Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Plan
The United States federal government should prohibit the use
of unpiloted aerial vehicles for domestic surveillance without a
warrant
Solvency
Solvency 1AC
Drone surveillance should be restricted to times when there is
a warrant
Jay Stanley and Catherine Crump, DECEMBER 2011, Protecting Privacy From
Aerial Surveillance: Recommendations for Government Use of Drone Aircraft,
American Civil Liberties Union,
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/protectingprivacyfromaerialsurveillance.pdf,
/Bingham-MB
Usage restrictions. UAVs should be subject to strict regulation to ensure
that their use does not eviscerate the privacy that Americans have
must adapt constitutional jurisprudence to properly address modern technology. The fact that it is now feasible to
cheaply perform surveillance on an individual or entire area of individuals should not mean that these actions are
in areas where
people would have an expectation of privacy or at least an expectation
that they will not be subject to covert observation and recording,
sanctions should be imposed. Lawmakers should be concerned with changes in technology that
constitutional. Particularly when surveillance is conducted on the property of another, or
allow commercial or private actors to gather data on or track the movements of individuals. These technological
changes mean that individuals need laws to protect their dignity, autonomy, and privacy. At the same time,
lawmakers must be cognizant of the fact that there are numerous legitimate uses for drone technology, including
Privacy Advantage
Privacy 1AC
Drones are inevitablewe need rules on drone surveillance to
ensure privacy protections
Tiffany Sommadossi, 8-5-2014, Domestic Surveillance Drones: To Fear or Not
Privacy underpins human dignity and other key values such as freedom of
association and freedom of speech. It has become one of the most
important human rights issues of the modern age . The publication of this
report reflects the growing importance, diversity and complexity of this fundamental
right. This report provides details of the state of privacy in fifty countries from
around the world. It outlines the constitutional and legal conditions of privacy
protection, and summarizes important issues and events relating to privacy and
surveillance. Nearly every country in the world recognizes a right of privacy
explicitly in their Constitution. At a minimum, these provisions include rights of
inviolability of the home and secrecy of communications. Most recently-written
Constitutions such as South Africa's and Hungary's include specific rights to access
and control one's personal information. In many of the countries where privacy is
not explicitly recognized in the Constitution, such as the United States, Ireland and
India, the courts have found that right in other provisions. In many countries,
international agreements that recognize privacy rights such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the European
Convention on Human Rights have been adopted into law. In the early 1970s,
countries began adopting broad laws intended to protect individual
privacy. Throughout the world, there is a general movement towards the
adoption of comprehensive privacy laws that set a framework for
protection. Most of these laws are based on the models introduced by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Council of Europe.
In 1995, conscious both of the shortcomings of law, and the many differences in the
level of protection in each of its States, the European Union passed a Europe-wide
directive which will provide citizens with a wider range of protections over abuses of
their data.[fn 1] The directive on the "Protection of Individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data" sets a
benchmark for national law. Each EU State must pass complementary legislation by
October 1998. The Directive also imposes an obligation on member States to ensure
that the personal information relating to European citizens is covered by law when it
is exported to, and processed in, countries outside Europe. This requirement has
resulted in growing pressure outside Europe for the passage of privacy laws. More
than forty countries now have data protection or information privacy laws.
More are in the process of being enacted. Reasons for Adopting
Comprehensive Laws There are three major reasons for the movement towards
comprehensive privacy and data protection laws. Many countries are adopting
these laws for one or more reasons. To remedy past injustices. Many
countries, especially in Central Europe, South America and South Africa, are
adopting laws to remedy privacy violations that occurred under previous
authoritarian regimes. To promote electronic commerce. Many countries,
especially in Asia, but also Canada, have developed or are currently developing laws
in an effort to promote electronic commerce. These countries recognize consumers
are uneasy with their personal information being sent worldwide. Privacy laws are
being introduced as part of a package of laws intended to facilitate
electronic commerce by setting up uniform rules. To ensure laws are
consistent with Pan-European laws. Most countries in Central and Eastern Europe
are adopting new laws based on the Council of Europe Convention and the
European Union Data Protection Directive. Many of these countries hope to join the
European Union in the near future. Countries in other regions, such as Canada, are
adopting new laws to ensure that trade will not be affected by the requirements of
the EU Directive. Continuing Problems Even with the adoption of legal and other
protections, violations of privacy remain a concern. In many countries, laws have
not kept up with the technology, leaving significant gaps in protections. In other
countries, law enforcement and intelligence agencies have been given significant
exemptions. Finally, in the absence of adequate oversight and enforcement,
the mere presence of a law may not provide adequate protection. There
are widespread violations of laws relating to surveillance of
communications, even in the most democratic of countries. The U.S. State
Department's annual review of human rights violations finds that over 90
countries engage in illegally monitoring the communications of political
opponents, human rights workers, journalists and labor organizers. In France, a
government commission estimated in 1996 that there were over 100,000 wiretaps
conducted by private parties, many on behalf of government agencies. In Japan,
police were recently fined 2.5 million yen for illegally wiretapping members of the
Communist party. Police services, even in countries with strong privacy
laws, still maintain extensive files on citizens not accused or even
suspected of any crime. There are currently investigations in Sweden and
Norway, two countries with the longest history of privacy protection for police files.
Companies regularly flaunt the laws, collecting and disseminating personal
information. In the United States, even with the long-standing existence of a law on
consumer credit information, companies still make extensive use of such
information for marketing purposes. THREATS TO PRIVACY The increasing
sophistication of information technology with its capacity to collect,
analyze and disseminate information on individuals has introduced a
sense of urgency to the demand for legislation. Furthermore, new
developments in medical research and care, telecommunications, advanced
transportation systems and financial transfers have dramatically increased the
level of information generated by each individual. Computers linked together
by high speed networks with advanced processing systems can create
comprehensive dossiers on any person without the need for a single central
computer system. New technologies developed by the defense industry are
spreading into law enforcement, civilian agencies, and private companies.
According to opinion polls, concern over privacy violations is now greater
than at any time in recent history. [fn 2] Uniformly, populations throughout
the world express fears about encroachment on privacy, prompting an
unprecedented number of nations to pass laws which specifically protect
the privacy of their citizens. Human rights groups are concerned that
much of this technology is being exported to developing countries which
lack adequate protections. Currently, there are few barriers to the trade in
surveillance technologies. It is now common wisdom that the power,
capacity and speed of information technology is accelerating rapidly. The
extent of privacy invasion -- or certainly the potential to invade privacy -increases correspondingly. Beyond these obvious aspects of capacity and cost,
there are a number of important trends that contribute to privacy invasion :
GLOBALISATION removes geographical limitations to the flow of data. The
development of the Internet is perhaps the best known example of a global
technology. CONVERGENCE is leading to the elimination of technological barriers
between systems. Modern information systems are increasingly interoperable with
other systems, and can mutually exchange and process different forms of data.
MULTI-MEDIA fuses many forms of transmission and expression of data and images
so that information gathered in a certain form can be easily translated into other
forms. Technology transfer and policy convergence The macro-trends outlined
above have had particular effect on surveillance in developing nations. In the field
of information and communications technology, the speed of policy convergence is
compressed. Across the surveillance spectrum -- wiretapping, personal ID systems,
data mining, censorship or encryption controls -- it is the West which invariably sets
a proscriptive pace.[fn 3] Governments of developing nations rely on first world
countries to supply them with technologies of surveillance such as digital
wiretapping equipment, deciphering equipment, scanners, bugs, tracking
equipment and computer intercept systems. The transfer of surveillance
technology from first to third world is now a lucrative sideline for the arms
industry. [fn 4] According to a 1997 report "Assessing the Technologies of Political
Control" commissioned by the European Parliament's Civil Liberties Committee and
undertaken by the European Commission's Science and Technology Options
Assessment office (STOA), [fn 5] much of this technology is used to track the
activities of dissidents, human rights activists, journalists, student leaders,
minorities, trade union leaders, and political opponents. The report concludes
that such technologies (which it describes as "new surveillance technology") can
exert a powerful 'chill effect' on those who "might wish to take a
dissenting view and few will risk exercising their right to democratic
protest". Large scale ID systems are also useful for monitoring larger sectors of the
population. As Privacy International observed, "In the absence of
meaningful legal or constitutional protections, such technology is inimical
to democratic reform. It can certainly prove fatal to anyone 'of interest' to
a regime." Government and citizen alike may benefit from the plethora of IT
schemes being implemented by the private and public sectors. New "smart card"
projects in which client information is placed on a chip in a card may streamline
complex transactions. The Internet will revolutionize access to basic information on
government services. Encryption can provide security and privacy for all parties.
However, these initiatives will require a bold, forward looking legislative
framework. Whether governments can deliver this framework will depend
on their willingness to listen to the pulse of the emerging global digital
economy and to recognize the need for strong protection of privacy.
The US is key
Freedom House, August 2, 2012, Ten Critical Human Rights Challenges for the
Next American President, This paper is a product of Freedom House and the Connect
US Fund and is endorsed by the following individuals and institutions: American Civil
Liberties Union Amnesty International USA Better World Campaign Center for Justice
and Accountability Center for Victims of Torture The Connect US Fund The Enough
Project Freedom House Futures Without Violence Global Rights Global Solutions
Global Witness Chris Hennemeyer International Development Consultant Human
Rights First Human Rights Watch Ambassador Mark P. Lagon International Relations
Chair, Georgetown University MSFS Program Physicians for Human Rights Project on
Middle East Democracy Resolve Eric Sapp Executive Director, American Values
Network Ted Piccone Brookings Institution United to End Genocide Jennifer Windsor
Associate Dean for Programs, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service,
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Ten%20Critical%20Human%20Rights
%20Challenges%20For%20The%20Next%20American%20President.pdf, /BinghamMB
The upcoming presidential election and inauguration of the next administration is a
critical moment to review and update U.S. policy on human rights. Among the
challenges the United States faces in the coming years are human rights
abuses committed by governments and other actors across the globe that
flout internationally accepted principles and undermine U.S. values and
interests. The next administration, whether a second Obama administration or a
Romney administration, will need to address a range of international issues. We
believe that human rights merit particular attention. The promotion of
human rights is both an expression of the universal values that Americans
share with people throughout the world and an integral component of the
pursuit of American interests abroad. The next administrations record on
foreign policy will depend to a significant degree on its ability to effectively protect
and advance human rights. U.S. leadership is critical to effectively address
international human rights issues . International responses to gross
violations and systematic abuses of human rights around the world tend
to have the greatest impact when the United States plays a prominent
role or is otherwise actively engaged in promoting a rights-based
response . Multilateral human rights institutions similarly make the
greatest progress in drawing attention to abuses and maintaining human
rights standards when the United States exercises leadership. Human
rights affect almost every aspect of U.S. engagement abroad.
Governments that abuse human rights make unstable and unreliable
partners across the range of U.S. interests, from business to arms control to
counter-terrorism. By strengthening the protection of human rights, the
United States not only promotes its own values but also advances its
strategic interests.
