA's activities.
exactly the same thing.
Tech Competitiveness
NSA kills US tech competitivenesscreates opportunity
for foreign firms to gain the lead
Enderle 6/12/15
NSA surveillance hurts U.S., creates opportunity for competing foreign firms This has created
significant opportunity for foreign firms competing with U.S. firms . For instance,
Hortensecurity (Germany) now markets itself as Cloud Services Made in
Germany and safe from the NSA. Cloudwatt (France) has joined a nationalistic
consortium of companies called Sovereign Cloud (cool name) and advertises as
being resistant to NSA spying. F-Secure, which competes with Dropbox and
Microsoft OneDrive, has altered its marketing to include the language that
they will not share data with the U.S. government as they move against these U.S.
firms. Additional findings include broad protectionist measures in a variety of regions using this disclosure
to lock U.S. firms out of the country and favor local firms and the creation of anti-U.S. technology
governments are aggressively funding domestic startups

that can replace U.S. companies in their country . Australia, China, Russia, and
India have passed laws making it illegal for personal information to be stored
out of the country making it far more difficult for U.S. firms to do business
networks. In addition, the
there. China further launched an IOE movement to prevent banks from buying from IBM, Oracle and EMC.
The NSA is an advanced persistent threat to American

companies that continually drives down the tech sector
Robbins 14 (Carla Anne, former editor and reporter for the New York Times and
Wall Street Journal, is a clinical professor of national security studies at Baruch
College and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations at Bloomberg
business, How to Be Friends With the NSA Again, July 14,
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-07-03/nsa-tech-industry-must-makenice-to-ensure-web-security// rck)
For years the tech sectorwith its libertarian streakwasnt sure why it should sully itself with
Washington, a town where the BlackBerry (BBRY) still rules. Microsoft (MSFT) began seriously lobbying only
after it ran into antitrust problems in the mid-1990s. Google set up a single lobbyist in the capital in 2005,
policymaking and regulatory activity in

Washington, D.C., affect Google and our users more every day. Last year the
tech sector was the fourth-largest spender on D.C. lobbying, a few million dollars behind
explaining on a company blog that it seems that
the oil and gas industry. The Snowden scandal only confirmed techs suspicions about the government.
there is a lot we still dont know about

relations between the NSA and American companies , including how much personal
More than a year after the Snowden leaks began,
data was voluntarily shared by the tech sector and the more accommodating telecommunications
Allied governments
and foreign companies believe the worst. On June 26, Germany announced it
would not renew a contract with Verizon (VZ) over concern that the company could not keep
providers, and how much came from the NSAs hacking into companies data.
Afraid of losing overseas markets, tech leaders have

become increasingly vocal about their frustration and their intention to
challenge Washington on every issue. Late last year, Brad Smith, Microsofts general
counsel, described government snooping as an advanced persistent threat
data from the U.S. government.
techspeak that was once reserved for the most sophisticated kinds of Chinese hacking. After reports in
March that the NSA had masqueraded as a Facebook (FB) server to hack into an unknown number of
computers, Chief Executive Officer Mark Zuckerberg called President Obama to protest. He then vented his
our engineers work tirelessly to improve security, we

imagine we are protecting you against criminals, not our own government.
anger in a Facebook post, writing, When
Absent restrictions, surveillance will undermine our long

term tech competitiveness.
Arce 15 (Nicole; 6/10/15; journalist for the Tech Times, Effect Of NSA Spying On US Tech Industry:
$35 Billion? No. Way More http://www.techtimes.com/articles/59316/20150610/effect-of-nsa-spying-on-ustech-industry-35-billion-no-way-more.htm)
Two years ago, the industry-funded think tank Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF)
estimated that the NSA surveillance would cost cloud computing companies such as Microsoft, Amazon
and IBM somewhere around $21.5 billion to $35 billion in lost revenue due to the Snowden revelations.
However, privacy and security concerns continue to grow well into 2015, and ITIF says the figure could be
the U.S. tech

industry as a whole, not just the cloud computing sector, has underperformed as a result of the Snowden revelations," say [pdf] Daniel Castro and Alan McQuinn, authors
far more than its early estimate of $35 billion. "Since then, it has become clear that
of a new ITIF report. "Therefore, the economic impact of U.S. surveillance practices will likely far exceed
ITIF cites a string of financial reports by technology

companies and cloud providers showing disappointing earnings and lowerthan-expected sales figures, with only Apple making considerable headway
overseas with its growing iPhone market in China. The foundation says the
dismal figures are partly a result of customers who are increasingly turning to
local providers over fears that the NSA will claw its way into their private
information via U.S. firms. Foreign governments, which were expending
significant amounts of money to invest in IT, are turning away and
encouraging their citizens to patronize local providers. Russia , for instance, has
passed a new law requiring all tech firms operating within its borders to store
information about their customers in servers located within the Russian
territory, a requirement that forces companies to spend more as they
decentralize operations and build new data centers. France and Germany also
have a similar law, forcing Amazon to build new facilities in Frankfurt and Microsoft in Vienna,
while China, India and Australia have their own data localization laws. China ,
in particular, has extreme conditions for U.S. tech companies by requiring them
to provide access to valuable intellectual property, such as source code . To
make matters worse, U.S. lawmakers are not helping as they fail to create new laws
that scale back government surveillance, which "sacrifices robust
competitiveness of the U.S. tech sector for vague and unconvincing promises of improved
ITIF's initial $35 billion estimate."
national security," says ITIF. President Barack Obama recently signed into law a bill ending the NSA's bulk
collection of telephone metadata, but ITIF says the agency has several other surveillance programs in
place that need to be reformed. PRISM, for instance, allows the NSA to obtain private data about a
customer in the U.S. or abroad without the need for a warrant, while Bullrun aims to undermine encryption
standards. "In
the short term, U.S. companies lose out on contracts, and over the
long term, other countries create protectionist policies that lock U.S.
businesses out of foreign markets," says ITIF. "This not only hurts U.S. technology
companies but costs American jobs and weakens the U.S. trade balance ."
Tech Leadership
NSA kills US tech leadershiploss of tech industry, tools,
and weapons
Enderle 6/12/15
Government surveillance might just cripple and eliminate U.S. tech dominance The report
concludes that these changes taken in total will cripple and could virtually eliminate U.S.
dominance in technology internationally. While it doesnt address what U.S. companies are
doing, it is likely many of them are looking at U.S. tech companies adversely because of the
double hit of both the spying program and the inability to adequately secure
either the information about the program itself or information in general (thus
the information that was captured is also at risk). The irony here is that if the U.S. loses the
technology industry and it moves to Asia and Europe the U.S. spy agencies
will lose virtually all of their spying digital capability anyway, or it will drop to the same
level as a non-tech third-world country, because they wont be able to force the foreign firms to give them
they will also lose the capability to develop

leading tech-based tools and weapons as those skills also migrate out of the
U.S. So, in a foolish effort to make the country safer, not only is the collateral damage unacceptable to
the U.S. economy it will likely result in a dramatically reduced intelligence capability. This is a level of
self-correction the U.S. might not recover from.
inside access.
It could also be noted that
$180 Billion Lost

NSA surveillance expected to hurt companies by as much
as $180 billion
Rodriguez 2/17/15
(Salvador, 2/17/15, IBT, NSA Equation Fallout: Experts Say Damage to US
Tech Firms Could Top $180B, Salvador Rodriguez is a Silicon Valley
Correspondent for the International Bussiness Times, previously covered
technology for the LA Times, http://www.ibtimes.com/nsa-equation-falloutexperts-say-damage-us-tech-firms-could-top-180b-1819264, 7/13/15, SM)
Since whistleblower Edward Snowden came out two years ago with revelations of widespread
American businesses have been negatively impacted as

countries around the globe lose their trust U.S.-made tech. Qualcomm, IBM,
Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard have been among companies whove reported
diminished sales in China as a result. In Brazil, Boeing missed out on a $4.5 billion
jet contract due to the NSAs activities. The total damage to American
tech businesses could amount to as much as $180 billion , according to an
estimate by Forrester Research's James Staten. This will most certainly have a long-term
impact on the brands of the companies involved -- Seagate, Toshiba, and Western Digital -- at
cyberespionage by the NSA,
the very least tainting their products as suspicious, said Jim Gregory, chairman of Tenet, a brand
innovation and marketing firm. Their corporate brand will be impacted and the damage will last from
three to five years depending on how actively they manage the crisis.
Surveillance will cost $180 billion NSA-proof products

are stealing the Asian and European markets and regional
networks will undercut global efficiency.
Swartz 14 (Jon; 2/28/14; tech reporter; USA Today, NSA surveillance hurting tech firms' business
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/02/27/nsa-resistant-products-obama-tech-companies-encryptionoverseas/5290553/)
SAN FRANCISCO It used to be that tech titans such as Cisco Systems and IBM could bank on fertile
markets in Asia and Europe in their quest for worldwide financial domination. Not so much anymore.
The
National Security Agency, and revelations about its extensive surveillance operations
sometimes with the cooperation of tech firms have undermined the ability of many U.S.
companies to sell products in key foreign countries, creating a fissure with the
U.S. government and prompting some to scramble to create "NSA-resistant"
products. The fallout could cost the tech industry billions of dollars in
potential contracts, which has executives seething at the White House. "Suspicion of U.S.
vendors is running at an all-time high ," says Andrew Jaquith, chief technology officer at
cloud-security firm SilverSky. Cisco, IBM, Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard have reported
declines in business in China since the NSA surveillance program was
exposed. The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation estimates the NSA imbroglio will cost
U.S. businesses $22 billion through 2016. Forrester Research pegs potential losses at
$180 billion, which includes tech firms and managed service providers The conflagration took on
political tones this month when German Chancellor Angela Merkel whose mobile phone was
tapped by U.S. spy agencies said she would press France President Francois
Hollande to back a push for EU-based alternatives to the current U.S.-
dominated Internet infrastructure. "We'll talk with France about how we can maintain a high
level of data protection," Merkel said in her weekly podcast in mid-February. "Above all, we'll talk with
European providers that offer security for our citizens, so that one shouldn't have to send e-mails and
Disclosures that
the NSA routinely cracked encryption, or data-scrambling, technology has
heightened the anxiety of industry leaders. But in their pursuit of NSA-proof
products, they've alarmed some intelligence officials, who argue that without
the ability to break encryption and create "back doors" to enter computer
systems abroad, the USA would be disarming at a moment of heightened
cyberconflict. During a speech on NSA reforms on Jan. 17, President Obama angered tech leaders
other information across the Atlantic." The situation is more combustible at home.
when he did not embrace two recommendations by a panel he appointed to review the surveillance that
are of pressing concern to Silicon Valley and the business community. It had recommended the NSA "not in
any way subvert, undermine, weaken or make vulnerable" commercial software, and that it move away
Many
tech companies feel they have no choice but to try to develop NSA-resistant
products because customers from China to Germany threaten to boycott
American hardware and cloud services they view as compromised . It's already
happening, with large corporate deals either lost or in danger of falling by the wayside. The United
Arab Emirates is threatening to scrap a $926 million intelligent-satellite deal
with two French firms unless they remove U.S.-built components . The UAE fears
the equipment would contain digital backdoors that compromise the security of data. About 25% of
300 British and Canadian businesses surveyed by Canadian cloud firm Peer 1
Hosting said they intend to move their computer-hosting operations out of
the U.S. While Internet service providers question the practicalities of how e-mail between the U.S. and
other countries would work in such an undefined new service suggested by Merkel, American tech
companies caution secure regional networks would fragment the Internet . With
from exploiting flaws in software to conduct cyberattacks or surveillance. NSA-resistant products
the exception of Microsoft which says it will let overseas customers have personal data stored on
servers outside the U.S. tech companies such as Facebook and Google have opposed such private
Regional data systems could Balkanize the Internet and

undercut its efficiency. Because they are not U.S. companies, "larger telecoms in Europe
can rapidly take advantage of the situation ," to the detriment of a Google, Yahoo and
European clouds. Their fear:
Dropbox, says Eric Cowperthwaite, vice president of advanced security and strategy at Core Security.
Tech Credibility
Backdoor technology makes foreign companies unwilling
to work with the USkills tech credibility
Holmes 13
(Allan, 9/10/13, BloombergBusiness, NSA Spying Seen Risking Billions in U.S.
Technology Sales, Director of Technology and Telecommunications @
Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-10/nsa-spyingseen-risking-billions-in-u-s-technology-sales, 7/13/15, SM)
Sept. 10 (Bloomberg) -- A congressional committees effective blacklisting of Huawei Technologies Co.s
products from the U.S. telecommunications market over allegations they can enable Chinese spying may
the National Security Agency persuaded some U.S.

technology companies to build so-called backdoors into security products,
networks and devices to allow easier surveillance are similar to how the House
come back to bite Silicon Valley. Reports that
Intelligence Committee described the threat posed by China through Huawei. Just as the Shenzhen, China-
the NSA
disclosures may reduce U.S. technology sales overseas by as much as $180
billion, or 25 percent of information technology services, by 2016 , according to
Forrester Research Inc., a research group in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The National Security
Agency will kill the U.S. technology industry singlehandedly , Rob
based Huawei lost business after the report urged U.S. companies not to use its equipment,
Enderle, a technology analyst in San Jose, California, said in an interview. These companies may be just
Internet
companies, network equipment manufacturers and encryption tool makers
receive significant shares of their revenue from overseas companies and
governments. Cisco Systems Inc., the worlds biggest networking equipment maker , received
42 percent of its $46.1 billion in fiscal 2012 revenue from outside the U.S.,
dealing with the difficulty in meeting our numbers through the end of the decade.
according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Symantec Corp., the biggest maker of computer-security
software based in Mountain View, California, reported 46 percent of its fiscal 2013 revenue of $6.9 billion
from markets other than the U.S., Canada and Latin America. Intel Corp., the worlds largest
semiconductor maker, reported 84 percent of its $53.3 billion in fiscal 2012 revenue came from outside the
U.S., according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
NSA surveillance has tarnished the reputation of the US

tech industrythat causes foreign customers to abandon
US companies
Holmes 13
(Allan, 9/10/13, BloombergBusiness, NSA Spying Seen Risking Billions in U.S.
Technology Sales, Director of Technology and Telecommunications @
Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-10/nsa-spyingseen-risking-billions-in-u-s-technology-sales, 7/13/15, SM)
Tarnished Reputations An Information Technology and Innovation Foundation
report in August found U.S. providers of cloud services -- which manage the
networks, storage, applications and computing power for companies -- stand
to lose as much as $35 billion a year as foreign companies, spooked by the
NSAs surveillance, seek non-U.S. offerings. Customers buy products and
services based on a companys reputation, and the NSA has single-
handedly tarnished the reputation of the entire U.S. tech industry,

said Daniel Castro, the reports author and an analyst with the non-partisan
research group in Washington, in an e-mail. I suspect many foreign
customers are going to be shopping elsewhere for their hardware and
software.
Tech credibility is not zero-sumas US businesses fail,

foreign companies report substantial growth
Kehl et al 14 (Danielle Kehl is a Policy Analyst at New Americas Open
Technology Institute (OTI). Kevin Bankston is the Policy Director at OTI, Robyn
Greene is a Policy Counsel at OTI, and Robert Morgus is a Research Associate
at OTI, New Americas Open Technology Institute Policy Paper, Surveillance
Costs: The NSAs Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity,
July 2014, rck)
Trust in American businesses has taken a significant hit since the initial reports on the
PRISM program suggested that the NSA was directly tapping into the servers of nine U.S. companies to
obtain customer data for national security investigations.28 The Washington Posts original story on the
program provoked an uproar in the media and prompted the CEOs of several major companies to deny
knowledge of or participation in the program.29 The exact nature of the requests made through the PRISM
program was later clarified,30 but the public attention on the relationship between American companies
especially in industries where users

entrust companies to store sensitive personal and commercial data. Last years
national security leaks have also had a commercial and financial impact on
American technology companies that have provided these records, noted Representative
and the NSA still created a significant trust gap,
Bob Goodlatte, a prominent Republican leader and Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, in May
2014. They
have experienced backlash from both American and foreign

consumers and have had their competitive standing in the global
marketplace damaged.31 Given heightened concerns about the NSAs ability to access data
stored by U.S. companies, it is no surprise that American companies offering cloud
computing and webhosting services are among those experiencing the most
acute economic fallout from NSA surveillance. Within just a few weeks of the first
disclosures, reports began to emerge that American cloud computing companies like Dropbox and
Amazon Web Services were starting to lose business to overseas
competitors.32 The CEO of Artmotion, one of Switzerlands largest offshore hosting providers,
reported in July 2013 that his company had seen a 45 percent jump in revenue since the
first leaks,33 an early sign that the countrys perceived neutrality and strong data and
privacy protections34 could potentially be turned into a serious competitive
advantage.35 Foreign companies are clearly poised to benefit from growing
fears about the security ramifica- tions of keeping data in the United States. In a survey of 300 British
and Canadian businesses released by PEER 1 in January 2014,36 25 percent of respondents indicated that
they were moving data outside of the U.S. as a result of the NSA revelations. An overwhelming number of
the companies surveyed indicated that security and data privacy were their top concerns, with 81 percent
stating that they want to know exactly where their data is being hosted. Seventy percent were even
willing to sacrifice performance in order to ensure that their data was protected.37
Data Localization
Foreign data localization and regulations make it harder
for US companies to conduct business abroad
Kehl 14
(Danielle, 7/31/14, Slate, How the NSA Hurts Our Economy, Cybersecurity,
and Foreign Policy,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/07/31/usa_freedom_act_update
_how_the_nsa_hurts_our_economy_cybersecurity_and_foreign.html, 7/13/15,
SM)
Snowden disclosures have accelerated data
localization and data protection proposals from foreign governments that are
looking for greater national control over their citizens info . These proposals
could create significant economic and technological hurdles for
American businesses: Its both more expensive and more difficult to house
servers in specific countries in order to comply with data localization laws .
Beyond the dollars and cents, the
Whats more, mandatory data localization policies can have a negative impact on Internet freedom and the
protection of human rights in countries that do not have strong local protections against surveillance. In
disclosures could broadly undermine the entire U.S. Internet

