FBI Drug Testing Affirmative

1AC

1AC Cybersecurity Advantage

Contention One is Cybersecurity

FBI drug testing policy creates a private brain drain that undermines
cybersecurity.
Tracy 14 Sam Tracy, Activism Director for Tech Freedom, Former Board Member of the ACLU, M.A. in Sociology
and Political Science from the University of Connecticut, 2014 (The FBI Isn't Updating Its Drug-Related Hiring Policies,
But It Should Be, Huffington Post, May 27th, accessible online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-tracy/the-fbi-isntupdating-its_b_5394775.html, accessed on 7-6-15)
Last week, the Internet erupted in praise, skepticism, and played-out puns following reports that the FBI was
reconsidering its hiring restrictions on marijuana use. FBI Director James B. Comey

said Monday that the

agency was "grappling with the question right now" as the country changed its
approach to marijuana, but backpedaled two days later, declaring at a Senate hearing, "I am
absolutely dead set against using marijuana... I did not say I'm going to change that ban." It's a shame -- to stay as
effective as possible, the FBI would do well to become more flexible on
prospective employees' marijuana use. The supposed potential change was a
reaction to the agency's troubles recruiting hackers to fight cybercrime amid
growing threats from China and elsewhere. Comey, playing up stereotypes while stating a valid
concern, went so far to say, "I have to hire a great work force to compete with those cyber criminals and some of those kids
want to smoke weed on the way to the interview." Meanwhile, the FBI's policies state that job applicants can't have used
marijuana within the past three years, any other illegal drug in the past 10, or ever sold or transported any illegal drug.

It

is certainly true that many talented young hackers use marijuana. 14 percent of
18-29 year olds told the latest Gallup poll they were current marijuana users, and 36 percent
reported trying it at some point in their lives -- and hackers are one of many subcultures well-known for their cannabis
use. The

cream of the crop is even more susceptible to disqualification: a number

of studies have found smart people are more likely to experiment with drugs than
their less-intelligent peers. But a policy change wouldn't just affect young hackers
who use marijuana recreationally. The FBI employs over 35,000 people, from hackers to secretaries to
spies to janitors. When a young hacker who enjoys marijuana is turned away from an
FBI job for her past-time, she can probably find a better-paying, drug-test-free
job at Google, Microsoft, or one of the countless startups hoping to be listed along
with those giants one day. But a medical marijuana patient in one of the 21 states (and the nation's capital)
where it's legal may not have as many options, and current FBI employees who could benefit from its use may turn to

A majority of Americans live in states

where it's legal to use marijuana for medical purposes, and millions of adults who live in (or
vacation to) Colorado can already use it like they do alcohol or tobacco. Yet the federal government's
unwillingness to update its approach to marijuana precludes countless otherwise
law-abiding citizens from serving our country in agencies like the FBI or CIA. This
more risky treatment alternatives in order to keep their jobs.

already-nonsensical policy is all the more ridiculous when you consider our last three presidents -- each the ultimate head
of the FBI -- has admitted to past illegal drug use. If having used cocaine doesn't disqualify one from being Commander in

Chief, why should it take you out of the running to be an entry-level security analyst? The

FBI could greatly

expand its applicant pool, thus increasing the quality of its hires, if it simply
threw out the rules barring past drug use and focused instead on preventing onthe-job impairment. They've already eased up on their restrictions before: no one
who used marijuana more than 15 times could be hired before the FBI changed to
its current policies in 2007. What drugs someone chooses to use has nothing to do
with their trustworthiness or love of country, and we'd all do well to stop
pretending it does.

Current employees are forced to turn to riskier methods of

medical treatment in order to avoid testing positive,
jeopardizing their health
Huffington Post 14 (written by Sam Tracy, civil rights activist focused on drug policy reform, technological
law, and criminal justice, The FBI Isn't Updating Its Drug-Related Hiring Policies, But It Should Be
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-tracy/the-fbi-isnt-updating-its_b_5394775.html) aj
But a

policy change wouldn't just affect young hackers who use marijuana
recreationally. The FBI employs over 35,000 people, from hackers to secretaries
to spies to janitors. When a young hacker who enjoys marijuana is turned away from an FBI job for her pasttime, she can probably find a better-paying, drug-test-free job at Google, Microsoft, or one of the countless startups
hoping to be listed along with those giants one day. But a medical marijuana patient in one of the 21 states (and the
nation's capital) where it's legal may not have as many options, and current

FBI employees who

could benefit from its use may turn to more risky treatment
alternatives in order to keep their jobs. The FBI could greatly expand its
applicant pool, thus increasing the quality of its hires, if it simply threw out the rules barring
past drug use and focused instead on preventing on-the-job impairment. They've already eased up on
their restrictions before: no one who used marijuana more than 15
times could be hired before the FBI changed to its current policies in
2007. What drugs someone chooses to use has nothing to do with their trustworthiness or love of country, and we'd all
do well to stop pretending it does.

Lack of qualified hackers drastically increases the risk of cyber-terror

current levels are not sufficient.
Wait 14 Patience Wait, freelance tech editor for Information Week internally citing Gregory Wilshusen, Director
of Information Security Issues at the Governemnt Accountability Office, M.S. in Information Management from George
Washington University, and Robert Childs, Former Chancellor of the National Defense University, Deputy to the
President for Cyber and Information, ED in Education Management and Law from Duke University, 2014 (Government
Hiring Practices Hamper Cybersecurity Efforts, Information Week, May 20th, accessible online at
http://www.informationweek.com/government/cybersecurity/government-hiring-practices-hamper-cybersecurityefforts/d/d-id/1252939?page_number=2, accessed on 7-6-15)
Bucci added that just getting employees to follow the cybersecurity policies already on the books would help -- and that
has to include the bosses. "If the boss isn't doing it, no one else will," he said. Wilshusen said

many federal

agency leaders are starting to understand the importance of recruiting better

talent. "The incidents reported to US-CERT have more than doubled in the past
four years." But it's going to take more than just agency leaders recognizing the
problem. Childs pointed to previous cyberattacks, including when attackers shut
down much of Estonia's electronic infrastructure in 2007 and another on the Saudi
national oil company Aramco in 2012, as acts of cyber warfare. The war between Russia and
Georgia in 2008 was the first demonstration of "cyber (attacks) combined with
kinetic attacks," he said. Bucci said the US military comes closest to understanding and preparing for these kinds
of orchestrated attacks. "But in a [military] exercise, add the cyber component and the
exercise comes crashing to a halt within a couple of hours ," he said. The leaders of
the exercise will usually insist on shutting down the cyber component so they can
continue, even though they won't be able to do that on a real battlefield, he said.

Drug testing prevents the FBI from hiring vital cybersecurity experts
Mottl 14 (Judy, Tech Times, FBI: Finding cybersecurity gurus is tough as many are pot heads, May 21, 2014,
http://www.techtimes.com/articles/7352/20140521/feds-finding-cyber-security-gurus-tough-pot-heads.htm, JZG)

The FBI is mulling revamping its hiring rules regarding drug use, specifically
marijuana, as it's getting tough to hire on cybersecurity gurus given the potsmoking habit many seem to have these days. FBI Director James B. Comey said the federal
enforcement agency may have to change up its regulations regarding employee
drug rules to hire on needed IT talent in its quest to fight cybersecurity threats . The
FBI has the approval of Congress to add 2,000 staffers and most will be focused
on cybersecurity. But finding that many gurus who don't have a pot habit may be
tough, said Comey, during a conference Monday in New York. "I have to hire a great work force to
compete with those cyber criminals and some of those kids want to smoke weed
on the way to the interview," Comey said. Right now the FBI can't hire anyone who may
be users of marijuana but Comey said publicly that those who do have a habit and are cybersecurity experts
should apply for a job if interested.

Scenario One is Cyber Attacks

Cyber attacks are frequent and devastating. Every attack

increases the risk of existential catastrophe.
Nolan 15 Andrew Nolan, Legislative Attorney at the Congressional Research Service, former Trial
Attorney at the United States Department of Justice, holds a J.D. from George Washington University, 2015
(Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Legal Challenges and Solutions, CRS Report to Congress, March
16th, Available Online at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43941.pdf, Accessed 07-05-2015, p. 1-3)
Introduction

Over the course of the last year, a host of cyberattacks have been
perpetrated on a number of high profile American companies. In
January 2014, Target announced that hackers, using malware, had
digitally impersonated one of the retail giants contractors, stealing
vast amounts of dataincluding the names, mailing addresses, phone numbers or email
1

addresses for up to 70 million individuals and the credit card information of 40 million shoppers. 4

Cyberattacks in February and March of 2014 potentially exposed

contact and log-in information of eBays customers, prompting the online retailer
to ask its more than 200 million users to change their passwords. In September, it was
revealed that over the course of five months cyber-criminals tried to
steal the credit card information of more than fifty million shoppers of
the worlds largest home improvement retailer, Home Depot. One month later, J.P.
Morgan Chase, the largest U.S. bank by assets, disclosed that contact
information for about 76 million households was captured in a
cyberattack earlier in the year. In perhaps the most infamous cyberattack of
2014, in late November, Sony Pictures Entertainment suffered a significant
system disruption as a result of a brazen cyber attack that resulted
in the leaking of the personal details of thousands of Sony employees.
And in February of 2015, the health care provider Anthem Blue Cross
Blue Shield [end page 1] disclosed that a very sophisticated attack
obtained personal information relating to the companys customers
and employees.
5

10

The high profile cyberattacks of 2014 and early 2015 appear to be

indicative of a broader trend: the frequency and ferocity of
cyberattacks are increasing, posing grave threats to the national
interests of the United States. Indeed, the attacks on Target, eBay, Home
Depot, J.P. Morgan-Chase, Sony Pictures, and Anthem were only a few
of the many publicly disclosed cyberattacks perpetrated in 2014 and 2105.
Experts suggest that hundreds of thousands of other entities may have
suffered similar incidents during the same period, with one survey
indicating that 43% of firms in the United States had experienced a data
breach in the past year.14 Moreover, just as the cyberattacks of 2013
which included incidents involving companies like the New York Times,
Facebook, Twitter, Apple, and Microsoft were eclipsed by those that
occurred in 2014, the consensus view is that 2015 and beyond will
witness more frequent and more sophisticated cyber incidents. To
the extent that its expected rise outpaces any corresponding rise in the
ability to defend against such attacks, the result could be troubling
news for countless businesses that rely more and more on computers
in all aspects of their operations, as the economic losses resulting from
11

12

13

15

16

17

a single cyberattack can be extremely costly. And the resulting

effects of a cyberattack can have effects beyond a single companys
bottom line. As nations are becoming ever more dependent on
information and information technology, the threat posed by any one
cyberattack [end page 2] can have devastating collateral and
cascading effects across a wide range of physical, economic
and social systems. With reports that foreign nationssuch as
Russia, China, Iran, and North Koreamay be using cyberspace as a
new front to wage war, fears abound that a cyberattack could be
used to shut down the nations electrical grid, hijack a
commercial airliner, or even launch a nuclear weapon with a
single keystroke.24 In short, the potential exists that the United States
could suffer a cyber Pearl Harbor, an attack that would cause
physical destruction and loss of life and exposein the words of one
prominent cybersecurity expertvulnerabilities of staggering
proportions.
18

19

20

21

22

23

25

26

This escalates to nuclear war

Fritz 09 Jason Fritz, Bond University IR Masters, July 2009, Hacking Nuclear Command and Control,
http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf
This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open
source knowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be
compromised through computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists
capabilities, strategies, and tactics. If

access to command and control centres is obtained, terrorists

could fake or actually cause one nuclear-armed state to attack another, thus
provoking a nuclear response from another nuclear power. This may be an easier
alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves. This would also act
as a force equaliser, and provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of geographical distance,
and a relatively low cost. Continuing difficulties in developing computer tracking technologies which could trace the
identity of intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses to
computer network operations, point towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to manage nuclear
weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing the hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals. All computers

Computers which operate

on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker methods, such as
privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded
exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry points . For example, e-mail
spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead
to the installation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported
which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control.

on removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information

found on the internet may also

reveal how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing

reliance on computer networks, including experimental tech nology such as

autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad

capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command
centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier task. There

is

evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been made by hackers to compromise the
extremely low radio frequency once used by the US Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines.
Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was
unable to establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response in the event that
nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists
blocking communications through computer network operations in an attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be
launched, damage could be further enhanced through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, multilayered attacks could be engineered. Terrorists could remotely commandeer computers in China and use them to launch a
US nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under attack from the US and the US would believe
China was responsible. Further, emergency response communications could be disrupted, transportation could be shut
down, and disinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and
maximizing destruction. Disruptions

in communication and the use of disinformation could

also be used to provoke uninformed responses. For example, a nuclear strike between India and
Pakistan could be coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against key networks, so they would have further
difficulty in identifying what happened and be forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock out communications
between these states so they cannot discuss the situation. Alternatively, amidst

the confusion of a traditional

large-scale terrorist attack, claims of responsibility and declarations of war could be

falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty military response. These false claims could be posted
directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be sent to the media and foreign
governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials .

A sophisticated and all

encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber

terrorism could be
enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own, without the need for
compromising command and control centres directly.

Scenario Two is Money Laundering

Countering cybercrime at the FBI is necessary to prevent financial
crime
FBI 11 (The NCFTA: Combining Forces to Fight Cyber Crime, The Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/16/11,
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/september/cyber_091611)//kjz
Long before it was acknowledged to be a significant criminal and national security threat ,

the FBI established a

forward-looking organization to proactively address the issue of cyber crime.
Since its creation in 1997, the National Cyber-Forensics & Training Allianc e
(NCFTA), based in Pittsburgh, has become an international model for bringing together
law enforcement, private industry, and academia to share information to stop
emerging cyber threats and mitigate existing ones. The exchange of strategic and
threat intelligence is really the bread and butter of the NCFTA , said Special Agent Eric
Strom, who heads the FBI unitthe Cyber Initiative and Resource Fusion Unit (CIRFU)assigned to the NCFTA. The
success of this effort at every level comes down to the free flow of information
among our partners. When the nonprofit NCFTA was established, the biggest threat to industry was from
spamthose annoying unsolicited e-mails that fill up inboxes. Today , the organization deals with
malicious computer viruses, stock manipulation schemes, telecommunication

scams, and other financial frauds perpetrated by organized crime groups who
cause billions of dollars in losses to companies and consumers. CIRFU logo Cyber
Takedowns The FBI has conducted a number of major cyber takedowns with the help
of the Cyber Initiative and Resource Fusion Unit (CIRFU)the cyber unit attached to the NCFTA. Here is a brief look
at a three of those cases: Dark Market: Fifty-six individuals were arrested worldwide and $70
million in potential loss was prevented. A CIRFU undercover agent posing as a
cyber crook infiltrated a criminal Internet forum at its highest level. More Coreflood:
Investigators disrupted an international cyber fraud operation by seizing the
servers that had infected as many as two million computers with malicious
software. More Trident Breach: This major bust targeted a theft ring that used a Trojan
horse virus to steal millions of dollars from victims bank accounts . More The
NCFTA essentially works as an early-warning system. If investigators for a major
banking institution, for example, notice a new kind of malware attacking their
network, they immediately pass that information to other NCFTA members.
Alliance membersmany have staff permanently located at the NCFTAthen develop strategies to
mitigate the threat. FBI agents and analysts from CIRFU, also located at NCFTA headquarters, use that
information to open or further existing FBI investigations, often in concert with law enforcement partners around the
world. Cyber crime has changed so much since those early days of spamming, Strom said. And the threat continues to
evolve globally, which is why the NCFTAs work is so critical to both business and law enforcement. The organization
draws its intelligence from hundreds of private-sector members, Carnegie Mellon Universitys Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT), and the FBIs Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3). That extensive knowledge base has helped
CIRFU play a key role in some of the FBIs most significant cyber cases in the past several years. (See sidebar.) Training is
another important role of the NCFTA. Last year, an international internship program was held in which cyber
investigators from Germany, Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, Lithuania, and the Ukraine came to the alliance
headquarters for 90 days to share knowledge, build relationships, and help with each others investigations. Working
with CIRFU and the NCFTA makes our cooperation very direct, said Mirko Manske, a cyber investigator for the German
Federal Criminal Police. We can work in real time, sharing information and moving our cases forward. That is one of the
biggest gains for us. Manske added, If I need a contact in the U.S., I reach out to CIRFU, and they help me immediately.
And we do the same for them. Basically we are opening doors for each other. When it comes to the global reach of cyber
crime, Manske said, The FBI gets it. They realize that no one organization can succeed by itself. CIRFU started all of this,
he added. The unit is one of the reasons the FBI is recognized as one of the worldwide leaders in the fight against cyber
crime.