Special Assistant to the Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International
Affairs, Princeton University, Spring 2004, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 17 Harv.
Hum. Rts. J. 249, p. 279-280
This Article presents a strategic--as opposed to ideological or normative--argument that the
promotion of human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign
policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic human rights
practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive
international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national security are acts of aggression by other
states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the U nited States, as did the Japanese
bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas , as in Kuwait
fifty years later. Evidence from the post-Cold War period [*250] indicates that states that systematically
abuse their own citizens' h uman r ights are also those most likely to engage in
aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states' human rights records
decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can
significantly enhance U.S. and global security. Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy
appears to be a telling indicator of that state's propensity to engage in
international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of
peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression. n2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides
U.S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A
strategic linkage between national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy
modifications. First, it changes the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting
the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a
means of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights records.
Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, October 1995. Available from the World
Wide Web at: http://www.carnegie.org/sub/pubs/deadly/dia95_01.html, accessed
2/20/04.
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and wellbeing in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist
aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of
illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates
that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly
corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on
Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of
these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or
aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions
for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons.
Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go
to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to
aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments
do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less
likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism
against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to
use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more
reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they
offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more
environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own
citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are
better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and
because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in
secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil
liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable
foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can
be built.
Solvency Privacy
ACLU recommends restrictions as domestic surveillance drones
become increasingly prevalent to protect privacy
ACLU 5/12/15 [American Civil Liberties Union Domestic Drones
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/domesticdrones c.shack]
U.S. law enforcement is greatly expanding its use of surveillance drones ,
and private actors are also seeking to use the technology for personal and commercial use. Drones have many
deployed
without proper regulation, drones equipped with facial recognition
software, infrared technology, and speakers capable of monitoring
personal conversations would cause unprecedented invasions of our
privacy rights. Interconnected drones could enable mass tracking of vehicles and people in wide areas. Tiny
beneficial uses, including in search-and-rescue missions, scientific research, mapping, and more. But
drones could go completely unnoticed while peering into the window of a home or place of worship. Surveillance
drones have been the subject of fierce debate among both legislators and the public, giving rise to an impressive
not by police departments, and the policies should be clear, written, and open to the public. Abuse Prevention and
assisted arrest.19 DHS, in conjunction with local law enforcement agencies, has been testing drone capabilities in a
host of other situations including detecting radiation, monitoring a hostage situation, tracking a gun tossed by a
relative sophistication of drones contrasted with traditional surveillance technology may influence a courts decision
whether domestic drone use is lawful under the Fourth Amendment.
Drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), are aircraft that can fly without an onboard human operator. An
unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is the entire system, including the aircraft, digital network, and personnel on the
ground. Drones can fly either by remote control or on a predetermined flight path; can be as small as an insect and
as large as a traditional jet; can be produced more cheaply than traditional aircraft; and can keep operators out of
role in this expansion. In February 2012, Congress enacted the FAA Modernization and Reform Act (P.L.
112-95), which calls for the FAA to accelerate the integration of unmanned aircraft into the national airspace system
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness. A reviewing courts determination of the reasonableness of a drone search would likely be informed
by location of the search, the sophistication of the technology used, and societys conception of privacy in an age of
what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment may adjust as peoples expectations of privacy evolve. In the
113th Congress,
attached to engage in surveillance, but the costs of fuel, a pilot, and video storage would have limited the time such
When the government outsources law enforcement functionssuch as the private ownership of stoplight
cameras[109]private
surveillance more pervasive. For instance, if a drone producer offered cloud storage for information captured by
private drones, that information could potentially be collected by the government without a warrant. And under
some approaches to Fourth Amendment law, increased drone use by the public could mean that individuals have a
reduced expectation of privacy with regard to government drone surveillance. [110] The threat that unregulated
only make possible new types of crime, but make it much easier to commit others. Just as problems of stalking have
become more prolific in the online context, a jealous ex or a grudge-holding competitor could deploy his personal
drone to follow someone throughout her day without leaving his desk.
classified documents about UK and US spying and the collection of personal data. The former international criminal
international community co-operated to denounce it, adding: "Combined and collective action by everybody can
the issue of
internet [ privacy ], which right now is extremely troubling because the
revelations of surveillance have implications for human rights People
are really afraid that all their personal details are being used in violation
of traditional national protections." The UN general assembly unanimously voted last week to
adopt a resolution, introduced by Germany and Brazil, stating that "the same rights that people
have offline must also be protected online, including the right to privacy".
end serious violations of human rights That experience inspires me to go on and address
Brazil's president, Dilma Rousseff, and the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, were among those spied on,
according to the documents leaked by Snowden. The resolution called on the 193 UN member states "t o
review
their procedures, practices and legislation regarding the surveillance of
communications, their interception and collection of personal data, with a
view to upholding the right to privacy of all their obligations under
international human rights law". It also directed Pillay to publish a report on the
protection and promotion of privacy "in the context of domestic and
extraterritorial surveillance ... including on a mass scale". She told Berners-Lee it
was "very important that governments now want to discuss the matters of
mass surveillance and right to privacy in a serious way".
Impact Democracy
Democracy solves global wars
Epstien et al, 2007
[Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko Specialists in Foreign Policy
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional research service,
Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?, 12-26-7,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl34296.pdf] /Wyo-MB
A common rationale offered by proponents of democracy promotion,
including former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and current Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice, is that democracies do not go to war with one
another. This is sometimes referred to as the democratic peace theory.
Experts point to European countries, the United States, Canada, and
Mexico as present-day examples. According to President Clintons National
Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement: Democracies create free
markets that offer economic opportunity, make for more reliable trading
partners, and are far less likely to wage war on one another.22 Some
have refined this democracy peace theory by distinguishing between mature
democracies and those in transition, suggesting that mature democracies do
not fight wars with each other, but that countries transitioning toward
democracy are more prone to being attacked (because of weak governmental
institutions) or being aggressive toward others. States that made transitions from
an autocracy toward early stages of democracy and were involved in hostilities
soon after include France in the mid-1800s under Napoleon III, Prussia/Germany
under Bismarck (1870-1890), Chile shortly before the War of the Pacific in 1879,
Serbias multiparty constitutional monarchy before the Balkan Wars of the late 20th
Century, and Pakistans military guided pseudo-democracy before its wars with
India in 1965 and 1971.23 The George W. Bush Administration asserts that
democracy promotion is a long-term antidote to terrorism. The
Administrations Strategy for Winning the War on Terror asserts that
inequality in political participation and access to wealth resources in a
country, lack of freedom of speech, and poor education all breed
volatility. By promoting basic human rights, freedoms of speech, religion,
assembly, association and press, and by maintaining order within their
borders and providing an independent justice system, effective
democracies can defeat terrorism in the long run, according to the Bush
White House.24 Another reason given to encourage democracies (although debated
by some experts) is the belief that democracies promote economic prosperity.
From this perspective, as the rule of law leads to a more stable society and
as equal economic opportunity for all helps to spur economic activity,
economic growth, particularly of per capita income, is likely to follow. In
addition, a democracy under this scenario may be more likely to be
viewed by other countries as a good trading partner and by outside investors
as a more stable environment for investment, according to some experts.
Moreover, countries that have developed as stable democracies are
viewed as being more likely to honor treaties, according to some experts.25
Impact Liberty
Privacy is critical to self-development and actualization
critical to a meaningful life
Jathan Sadowski Studies Applied Ethics and The Human And Social Dimensions
Of Science And Technology At Arizona State University., 2-26- 2013, Why Does
Privacy Matter? One Scholar's Answer," Atlantic,
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/02/why-does-privacy-matterone-scholars-answer/273521/ /Bingham-MB
Cohen doesn't think we should treat privacy as a dispensable instrument. To the contrary, she argues privacy is
irreducible to a "fixed condition or attribute (such as seclusion or control) whose boundaries can be crisply
fulfilled life . Woodrow Hartzog and Evan Selinger make similar arguments in a recent article on the value of
"obscurity." When structural constraints prevent unwanted parties from getting to your data, obscurity protections
Professor of Law @ Wake Forest University. University of Toledo Law Review Spring
1974, page. 480
However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest HemingwayI believe in only one
thing: liberty. And it is always well to bear in mind David Humes observation: It is
seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once. Thus, it is unacceptable to say
that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there
have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos,
tyranny, despotism and the end of all human aspiratio n. Ask Solzhenistyn.
Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and the
proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material
welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified
and resisted with undying spirit.
Add On Legitimacy
Its reverse casual aligning the war on terror with rights
issues builds support for US leadership on human rights the
impact is warming and legitimacy
Schulz 8 (William F., Senior Fellow Center for American Progress, Adjunct
Professor of International Relations The New School, Former Executive Direction
Amnesty International, Introduction, The Future of Human Rights: U.S. Policy for a
New Era, p. 11-14)
Which leads to the second general principle the United States must reaffirm: a
commitment to global cooperation and respect for international protocols and
institutions, imperfect as they are. Of Francis Fukuyama's four bedrock characteristics of neoconservatism, it
is the final one" skepticism about the legitimacy and effectiveness of international law and institutions to achieve
either security or justice"38-that most dramatically divides normative human rights practice from neoconservative.
Sophisticated advocates of human rights are not naive about the failures of the United Nations, the shortcomings of
the UN Human Rights Council, the unproven value of the International Criminal Court, or the weakness of
human rights is God, natural law, or consensualism, an international imprimatur lends legitimacy to our pursuit of
them. As a study by the Princeton Project on National Security noted recently, "Liberty under law within nations is
inextricably linked with a stable system of liberty under law among them. " 40 Surely even Condoleezza Rice who,
during the 2000 presidential campaign, wrote that "foreign policy in a Republican administration ... will proceed
from the firm ground of the national interest, not the interests of an illusory international community [emphasis
added] " 41 has come to rue the day she thought the world community no more than a chimera.
the Damage
Repairing
The damaging effect of neoconservative policies on human rights goes well beyond
reinforcement of the suspicion that American advocacy of human rights is a mere cover for an imperialist agenda.