Freedom agenda, which was a key component of American foreign policy under Secretary of State
fact, the Snowden
Hillary Clinton.
Foreign countries and companies are localizing data and

seeking alternatives to US vendorsGermany and France
prove
Swartz 14
(Jon, 2/28/14, USA Today, NSA surveillance hurting tech firms' business,
Silicon Valley-based tech reporter @ USA Today,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/02/27/nsa-resistant-productsobama-tech-companies-encryption-overseas/5290553/, 7/13/15, SM)
The National Security Agency, and revelations about its extensive surveillance operations sometimes with the cooperation of tech firms have
undermined the ability of many U.S. companies to sell products in key foreign
countries, creating a fissure with the U.S. government and prompting some to scramble to create "NSAresistant" products. The fallout could cost the tech industry billions of dollars in potential contracts, which has executives seething at the White
House. "Suspicion of U.S. vendors is running at an all-time high ," says Andrew Jaquith, chief
technology officer at cloud-security firm SilverSky. Cisco, IBM, Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard have
reported declines in business in China since the NSA surveillance program
was exposed. The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation estimates the NSA imbroglio will cost U.S. businesses $22 billion through 2016. Forrester
Research pegs potential losses at $180 billion, which includes tech firms and managed service providers
The conflagration took on political tones this month when
Angela Merkel whose mobile phone was tapped by U.S. spy agencies said she would press
France President Francois Hollande to back a push for EU-based alternatives
to the current U.S.-dominated Internet infrastructure . "We'll talk with France
about how we can maintain a high level of data protection ," Merkel said in her weekly podcast in midFebruary. "Above all, we'll talk with European providers that offer security for our citizens,
German Chancellor
so that one shouldn't have to send e-mails and other information across the
Atlantic."
Alternative Products
NSA kills the US economyforeign customers will look for
alternatives to US products in emerging markets
Benner 14
(Katie, 12/19/14, BloombergView, Microsoft and Google in a Post-Snowden
World, Katie Benner is a columnist @ BloombergView reporting on
companies, culture, and technology,
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-12-19/microsoft-and-google-ina-postsnowden-world, 7/13/15, SM)
China intends to replace hardware and software
made by Microsoft, Cisco, IBM, Intel and Hewlett-Packard with homegrown
operating systems and networking equipment by 2020 . For those trying to calculate
Yesterday, Bloomberg reported that
the impact of all of this, it's good to keep in mind that it's costly and hard to rip out and replace an entire IT
stack that you've come to depend on over a long period of time. Simply doing it invites disruption and
glitches and all of the things we've come to hate when technological processes go awry. But its the sort of
thing that a semi-state run economy like China's can implement, even if it stymies production.
the move reflects a harsh reality for U.S. tech companies : They
earned leadership positions worldwide by making the best hardware and
software, and now global politics could obliterate the advantages created by
superior innovation and high-quality products. Most overseas corporations wont up and
abandon U.S. tech companies since they cant afford to rebuild their
businesses from the ground up. But as Bloomberg has reported, potential clients
with new projects overseas will likely look for alternatives to the
U.S. technology suppliers. Tech projects in emerging markets are
growing at a faster rate than those in developed markets, where
infrastructure is already entrenched. Brazil has already said that it can build a $185
million submarine data cable without U.S. help. Revelations about parts of the NSA
surveillance program could cause the U.S. cloud computing industry to lose $35
billion of business by 2016 (about 20 percent of the potential revenues from foreign markets), according
to a report from the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation. Forrester Research thinks that NSA
spying could cost the U.S. tech industry as much as $180 billion by 2016 because
surveillance worries will affect non-cloud companies too - and domestic
customers will want to bypass vendors perceived to be feeding data to the
government.
Nevertheless,
International Cooperation
NSA surveillance undermines US companiesdamages
international cooperation
Benner 14
(Katie, 12/19/14, BloombergView, Microsoft and Google in a Post-Snowden
World, Katie Benner is a columnist @ BloombergView reporting on
companies, culture, and technology,
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-12-19/microsoft-and-google-ina-postsnowden-world, 7/13/15, SM)
privacy concerns have already caused big
companies like IBM, Salesforce.com and Amazon to move forward with plans to build
more overseas data centers. Microsoft is trying to beat back the tide. Last week it appealed a
New York judge's order forcing the company to give the U.S. government
customer information that's stored overseas in a data center in Ireland . The
Even if tech companies dont lose customers right away,
Department of Justice wants emails and other personal information that belong to a person connected to a drug trafficking
investigation. Since the data is housed in one of Microsofts Irish data centers, the company contends that the U.S.
governments domestic search warrant lacks jurisdiction. Microsoft argues that it may violate European privacy laws if it
hands over the information, and it would certainly make foreign nations and individuals think twice about using Microsoft
for cloud-based storage. About 30 tech and media giants filed briefs in support of Microsoft, along with dozens of trade
associations and academics. Many of the companies, including Amazon, Apple, AT&T and Verizon, have large cloud
computing operations or have access to lots of user information. One brief that was filed jointly by Verizon, Cisco, H-P,
eBay, Salesforce.com and Infor (and is representative of the arguments made by all of the companies that are taking
The District Courts decision allowing the U.S. government to

demand the disclosure of the contents of customer communications (as opposed to
Microsofts own business records) stored in overseas data centers is extraordinarily sweeping in its
Microsofts side) says:
scope and impact. It affects not only the e-mail service at issue in the case, but a host of other communication services,
will expose American businesses to

legal jeopardy in other countries and damage American businesses
economically. It will upset our international agreements and undermine
international cooperation. And it will spur retaliation by foreign governments,
which will threaten the privacy of Americans and non-Americans alike .
data storage providers, and technology companies. It
Datacenters
NSA surveillance forces companies to spend billions of
dollars on datacenters abroadIBM proves
Kontzer 14
(Tony, 1/23/14, Network Computing, IBM Spends $1.2 Billion On New Cloud
Datacenters, former senior editor @ InformationWeek where he covered
tech, writes for CIO Insight, Baseline, and Investors Business Daily,
http://www.networkcomputing.com/data-centers/ibm-spends-$12-billion-onnew-cloud-datacenters/d/d-id/1234641, 7/13/15, SM)
IBM plans to invest $1.2 billion in the coming year to build out its network of cloud
datacenters in an effort to put computing resources closer to customers. IBM has been rolling out an
aggressive cloud strategy the past couple of years, and it spent $2 billion last summer to acquire cloud
IBM said
last week that it would add 15 new datacenters to its cloud arsenal by the
end of 2014, bringing to 40 the total number of datacenters it will have to
support customers' cloud environments. The company wants to spread its geographic
infrastructure provider SoftLayer -- a commitment this newest investment clearly targets.
footprint, and much of the planned expansion will focus on adding data centers in international markets,
including Hong Kong, London, Mexico City, and Sydney. The new data centers will primarily provide
Infrastructure-as-a-Service, enabling IBM to extract maximum value from the SoftLayer deal. Dennis Quan,
IBM's VP of cloud infrastructure services, said during a phone interview that the move is intended to do two
things: Help customers better contend with regulatory compliance requirements by enabling them to keep
data within the countries they operate in, and ensure that their apps are more reliable. "By placing data
centers in more countries around the world, we're much more able to meet these needs and enable our
customers to keep data in country," Quan said. On the first front, having more data centers geographically
closer to clients would allow those companies to satisfy local regulations requiring that personal data be
it also will give them more options for

storing data outside of the U.S., and thus away from the prying eyes
of the National Security Agency -- an important consideration ever since contractor
retained within a country's borders. But
Edward Snowden leaked documents detailing the NSA's far-reaching surveillance tactics. And even though
giving customers more flexibility in

where they store their data, and shielding them from unwelcome snooping -- are
intertwined. "The concerns about data locality are real," Eric Hanselman, chief
IBM is distancing itself from that topic, the two goals --
analyst at 451 Research, said via email. "The NSA revelations arent causing a sudden dash for the exits.
The reality of what it takes to get into and out of a datacenter is that it just cant happen that quickly. But it
is a major concern that is shaping decisions that are being made today." Major enough that a recent
one in four companies in the UK and

Canada is moving data out of the U.S. to dodge the NSA 's surveillance efforts. In such
an environment, having cloud data centers in as many international
locations as possible clearly is an advantage.
survey by co-location provider Peer 1 found that
Backdoors
The NSAs backdoors and sinking credibility kills US
businesses in crucial growth marketsChinese
authorization proves
Whittaker 2/25/15 (Zach, writer-editor for ZDNet, business technology news
website published by CBS Interactive, along with TechRepublic and SmartPlanet, and
sister sites CNET and CBS News, It's official: NSA spying is hurting the US tech
economy, http://www.zdnet.com/article/another-reason-to-hate-the-nsa-china-isbacking-away-from-us-tech-brands// , rck)
China is no longer using high-profile US technology brands for state

purchases, amid ongoing revelations about mass surveillance and hacking by
the US government. A new report confirmed key brands, including Cisco, Apple,
Intel, and McAfee -- among others -- have been dropped from the Chinese
government's list of authorized brands, a Reuters report said Wednesday. The number of
approved foreign technology brands fell by a third , based on an analysis of the
procurement list. Less than half of those companies with security products remain on the list. Although a
domestic companies were said to offer "more product

guarantees" than overseas rivals in the wake of the Edward Snowden leaks.
Some reports have attempted to pin a multi-billion dollar figure on the impact of the
leaks. In reality, the figure could be incalculable. The report confirms what many US
technology companies have been saying for the past year: the activities by the NSA are
harming their businesses in crucial growth markets , including China.
number of reasons were cited,
The Chinese government's procurement list changes coincided with a series of high profile leaks that
showed the US government have been on an international mass surveillance spree, as well as hacking
expeditions into technology companies, governments, and the personal cellphones of world leaders.
Concerned about backdoors implanted by the NSA, those revelations sparked

a change in Chinese policy by forcing Western technology companies to hand
over their source code for inspection. That led to an outcry in the capital by
politicians who in the not-so-distant past accused Chinese companies of doing exactly the same thing.
From encrypted instant messengers to secure browsers and operating systems, thees privacy-enhancing
The fear is that as the

China-US cybersecurity standoff continues, it's come too late for Silicon Valley
companies, which are already suffering financially thanks to the NSA's
activities. Microsoft said in January at its fiscal fourth-quarter earnings that China "fell short" of its
apps, extensions, and services can protect you both online and offline.
expectations, which chief executive Satya Nadella described as a "set of geopolitical issues" that the
company was working through. He did not elaborate. Most recently, HP said on Tuesday at its fiscal firstquarter earnings call that it had "execution issues" in China thanks to the "tough market" with
increasing competition from the local vendors approved by the Chinese government. But one company
stands out: Cisco probably suffered the worst of all. Earlier this month at its fiscal second-quarter earnings,
the networking giant said it took a 19 percent revenue ding in China, amid
claims the NSA was installing backdoors and implants on its routers in transit.
China remains a vital core geography for most US technology giants with a global reach. But until some
middle-ground can be reached between the two governments, expect Silicon Valley's struggles in the
country to only get worse.
NSA surveillance decimates Internet productivitycreates

backdoors for hackers and hurts the economy
Global Research 2/18/15 (news articles, commentary, background
research and analysis on a broad range of issues, focusing on social, economic,
strategic and environmental issues. The Global Research website was established on
the 9th of September 2001, two days before the tragic events of September 11.
Barely a few days later, Global Research had become a major news source on the
New World Order and Washingtons war on terrorism. Since September 2001, we
have established an extensive archive of news articles, in-depth reports and analysis
on issues which are barely covered by the mainstream media,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/5-ways-mass-surveillance-is-destroying-the-useconomy/5432031//, rck)
Moreover, surveillance hampers the free flow of information as many people

begin to watch what they say. The free flow of information is a core
requisite for a fast-moving economy especially an information
economy, as opposed to economies focused on resource-extraction or
manufacturing. As quoted above, the White House states: Assuring the free
flow of information [is] essential to American and global economic
prosperity, security, and the promotion of universal rights. Mass
surveillance makes people more reluctant to share information
and thus hurts the economy. 4. Mass Surveillance Hurts Productivity: Top
computer and internet experts say that NSA spying breaks the functionality of
our computers and of the Internet. It reduces functionality and reduces
security by for example creating backdoors that malicious hackers can get
through. Remember, American and British spy agencies have intentionally
weakened security for many decades. And its getting worse and worse. For
example, they plan to use automated programs to infect millions of
computers. How much time and productivity have we lost in battling viruses
let in because of the spies tinkering? How much have we lost because their
computer programs conflict with our programs? Microsofts general counsel
labels government snooping an advanced persistent threat, a term
generally used to describe teams of hackers that coordinate cyberattacks for
foreign governments. It is well-known among IT and security professionals
that hacking decreases employee productivity. While theyre usually referring
to hacking by private parties, the same is likely true for hacking by
government agencies, as well. And the spy agencies are already collecting
millions of webcam images from our computers. THATS got to tie up our
system resources so we cant get our work done as fast. Moreover, the
Snowden documents show that the American and British spy agencies
launched attacks to disrupt the computer networks of hacktivists and
others they dont like, and tracked supporters of groups such as Wikileaks.
Given that the spy agencies are spying on everyone, capturing millions of
screenshots, intercepting laptop shipments, creating fake versions of popular
websites to inject malware on peoples computers, launching offensive cyberwarfare operations against folks they dont like, and that they may view
journalism, government criticism or even thinking for ones self as terrorism
and tend to re-label dissidents as terrorists its not unreasonable to

assume that all of us are being adversely effected to one degree or another
by spy agency operations. Bill Binney the high-level NSA executive who
created the agencys mass surveillance program for digital information, a 32year NSA veteran widely regarded as a legend within the agency, the
senior technical director within the agency, who managed thousands of NSA
employees tells Washingtons Blog: The other costs involve weakening
systems (operating systems/firewalls/encryption). When they do that, this
weakens the systems for all to find. Hackers around the world as well as
governments too. These costs are hard to count. For example, we hear of
hackers getting customer data over and over again. Is that because of what
our government has done? Or, how about all the attacks on systems in
government? Are these because of weakened systems?
Backdoors are a major threat to the economy

CSI 15 (Counter Surveillance Intelligence, NY Bank Regulator: Third Party
Vendors Are a Backdoor to Hackers, April 29th, 2015,
http://www.cybersecurityintelligence.com/blog/-ny-bank-regulator-third-partyvendors-are-a-backdoor-to-hackers-242.html)
Benjamin M. Lawsky,
Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial

Services (NYDFS), released a report warning banks that insufficient security at
third-party vendors could provide a backdoor for hackers to gain access to
critical systems and pilfer sensitive financial information. A banks cyber security is often only as
good as the cyber security of its vendors. Unfortunately, those third-party firms can provide a
backdoor entrance to hackers who are seeking to steal sensitive bank
customer data, Lawsky said. Financial institutions rely on third-party vendors for
a broad-range of services, ranging from law firms to companies contracted to maintain HVAC
systems, and those vendors often have access to a banks information
technology networks, providing a potential point of entry for hackers as was seen in the Target
breach. NYDFS conducted a survey of 40 banks, including many of the largest institutions it regulates,
examining the security standards those firms have in place in regards to their third-party vendors.
Among other findings, the NYDFS report uncovered that nearly 1 in 3 banks surveyed do not require their
I am
deeply worried that we are soon going to see a major cyber attack aimed at
the financial system that is going to make all of us to shudder. Cyber hacking
could represent a systemic risk to our financial markets by creating a run or
panic that spills over into the broader economy , Lawsky. We are concerned
that within the next decade, or perhaps sooner, we will experience an
Armageddon-type cyber event that causes a significant disruption in the
financial system for a period of time.
third-party vendors to notify them of cyber security breaches, NYDFS said in a statement.
Spillover
International backlash from foreign markets heavily
affects US cloud computing industryspills over to other
sectors
Kehl et al 14 (Danielle Kehl is a Policy Analyst at New Americas Open
Technology Institute (OTI). Kevin Bankston is the Policy Director at OTI, Robyn
Greene is a Policy Counsel at OTI, and Robert Morgus is a Research Associate
at OTI, New Americas Open Technology Institute Policy Paper, Surveillance
Costs: The NSAs Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity,
July 2014, rck)
It appears that little consideration was given over the past decade to the potential economic repercussions
if the NSAs secret programs were revealed.38 This failure was acutely demonstrated by the Obama
Administrations initial focus on reassuring the public that its programs primarily affect non-Americans,
non-Americans are also heavy users of American companies

products. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg put a fine point on the issue, saying that the
government blew it in its response to the scandal. He noted sarcasti- cally: The government
even though
response was, Oh dont worry, were not spying on any Americans. Oh, wonderful: thats really helpful to
companies [like Facebook] trying to serve people around the world, and thats really going to inspire
parts of the
American technology industry are particularly vulnerable to international backlash
since growth is heavily dependent on foreign markets . For example, the U.S. cloud
confidence in American internet companies.39 As Zuckerbergs comments reflect, certain
computing industry has grown from an estimated $46 billion in 2008 to $150 billion in 2014, with nearly 50
percent of worldwide cloud-computing revenues coming from the U.S.40 R Street Institutes January 2014
policy study concluded that in the next few years, new products and services that rely on cloud computing
will become increasingly pervasive. Cloud
computing is also the root of development

for the emerging generation of Web-based applicationshome security, outpatient care, mobile payment, distance learning, efficient energy use and
driverless cars, writes R Streets Steven Titch in the study. And it is a research area where the
United States is an undisputed leader.41 This trajectory may be dramatically altered ,
however, as a consequence of the NSA s surveillance programs. Economic forecasts after the
Snowden leaks have predicted significant, ongoing losses for the cloud-computing industry in the next few
and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) estimated

could cost the American cloud computing
years. An August 2013 study by the Information Technology

that revelations about the NSAs PRISM program
industry $22 to $35 billion over the next three years.42 On the low end, the ITIF projection
suggests that U.S. cloud computing providers would lose 10 percent of the foreign market share to
European or Asian competitors, totaling in about $21.5 billion in losses; on the high-end, the $35 billion
figure represents about 20 percent of the companies foreign market share. Because the cloud computing
industry is undergoing rapid growth right nowa 2012 Gartner study predicted global spending on cloud
computing would increase by 100 percent from 2012 to 2016, compared to a 3 percent overall growth rate
in the tech industry as a whole43vendors in this sector are particularly vulnerable to shifts in the market.
Failing to recruit new customers or losing a competitive advantage due to exploitation by rival companies
in other countries can quickly lead to a dwindling market share. The ITIF study further notes that the
percentage lost to foreign competitors could go higher if foreign

governments enact protectionist trade barriers that effectively cut out U.S.
providers, citing early calls from German data protection authorities to suspend the U.S.-EU Safe
Harbor program (which will be discussed at length in the next section).44 As the R Street Policy Study
highlights, Ironically, the NSA turned the competitive edge U.S. companies have in cloud computing into
a liability, especially in Europe.45
Innovation
Surveillance destroys innovationthats key to economic growth
Creativity A Prime Driver of Prosperity Requires Privacy . The Information and

Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada Ann Cavoukian, Ph.D. noted recently: Privacy is Essential to
Innovation, creativity and the resultant prosperity of a

society requires freedom; Privacy is the essence of freedom: Without privacy, individual human
rights, property rights and civil liberties the conceptual engines of innovation and
creativity, could not exist in a meaningful manner; Surveillance is the
antithesis of privacy: A negative consequence of surveillance is the usurpation of a
persons limited cognitive bandwidth, away from innovation and creativity. The
Prosperity and Well-Being.
Financial Post reported last year: Big Brother culture will have adverse effect on creativity, productivity.
Christopher Lingle visiting professor of economics at ESEADE, Universidad Francisco Marroqun agrees
creativity is a key to economic prosperity. Edward Snowden points out: The

success of economies in developed nations relies increasingly on their
creative output, and if that success is to continue we must remember that creativity is the product of
curiosity, which in turn is the product of privacy. Silicon Valley is currently one of the
largest drivers of the U.S. economy. Do you think Bill Gates and Steve Jobs could have
that
tinkered so creatively in their garages if the government had been watching everything they do? Everyone
who has every done anything creative knows that you need a little privacy to try different things before
youre ready to go public with it. If your bench model, rough sketch or initial melody is being dissected in
real time by an intrusive audience youre not going to be very creative. And see this.
Privacy
Plummeting US credibility destroys privacythats key to
the economy
Trust is KEY for a prosperous economy. Its hard to trust when your government, your
internet service provider and your favorite websites are all spying on you. The destruction of privacy by
the NSA directly harms internet companies, Silicon Valley, California and the entire U.S.
economy (Facebook lost 11 millions users as of April mainly due to privacy concerns and that was before
the Snowden revelations). If people dont trust the companies to keep their data private, theyll use foreign
companies. And destruction of trust in government and other institutions is destroying our economy. A top
If privacy is not protected while performing mass

surveillance for national security purposes, then the peoples level of trust in
the government decreases. We noted in 2012: Personal freedom and liberty and freedom
from the arbitrary exercise of government power are strongly correlated with a healthy
economy, but America is descending into tyranny. Authoritarian actions by the government interfere
with the free market, and thus harm prosperity . U.S. News and World Report notes: The
cyber security consultant points out:
Fraser Institutes latest Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report is out, and the news is not good for
the United States. Ranked among the five freest countries in the world from 1975 through 2002, the United
States has since dropped to 18th place. The Cato institute notes:
The United States has
plummeted to 18th place in the ranked list, trailing such countries as Estonia, Taiwan, and Qatar.
Actually, the decline began under President George W. Bush. For 20 years the U.S. had consistently ranked
as one of the worlds three freest economies, along with Hong Kong and Singapore. By the end of the Bush
presidency, we were barely in the top ten. And, as with so many disastrous legacies of the Bush era,
Barack Obama took a bad thing and made it worse. But the American government has shredded the
constitution, by spying on all Americans, and otherwise attacking our freedoms. Indeed, rights won in
1215 in the Magna Carta are being repealed. Economic historian Niall Ferguson notes, draconian
national security laws are one of the main things undermining the rule of law :
We must pose the familiar question about how far our civil liberties have been eroded by the national
security state a process that in fact dates back almost a hundred years to the outbreak of the First World
War and the passage of the 1914 Defence of the Realm Act. Recent debates about the protracted
detention of terrorist suspects are in no way new. Somehow its always a choice between habeas corpus
and hundreds of corpses. Of course, many of this decades national security measures have not been
taken to keep us safe in the post-9/11 world indeed, many of them [including spying on Americans]
And America has been in a continuous declared state of

national emergency since 9/11, and we are in a literally never-ending state of
perpetual war. See this, this, this and this. So lawlessness infringement of our liberty is destroying our
prosperity. Put another way, lack of privacy kills the ability to creatively criticize bad
government policy and to demand enforcement of the rule of law. Indeed, 5,000 years of history
started before 9/11.
shows that mass surveillance is always carried out to crush dissent. In other words, mass surveillance is
the opposite of the principle of the rule of law (in distinction to the rule of men) upon which America was
founded. Free speech and checks and balances on the power of government officials are two of the main
And a strong rule of law is in turn the main

determinant of GDP growth.
elements of justice in any society.
Cybercrime/Cyberspying
Cybercrime is hugely costly for small businesses
Viuker 15 (Steve Viuker, Cybercrime and hacking are even bigger worries
for small business owners, The Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jan/21/cybersecurity-smallbusiness-thwarting-hackers-obama-cameron, January 21st, 2015)
Cybercrime. It was the talk of Washington at President Obamas 2015 State of
the Union, adding one more city to the world tour of technological fear:
London, New York, Los Angeles, Paris. Even though the Charlie Hebdo attacks
on the French capital were physical in nature, serious cases of cybercrime
were reported soon after. In an effort to stymie these attacks, President
Obama and Britains Prime Minister Cameron recently announced a joint
cybergames war test. And while much of focus has been on attacks on
Target, JPMorgan Chase and Sony, small businesses are far from immune.
Hackers targeted 19,000 French websites soon after the terror attacks.
According to Arbor Networks, France was the target of 1,070 denial of service
attacks. (In 2011, hackers breached the PlayStation network, resulting in a
shutdown for several weeks. The cost to Sony was $170m.) A report from
McAfee found almost 90% of small- and medium-sized business in the US do
not use data protection for company and customer information, and less than
half secured company email to prevent phishing scams. This is an expensive
mistake. Cybercrime and cyberspying cost the US economy $100bn a year
and the global economy about $300bn annually, according to the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. According to PwC, the average cost of a
firms worst security breach is rising significantly. For small businesses, the
worst breaches cost between 65,000 and 115,000 on average; for large
firms, the damage is between 600,000 and 1.15m.
Impact
Global economic collapse cause global war
Royal 10 [Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of
Defense, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in
Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213214]
Less intuitive is how periods of
economic decline may increase the likelihood of
external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of
economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been
considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins
rhythms in the
global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power
and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such,
exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution
of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances,
increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively
certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for
conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999).
(2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that
Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the
likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections
between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's
'future expectation of trade' is a

significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security
behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so
long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future
trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for
conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to
those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade
expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third,
others have considered the link between economic decline and
external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002)
find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict,
particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal
(1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that
and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal
presence of a recession tends to

amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts selfreinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been
linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004),
conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the
which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the
"Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing

unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have
increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally
around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find
popularity of a sitting government.
supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller
the tendency towards diversionary

tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that
(1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that
democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen
periods of weak economic performance in the

United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to
(2000) has provided evidence showing that
an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic
integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship
links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and
national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured
prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.
Economic collapse causes competition for resources and

instability that escalates and goes nuclear
Harris and Burrows, 9 [counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal
drafter of Global Trends 2025, **member of the NICs Long Range Analysis Unit Revisiting the Future:
Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis, Washington Quarterly,
http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf]
Increased Potential for Global Conflict
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a
number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample
opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive
While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be

repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on
fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and
on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason
to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth
century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could
grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as
than ever.
they would be if change would be steadier.

In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as
resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorisms appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the
Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the
diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the worlds most dangerous capabilities within their
reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups
inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct
selfradicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic
downturn.
sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become
The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S.

military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Irans acquisition
of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states
in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers,
acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is
not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great
powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes
of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and
The close proximity

of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable
Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning
of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short
warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place
more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to
escalating crises.
broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established.
Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over

resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is
a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity
will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy
supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem
assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of
Maritime security
concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as Chinas and
their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications.
Indias development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward,
one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to
increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for
multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East,
cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in
more dog-eat-dog world.
And, U.S. technological leadership is on the brink its an

existential risk
Hummell et al 2k12
(Robert Hummel, PhD1,*, Policy Research Division, Potomac
Institute for Policy Studies,, Patrick Cheetham1, Justin Rossi1,
Synesis: A Journal of Science, Technology, Ethics, and Policy 2012
US Science and Technology Leadership, and Technology Grand
Challenges, pg online
@http://www.synesisjournal.com/vol3_g/Hummel_2012_G1439.pdf //um-ef)
Taken together, there is no direct evidence that the US has been overtaken in quality of S&T output, and most indications support the notion that
leads the world in
the US
science and technology in all fields However,

.
the trends are not favorable to maintenance of this position,

and it seems likely that in some fields, USleadership could falter. When such cross-over might
occur, or in what fields, and whether it is inevitable, is uncertain. DoD policy implications While a gradual decline in US
S&Tleadership does not provide a Sputnik moment (65),ix it poses no less of
threat When tech
an existential
innovations occur inpotentially adversarial

countries or domains, a strategy that relies on
technological superiority for defensecapabilities will no longer
suffice. If a potential adversary can introduce a disruptive
.
nical
technological capability, they can then use deterrence or

influence to control behaviors, compete
economically, securescarce resources, and control
diplomatic agendas The US strategy continues to depend on
technologicalsuperiority. Thus from a DoD perspective, it is imperative that the US
maintain its position of technological leadership. A Senate Armed Services Committee
(subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities) hearing on the Health and Status of the Defense Industrial Base and its S&T-related elements (66)xi took place in
May 2011, and highlighted some of the issues and potential solution paths. Those testifying called for a comprehensive strategy for the US to maintain technological
leadership well into the 21st century. Many other specific suggestions were made during that hearing as to ways to support the industrial base and to assist the
partnership of DoD and the defense industrial base to utilize technology advances efficiently. Future prospects Many remedies have been proposed to ensure continued US
technology leadership, in the face of challenges and stresses within the US S&T enterprise. Some of the typical concerns are overall funding levels, DoD funding for S&T,
the efficiency of the application of funds to S&T, and the emphasis of disciplines within S&T. Other concerns include regulations and impediments to research in S&T,
and the production rate of scientists and the career opportunities. We have noted many of these issues in our survey of elements of the S&T enterprise. The larger concern
is over the respect in which science and technology is held within our society. Since research is an intermediate product, often accomplished years before product and
societal benefits, there is often little appreciation of the role of the researcher and inventor. After World War II, there was great respect afforded scientists, particularly
physicists. Post-Sputnik, there was a deliberate effort to elevate the stature of science and technology, and the manned space program certainly contributed to societal
respect. Some argue that it is because there has been a precipitous off-shoring of manufacturing that the generation of new ideas has moved overseas (67). Andy Grove of
as manufacturing moves overseas, American

companies lose the knowledge of how to scale up new ideas to full-scale
production (68). Both arguments suggestthere are reduced incentives for domestic research
as manufacturing moves elsewhere, and lead to the conclusion that research is best performed by those with familiarity of
product production. Thus, they argue that we need to reinvigorate manufacturing and
production for economic vitality so that technology development and
leadership will follow. And, indeed, the nation has an Advanced Manufacturing Initiative, and many cite a resurgence of domestic
Intel makes a complementary argument: That
manufacturing as incentives normalize to less favor off-shoring. Summing up the landscape The US has the best universities, the most winners of the Nobel Prize, the best
can it be that the US is

apparently losing its lead in science and technology? The answer
isnt that the US has slowed down, although according to some the rate of technical progress has, indeed, slowed. The
fact is that the competition has discovered the importance of innovation, and has
begun to reap rewards from speeding up. We have seen that China especially
is mustering its considerable resources to develop what they call an
innovation economy, but that other nations, as well as Europe, highly value
science and engineering, andimplicitly or tacitly have begun to
challenge US technology leadership. At the same time, the globalization of research
and ease with which international science collaborations take place mean
that continued US leadership requires full engagement with the international
scientific community. Thus, impediments to exchange of information and bureaucracy in the conduct of US research are counterproductive. According to Bill Gates, you always have to renew your lead.xii The US has the resources and
infrastructure necessary to maintain and renew a lead in technology.
But momentum is not sufficient. In light of concerted efforts in other nations, coasting in science
and technology will jeopardize national security, and also jeopardize the
economic and societal benefits of being first to market with technological
innovations. No single agency or entity within the United States can enact a strategy to renew the technology lead. Instead, continued US technical
young scientists, and the largest investment in research and development of any nation on earth. So how
leadership will require a dedicated and coordinated effort throughout the society.
AT
Tech Leadership On the Brink

U.S. technological leadership is on the brink its an
existential risk
Hummell et al 2k12
(Robert Hummel, PhD1,*, Policy Research Division, Potomac
Institute for Policy Studies,, Patrick Cheetham1, Justin Rossi1,
Synesis: A Journal of Science, Technology, Ethics, and Policy 2012
US Science and Technology Leadership, and Technology Grand
Challenges, pg online
@http://www.synesisjournal.com/vol3_g/Hummel_2012_G1439.pdf //um-ef)
Taken together, there is no direct evidence that the US has been overtaken in
quality of S&T output, and most indications support the notion that the US
leads the world in science and technology in all fields. However, the trends
are not favorable to maintenance of this position, and it seems likely that in
some fields, US leadership could falter. When such cross-over might occur, or
in what fields, and whether it is inevitable, is uncertain. DoD policy
implications While a gradual decline in US S&T leadership does not provide a
Sputnik moment (65),ix it poses no less of an existential threat. When
technical innovations occur in potentially adversarial countries or domains, a
strategy that relies on technological superiority for defense capabilities will
no longer suffice. If a potential adversary can introduce a disruptive
technological capability, they can then use deterrence or influence to control
behaviors, compete economically, secure scarce resources, and control
diplomatic agendas The US strategycontinues to depend on
technological superiority. Thus from a DoD perspective, it is imperative that
the US maintain its position of technological leadership. A Senate Armed
Services Committee (subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities)
hearing on the Health and Status of the Defense Industrial Base and its S&Trelated elements (66)xi took place in May 2011, and highlighted some of the
issues and potential solution paths. Those testifying called for a
comprehensive strategy for the US to maintain technological leadership well
into the 21st century. Many other specific suggestions were made during that
hearing as to ways to support the industrial base and to assist the
partnership of DoD and the defense industrial base to utilize technology
advances efficiently. Future prospects Many remedies have been proposed to
ensure continued US technology leadership, in the face of challenges and
stresses within the US S&T enterprise. Some of the typical concerns are
overall funding levels, DoD funding for S&T, the efficiency of the application
of funds to S&T, and the emphasis of disciplines within S&T. Other concerns
include regulations and impediments to research in S&T, and the production
rate of scientists and the career opportunities. We have noted many of these
issues in our survey of elements of the S&T enterprise. The larger concern is
over the respect in which science and technology is held within our society.
Since research is an intermediate product, often accomplished years before
product and societal benefits, there is often little appreciation of the role of
the researcher and inventor. After World War II, there was great respect
afforded scientists, particularly physicists. Post-Sputnik, there was a
deliberate effort to elevate the stature of science and technology, and the
manned space program certainly contributed to societal respect. Some argue
that it is because there has been a precipitous off-shoring of manufacturing
that the generation of new ideas has moved overseas (67). Andy Grove of
Intel makes a complementary argument: That as manufacturing moves
overseas, American companies lose the knowledge of how to scale up new
ideas to full-scale production (68). Both arguments suggest there are reduced
incentives for domestic research as manufacturing moves elsewhere, and
lead to the conclusion that research is best performed by those with
familiarity of product production. Thus, they argue that we need to
reinvigorate manufacturing and production for economic vitality so that
technology development and leadership will follow. And, indeed, the nation
has an Advanced Manufacturing Initiative, and many cite a resurgence of
domestic manufacturing as incentives normalize to less favor off-shoring.
Summing up the landscape The US has the best universities, the most
winners of the Nobel Prize, the best young scientists, and the largest
investment in research and development of any nation on earth. So how can
it be that the US is apparently losing its lead in science and technology? The
answer isnt that the US has slowed down, although according to some the
rate of technical progress has, indeed, slowed. The fact is
that the competition has discovered the importance of innovation, and has
begun to reap rewards from speeding up. We have seen that China especially
is mustering its considerable resources to develop what they call an
innovation economy, but that other nations, as well as Europe, highly value
science and engineering, and implicitly or tacitly have begun to challenge US
technologyleadership. At the same time, the globalization of research and
ease with which international science collaborations take place mean that
continued US leadership requires full engagement with the international
scientific community. Thus, impediments to exchange of information and
bureaucracy in the conduct of US research are counter-productive. According
to Bill Gates, you always have to renew your lead.xii The US has the
resources and infrastructure necessary to maintain and renew a lead in
technology. But momentum is not sufficient. In light of concerted efforts in
other nations, coasting in science and technology will jeopardize national
security, and also jeopardize the economic and societal benefits of being first
to market with technological innovations. No single agency or entity within
the United States can enact a strategy to renew the technology lead. Instead,
continued US technical leadership will require a dedicated and coordinated
effort throughout the society.
Cloud Computing Industry Key