FBI policy is key to prevent financial crimes like money laundering

Find Law 15 (Find Law a database for information on criminal law, last updated in 2015, Fraud and Financial
Crimes http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-charges/fraud-financial-crimes.html) CW

financial crimes are a form of theft/larceny that occur when a person or

entity takes money or property, or uses them in an illicit manner, with the intent
to gain a benefit from it. These crimes typically involve some form of deceit,
subterfuge or the abuse of a position of trust, which distinguishes them from
common theft or robbery. In today's complex economy, fraud and financial crimes can take many forms. The
Fraud and

resources below will introduce you to the more common forms of financial crimes, such as forgery, credit card fraud,
embezzlement and money laundering. Bribery Brief explanation of bribery, which is

the act of accepting or

offering something of value in exchange for influence or power in connection to
an elected position or public employment. Fraud In-depth information about fraud in general and

definitions of the various types of fraud such as wire

fraud; tax evasion; insurance fraud; and

identity theft plus tips for identifying fraudulent activity. Embezzlement Overview of embezzlement, a
crime that occurs when an individual steals money or property that he or she has
been entrusted to manage, with links to FindLaw's theft and larceny subsection. Identity Theft Brief
definition of identity theft, which occurs when someone unlawfully uses another's
personally identifying information (such as a Social Security Number) to commit other
crimes, such as credit card fraud. Money Laundering Definition of money laundering, a crime
involving the movement of illicit money and other gains into
legitimate channels in order to disguise the money's illegal source and
thwart tax officials. Mortgage Fraud Explanation of the various different illegal schemes related to
the misrepresentation or misstatement of mortgage documents for the purpose of
defrauding another party, such as a lender or a homeowner. Racketeering / RICO Overview
of federal and state racketeering and RICO (Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organization) laws, which
make it a crime for a criminal organization to profit from otherwise legitimate
business operations. Securities Fraud Definition of securities fraud, a crime in which a
corporate officer, for example, makes misleading statements about the companys
stock performance or discloses confidential information related to its stock. Tax
Evasion / Fraud Brief overview of tax evasion, the crime of not paying ones legally required
share of either federal or state taxes, which is punished severely and can lead to
asset forfeiture or prison. White Collar Crimes So-called white-collar crimes encompass many
separate individual crimes, most commonly related to the use of deceit for financial gains, such as Ponzi
schemes; securities fraud; tax evasion; and embezzlement.

US action key on curbing IFFs

Targeted News Service 12 (Mexico Hemorrhages US$872 Billion to Crime, Corruption, Tax Evasion
from 1970-2010, Targeted News Service, January 29, 2012, pageLexis)//JW

The large spike in illicit outflows following the implementation of NAFTA would imply
that much of those outflows were indeed headed for the United States. This
suggests that U.S. policymakers have a significant role to play in
curtailing the flow of illicit money out of their southern neighbor. In addition to
the U.S., tax havens in the Caribbean and Europe were the second and third largest recipients of Mexican capital
outflows. Drug Cartels and National Security Risk A

large portion of drug cartel activity is

conducted in cash, and none of those cash transactions are detected in GFI's data,
which is one of the reasons why the organization believes its figures to be
extremely conservative. That said, drug cartels like many criminal enterprises
also utilize legitimate commercial transactions to launder their profits. In fact, the Los
Angeles Times reported last month that Mexican drug cartels were utilizing trade-based
money laundering techniques to move their money across the U.S.-Mexico
border. Those kinds of business transactions would show up in the organizations data, however it cannot be
determined exactly how much of the trade mispricing in GFI's report is attributable to the activities of drug cartels. As

such, the organization believes that this has serious implications for national
security. "The ease with which money can be laundered across the U.S.-Mexico
border via trade mispricing poses a major national security risk to both the
United States and Mexico," said Mr. Baker. "Drug traffickers, like kleptocrats, terrorists and
tax dodgers, all gain from anonymous shell companies, tax haven secrecy, and
nefarious trade mispricing tactics. Taking steps to address these issues would
curtail a number of societal ills."

IFFs structurally undermine government legitimacy and development

while increasing dependence and the risk of economic crises
Le Billon 11 Associate Professor of Geography and Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia
(Philippe, CMI (Chr. Michelsin Institute, Extractive Sectors and Illicit Financial Flows: What Role for Revenue
Governance Issues? U4 Issue, October 2011, No. 11, http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/4248-extractive-sectors-andillicit-financial-flows.pdf)

The Norway-sponsored Task Force on the Development Impact of Illicit Financial Flows
(2008) has stressed the negative development impacts of IFF and particularly those
coming from natural resource sectors in developing countries . The Task Force observes that
IFF undermine health, development, and government legitimacy, while
increasing debt, aid dependence, and the risk of economic crises. Quantitative studies specifically
testing for these impacts are lacking, largely because of the relative novelty and persistent uncertainty of IFF data.
However, it is estimated that developing countries experienced approximately US$1.2 trillion in illicit flows during 2008,
10 times the amount of overseas development assistance provided by members of the OECD Development Assistance
Committee that year (Kar and Curcio 2011). A

major concern of extractive sector governance is

the collection and allocation of revenue flows to maximise government revenue
share, eradicate corruption, and ensure fair and efficient use of the revenues. Illicit financial flows
constitute a serious threat to several objectives: IFF coming from corruption
encourage such illegal activities by establishing transfer networks that facilitate the outflow of proceeds.
Corruption undermines the sound governance of resources, notably by facilitating illegal exploitation and poor
environmental and social practices, as well as by eroding the tax base. IFF

undermine the maximisation

of government revenues through tax evasion practices, including transfer mispricing and
misinvoicing. African governments have been particularly vulnerable to this, in part because of inadequate institutional

In turn, this significantly reduces the

contribution of mineral resource revenues to national development. IFF
exacerbate inequalities (by increasing private gains for a few at the expense of public gains for the many) and
inefficiencies (by resulting in suboptimal policies). Because national companies are less able
to lower their effective tax rates, trade mispricing advantages multinationals.
This, in turn, negatively affects the domestic private sector . The developmental impact of
domestic companies, moreover, is frequently undermined by predatory practices. There is a fine balance
between granting sufficient autonomy to a national resource company to allow it
to thrive, and controlling it so it does not become self-serving. IFF discourage
capacity to ensure tax compliance (ATAF 2010, 1).

accountability and encourage discretionary decision making, short-term

thinking, and favouritism by bureaucrats and officials. These practices, in turn,
drastically reduce total earnings that a country derives from extractive assets.

And, broad statistical models prove growth solves war

Royal 10 [Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction U.S. Department of Defense, Economic
Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal
and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215]

Less intuitive is how periods of economic

decline may increase the likelihood of external

conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline
and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic,
dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances
Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms

in the global
economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the
often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous
shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also
Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation
(Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to
a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power
(Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with
parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major , medium and small
powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security
conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that

'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic

conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain
pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the
expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources,
the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain
access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade
expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others
have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict
at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between
internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic
downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and
prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict,
which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the
extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other .
(Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the
likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders
and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government.

"Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from

economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate
external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect . Wang (1996), DeRouen
(1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force
are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that

the

tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic
states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of
domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods

of weak economic
performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are
statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship
positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political
science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic,
dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not
featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

1AC Plan
The Federal Bureau of Investigation should cease drug testing
its job applicants for marijuana.

1AC Solvency
The plan solves now is key to amend the policy
Levinson 14

(Charles, reporter for the Wall Street Journal, Comey: FBI Grappling With Hiring
Policy Concerning Marijuana, Wall Street Journal, 5/20/14, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/05/20/directorcomey-fbi-grappling-with-hiring-policy-concerning-marijuana/)//kjz
Monday was a big day for the nations cyber police. The Justice Department charged five Chinese military
officials with hacking, and brought charges against the creators of powerful hacking software. But FBI
Director James B. Comey said Monday that if the FBI hopes to continue to keep pace with cyber criminals,
the organization may have to loosen up its no-tolerance policy for hiring those who like to smoke

Congress has authorized the FBI to add 2,000 personnel to its rolls this
year, and many of those new recruits will be assigned to tackle cyber crimes, a
growing priority for the agency. And thats a problem, Mr. Comey told the White Collar Crime
Institute, an annual conference held at the New York City Bar Association in Manhattan. A lot of the
nations top computer programmers and hacking gurus are also fond of
marijuana. I have to hire a great work force to compete with those cyber
criminals and some of those kids want to smoke weed on the way to the
interview, Mr. Comey said. Mr. Comey said that the agency was grappling with
the question right now of how to amend the agencys marijuana policie s, which
marijuana.

excludes from consideration anyone who has smoked marijuana in the previous three years, according to
the FBIs Web site. One conference goer asked Mr. Comey about a friend who had shied away from
applying because of the policy. He should go ahead and apply, despite the marijuana use, Mr. Comey
said.

The aff is unique Comeys dead set against hiring those who use
marijuana
Huffington Post 14 (written by Sam Tracy, civil rights activist focused on drug policy reform, technological
law, and criminal justice, The FBI Isn't Updating Its Drug-Related Hiring Policies, But It Should Be
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-tracy/the-fbi-isnt-updating-its_b_5394775.html) aj
Last week, the Internet erupted in praise, skepticism, and played-out puns following reports that the FBI was
reconsidering its hiring restrictions on marijuana use. FBI Director James B. Comey

said Monday that the

agency was "grappling with the question right now" as the country changed its
approach to marijuana, but backpedaled two days later, declaring at a Senate
hearing, "I am absolutely dead set against using marijuana... I did not
say I'm going to change that ban." It's a shame -- to stay as effective as possible, the FBI would do
well to become more flexible on prospective employees' marijuana use. The supposed potential change
was a reaction to the agency's troubles recruiting hackers to fight cybercrime
amid growing threats from China and elsewhere. Comey, playing up stereotypes while stating a
valid concern, went so far to say, "I have to hire a great work force to compete with those cyber criminals and some of
those kids want to smoke weed on the way to the interview." Meanwhile, the

FBI's policies state that job

applicants can't have used marijuana within the past three years, any other illegal
drug in the past 10, or ever sold or transported any illegal drug.

Drug policy uniquely hurts people with high IQs

Szalavitz 11 (Maia, a neuroscience journalist and author of the forthcoming book "Unbroken Brain: Why
Addiction Is a Learning Disorder and Why It Matters, Why Kids With High IQs Are More Likely to Take Drugs, Time,
11/15/11, http://healthland.time.com/2011/11/15/why-kids-with-high-iq-are-more-likely-to-take-drugs/)//kjz

People with high IQs are more likely to smoke marijuana and take other illegal
drugs, compared with those who score lower on intelligence tests , according to a new
study from the U.K. Its counterintuitive, says lead author James White of the Center for the Development and
Evaluation of Complex Interventions for Public Health Improvement at Cardiff University in Wales. Its not what we
thought we would find. The research was based on interviews with some 7,900 British people born in early April 1970.
Researchers measured the participants IQs at ages 5 and 10, then followed up with them at ages 16 and 30, asking about
symptoms of psychological distress and drug use as part of a larger survey. MORE: Are Stoners Really Dumb, or Do They
Just Think They Are? At

age 30, about 35% of men and 16% of women said they had
smoked marijuana at least once in the previous year ; over the same time period, 9% of men and
4% of women said they had taken cocaine. Previous-year drug users tended to have scored
higher on IQ tests than non-users. The IQ effect was larger in women: women in the top third of the IQ
range at age 5 were more than twice as likely to have taken marijuana or cocaine by age 30, compared with those scoring
in the bottom third. The men with the highest IQs were nearly 50% more likely to have taken amphetamines and 65%
more likely to have taken ecstasy, compared to those with lower scores. And

these results held even when

researchers controlled for factors like socioeconomic status and psychological
distress, which are also correlated with rates of drug use. So why might smarter kids be more
likely to try drugs? People with high IQs are more likely to score high on personality
scales of openness to experience, says White. They may be more willing to experiment and seek out
novel experiences. MORE: Popping Smart Pills: The Case for Cognitive Enhancement Another factor could be
that the messages used to attempt to deter teens from drug use particularly during the
1980s in the U.K. when the study group was in adolescence werent exactly known for the subtlety
of their reasoning, so they may not have targeted the smarter group well. What you
typically find is that people with high IQs are less likely to smoke [cigarettes], more likely to be active and to have a good
diet, says White, noting that they are also likely to have high socioeconomic status. People in this group tend to make
healthy choices, based both on health information and their own experience. This

group isnt likely to see

occasional drug use as particularly harmful, White says, both because there is little data to suggest
great risk of harm from such use and because evidence of harm is rare among their peers. With smoking, the evidence
[about its dangers] is overwhelming, says White, whereas when you look at things like cannabis use, since they are more
likely to associate with people who are similar to them, they are likely to see that smoking cannabis relatively infrequently
doesnt have huge impact. In contrast, drug

users with less education and wealth are more

likely to be exposed to negative consequences of drug use. This is due in part to the fact that
money itself can buy protection against the types of criminal involvement and disease that can affect poor drug users.
MORE: Portugals Drug Experience: New Study Confirms Decriminalization Was a Success The likely mechanism is
openness to experience, White concludes, and, I think, its also this idea of having an educated view of risk as well. (Of
course, American views about what consists of an educated perspective on drug risks have often clashed with those of
the more relaxed position typically taken in Europe.) The study didnt look at the risk of addiction among those with high
IQs because it wasnt able to measure the frequency of drug use in participants. However, earlier research has found a
connection between high IQ and greater risk of alcohol abuse and dependence. That could potentially be linked to the
boredom and social isolation experienced by many gifted children, the authors note. But since a link between IQ and drug

use remains independent of psychological distress, that cant be all thats going on. It rules out the argument that the only
reason people take illegal drugs is to self medicate, says White. The research was published in the Journal of
Epidemiology and Community Health.

General Case

Inherency
The government still enforces drug testing laws on federal employees
even in states where it is legal OPM statements
Veksler 15
(Marie, LEGAL CANNABIS OFF LIMITS TO FEDERAL EMPLOYEES, June 8, 2015, https://www.whaxy.com/news/canfederal-employees-use-marijuana, JZG)

The government issued a warning to federal employees that the use of legal
cannabis is not sanctioned activity under any circumstance. Regardless of
whether employees live in states where cannabis use has been legalized or not, in the eyes
of a federal employer, marijuana is still an illegal substance. The federal government issued a formal,
written guidance to all 4.1 million federal workers all across the globe to make its
warning loud and clear. The warning came straight from Katherine Archuleta, director of
the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM). In the guidance, the fact that cannabis remains illegal under
federal law was clearly communicated. The plant is still classified as a Schedule I controlled
substance under the Controlled Substances Act. Any employee that knowingly or
intentionally engages in the possession of cannabis, regardless of intent is
breaking the law and the rules regarding their employment. Any employee caught
in possession of the plant is subject to be prosecuted , even in states where it has been legalized.
All federal employees are subject to a higher standard that supersedes recent legislative changes regarding marijuana,
according to the issued statement. Federal

law regarding the use of marijuana or any illegal

substance or drug remains in effect. Many federal workers have sensitive jobs in law enforcement,
security and other areas of safety, and therefore they are prohibited from using cannabis even when off the clock. This is
an interesting development considering that several states, including Colorado, Oregon, Washington and Alaska have all
recently legalized the recreational use and retail sale of cannabis. Voters in Washington D.C. also legalized possession and
cultivation of cannabis, but retail sales are not permitted. Nearly half of the United States have legalized marijuana for
medicinal purposes, and several others have enacted very limited and restrictive cannabinoid specific legislation. In terms
of federal employees, the message cannot be any clearer or more disheartening. Even

a single use or
exposure to the substance can linger in the body in traceable amounts for several
weeks. This could be problematic for many federal workers who are required to
undergo routine drug testing.
Current drug policies are an impediment to hiring skilled hackers
Cherney 14 (MAX CHERNEY - San Francisco-based author who contributes to news items and feature stories to
Bay Area, national, and international publications in VICE, San Francisco Magazine, and The Economist, San Francisco
Examiner, SF Weekly, The Bold Italic, and San Francisco Appeal, IndieWire, Ghost write speeches and opinion pieces for
CEOs in the technology industry, Vice, The FBI Says It Can't Find Hackers to Hire Because They All Smoke Pot
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-fbi-cant-find-hackers-that-dont-smoke-pot) CW

Its no secret that the federal government is having a hard time hiring
cybersecurity experts, largely because many hackers can find more lucrative deals that don't involve working for
the feds. But there's another wrinkle: the FBI now says that its drug-testing policies are
keeping experts off the payroll. According to the Wall Street Journal, FBI Director James Comey said

that in order to pursue so-called cyber criminals, the government would pretty
much have to let government hackers get stonedbecause who's going to quit the
habit just to work for the FBI? I have to hire a great work force to compete with
those cyber criminals and some of those kids want to smoke weed on the way to
the interview, Comey said, clearly not pandering to stereotypes. The reason for the FBIs
unorthodox approach is that Congress has told the agency it needs to hire 2,000
more people this year, and many of those new recruits are going to fight
computer-related crime. And as it turns out, those that know computer crime best aren't often the Men's
Wearhouse set. The agency's current regs say that the lawmen wont hire someone who has smoked marijuana in the last
three years. (No word on dabs, edibles and other forms of marijuana consumption.) In theory, relaxing

hiring
restrictions for marijuana does make sense. Earlier this year, the feds admitted
that the government isnt very good at internet securitydespite the fact that the NSA is
basically a Philip K. Dick characters worst nightmare and that various agencies need to take a
long, hard look at hiring practices across the board. "[We have] the government hiring practices
of the 1940s and 50s in the 21st century," Gregory Wilshusen, director of information at the General Accountability Office,
told InformationWeek. Also, despite the federal governments mixed approach to marijuana enforcement, the majority of
Americans believe that its about time to legalize the drug, which remains classified as a Schedule I drug in the US, which
is reserved for the most dangerous and addictive intoxicants known to humanity. Regardless of the federal
governments stance, the FBI will apparently consider the issue, and is encouraging anyone who has recently got stoned to
apply for a job.