Those policies have undermined the notion that spreading human rights
and democracy around the globe are viable goals of U.S. foreign policy . They
have weakened international institutions upon which human rights
depend. And they have increased a certain natural reticence on the part of the American people to commit U.S.
troops to humanitarian and peace keeping missions, even when they are justified, as they are, for example, in
Darfur.
civil societies and strong democratic institutions are especially prone to be breeding grounds for all sorts of mischief, not least the
production of terrorists. The tragedy of the Iraq War will only be compounded if the lesson drawn from it is that, because force- .
feeding democracy proved so destructive, the only alternative is quiescence. While democracy is no magic bullet, tyranny
guarantees bullets aplenty. Not every nation is ready to leap into full-blown democracy on a moment's notice. But if, indeed, as
worldwide surveys have found, more than 90 percent of Muslims endorse democ- Introduction 13 racy as the best form of
government, what is required of us is neither perfectionism nor passivity.42 What is required of us is patience. It will need to codify
the positive obligations of the United States under the newly minted doctrine of the "responsibility to protect. "Just as the Iraq War
ought not sour us on promoting democracy, so we must not allow it to impose an unfitting shyness upon us about using military
power for humanitarian ends. In 2005 the UN General Assembly endorsed the worldwide responsibility to protect civilian populations
at risk from mass atrocities.43 That does not imply that the United States will have to be the proverbial "world's policeman,"
committing its troops willy-nilly to the far corners of the globe. But it does mean that the United States will need to take mass
atrocities seriously, adopting an early warning system for populations in danger, shoring up weak and failing states, and providing
leadership and support for intervention when necessary, even when it itself stays far away from battle. The American people can
distinguish between unwise military posturing and morally justified humanitarian interventions. In January 2007, after more than
three years and 3,000 U.S. deaths in Iraq, 63 percent of Americans, quite understandably, said that the world has grown more afraid
of U.S. military force and that such fear undermines U.S. security by prompting other nations to seek means to protect
themselves.44 Yet, even so, in a poll taken six months later, a plurality of Americans favored deploying U.S. troops as part of a
multinational force in Darfur.45 If the American people can tell the difference between legitimate and illegitimate use of force, the
adjudicated, especially when highly classified intelligence is involved-whether, for example, the United States
should establish special national security courts or integrate such defendants into the regular criminal justice
Flight Center and Don is a PhD and MA from UT, former Dean of the University
College @ Ohio University, former Associate Dean at SUNY and Case Institute of
Technology, Former Manager for University/Industry Experiments for the NASA ACTS
Satellite, currently Professor of Telecommunications @ Scripps College of
Communications, Ohio University, Solar Power Satellites, January 2012, Springer
Briefs in Space Development, p. 10-11
In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a NASA scientist at
Goddard Space Flight Center, a research center in the forefront of science of space
and Earth, writes, The evidence of global warming is alarming, noting the
potential for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and
troubling (Hsu 2010 ) . Hsu and his NASA colleagues were engaged in
monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a global scale, through
which they received first-hand scientific information and data relating to
global warming issues, including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After
discussing this research with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he
wrote: I now have no doubt global temperatures are rising, and that global
on terrorism, to which most states subscribed. When it went too far, the United States found that, while
secondary powers could not stop it from taking action, they could deny it legitimacy and
make the achievement of its objectives unattainable . Thus, despite the common
narrative, U.S. power was successfully checked, and the United States found the limitations
of its power, even under the Bush administration. Defining Hegemony Let me begin with my conception of
hegemony. While the definition of hegemony is based on its material aspectsthe preponderance of power
collective interests and to shoulder most of the burden, it can improve the
prospects of international cooperation. However, even when there is a hegemon willing to
lead a collective action and when states accept that action is needed, obstacles may still arise. These difficulties
can be attributed to various factors, but especially prominent is the disagreement over the particular strategy that
the hegemon promotes in pursuing the general interest. When states think that the strategy and policies offered by
the hegemon are not compatible with the accepted rules of rightful conduct and break established norms, many
will disapprove and resist. Indeed, while acceptance of a hegemons leadership in international society may result in
broad willingness to cooperate with the hegemon in pursuit of shared interests it does not guarantee immediate
and unconditional compliance with all the policies the hegemon articulates. While its legitimacy does transfer to its
actions and grants some leeway, that legitimacy does not justify every policy the hegemon pursuesparticularly
those policies that are not seen as naturally deriving from the existing order. As a result, specific policies must be
legitimated before cooperation takes place. This process constrains the hegemons actions and prevents the
uninhibited exercise of power.
Extinction
Zhang and Shi 11 Yuhan Zhang is a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, D.C.; Lin Shi is from Columbia University. She also
serves as an independent consultant for the Eurasia Group and a consultant for the
World Bank in Washington, D.C., 1/22, Americas decline: A harbinger of conflict
and rivalry, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-aharbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/
This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although
across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as
well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this
question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public
imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would
return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and
strategic rivalry . Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World
Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East
Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washingtons withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic
Free markets would become more politicised and, well, less free
and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power
plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element . In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic
power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as
American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton
Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one
orders.
Integration 1AC
Failure to reform drone privacy standards results in public
backlash
Sara Sorcher, 2-21-2013, The Backlash Against Drones," nationaljournal,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-backlash-against-drones-20130221,
Accessed: 5-29-2015, /Bingham-MB
Public concerns are not limited to Seattle. Lawmakers in at least 11 states want
to restrict the use of drones because of fears they will spy on American s,
and some are pushing to require warrants before the robots collect
evidence in investigations. Just this month, the Virginia General Assembly
passed a two-year moratorium on drones. The outcry comes after the Electronic
Frontier Foundation sued last year for a list of drone applicants within the U.S. When
that information went public, staff attorney Jennifer Lynch says, it really got
people up in arms about how drones are being used , and got people to
question their city councils and local law-enforcement agencies to ask for
appropriate policies to be put in place to regulate drone usage. Drones
change the game: Nearly continuous surveillance could be possible without
a physical intrusion such as a property search or an implanted listening device. The
flying robots can carry high-powered cameras, even facial-recognition software or
thermal imaging to see through walls. They can hover, potentially undetected, for
hours or days at a time. As of yet, however, there are no laws governing the
use of domestic drones when it comes to privacy. Unless Congress or the
executive branch moves to regulate the robots use before they take to
the skies en masse, states will likely continue to try to limit or ban drone
use altogether , which could stymie their potential for other , beneficial
uses. And failing to enact privacy limits only increases the likelihood of
an incident in which the public perceives that the technology is being
misused.
the global economy has in fact been 'America-centred' for more than
60 years. Countries - China, Japan, Canada, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and so on
- either sell to the US or they sell to countries that sell to the US . This system
fact that
has generally been advantageous for all concerned. America gained certain historically unprecedented benefits, but
the system also enabled participating countries - first in Western Europe and Japan, and later, many in the Third
even though it will soon pass Japan as the world's second largest economy. There are real possibilities for growth in
China's domestic demand. But given its structure as an export-oriented economy, it is doubtful if even a successful
Chinese stimulus plan can pull the rest of the world along unless and until China can start selling again to the US on
Finally, the key 'system' issue for China - or for the European
Union - in thinking about becoming the engine of the world economy - is
monetary: What are the implications of having your domestic currency become the global reserve currency?
a massive scale.
This is an extremely complex issue that the US has struggled with, not always successfully, from 1959 to the
present. Without going into detail, it can safely be said that though having the US dollar as the world's medium of
exchange has given the US some tremendous advantages, it has also created huge problems, both for America and
It will try to
avoid the yuan becoming an international medium of exchange until it
feels much more confident in its ability to handle the manifold currency
problems that the US has grappled with for decades. Given all this, the US
will remain the engine of global economic recovery for the foreseeable
future, even though other countries must certainly help. This crisis began
in the US - and it is going to have to be solved there too.
the global economic system. The Chinese leadership is certainly familiar with this history.
history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great
Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the
harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think
Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions
(think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would
not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century . For that
reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be
even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change
would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will
diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the worlds most dangerous capabilities within
their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established
groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to
become
self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would
become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty
of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would
almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons is not
inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region
to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire
additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is
conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that
not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold
conflict and
could lead to an unintended escalation and
broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close
proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities
and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in
War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity
terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella
achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in
neighboring states like Israel,
short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a
rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as Chinas and Indias development of blue water naval
farmers monitor their crops. But these methods often can be incomplete
or time consuming, and when data is collected it can take a long time to
process and analyze. As a result, it can be difficult or impossible for the
farmer to react to a problem like a disease outbreak before it's too late or
the costs to treat it have soared. Drones which range in cost from $2,000 for
a plane the farmer puts together up to around $160,000 for a military-style device
are equipped with infrared cameras, sensors and other technology controlled by
a pilot on the ground. The sticker shock may be steep, but backers of the
technology say the data they collect from identifying insect problems,
watering issues, assessing crop yields or tracking down cattle that have
wandered off help farmers recover the investment, often within a year .
Farmers also can use drones to tailor their use of pesticides, herbicides,
fertilizer and other applications based on how much is needed at a specific
point in a field a process known as precision agriculture saving the
grower money from unnecessarily overusing resources while at the same
time reducing the amount of runoff that could flow into nearby rivers and
streams.
Coleman 12 [Isobel Coleman, Senior Fellow and Director of the Civil Society,
Markets, and Democracy Initiative; Director of the Women and Foreign Policy
Program, U.S. Drought and Rising Global Food Prices, August 2,
http://www.cfr.org/food-security/us-drought-rising-global-food-prices/p28777]
The ongoing drought in the Midwest has affected approximately 80 percent of the U.S. corn crop
and more than 11 percent of the soybean crop, triggering a rise in global food prices
(RFE/RL) that CFR's Isobel Coleman says may fuel political instability in developing countries. The United States
produces approximately 35 percent of the world's corn and soybean supply, commodities that are "crucial in the food chain, because
ethanol mandate and building "more resilience into the global food system." How is the U.S. drought affecting commodity crops,
food production, and prices? As recently as May, experts were predicting a record crop in the United States--and of course, what the
with severe
drought in the Midwest, you've already seen a failure in the soybean and corn crop in the
United States. That increased world commodity prices, and it is going to trickle through the whole food
chain. This is the hottest summer on record in the United States since 1895, and people are beginning to wonder whether this
type of drought that we're experiencing could become a new normal. The United States is a pivotal player in
world food production and has the most sophisticated ag ricultural sector in terms of
seeds, technology, irrigation, deep commodity markets, and future markets. If the United States crop
United States does is so important, because the Midwest is the bread basket for the rest of the world. But
is so devastated by drought, what is going to happen to the rest of the world? How do rising U.S. food prices affect global food prices
down the world's food supply chain? Which areas of the globe are most at risk? There are many large food producers in the world.
China is the largest wheat producer, but it is also the largest wheat consumer. What makes the United States unique is that we are
the largest exporter, so we produce about 35 percent of the world's corn and soybean supply. Those two commodities are crucial in
the food chain, because they are used for feed stock for animals. Around the world you have rising middle classes, a growing
demand for meat and protein in the diet, and countries around the world are becoming increasingly dependent on relatively
inexpensive food stocks from the United States. When you see a crop failure of the magnitude you have seen this summer, it flows
and you see rising food prices translate almost directly into street protests. You're going to see the continuation of [political]
instability driven in part by rapidly rising food prices. In 2008, we had food protests across much of the Middle East, so
very much on the alert for unrest and very sensitive to it. Egypt is already
spending about one-third of its subsidies on food, and it is draining the Egyptian foreign exchange reserve to continue those
subsidies. This combination of an already mobilized population out on the streets demanding lots of different changes [in Egypt],
and rising food prices is going to create a very unstable atmosphere. What are some policy responses for alleviating the pressures
being felt in the United States and other countries because of rising food prices? In the United States, we have to look at our own
policies that are part of the problem, [including] our mandated use of ethanol in gasoline. This is something that is a mandated [10]
percent that is not flexible, and when you have rising food prices and a problem with the failing crop, you would think that maybe
we could lighten up on the ethanol mandate. Because right now so much of our food production is going into ethanol. So you've
already seen governors across the United States in some of the hard-hit states saying, "Shouldn't we review our ethanol policies?"