Surveillance will hurt the cloud computing industry worst
because its young that will undercut our
competitiveness.
Castro 13 (Daniel; August; Vice President of the Information Technology and Innovation
Foundation and Director of the Center for Data Innovation, U.S. Secretary of Commerce appointed Castro
to the Commerce Data Advisory Council, formerly at GAO, SEC, FDIC; The Information Technology &
Innovation Foundation, How Much Will PRISM Cost the U.S. Cloud Computing Industry?
http://www2.itif.org/2013-cloud-computing-costs.pdf)
The United States has been the leader in providing cloud computing services
not just domestically, but also abroad where it dominates every segment of the market. In
the 2013 Informa Cloud World Global Insights survey, 71 percent of respondents (of which only 9
percent were from North America) ranked the United States as the leader in cloud
computing usage and innovation.1 In this same survey, nine out of ten respondents
linked cloud computing to their countrys economic competitiveness. But
other countries are trying to play catch-up to the United States early
success. Of the $13.5 billion in investments that cloud computing service
providers made in 2011, $5.6 billion came from companies outside North
America. 2 Even national governments are helping to bankroll these efforts to combat U.S. market
leadershipFrance, for example, invested 135 million in a joint venture in cloud computing.3 At stake is a
the global enterprise public cloud

computing market will be a $207 billion industry by 2016 .4 Europeans in
particular are trying to edge out their American competitors, and they are
enlisting their governments to help. Jean-Francois Audenard, the cloud security advisor to
significant amount of revenue. As shown in figure 1,
France Telecom, said with no small amount of nationalistic hyperbole, Its extremely important to have the
governments of Europe take care of this issue because if all the data of enterprises were going to be under
the control of the U.S., its not really good for the future of the European people.5 And governments have
begun to respond. In a 2012 policy document titled Unleashing the Potential of Cloud Computing in
the European Commission (EC) called for a number of steps to promote

cloud computing adoption in Europe, including creating pan-European technical standards,
Europe,
EU-wide certification for cloud computing providers, and model contract language.7 The Europeans are
quite frank about their intentions. The EC notes this strategy is about building a new industry, and better
competing against the United States in particular.8 Gartner estimates that in Western Europe alone the
cloud computing market will be $47 billion by 2015, and the EC estimates that European cloud computing
While much of this projected growth

was until recently up for grabs by U.S. companies, the disclosures of the
NSAs electronic surveillance may fundamentally alter the market dynamics .
providers stand to gain 80 billion in revenue by 2020.9
Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for Digital Affairs, stated the problem quite succinctly, If European
cloud customers cannot trust the United States government, then maybe they won't trust U.S. cloud
providers either. If I am right, there are multibillion-euro consequences for American companies. If I were
The impact
of PRISM on U.S companies may be particularly acute because cloud
computing is a rapidly growing industry. This means that cloud computing
vendors not only have to retain existing customers, they must actively recruit
new customers to retain market share. Global spending on cloud computing is
expected to grow by as much as 100 percent between 2012 and 2016 , whereas
an American cloud provider, I would be quite frustrated with my government right now.10
the global IT market will only grow by 3 percent.11 If U.S. companies lose market share in the short term,
this will have long-term implications on their competitive advantage in this new industry. Rival countries
have noted this opportunity and will try to exploit it. One tactic they used before the PRISM disclosures was
to stoke fear and uncertainty about the USA PATRIOT Act to argue that European businesses should store
data locally to protect domestic data from the U.S. government.12 Reinhard Clemens, CEO of Deutsche
Telekoms T-systems group, argued in 2011 that creating a German or European cloud computing
certification could advantage domestic cloud computing providers. He stated, The Americans say that no
matter what happens Ill release the data to the government if Im forced to do so, from anywhere in the
world. Certain German companies dont want others to access their systems. Thats why were wellpositioned if we can say were a European provider in a European legal sphere and no American can get to
them.13 And after the recent PRISM leaks, German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich declared publicly,
whoever fears their communication is being intercepted in any way should use services that don't go
through American servers.14 Similarly, Jrg-Uwe Hahn, a German Justice Minister, called for a boycott of
U.S. companies.15 After PRISM, the case for national clouds or other protectionist measures is even easier
to make.
[WAITING FOR GENERIC] Tech K2 US Econ

Technology key to the global economy
Ranis 11 (Gustav; Technology and Human Development Gustav Ranis
ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER YALE UNIVERSITY leading development
economist and the Frank Altschul Professor Emeritus of International
Economics at Yale University.//Ritt)
There can be little doubt that technology both in its process and quality
dimensions when combined with human development makes a critically
important contribution to economic growth which in turn leads to
advances in human development as a societys bottom line achievement. In a
1997 STICERD article Development Thinking at the Beginning of the 21st
Century Amartya Sen endeavored to distinguish between human progress
by dint of BLAST, i.e., achieved in Blood, Sweat and Tears, also known as
savings and investment, and GALA, human advancement via the
enhancement of capabilities generated by a combination of human
development and technology (Sen, 1997). BLAST itself has, of course,
become less tearful over time as the Harrod-Domar world of constant
proportions yielded to Solows substitutability among inputs and the newly
recognized sizable unexplained technology residual responsible for GDP
growth. This exogenous technology change was indeed for some time seen as
a measure of our ignorance and the holy grail to be incorporated into ever
more sophisticated macroeconomic growth models. More recently, the advent
of the new growth theory of Lucas (1988), Romer (1990) et al. meant that
technology change has been endogenized and linked up more closely to
education, health and other such inputs, i.e., approaching human
development. But the objective remains GDP growth, which, in turn, leads to
the bottom line, i.e. further improvements in human development. What I
intend to accomplish in this paper is, in the first instance, focus on the role of
technology, in combination with human development, in generating the
growth needed for further increases in human development. This relationship
between 4 technology and human development is an intensive one, running
through growth as a critical instrument and to human development as the
bottom line output. There are really two channels to be considered here. The
first runs from economic growth to human development and is fueled by
household and government expenditures, heavily influenced by the role of
technology in converting household and government allocations of savings
into advances in education, health and other dimensions of human
development. This production function contains a role for technology in
converting BLAST inputs into GALA outputs but it is not yet terribly well
understood. A good deal of research has, of course, been done on the subject
tracing the impact of single investments such as education expenditures
coming out of economic growth by the state and the family on literacy or
completed primary schooling. But the joint impact of interactions among
education, health and nutrition inputs, etc., in generating human
development advances is still far from fully understood. It has thus far proved
difficult to determine exactly how technology change affects human

development. We know that per capita income affects life expectancy levels
and nutrition, etc., and that human development is positively affected by
household and government expenditures on health and education. However,
as much research, including that of Behrman (1990), has pointed out, there
are many interrelated inputs, including home-schooling, home health inputs,
the distribution of income as well as the relevance of household
characteristics, plus alternative ways in which the public sector is organized,
all of which makes it difficult to get a good fix on this production function. It
reminds one of the problem encountered in earlier years, in determining
agricultural sector productivity change, given multiple quantitative and
qualitative inputs and the somewhat mysterious role of technology
in converting expenditures on agricultural inputs into agricultural productivity
achievements.
US Competitiveness k2 Global Econ

US competitiveness is key to the global economy
Porter and Rivkin 12 (Michael Porter and Jan W. Rivkin, The Looming
Challenge to U.S. Competitiveness, Harvard Business Review,
https://hbr.org/2012/03/the-looming-challenge-to-us-competitiveness)
Competitiveness is not a zero-sum game, in which one country can advance only if others
lose. Long-term productivityand, along with it, living standardscan improve
in many countries. Global competition is not a fight for a fixed pool of
demand; huge needs for improving living standards are waiting to be met around the world.
Productivity improvements in one country create new demand for goods and
services that firms in other countries can pursue. Greater productivity in, say, India can
lead to higher wages and profits there, boosting demand for pharmaceuticals from New Jersey and
Spreading innovation and productivity improvement

allows global prosperity to grow. Because the global economy is not a zerosum game, the decline of American competitiveness is a problem not only for
the U.S. The global economy will be diminished if its largest national economy
is weak, ceases to be an engine of innovation, and loses its influence in
shaping a fair and open global trading system.
software from Silicon Valley.
US Competition spurs economy

Baily 08 (Martin Baily and Matthew Slaughter, Strengthening US
Competitiveness in the Global Economy,
http://www.pegcc.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/pec_wp_strengthening_120908a.pdf)
provided the dollar stays at a
competitive level, there is a tremendous opportunity for US companies and
workers . p roduction, profits and jobs in sec - tors that either export or
compete with imports can be increased, looking both at goods and services in - dustries.
t hat opportunity has to be seized, however, for there is no guarantee that the actual trade
deficit will fall in line with the prediction of Figure 1. t here must be an adequate supply
of trained and skilled workers, and companies must build their technology
bases and production. Just as important, there is a challenge to restore an adequate level of
Despite these caveats there is an important lesson to be drawn:
saving in the US economy. It may be hard intuitively to connect the trade deficit with the level of saving
in the economy, but in fact they are strongly related. t he trade deficit has been financed by a large
inflow of capital to the U.S. and any reduction in the trade deficit will have to be sustained by an increase
in the national rate of savingor else by a reduction in national investment, which is not a desirable
outcome.
[WAITING FOR GENERIC] US Econ k2 Global

Econ
[WAITING FOR GENERIC] Yes War
***TERRORISM ADVANTAGE
Note
You probably shouldnt read this if you know theyre going to read a Terror DA.
1AC
Terrorism threat highcyberattack, recruitment
Bennett and Viebeck 5/17/15
(Cory, Elise, 5/17/15, The Hill, Isis preps for cyber war,
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/242280-isis-preps-for-cyber-war,
7/10/15, SM)
Islamic terrorists are stoking alarm with threats of an all-out cyber crusade
against the United States, and experts say the warnings should be taken seriously. Hackers
claiming affiliation with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) released a video Monday
vowing an electronic war against the United States and Europe and
claiming access to American leadership online . Praise to Allah, today we extend on
the land and in the Internet, a faceless, hooded figure said in Arabic. We send this message to America
and Europe: We are the hackers of the Islamic State and the electronic war has not yet begun. The video
received ridicule online for its poor phrasing and the groups apparent inability to make good on its cyber
threat this week. But as hackers around the world become more sophisticated, terrorist groups are likely
to follow their lead and use the same tools to further their ends, experts said. Its
only really a
matter of time till we start seeing terrorist organizations using cyberattack
techniques in a more expanded way, said John Cohen, a former
counterterrorism coordinator at the Department of Homeland Security . The
concern is that, as an organization like ISIS acquires more resources financially, they will
be able to hire the talent they need or outsource to criminal organizations ,
Cohen added. I think theyre probably moving in that direction anyway. Military officials agree. NSA
Director Adm. Michael Rogers this week called the pending shift a great concern and something that we
pay lots of attention to. At what point do they decide they need to move from viewing the Internet as a
source of recruitment [to] viewing it as a potential weapon system? Rogers asked. While ISIS has been
widely recognized for its social media prowess, the growing computer science talent of its recruits has
mostly gone unnoticed. A
number of individuals that have recently joined the movement

of ISIS were folks that studied computer science in British schools and European universities,
said Tom Kellermann, chief cybersecurity officer at security firm Trend Micro, who said ISISs cyber
capabilities are advancing dramatically. Even the man reportedly responsible for a
number of the brutal ISIS beheadings, dubbed Jihadi John by his captives, has a computer science
degree, Kellermann said. The burgeoning online threat posed by Islamic extremists was part of the
motivation for a new security pact announced Thursday between the White House and Gulf states. In
addition to securing infrastructure and providing cyber training, U.S. officials will also work with partner
Part of the danger of

the ISIS threat is the groups ability to marshal attacks from its sympathizers ,
states to expand joint exercises that involve the potential for cyber warfare.
generating a diffuse and unconnected network that is hard to track. Kellermann said the video threats this
week were a call to arms more than anything, meant to incite individuals to act on their own. It has
actually added a new dimension to the terrorist threat that our counterterrorism approach is not intended
or designed to pick up on, Cohen said. So far, supporters have focused on distributed denial-of-service
attacks, spear phishing campaigns and hijacking legitimate websites to push malware, creating what are
known as watering holes. For example, if you go to an ISIS website and download their videos, you
better recognize most of those websites are watering holes, Kellermann said. [They are] basically trying
to attack you while youre watching that video. Experts think radical hackers are likely to expand this
tactic to mainstream websites and powerful companies websites as a way to gather information on
targets. Theyre beginning to conduct more and more counterintelligence, Kellermann said. The ISIS's
use of the Internet has been described as unprecedented for a terrorist group, and lawmakers are growing
increasingly concerned about U.S. attempts to counter its rhetoric online. Sen. Cory Booker (D-N.J.)
recently criticized U.S.-led online campaigns against radicalization as laughable, saying he was
stunned by the efforts lack of sophistication. Jen Weedon, threat intelligence manager at security
researcher FireEye, said these concerns are understandable. Part of the reason why theres a belief that
these emissaries are so savvy is because there's a sense of people not feeling that they're in control of the
message, she said. Most of ISISs current online power lies in its messaging, experts say, and not in its
ability to hack real computer networks. But a handful of high-profile intrusions point toward its aspirations
ISIS
affiliates or sympathizers. The so-called Cyber Caliphate took over the Twitter and YouTube
accounts for the U.S. Central Command in January and the Twitter account for
Newsweek magazine in February. Then, the next month, the so-called Islamic State Hacking Division
posted the personal details of 100 U.S. military personnel supposedly involved in
attacks on ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Kill them in their own lands, behead them in their own homes, stab
as a hacking group. Almost every month of 2015 has been punctuated by some online attack by
them to death as they walk their streets thinking they are safe, the group urged supporters. In April, a
French TV station was knocked offline in perhaps the best example of terrorists abilities. It seemed to be
of a broader scale than we had seen previously, Weedon said. There were a number of facets to that
attack, and they also took the station offline for quite awhile. That seemed to me to be of a different
magnitude. Some worry the next step is inevitable within the year. Kellermann has noticed an uptick in
ISIS activity on the cyber arms bazaar, the massive underground dark Web market run out of Eastern
Europe that traffics in almost every form of cyber sabotage imaginable. By
the end of 2015,

going to hear about significant attacks that were pulled off
by sympathizers of ISIS.
Kellermann said, were
NSA surveillance has not stopped a single terrorist attack

no evidence
Friedersdorf 5/19/15
(Conor, 5/19/15, The Atlantic, The Last Defenders of the NSA,
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/the-last-defenders-forthe-phone-dragnet/393581/, 7/16/15, SM)
To illustrate the ongoing threat of terrorism, he begins his article by referencing the Islamists killed while
trying to attack Pamella Gellers cartoon contest, noting that while they were quickly shot dead, There
may not be heavy security in place the next time ISIS attacks. While true, whats more relevant is that
the phone dragnet did nothing to help prevent the attack even though it was
very much operational, just as it failed to stop the Tsarnaev brothers before
they attacked Boston. In both cases no more lives wouldve been lost without it. The pesky,
rather inconvenient fact is that the government's mass surveillance programs
operating under Section 215 of the Patriot Act have never stopped an act of
terrorism, the ACLU notes. That is not the opinion of the NSA's most ardent critics, but rather the
findings of the president's own review board and the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board. This program has had over a decade to prove its
value, and yet there is no evidence that it has helped identify a terrorism
suspect or made a concrete different in the outcome of a counterterrorism
investigation. Yet Fred Fleitzs article disputes this, claiming that the Section 215 program has
been a successful tool in stopping terrorist attacks, pointing to Senator Dianne Feinsteins claim that this
program had helped stop terrorist plots to bomb the New York City subways, the New York stock exchange,
and a Danish newspaper. Lets take those cases one by one. The New York City Subway The
Associated Press investigated Najibullah Zazis failed attempt to bomb the New York City subway. The news
organization concluded that in the rush to defend the surveillance programs government officials have
changed their stories and misstated key facts of the Zazi plot. For example, they left out this hugely
important detail: The
email that disrupted the plan could easily have been

intercepted without PRISM, an NSA program used to conduct mass surveillance on Internet
communication. Notice that the phone-records program played no role at all here. The New York
Stock Exchange The Kansas City Star pored over court records pertaining to the alleged plot to
bomb the stock exchange. It reported that its extent was as follows: Sabirhan Hasanoff, a wannabe
jihadist, sought to travel overseas and fight alongside Islamist radicals. A contact in Yemen began
correspondence, wanting Hasanoffs money more than his presence, saying he could arrange a suicide
mission but that Hasanoff would have to wait to fight abroad. Hasanoff didnt want to die and kept getting
strung along, sending occasional money to his Yemeni contact, who at one point asked for some research.
Like a student pasting Wikipedia entries into a term paper, Hasanoff completely dogged his August 2008
assignment to study the New York Stock Exchange for a possible bombing attack, the newspaper
reported, adding that when he turned over his findings, his contact in Yemen reportedly tore up the
report, threw it in the street, and never showed it to anyone, and that it added nothing to his
understanding of the stock exchange. Another Yemeni in contact with the American told the FBI that they
never had a real plan to bomb the stock exchange, and that Hasanoff was useful only insofar as he kept
Theres no cause to think the stock exchange wouldve been hit