China hack makes cyber-security workers uniquely key

Kravets 15 (David Kravets - The senior editor for Ars Technica, 5/20/15 FBI chief says anti-marijuana policy
hinders the hiring of cyber experts http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/fbi-chief-says-anti-marijuana-policyhinders-the-hiring-of-cyber-experts/)
James Comey, the FBI director, says the bureau's no-tolerance marijuana policy is hindering the hiring of cyber-security
experts. Comey added that he is "grappling" with possibly changing the practice. Just yesterday,

Comey was
"grappling" with lifting marijuana-use ban on hiring. The director's comments
come one day after five members of the Chinese military were indicted in the US
on allegations of hacking into major US corporations and stealing trade secrets "I
have to hire a great work force to compete with those cyber criminals and some of those kids want to smoke weed on the

The bureau, which is

seeking to employ as many as 2,000 new recruits this year, is prohibited from
hiring those who have used marijuana the previous years .
way to the interview," Comey told a New York City Bar Association meeting Tuesday.

Government drug policy causes a skill shortage FBI key

Muncaster 15 (Phil, reporter for Infosecurity Magazine- Infosecurity Magazine has over ten years of experience
providing knowledge and insight into the information security industry. Its multiple award winning editorial content
provides compelling features both online and in print that focus on hot topics and trends, in-depth news analysis and
opinion columns from industry experts. FBI on the Hunt for Cyber Special Agents 1/2/15 http://www.infosecuritymagazine.com/news/fbi-on-the-hunt-for-cyber-special/)lg
The FBI has asked cyber security experts to consider a career as a special agent, in a recruitment drive designed to ensure the agency stays on top of evolving online threats. In a lengthy release on Monday, the Feds stated that potential candidates
must be between 23 ad 37-years-old, and will be required to pass a rigorous background check and fitness test. Some of the preferred backgrounds noted include computer programming and security, database administration, malware analysis,

The FBI
seeks highly talented, technically trained individuals who are motivated by the
FBIs mission to protect our nation and the American people from the rapidly
digital forensics, and ethical hacking, according to a job posting issued recently which remains open until 20 January. That reveals the salary cyber special agents can expect is anywhere from $59,340 to $76,568.

evolving cyber threa

t, said Robert Anderson Jr, executive assistant director for the Bureaus Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch. What we want are people who are going to come and be part

of a team that is working different very complex types of investigations and to utilize their skillsets in that team environment. He added that successful applicants would be integrated into the FBIs team of special agents, leading their own cases.

Cyber permeates every aspect of what we do, whether its counterterrorism,

criminal investigations, or traditional cyber attacks, as weve seen in the recent
past
Thats why these types of people are so important to get into the
pipeline and come into our organization
the FBI can offer interested
applicants an unrivalled mission and scale of investigations. It doesnt
matter where you go, it doesnt matter who you work for, you cant get that
anywhere else but the FBI, said
, its not been easy given chronic skills shortages
Comey
admitted
the agency may have to reconsider its zero tolerance
policy on operatives who smoke marijuana after claiming many
potential cyber recruits enjoy the occasional toke 56% of (ISC)
members believe there is a global cyber security skills shortage as opposed to just
2% who said they think theres a surplus

, Anderson said in the statement.

. He signed off by claiming

Anderson. Although the US government and its law enforcement agencies are increasingly reaching out to the broader cyber community to recruit

experts to their ranks

. Director James

even

in a speech last year that

. Some

, according to 2013s Global Information Security Workforce Study.

Cyber-security has reached a pre 9/11 moment experts are key

Aleaziz 12 (Hamed; October 30, 2012; Think Progress; Federal Government Lacks Experts To Address Cyber
Security Threats; http://thinkprogress.org/security/2012/10/30/1111081/experts-cyber-security/)//CC

The federal government faces a shortage of cyber security experts . Thats according to an
article published in FCW, a technology-focused publication. FCW interviewed federal officials
regarding the governments ability to effectively beef up its cyber security
program and found a unsettling trend: the government needs more tech experts .
In some cases, according to a Department of Defense official, the government hasnt even figured out what to hire for:

We dont have all the capacity and the right sets of skills that we need to do all
thats required. In the department we are still struggling to fully define and
empower the cyber workforce. Its a big challenge, just to define the techniques. In July, a State
Department official gave an estimate of the shortage to Reuters: The numbers Ive seen look like
shortages in the 20,000s to 40,000s for years to come. Why is there a shortage? According to
Cynthia Dion-Schwarz from the National Science Foundation, its a pipeline problem. In short, the government cant
find the people with the right skills sets to just have the entry-level skills needed in order to make progress in
cybersecurity, Schwarz told FCW. Others, like John Arguila,

a U.S. Naval Postgraduate School

professor and cyber security expert, say its time to think outside the box when it
comes to recruiting, telling the Guardian that most of these sorts of guys cant be vetted in
the traditional way. We need a new institutional culture that allows us to reach
out to them. The shortage is especially relevant now that the president is likely
to sign an executive order on cyber security, putting, according to a copy of the report, the
Department of Homeland Security in charge of organizing an information-sharing network that rapidly distributes
sanitized summaries of top-secret intelligence reports about known cyberthreats that identify a specific target. For

Janet Napolitano,
the head of Homeland Security, said: There is a lack of expertise and there are a lot of
people clamoring for people who know the internet wellWe need analysts. We need people who are engineers . We
need people who are experienced in intelligence as it relates to the cybermonths, federal officials and cyber security experts have been warning about this. In April,

universe. Its not just federal officials who have connected the shortage to national security; Enrique Salem, an
executive at Symantec, a cyber security organization and software maker, told Reuters in June: What I would tell you is
its going to be a bigger issue from a national security perspective than people realize. Earlier this month, Leon

Panetta, the secretary of defense, said cyber security was at a pre-9/11 moment .
Cybersecurity is vulnerable now skilled government workers are
key
Booz Allen Hamilton 15 (Booz Allen Hamilton is a leading provider of management consulting,
technology, and engineering services to the US government in defense, intelligence, and civil markets, and to major
corporations and not-for-profit organizations; April, 2015; Cyber Insecurity II Closing the Federal Talent Gap; 27;
http://ourpublicservice.org/publications/download.php?id=504)//CC

As society continues to enjoy new innovations from technology, it must be

prepared for new threats. Because government is the means through which we
address common societal needs, government has a critical leadership role to play
in protecting the nation against cyber threats. Taking a page from the nations approach to
counterterrorism, we believe it will take a network to defeator at least defend againstall
the cyber threats against our network. And that network cannot just be one of
terminals and fiber optic cables, it must be about the people. This process needs
to begin with a comprehensive understanding of our existing federal workforce
and the resources that we have available. We also need to anticipate the types of skills that we will need in the future.

There is no time to lose. The government is dependent on communication and

information systems in all aspects of its operations and mission, from business transactions and
national security, defense and law enforcement matters to processing, maintaining and transmitting sensitive and
proprietary information. Without

the skilled workforce in place to protect the integrity of

these systems, the nation will be highly vulnerable. Currently, federal agencies are
scrambling to attract and retain elite professionals to strengthen their defenses, but as
outlined in this report, they often are impeded in getting some of the highly skilled employees by the absence
of a government-wide strategy, and because of factors such as weak talent pipelines, insufficient applicant
assessments, a cumbersome and inflexible hiring process , a lack of consistent and targeted training,
non-competitive pay, and ill-defined job classifications and career paths.

Internal Links
Weed-smoking hackers key to FBI cyber missions
The Wire 14 (Atlantic News reporting service, written by Connor Simpson, journalist for The Wire and Business
Insider, FBI Director: Don't Let Weed Stop You from Applying to the FBI,
http://www.thewire.com/national/2014/05/fbi-director-dont-let-weed-stop-you-from-applying-to-the-fbi/371279/) aj
Law enforcement agencies generally don't hire stoners and slackers. But

as the cyber war heats up,

groups like the FBI may be forced to turn to people who like to get a
little heated to stay ahead of the curve. He should go ahead and apply,
was the advice FBI Director James B. Comey had on Monday for a young man
who theoretically balked at applying for an FBI job because he liked to get lit.
Comey spoke about the difficulties facing the FBI when it comes to hiring promising young hackers at the White Collar
Crime Institute, an annual conference held at Manhattan's New York City Bar Association, according to the Wall Street
Journal. The trouble is, a lot of hackers smoke weed, and that's something the FBI generally frowns
upon. One attendee asked Comey about a friend who considered an FBI job but ultimately did not apply because of the
marijuana policy. The theoretical FBI applicant knew he would never pass a drug test. But director

Comey's
comments clearly signal the FBI at least wants to move on from the
increasingly outdated anti-marijuana policy that is complicating its
efforts to fight cyber crime. Bongs are everywhere in the fictionalized hacker hangout on HBO's
Silicon Valley. Heck, two weeks ago police accidentally busted Erlich, one of the main characters, for his grow-op hidden
in their garage. Weed is baked into the tech culture at this point, and many

people working in tech have

zeroed in on the marijuana industry as one ripe for disruption, as Wired's Mat Honan
explained recently. Plus, the USA is moving relaxing its marijuana attitudes, considering
the drug is now legal in two states. As it stands, the FBI's hiring policy on its website says an applicant
must be marijuana free for three years if they hope to apply for a job with the bureau. Unfortunately for Comey who has
to fill 2000 new jobs this year, many of them dedicated to fighting cyber crime finding

a tech wizard who

hasn't smoked in the last hour is hard enough. I have to hire a great work force to compete with
those cyber criminals and some of those kids want to smoke weed on the way to the interview, Comey told the conference
attendees. The

FBI could possibly amend those strict rules soon. Comey told the
conference the bureau is grappling with the question right now of how to
change the drug policy without scaring off the cream of the hacking
crop
Pre-plan drug testing policies turn away the most skilled workers- key
to prevent cyber attacks
Noble 15 (Danica, coordinator of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Law (NORML) Women of
Washington. She lives in the Pacific Northwest where she practices competition law. You can find her TEDx on womens
role in ending prohibition here. Let Federal Employees Toke Up. Its Good for Everyone 7/9/15
http://www.wired.com/2015/07/let-federal-employees-toke-good-everyone/)lg
**edited for ableist language
MARIJUANA MAY BE legal in your state, but if you partake, you cant work for the government. Katherine Archuleta, the Executive Director of the Office of Personal Management, recently sent notice to the heads of every federal agency
announcing a policy under which any federal employee who uses marijuana, or even possesses it for a sick child off duty, is not suited to work for the federal government. This policy remains in place even if the employee resides in a state where
such use is legal under state law. The Office of Personnel Management, or OPM, is essentially the human resources department for the 4.1 million federal employees. Under the detailed guidance issued by Archuleta, even off-the-job, statesanctioned doctor-supervised marijuana use by federal employees adversely impacts the efficiency, credibility, and productivity of the federal government. The letter relied heavily on an executive order from 1986, signed by President Reagan,
calling for a Drug Free Federal Work Place. That executive orders number one concern: funding cartels. Hard to see the direct relevance to the state taxed and regulated systems at issue. The guidance from Archuleta was unusually detailed. It
explained disciplinary procedures and clearly declared that a federal employee is unfit for their job if they use marijuana for any reason, at any place, or at any time. The letter firmly plants the government on the wrong side of history. I myself am

lots of wonderfully
successful, productive, creative, responsible adults consume marijuana. Support
nationwide for medical use of marijuana regularly polls above 80 percent. It
turns out that the war on drugs, and its largest component, the prohibition of
marijuana, is really terrible for American families, communities, and democracy.
The U.S. spends $3.6 billion a year on marijuana prohibition and it has been a
total failure; over 40 years neither demand nor supply has been reduced. Instead,
success is measured by the number of people arrested, which is more than one
per minute, and more than all violent crimes combined. We spend far more
building prisons than schools and on prisoners than students.
the untenable federal
definition of marijuana as an exceptionally dangerous drug with no medical
value, has virtually eliminated opportunities for scientific research. We are left
without the information we need to make smart choices as citizens and
government
Marijuana prohibition is unquestionably
based in unscientific propaganda. So why, when the paradigm is clearly shifting,
spend so much effort to double down on policies that cannot be justified in
science, reason, or justice?
a federal employee of almost 10 years. Ive also been researching and advocating for reasonable marijuana policy since I was in law school. What Ive learned in that time is that

Our prisons are bursting: 1 in 28 kids has a parent in jail

and the US holds 1 in 3 of the worlds incarcerated women. And while prohibition hasnt stopped anyone from using marijuananearly half of the country tries it

. In fact, scientists sometimes seem like the only ones who struggle to access pot.

I am all for improving the efficiency and reputation of the federal government. It would make my life easier! But shouldnt we look at actual productivity,

impairment, capabilities, and effort? OPMs approach is the equivalent to firing anyone who ever broke the law by exceeding the speed limit. Meanwhile, if you are wondering why OPM and Katherine Archuleta sounds familiar, maybe it is
because while she was busy digging up an outdated executive order from the failed drug war, hackers were steeling the social security, addresses, names, and 127 page security background checks for every single federal employee right under
Katherine Archuletas watch. In fact, the news reports keep getting worse. OPM was under the worst hack in history, it did not detect the breach and it affected every single federal employee and an additional 10 million people? Fail. There is a

FBI Director James Comey said that the OPM policy against
hiring anyone who has smoked marijuana in the last five years has
hindered our ability to prepare for cyber-attacks all the best
candidates are disqualified by this policy.
Gerry Connolly
offered an amendment that would require a congressional report on how
marijuanas status as a Schedule 1 drug is affecting our nations security,
specifically whether it disqualifies the most efficient, productive, and suitable
candidates.
. In the
face of
concerns and mainstream support for marijuana law reform across
the country
Archuleta spent resources calling for people, who are good at
their jobs, to be fired under the banner of the morally expired, criminal
marijuana prohibition. Archuleta perpetuated the injustice of the drug war
despite a conspicuous lack of any evidence to suggest that responsible, off-duty,
marijuana use negatively affects job performance.
Archuleta was too worried about what federal employees do in the privacy
of their own homes to realize that her flat-Earth priorities actually
contribute to our governments vulnerability to defend against data
breaches and deter cyber attacks. Is perpetuating marijuana prohibition
worth sacrificing national security? Of course not. When will the government
recover from reefer madness?
connection here. Last May,

. He said

In April of this year, Representative

of Virginia

As a Schedule 1 drug, marijuana is officially defined as having no medical uses, a high potential for abuse and being too dangerous for use even in a hospital under a doctors supervision

these recurring

, Katherine

good

At the same time, the countrys largest employer failed to notice it was the target of the largest

data breach in history.