That's not a short-term fix, but it is potentially longer-term and something we should be looking at carefully. In terms of policy, we
We have more mouths to feed every year, and food security for
the world is a critical issue. We should be looking at how to build in more resilience into the
global food system. Africa, which has the highest population growth rates of any continent in the world, used to feed itself
have a rising global population.
and used to export food, but [its] agriculture has suffered tremendously over the last half century. Only 4 percent of the land in
Africa is even irrigated, and you've seen a green revolution occur in many parts of the world that has really passed Africa by. And so
building in greater resilience and improving the agricultural capacity of Africa is a critical part of this equation, so that Africa has
more of an ability to feed itself and become more a part of the global supply chain and not be so dependent on it. Unfortunately,
governments have not made the investments in the agricultural sector that they needed to over the past half century, which is why
you have this situation in Africa today.
food and water insecurity can be the cause of conflict and, at worst,
war. While dealing predominately with food and water issues, the paper also recognises the nexus that
There is a growing appreciation that the
conflicts in the next century will most likely be fought over a lack of resources . Yet, in a
result in
Food, Lindsay Falvey, a participant in FDIs March 2012 workshop on the issue of food and conflict, clearly
expresses the problem and why countries across the globe are starting to take note. . He writes (p.36), if
people are hungry, especially in cities, the state is not stable riots, violence, breakdown of law and order and
migration result. Hunger feeds anarchy. This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming
Famine, writes that
if large regions of the world run short of food , land or water in the decades
that lie ahead, then wholesale, bloody wars are liable to follow . He continues: An increasingly
credible scenario for World War 3 is not so much a confrontation of super powers and their allies, as a festering,
resource conflicts. He also says: The wars of the 21st Century are less
likely to be global conflicts with sharply defined sides and huge armies, than a
scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies, terrorism and
genocides, sparked by bloody competition over dwindling resources . As another
self-perpetuating chain of
workshop participant put it, people do not go to war to kill; they go to war over resources, either to protect or to
gain the resources for themselves. Another observed that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over
an important constraint on police by requiring that they demonstrate good reason for a search to a neutral judge. It
is unclear, though, how the Fourth Amendment applies to drones. The technology is too new for the courts to have
In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the police may use lowflying airplanes to gather information without a warrant. The court said
that this was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. If the court follows this with regard to drones, there would
be no constitutional limit on their use. Rather than wait for the Supreme Court, legislatures
ruled.
must step in. In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control Act to regulate electronic surveillance by police
and to require that a warrant be obtained by police before wiretapping occurs. The same is needed for technology
like drones. AB 1327 would do that in California and provide a model to other states. In fact, a handful of other
states have enacted this kind of common-sense requirement, and California can help tremendously by joining this
Most of the concern about the domestic deployment of drones by DHS has
focused on the crossover to law-enforcement missions that threaten
privacy and civil rights and without more regulations in place will
accelerate the transition to what critics call a surveillance society. Also
worth public attention and congressional review is the increasing interface
between border drones and national security and military missions. The
prevalence of military jargon used by CBP officials such as defense in depth and
situational awareness points to at least a rhetorical overlapping of border control
and military strategy. Another sign of the increasing coincidence between CBP/OAM
drone program and the military is that the commanders and deputies of OAM are
retired military officers. Both Major General Michael Kostelnik and his successor
Major General Randolph Alles, retired from U.S. Marines, were highly placed military
commanders involved in drone development and procurement. Kostelnik was
involved in the development of the Predator by General Atomics since the mid1990s and was an early proponent of providing Air Force funding to weaponize the
Predator. As commander of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Alles was a
leading proponent of having each military branch work with military contractors to
develop their own drone breeds, including near replicas of the Predator
manufactured for the Army by General Atomics.57 In promoting and justifying
the DHS drone program, Kostelnik routinely alluded to the national
security potential of drones slated for border security duty. On several
occasions Kostelnik pointed to the seamless interoperability with DOD UAV forces.
At a moments notice, Kostelnik said that OAM could be CHOPed meaning a
Change in Operational Command from DHS to DOD.58 DHS has not released
operational data about CBP/OAM drone operations. Therefore, the extent of the
participation of DHS drones in domestic and international operations is unknown.
But statements by CBP officials and media reports from the Caribbean point to
a rapidly expanding participation of DHS Guardian UAVs in druginterdiction and other unspecified operations as far south as Panama. CBP
states that OAM routinely provides air and marine support to other
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and works with the
U.S. military in joint international anti-smuggling operations and in
support of National Security Special Events [such as the Olympics]. According
to Kostelnik, CBP planned a Spring 2011 deployment of the Guardian to a Central
American country in association with Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATFSouth) based at the naval station in Key West, Florida.59 JIATFSouth is a subordinate
command to the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), whose
geographical purview includes the Caribbean, Central America and South America.
In mid-2012, CBP/OAM participated in a JIATFSouth collaborative venture called
Operation Caribbean Focus that involved flight over the Caribbean Sea and
nations in the region with the Dominican Republic acting as the regional host for
the Guardian operations, which CBP/OAM considers a prototype for future transit
zone UAS deployments. CBP says that OAM drones have not been deployed
within Mexico, but notes that OAM works in collaboration with the
Government of Mexico in addressing border security issues, without
specifying the form and objectives of this collaboration.60 As part of the U.S.
global drug war and as an extension of border security, unarmed drones
are also crossing the border into Mexico. The U.S. Northern Command has
acknowledged that the U.S. military does fly a $38-million Global Hawk drone into
Mexico to assist the Mexicos war against the drug cartels.61 Communities, state
legislatures and even some congressional members are proceeding to enact
legislation and revise ordinances to decriminalize or legalize the consumption of
drugs, especially marijuana, targeted by the federal governments drug war of more
than four decades. At the same time, DHS has been escalating its
contributions to the domestic and international drug war in the name of
both homeland security and national security. Drug seizures on the
border and drug interdiction over coastal and neighboring waters are
certainly the top operative priorities of OAM . Enlisting its Guardian drones in
SOUTHCOMs drug interdiction efforts underscores the increasing emphasis within
the entire CBP on counternarcotic operations. CBP is a DHS agency that is almost
exclusively focused on tactics. While CBP as the umbrella agency and the Office of
the Border Patrol and OAM all have strategic plans, these plans are marked by their
rigid military frameworks, their startling absence of serious strategic thinking, and
the diffuse distinctions between strategic goals and tactics. As a result of the
border security buildup, south-north drug flows (particularly cocaine and
more high-value drugs) have shifted back to marine smuggling, mainly
through the Caribbean, but also through the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific.62
International and Director of the Centre for Global Commerce at Belmont Abbey
College, Powers International, 4-3-2009, DHS, Drug Interdiction and Common
Sense," CSO Online, http://www.csoonline.com/article/2123915/compliance/dhs-drug-interdiction-and-common-sense.html, Accessed: 5-30-2015, /Bingham-MB
Why should there even be MOUs between DHS and the Department of Justice when
their respective law enforcement agencies have drug interdiction
responsibilities which by their nature include a required, and normal follow-up
operations routinely made be all legitimate law enforcement agencies?
These MOUs are nothing more than turf wars, with competing Federal agencies
competing for attention, money, and credibility. Turf wars are certainly unnecessary
especially in the face of not only horrific actions of Mexican drug cartels along our
Southern border, but also in our cities. These drug-related crime waves in Mexico
include killings, torture, kidnapping and corruption which threaten to spill over into
the United States. Kidnappings already have! The United States needs no political
issue, especially a turf issue, to divert attention from the serious escalation of
drug and arms smuggling across its borders. "Our agents and officers,
working together with local law enforcement agencies, are preventing
millions of dollars from crossing the border into Mexico," said Secretary
Napolitano. " In stopping the funds that fuel the drug war, we will stifle
cartel activity in the United States while helping our neighbors to the
south by cracking down on illegal cash before it gets there."[13] Imagine
what would happen if ICE had Title-21 authority. Improvements in drug interdictions,
investigations, and arrests, would result.
American Strategy", "Strategic Horizons: All Options Bad If Mexico's Drug Violence
Expands to U.S.", February 19,
www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13576/strategic-horizons-all-options-bad-ifmexico-s-drug-violence-expands-to-u-s
A second way that Mexicos violence could spread north is via the partnership
between the narcotraffickers and ideologically motivated terrorist groups. The Zetas
already have a substantial connection to Hezbollah , based on
collaborative narcotrafficking and arms smuggling. Hezbollah has relied on
terrorism since its founding and has few qualms about conducting attacks
far from its home turf in southern Lebanon. Since Hezbollah is a close ally or proxy of Iran,
it might some day attempt to strike the United States in retribution for American
action against Tehran. If so, it would likely attempt to exploit its
connection with the Zetas , pulling the narcotraffickers into a transnational proxy war. The
foundation for this scenario is already in place: Security analysts like Douglas Farah have
warned of a tier-one security threat for the United States from an improbable alliance between narcotraffickers and anti-
miscalculation . No matter how violence from the Mexican cartels came to the United States, the key issue would be
Washingtons response. If the Zetas, another Mexican cartel or someone acting in their stead launched a
campaign of assassinations or bombings in the United States or helped
Hezbollah or some other transnational terrorist organization with a mass
casualty attack, and the Mexican government proved unwilling or unable to respond in a way that Washington
considered adequate, the United States would have to consider military action . While the United
States has deep cultural and economic ties to Mexico and works closely with Mexican law enforcement on the narcotrafficking
problem, the security relationship between the two has always been difficultunderstandably so given the long history of U.S.
president and encourage the Mexican cartels to believe that they could attack U.S. targets with impunity. After all, the primary
lesson from Sept. 11 was that playing only defense and allowing groups that attack the United States undisturbed foreign sanctuary
using the U.S. military against the cartels on Mexican soil could
weaken the Mexican government or even cause its collapse, end further
does not work. But
security cooperation between Mexico and the U nited S tates and damage
the most important
and intimate
one of
Quite simply, every available strategic option would be disastrous. Hopefully, cooperation between Mexican and U.S. security and
so long as the
core dynamic of narcotraffickingmassive demand for drugs in the United
States combined with their prohibitionpersists, the utter ruthlessness, lack of
restraint and unlimited ambition of the narcotraffickers raises the possibility of violent
intelligence services will be able to forestall such a crisis. No one wants to see U.S. drones over Mexico. But
miscalculation and the political and economic calamity that would follow.