but for the phone dragnet. The Danish Newspaper The plot to attack the Danish
sending money.
newspaper is a particularly absurd case to cite as justification for keeping the phone dragnet. The terrorist
in this case is David Coleman Headley. Even a cursory look at his story suggests numerous ways that
the
U.S. government couldve stopped him years before they did , and renders absurd
the suggestion that he could only be identified through bulk collection of metadata. As Pro Publica
reports: The convicted drug smuggler radicalized and joined Lashkar in Pakistan in the late 1990s while
spying on Pakistani heroin traffickers as a paid informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration. His
associates first warned federal agencies about his Islamic extremism days after the Sept. 11 attacks.
Investigators questioned him in front of his DEA handlers in New York, and he was cleared. U.S.
prosecutors then made the unusual decision to end Headley's probation for a drug conviction three years
early. He then hurried to Pakistan and began training in Lashkar terror camps. Although the DEA insists he
was deactivated in early 2002, some U.S., European and Indian officials suspect that he remained an
informant in some capacity and that the DEA ... sent him to Pakistan to spy ... Those officials believe his
status as an operative or former informant may have deflected subsequent FBI inquiries. The FBI received
new tips in 2002 and in 2005 when Headley's wife in New York had him arrested for domestic violence and
told counterterror investigators about his radicalism and training in Pakistan. Inquiries were conducted, but
he was not interviewed or placed on a watch list, officials have said ... In late 2007... another wife told U.S.
embassy officials in Islamabad that Headley was a terrorist and a spy, describing his frequent trips to
Mumbai and his stay at the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel. In fact, Headley was conducting meticulous surveillance
on the Taj and other targets for an impending attack by a seaborne squad of gunmen. Once again, U.S.
agencies say they did not question or monitor him because the information from the wife was not specific
enough The final tip to authorities about Headley came from a family friend days after the Mumbai
attacks FBI agents in Philadelphia questioned a cousin of Headleys. The cousin lied, saying Headley was
in Pakistan when he was actually at home in Chicago The cousin alerted Headley about the FBI inquiry,
but Headley went to Denmark as planned. U.S. agencies did not find Headley or warn foreign counterparts
about him in the first half of 2009 while he conducted surveillance in Denmark and India and met alQaida leaders. After all that, the U.S. only caught up with Headley after a tip from British intelligence!
Supporters of sweeping U.S. surveillance say it's needed to build a haystack of information in which to
find a needle, Pro Publica would conclude. In
Headley's case, it appears the U.S. was
handed the needleand then deployed surveillance that led to the arrest and prosecution of
Headley and other plotters. To sum up, Fleitzs national-security claim is unsubstantiated while skeptics
of Section 215 are on solid ground. As Peter Bergen put it in his report for the New America Foundation,
Surveillance of American phone metadata has had no discernible impact on

preventing acts of terrorism and only the most marginal of impacts on
preventing terrorist-related activity, such as fundraising for a terrorist group .
* * * The National Review article next turns to a terrorist attack that preceded the phone dragnet, quoting
a speculative claim by former deputy CIA director Michael Morell that Had the [metadata] program been
in place more than a decade ago, it would likely have prevented 9/11. And it has the potential to prevent
the next 9/11. A compelling reason to discount that claim was recently offered by Julian Sanchez, writing
in the aftermath of the revelation that the Drug Enforcement Administration was running another
the [NSA] programs

defenders often suggest that had we only had some kind of bulk telephone
database, the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks could have been identified via
their calls to a known safehouse in Yemen. Now, of course, we know that there was such a
databaseand indeed, a database that had already been employed in other
counterterror investigations, including the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. It does not
international phone-metadata program as early as the 1990s. He writes:
appear to have helped. Second, we now know that DEA was able to find another solution to
monitor calls related to suspected narcotics traffickers when the program was ended in 2013, using
targeted orders. It is, according to reports, somewhat more costly and time consumingbut it ultimately
achieves the same ends without requiring the government to vacuum up millions of innocent peoples
international call records.
NSA mass surveillance fails to solve terrorism false

positives overwhelm.
Schneier 15
Bruce Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at
Harvard Law School, a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open
Technology Institute, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
an Advisory Board Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and
the Chief Technology Officer at Resilient Systems, Inc., 3/2/15, Data and
Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World.
The US intelligence community also likens finding a terrorist plot to looking
for a needle in a haystack. And, as former NSA director General Keith Alexander said, you need
the haystack to find the needle. That statement perfectly illustrates the problem with mass surveillance
When youre looking for the needle, the last thing you want to
do is pile lots more hay on it. More specifically, there is no scientific rationale for
believing that adding irrelevant data about innocent people makes it easier to
find a terrorist attack, and lots of evidence that it does not. You might be adding slightly
more signal, but youre also adding much more noise. And despite the NSAs collect it
all mentality, its own documents bear this out. The military intelligence community even
talks about the problem of drinking from a fire hose: having so much
irrelevant data that its impossible to find the important bits . We saw this problem
with the NSAs eavesdropping program: the false positives overwhelmed the system . In
the years after 9/11, the NSA passed to the FBI thousands of tips per month; every
one of them turned out to be a false alarm. The cost was enormous, and ended
and bulk collection.
up frustrating the FBI agents who were obligated to investigate all the tips. We also saw this with the
Suspicious Activity Reports or SAR database: tens of thousands of reports, and no actual results. And
all the telephone metadata the NSA collected led to just one success: the conviction of a taxi driver who
sent $8,500 to a Somali group that posed no direct threat to the US and that was probably trumped up
so the NSA would have better talking points in front of Congress.
NSA surveillance trades off with better

counterterrorism strategiesinvestigation, human
intelligence, and emergency response
Schneier 15
Bruce Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at
Harvard Law School, a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open
Technology Institute, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
an Advisory Board Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and
the Chief Technology Officer at Resilient Systems, Inc., 3/2/15, Data and
Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World
Mass surveillance didnt catch underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in 2006,
even though his father had repeatedly warned the U.S. government that he
was dangerous. And the liquid bombers (theyre the reason governments prohibit passengers from
bringing large bottles of liquids, creams, and gels on airplanes in their carry-on luggage) were captured in
2006 in their London apartment not due to mass surveillance but through traditional investigative police
Whenever we learn about an NSA success, it invariably comes

from targeted surveillance rather than from mass surveillance . One
work.
analysis showed that the FBI identifies potential terrorist plots from reports of suspicious activity, reports of
Ubiquitous surveillance
and data mining are not suitable tools for finding dedicated criminals or
terrorists. We taxpayers are wasting billions on mass-surveillance programs, and not getting the
security weve been promised. More importantly, the money were wasting on these
ineffective surveillance programs is not being spent on
investigation, intelligence, and emergency response: tactics that have been
proven to work. The NSA's surveillance efforts have actually made us less secure. Mass surveillance
and data mining are much more suitable for tasks of population
discrimination: finding people with certain political beliefs, people who are friends with certain
plots, and investigations of other, unrelated, crimes. This is a critical point.
individuals, people who are members of secret societies, and people who attend certain meetings and
The
reason data mining works to find them is that, like credit card fraudsters,
political dissidents are likely to share a well-defined profile . Additionally,
under authoritarian rule the inevitable false alarms are less of a problem;
charging innocent people with sedition instills fear in the populace.
rallies. Those are all individuals of interest to a government intent on social control like China.
A switch to human intelligence is key to solve for

terrorism
Dredge 7/15/15 (Stuart, at the Guardian, editor to Guardian Technology,
specializing in apps and mobile content, Experts call for return to human
intelligence after Snowden,
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/14/human-intelligence-snowdensurveillance-nsa-gchq, //rck)
Bartlett said Snowden has prompted a robust response from technology companies, and an increase in the availability of
terrorists and criminals would also be benefitting

from encrypted services, making it harder for agencies to prevent attacks ,
especially perpetrated by unpredictable individuals with a low barrier to entry. It could mean, he said, the crisis
of confidence in the intelligence agencies will be about them failing to stop terrorism ,
rather than in overstepping the mark on privacy. Bartlett speculated about a return to old-fashioned human
intelligence: targeted bugs in rooms and infiltration of groups, though these actually
present a greater moral hazard. We need a new settlement about the types of
intelligence were going to allow - and crucial to that is a far better system of
oversight. Rather than securicrats watching other securicrats, I want citizens who are security cleared to be part of
easy-to-use encryption services for the public. But
the Intelligence and Security Committee [in parliament], he said. Machon called for a proper channel for whistleblowers
that would listen to their concerns, investigate and punish any wrongdoing. What
we have is a system where if

marked
you ask questions or have ethical concerns you are told to shut up and just follow orders. And you become
as a troublemaker, she said. So those who do have ethical concerns, those who are concerned about illegal
operations, usually just resign and get on with their lives. Machon drew on her own experience going on the run with her
then-partner David Shayler in 1996, and noted that intelligence whistleblowers still face the punishment of being de facto
criminalised for speaking to anyone outside that agency. That will be the only way to change the culture: that
awareness that they cant get away with this closed groupthink any longer; the awareness that they will be held to
they cannot lie to government any more to cover up

their crimes and mistakes, she said. Were a long way from it. We have the Intelligence and Security
account; and the awareness that
Committee in parliament, which is made up of place-men, appointed by the prime minister, and it really has no teeth .
It
cant investigate properly.
It never has been able to investigate properly. And if this was beefed up into a
meaningful oversight body that whistleblowers and others could go to, then I think that would enforce change. Bartlett
suggested that Hannigans decision to go on the offensive reflected wider frustration within GCHQ about technology
companies ramping up encryption features. One might say with some weight that theyve brought this on themselves,
because its as a result of the revelations of Edward Snowden that more people are using this type of software, he said.
It is very difficult indeed for GCHQ and others to keep tabs on what ISIS is doing. They have become far more
sophisticated and their use of open source encryption has been increasing dramatically, he said adding that there should
be more of a partnership approach rather than bullying the sector. Theyre going to have to find a more progressive,
positive working relationship. And I dont think the best way of doing it is going on the front foot and slagging them off.
there needs to be a debate about the

intelligence agencies. Our intelligence agencies were put in place to protect
national security - which has never been legally defined under British law - and to
protect the economic wellbeing of the state, she said, citing WWII and the provisional IRA campaigns of the
Terrorism is for the police, not the security services. Machon said
role of the
1970s to 1990s as examples of threats to national security. But going after small, fast-paced terrorist organisations is
not national security. These terrorist attacks are horrific, appalling crimes that traumatise people. But they are not a threat
to our national security, she said. The agencies have mission creep going on. They have taken over work that is not
intelligence agency, but is more appropriate for police work, where youre supposed to
needed to be a
wholesale rethink of British intelligence agencies and surveillance, starting with the establishment of an
really appropriate to an
gather evidence and put people on trial in front of a jury of their peers. Machon said there
entirely new agency that worked within a regulatory framework. Sankey said it is inappropriate for UK ministers to be
signing surveillance and interception warrants when Canada, New Zealand and Australia all appointed judges to do so.
She said Liberty had calculated that the home secretary signs around seven each day. How,
amongst all the

other duties of the home secretary, are they supposed to have the time and attention
to scrutinise each one, assess whether its necessary and proportionate, and
ask the necessary questions? They just dont . Its a ridiculous system. Sankey claimed that
independent research on NSA bulk interception has shown it hasnt prevented a single
attack. The efficacy of the policy has not been shown to work, she said. If that information isnt being acted upon,
whats the point of ever harvesting more and more of it? In the hackneyed needle and haystack
analogy, you rarely need a bigger haystack .
Terrorism guarantees extinction

Hellman, Stanford Engineering Prof, 8
[Martin E., emeritus prof of engineering at Stanford, Spring 2008, Risk
Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence accessed 5-28-14,
http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf, hec)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the publics mind than the threat of a full-scale
nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before
proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe
of immense proportions: A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day
would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage.
America and its way of life would be changed forever. [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix].
The likelihood of
such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the
chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page
15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent,
but notes, We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like
Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we
cant live in a world where its anything but extremely low-probability. [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85
national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the probability
of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years, with 79
percent of the respondents believing it more likely to be carried out by terrorists than by a government
[Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is
terrorism is one of the potential

trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war , the risk analyses proposed herein will
not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because
include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the
overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to
reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g.,
nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with
the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are
unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In
fact, societys almost total neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the
The danger associated with nuclear

deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate .3 This
more important. The cosT of World War iii
section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the
a failure of deterrence to
mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and
Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people
failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines
died as a result of the first World War. World War IIs fatalities were double or triple that numberchaos
prevented a more precise determination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears
few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third
World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In
that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which
it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very
different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas
MacArthur, stated, Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. If you lose, you are
annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of
a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
expressed a similar view: If
deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present

U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will
be destroyed [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry
Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagans belief that
nuclear weapons were totally irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly
destructive of life on earth and civilization. [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less
emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact: The
resulting
deaths would be far beyond any precedent .
Executive branch calculations show a range

of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) a change in targeting could kill
somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations
during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would
eventually die from lack of adequate medical care millions of people might starve or
freeze during the following winter, but it is not possible to estimate how
many. further millions might eventually die of latent radiation effects .
reflect only deaths
[OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979,
page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that
the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and
their resultant fire- storms could usher in a nuclear winter that might erase
homo sapiens from the face of the earth , much as many scientists now believe the K-T
Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter
caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth . The
TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear
even
a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states,
such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic
consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by
winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that
fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence
dictates that we apply the same engineering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from
collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that
not an option.
preventing World War III is a necessity
AT Racism
Threats are realISIS has made it very clear that they are
threatening the United Statestheyre posting videos of
themselves beheading American citizens and have plans
to unleash bioweaponsif we win any risk that the threat
is real and is not merely constructed by the USFG, you
have no reason to reject us
If most manifestations of Islamophobia stem from
domestic surveillance, then we solve for thatwe curtail
that surveillancemake them prove that HUMAN
intelligence and investigation are racist
***PRIVACY ADVANTAGE
FISA court infringes on privacy much more than Title III of
Wiretap Act.
Granick, 11-13-2012, (Jennifer Granick; Director of Civil Liberties
at Stanford Law School, Expertise on Privacy, Cyber Crime,
Cybersecurity, Civil Liberties; "FISA Amendments Act Is Way
Worse for Privacy Than Title III,"
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2012/11/fisa-amendments-actway-worse-privacy-title-iii. AGY)
Advocates for renewal of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) often argue that the statute poses no more harm
to the privacy of innocent Americans than does the Wiretap Act, also known as Title III. After all, when FBI
agents are tapping a suspected drug couriers phones, his friends or mother may also call. How is the FAA
any different? Actually, there are many important differences between Title III, the FAA and even traditional
FAA is far more intrusive than Title

III and poses a categorically different threat to the privacy of
innocent Americans. Title III establishes a comprehensive statutory scheme, closely monitored
FISA intercept orders. These differences mean that
by the federal courts, for conducting wiretap and other electronic surveillance in the federal law
Title III warrants allow federal agents to monitor specific and

identified communications facilities where there is probable cause to believe
that co-conspirators in a federal offense will communicate. Minimization practices stop
the agents from listening to or recording conversations that are not about the
crime under investigation. After the interceptions, individuals named in the wiretap order must be
enforcement context.
notified, and the Court may order notification of other monitored parties. Title III prescribes serious legal
consequences, including prison time, for failing to follow the law. In practice, this means that the
agents
FBI
investigating the drug conspiracy may be on the line when a suspects mother calls to discuss
may only listen to and record

conversations about the drugs. In contrast, FAA authorizations allow the
government to monitor Americans international communications
flowing through any facility, so long as the purpose of the monitoring is to collect foreign
holiday plans, but they have to stop listening. They
intelligence information about a non-US individual or entity reasonably believed to be overseas. In

practice, while the precise details of FAA targeting and minimization procedures are secret, the statute
authorizes the NSA to monitor any Americans international communications with agents of a foreign
target, which could be Al Qaeda, Amnesty International or the French government, for foreign intelligence
information. Conversations with a favorite aunt -- who works for Amnesty in their UK offices -- about the
NGOs strategy to affect US human rights policies could lawfully be collected and logged. What about
Under Title III, innocent Americans are only

incidentally monitored, and if the conversation is not about the
crime under investigation, the agents must stop listening and may
not record the call. FISA minimization does not require agents to
stop listening. Under FISA, minimization practices generally permit acquisition of nearly all
irrelevant communications?
information from a monitored facility. Kris & Wilson, National Security Investigations and Prosecutions 2d
9:4 (2012) [Author David Kris was formerly the Department of Justices head of national security.]
Information is minimized later, and then only if it could not be foreign intelligence information. Further,
minimization does not necessarily mean that the information is deleted. It may be stored but not indexed.
So when my aunt -- Amnestys employee -- starts talking about her plans to visit San Francisco for the
holidays, those communications will be copied, stored, and searched at the governments discretion. Only
if those messages could not be foreign intelligence information will they be deleted or, alternatively,
innocent Americans are far more

likely to be monitored under the FAA than under Title III because
under the FAA: Any number of individuals thought to be agents of a foreign entity target
may be intentionally monitored as a result of a single FAA authorization , and need
not be specifically identified [More Americans likely to be monitored since an undefined and
evolving list of individuals are believed to be agents of approved targets]; No wrongdoing required
on the part of the target [Thus, the people talking to the target are also innocent]; Any
facility may be monitored, even if there is no connection to the target ; FISA
minimization operates on a collect now, minimize later model ; FISA
minimization allows the government to keep information concerning
Americans until it could not be foreign intelligence information; FISA minimization doesnt
necessarily mean the information is deleted. It may remain stored, but not indexed; No judicial
review of the justification for the surveillance; No notification to individuals
incidentally or mistakenly monitored; Very difficult to impose consequences
for violating the FAA, see e.g. governments argument in Amnesty v. Clapper. In fact, FAA has less
stored forever without being indexed or logged. In sum,
safeguards even than traditional FISA. Traditional FISA at least required agents to: (1) identify the
individuals to be monitored and get court approval; (2) specify the facilities to be surveilled and show
probable cause that those facilities would be used by the target; and (3) get FISA Court approval and allow
supervision of the targeting and minimization procedures to be used in each intercept, rather than merely
green lighting general operational practices. Also, minimization under FAA need only be as appropriate,
which, according to Kris and Wilson, "suggests that the government has some latitude to tailor [traditional
FISA] minimization procedures to address the acquisition authorized by each of three [FAA] statutory
the FAA poses far greater danger to the privacy of innocent

Americans than does Title III because it both (1) authorizes monitoring of
international communications for foreign intelligence information and (2)
implements vastly different minimization procedures that ensure irrelevant
procedures. As a result,
communications will be collected and stored, perhaps indefinitely.
FISAs procedures destroy American privacy- 8 instances.