Probably not while Archuleta is in charge.

FBI Marijuana tests prevent cyber security recruitments

Lam 3/4/15 (Bourree Lam is an associate editor at The Atlantic. She was previously the editor of Freakonomics.com,
The Atlantic, Are Companies With Drug Tests Weeding Out Great Candidates?
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/are-companies-with-drug-tests-weeding-out-greatcandidates/386447/) CW
The FBI's jobs page makes it pretty clear how the agency feels about marijuana: " You

can easily determine

whether you meet the FBI's illegal drug policy by answering the following
questions." The list's first question: "Have you used marijuana at all within the
last three years?" Government agencies are some of the strictest of
employers when it comes to drug testing. The CIA's policy, for example,
prohibits marijuana use in the previous 12 months, but any prior drug use is
"carefully evaluated." Yet news that the FBI might be having a hard time
recruiting cyber-security experts due to a strict "no marijuana" rule
raises the question of how applicant pools will be affected by the growing popularity and legalization of marijuana. Last
year, FBI

chief James B. Comey made comments that the bureau might

loosen the rules to recruit hackers, though he later backtracked. And
one police force in Idaho said that its recruitment efforts are set back by its own
drug policy, which mandates that anyone who has used marijuana in the past
three years can't be hired.

AT: Alt Causes

Other methods to remedy the problem will only be effective in the
long run status quo drug policy is the key short-term lynchpin
Libicki et al 14 (Martin C. Libicki is an

American scholar and Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND

Graduate School, David Senty is a retired Major General in the United States Air Force, Julia Pollak is a Ph.D. candidate at
the Pardee RAND Graduate School and an assistant policy analyst at RAND, Hackers Wanted: An Examination of the
Cybersecurity Labor Market, published on RAND, a nonprofit global policy thinktank,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR430.html) aj
There is a general perception that there

is a shortage of cybersecurity professionals

within the United States, and a particular shortage of these
professionals within the federal government, working on national
security as well as intelligence. Shortages of this nature complicate securing
the nation's networks and may leave the United States ill-prepared to carry out
conflict in cyberspace. RAND examined the current status of the labor market for cybersecurity professionals
with an emphasis on their being employed to defend the United States. This effort was in three parts: first, a review of the
literature; second, interviews with managers and educators of cybersecurity professionals, supplemented by reportage;
and third, an examination of the economic literature about labor markets. RAND also disaggregated the broad definition

In general, we support
the use of market forces (and preexisting government programs) to address the
strong demand for cybersecurity professionals in the longer run. Increases in
educational opportunities and compensation packages will draw
more workers into the profession over time. Cybersecurity professionals take time to
reach their potential; drastic steps taken today to increase their quantity and
quality would not bear fruit for another five to ten years. By then, the current
concern over cybersecurity could easily abate, driven by new technology and more secure architectures. Pushing too
many people into the profession now could leave an overabundance of highly
trained and narrowly skilled individuals who could better be serving national
needs in other vocations.
of "cybersecurity professionals" to unearth skills differentiation as relevant to this study.

Drug testing is the key lynchpin no alt causes

Noble 15 (Danica, coordinator of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Law (NORML) Women of
Washington. She lives in the Pacific Northwest where she practices competition law. You can find her TEDx on womens
role in ending prohibition here. Let Federal Employees Toke Up. Its Good for Everyone 7/9/15
http://www.wired.com/2015/07/let-federal-employees-toke-good-everyone/)lg
**edited for ableist language
MARIJUANA MAY BE legal in your state, but if you partake, you cant work for the government. Katherine Archuleta, the Executive Director of the Office of Personal Management, recently sent notice to the heads of every federal agency
announcing a policy under which any federal employee who uses marijuana, or even possesses it for a sick child off duty, is not suited to work for the federal government. This policy remains in place even if the employee resides in a state where
such use is legal under state law. The Office of Personnel Management, or OPM, is essentially the human resources department for the 4.1 million federal employees. Under the detailed guidance issued by Archuleta, even off-the-job, statesanctioned doctor-supervised marijuana use by federal employees adversely impacts the efficiency, credibility, and productivity of the federal government. The letter relied heavily on an executive order from 1986, signed by President Reagan,
calling for a Drug Free Federal Work Place. That executive orders number one concern: funding cartels. Hard to see the direct relevance to the state taxed and regulated systems at issue. The guidance from Archuleta was unusually detailed. It
explained disciplinary procedures and clearly declared that a federal employee is unfit for their job if they use marijuana for any reason, at any place, or at any time. The letter firmly plants the government on the wrong side of history. I myself am

lots of wonderfully
successful, productive, creative, responsible adults consume marijuana. Support
nationwide for medical use of marijuana regularly polls above 80 percent. It
a federal employee of almost 10 years. Ive also been researching and advocating for reasonable marijuana policy since I was in law school. What Ive learned in that time is that

turns out that the war on drugs, and its largest component, the prohibition of
marijuana, is really terrible for American families, communities, and democracy.
The U.S. spends $3.6 billion a year on marijuana prohibition and it has been a
total failure; over 40 years neither demand nor supply has been reduced. Instead,
success is measured by the number of people arrested, which is more than one
per minute, and more than all violent crimes combined. We spend far more
building prisons than schools and on prisoners than students.
the untenable federal
definition of marijuana as an exceptionally dangerous drug with no medical
value, has virtually eliminated opportunities for scientific research. We are left
without the information we need to make smart choices as citizens and
government
Marijuana prohibition is unquestionably
based in unscientific propaganda. So why, when the paradigm is clearly shifting,
spend so much effort to double down on policies that cannot be justified in
science, reason, or justice?
Our prisons are bursting: 1 in 28 kids has a parent in jail

and the US holds 1 in 3 of the worlds incarcerated women. And while prohibition hasnt stopped anyone from using marijuananearly half of the country tries it

. In fact, scientists sometimes seem like the only ones who struggle to access pot.

I am all for improving the efficiency and reputation of the federal government. It would make my life easier! But shouldnt we look at actual productivity,

impairment, capabilities, and effort? OPMs approach is the equivalent to firing anyone who ever broke the law by exceeding the speed limit. Meanwhile, if you are wondering why OPM and Katherine Archuleta sounds familiar, maybe it is
because while she was busy digging up an outdated executive order from the failed drug war, hackers were steeling the social security, addresses, names, and 127 page security background checks for every single federal employee right under
Katherine Archuletas watch. In fact, the news reports keep getting worse. OPM was under the worst hack in history, it did not detect the breach and it affected every single federal employee and an additional 10 million people? Fail. There is a

FBI Director James Comey said that the OPM policy against
hiring anyone who has smoked marijuana in the last five years has
hindered our ability to prepare for cyber-attacks all the best
candidates are disqualified by this policy.
Gerry Connolly
offered an amendment that would require a congressional report on how
marijuanas status as a Schedule 1 drug is affecting our nations security,
specifically whether it disqualifies the most efficient, productive, and suitable
candidates.
. In the
face of
concerns and mainstream support for marijuana law reform across
the country
Archuleta spent resources calling for people, who are good at
their jobs, to be fired under the banner of the morally expired, criminal
marijuana prohibition. Archuleta perpetuated the injustice of the drug war
despite a conspicuous lack of any evidence to suggest that responsible, off-duty,
marijuana use negatively affects job performance.
Archuleta was too worried about what federal employees do in the privacy
of their own homes to realize that her flat-Earth priorities actually
contribute to our governments vulnerability to defend against data
breaches and deter cyber attacks. Is perpetuating marijuana prohibition
worth sacrificing national security? Of course not. When will the government
recover from reefer madness?
connection here. Last May,

. He said

In April of this year, Representative

of Virginia

As a Schedule 1 drug, marijuana is officially defined as having no medical uses, a high potential for abuse and being too dangerous for use even in a hospital under a doctors supervision

these recurring

, Katherine

good

At the same time, the countrys largest employer failed to notice it was the target of the largest

data breach in history.

Probably not while Archuleta is in charge.

Private companies dont solve terror

Muncaster 15 (Phil, reporter for Infosecurity Magazine- Infosecurity Magazine has over ten years of experience
providing knowledge and insight into the information security industry. Its multiple award winning editorial content
provides compelling features both online and in print that focus on hot topics and trends, in-depth news analysis and

opinion columns from industry experts. FBI on the Hunt for Cyber Special Agents 1/2/15 http://www.infosecuritymagazine.com/news/fbi-on-the-hunt-for-cyber-special/)lg
The FBI has asked cyber security experts to consider a career as a special agent, in a recruitment drive designed to ensure the agency stays on top of evolving online threats. In a lengthy release on Monday, the Feds stated that potential candidates
must be between 23 ad 37-years-old, and will be required to pass a rigorous background check and fitness test. Some of the preferred backgrounds noted include computer programming and security, database administration, malware analysis,

The FBI
seeks highly talented, technically trained individuals who are motivated by the
FBIs mission to protect our nation and the American people from the rapidly
evolving cyber threa
digital forensics, and ethical hacking, according to a job posting issued recently which remains open until 20 January. That reveals the salary cyber special agents can expect is anywhere from $59,340 to $76,568.

t, said Robert Anderson Jr, executive assistant director for the Bureaus Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch. What we want are people who are going to come and be part

of a team that is working different very complex types of investigations and to utilize their skillsets in that team environment. He added that successful applicants would be integrated into the FBIs team of special agents, leading their own cases.

Cyber permeates every aspect of what we do, whether its counterterrorism,

criminal investigations, or traditional cyber attacks, as weve seen in the recent
past
Thats why these types of people are so important to get into the
pipeline and come into our organization
the FBI can offer interested
applicants an unrivalled mission and scale of investigations. It
doesnt matter where you go, it doesnt matter who you work for, you
cant get that anywhere else but the FBI
, its not been easy given chronic skills shortages. Director
James Comey even admitted in a speech last year that the agency may have to
reconsider its zero tolerance policy on operatives who smoke marijuana after
claiming many potential cyber recruits enjoy the occasional toke. Some 56% of
(ISC) members believe there is a global cyber security skills shortage as opposed
to just 2% who said they think theres a surplus, according to 2013s Global
Information Security Workforce Study.

, Anderson said in the statement.

. He signed off by claiming

, said Anderson. Although the US government and its law enforcement agencies are increasingly reaching

out to the broader cyber community to recruit experts to their ranks

AT: No One Uses Marijuana

Pot smoking at an all-time high
Wadley 14 (Jared Wadley analyst for student health, 9/8/14, University of Michigan College students' use of
marijuana on the rise, some drugs declining http://ns.umich.edu/new/releases/22362-college-students-use-ofmarijuana-on-the-rise-some-drugs-declining) //CW
ANN ARBORMore college students nationwide have added illicit drugs, such as marijuana and amphetamine, to their
back-to-school supply lists. Illicit drug

use has been rising gradually among American

college students since 2006, when 34 percent indicated that they used some illicit drug
in the prior year; that rate was up to 39 percent by 2013. Most of this increase is attributable to
a rising proportion using marijuana, according to the University of Michigan scientists who conduct the nationwide
Monitoring the Future study. Daily marijuana

use is now at the highest rate among college

students in more than three decades. Half (51 percent) of all full-time college
students today have used an illicit drug at some time in their lives; roughly four in 10 (39
percent) have used one or more such drugs in just the 12 months preceding the survey. The results are based on a
nationally representative sample of some 1,100 students enrolled full time in a 2- or 4-year college in spring 2013. The
survey is part of the long-term MTF study, which also tracks substance use among the nation's secondary students and
older adults under research grants from the National Institute on Drug Abuse. Marijuana

has remained the

most widely used illicit drug over the 34 years that MTF has tracked substance
use by college students, but the level of use has varied considerably over time. In
2006, 30 percent of the nation's college students said they used marijuana in the
prior 12 months, whereas in 2013 nearly 36 percent indicated doing so. Of perhaps
greater importance, daily or near-daily use of marijuanadefined as 20 or more occasions of use in the prior 30 dayshas
been on the rise. The recent low was 3.5 percent in 2007, but the rate had risen to 5.1 percent by 2013. "This is the highest
rate of daily use observed among college students since 1981a third of a century ago," said Lloyd Johnston, the principal
investigator of the MTF study. "In

other words, one in every 20 college students was

smoking pot on a daily or near-daily basis in 2013, including one in every 11
males and one in every 34 females. To put this into a longer-term perspective,
from 1990 to 1994, fewer than one in 50 college students used marijuana that
frequently."

Statistics prove everyone does pot

Baca 14 (Ricardo Baca is the editor of The Cannabist 12/26/14 $573 million in pot sales: Here are 12 stats that
define the year in marijuana http://www.thecannabist.co/2014/12/26/pot-sales-taxes-statistics/26031/) CW
But since were journalists we also track down the hard numbers that show legal marijuanas definitive impact on the state
in this first year of recreational pot sales. And a glance at the numbers, statistics and calculations below will give you a very
clear picture of what legal, regulated, first-of-its-kind marijuana looks like in the Rocky Mountains. 1. 130.3

metric

tons Thats Colorados annual demand for marijuana equal to 36.8 million eighths of
cannabis flower. Makes you wonder how many Coloradans use cannabis regularly 2. 485,000 Thats the number of
adults who are 21 and older using marijuana regularly (at least once a month), and its about 9
percent of the states population. And what about those using more often than that 3. 23 percent Thats the amount

of Colorados user population that consumes cannabis near daily . But what about the outof-state tourists visiting Colorado and purchasing legal weed 4. 90 percent Thats the amount of
recreational pot sales out-of-state tourists are responsible for at shops in
mountain resort communities. But how much of Colorados annual demand are these tourists actually
buying 5. 7 percent Thats the amount of Colorados annual pot demand purchased by
out-of-state tourists. But has Colorado pot gotten more or less expensive since the sales first began on Jan. 1
6. -9 percent Thats the price drop on a recreational eighth of marijuana flower at a dozen prominent Colorado pot shops
from January 2014 ($53.88) to December 2014 ($48.95). But how much did Colorado sell in recreational cannabis 7.
$246,810,599.03 Thats the states total recreational marijuana sales, as counted from January to October (November and
December data isnt yet available from the Colorado Department of Revenue). And what about total medical sales 8.
$326,716,273.59 Thats Colorados total medical marijuana sales, also from January to October. (Yep, thats
$573,526,872.62 in 10 months for both recreational and medical pot sales in Colorado.) And what are the majority of the
states medical marijuana patients claiming as their need for medicinal pot 9. 103,918 Thats the number

of

medical marijuana patients reporting severe pain as their condition for a

license or 94 percent of the states total patients . So what does all of this mean for the taxes
raised by the sale of legal marijuana in Colorado 10. $60.1 million Thats the amount Colorado has brought in via taxes,
licenses and fees on recreational and medical marijuana, from January to October. And what about the cannabis-infused
edibles, the cookies and gummies and brownies that proved to be surprisingly popular in this first year of recreational
sales 11: 10

milligrams of THC Thats the state-standard single-serving size for

marijuana edibles, with 100 milligrams maximum allowed in an individually
packaged product being sold recreationally.
Marijuana use is increasing
NIH Abuse 15 (NIH -National Institute on Drug Abuse government institute of science of drug abuse and
addiction, Last updated: June 2015, DrugFacts: Marijuana
http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/marijuana) CW
Marijuana refers to the dried leaves, flowers, stems, and seeds from the hemp plant, Cannabis sativa. The plant contains
the mind-altering chemical delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and other related compounds. Extracts with high
amounts of THC can also be made from the cannabis plant (see "Marijuana Extracts"). Marijuana

is the most
commonly used illicit drug in the United States (SAMHSA, 2014). Its use is widespread
among young people. According to a yearly survey of middle and high school students, rates
of marijuana use have steadied in the past few years after several years of
increase. However, the number of young people who believe marijuana use is risky is
decreasing (Johnston, 2014). Legalization of marijuana for medical use or adult
recreational use in a growing number of states may affect these views.