Extinction
Hellman 8 (Martin E, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, Risk Analysis of
Nuclear Deterrence SPRING, THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI,
http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the publics mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter.
An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a
catastrophe of immense proportions: A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people,
and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever. [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an
attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist
incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than
one percent, but notes, We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event,
component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar
remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected
societys almost
total neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more
important. The cosT of World War iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of
the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact,
nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear
weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War IIs fatalities were double or
triple that numberchaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people
therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is something
that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint
session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to
No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the
germs of double suicide. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO
strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry
lose.
Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagans belief that nuclear weapons were totally irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly
The
resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79destructive of life on earth and civilization. [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact:
160 million dead) a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days.
Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care millions of people might starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to
estimate how many. further millions might eventually die of latent radiation effects. [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a
concern that as- sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous
resultant fire- storms
earth, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The
TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that
even a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating
long-lasting climatic consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how
destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that
Impact Terror
The terrorist attack will be a WMD attack
Steven David 8, Professor of International Relations and Vice Dean for
Undergraduate Education at Johns Hopkins University, PhD in Political Science from
Harvard, 2008, Catastrophic Consequences: Civil Wars and American Interests
At first glance, it seems puzzling to talk of instability in Mexico. After all, in the first years of the twenty-first century,
Mexico appeared to be doing very well. An increasingly privatized economy grew at a healthy rate of more than 4%
per year in 2005 and 2006. The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) generated huge increases in
bilateral trade, spreading prosperity throughout Mexico. Regional insurgencies, such as the 1994 Chiapas uprising,
have been largely absent. Most important, Mexican democracy came of age in 2000, when the 7o-year reign of the
authoritarian Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) ended with the election of Vicente Fox, head of the rival National
Action Party (PAN) in a free and fair contest. It would be easy to conclude that Mexico had moved into the ranks of
the developed world, where threats of economic collapse and violent instability have all but vanished. Such a
conclusion would be wrong.
crumble suddenly, driving the country into recession or worse. The 2006 elections for Fox's successor demonstrated
continued paralysis, as three lameduck parties square off against each other and a lame-duck president. The cancer
drug trafficking and rampant crime continue to eat away at the rule of
law, making a mockery out of any hope for justice and accountability . More
of
than a dozen armed groups, quiet but far from dead, wait for a national emergency to set their violent agenda in
the trends
are worrisome and could lead to a prolonged period of instability that flies in the face of recent optimism.
All this matters to the United States because Mexico matters to the United States. A wide
range of American vital interests depend on Mexico, most of which stem from
the 2,ooo-mile border shared by the two countries. America's national
security and economic health are inexorably linked to what goes on in Mexico.
motion. Unlike Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Mexico does not face imminent collapse. Nevertheless,
Concerns for Americans living and traveling abroad, the demands of the growing Hispanic bloc in the United States,
and fears of spreading disorder and environmental degradation all have roots in what happens in Mexico. If Mexico's
seeming move to stability is illusory, it behooves Washington to pay close attention. The wide range of vital
American interests in Mexico makes it difficult to think of any country whose fate is more important to the United
prospect of major disorder a realistic possibility. Whether Mexico is tip to the challenges it confronts is unclear, but
maintains a wide range of vital interests in Mexico. Most of these interests stem from the United States being the
only First World country to share a long border with a Third World state, a situation that is the source of much that is
beneficial to both countries but which also threatens key American concerns. Foremost among these concerns is
safeguarding American security, especially in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. In 2005 alone, the U.S. Border Patrol
arrested over 1 million illegal aliens attempting to enter the United States from Mexico.' The great majority of this
number of those crossing into the United States who pose at least a
potential risk of terrorism could well be in the thousands.-
Southcom says it hasn't calculated them yet). Cochran, the ranking Republican
member on the Senate Appropriations Committee's Defense Subcommittee, is
convinced the Heron has "operational readiness and potential to provide
more persistent and cost-effective intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance," says the Senator's spokeswoman, Margaret McPhillips. (See
pictures from the front lines of Mexico's drug war.) The program, not coincidentally,
could also mean hundreds of new jobs in Cochran's state: Stark Aerospace, the U.S.
subsidiary of Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), which makes the Heron, is based in
Mississippi. (Massachusetts-based Raytheon is also involved in the Southcom
project.) But Southcom believes the drone, each of which costs about $6.5 million, is
a good fit for today's counterdrug needs. A key reason is endurance. Manned
counterdrug aircraft like the E-2 Hawkeye can stay up only about one-third as long
as a drone can. And with drug cartels using harder-to-detect shipment
methods like semisubmersibles (jury-rigged submarines), it's critical to have
surveillance craft that can "perch and stare" for longer periods , says P.W.
Singer, author of Wired For War and director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative
at the Brookings Institute in Washington, D.C. "Drones are best for the dull,
dirty and dangerous jobs, so this is a smart move," says Singer. "We can't
ask counterdrug crews to keep their eyes open for 20 hours over oceans
and mangroves."
only and are not armed. The announcement came the day The New York Times published a story revealing that U.S.
agencies have been sending an undetermined number of Global Hawk drones to interior Mexico since last month.
Homeland Security drones flew along the U.S.-Mexico border in past years to gather intelligence on organized
crime. Global Hawks are military drones that have been used for surveillance missions in Afghan istan as well as for
relief efforts in natural disaster zones. Global Hawks can look over areas as large as 40,000 square miles. The
newspaper cited officials who spoke anonymously because the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Defense, who reportedly operate the drones, did not publicly comment. "All U.S. cooperation with
Mexico is at the government of Mexico's invitation and is fully coordinated with the government of Mexico," said
Matt Chandler, Homeland Security spokesman. Chandler declined to comment specifically on the use of unmanned
aircraft in Mexico. Department of Defense officials did not return calls on Wednesday. U.S. Rep. Michael McCaul, RTexas, is the chairman of a Homeland Security subcommittee. McCaul said he did not know that drones flew over
Mexico before Wednesday. "They are probably trying to do it under the radar," he said. But McCaul said it is a
positive sign to increase the role of the United States in the Mexican drug war. Mexico, he said, has been reluctant
to accept U.S. intervention, but he said times are changing. "It's a significant departure in the right direction," he
said. "We are seeing the (Mexican President) Felipe Caldern administration welcoming our military presence."
killed on a highway in San Luis Potos on Feb. 15. The drones may also set a precedent to devise a joint military
operation with Mexico, McCaul said. When President Caldern visited the White House on March 3, he said, officials
sought to be "very open-minded and search for more creative solutions." "It seems to me that we are experiencing
extraordinary circumstances that call for extraordinary actions by our governments," Caldern said. Mexican army
and embassy officials declined to comment on the U.S. drones flying over Mexico, and instead referred inquiries to
the National Security Council. Earlier this week, Jurez Mayor Hctor Murgua hosted Carlos Pascual, the U.S.
ambassador in Mexico, to discuss national security matters. Murgua appeared welcoming to ideas such as placing
ICE agents on the ground in Jurez. He also said he is pleased to receive any support the neighboring country could
give to the city of 1.3 million that has been ravaged by drug-cartel violence. Murgua refused to comment on
whether he and Pascual spoke about the drones, calling it a matter of "national security." The fact that U.S. drones
are flying inland by the request of the Mexican government shows the two countries' relations are deepening, said
Eric Olsen, senior associate at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars' Mexico Institute in
Washington, D.C. "Of course these kinds of operations are shrouded in secrecy," he said .
"There is
enormous sensitivity, but there is also a realization that the threat posed
by drug cartels is severe." Olsen said the U.S. presence is still limited. There are no law enforcement
operations on the ground, and American agents are not armed. While Mexican officials said on
Wednesday that they will heighten their use of technology with the help of the United
States , Olsen said a military intervention in Mexico is not likely. "I certainly believe that
Mexico with the appropriate support and help from the United States has
the ability to tackle its problems."
assisted arrest.19 DHS, in conjunction with local law enforcement agencies, has been testing drone capabilities in a
host of other situations including detecting radiation, monitoring a hostage situation, tracking a gun tossed by a
relative sophistication of drones contrasted with traditional surveillance technology may influence a courts decision
whether domestic drone use is lawful under the Fourth Amendment.
Solvency Surveillance
Domestic drone surveillance is gaining traction and legislative
measures are needed to restrict their usage
Thompson 13 [Richard M. III, Legislative Attorney, Drones in Domestic
Drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), are aircraft that can fly without an onboard human operator. An
unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is the entire system, including the aircraft, digital network, and personnel on the
ground. Drones can fly either by remote control or on a predetermined flight path; can be as small as an insect and
as large as a traditional jet; can be produced more cheaply than traditional aircraft; and can keep operators out of
112-95), which calls for the FAA to accelerate the integration of unmanned aircraft into the national airspace system
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness. A reviewing courts determination of the reasonableness of a drone search would likely be informed
by location of the search, the sophistication of the technology used, and societys conception of privacy in an age of
what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment may adjust as peoples expectations of privacy evolve. In the
113th Congress,
aerial surveillance have changed dramatically. Low-cost drones, coupled with leaps in camera technology and cheap
data storage, create the capacity for pervasive and indiscriminate surveillance. Surveillance technology is now
economically and practically feasible for even small police forces. Quite simply, while the problem of aerial
attached to engage in surveillance, but the costs of fuel, a pilot, and video storage would have limited the time such
When the government outsources law enforcement functionssuch as the private ownership of stoplight
cameras[109]private
only make possible new types of crime, but make it much easier to commit others. Just as problems of stalking have
become more prolific in the online context, a jealous ex or a grudge-holding competitor could deploy his personal
both in ways
drones into the airspace by 2015, but many drones operated by research centers, law-enforcement agencies, and
Sen. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) proposed a federal law that requires public agencies to get a warrant before using a
public safety, said Capt. Tom Madigan of the Alameda County Sheriffs Department. We are not looking at military-
They are not armed. For now, drones for civilian use run on relatively
small batteries and fly short distances. In principle, various sensors,
including cameras, can be attached to them. But there is no consensus in
law on how the data collected can be used, shared or stored. State and local
grade Predator drones.