ACLU No Date (How the NSAs Surveillance Procedures
Threaten American Privacy, https://www.aclu.org/how-nsassurveillance-procedures-threaten-americans-privacy., AGY)
Now The Guardian has published two previously secret documents that show how the FISA Amendments
Act is being implemented. One document sets out the government's "targeting procedures"the
procedures it uses to determine whether it has the authority to acquire communications in the first place.
The other sets out the government's "minimization procedures"the procedures that govern the retention,
analysis, and dissemination of the communications it acquires. Both documents the
"Procedures"have apparently been endorsed by the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Court, which oversees government surveillance in some national security cases. The
Procedures are complex, but at least some of their flaws are clear. 1. The Procedures permit
the NSA to monitor Americans' international communications in the
course of surveillance targeted at foreigners abroad. The NSA "is not listening
to Americans' phone calls or monitoring their emails," the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee
recently said, and many other government officials, including the president himself, have made similar
assurances. But these statements are not true. While the FISA Amendments Act authorizes the
government to target foreigners abroad, not Americans, it permits the government to collect Americans'
communications with those foreign targets. Indeed, in advocating for the Act, government officials made
clear that these "one-end-domestic" communications were the ones of most interest to them. The
Procedures contemplate not only that the NSA will acquire Americans' international communications but
that it will retain them and possibly disseminate them to other U.S. government agencies and foreign
governments. Americans' communications that contain "foreign intelligence information" or evidence of a
crime can be retained forever, and even communications that don't can be retained for as long as five
years. Despite government officials' claims to the contrary, t he
NSA is building a growing

database of Americans' international telephone calls and emails . 2. The
Procedures allow the surveillance of Americans by failing to ensure
that the NSA's surveillance targets are in fact foreigners outside the
United States. The Act is predicated on the theory that foreigners abroad have no right to privacy
or, at any rate, no right that the United States should respect. Because they have no right to
privacy, the U.S. government sees no bar to the collection of their
communications, including their communications with Americans. But even if one
accepts the government's premise, the Procedures fail to ensure that the NSA's
surveillance targets are in fact foreigners outside the U nited States. This is because
the Procedures permit the NSA to presume that prospective surveillance targets are foreigners outside the
United States absent specific information to the contraryand to presume therefore that they are fair
3. The Procedures permit the government to

conduct surveillance that has no real connection to the
government's foreign intelligence interests . One of the fundamental problems with
the Act is that it permits the government to conduct surveillance without
probable cause or individualized suspicion. It permits the government to monitor people who aren't
game for warrantless surveillance.
even thought to be doing anything wrong, and to do so without particularized warrants or meaningful
review by impartial judges. Government officials have placed heavy emphasis on the fact that the Act
allows the government to conduct surveillance only if one of its purposes is to gather "foreign intelligence
information." That term, though, is defined very broadly to include not only information about terrorism but
also information about intelligence activities, the national defense, and even "the foreign affairs of the
United States." The Procedures weaken the limitation further. Among the things the NSA examines to
determine whether a particular email address or phone number will be used to exchange foreign
intelligence information is whether it has been used in the past to communicate with foreigners. Another is
whether it is listed in a foreigner's address book. In other words, the NSA seems to equate a propensity to
communicate with foreigners with a propensity to communicate foreign intelligence information .
The
effect is to bring virtually every international communication within the reach
of the NSA's surveillance. 4. The Procedures permit the NSA to collect
international communications, including Americans' international communications, in bulk. On
its face, the Act permits the NSA to conduct dragnet surveillance, not just surveillance of specific
individuals. Officials who advocated for the Act made clear that this was one of its principal purposes, and
unsurprisingly, the Procedures give effect to that design. While they require the government to identify a
Procedures permit the NSA

to sweep up the communications of any foreigner who may be
communicating "about" the target. The Procedures contemplate that the NSA will do this by
"target" outside the country, once the target has been identified the
"employ[ing] an Internet Protocol filter to ensure that the person from whom it seeks to obtain foreign
intelligence information is located overseas," by "target[ing] Internet links that terminate in a foreign
country," or by identifying "the country code of the telephone number." However the NSA does it, the
result is the same: millions of communications may be swept up, Americans' international communications
5. The Procedures allow the NSA to retain even purely

domestic communications. Given the permissive standards the NSA uses to determine
among them.
whether prospective surveillance targets are foreigners abroad, errors are inevitable. Some of the
communications the NSA collects under the Act, then, will be purely domestic. (Notably, a 2009 New York
Times article discusses an episode in which the NSA used the Act to engage in "significant and systemic"
overcollection of such domestic communications.) The Act should require the NSA to purge these
communications from its databases, but it does not. The Procedures allow the government to keep and
analyze even purely domestic communications if they contain significant foreign intelligence information,
evidence of a crime, or encrypted information. Again, foreign intelligence information is defined
the NSA is steadily building a database of

Americans' purely domestic calls and emails. 6. The Procedures allow the
government to collect and retain communications protected by the
attorneyclient privilege. The Procedures expressly contemplate that the NSA will collect
exceedingly broadly. The result is that
these communications receive no special

protectionthey can be acquired, retained, and disseminated like any other .
attorneyclient communications. In general,
Thus, if the NSA acquires the communications of lawyers representing individuals who have been charged
before the military commissions at Guantanamo, nothing in the Procedures would seem to prohibit the NSA
from sharing the communications with military prosecutors. The Procedures include a more restrictive rule
for communications between attorneys and their clients who have been criminally indicted in the United
Statesthe NSA may not share these communications with prosecutors. Even those communications,
7. The
Procedures contemplate that the NSA will maintain "knowledge
databases" containing sensitive information about Americans. To
however, may be retained to the extent that they include foreign intelligence information.
determine whether a target is a foreigner abroad, the Procedures contemplate that the NSA will consult
various NSA databases containing information collected by it and other agencies through signals
These databasesreferred to as
databases"apparently house internet data,
including metadata that reveals online activities , as well as telephone numbers
and email addresses that the agency has reason to believe are being used by
U.S. persons. The Procedures' reference to "Home Location Registers," which receive updates
intelligence, human intelligence, law enforcement, and other means.
"NSA content repositories" and "knowledge
whenever a phone "moves into a new service area," suggests that the NSA also collects some form of
location information about millions of Americans' cellphones. The Procedures do not say what limits apply
8.
The Procedures allow the NSA to retain encrypted communications
indefinitely. The Procedures permit the NSA to retain, forever, all communicationseven purely
to these databases or what safeguards, if any, are in place to protect Americans' constitutional rights.
domestic onesthat are encrypted. The use of encryption to protect data is a routine and sometimes
legally required practice by financial organizations, health care providers, and real-time communications
services (like Skype and Apple's FaceTime). Accordingly, the Procedures permit the NSA to retain huge
volumes of Americans' most sensitive information.
The NSA routinely breaches Americans privacy

Perlroth et al, 13
NICOLE PERLROTH, technology reporter for The New York Times, JEFF LARSON
and SCOTT SHANE, writer for the New York Times, September 5, 2013, N.S.A.
Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, The New York Times,
http://ctvoterscount.org/CTVCdata/13/09/NYTimes20130905.pdf, JL @ DDI
The National Security Agency is winning its long-running secret war on
encryption, using supercomputers, technical trickery, court orders and
behindthe-scenes persuasion to undermine the major tools protecting the
privacy of everyday communications in the Internet age, according to newly
disclosed documents. The agency has circumvented or cracked much of the
encryption, or digital scrambling, that guards global commerce and banking
systems, protects sensitive data like trade secrets and medical records, and
automatically secures the e-mails, Web searches, Internet chats and phone
calls of Americans and others around the world, the documents show. Many
users assume or have been assured by Internet companies that their
data is safe from prying eyes, including those of the government, and the
N.S.A. wants to keep it that way. The agency treats its recent successes in
deciphering protected information as among its most closely guarded secrets,
restricted to those cleared for a highly classified program code-named
Bullrun, according to the documents, provided by Edward J. Snowden, the
former N.S.A. contractor. Beginning in 2000, as encryption tools were
gradually blanketing the Web, the N.S.A. invested billions of dollars in a

clandestine campaign to preserve its ability to eavesdrop. Having lost a
public battle in the 1990s to insert its own back door in all encryption, it set
out to accomplish the same goal by stealth. The agency, according to the
documents and interviews with industry officials, deployed custom-built,
superfast computers to break codes, and began collaborating with technology
companies in the United States and abroad to build entry points into their
products. The documents do not identify which companies have participated.
The N.S.A. hacked into target computers to snare messages before they were
encrypted. In some cases, companies say they were coerced by the
government into handing over their master encryption keys or building in a
back door. And the agency used its influence as the worlds most experienced
code maker to covertly introduce weaknesses into the encryption standards
followed by hardware and software developers around the world. For the
past decade, N.S.A. has led an aggressive, multipronged effort to break
widely used Internet encryption technologies, said a 2010 memo describing
a briefing about N.S.A. accomplishments for employees of its British
counterpart, Government Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ.
Cryptanalytic capabilities are now coming online. Vast amounts of encrypted
Internet data which have up till now been discarded are now exploitable.
When the British analysts, who often work side by side with N.S.A. officers,
were first told about the program, another memo said, those not already
briefed were gobsmacked! An intelligence budget document makes clear
that the effort is still going strong. We are investing in groundbreaking
cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat adversarial cryptography and exploit
Internet traffic, the director of national intelligence, James R. Clapper Jr.,
wrote in his budget request for the current year. In recent months, the
documents disclosed by Mr. Snowden have described the N.S.A.s reach in
scooping up vast amounts of communications around the world. The
encryption documents now show, in striking detail, how the agency works to
ensure that it is actually able to read the information it collects. The agencys
success in defeating many of the privacy protections offered by encryption
does not change the rules that prohibit the deliberate targeting of Americans
e-mails or phone calls without a warrant. But it shows that the agency, which
was sharply rebuked by a federal judge in 2011 for violating the rules and
misleading the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, cannot necessarily be
restrained by privacy technology. N.S.A. rules permit the agency to store any
encrypted communication, domestic or foreign, for as long as the agency is
trying to decrypt it or analyze its technical features. The N.S.A., which has
specialized in code-breaking since its creation in 1952, sees that task as
essential to its mission. If it cannot decipher the messages of terrorists,
foreign spies and other adversaries, the United States will be at serious risk,
agency officials say. Just in recent weeks, the Obama administration has
called on the intelligence agencies for details of communications by leaders
of Al Qaeda about a terrorist plot and of Syrian officials messages about the
chemical weapons attack outside Damascus. If such communications can be
hidden by unbreakable encryption, N.S.A. officials say, the agency cannot do
its work. But some experts say the N.S.A.s campaign to bypass and weaken
communications security may have serious unintended consequences. They
say the agency is working at cross-purposes with its other major mission,
apart from eavesdropping: ensuring the security of American
communications. Some of the agencys most intensive efforts have focused
on the encryption in universal use in the United States, including Secure
Sockets Layer, or SSL; virtual private networks, or VPNs; and the protection
used on fourthgeneration, or 4G, smartphones. Many Americans, often
without realizing it, rely on such protection every time they send an e-mail,
buy something online, consult with colleagues via their companys computer
network, or use a phone or a tablet on a 4G network. For at least three years,
one document says, GCHQ, almost certainly in collaboration with the N.S.A.,
has been looking for ways into protected traffic of popular Internet
companies: Google, Yahoo, Facebook and Microsofts Hotmail. By 2012, GCHQ
had developed new access opportunities into Googles systems, according
to the document. (Google denied giving any government access and said it
had no evidence its systems had been breached). The risk is that when you
build a back door into systems, youre not the only one to exploit it, said
Matthew D. Green, a cryptography researcher at Johns Hopkins University.
Those back doors could work against U.S. communications, too. Paul
Kocher, a leading cryptographer who helped design the SSL protocol, recalled
how the N.S.A. lost the heated national debate in the 1990s about inserting
into all encryption a government back door called the Clipper Chip. And they
went and did it anyway, without telling anyone, Mr. Kocher said. He said he
understood the agencys mission but was concerned about the danger of
allowing it unbridled access to private information. The intelligence
community has worried about going dark forever, but today they are
conducting instant, total invasion of privacy with limited effort, he said. This
is the golden age of spying.
The NSA has overstepped its authority and invaded

Americans privacy
Huffington Post, 10/15/2013, "NSA Reportedly Broke Privacy Rules
Thousands Of Times Per Year," Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/15/nsa-surveillance-privacyrules_n_3765063.html, JL @ DDI
WASHINGTON The National Security Agency has broken privacy rules or
overstepped its legal authority thousands of times each year since Congress
granted the agency broad new powers in 2008, The Washington Post reported
Thursday. Most of the infractions involve unauthorized surveillance of
Americans or foreign intelligence targets in the United States, both of which
are restricted by law and executive order. They range from significant
violations of law to typographical errors that resulted in unintended
interception of U.S. emails and telephone calls, the Post said, citing an
internal audit and other top-secret documents provided it earlier this summer
from NSA leaker Edward Snowden, a former systems analyst with the agency.
In one of the documents, agency personnel are instructed to remove details
and substitute more generic language in reports to the Justice Department
and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The Post cited a 2008
example of the interception of a "large number" of calls placed from
Washington when a programming error confused U.S. area code 202 for 20,
the international dialing code for Egypt, according to a "quality assurance"
review that was not distributed to the NSA's oversight staff. In another case,
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which has authority over some
NSA operations, did not learn about a new collection method until it had been
in operation for many months. The court ruled it unconstitutional. The NSA
audit obtained by the Post dated May 2012, counted 2,776 incidents in the
preceding 12 months of unauthorized collection, storage, access to or
distribution of legally protected communications. Most were unintended.
Many involved failures of due diligence or violations of standard operating
procedure. The most serious incidents included a violation of a court order
and unauthorized use of data about more than 3,000 Americans and greencard holders. In an emailed statement to The Associated Press late Thursday,
John DeLong, NSA's director of compliance, said, "We want people to report if
they have made a mistake or even if they believe that an NSA activity is not
consistent with the rules. NSA, like other regulated organizations, also has a
`hotline' for people to report and no adverse action or reprisal can be taken
for the simple act of reporting. We take each report seriously, investigate the
matter, address the issue, constantly look for trends and address them as
well all as a part of NSA's internal oversight and compliance efforts. What's
more, we keep our overseers informed through both immediate reporting and
periodic reporting."
***SOFT POWER
US credibility decrease because of the NSA leaks only
revision of surveillance policy will appease US
corporations that are the largest tool of US soft power
Sanger and Miller 1/20/14 (DAVID E. SANGER and CLAIRE CAIN MILLER,
International New York Times, January 20, 2014, Obama maintains United
States' grip on the data pipeline lexis nexis; accessed 7/15/15 JH @ DDI)
Intel and computer security companies were eager to hear Mr. Obama embrace a commitment that the
United States would never knowingly move to weaken encryption systems. They got none of that. Perhaps
Obama's speech Friday was what it omitted: While he bolstered

some protections for citizens who fear that the N.S.A. is downloading their
every dial, tweet and text message, he did nothing, at least yet, to loosen the
agency's grip on the world's digital pipelines . White House officials said Mr.
Obama was committed to studying the complaints by American industry that
the revelations were costing them billions of dollars in business overseas , by
the most striking element of Mr.
giving everyone from the Germans to the Chinese an excuse to avoid American hardware and cloud
services. ''The most interesting part of this speech was not how the president weighed individual privacy
against the N.S.A.,'' said Fred H. Cate, director of the Center of Applied Cybersecurity Research at Indiana
University, ''but that he said little about what to do about the agency's practice of vacuuming up
everything it can get its hands on.'' Mr. Cate, who also advises the Department of Homeland Security on
cyber issues, noted that Mr. Obama had taken ''a report that had 46 recommendations, and touched on
three or four of them.'' In fact, he did more than that: Mr. Obama reminded the United States that it was
not only the government that was monitoring users of the Web, it was also companies like Apple,
Facebook, Twitter and Yahoo that had complained so loudly as members of an industry group called Reform
Government Surveillance. ''Corporations of all shapes and sizes track what you buy, store and analyze our
data, and use it for commercial purposes,'' Mr. Cate said. ''That's how those targeted ads pop up on your
Corporate America wants to be

able to mine data but fears business will be hurt when the government uses it
for intelligence purposes. In fact, behind the speech lies a struggle that pits
corporations that view themselves as the core of America's soft power around
the world - the country's economic driver and the guardians of its innovative
edge - against an intelligence community 100,000-strong that regards its ability to peer into any corner
computer and your smartphone periodically.'' Translation:
of the digital world, and manipulate it if necessary, as crucial to security. In public, the coalition was polite
if unenthusiastic about the president's speech. His proposals, the companies said in a statement,
''represent positive progress on key issues,'' even while ''crucial details remain to be addressed on these
issues, and additional steps are needed on other important issues.'' But as Mr. Obama himself
acknowledged,
the United States has a credibility problem that will take years to
address. The discovery that it had monitored the cellphone of Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, or
that it had found a way to tap into computers around the world that are completely disconnected from the
That argument, heard