Cybersecurity Impacts

yes extinction
Extinction
Guterl 12 Guterl, executive editor Scientific American, 11/28/12 (Fred, Armageddon 2.0, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists)

The world lived for half a century with the constant specter of nuclear war and its
potentially devastating consequences. The end of the Cold War took the potency
out of this Armageddon scenario, yet the existential dangers have only
multiplied. Today the technologies that pose some of the biggest problems are not so much
military as commercial. They come from biology, energy production, and the information sciences
-- and are the very technologies that have fueled our prodigious growth as a species. They are far more
seductive than nuclear weapons, and more difficult to extricate ourselves from. The
technologies we worry about today form the basis of our global civilization and
are essential to our survival. The mistake many of us make about the darker aspects of our high-tech
civilization is in thinking that we have plenty of time to address them. We may, if we're lucky. But it's more likely that we
have less time than we think. There

may be a limited window of opportunity for preventing

catastrophes such as pandemics, runaway climate change, and cyber attacks on national power
grids. Emerging diseases. The influenza pandemic of 2009 is a case in point. Because of rising prosperity and travel, the
world has grown more conducive to a destructive flu virus in recent years, many public health officials believe. Most
people probably remember 2009 as a time when health officials overreacted. But in truth, the 2009 virus came from
nowhere, and by the time it reached the radar screens of health officials, it was already well on its way to spreading far and
wide. "H1N1 caught us all with our pants down," says flu expert Robert G. Webster of St. Jude Children's Research
Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee. Before it became apparent that the virus was a mild one, health officials must have felt
as if they were staring into the abyss. If the virus had been as deadly as, say, the 1918 flu virus or some more recent strains
of bird flu, the result would have rivaled what the planners of the 1950s expected from a nuclear war. It would have been a
"total disaster," Webster says. "You wouldn't get the gasoline for your car, you wouldn't get the electricity for your power,
you wouldn't get the medicines you need. Society as we know it would fall apart." Climate change. Climate is another
potentially urgent risk. It's easy to think about greenhouse gases as a long-term problem, but the current rate of change in
the Arctic has alarmed more and more scientists in recent years. Tim Lenton, a climate scientist at the University of Exeter
in England, has looked at climate from the standpoint of tipping points -- sudden changes that are not reflected in current
climate models. We may already have reached a tipping point -- a transition to a new state in which the Arctic is ice-free
during the summer months. Perhaps the most alarming of Lenton's tipping points is the Indian summer monsoon. Smoke
from household fires, and soot from automobiles and buses in crowded cities, rises into the atmosphere and drifts out over
the Indian Ocean, changing the atmospheric dynamics upon which the monsoon depends -- keeping much of the sun's
energy from reaching the surface, and lessening the power of storms. At the same time, the buildup of greenhouse gases -emitted mainly from developed countries in the northern hemisphere -- has a very different effect on the Indian summer
monsoon: It makes it stronger. These two opposite influences make the fate of the monsoon difficult to predict and subject
to instability. A small influence -- a bit more carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and a bit more brown haze -- could have
an outsize effect. The Indian monsoon, Lenton believes, could be teetering on a knife's edge, ready to change abruptly in
ways that are hard to predict. What happens then? More than a billion people depend on the monsoon's rains. Other
tipping points may be in play, says Lenton. The West African monsoon is potentially near a tipping point. So are
Greenland's glaciers, which hold enough water to raise sea levels by more than 20 feet; and the West Antarctic Ice Sheet,
which has enough ice to raise sea levels by at least 10 feet. Regional tipping points could hasten the ill effects of climate
change more quickly than currently projected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Computer hacking. The
computer industry has already made it possible for computers to handle a variety of tasks without human intervention.
Autonomous computers, using techniques formerly known as artificial intelligence, have

begun to exert

control in virtually every sphere of our lives. Cars, for instance, can now take action to avoid
collisions. To do this, a car has to make decisions: When does it take control? How much braking power should be applied,

and to which wheels? And when should the car allow its reflex-challenged driver to regain control? Cars that drive
themselves, currently being field tested, could hit dealer showrooms in a few years. Autonomous

computers

can make our lives easier and safer, but they can also make them more dangerous. A case in point is
Stuxnet, the computer worm designed by the US and Israel to attack Iran's nuclear fuel program. It is a
watershed in the brief history of malware -- the Jason Bourne of computer code, designed for maximum autonomy
and effectiveness. Stuxnet's creators gave their program the best training possible: they stocked it with detailed technical
knowledge that would come in handy for whatever situation Stuxnet could conceivably encounter. Although the software
included rendezvous procedures and communication codes for reporting back to headquarters, Stuxnet

was built
to survive and carry out its mission even if it found itself cut off. The uranium
centrifuges that Stuxnet attacked are very similar in principle to the generators that
power the US electrical grid. Both are monitored and controlled by programmable-logic computer chips.
Stuxnet cleverly caused the uranium centrifuges to throw themselves off-balance, inflicting enough damage to set the
Iranian nuclear industry back by 18 months or more. A

similar piece of malware installed on the

computers that control the generators at the base of the Grand Coulee Dam would likewise
cause them to shake, rattle, and roll -- and eventually explode. If Stuxnet-like malware were to insinuate itself
into a few hundred power generators in the United States and attack them all at once, the damage would be enough to
cause blackouts on the East and West Coasts. With

such widespread destruction, it could take

many months to restore power to the grid. It seems incredible that this should be so, but the
worldwide capacity to manufacture generator parts is limited. Generators generally last 30
years, sometimes 50, so normally there's little need for replacements. The main demand for
generators is in China, India, and other parts of rapidly developing Asia. That's where the
manufacturers are -- not in the United States. Even if the United States, in crisis mode, put full diplomatic
pressure on supplier nations -- or launched a military invasion to take over manufacturing facilities -- the capacity
to ramp up production would be severely limited. Worldwide production currently amounts to
only a few hundred generators per year. The consequences of going without power for months,
across a large swath of the United States, would be devastating. Backup electrical
generators in hospitals and other vulnerable facilities would have to rely on fuel that would be in
high demand. Diabetics would go without their insulin; heart attack victims would not have their defibrillators; and
sick people would have no place to go. Businesses would run out of inventory and extra capacity. Grocery stores
would run out of food, and deliveries of all sorts would virtually cease (no gasoline for trucks and
airplanes, trains would be down). As we saw with the blackouts caused by Hurricane Sandy, gas stations
couldn't pump gas from their tanks, and fuel-carrying trucks wouldn't be able to fill up at refueling stations. Without
power, the

economy would virtually cease, and if power failed over a large enough portion of the
country, simply trucking in supplies from elsewhere would not be adequate to cover the needs
of hundreds of millions of people. People would start to die by the thousands, then by the
tens of thousands, and eventually the millions. The loss of the power grid would put nuclear plants on
backup, but how many of those systems would fail, causing meltdowns , as we saw at Fukushima? The
loss in human life would quickly reach, and perhaps exceed, After eight to 10 days,
about 72 percent of all economic activity, as measured by GDP, would shut down, according to
an analysis by Scott Borg, a cybersecurity expert.

Cyber war escalates

Tilford 12 (27 July 2012, Robert, Writer for The Examiner, http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackerscould-easily-shut-down-the-electric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa)
Cyber attackers could all too easily shut down the electric grid for the entire
east coast, the west coast, and the middle part of our country, said Senator
Grassley on July 26, 2012. Any one attack could leave dozens of major cities and tens
of millions of Americans without power. We know, because we were shown in a room here in the
Capitol, how an attack could take place and what damage it would do, so we know this is not just make believe, he said.
So what would a cyber attack look like anyway? The Senator explained: Without

ATMs or debit card

readers, commerce would immediately grind to a halt. My daughter, who lives here in the DC area,
lost power when the storm hit. They waited for a number of hours, and then they took all the food out of their freezer, they
gave away what they could, and they threw the rest away. And that was the way it was all over. Their power was out for
about a week, and it made it very difficult. They are fortunate enough to have a basement, and the heat wasnt oppressive
down there. Without

refrigeration, food would rot on the shelves, the freezers would

have to be emptied, and people could actually go hungry. Without gas pumps,
transportation arteries would clog with abandoned vehicles. Without cell phones
or computers, whole regions of the country would be cut off from communication
and families would be unable to reach each other. Without air conditioning and
without lifesaving technology and the service of hospitals and nursing homes, the
elderly and sick would become much sicker and die. Most major hospitals have
backup power, but it is only for a limited amount of time. It depends on how much fuel they can store,
and that is very limited, Senator Grassley said. The devastation that the Senator describes is truly unimaginable. To make
matters worse a

cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for example could also
cripple the U.S. military. The senator notes that is that the same power grids that
supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors
also power every military base in our country. Although bases would be
prepared to weather a short power outage with backup diesel generators, within hours, not
days, fuel supplies would run out, he said. Which means military command and
control centers could go dark. Radar systems that detect air threats to our
country would shut Down completely. Communication between commanders and their troops would
also go silent. And many weapons systems would be left without either fuel or electric power, said Senator Grassley. So

in a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in the world would be left
scrambling to maintain base functions, he said. We contacted the Pentagon and officials
confirmed the threat of a cyber attack is something very real. Top national
security officialsincluding the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the
National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director have
said, preventing a cyber attack and improving the nations electric grids is among the most
urgent priorities of our country (source: Congressional Record). So how serious is the
Pentagon taking all this? Enough to start, or end a war over it, for sure (see
video: Pentagon declares war on cyber attacks http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_kVQrp_D0kY&feature=relmfu ). A
cyber attack today against the US could very well be seen as an Act of War and could be

met with a full scale US military response. That could include the use of
nuclear weapons, if authorized by the President.

Miscalc, draws in major powers, collapses nuclear deterrence

Cimbala 11, PhD, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State UniversityBrandywine, served as a
consultant for various US government agencies and private contractors, (Stephen J. "Nuclear Crisis Management and
CyberwarPhishing for Trouble?," Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring, www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/spring/cimbala.pdf)
Notwithstanding the preceding disclaimers, information

warfare has the potential to attack or

disrupt successful crisis management on each of four dimensions. First, it can muddy the
signals being sent from one side to the other in a crisis. This can be done deliberately or
inadvertently. Suppose one side plants a virus or worm in the others communications
networks.19 The virus or worm becomes activated during the crisis and destroys
or alters information. The missing or altered information may make it more difficult
for the cyber victim to arrange a military attack. But destroyed or altered information may mislead
either side into thinking that its signal has been correctly interpreted when it has not. Thus, side A may intend to signal
resolve instead of yield to its opponent on a particular issue. Side B, misperceiving a yield message, may decide to
continue its aggression, meeting unexpected resistance and causing a much more dangerous situation to develop.

Infowar can also destroy or disrupt communication channels necessary for

successful crisis management. One way it can do this is to disrupt communication
links between policymakers and military commanders during a period of high
threat and severe time pressure. Two kinds of unanticipated problems, from the standpoint of civilmilitary relations, are possible under these conditions. First, political leaders may have predelegated
limited authority for nuclear release or launch under restrictive conditions ; only
when these few conditions obtain, according to the protocols of predelegation, would military commanders be authorized
to employ nuclear weapons distributed within their command. Clogged,

destroyed, or disrupted
communications could prevent top leaders from knowing that military
commanders perceived a situation to be far more desperate, and thus permissive
of nuclear initiative, than it really was. During the Cold War, for example, disrupted
communications between the US National Command Authority and ballistic
missile submarines, once the latter came under attack, could have resulted in a
joint decision by submarine officers to launch in the absence of contrary
instructions. Second, information warfare during a crisis will almost certainly increase
the time pressure under which political leaders operate. It may do this literally, or
it may affect the perceived timelines within which the policymaking process can make its decisions.
Once either side sees parts of its command, control, and communications (C3) system being
subverted by phony information or extraneous cyber noise, its sense of panic at the possible loss of military
options will be enormous. In the case of US Cold War nuclear war plans , for example,
disruption of even portions of the strategic C3 system could have prevented competent
execution of parts of the SIOP (the strategic nuclear war plan). The SIOP depended upon finely
orchestrated time-on-target estimates and precise damage expectancies against various classes of targets. Partially
misinformed or disinformed

networks and communications centers would have led to redundant

attacks against the same target sets and, quite possibly, unplanned attacks on
friendly military or civilian installations. A third potentially disruptive effect of
infowar on nuclear crisis management is that it may reduce the search for available
alternatives to the few and desperate. Policymakers searching for escapes from
crisis denouements need flexible options and creative problem solving. Victims of
information warfare may have a diminished ability to solve problems routinely,
let alone creatively, once information networks are filled with flotsam and jetsam. Questions to operators will be
poorly posed, and responses (if available at all) will be driven toward the least common denominator of previously
programmed standard operating procedures. Retaliatory

systems that depend on launch-onwarning instead of survival after riding out an attack are especially vulnerable to reduced time
cycles and restricted alternatives: A well-designed warning system cannot save commanders from
misjudging the situation under the constraints of time and information imposed by a posture of launch on warning. Such a
posture truncates the decision process too early for iterative estimates to converge on reality. Rapid reaction is inherently
unstable because it cuts short the learning time needed to match perception with reality.20 The propensity to search for
the first available alternative that meets minimum satisfactory conditions of goal attainment is strong enough under
normal conditions in nonmilitary bureaucratic organizations. 21

In civil-military command and

control systems under the stress of nuclear crisis decision making, the first
available alternative may quite literally be the last; or so policymakers and their military advisors
may persuade themselves. Accordingly, the bias toward prompt and adequate solutions is
strong. During the Cuban missile crisis, a number of members of the presidential
advisory group continued to propound an air strike and invasion of Cuba during
the entire 13 days of crisis deliberation. Had less time been available for debate
and had President Kennedy not deliberately structured the discussion in a way that forced alternatives to the surface, the
air strike and invasion might well have been the chosen alternative .22 Fourth and
finally on the issue of crisis management, infowar can cause flawed images of each sides
intentions and capabilities to be conveyed to the other, with potentially
disastrous results. Another example from the Cuban crisis demonstrates the possible side effects of simple
misunderstanding and noncommunication on US crisis management. At the most tense period of the
crisis, a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft got off course and strayed into Soviet
airspace. US and Soviet fighters scrambled, and a possible Arctic confrontation of
air forces loomed. Khrushchev later told Kennedy that Soviet air defenses might have interpreted the U-2 flight as
a prestrike reconnaissance mission or as a bomber, calling for a compensatory response by Moscow.23 Fortunately
Moscow chose to give the United States the benefit of the doubt in this instance
and to permit US fighters to escort the wayward U-2 back to Alaska. Why this scheduled
U-2 mission was not scrubbed once the crisis began has never been fully revealed; the answer may be as simple as
bureaucratic inertia compounded by noncommunication down the chain of command by policymakers who failed to
appreciate the risk of normal reconnaissance under these extraordinary conditions. Further Issues and Implications The
outcome of a nuclear crisis management scenario influenced by information operations may not be a favorable one.

Despite the best efforts of crisis participants, the dispute may degenerate into a
nuclear first use or first strike by one side and retaliation by the other . In that situation,
information operations by either, or both, sides might make it more difficult to
limit the war and bring it to a conclusion before catastrophic destruction and loss
of life had taken place. Although there are no such things as small nuclear wars, compared to conventional
wars, there can be different kinds of nuclear wars in terms of their proximate causes and consequences.24

Possibilities include a nuclear attack from an unknown source; an ambiguous

case of possible, but not proved, nuclear first use; a nuclear test detonation
intended to intimidate but with no immediate destruction; and a conventional
strike mistaken, at least initially, for a nuclear one. As George Quester has noted: The United
States and other powers have developed some very large and powerful conventional warheads, intended for destroying the
hardened underground bunkers that may house an enemy command post or a hard-sheltered weapons system. Such
bunker-buster

bombs radiate a sound signal when they are used and an

underground seismic signal that could be mistaken from a distance for the
signature of a small nuclear warhead.25 The dominant scenario of a general
nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union preoccupied Cold
War policymakers, and under that assumption concerns about escalation control
and war termination were swamped by apocalyptic visions of the end of days. The
second nuclear age, roughly coinciding with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union,
offers a more complicated menu of nuclear possibilities and responses .26 Interest in
the threat or use of nuclear weapons by rogue states, by aspiring regional hegemons, or by terrorists abetted by the
possible spread of nuclear weapons among currently nonnuclear weapons states stretches the ingenuity of military

there is
also the possibility of backsliding in political conditions, as between the United
States and Russia, or Russia and China, or China and India (among current nuclear weapons
states). Politically unthinkable conflicts of one decade have a way of evolving into
the politically unavoidable wars of anotherWorld War I is instructive in this
regard. The war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 was a reminder that local
conflicts on regional fault lines between blocs or major powers have the potential
to expand into worse.
planners and fiction writers. In addition to the worlds worst characters engaged in nuclear threat of first use,

2nc yes motive

Cyber-threat is high
Carney 14, Jordain, Staff @ National Journal, Defense Leaders Say Cyber is Top Terror Threat, 1-6-14,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/defense-leaders-say-cyber-is-top-terror-threat-20140106, DOA: 8-13-14, y2k

see cyberattacks as the greatest threat to U.S. national security,

according to a survey released Monday. Forty-five percent of respondents to the Defense
News Leadership Poll named a cyberattack as the single greatest threatnearly 20
percentage points above terrorism, which ranked second. The Defense News Leadership Poll,
underwritten by United Technologies, surveyed 352 Defense News subscribers, based on
job seniority, between Nov. 14 and Nov. 28, 2013. The poll targeted senior employees
within the White House, Pentagon, Congress, and the defense industry. "The
Defense officials

magnitude of the cyber problem, combined with declining budgets, will challenge the
nation for years to come," said Vago Muradian, the editor of Defense News. It's not the first
time cyber has ranked at or near the top of a list of security concerns. Seventy percent of
Americans called a cyberattack from another country a major threat in a Pew Research Center
survey released last month. Defense Department officials, for their part, have warned about the
increasing threat. FBI Director James Comey, Rand Beers, the then-acting secretary for

the Homeland Security Department, and Gen. Keith Alexander, director of the
National Security Agency, each voiced their concerns before Congress last year. And House
Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, R-Mich., called it the "largest
national security threat to the face the U.S. that we are not even close to being prepared to
handle as a country."