government authorities are trying to fill that void. As they do, they are weighing not only the demands of the police
and civil libertarians but also tricky legal questions. The law offers citizens the right to take pictures on the street,
for instance, just as it protects citizens from unreasonable search. State legislatures have come up with measures
that seek to permit certain uses, while reassuring citizens against unwanted snooping. Virginia is furthest along in
dealing with the issue. In early February, its state Legislature passed a two-year moratorium on the use of drones in
criminal investigations, though it has yet to be reviewed by the governor. In several states, proposals would require
the police to obtain a search warrant before collecting evidence with a drone. Arizona is among them. So is
Montana. The bills sponsor there, Senator Matt Rosendale, a Republican, said he had no problems with drones
being used for other purposes, like surveying forest fires, but he was especially vexed by the prospect of
government surveillance. The manufacturers, he added, were marketing the new technology to government
agencies, but neither federal nor local statutes specified how they could be used. The technology was getting in
front of the laws, Mr. Rosendale said. An Idaho lawmaker, Chuck Winder, said he did not want to restrict law
enforcement with a search warrant requirement. He said he was drafting language that would give law enforcement
discretion to evaluate if there was reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. The attention by lawmakers has
delighted traditional privacy advocates. Ive been working on privacy issues for over a decade and rarely do we
see such interest in a privacy threat thats largely in the future, said Jay Stanley, a senior policy analyst with the
American Civil Liberties Union in Washington. Drones are a concrete and instantly graspable threat to privacy. A
counterargument has come from an industry group, the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International,
it announced the creation of six sites around the country where drones of various sorts can be tested. Pressed by
advocacy groups, it said it would invite public comment on privacy protections in those sites. The agency
estimates that the worldwide drone market could grow to $90 billion in
the next decade.
many more
believe unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) provide tremendous benefits and dividends for
public safety. This includes everything from traffic accident investigation; forensics;
public and civil rights opponents that broad use of drones heralds a domestic surveillance state,
for their buck as important force multipliers. Ben Gielow, general counsel of the Association for Unmanned Vehicle
Systems International (AUVSI), noted that unmanned aircraft help save time [and] save money, not to mention
saving lives." FAA approves first certificate for drones Monrovia, CA.-based AeroVironment, Inc. announced on July
19 it received a first of its kind Restricted Category rating for its 13-pound Puma AE SUAS from the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). The FAA certificate permits operators to fly the Puma for commercial missions, such
as oil spill monitoring and ocean surveys in the North Slope region of the Arctic. Prior to the FAA issued this
Restricted Category certificate for a SUAS, it was not possible to operate a UAS in the national airspace for
commercial operations. Although a potential user could obtain an experimental airworthiness certificate, the
certificate specifically excluded and did not authorize the use of an unmanned aircraft system for commercial
operations, AeroVironment said in a statement. The FAA said in its announcement that previous military
acceptance of the Puma AE design allowed the FAA to issue the Restricted Category type certificate. This marks
the first time the FAA has approved a hand-launched unmanned aircraft system for commercial missions,
AeroVironment said. Closely regulated by the FAA, drones are expected to be cleared for wider use in the
continental United States (CONUS) following a congressional mandate that the FAA establish guidelines for their use
within US national airspace by 2015. This certificate [for AeroVironment]represents an aviation milestone that
could not have happened without the FAAs vision and leadership, said Tim Conver, AeroVironment chairman and
chief executive officer. Aerial
Economy 2AC
The Teal Group, a leading aerospace market intelligence firm, says that despite cuts in defense spending, annual
global spending on drones will grow from $5.9 billion in 2012 to $11.3 billion in 2021. Carr also pointed out that
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency funds a crowdsourcing competition called UAVForge. The 2012
competition highlighted the decentralized, entrepreneurial nature of unmanned development by the more than
140 teams and 3,500 people from 153 countries who participated in the competition, he said. Many applications
of drone platforms are in some phase of research, development, testing, evaluation or operation, and the industry
Solvency Economy
Drones will substantially boost US economy but regulations are
key
Kimery 13 [Anthony L. Homeland Security Today Drones: Force Multipliers For
Law Enforcement, Other First Responders July 28, 2013
http://www.hstoday.us/columns/the-kimery-report/blog/drones-force-multipliers-forlaw-enforcement-other-first-responders/06bfa4d1a8afea68ce724424cb7679f6.html
c.shack]
Economic impact A recent study of the economic impact from the expected explosion in the US drone market in the
Integration in the United States, by Daryl Jenkins. Jenkins is an aviation industry economist with more than 30 years
of experience and a former director of the Aviation Institute at George Washington University and a past professor
at George Washington University and Embry Riddle Aeronautical University. In his Dec. 2012 oversight report,
Safety at Any Price: Assessing the Impact of Homeland Security Spending in US Cities, OK. Republican Sen. Tom
Coburn -- known for his admirable determination in ferreting out waste, fraud and abuse in government spending -said his staffs year-long investigation expose[d] misguided and wasteful spending in one of the largest terrorprevention grant programs at the Department of Homeland Security -- the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI),
and implied that among the useless and ineffective taxpayer expenditures is the taxdollars thats been spent for
buying drones. Granted, Coburns 55-page investigative report exposed what can only be described as a lot of
politically motivated pork spending, waste, abuse, mismanagement and widespread lack of oversight of UASI on the
part of DHS -- and Congress. Significant evidence suggests that the program is struggling to demonstrate how it is
making US cities less vulnerable to attack and more prepared if one were to occur -- despite receiving $7.1 billion in
federal funding since 2003, the study said. But it doesnt adequately explain the cost-risk benefit of using UASI
grants to buy drones for use by first responders. Authorities said the reports criticism that UASI grants by local
police departments to acquire drones amounts to a wasteful use of the funding failed to understand the drones
force multiplying effect on law enforcement and other first responders, as one large metro police official remarked.
According to Coburns report, federally funded drones are already patrolling the skies like never before in the
United States. However, DHS RAPS Test Plan said Within the United States, almost 50,000 police and fire
departments exist but only about 300 (less than 1 percent) have aviation departments, owing primarily to the
significant cost of acquiring, operating and maintaining manned fixed-wing and rotary-wing platforms. The
estimated cost per flight hour for these assets is 300 times more expensive than commercially available SUAS
which can be operated at costs lower than those of a typical police cruiser. But for state, county or city entities to
become potential users of SUAS, their adoption must be justifiable and affordable. The RAPS Test Plan reiterated
that SUAS may soon become valuable tools for first and emergency responders and for those responsible for US
border security. The plan emphasized that SUAS can provide tactical, rapid-response capabilities and much better
situational awareness before field officers and agents respond to and engage in potentially dangerous operations.
The growth in the use of unmanned aerial systems for homeland security and other public sector needs hinges on
the FAA, which is tasked with finding out how aerial drones can coexist with commercial airlines and comply with
the privacy concerns of the public, according to the NCPA study. As the use of unmanned drones nears full
integration into the National Airspace System in 2015, NCPA is urging exploration of the civilian, commercial and
scientific applications of drones, while taking into account the many concerns over civilian privacy. NCPAs Carr
said his study concluded strict privacy protections must be implemented before the public will support transparent
drone use in domestic airspace. Addressing privacy issues are paramount. Carr said, According to the consulting
Impact Economy
Economic decline causes nuclear global chaos in multiple
countries
Auslin 9
global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments
across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans
suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the
adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market
systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern . China, until last year the world's
fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of
Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As
Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency
economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this
decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010;
Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is
haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets.
Europe as a whole
A prolonged
global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions
inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation
in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all
regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually
know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions
that coalesce into a big bang.
million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe.
Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served
in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for
national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on
the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control
Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves
West: India, China, and Asias Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4
The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario;
everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation
weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a
have caused him to raise the odds of a new recession to 33% from 25% only 10 days ago. Other economists
surveyed by CNNMoney are also raising their recession risk estimates. The survey found an average chance of a
new recession to be about 25%, up from a 15% chance only three months ago. Of the 21 economists who
responded to the survey, six have joined Zandi in increasing their estimates in just the last few days. The main
reason: the huge slide in stocks. Standard & Poor's downgrade of the U.S. credit rating is another concern. "The
correction in equity markets raises the risk of recession due to the negative hit to wealth and confidence," said Sal
Guatieri, senior economist for BMO Capital Markets. Even with a 430-point rebound in the Dow Jones industrial
average Tuesday following the Federal Reserve meeting, major U.S. stock indexes have lost more than 11% of their
value over the last 12 trading days. Recovery at risk A plunge in stocks doesn't necessarily mean a new recession.
The economy avoided a recession after the stock market crash of 1987. "Stock price declines are often misleading
indicators of future recessions," said David Berson, chief economist of BMI Group. But with the economy already so
fragile, the shock of another stock market drop and resulting loss of wealth could be the tipping point. "It really
does matter where the economy is when it gets hit by these shocks," said Zandi. "If we all pull back on spending,
that's a prescription for a long, painful recession," he said. Most economists say they aren't worried that S&P's
downgrade makes recession more likely, although a few said any bad news at this point increases the risk. "The
downgrade has a psychological impact in terms of hurting consumer confidence," said Lawrence Yun, chief
currently stands at 9.1%. In November 2007, the month before the start of the Great Recession, it was just 4.7%.
And the large number of Americans who have stopped looking for work in the last few years has left the percentage
banks on the FDIC's list of troubled institutions, the highest number since 1993. Only 76 banks were at risk as the
the policy response by Congress and the Fed," said Dan Seiver, a finance professor at San Diego State University.
"We
won't see that this time." Three times between 2008 and 2010, Congress approved
massive spending or temporary tax cuts to try to stimulate the economy .
But fresh from the bruising debt ceiling battle and credit rating downgrade, and with elections looming, the
federal government has shown little inclination to move in that direction.
So this new recession would likely have virtually no policy effort to
counteract it.
Agriculture 2AC
Impact Food
And, food insecurity makes conflicts longer and deadlier
Simmons 13 (Emily Simmons. People and Practices (HR), Advisor at The Marketing Store. Harvesting
Peace: Food Security, Conflict, and Cooperation. New Security Beat. 3 September 2013.
http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2013/09/harvesting-peace-food-security-conflictcooperation/#.Uth9YaCLDy8)//JuneC//
Food and Conflict, Conflict and Food Harvesting Peace: Food Security, Conflict, and Cooperation, the latest edition
of ECSP Report, explores the complex linkages between conflict and food security, drawing
insights from scholarly work to help inform more effective programming for practitioners. There is no doubt that
conflict exacerbates food insecurity. Conflict can reduce the amount of food available, disrupt peoples access to
food, limits families access to food preparation facilities and health care, and increase uncertainty about satisfying
substantiate the many ways in which food insecurity can trigger, fuel, or
sustain conflict . Unanticipated food price rises frequently provide a spark
for unrest. Conflict among groups competing to control the natural
resources needed for food production can catalyze conflict. Social,
political, or economic inequities that affect peoples food security can
exacerbate grievances and build momentum toward conflict . Incentives to join or
support conflicts and rebellions stem from a number of causes, of which the protection of food security is just one.
Food insecurity may also help to sustain conflict. If post-conflict recovery proves difficult and
food insecurity remains high, incentives for reigniting conflict may be strengthened.
Given the complexity of factors underlying food security, however, we do not yet understand what levels or aspects
of food insecurity are most likely, in what circumstances, to directly contribute to or cause conflict. More explicit
integration of food security variables into theories of conflict could help inform external interventions aimed at
mitigating food insecurity and preventing conflict. The high human and economic costs of conflict and food
insecurity already provide substantial incentives for international humanitarian and development organizations to
intervene in order to alleviate food insecurity in fragile states and conflict-affected societies. Experience suggests,
however, that effective efforts to address food insecurity in these situations may require external actors to
reconsider the ways in which they intervene. Modifying operational approaches to ensure greater complementarity
and continuity between humanitarian and development interventions, for example, could help to improve
closely with households caught in conflict-created poverty traps could alleviate persistent food insecurity and
potentially sustain conflict recovery. And mobilizing civil society and private businesses as partners could enable
both humanitarian and development organizations to broaden the capacities for conflict recovery and food security.