may only be an excuse for protectionism. But it is
Internet only fuels the argument that American products cannot be trusted.
these days from Berlin to Mexico City,
an excuse that often works. ''When your products are considered to not only be flawed but
intentionally flawed in the support of intelligence missions, don't expect people to buy them,'' said Dan
Kaminsky, a security researcher and chief scientist at White Ops, an anti-fraud company.
will have to address those issues
Mr. Obama
at some point. Every time he meets Silicon Valley executives,

many of whom enthusiastically campaigned for him, they remind him of their complaints. But at the Justice
Department on Friday, he reminded them that the battle for cyberspace ran in all directions. ''We cannot
unilaterally disarm our intelligence agencies,'' he said in the speech. ''There is a reason why BlackBerrys
and iPhones are not allowed in the White House Situation Room. We know that the intelligence services of
other countries - including some who feign surprise over the Snowden disclosures - are constantly probing
our government and private-sector networks, and accelerating programs to listen to our conversations,
and intercept our emails and compromise our systems.''
The US got caught breaking the rules that it promoted

only a revision of NSA surveillance policy will increase soft
power
Potter, writer on Policy specializing in Industrial Relations, Climate,
Productivity for the Australian Financial Review, 9/27/ 13 (Ben, Australian
Financial Review, December 27, 2013 I spy with my big eye lexis nexis;
accessed 7/15/15 JH @ DDI)
None of this hurts Moscow or Beijing. Days before Snowden fled, US president Barack Obama lectured
Chinese President Xi Jinping about Chinese spying at a summit at Sunnylands, just outside Los Angeles.
America was preparing to intensify a public relations campaign to force China to back off from rampant
cyber-spying and stealing of western secrets. Russian President Vladimir Putin had already copped the
sharp edge of Obama's tongue for backing Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and persecuting dissidents.
Obama's bad run They must have pinched themselves. It began a bad run for Obama - humiliated by
Congress when he tried to intervene militarily in Syria and poleaxed by the flawed launch of healthcare
reforms. He ended the year a wounded president. He had to dial down the volume on Chinese spying,
Syria, and human rights, to concentrate on fixing the messes in his own back yard. " There
is
obviously damage to America's soft power, precisely for the reason that the
US is so keen on promoting the rules-based system. When it's caught bending
the rules it obviously makes that harder to do," says Rory Medcalf, director of the
international security program at the Lowy Institute. The impact on America's "hard power"
- military and economic clout - is less obvious . "It's not going to change the
balance of power between China and the US," says Paul Buchanan, a former US defence
official and director of 36th Parallel Assessments in Auckland. "They know what the US is doing and they
are acutely aware that the US is climbing all over them and views them as a rival and as an adversary."
The job of cleaning up the mess has only just begun. It's the worst western security
breach since World War II, if not ever. Snowden and Glenn Greenwald, his journalist accomplice, are said to
have released only a tiny fraction of the vast store of documents they possess from the NSA and its Five
Eyes equivalents: Britain's General Communications Headquarters or GCHQ, the Australian Signals
Directorate and their equivalents in Canada and New Zealand. Embarrassing We should expect "heavier
stuff" says Buchanan. Tapping SBY's phones was just embarrassing. Revelations of hacking into Chinese
military or naval networks - or those of our negotiating partners in the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal could provoke much more damaging repercussions, should they emerge. There's also the physical cost of
fixing it. America's enemies have been given unprecedented insights into the workings of modern western
spycraft, enormously aiding their efforts to counter it.
"The fallout from this is going to take
years to work through. They are going to have to change not only all their codes but the protocols
by which they engage in signals intelligence as a result of Snowden," Buchanan says. "The whole network
has to be reconfigured to prevent the Russians and the Chinese from getting in there." Business also needs
to bolster its defences, which means billions more in cyber-security.
Placing limits on the scale of US surveillance is key to

restoring soft power
International New York Times 10/24/13 (International New York
Times, October 24, 2013, New leaks, new repercussions lexis nexis;
Stunning new details continue to emerge from Edward Snowden's leaks about
the vast electronic data mining carried out by the National Security Agency ,
setting off one diplomatic aftershock after another. The latest was spurred by reports in Le Monde this
week that the agency had gained access to the records of more than 70 million calls inside France in one
30-day period. The American ambassador was summoned to the French Foreign Ministry for an
explanation; President Franois Hollande told President Obama by telephone that the data sweep was
''unacceptable,'' and the matter has already become an issue in a visit to Paris by Secretary of State John
Kerry intended to focus on Syria. Previous reports based on Mr. Snowden's information have alleged
American eavesdropping on Germany, Britain, Brazil, Mexico, European Union offices and European
diplomatic missions. More revelations are likely. The Obama administration's response has been
that the United States seeks to gather foreign intelligence as other nations do. That is not in dispute, and
no doubt much of the public indignation by France and other governments is largely rhetorical. Le Monde
reported in July that the French intelligence agency has its own extensive electronic surveillance operation.
Nor is there much dispute that intelligence is necessary to protect citizens against terrorists and other
But the very scale of America's clandestine electronic operations

appears to be undercutting its ''soft power'' - the ability to influence global
affairs through example and moral leadership . Brazil has complained about the reach of
enemies.
U.S. surveillance, while the European Parliament has revived an effort to enact privacy legislation that
could impose restrictions on American Internet providers and complicate talks on a trans-Atlantic trade and
investment agreement. Mr. Kerry said the United States was working to find a balance between protecting
privacy and providing security in a dangerous world. Mr. Obama has pledged to review electronic
intelligence gathering, as well as the institutions charged with judicial and political oversight, a vow he
must honor given the scope of the N.S.A.'s operations. The fact is that most nations practice electronic
surveillance and that citizens everywhere surrender personal data voluntarily to digital services and social
That is why free countries must place stern limits on the security
institutions allowed to function in the shadows.
networks.
The loss of soft power from NSA surveillance is not

substantial enough to break any alliances or damage
international cooperation
Chernin and Dhingra 2013 (Michael, Associate Editor; Reva, B.A. in Middle East Studies and
International Relations, the Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University; The Brown Journal
of World Affairs20.1 (Fall 2013): 283-291. Internally quoting Joseph Nye, the person who pretty much
created the theory of soft power and smart power. His other qualifications? Here: University Distinguished
Service Professor and former Dean of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. He has served
as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence
Council, and a Deputy Under Secretary of State. Presidential Leadership and U.S. Foreign Policy proquest;
Nye: Soft power, or attraction, rests in the eye of the beholder , and it can be quite
different regionally. The Chinese authoritarian system may not look unattractive to some of the more
authoritarian states in Africa-Zimbabwe is a case in point-but it doesn't look very attractive in many parts
of Latin America. I think the Chinese problem is that they don't give enough freedom to civil society
because, while lots of soft power is generated by actors in civil society, the Communist Party doesn't want
strong civil society actors that would escape its control. That means that when somebody challenges the
party, it can create embarrassing moments for China. China had great success in soft power with the
Olympics and the Shanghai exposition, but then when Liu Xiaobo signed a petition asking for greater
freedoms in the country, he was locked up. When he won the Nobel Peace Prize, there was an empty seat
on the platform in Oslo, which essentially drew attention to a deficiency in China's attractiveness. I think
that's an example of what people in advertising call "stepping on your own message." I don't know that it
had much effect on Zimbabwe, but it certainly did in Europe and North America. Journal: You have
previously stated that "presidents will increasingly need to exert power with others as much as over
others; our leaders' capacity to maintain alliances and create networks will be an important dimension of
in light of recent revelations that the NSA has surveilled

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and millions of French citizens and possibly
our hard and soft power." So,
French diplomats, potentially with the president's compliance, do you see a continued tendency in U.S.
foreign policy to exert power over our allies rather than with them? Will this isolate the United States in its
The concept of working with others

reflects the fact that there are some issues that cannot be solved by working
alone. For example, with climate change or with dealing with pandemics or
foreign policy, whether immediately or in the future? Nye:
with preserving global financial stability, no one country can do it by itselfyou have to work with others. But that is a two-way street. Even if our allies may be
annoyed with us because of some of the NSA surveillance, they are
concerned about international financial stability, pandemics, and climate
change, and they are going to have to work with us as well. Therefore, I think
there has been reputational damage for American soft power from the
revelations that followed Snowden, but I don't think that it is going to destroy
alliances or destroy cooperation.
The combination of hard and soft power is key to fighting

terrorism we already have the hard power so an
increase in soft power is needed
Nye, University Distinguished Service Professor and former Dean of Harvard
University's Kennedy School of Government and served as Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National
Intelligence Council, and a Deputy Under Secretary of State 5/13/ 13 (Joseph,
The Independent, London, 13 May 2013, Podium: Joseph Nye: 'To win the war
on terror, you need the carrot as well as the stick' ; From a speech by the
former US Under-Secretary of State, given at the Royal Institute of
International Affairs in London: [First Edition] proquest, accessed 7/15/15 JH
@ DDI)
If hard power is characterised by the use of military force to project our will, then the essence of
soft
power lies in values, in our culture and in the way we handle ourselves
internationally. Soft power is about creating a sense of legitimacy for a nation's
international aims. To understand what's happening in US foreign policy you have to start with 9/11. Before
that date the Bush administration had been running on a fairly traditional realist platform; no more nationbuilding, and a broadly unilateralist approach to foreign policy. After 9/11 the Bush administration realised
this had to change. Credit must be given to the Bush government for the speed in which they realised
traditional conceptions of threats to national security had changed. However, what they are still struggling
Hard power, which

is so successful at one level, does play a role in the war on terrorism , but it is not
with is how to combat diffuse non-state actors, primarily in the form of al-Qa'ida.
quite the role you first expect. Hard military power did topple the Taliban, something soft- power was in no
position to do. However, if you look at the number of Taliban fighters actually killed in Afghanistan, you're
looking at maybe no more than a third. In order to win the war on terror therefore, you also need soft
You need the stick but you also need the carrot . Bombing and land invasions of
we must employ greater
public diplomacy in order to attract people away from militant Islam . If the US
power.
countries harbouring and fomenting terrorism are important, but
would divert even 1 per cent of its defence budget to public diplomacy it would signal a quadrupling of the
budget currently given to those looking to implement soft power rather than hard. To conclude,
important is not soft power or hard power alone. It's a combination.
what is
Our military
power stopped Soviet aggression, but it was our soft power which fostered cultural progression and
sympathy to our aims and stopped states from falling into the hands of communism.
Relations
Other countries hate US surveillance (not a really good
card)
Mitchell 13 (Andrea Mitchell and Erin McClam, US coping with furious
allies as NSA spying revelations grow, NBC,
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/us-coping-furious-allies-nsa-spyingrevelations-grow-f8C11478337, October 28th, 2013)
The United States is scrambling to soothe some of its closest allies, angered
as one report after another details vast American spying including
gathering data on tens of millions of phone calls in Spain in a single month .
The latest report, published Monday in the Spanish newspaper El Mundo, said that the National
Security Agency had collected information on 60 million calls in that country
last December. It followed reports in the last week that the United States spied on leaders of at least
35 countries, and even bugged the personal cellphone of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Jay Carney,
the White House press secretary, said Monday that a White House review of intelligence-gathering would
be complete by years end, and that it would address how to balance national security and privacy. But he
stressed: The work thats being done here saves lives and protects the United States and protects our
allies, and protects Americans stationed in very dangerous places around the world. "We need to make
sure that we're collecting intelligence in a way that advances our security needs and that we don't just do
it because we can," he said. He declined comment on stories about specific NSA spying activities.
German intelligence chiefs are preparing to visit Washington this week to

demand answers, and the German Parliament on Monday called a special
session for Nov. 18 to talk about NSA spying . At the Capitol, a delegation of
European Parliament officials met with Rep. Mike Rogers , R-Mich. and the chairman of
the House Intelligence Committee, to discuss the spying reports. Several who spoke to
reporters later voiced frustration, and questioned whether the United States
was legitimately trying to fight terrorism. If we dont get the explanations, I
dont think we can trust on the reliability of the U.S. in these questions, said
Axel Voss, a German member of the European Parliament. But if they are now
starting to talk to us and explaining to us why and how and what data and so
on, then it might be very helpful, and we can regain trust and reinstall trust
again. He added: But its getting more and more difficult.President
Barack Obama has had to apologize to Merkel and to the presidents of France and Brazil. The Brazilian
president was so angry she canceled a state visit . Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., the
Senate Intelligence Committee chairwoman, on Monday called for a "total review" of intelligence programs
and said she is "unequivocally opposed" to NSA surveillance of friendly foreign leaders. She suggested that
Congress was unaware of such activities. "With respect to NSA collection of intelligence on leaders of U.S.
allies-including France, Spain, Mexico and Germany-let me state unequivocally: I am totally opposed,"
Feinstein said in a statement. "It is my understanding that President Obama was not aware Chancellor
Merkel's communications were being collected since 2002. That is a big problem," she said. In a
statement, another member of the committee, Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, said she knew of no
justification for the administration's collection of intelligence on the leaders of our closest allies, such as
Chancellor Angela Merkel. Collins said she is meeting with the German ambassador on Tuesday night and
State Department
spokeswoman Jen Psaki acknowledged that U.S. spying has "created
significant challenges in some of our most important partnerships," but added
will express directly that monitoring Merkels phone calls was wrong.
that the U.S. has "not seen an across-the board impact on our foreign policy."
US surveillance is terrible for relations

Shah 13 (Amup Shah, Surveillance State: NSA Spying and more,
http://www.globalissues.org/article/802/surveillance-state, October 7th, 2013)
At the start of June 2013, a large number of documents detailing surveillance
by intelligence agencies such as the USs NSA and UKs GCHQ started to be
revealed, based on information supplied by NSA whistle blower, Edward
Snowden. These leaks revealed a massive surveillance program that
included interception of email and other Internet communications and phone
call tapping. Some of it appears illegal, while other revelations show the US
spying on friendly nations during various international summits.
Unsurprisingly, there has been a lot of furor. While some countries are no
doubt using this to win some diplomatic points, there has been increased
tensions between the US and other regions around the world.
US surveillance causes concern

OBrien 13 (Danny OBrien and Katitza Rodriguez, Surveillance at the
United Nations, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/surveillance-humanrights-council, 9/17/13)
The surveillance scandal has now reached the United Nations Human Rights
Council, which opened its 24th session last week to a volley of questions
about privacy and spying, many of them targeted at the United States and
United Kingdom. (That's perhaps not surprising, since U.N. representatives were among those listed as
being monitored by the NSA and GCHQ).
The opening statement by the eminent South African

human rights lawyer Navi Pillay (now the U.N.'s High Commissioner for Human Rights) warned of the
"broad scope of national security surveillance in countries, including the
United States and United Kingdom," and urged all countries to "ensure that
adequate safeguards are in place to prevent security agency overreach and
to protect the right to privacy and other human rights." On September 13, the
German Ambassador Schumacher delivered a joint statement on behalf of Austria, Germany,
Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and Hungary expressing their concern
about the consequences of surveillance, decryption and mass data
collection." One part of the potential solution to those concerns will be officially launched this Friday
in a Human Rights Council side-meeting on digital privacy hosted by these same concerned countries: the
International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance.
Domestic surveillance kills US relations

Arkedis 13 (Jim Arkedis, PRISM Is Bad for American Soft Power, The
Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/prism-isbad-for-american-soft-power/277015/, 6/19/13)
The lack of public debate, shifting attitudes towards civil liberties, insufficient
disclosure, and a decreasing terrorist threat demands that collecting
Americans' phone and Internet records must meet the absolute highest bar of
public consent. It's a test the Obama administration is failing. This brings us
back to Harry Truman and Jim Crow. Even though PRISM is technically legal,
the lack of recent public debate and support for aggressive domestic
collection is hurting America's soft power. The evidence is rolling in. The
China Daily, an English-language mouthpiece for the Communist Party, is
having a field day, pointing out America's hypocrisy as the Soviet Union did
with Jim Crow. Chinese dissident artist Ai Wei Wei made the link explicitly,
saying "In the Soviet Union before, in China today, and even in the U.S.,
officials always think what they do is necessary... but the lesson that people
should learn from history is the need to limit state power." Even America's
allies are uneasy, at best. German Chancellor Angela Merkel grew up in the
East German police state and expressed diplomatic "surprise" at the NSA's
activities. She vowed to raise the issue with Obama at this week's G8
meetings. The Italian data protection commissioner said the program would
"not be legal" in his country. British Foreign Minister William Hague came
under fire in Parliament for his government's participation. If Americans
supported these programs, our adversaries and allies would have no
argument. As it is, the next time the United States asks others for help in
tracking terrorists, it's more likely than not that they will question
Washington's motives.
Impact
Soft power solves prolif
Poe 11
(Carl P., March 2011, Calhoun Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate
School, An influence analysis of dissuading nation states from producing and
proliferating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Lieutenant @ the United
States Navy, BS from Savannah State University,
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/5794/11Mar_Poe.pdf?
sequence=1, 7/17/15, SM)
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to be one of the
United States and the international communitys major security issues . Since
the United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan, the production and proliferation of nuclear weapons
has shaped the progression of several nation states. While Rublee presented cases for why nation-states
did not pursue nuclear weapons, evidence has shown that other nation states, such as India and Iraq,
chose to pursue nuclear weapons for opposite reasons. In the case of India and Iraq, the perceived threat
of national security seems to have trumped all other forms of strategic nuclear deterrence. In terms of
social-influence tactics that mirrored, or could have been used along with the strategic measures, the
If the nation-state leaders perceived threat outweighs the