2nc goes nuclear

Cyber attacks escalate nuclear war fast
Austin 13 (Greg Austin, PhD in IR, director of policy innovation at the EastWest Institute, Costs of American Cyber
Superiority August 6, 2013, China-US Focus)
The NSA Prism program exists because it is technologically possible and there have been no effective restraints on its
international targeting. This lack of restraint is especially important because the command and control of
strategic nuclear weapons is a potential target both of cyber espionage and offensive cyber operations . The
argument here is not to suggest a similarity between the weapons themselves, but to identify correctly the very close
relationship between cyber operations and nuclear weapons planning. Thus the lack

of restraint in
cyber weapons might arguably affect (destabilize) pre-existing agreements that
constrain nuclear weapons deployment and possible use. The cyber superiority of the
United States, while legal and understandable, is now a cause of strategic instability between nuclear armed powers. This
is similar to the situation that persisted with nuclear weapons themselves until 1969 when the USSR first proposed an end
of the race for the technological frontier of potential planetary devastation. After achieving initial capability, the U.S.
nuclear missile build up was not a rational military response to each step increase in Soviet military capability. It was a
race for the technological frontier by both sides with insufficient recognition of the consequences. This conclusion was
borne out by a remarkable Top Secret study commissioned in 1974 by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Dr James Schlesinger.
By the time it was completed and submitted in 1981, it assessed that the nuclear arms build-up by both sides was driven
not by a supposed tit for tat escalation in capability of deployed military systems but rather by an unconstrained race for
the technological limits of each sides military potential and by its own military doctrinal preferences. The decisions of
each side were not for the most part, according to this now declassified study, a direct response to particular systems that
the other side was building. In 1969, the USSR acted first to propose an end to the race for the technological frontier of
nuclear weapons because it knew it was losing the contest and because it knew there was political sentiment in the United
States and in its Allied countries that supported limitations on the unbridled nuclear fetish. As we ponder the American
cyber industrial complex of today, we see a similar constellation of opposition to its power emerging. This constellation
includes not just the political rivals who see they are losing in cyber space (China and Russia), but nervous allies who see
themselves as the likely biggest victims of the American race for cyber superiority, and loyal American military
commanders who can see the risks and dangers of that quest. It is time for the United States to take stock of the collateral
damage that its quest for cyber military power, including its understandable quest for intelligence superiority over the
terrorist enemy, has caused amongst its allies. The loss has not yet been seen at the high political level among allies, in
spite of several pro forma requests for information from countries such as Germany. The loss of U.S. credibility has
happened more at the popular level. Around the world, once loyal supporters of the United States in its war on terrorism
had a reasonable expectation to be treated as faithful allies. They had the expectation, perhaps nave, that privacy was a
value the Americans shared with them. They did not expect to be subject to such a crude distinction (you are all nonAmericans now). They did not want to know that their entire personal lives in cyber space are now recoverable should
someone so decide by the running of a bit of software in the NSA. After the Prism revelations, so many of these foreign
citizens with an internationalist persuasion and solidarity for the United States now feel a little betrayed. Yet, in the long
run, the most influential voice to end the American quest for cyber military superiority may come from its own armed
forces. There are military figures in the United States who have had responsibility for nuclear weapons command and
control systems and who, in private, counsel caution. They advocate the need to abandon the quest for cyber dominance
and pursue a strategy of mutual security in cyber space though that has yet to be defined. They
cite military exercises where the Blue team gets little or no warning of Red team disruptive cyber attack on systems that
might affect critical nuclear command and control or wider war mobilization functions . Strategic nuclear
stability may be at risk because of uncertainty about innovations in cyber attack capability. This question is worth much
more attention.

at: defenses
Defenses are insufficient
Pew 14 Pew Research Center, citing a slew of experts, October 29, 2014, Cyber Attacks Likely to Increase,
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/29/cyber-attacks-likely-to-increase/
Yes respondents theme 2) Security is generally not the first concern in the design of Internet applications. It

seems

as if the world will only wake up to these vulnerabilities after

catastrophe occurs. Patrick Tucker, futurist and author of The Naked Future: What Happens In a World
That Anticipates Your Every Move? said, Today, cities around the world use supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems to manage water, sewage, electricity, and even traffic lights. I ndependent

analysis has
found that these systems suffer from 25 different security vulnerabilities. Thats bad
enough, but then consider how human error and incompetence makes these
common systems even less secure. Many of the IT managers that use these
systems havent changed the manufacturer-installed security codes. As writers Indu B.
Singh and Joseph N. Pelton have pointed out in The Futurist magazine, that failure to take even the most
basic security precautions leaves these systems open to remote hacking. Stuart
Umpleby, a systems theory expert and professor at George Washington University wrote, In addition to cyber attacks
there are threats from individuals who have access (e.g., Manning, Snowden, Bernie Madoff, Steven Cohen). Digital
equipment is vulnerable to solar flares and EMP (electromagnetic pulse). There can be overlooked or underestimated
design flaws (e.g., the Y2K bug, Long Term Capital Management, financial derivatives, or the change in the Glass-Steagall
Act). Possible solutions: 1. Decentralization can stop cascade effects. However, decentralization plus connection can lead
to vulnerabilities since no one is in charge. 2. Oversight and regulation. However, technical regulation requires highly
skilled people and the private sector pays higher salaries. Firms also try to keep secrets. In finance the banks are now in a
position to write the rules that regulate them. Big banks are getting bigger. So far losses in the billions have been due to
financial and political design flaws more than technical design flaws. Elena Kvochko, manager for IT industry at an
international organization based in New York, noted, The

possibility of a widespread cyber

attack on national critical infrastructure is a major concern for many
governments. The scope and the consequences of such attacks may be different for different nations.
However, a large portion of critical infrastructure facilities still rely
on software and technology created decades ago and which has not
been upgraded. The level of sophistication of adversaries generally progresses
much faster, therefore, it is important to implement adequate measures to ensure a proper protection of critical
assets and capabilities. An executive for a major national news organization in the US wrote, The
government and the private sector are responding too slowly to this
threat. Weve already seen the US Chamber of Commerce hacked, allegedly by the Chinese. Weve seen numerous
botnet attacks on financial institutions that have rendered their sites unusable for hours at a time. And, at the
moment, theres little political will to impose minimal cybersecurity standards
even on essential businesses, such as electric utilities, telecommunications
companies and financial institutions. Some Obama administration officials have warned of
a coming Cyber Pearl Harbor. Still, the public and many businesses seem sanguine about this
possibility. Systems are highly vulnerable the threat will only get worse Pew 14 Pew Research Center, citing a slew
of experts, October 29, 2014, Cyber Attacks Likely to Increase, http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/29/cyber-attacks-

likely-to-increase/ Yes respondents theme 1) Internet-connected systems are inviting targets. The
Internet is a critical infrastructure for national defense activities, energy resources, banking/finance, transportation, and
essential daily-life pursuits for billions of people. The

tools already exist to mount cyber

attacks now and they will improve in coming years but countermeasures will
evolve, too. Joe Kochan, chief operating officer for US Ignite, a company developing gigabit-ready digital experiences and
applications, wrote, Cyber

attacks will become a pillar of warfare and terrorism

between now and 2025. So much of a countrys infrastructurecommerce, finance,
energy, education, health carewill be online, and gaining control of or
disrupting a countrys online systems will become a critical goal in future
conflicts. Mark Nall, a program manager for NASA, responded, Current threats include economic transactions,
power grid, and air traffic control. This will expand to include others such as self-driving cars, unmanned aerial vehicles,
and building infrastructure. In addition to current methods for thwarting opponents, growing use of strong artificial
intelligence to monitor and diagnose itself, and other systems will help as well. Geoff Livingston on the future of cyber
attacks Geoff Livingston, author and president of Tenacity5 Media, responded, Cyberwar

is the battlefield

of now. Dont kid yourself. Battlefields in Sudan, Afghanistan, and Syria are real, but there is a new battlefield and
every day wars are won and lost between individuals, businesses, and countries. The Pentagon and Chinas military are
regularly engaged in digital spats. We really have no idea how deep this goes, but we are much closer to William Gibsons
vision in the seminal cyberpunk novel Neuromancer than any of us would like to admit. Herb Lin, chief scientist for the
Computer Science and Telecommunications Board at the National Research Council of the US National Academies of
Science, replied, More likely is cyber sabotage of individual enterprises. On a large scale, cyber

attacks may be
combined with kinetic attacks and the combination may cause large-scale
damage. Christian Huitema, a distinguished engineer with Microsoft, observed, We are already witnessing the theft
of trade secrets, with impact well worth tens of billions of dollars. We are also seeing active development of cyber weapons
by many world powers. Historically, such new weapons are always used at least once or twice before nations realize it is
too dangerous and start relying on diplomacy. Stewart Baker, a partner at Steptoe & Johnson, a Washington law firm,
wrote, Cyberwar

just plain makes sense. Attacking the power grid or other

industrial control systems is asymmetrical and deniable and
devilishly effective. Plus, it gets easier every year. We used to worry about Russia and
China taking down our infrastructure. Now we have to worry about Iran and Syria and North
Korea. Next up: Hezbollah and Anonymous.

Stuxnet was the tip of the iceberg

Pew 14 Pew Research Center, citing a slew of experts, October 29, 2014, Cyber Attacks Likely to Increase,
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/29/cyber-attacks-likely-to-increase/
Yes respondents theme 3) Major

cyber attacks have already happened, for instance the

Stuxnet worm and attacks in nations where mass opposition to a regime has taken to the streets. Similar or
worse attacks are a given. A notable number of respondents cited Stuxnet and other acts against
various populations as evidence that cyber attacks were now integrated into national military
and intelligence strategies. The Stuxnet computer worm, according to a publication of the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, infected the software of at least 14 industrial sites in Iran several years ago. A worm
is not like a computer virus, which must be installedunwittinglyby a user in order to work. Instead, a worm spreads on
its own among computers once it has been introduced to a network. In the case of Stuxnet the worm targeted computer
systems tied to production of Irans nuclear program and helped destroy as many as a fifth of the centrifuges. Jason
Pontin, editor in chief and publisher of MIT Technology Review, wrote, Oh, sure it is possible. Although not at your
defined level, there has already been a Pearl Harbor event: the Stuxnet computer worm that was used to attack Irans

nuclear capabilities. Do

we really believe that the infrastructure of a major industrial

power will not be so attacked in the next twelve years? The Internet is an
insecure network; all industrialized nations depend on it. Theyre
wide open. Stowe Boyd, lead researcher for GigaOM Research, said, A bellicose China might cyber invade the
military capabilities of Japan and South Korea as part of the conflict around the China Sea, leading to the need to
reconfigure their electronics, at huge cost. Israel and the United States have already created the Stuxnet computer worm
to damage Irans nuclear refinement centrifuges, for example. Imagine a world dependent on robotic farm vehicles,
delivery drones, and AI-managed transport, and how one country might opt to disrupt the spring harvest as a means to
damage a neighboring opponent. Judith Perrolle, a professor at Northeastern University in Boston, wrote, The US
governments series of cyber attacks on citizens, economic entities, and governments around the world has already done
this. People have died from faulty equipment producing gas pipeline explosions and from drone bombings of civilians. US
companies have lost billions worth of business as foreign customers no longer trust their products and services. One way
to counter such attacks is by diplomacy and respect for international law, especially by the United States. As one of my
students once titled a paper on Stuxnet: People who live in electronic houses shouldnt throw worms. A second line of
defense is to design computer and information systems to be more secure. Our current systems are incredibly vulnerable,
by design. US cyber security efforts seem dedicated to breaking into computer systems, not securing them. Maurice
Vergeer, an assistant professor at Radboud University Nijmegen in the Netherlands, replied, It probably will. Estonia was
one of the first countries that suffered a major cyber attack some years ago. If

an agency can create

something like Stuxnet to sabotage Iranian nuclear facilities, its a question of
time for another agency to come up with another piece of malware to sabotage
essential infrastructure. The problem is that because of the Internet of
things, this is even more likely because most computers and machines
will be connected to the Internet. Even when security is tight, the
human factor is probably the weakest link.

at: rid
Rid is wrong --- lack of bureaucratic friction increases the risk
Junio 13 (Tim, Cybersecurity predoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperationat Stanford
University and PhD Candidate in Polisci @ UPenn and MA in IR from Johns Hopkins and develops new cyber capabilities
at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, How Probable is Cyber War? Bringing IR Theory Back In to the
Cyber Conflict Debate 06 Feb 2013, Journal of Strategic Studies Volume 36, Issue 1, pages 125-133)
Two recent articles in the pages of this journal contribute to an important debate about how information technology (IT)
influences international politics.1 Thomas Rid and Adam Liff argue that cyber war has never happened and probably will
not happen. A fundamental problem with these articles is that Rid and Liff do not commit to a theoretical framework
regarding the causes of war. Doing so yields an opposite conclusion: international relations theory
identifies many mechanisms that may cause violent escalation with cyber weapons. This brief response
article explains why cyber war is sufficiently probable to merit serious attention from scholars and practitioners, and
proposes a theoretical research agenda. First, domestic political factors such as states' command and control over cyber
operations must be problematized. The principal-agent approach demonstrates how variation in incentives and
preferences may make militaries more likely to favor cyber attack than other kinds of bureaucracies. This matters in
societies with poor civilian control over the military. Second, the unique material qualities of IT must
be evaluated alongside traditional mechanisms that cause war. For instance, the attribution problem and computational
complexity in modeling cyber operations may increase the odds of inadvertent cyber war by causing states to retaliate
against the wrong targets or miscalculate the potential costs and gains of attacking. What is Cyber War? (Again) Rid and
Liff do not define cyber war the same way, and there is no disciplinary consensus. Rid, Liff, and this author at least agree
on the following: cyber war is a coercive act involving computer network attack. Network attack means information is
disrupted, degraded, or destroyed. Coercive means using force to change or preserve a political status quo. A point of
contention is lethality, which Rid believes is necessary for cyber war.2 This is an extreme and undesirable requirement,
particularly because (as Rid himself points out) non-lethal cyber attacks may be more costly than conventional warfare.3
It is important to note that Rid focuses on network attack, whereas Liff considers a broader conflict process. This response
addresses both. The central point of Rid's article is that it is difficult to cause lethal effects with cyber weapons, and that
politically motivated, instrumental cyber attack has never killed anyone.4 While the empirics of his article are sound he
describes recent cyber attacks accurately Rid never explains what causes war or makes war more or less likely. The
arguments in his article are exclusively definitional, and do not directly support his title's assertion that Cyber
War Will Not Take Place. Liff does better from a theoretical point of view; he links his article to the bargaining
approach to war.5 He does an excellent job of offering counterpoints to four arguments about why cyber attack may
increase the probability of war. However, Liff never establishes why his reasonable views are more plausible than their
alternatives. This is because he is not explicit about assumptions that are necessary for his arguments to hold, nor about
the circumstances under which those assumptions break down. For example, Liff argues that private information may
make war less likely because states poorly estimate the gains from cyber attack.6 Although Liff is right to point out that
ambiguity in cyber operations is important, he is wrong to assume the causal arrow points in one direction. Ambiguity can
make war more or less likely, because it may lead states to overestimate their potential gains, overestimate their stealth,
and/or underestimate their adversary's skill. Finally, it must be recognized that any future war is a low probability event.
Crafting claims that particular conflict scenarios are improbable is rather unimpressive; what is important to understand
is the potential cost and probability of cyber war relative to other kinds of conflict. Causes of Cyber War The noted
problems in the Rid and Liff articles could have been avoided by drawing on structured theoretical approaches that are
common to the study of the causes of all kinds of warfare. What would such an approach look like? This response lacks the
space to fully develop one, but recommends a way forward. Literally dozens of arguments have been advanced in the
political science discipline regarding the causes of war, and very many of these offer reasons to believe cyber war is
plausible or even probable.7 An approach, advanced in James Fearon's modern classic Rationalist Explanations for War,
is to list assumptions that create an ideal condition in which war should never happen.8 One way to structure scientific
inquiry regarding the probability of cyber war is to examine how the unique material qualities of IT affect each of the
assumptions. Table 1 offers a cursory version of such an analysis to identify priority areas for further study. Among a large
number of revealed paths to cyber war, one principal-agent problems involving the bureaucracies that conduct cyber
operations is detailed here to demonstrate the plausibility of specific mechanisms and what follow-on empirical work
should look like. Principal-Agent Problems Rid and Liff appear to assume that states are unitary rational actors (URAs),
and do not explain the domestic political processes whereby states make foreign policy choices. Empirically and