World Wide Fund for Nature Gold Medal, and the Blue Planet Prize, Could Food
Shortages Bring Down Civilization?
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/civilization-food-shortages/]
One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change. Typically we project the future by
extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well. But sometimes it fails
spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as todays economic crisis. For most of us, the idea
that civilization itself could disintegrate probably seems preposterous. Who would not find it hard to think seriously
about such a complete departure from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a
warning so direand how would we go about responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely
catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization
might devolve into chaosand Earth might collide with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global
agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of those
trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Yet I, too,
have resisted the idea that
global civilization . I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the
environmental declines that are undermining the world food economymost important, falling water tables,
eroding soils and rising temperaturesforces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible. The Problem
also our
of Failed States Even a cursory look at the vital signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my
conclusion. And those of us in the environmental field are well into our third decade of charting trends of
environmental decline without seeing any significant effort to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years
world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008
harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62
days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and summer of last year
foodprice inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering
on the edge of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to
the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was
climbed to the highest level ever. As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting
expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problems stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations.
if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an
ever increasing rate. We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century
the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is
failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk. States fail
when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security
But
and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory.
seven, is the worlds leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from
that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic
were worried, all right, but the object of their worry was somewhat theoretical. Nobody knew for certain if such a supervirus was
even possible. To cause that kind of damage to the human population, a flu virus has to combine two traits: lethality and
transmissibility. The more optimistically minded scientists argued that one trait precluded the other, that if the bird flu acquired the
ability to spread like wildfire, it would lose its ability to kill with terrifying efficiency. The virus would spread, cause some fever and
optimists, we found
were wrong. Two groups of scientists working independently managed to create bird flu
viruses in the lab that had that killer combination of lethality and transmissibility among
humans. They did it for the best reasons, of courseto find vaccines and medicines to treat a pandemic should one occur, and
sniffles, and take its place among the pantheon of ordinary flu viruses that come and go each season. The
out last fall,
more generally to understand how influenza viruses work. If we're lucky, the scientists will get there before nature manages to come
up with the virus herself, or before someone steals the genetic blueprints and turns this knowledge against us. Influenza is a
of much of the military power in the developed world is nuclear. It is the reigning
symbol of global power, the basis, albeit, unspoken or else barely whispered by
which powerful countries subtly assert aggressive intentions and ambitions for
hegemony, though masked by diplomacy and negotiations, and yet this basis
is not as stable as most believe it to be. In a remarkable website on nuclear war,
Carol Moore asks the question Is Nuclear War Inevitable?? [10].4 In Section 1,
Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the
nuclear tensions between powerful countries . No doubt, theyve figured
out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set
off a nuclear exchange . As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would
have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either
Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian dead hand system, where regional
nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed, it is
likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States [10]. Israeli leaders
and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer
a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would
retaliate with the suicidal Samson option against all major Muslim cities
in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also
include attacks on Russia and even anti-Semitic European cities [10]. In
that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then
retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as
thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them
much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would
rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere.
Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift
throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else
radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future
generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years,
taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well.
And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the
nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or lone
wolf act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use
of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid
escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited
nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the use
them or lose them strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be
interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a
window of opportunity to win the war. In otherwords, once Pandoras
Box is opened, it will spread quickly , as it will be the signal for permission for
anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of
people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, everyone else feels free
to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and
external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites
needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and
inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who
seek selfdetermination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their
oppressors [10]. In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by
the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation
of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just
one is used, it is very likely thatmany, if not all, will be used , leading to horrific
scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization
while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of
unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.
Solvency Agriculture
Integration of drone technology is key to agriculture
The Economist, 12-4-2014, Free the drones,"
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21635489-drones-have-immensecommercial-potentialso-long-regulators-dont-try-tether-them, Accessed: 5-262015, /Bingham-MB
One immediate commercial use is surveying land cheaply and effectively. A
drone can photograph a road to a resolution of 2cm, compared with the 30cm that a
satellite offersand it can do so at a third of the cost. Already farmers are using
them to monitor crop growth, which in turn enables modern farm
machinery to deliver exactly the right amount and type of fertiliser. In
France, where the technology is widely used, farmers say drones boost
revenues by 50 ($62) or so per hectare. Drones also improve safety: they can
be used to do jobs, such as inspecting power lines, that currently require dangling a
man from a helicopter. And they can deliver goods faster: DHL, a logistics firm,
already uses a parcelcopter to deliver medicine to Juist, a small island off the
coast of Germany.
2AC
according to a new study commissioned by the American Red Cross. Measure, a 32 Advisors Company, and the
American Red Cross, recently released a 52-page report based on extensive research and industry collaboration
examining the humanitarian, safety and economic benefits of using drones to aid disaster relief efforts. Sponsors of
the report include Boeing Co, Lockheed Martin Corp, United Parcel Service Inc, International Business Machines
Corp, Willis Group Holdings Ltd, Guy Carpenter and Company, United Services Automobile Association, and Zurich
Measure. We have a unique opportunity for companies and governments to save lives and rebuild communities by
Recovery, in the soon to be published April/May Homeland Security Today. Test flights were conducted in support of
this project through partnership with Dr. Robin Murphy at the Center for Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue
(CRASAR). In March 2015, Measure, Murphys team and the sponsors of the report successfully tested and
The use of this gamechanging disaster response technology provides benefits in the real time
management and assessment of catastrophes, said John Trace, Guy Carpenter executive
vice president. Aerial drone technology offers enormous potential in predisaster planning and for assessing damage after a catastrophe. By
sharing that information collected by drones with the public, government
and relief organizations, we can greatly improve response time, save lives
and mitigate damage in response to disasters. With a number of
compelling humanitarian, safety and economic reasons to use drones for
disaster response and recovery, the integration of drones into emergency
and disaster response protocols must be a top priority for the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), according to the report. The report was released just days before the April 24 deadline for
demonstrated the capabilities of drones in a chaotic post-disaster simulation.
public comment on newly proposed FAA drone regulations. As Homeland Security Today previously reported, amid
mounting concerns that the FAAs slow pace in developing a plan to open the skies to commercial drones has
prevented the drone industry from taking off, earlier this year the FAA proposed a framework of regulations that
would allow routine use of certain small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in todays aviation system. Currently,
commercial drone operations are prohibited in the United States without an FAA-granted exemption, and rules likely
wont be finalized until late 2016 or 2017. We
-- devastated by future disasters - can recover and move forward, said Dan
Riordan, CEO of Zurich Global Corporate in North America.
The relentless assaults of our earthly habitat are heightening the global
risks of deadly conflict . Climate change is just one of the ongoing trends increasing the chances that
natural disasters and extreme environmental events will lead to social
disruptions, aggressive competition for scarce resources, serious political
confrontations, and even war. 1 The fractious debates surrounding global warmingits pace, effects,
and human contributionhave distracted public attention from population trends and other
factors that already have made large numbers of people more vulnerable
to even normal patterns of natural disasters: earthquakes, storms, floods,
droughts, and epidemics. The cumulative effect of increased and
overlapping extreme environmental events will likely stimulate popular
and political insecurities that eventually shift the fiscal and security
priorities of the United States
commitment by the United States and other major governments, as the UN Charter puts it, to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace.2 Experts and officials have an urgent
responsibility to anticipate and explain the security implications and larger global repercussions of this emerging
profile of natural assaults, while emphasizing the importance of collaborating internationally to reduce
vulnerabilities, avoid popular overreactions, and contain adverse political consequences. Acts of God and Human
Vulnerabilities The legal system has a term for destructive natural phenomena deemed beyond the control and
responsibility of human beings: acts of God. While most of us no longer regard these assaults of nature as
deliberate acts by enraged or punitive deities, we have come to respect their often awesome and arbitrary effects.
Modern science explains them as modulations in one of the three spheres of our planetary surroundingsthe
lithosphere, atmosphere, and biosphere. In the lithosphere, energy eruptions in the earths crust can cause
earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanoes. In the atmosphere, changing concentrations and distributions of
temperature through water and air can cause hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, droughts, and wildfires. In the
biosphere, the modulation and migration of microorganisms can cause epidemics that weaken and kill people,
animals, and plants. As the three spheres of our habitat evolve and erupt, human beings frequently get in the way.
Natural hazards become humanitarian disasters when they expose and exacerbate human vulnerabilitiesthose
characteristics of societies that limit their ability to avoid major damage and recover quickly.3 Such vulnerabilities
range from very concrete weaknesses in infrastructure or the exposed locations of large populated areas to more
intangible dimensions of economic fragility, social cohesion, and political capacity, which affect both preparedness
and recovery. Although the recent historical pattern of major storms, droughts, and earthquakes can be traced (see
map 1 at the end of this report), the extent of human vulnerabilities is a complex and subjective matter, often
evident only after the fact. Mortality figures are typically used as indicators of the severity of disasters. By that
measure, the three worst disasters in the world since 1950 were the earthquake in Tangshan, China, in 1976
(250,000 dead), the earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004 (240,000 dead), and the earthquake in
Haiti in 2010 (316,000 dead).4 These three earthquakes were by no means the largest in that sixty-year time frame,
but they occurred where large numbers of people were exposed and unable to protect themselves. Severity also
can be measured by other direct effects: destruction, dislocation, and disease. The 2010 earthquake in Haiti not
only killed more than 300,000 people but injured an additional 300,000, affected 3.7 million (30 percent of the total
population), caused $8 billion in damage, and was followed by 470,000 cases of cholera with 6,631 attributable
deaths. The death rate from an earthquake, hurricane, or epidemic is generally much higher in poorer societies than
in richer ones, where economic damage is usually the more numerically impressive consequence. Because their
constituents have come to recognize how much the damage from acts of God can be affected by the actions, or
inactions, of human beings, political leaders are increasingly being held accountable for minimizing the foreseeable
risks of extreme events. Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters: The Economics of Effective Prevention is the
indicative title of one important report by the United Nations and the World Bank. Reducing the risks begins with the
shorelines or coastal wetlands, marginal urban slums, and huge temporary settlements of internally displaced
becoming increasingly problematic for more and more people. Demographic trends best convey the scale of the
In less than twenty years, the global population will rise from 7.1
billion to more than 8 billion. Key countries will grow even more rapidly .
challenges.