perceived benefits of not producing nuclear weapons, then a situation exists
where there may not be any means to deter/dissuade the nation-state from
producing nuclear weapons. Total elimination of the nation-states nuclear facilities by
conducting preemptive strikes or war efforts may be the only means of complete assurance. Total
elimination of a nation-states nuclear facilities out of fear that the nationstate may one
day decide to create a divergent path within the program to produce nuclear weapons would not
be a practical approach due to the complexities presented by globalization.
Instead, a more practical means to prevent the production and proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction among emerging nation-states would through early engagement. Working with
other adjacent nation-states through diplomatic exchange to reduce the
threat perceived by the emerging nation-state would be just one approach to lowering
the security threshold. This could be through the creation of a nuclear free zone within
same can be said.
a given region and increasing the level of transparency of military and governmental programs among
regional nation-states. Also, persuading the emerging nation-state to sign documentation such as the NPT
and the CTBT would also be a key step in deterring and dissuading the nation-state not to produce and
proliferate WMD. Couple these strategic approaches with the social influence tactics discussed in Chapter
V and more formidable measures such as sanctions, resolutions, and fear tactics may not have to be
invoked.
AT Off Case
Cap K
Turn NSAs collection of metadata entrenches the states
ability to use surveillance to further advance global
capitalism the aff limits this power
Price, Professor of Anthropology in the Department of Society and Social
Justice at Saint Martin's University, August 2014 (David H., Monthly Review,
Volume: 66 Issue: 3 Pages: 43-53, The New Surveillance Normal: NSA and
Corporate Surveillance in the Age of Global Capitalism proquest; accessed
7/14/15 JH @ DDI)
The National Security Agency (NSA) document cache released by Edward Snowden reveals a
need to re-theorize the role of state and corporate surveillance systems in an
age of neoliberal global capitalism. While much remains unknowable to us, we now are in
a world where private communications are legible in previously inconceivable
ways, ideologies of surveillance are undergoing rapid transformations, and
the commodification of metadata (and other surveillance intelligence) transforms
privacy. In light of this, we need to consider how the NSA and corporate metadata mining
converge to support the interests of capital . This is an age of converging state and
corporate surveillance. Like other features of the political economy, these shifts
develop with apparent independence of institutional motivations, yet
corporate and spy agencies' practices share common appetites for metadata.
Snowden's revelations of the NSA's global surveillance programs raises the possibility that the state
intelligence apparatus is used for industrial espionage in ways that could unite governmental intelligence
and corporate interests-for which there appears to be historical precedent. The convergence of the
interests, incentives, and methods of U.S. intelligence agencies, and the corporate powers they serve,
the NSA and CIA fulfill their roles, which have been
described by former CIA agent Philip Agee as: "the secret police of U.S. capitalism,
plugging up leaks in the political dam night and day so that shareholders of
U.S. companies operating in poor countries can continue enjoying the ripoff."1 There is a long history in the United States of overwhelming public opposition to new forms of
raise questions about the ways that
electronic surveillance. Police, prosecutors, and spy agencies have recurrently used public crises-ranging
from the Lindbergh baby kidnapping, wars, claimed threats of organized crime and terror attacks, to
marshal expanded state surveillance powers.2 During the two decades preceding the 9/11 terror attacks,
Congress periodically considered developing legislation establishing rights of privacy; but even in the pre-
Pre-2001 critiques of
electronic-surveillance focused on privacy rights and threats to boundaries
between individuals, corporations, and the state; what would later be known as metadata
collection were then broadly understood as violating shared notions of
privacy, and as exposing the scaffolding of a police state or a corporate
panopticon inhabited by consumers living in a George Tooker painting. The rapid shifts in U.S.
Internet age, corporate interests scoffed at the need for any such protections.
attitudes favoring expanded domestic intelligence powers following 9/11 were significant. In the summer of
2001, distrust of the FBI and other surveillance agencies had reached one of its highest historical levels.
Decades of longitudinal survey data collected by the Justice Department establish longstanding U.S.
opposition to wiretaps; disapproval levels fluctuated between 70-80 percent during the thirty years
preceding 2001.3 But a December 2001 New York Times poll suddenly found only 44 percent of
respondents believed widespread governmental wiretaps "would violate American's rights."4
Turn metadata commodification inevitable the affs

reduction of surveillance prevents the stratification of
electronic privacy to social elites and use of metadata in
support of global capital
7/14/15 JH @ DDI)
Notions of privacy and surveillance are always culturally constructed and are
embedded within economic and social formations of the larger society . Some
centralized state-socialist systems, such as the USSR or East Germany, developed intrusive surveillance systems, an
incessant and effective theme of anti-Soviet propaganda. The democratic-socialist formations, such as those of
contemporary northern Europe, have laws that significantly limit the forms of electronic surveillance and the collection of
metadata, compared to Anglo- U.S. practice. Despite the significant limitations hindering analysis of the intentionally
secret activities of intelligence agencies operating outside of public accountability and systems of legal accountability, the
documents made available by whistleblowers like Snowden and WikiLeaks,

and knowledge of past intelligence agencies' activities, provide information
that can help us develop a useful framework for considering the uses to
which these new invasive electronic surveillance technologies can be put. We
need a theory of surveillance that incorporates the political economy of the
U.S. national security state and the corporate interests which it serves and
protects. Such analysis needs an economic foundation and a view that looks
beyond cultural categories separating commerce and state security systems
designed to protect capital. The metadata, valuable private corporate data,
and fruits of industrial espionage gathered under PRISM and other NSA
programs all produce information of such a high value that it seems likely
some of it will be used in a context of global capital . It matters little what legal restrictions
are in place; in a global, high-tech, capitalist economy such information is
invariably commodified. It is likely to be used to: facilitate industrial or corporate sabotage operations of the
sort inflicted by the Stuxnet worm; steal either corporate secrets for NSA use, or foreign corporate secrets for U.S.
corporate use; make investments by intelligence agencies financing their own operations; or secure personal financial
The rise of new invasive technologies

coincides with the decline of ideological resistance to surveillance and the
compilation of metadata. The speed of Americans' adoption of ideologies
embracing previously unthinkable levels of corporate and state surveillance
suggests a continued public acceptance of a new surveillance normal will
continue to develop with little resistance. In a world where the CIA can hack the computers of
gain by individuals working in the intelligence sector.
Senator Feinstein-a leader of the one of the three branches of government-with impunity or lack of public outcry, it is
To live a
well-adjusted life in contemporary U.S. society requires the development of
rapid memory adjustments and shifting acceptance of corporate and state
intrusions into what were once protective spheres of private life. Like all
things in our society, we can expect these intrusions will themselves be
increasingly stratified, as electronic privacy, or illegibility, will increasingly
become a commodity available only to elites. Today, expensive technologies like GeeksPhone's
difficult to anticipate a deceleration in the pace at which NSA and CIA expand their surveillance reach.
Blackphone with enhanced PGP encryption, or Boeing's self-destructing Black Phone, afford special levels of privacy for
those who can pay.
Perm do both/Perm do the aff as starting point this

solves best aff provides a framework for broader
interrogation of capitalist surveillance practices
7/14/15 JH @ DDI)
the NSA is dependent on private corporate
services for the outsourced collection of data, and where the NSA is increasingly reliant on
corporate owned data farms where the storage and analysis of the data occurs. In the neoliberal United
States, Amazon and other private firms lease massive cloud server space to
the CIA, under an arrangement where it becomes a share cropper on these scattered data farms. These arrangements
Snowden's revelations reveal a world where
present nebulous security relationships raising questions of role confusion in shifting patron-client relationships; and
whatever resistance corporations like Amazon might have had to assisting NSA, CIA, or intelligence agencies is further
compromised by relations of commerce. This creates relationships of culpability, as Norman Solomon suggests, with
Amazon's $600 million CIA data farm contract: " if
Obama orders the CIA to kill a U.S. Citizen,

Amazon will be a partner in assassination."10 Such arrangements diffuse
complicity in ways seldom considered by consumers focused on Amazon
Prime's ability to speedily deliver a My Little Pony play set for a brony
nephew's birthday party, not on the company's links to drone attacks on
Pakistani wedding parties. The Internet developed first as a military-communication system; only later did it
evolve the commercial and recreational uses distant from the initial intent of its Pentagon landlords. Snowden's
revelations reveal how the Internet's architecture, a compromised judiciary,
and duplexed desires of capitalism and the national security state are today
converging to track our purchases, queries, movements, associations,
allegiances, and desires. The rise of e-commerce, and the soft addictive allure of social media, rapidly
transforms U.S. economic and social formations. Shifts in the base are followed by shifts in the superstructure, and new
generations of e- consumers are socialized to accept phones that track movements, and game systems that bring
We need to
develop critical frameworks considering how NSA and CIA surveillance
programs articulate not only with the United States' domestic and
international security apparatus, but with current international capitalist
formations. While secrecy shrouds our understanding of these relationships, CIA history provides examples of some
ways that intelligence operations have supported and informed past U.S. economic ventures. When these
historical patterns are combined with details from Snowden's disclosures we
find continuities of means, motive, and opportunity for neoliberal abuses of
state intelligence for private gains.
cameras into the formerly private refuges of our homes, as part of a "new surveillance normal."11
Neg Framework card

7/14/15 JH @ DDI)
Notions of privacy and surveillance are always culturally constructed and are
embedded within economic and social formations of the larger society . Some
centralized state-socialist systems, such as the USSR or East Germany, developed intrusive surveillance systems, an
incessant and effective theme of anti-Soviet propaganda. The democratic-socialist formations, such as those of
contemporary northern Europe, have laws that significantly limit the forms of electronic surveillance and the collection of
metadata, compared to Anglo- U.S. practice. Despite the significant limitations hindering analysis of the intentionally
secret activities of intelligence agencies operating outside of public accountability and systems of legal accountability, the
documents made available by whistleblowers like Snowden and WikiLeaks,

and knowledge of past intelligence agencies' activities, provide information
that can help us develop a useful framework for considering the uses to
which these new invasive electronic surveillance technologies can be put . We
need a theory of surveillance that incorporates the political economy of the
U.S. national security state and the corporate interests which it serves and
protects. Such analysis needs an economic foundation and a view that looks
beyond cultural categories separating commerce and state security systems
designed to protect capital. The metadata, valuable private corporate data,
and fruits of industrial espionage gathered under PRISM and other NSA
programs all produce information of such a high value that it seems likely
some of it will be used in a context of global capital. It matters little what legal restrictions
are in place; in a global, high-tech, capitalist economy such information is
invariably commodified. It is likely to be used to: facilitate industrial or corporate sabotage operations of the
sort inflicted by the Stuxnet worm; steal either corporate secrets for NSA use, or foreign corporate secrets for U.S.
corporate use; make investments by intelligence agencies financing their own operations; or secure personal financial
The rise of new invasive technologies

coincides with the decline of ideological resistance to surveillance and the
compilation of metadata. The speed of Americans' adoption of ideologies
embracing previously unthinkable levels of corporate and state surveillance
suggests a continued public acceptance of a new surveillance normal will
continue to develop with little resistance. In a world where the CIA can hack the computers of
gain by individuals working in the intelligence sector.
Senator Feinstein-a leader of the one of the three branches of government-with impunity or lack of public outcry, it is
To live a
well-adjusted life in contemporary U.S. society requires the development of
rapid memory adjustments and shifting acceptance of corporate and state
intrusions into what were once protective spheres of private life. Like all
things in our society, we can expect these intrusions will themselves be
increasingly stratified, as electronic privacy, or illegibility, will increasingly
become a commodity available only to elites. Today, expensive technologies like GeeksPhone's
difficult to anticipate a deceleration in the pace at which NSA and CIA expand their surveillance reach.
Blackphone with enhanced PGP encryption, or Boeing's self-destructing Black Phone, afford special levels of privacy for
While the United States' current state of surveillance acceptance

offers little immediate hope of a social movement limiting corporate or
government spying, there are enough historical instances of post-crises limits
being imposed on government surveillance to offer some hope . Following the Second
those who can pay.
World War, many European nations reconfigured long-distance billing systems to not record specific numbers called,
instead only recording billing zones-because the Nazis used phone billing records as metadata useful for identifying
members of resistance movements. Following the Arab Spring, Tunisia now reconfigures its Internet with a new info-packet
system known as mesh networks that hinder governmental monitoring-though USAID support for this project naturally
undermines trust in this system.27 Following the Church and Pike committees' congressional investigations of CIA and FBI
wrongdoing in the 1970s, the Hughes-Ryan Act brought significant oversight and limits on these groups, limits which
Some future crisis

may well provide similar opportunities to regain now lost contours of
privacies. Yet hope for immediate change remains limited. It will be difficult
for social reform movements striving to protect individual privacy to limit
decayed over time and whose remaining restraints were undone with the USA PATRIOT Act.
state and corporate surveillance. Today's surveillance complex aligned with

an economic base enthralled with the prospects of metadata appears too
strong for meaningful reforms without significant shifts in larger economic
formations. Whatever inherent contradictions exist within the present
surveillance system, and regardless of the objections of privacy advocates of
the liberal left and libertarian right, meaningful restrictions appear presently
unlikely with surveillance formations so closely tied to the current iteration of
global capitalism.
XO CP
Executive and electoral solutions to surveillance fail
Tyler C. Anderson, J.D Candidate, Harvard Law School, Class of 2014,
Summer 2014, Toward Institutional Reform of Intelligence Surveillance: A
Proposal to Amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Harvard Law &
Policy Review, 8 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 413, LexisNexis Scholastic, JL @ DDI
B. A Defense of a Legislative Solution
While it may be true that elections and insubordination (among other
mechanisms) can constrain the President's power to authorize broad
surveillance of American communications, neither of these answers will
satisfy critics or prevent the abuses disclosed by Edward Snowden. First,
insubordination is unreliable. As famously illustrated by Yale psychology
professor Stanley Milgram (before the ethics of human psychological testing
was seriously questioned), human beings follow orders even if asked to do
incredibly immoral things. In Milgram's experiments, he demonstrated that a
majority of people will shock innocent participants to death if given an order
to do so. n144 This phenomenon is not limited to the halls of the Yale
Psychology Department. In the context of U.S. national security law, during
the Iran-Contra Affair, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North abnegated
responsibility for violating Congress' explicit refusal to authorize arms sales to
the Nicaraguan Contras, declaring that he was just "following orders." n145
Lieutenant North's behavior is unsurprising; in cases of national security, it
might actually be more likely that presidential subordinates will err in favor of
following orders, since decisions by the President and government agencies
presumptively directly affect the safety and wellbeing of American citizens. If
we analogize to intelligence surveillance, it is entirely likely that intelligence
agencies will defer to their superiors and conduct surveillance even if they
themselves think that it is unlawful. Electoral constraints, while perhaps more
reliable than insubordination, are similarly unsatisfying, in part because even
broad consensus on the need for reform has so far failed to materialize into a
concrete FAA amendment. n146 Even when the American public does
respond strongly to perceived presidential overreach, as in the case of
Watergate and the 2006 and 2010 elections (against Bush's counter-terrorism
strategy and Obama's healthcare [*435] plan, respectively), electoral control
exerts itself only post-overreach, and sometimes only distantly so. n147
Additionally, unless the overreach is particularly egregious, the people and
Congress may not react at all. n148 This problem is compounded by the fact
that intelligence surveillance takes place in secret, and the behavior of
intelligence agencies is often classified. The American people cannot vote to
reject something that they do not know is happening. In short, if intelligence
agencies or the President try to conduct broad, warrantless surveillance
under the FAA, both insubordination and electoral outrage are unlikely to
effectively constrain their behavior. This is because insubordination is
unreliable and the surveillance process is too secretive to provoke a reaction
from the American public. Given these problems with constraints, America
would be better served by relying on legal mechanisms for reducing possible
executive branch overreach. Most importantly, the amendments to the FAA
that this article proposes will effectively restrict intelligence agencies in a way
that electoral politics and insubordination do not.

FISA Court Affirmative - DDI 2015 SWS

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FISA Court AFF

multiplying accounts of lawyers in the Intelligence Community

Might all these

national security agency counsel are

the commitment he attempted to bolster

pleaded for yes when it can be, . . . no when it must be.315

Freedom Act didnt do a whole lot the government can

The Freedom Act

A panel of experts appointed by the White House, which included

In terms of the total scope of surveillance

Critics of the NSA in Congress, such as Michigan representative

without the approval of a judge.

FISA Courts play a critical role in SQ of curtailing

(FISA) of 1978 provided a procedure under

PCLOB recommends a special advocate is put into place to

the FISC continues to review applications for

Our judicial system thrives on the

The ex parte system is not enough- public advocate is key

The Public advocate would have the ability to curtail

Executive is bound and that the Madisonian republic lives on.

Adding a public advocate curtails surveillance.

FISC proceedings are consistent with the

adding a public advocate to FISC proceedings would ensure that legal

Public advocates fall under the federal government

The public advocate would be subject to the Article

even if they were a government employee, they would not

A new Congressional Research Service report

Public advocate is constitutionally feasible and solves

The CRS Report

For one thing, the advocate would not

she would not exercise significant government

special advocate would have no such authority. She would not be

Public Advocate solve best

The public advocate would be subject to the Article

Last, as the advocate

Appointments Clause arguments may be rendered

but merely having a lawyer present, possibly

A public advocate would ensure the FISC meets standards

The absence of analysis is

An institutional advocate at the FISC would supplement legislative

Over time, an advocate should fit

Finally, the prophylactic

this innovation will be well

worth any modest inefficiencies that ensue .

Introducing a privacy advocate solves

While the FAA has corrected

suggests that the real issue

Unlike the Wiretap Reports issued by the Administrative

Foreign Investor Loss/Data Pullout

initially reported that the revenue

Cisco, McAfee/Intel, Apple

Laundry list of companies leaving the US because of

Foreigners comprise nearly

IBM said that it would be spending more than a billion

NSA surveillance costs US companies more than expected and

the NSAs massive surveillance machine it didnt

economic impact of U.S. surveillance

NSA surveillance hurts the economy and undercuts

According to the Information

To protect not only

NSA surveillance kills econChina

a number of reasons were cited, domestic

Concerned about backdoors implanted by the

The fear is that as the China-US cybersecurity standoff