theoretically, it

is important to relax the URA assumption and problematize who has formal
and actual release authority over cyber weapons. The principal-agent approach, for instance, works
from the premise that individuals and organizations often vary in their incentives and preferences, which could make war
beneficial for some at the cost of others.9 This and related thinking inform how scholars study other military technologies,
such as nuclear weapons. Scott Sagan points out that although unauthorized nuclear war is improbable, it is sufficiently
probable that people should worry a great deal about command and control (C2) issues.10 Many anecdotes echo Sagan's
work. For example, a Russian general was asked during the Cold War about his backup plan in the event he could not open
the safe containing his nuclear launch codes. His answer was that he would bash the safe open with a sledgehammer he
kept nearby!11 Consideration of how bureaucracies do what they do like keeping emergency nuclear war sledgehammers
is of critical importance to the cyber C2 question. Although controlling large organizations is a core function of
militaries, the conduct of cyber operations is different from other kinds of activity in a way that greatly magnifies the
strategic corporal problem. This is because constant cyber operations other than war decrease the bureaucratic friction
that normally alerts superiors to aberrant behavior. In the case of nuclear weapons, a long chain of events is
required before unauthorized activities occur. Someone probably would notice a crazed general using his
sledgehammer on the launch codes safe, turning keys, fueling missiles, and so on. In contrast, it is a core function of cyber
bureaucrats to access adversary networks constantly, and to develop push-button solutions to minimize lags during war.
Furthermore, if the perception that cyber weapons are non-lethal comes to be widely perceived (as Rid would prefer), it is
reasonable to conclude that the threshold for their use will be lower than other kinds of weapons even if the cost of cyber
attacks is greater.

What do they do?

What do federal cyber security employees do?
FBI 15 (Federal Bureau of Investigation Cyber Unit, Last updated in 2015, Computer Intrusions
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber/computer-intrusions) // CW
Every day, criminals

are invading countless homes and offices across the nationnot

by breaking down windows and doors, but by breaking into laptops, personal
computers, and wireless devices via hacks and bits of malicious code. The collective
impact is staggering. Billions of dollars are lost every year repairing systems hit by such attacks. Some take down vital
systems, disrupting and sometimes disabling the work of hospitals, banks, and 9-1-1 services around the country. Who is
behind such attacks? It

runs the gamutfrom computer geeks looking for bragging

rightsto businesses trying to gain an upper hand in the marketplace by hacking
competitor websites, from rings of criminals wanting to steal your personal
information and sell it on black marketsto spies and terrorists looking to rob
our nation of vital information or launch cyber strikes. Today, these computer
intrusion casescounterterrorism, counterintelligence, and criminalare the
paramount priorities of our cyber program because of their potential relationship
to national security. Combating the threat. In recent years, weve built a whole new set of
technological and investigative capabilities and partnershipsso were as
comfortable chasing outlaws in cyberspace as we are down back alleys and across
continents. That includes: A Cyber Division at FBI Headquarters to address cyber crime in a coordinated and
cohesive manner; Specially trained cyber squads at FBI headquarters and in each of
our 56 field offices, staffed with agents and analysts who protect against
investigate computer intrusions, theft of intellectual property and personal
information, child pornography and exploitation, and online fraud; New Cyber
Action Teams that travel around the world on a moments notice to assist in
computer intrusion cases and that gather vital intelligence that helps us identify
the cyber crimes that are most dangerous to our national security and to our
economy; Our 93 Computer Crimes Task Forces nationwide that combine stateof-the-art technology and the resources of our federal, state, and local
counterparts; A growing partnership with other federal agencies, including the
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and others
which share similar concerns and resolve in combating cyber crime.

What does a cyber-security worker do anyway?

GWU 15 (George Washington University Department of Computer Science, Cybersecurity Roles and Job Titles
https://www.cs.gwu.edu/academics/graduate_programs/master/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-jobs) CW
Overview Graduates from this new MS degree in Cybersecurity will have a large, hungry and lucrative job market
available to them, and will be qualified to occupy nearly all of the roles described in this page. The roles and job titles in

the security sector often involve somewhat overlapping responsibilities, and can be broad or specialized depending on the
size and special needs of the organization. Typical

job titles are security analyst, security

engineer, security administrator, security architect, security specialist, and
security consultant. To better describe the scope of those positions, employers often precede the above titles with
qualifying terms like Cyber, Information, Computer, Network, IT, and Applications. This results in fuller job
titles such as IT Security Engineer, Information Security Analyst, Network Security Administrator, IT Security Consultant,
and so on. Special variations of some of the titles are sometimes preferred, such as Information Assurance Analyst, and
Security Software Developer. Also, some security jobs are even more specialized, such as cryptographer, intrusion
detection specialist, computer security incident responder, and so on. Additional terms are sometimes used to convey
rank, such as Senior IT Security Consultant, and Chief Information Security Officer. Graduates of the new program will
normally qualify for such high ranks after several years of on-the-job experience. As the Cybersecurity domain expands
and develops further, new roles and titles are likely to emerge, and the roles attributed to the current titles will likely
crystallize or evolve. For now, the following is a good description of the various security job titles and roles employed by
the private and public sectors. Job Titles Description Summaries Security Analyst: analyzes

and assesses
vulnerabilities in the infrastructure (software, hardware, networks), investigates available
tools and countermeasures to remedy the detected vulnerabilities, and
recommends solutions and best practices. Analyzes and assesses damage to the data/infrastructure
as a result of security incidents, examines available recovery tools and processes, and
recommends solutions. Tests for compliance with security policies and procedures.
May assist in the creation, implementation, and/or management of security solutions. Security Engineer:
Performs security monitoring, security and data/logs analysis, and forensic
analysis, to detect security incidents, and mounts incident response. Investigates
and utilizes new technologies and processes to enhance security capabilities and
implement improvements Security Architect: Designs a security system or major
components of a security system, and may head a security design team building a
new security system. Security Administrator: Installs and manages organization-wide
security systems. May also take on some of the tasks of a security analyst in
smaller organizations. Security Software Developer: Develops security software, including
tools for monitoring, traffic analysis, intrusion detection, virus/spyware/malware
detection, anti-virus software, and so on. Also integrates/implements security
into applications software. Cryptographer/Cryptologist: Uses encryption to secure
information or to build security software. Also works as researcher to develop
stronger encryption algorithms. Cryptanalyst: Analyzes encrypted information to
break the code/cipher or to determine the purpose of malicious software . Chief
Information Security Officer: a high-level management position responsible for the entire
information security division/staff. The position may include hands-on technical
work. Security Consultant/Specialist: Broad titles that encompass any one or all of the other
roles/titles, tasked with protecting computers, networks, software, data, and/or
information systems against viruses, worms, spyware, malware, intrusion
detection, unauthorized access, denial-of-service attacks, and an ever increasing
list of attacks by hackers acting as individuals or as part of organized crime or
foreign governments. Very Specialized Roles: Intrusion Detection Specialist: Monitors networks,
computers, and applications in large organizations, looking for events and traffic
indicators that signal intrusion. Determines the damage caused by detected

intrusions, identifies how an intrusion occurred, and recommends safeguards

against similar intrusions. Also does penetration testing to identify vulnerabilities
and recommend safeguards as preemptive measures. Computer Security Incident Responder: A
member of team that prepares for and mounts rapid response to security threats
and attacks such as viruses and denial-of-service attacks. Source Code Auditor: Reviews
software source code to identify potential security issues and vulnerabilities that
could be exploited by hackers to gain unauthorized access to data and system
resources. Virus Technician: analyzes newly discovered computer viruses, and designs
and develops software to defend against them. Penetration Tester (also known as Ethical Hacker or
Assurance Validator): Not only scans for and identifies vulnerabilities, but exploits them
to provide hard evidence that they are vulnerabilities. When penetration-testing
large infrastructures such as power grids, utility systems, and nuclear facilities,
large teams of penetration testers, called Red Teams, are employed. Vulnerability
Assessor: Scans for, identifies and assesses vulnerabilities in IT systems including
computers, networks, software systems, information systems, and applications
software.

Money Laundering Impacts

Africa
IFFs cripple relief efforts in Africa breeding political and economic
instability in the region
Kar et al 10 [DevKar; Lead Economist at Global Financial Integrity, Former Economist at IMF
(Dev, Global Financial Integrity, Illicit Financial Flows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development, January 2010,
http://www.gfintegrity.org/content/view/300/154/]

The enormity of such a huge outflow of illicit capital explains why donor-driven
efforts to spur economicdevelopment and reduce poverty have been underachieving in
Africa. Policy measures must be taken to addressthe factors underlying illicit
outflows and also to impress upon the G-20 the need for better transparency
andtighter oversight of international banks and offshore financial centers that absorb these
flows.Research at Global Financial Integrity shows that the massive outflows of
illicitcapital are not just dueto suboptimal policiesin individual developing
countries butratherthatsuch policies find synergy in deep flawswithin the global
financial system. Take for example a simple indicator of aid effectiveness. According to recent studies by GFI and
other researchers, developing countries lose at least $10 through illegal flight capital for every $1 they receive in external
assistance. The comparable ratios for African countries are misleadingly low not only because of data deficiencies but also
due to the fact that they receive a disproportional share of development assistance provided to developing countries.So

long as illicit capital continues to hemorrhage out of poor African countries over
the long term at a rapidpace, efforts to reduce poverty and boost economic
growth will be thwarted as income distribution becomes evermoreskewed
leading to economic and political instability.The current global financial crisis,
which has generated a world-wide public backlash against the lack
oftransparency and excesses of financial institutions, offers both African and rich
donor countries an historicopportunity to address the problem of illicit flows and
absorption of such flows in the worlds shadow financial system. The existing global financial system shaped by
liberalization and deregulation of financial markets have instead ended up generating ever-rising illicit flows and loss in
government revenues. As several researchers have noted, economic

growth without credible reform

could lead to more, not less, capitalflight, as the increase in incomes would
simply finance the increased accumulation of foreign assets. Hence, prudent
macroeconomic policies such as lower fiscal deficits, reduced monetary expansion, positive real rates of interest, and an
appropriately valued exchange rate are crucial to improving the attractiveness of domestic investments relative to the
illicit transfer of capital abroad in search of better risk-adjusted rates of return. However, sound

economic
policies also need to be complemented by strengthened institutions, the rule of
law, and better governanceif policymakers areto curtail illicit financial flows on a lasting basis.
Africa instability coming now, escalates to war
MACP 12

[Moroccan American Center for Policy, 12/30/12, http://allafrica.com/stories/201212310063.html]

al-Qaeda across northern Africa," fueled by the Mali crisis and

Libyan arms influx, iscreating an 'Arc of Instability' across Africa's Sahel that poses an
"acute threat" to countries in the region and to Europe andthe US. The studies by NATO Allied Command's CivilTwo new studies report that "the growing role of

Military Fusion Centre, "Al Qaeda and the African Arc of Instability," and CNA Strategic Studies, "Security Challenges in Libya and the Sahel" also cite or link to
evidence of ties to al-Qaeda groups by members from the Polisario-run refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria. The CNA Strategic Studies report, by Sarah Vogler,

the situation in Mali remains a veritable powder keg." Regionally, the Mali crisis and flood of arms
from Libya has fed the formation of "a network of jihadists from Africa to Asia," and relocation of Al-Qaeda's
"center of gravity" to North Africa, extending an "Arc of Instability" across the region . Locally, the report warns
"the infiltration by AQIM and the political destabilization of the country pose an acute threat to Mali's
neighbors." Of particular concern "is evidence that AQIM has infiltrated the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, as well as indications that
says "

Sahrawi from the camps have joined terrorist groups based in Mali." This poses "immediate concerns for the security of Western Sahara, Mauritania, Morocco, and

As the Islamist militants

have established their control of the north, fighters from other countries have poured
into the area to join the conflict." The al-Qaeda-linked Islamist groups Ansar Dine and Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa
(MUJAO) have likewise allowed the "transnational terrorist organization a base of operation in Mali's north from which
to launch attacks against Western targets."
Algeria." The CNA Strategic Studies report says the security threat extends beyond the Sahel/North Africa neighborhood. "

African conflicts escalate to great power war

Glick 7 (Caroline, Senior Middle East Fellow Center for Security Policy, Condis African Holiday, 12-12,
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/home.aspx?sid=56&categoryid=56&subcategoryid=90&newsid=11568)

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice introduced a new venue for her superficial and destructive stewardship of US foreign policy during her lightning visit to the

Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small

wars, which rage continuously, can easily escalate into big wars .Local conflicts have regional and global
aspects . All of the conflicts in this tinderbox , which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the
Red Sea, can potentially give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing
regional actors and global powers .Located in and around the Horn of Africa are the states of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan
Horn of Africa last Wednesday.The Horn of

and Kenya. Eritrea, which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a 30-year civil war, is a major source of regional conflict. Eritrea has a nagging border
dispute with Ethiopia which could easily ignite. The two countries fought a bloody border war from 1998-2000 over control of the town of Badme. Although a UN
mandated body determined in 2002 that the disputed town belonged to Eritrea, Ethiopia has rejected the finding and so the conflict festers.Eritrea also fights a
proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia and in Ethiopia's rebellious Ogaden region. In Somalia, Eritrea is the primary sponsor of the al-Qaida-linked Islamic Courts
Union which took control of Somalia in June, 2006. In November 2006, the ICU government declared jihad against Ethiopia and Kenya. Backed by the US,
Ethiopia invaded Somalia last December to restore the recognized Transitional Federal Government to power which the ICU had deposed.Although the Ethiopian
army successfully ousted the ICU from power in less than a week, backed by massive military and financial assistance from Eritrea, as well as Egypt and Libya, the
ICU has waged a brutal insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military for the past year.The senior ICU leadership, including Sheikh Hassan DahirAweys
and Sheikh Sharif Ahmed have received safe haven in Eritrea. In September, the exiled ICU leadership held a nine-day conference in the Eritrean capital of Asmara
where they formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia headed by Ahmed.Eritrean President-for-life IsaiasAfwerki declared his country's support for the
insurgents stating, "The Eritrean people's support to the Somali people is consistent and historical, as well as a legal and moral obligation."Although touted in the
West as a moderate, Ahmed has openly supported jihad and terrorism against Ethiopia, Kenya and the West. Aweys, for his part, is wanted by the FBI in
connection with his role in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.Then there is Eritrea's support for the Ogaden separatists in Ethiopia.
The Ogaden rebels are Somali ethnics who live in the region bordering Somalia and Kenya. The rebellion is run by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)
which uses terror and sabotage as its preferred methods of warfare. It targets not only Ethiopian forces and military installations, but locals who wish to maintain
their allegiance to Ethiopia or reach a negotiated resolution of the conflict. In their most sensationalist attack to date, in April ONLF terror forces attacked a
Chinese-run oil installation in April killing nine Chinese and 65 Ethiopians.Ethiopia, for its part has fought a brutal counter-insurgency to restore its control over
the region. Human rights organizations have accused Ethiopia of massive human rights abuses of civilians in Ogaden.Then there is Sudan. As Eric Reeves wrote in
the Boston Globe on Saturday, "The brutal regime in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, has orchestrated genocidal counter-insurgency war in Darfur for five years,
and is now poised for victory in its ghastly assault on the region's African populations."The Islamist government of Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir is refusing to
accept non-African states as members of the hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping mission to Darfur that is due to replace the undermanned and demoralized
African Union peacekeeping force whose mandate ends on December 31. Without its UN component of non-African states, the UN Security Council mandated force
will be unable to operate effectively. Khartoum's veto led Jean-Marie Guehenno, the UN undersecretary for peacekeeping to warn last month that the entire
peacekeeping mission may have to be aborted.And the Darfur region is not the only one at risk. Due to Khartoum's refusal to carry out the terms of its 2005 peace
treaty with the Southern Sudanese that ended Khartoum's 20-year war and genocide against the region's Christian and animist population, the unsteady peace may
be undone. Given Khartoum's apparent sprint to victory over the international community regarding Darfur, there is little reason to doubt that once victory is

secured, it will renew its attacks in the south.

The conflicts in the Horn of Africa have

regional

and global

dimensions. Regionally, Egypt has played a central role in sponsoring and fomenting conflicts. Egypt's meddling advances its interest of preventing the
African nations from mounting a unified challenge to Egypt's colonial legacy of extraordinary rights to the waters of the Nile River which flows through all
countries of the region.

warming
Solving IFFs is key to raising domestic climate change financing
solves warming
Tax Justice Network 09 (Stop Illicit Capital Flows to Tackle the Climate Crisis, December 11,
http://taxjustice.blogspot.com/2009/12/stop-illicit-capital-fligh-to-solve.html)//SEP

What about mitigation, i.e. reversing the trend of increasing CO2 and other greehouse gas (GHG)
emissions in the atmosphere? Estimates vary even more here: the UNFCCC estimates US$ 52.4 billion,
while the World Bank says US $140-175 billion -- with cost of financing even higher if
that money has to be borrowed and then repaid (financing cost is estimated anywhere between
US$ 265-565 billion), hence the figure of US$ 400 billion to bring the level of CO2 in the climate down to a safer level of
450 parts per million (ppm) of CO2 in the climate. Meanwhile there is a petition on the 'safe' level actually being 350 ppm,
requiring a lot more climate financing. Whatever the 'magic figure', the demand for climate change finance is huge .

One

solution is this: tackle illicit financial flows from developing countries, estimated by
Global Financial Integrity (GFI), our colleagues in Washington D.C. annually between US$ 858.6-1060 billion annually
for the years 2002-2006. This

point was completely lost in the United Nations Climate Change Conference
2009 in Copenhagen (COP15) -- the 15th climate conference since the first one in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. If we
want to adapt to climate change, and further mitigate it, we need to look at the
capacity of especially the developing countries in raising domestic climate change
financing. Alongside tax evasion, illicit flows, and avoidance, there are questions such as low royalties and
imbalanced mineral contracts, sources of large losses. Ghana, for instance, in a report titled 'Breaking the Curse' says the
state could have raised further US$ 54.46-163.39 million due in mining royalties if a range of 6-12 per cent were applied
instead of the current minimum rate of 3 per cent, that all mining companies pay due to low reported profits from gold,
diamonds, manganese and bauxite mining. Meanwhile, in Sierra Leone, it is estimated in another report titled 'Sierra
Leone at Cross-Roads' that US$ 110 million more could be raised annually by 2020 in the future from the mining sector.
This potential for mobilising further domestic resources is there. Indeed, just as we argued at the Doha Financing for
Development (UNFfD) conference in Doha in November-December 2008, involving pledges to reinforce international tax
co-operation, to tackle illicit financial flows and to work towards a multilateral framework of automatic information
exchange. These will be productive ways of tackling the financial costs of the climate crisis.

poverty
We solve poverty IFFs are the root cause of poverty
Reuter 12 Professor in the School of Public Policy and the Department of Criminology, University of Maryland,
Senior Researcher at RAND, PhD in Economics from Yale University
(Peter, Draining Development: Controlling Flows of Illicit Funds From Developing Countries, World Bank,
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2242)

There is no doubt that illicit nancial ows (IFFs) from

developing coun- tries are substantial.

Even if the correct gure is only a 10th of the often- cited Global Financial
Integrity estimates (about US$1 trillion annually according to Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2008), that is, around
US$100 billion, it is large relative to either ofcial development assistance (about US$70
billion) or total foreign direct investment in the developing world (around US$250 billion in
2004 according to UNCTAD 2009). Eliminat- ing this outow, all else being equal, would be an
enormous gain to developing countries. This alone does not imply, however, that IFFs constitute a
good focus for policy. IFFs are a specic consequence of more fundamental prob- lems that have long been of great
concern. Most notably, corruption and the payment of bribes to major government ofcials have become a cen- tral issue
for the World Bank and for the development community gen- erally, at least since World Bank President James
Wolfensohn put it on the Banks agenda in the mid-1990s. Similarly, the failure of developing countries to collect taxes has
also come more into focus in the last decade; the reliance on ofcial development assistance is seen as, impor- tantly, a
consequence of the inability of these countries to tax their own resources (Brutigam, Fjeldstad, and Moore 2008). The

root cause argu- ment, then, is that one should focus on ways of reducing the
underlying problems: corruption, tax evasion, and so forth. The international
ows are only a manifestation of these problems. Cut down on corruption, tax evasion, and the rest,
and the IFFs will take care of themselves. The argument for focusing on causes rather than
symptoms is a com- mon one in many domains of policy. For example, many analysts argue
that crime is a manifestation less of individual failings or moral turpi- tude than of social failure (Sykes, Cullen, and
Merton 1992). Thus, they say, the most effective way of responding to crime is not detection and punishment of offenders,
which treat only the symptom, but elimina- tion of social inequality, improving the conditions in which the poor live, and
better schools and social programs, which treat the true causes of crime. In fact, there is evidence that society can usefully
do both. Police and prison do reduce crime, at least through incapacitation, and social programs such as early childhood
interventions also reduce the propensity to crime (Spelman 2000; Greenwood et al. 1998). There are other domains in
which policy focuses on root causes, but with little attention to amelioration of harms. For example, the cur- rent debate
about nancial regulation, in the wake of the global scal crisis, emphasizes rules to correct fundamentals rather than
postfailure remedies. There is thus no general approach. For some problems, ameliorative programs have a minimal role;

focusing on the root causes is, indeed, the only path to reduction of the problem.
For others, treating the symptom is also useful. What may be said about illicit ows in this respect? A distinctive
feature of the IFF issue is that the illicit ows may them- selves exacerbate the
underlying harms, that is, even if the tax evasion, corruption, and criminal
markets continued unabated and all that one accomplished was to prevent the
resulting funds leaving the home coun- try, the result would appear to be welfare
enhancing. Assuming that the owners of the illicit funds want to do more than hide their assets under mattresses,
there would be more money for domestic investment and, perhaps, also a stronger tax base. Mick Moore takes this up in
chapter 14. It

is also possible that trapping funds in the source countries reduces the

attractiveness of corruption, tax evasion, and so on. A focus on the consequences

might then reduce the underlying activities. This reduc- tion could occur through
at least two mechanisms. First, the returns associated with having to spend the
money at home, with only the goods and services available , for example, in Congolese
markets, may make the marginal dollar less valuable and, thus, lower the incentive to steal from the state. With increasing
globalization, however, the consumption pos- sibilities in developing countries are approaching those available elsewhere, at least in terms of perishables. Substitutes for homes in the south of France may remain difcult to nd in poorer
countries (indeed, in almost any country). Second,

the funds are less secure at home than

abroad. This will also lower the marginal return of another dollar stolen in an ex
ante calculation because a change in regime may lead to the seizure of some of
these assets. The calculation of the probabilities of seizure is no doubt
complicated, but the fear of such a loss surely weighs heavily in small countries
with kleptocratic traditions. The fear may increase the current kleptocrats incentives for retaining power
given that ight will separate them from their wealth.2 However, this seems a modest effect; few kleptocrats quit power
easily, even with vast amounts of wealth overseas, as evidenced by Muammar Ghadda s refusal to leave Libya under
extreme pressure, despite the availability of billions of dol- lars in overseas accounts.

AT: T-Substantial

2AC T-Substantial
W/M: Substantially is modifying the curtailment; not the
number of people. Resolution basis is best it doesnt say
anything about domestic surveillance of the population. We
are a substantial curtailment of domestic surveillance.
C/I: "Substantial" means of real worth or considerable value --this is the USUAL and CUSTOMARY meaning of the term
Words and Phrases 2 (Volume 40A, p. 458)
D.S.C. 1966. The word substantial within Civil Rights Act providing that a place is a
public accommodation if a substantial portion of food which is served has moved in
commerce must be construed in light of its usual and customary meaning,
that is, something of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable,
something worthwhile as distinguished from something without value or merely
nominal

Not all forms of surveillance are the same. The negative takes
a flawed approach to the topic some methods of surveillance
are more important. FBI drug testing is one of them.
Takash 7/8

(Budget and Tax Policy Intern at the Cato Institute, Applied Mathematics & Statistics and
Political Science major at JHU, Winners of Provost's Undergraduate Research Award, Young Voices
Advocates Advocate specializing in drug policy) aj
Drug testing also makes it harder for firms to maximize profit.

The NSA and FBI are starting

to reconsider testing applicants because its so difficult to find good hackers who dont use
marijuana or other drugs. If this means less qualified hackers are working for the government, the
federal governments drug testing policies are literally a threat
to national security.

Drug testing is a means of social control. Thats the worst form

of surveillance.
Gilliom 96 (Established in 1972, the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) is a
federally funded resource offering justice and drug-related information to support research, policy, and
program development worldwide. Surveillance, Privacy, and the Law: Employee Drug Testing and the
Politics of Social Control https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=169080)/lg
One view of employee drug

testing is that it is an innovative means of policing as part

of a broader move to move social control policy toward an ideal of total

surveillance and total crime prevention. While privacy and autonomy are obvious casualties of such a
system social control policy holds out the possibility of securing almost
total compliance with the law in
drug use welfare administration, and
,

such problematic areas as

taxation. Another view of employee drug testing is less about testing than about political and legal battles
over implementation. Drug

testing in the workplace is discussed in relation to

surveillance hegemony, and the law. The social construction of the drug crisis is examined; consent
,

and resistance in a unionized work force are considered; and constitutional issues associated with privacy,
due process, and the fourth amendment are explored. Supplemental information on employee drug testing
is provided in two appendixes. References, tables, and figures

They overlimit to only metadata affs because thats the only

thing that affects all US persons. Other portions of surveillance
are important for in-depth education and topic research on the
topic. Otherwise that justifies the aff and neg to only research
metadata for the entire year, disincentivizing argument
innovation and critical thinking which are the best portable
skills.

1AR T-Substantial
Substantial means considerable or to a large degree --- this
common meaning is preferable because the word is not a term
of art
Arkush 2 (David, JD Candidate Harvard University, Preserving "Catalyst" Attorneys' Fees Under the
Freedom of Information Act in the Wake of Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia Department
of Health and Human Resources, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, Winter,
37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 131)
Plaintiffs should argue that the term "substantially prevail" is not a term of art because if considered a
term of art, resort to Black's 7th produces a definition of "prevail" that could be interpreted adversely to
plaintiffs. 99 It is commonly accepted that

words that are not legal terms of art should be accorded their

ordinary, not their legal, meaning, 100 and ordinary-usage dictionaries provide FOIA fee claimants with
helpful arguments. The Supreme Court has already found favorable, temporally relevant definitions of the
word "substantially" in ordinary dictionaries: "Substantially" suggests "considerable" or "specified to a
large degree." See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1976) (defining "substantially" as "in
a substantial manner" and "substantial" as "considerable in amount, value, or worth" and "being that
specified to a large degree or in the main"); see also 17 Oxford English Dictionary 66-67 (2d ed. 1989)
("substantial": "relating to or proceeding from the essence of a thing; essential"; "of ample or considerable
amount, quantity or dimensions"). 101

Substantial means of considerable amount not some

contrived percentage
Prost 4 (Judge United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Committee For Fairly Traded
Venezuelan Cement v. United States, 6-18,
http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/04opinions/04-1016.html)
The URAA and the SAA neither amend nor refine the language of 1677(4)(C). In fact, they merely
suggest, without disqualifying other alternatives, a clearly higher/substantial proportion approach.
Indeed, the SAA specifically mentions that no precise mathematical formula or benchmark proportion
is to be used for a dumping concentration analysis. SAA at 860 (citations omitted); see also Venez.
Cement, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1329-30. Furthermore, as the Court of International Trade noted, the SAA
emphasizes that the Commission retains the discretion to determine concentration of imports on a case-

the definition of the word substantial undercuts the

argument. The word substantial generally means considerable in amount,

by-case basis. SAA at 860. Finally,

CFTVCs

value or worth. Websters Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1993).

It does not imply

a specific number or cut-off. What may be substantial in one situation may

not be in another situation.

The very breadth of the term substantial undercuts the CFTVCs

argument that Congress spoke clearly in establishing a standard for the Commissions regional
antidumping and countervailing duty analyses. It therefore supports the conclusion that the Commission is
owed deference in its interpretation of substantial proportion. The Commission clearly embarked on its
analysis having been given considerable leeway to interpret a particularly broad term.

Defining substantial curtailment quantitatively is completely

arbitrary
Albin 9 J. Albin, Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 197 N.J. 339; 963 A.2d 289; 2009 N.J.
LEXIS 6, 1-29, Lexis

Defining "stoppage of work" as a "substantial curtailment of work which is due to a

labor dispute" is a sensible interpretation; because a "stoppage" is "the act of stopping or the
state of being stopped[,]" Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language
Unabridged 2251 (1966), that portion of the definition appears both rational and reasonable on its face.

The difficulty, however, arises from the regulatory definition of a "substantial

curtailment [***66] of work" as a twenty percent reduction in output. The
hospital/employer argues that

there is

no factual basis on which to ground that

regulatory definition, and I am compelled to agree.

No doubt, administrative regulations are entitled to a presumption of validity, N.J. State League of
Municipalities v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 158 N.J. 211, 222, 729 A.2d 21 (1999). That said,

the deference afforded regulations does not go so far as to permit an

administrative agency under the guise of an administrative interpretation to give a
statute any greater effect than is permitted by the statutory language . Nor can agency
[h]owever,

regulations alter the terms of a legislative enactment or frustrate the policy embodied in the statute. If a
regulation is plainly at odds with the statute, the court must set it aside. As we have repeatedly stated, the
judicial role is to ensure that an agency's action does not violate express and implied legislative intent.
[*377] Thus, the meaning of enabling legislation is pivotal to any analysis of the legitimacy of a rule.
[T.H. v. Div. of Developmental Disabilities, 189 N.J. 478, 490-91, 916 A.2d 1025 (2007) (citations, internal
quotation marks and editing marks omitted).]
And, in determining the [***67] validity of challenged administrative regulations, our point of departure is
the statute's meaning and, "[o]rdinarily, we derive a statute's meaning from
at 491, 916 A.2d 1025 (citing State v. Sutton, 132 N.J. 471, 625 A.2d 1132 (1993)).

its language." Id.

Nothing in this record provides any basis whatsoever for the Department of Labor's
adoption of what clearly is a totally arbitrary "80% rule" to define a
"stoppage of work." Indeed, in its own answers to the public comments on this regulation, the
Department of Labor boldly asserted that "[t]he rules provide that only those individuals involved in the
labor dispute will be disqualified for benefits." Comments of the Department of Labor, Division of
Employment Security and Job Training to the proposed adoption of N.J.A.C. 12:17-12.2, 29 N.J.R. 5162 (Dec.
15, 1997) (emphasis supplied). Repeatedly, the Department of Labor claimed that it "recognizes
unemployment insurance as an insurance program and not an entitlement program . . . [and, therefore,
i]ndividuals must contribute to the unemployment system and must meet eligibility requirements in order
to receive unemployment benefits." Ibid. Yet, despite those clear statements of intent, nothing--absolutely
nothing [***68] --in the published history of the adoption of this regulation supports the arbitrary "80%
rule" [**313] adopted by the Department of Labor and on which the majority relies.