Between 2010 and 2025, Egypt is projected to grow from 81 million people to 106 million, Pakistan from 174 million
to 234 million, and Nigeria from 159 million to 258 million.5 Many more people around the world will attain middleclass incomes, but a large percentage in many countries will be young and unemployed. Half the worlds population
is already twenty-five years old or younger. Projections suggest that, by 2030, the world will need to provide fifty
percent more food and additional fresh water equivalent to twenty new Nile Rivers.6 In that time frame, the needs
of many countries, including India and China, will begin to exceed foreseeable water supplies for consumption and
irrigation.
of all. In just over a decade, metropolitan Jakarta will go from 9.6 million to 12.8 million people, Mexico City from
20 million to 24.6 million, Delhi from 22 million to 32.9 million, and Tokyo from 37 million to nearly 40 millionand
these are just four of the thirty-seven cities that will then have populations greater than 10 million.7 There were
only twenty-three in 2011. One of every seven or eight people in the world will be living in one of these massive
metropolises, many in huge urban slums that have few, if any, services or infrastructure. Such concentrated
population centers are extremely vulnerable to even normal patterns of earthquakes, storms, drought, and disease
(see map 2). Epidemics that spread within such populations are especially difficult to contain. Climate volatility adds
a further dimension of growing risk. Current changes in the climate of key regions portend severe near-term effects,
whether or not the consequences of global warming match the worst predictions for the longer term. Since the
1980sthe number of recorded natural disastersrelated to weather and climate has roughly doubled. According to
the above-mentioned United Nations-World Bank report, If there is no conscious change in adaptation policies to
extreme events, baseline damages [even] without climate change are expected to triple to $185 billion a year from
economic and population growth alone8 (emphasis added). Nor are these risks confined to poor or middle-income
countries. The worlds largest reinsurance companies, Munich Re and Swiss Re, warn of major increases in weatherrelated damage in both North America and Europe over the next decade.9 Contrary to critiques from global
warming skeptics, the scientific and intelligence communities actually have been cautious in predicting the human
effects of climate change. The April 2012 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is
relatively conservative in forecasting future climate-induced disasters.10 Likewise, the National Intelligence Council
handles climate change and natural disasters in a largely conventional and understated manner.11 However, an
increasing number of authoritative reports have begun to highlight the dire risks of current climate trends and the
need to begin assessing the potential for plausible adverse scenarios. Both the World Bank and the UN Environment
Programme warned recently that the likely rise in global mean temperatures will exceed key thresholds sooner than
previously expected, with implications for both severe weather and ocean surges.12 Security specialists are
beginning to take these trends to heart. The Defense Science Board warned in its 2011 report that climate changes
in key regions will interact with other vulnerabilities to become serious threat multipliers.13 The World Economic
Forum highlights the interactive implications of climate changes with governance, fiscal, population, and technology
vulnerabilities.14 A recent report of the National Research Council called on foreign policy experts to consider more
systematically the political and security implications of foreseeable climate changes, suggesting that it is prudent
for security analysts to expect climate surprises in the coming decade, including unexpected and potentially
disruptive single events as well as conjunctions of events occurring simultaneously or in sequence, and for them to
become progressively more serious and more frequent thereafter, most likely at an accelerating rate.15 Despite
the pervasive dysfunction of most governments in addressing climate surprises and other disaster vulnerabilities,
we will no doubt see environmental risks beginning to shape the political expectations of senior officials and
security, particularly if sudden and unanticipated.16 Not unlike other threats to peace and security, the inability to
predict with certainty the location and timing of future natural disasters should not obscure a nations vital interest
in assessing their likelihood and potential aftereffects. Local Catastrophes and Global Repercussions The challenge
is to envision plausible threats and sequential patterns of potential dangernot to scare people but to anticipate
potential consequences and devise strategies to prevent or reduce economic, political, and social damage. The
National Research Council suggests using analytical stress tests of particular countries or regions to envision the
effects of major disasters, or clusters of disasters, even if some of them should be considered unlikely. History offers
examples of catastrophes that illustrate the possible ripple effects from otherwise local disasters. The Lisbon
earthquake, tsunami, and fire of 1755 destroyed that city and decisively degraded Portugals role as an imperial
power.17 The Spanish flu epidemic of 191820 killed an estimated fifty million to one hundred million people
worldwide and was particularly lethal among young adults, compounding the immense losses to that generation
from World War I. More recently, the destruction from Hurricane Katrina on the U.S. Gulf Coast in 2005; the
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear shutdown in Fukushima, Japan in 2011; and Tropical Storm Sandy on the U.S East
Coast in 2012 exposed the interconnected vulnerabilities of coastal settlements, energy infrastructures, health-care
facilities, and large-scale relief and recovery operationsa complex combination for which neither the United States
nor Japan was adequately prepared. Major localized disasters do not always result in irreversible setbacks. The
Chicago Fire of 1871, the Boston Fire of 1872, and the San Francisco Earthquake of 1906 resulted in the major
reconstruction of all three cities, making each of them more economically vibrant and resilient.18 New York will
undoubtedly be better prepared after Sandy, as New Orleans was after Katrina when it faced Hurricane Isaac in
August 2012. Yet both disaster specialists and mainstream media too often treat natural disasters as limited and
local matters. Media focus has typically been more on immediate suffering than larger implications, direct effects
than long-term consequences, and infrastructure repair than major institutional reforms. Nevertheless, as the
number and scale of natural disasters increases, we are likely to witness growing public awareness and anxiety
about the vulnerability of certain areas, which will become a strong political factor adding to the wider and longerterm consequences of disasters. Internet technologies will facilitate not only the rapid dissemination of distressing
information about natural disasters and severe environmental conditions but also the potential for exaggerated
predictions, political incitement, conspiracy theories, or even popular panic. Worst-case scenarios may then become
urgent political focal points, especially those that illustrate the fragility of economic necessities, social cohesion, or
public safety.19 Economic Cascades The most troubling scenarios of natural disasters involve those with
simultaneous effects on major essentials: food, water, land, medicine, energy, or subsistence income. An
overlapping series of earthquakes, floods, and food shortages affecting a megacity could overwhelm the capacity of
national and international agencies to respond adequately. Other consequences could follow: The Fukushima
nuclear meltdown, for example, led both the Japanese and German governments to announce the phasing out of
their nuclear power industriesa major blow to any prospect of curbing global carbon emissions.20
Corn, wheat, and rice crop failures would lead to price hikes and shortages in far-
flung locations. The worldwide collapse of one of these major staplesfor example, from a new fungal infestation in
one region and a drought in anothercould lead to famines, export cutoffs, stockpiling and hoarding, or cartelized
supply arrangements.
solidarity in local relief and recovery operations, even among the poorest citizens.25 That city is now a prime
candidate for even bigger quakes, affecting an even larger population. Joint planning for such a crisis by the United
States and Mexico could reduce the possibility of greater casualties and infrastructure losses that might impel
hundreds of thousands to seek entry into the United States. Sudden large-scale migrations are an increasing
prospect among the effects of climate change. Low-lying islands, flood-prone coastal areas, large refugee camps,
and regions of prolonged drought could provoke major population movements. The possibility of Bangladeshis
pouring into India to escape delta flooding has already led the Indian government to construct a 4,000-kilometer
fence to forestall such influxes. Mass migration from Africa to Europe could also result from the droughts and floods
affecting an increasing number of areas. Within the continent, such forced movement could compound urbanization
Myanmar governments heartless response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008 was likely a further factor in the military
regimes political vulnerability and may have accelerated the recent transition there. An unprecedented drought in
Syria from 2006 to 2010 disrupted agriculture in regions that then became strong supporters of the armed
resistance.26 The rise in global food prices that began with a severe drought in Russia in the summer of 2010 was a
An earthquake and
tsunami near Jakarta40 percent of which is below sea level and frequently inundated by heavy rains
could render much of that city uninhabitable and set back Indonesias economic growth
and democratic development for years. It could also reduce the countrys
ability to cooperate on global issues, such as deforestation or pandemic
prevention, on which its involvement has been crucial .28 An earthquake in
Karachi or Delhi or a major flood in Mumbai or Lagos could
[collapse]cripple the economies of their respective countries and further
degrade the effectiveness of government authorities to avoid serious
key factor in provoking popular uprisings in various Arab states the following year.27
As the extent of
global fragility in the face of natural disasters becomes more widely felt,
the public may sense the start of a regional or even global slide toward
scarcities of various kinds, leading to political pressures for more secure
sources of necessities. Such pressures increase the risk of international
confrontation and present opportunities for exploitation by terrorists,
criminals, or fanatics who see increased mayhem as in their interest. 29
governments can
no longer cope with pandemics, global warming, international terrorism,
unregulated global finance -- unless they act in unison in intergovernmental
organizations. But, by the same token, Lilliputian micro states, emerging from the global
separatist wave, would be even be less capable to deal with these problems.
Global governance would then be completely controlled by the remaining, still
international, private networks. A scary scenario to be sure. Does that mean we must stay put and freeze present
problems and too small for the big ones. His words were prophetic but they cut both ways. National
borders in perpetuity. No, obviously not. Re-arrangements and restructuring are necessary. But the more sustainable answer may be
in new forms of federalism rather than in the pure multiplication of sovereignties. In today's interdependent world, sovereignty is an
illusion except if you are a superpower. The problems are too big while the means available to the new so-called 'sovereign'
AT: Terror DA
Exemptions solve terrorism DA link
Rand Paul, Special To Cnn, 6-15-2012, Don't let drones invade our privacy,"
CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/14/opinion/rand-paul-drones/, Accessed: 5-252015, /Bingham-MB
There are some exceptions within this bill, such as the patrol of our national
borders, when immediate action is needed to prevent "imminent danger to
life," and when we are under a high risk of a terrorist attack. Otherwise, the
government must have probable cause that led them to ask for a warrant before the
use of drones is permitted.
Domestic Drones To Enhance U.S. Patrol Procedures MARCH 26, 2014 In Public
Safety http://inpublicsafety.com/2014/03/domestic-drones-to-enhance-u-s-patrolprocedures/ c.shack]
In Tijuana, Mexico, the local police are using unarmed drone aircraft equipped with video cameras as part of their
increased patrol presence. These low-altitude and small unmanned aircraft are stealth and quiet in flight because
they use lithium polymer batteries (LiPo), which gives them approximately 20 minutes of flight time before battery
packs need to be changed and re-charged. These drones allow the Tijuana police to patrol areas without
announcing their presence. They also give police a tactical advantage because drone operators can provide timely
and accurate reports to responding patrol officers. Tijuana Chief of Police Alejandro Lares wants to use the patrol
drones to prevent crime in his city. Chief Lares has stated that he is not hiding the drones from the public and wants
anyone who lives or visits the city to know that they will be safe because the police are watching day and night with
the drones. The drone cameras are capable of night-vision operations so Chief Lares is promising 24/7 drone police
patrol coverage when his fleet of drones are fully operational. At this point, they are still experimenting and working
out policies and tactics for how best to use the drone platforms for observation and crime prevention. The Tijuana
3D Robotics drones can be programmed to fly a specific pattern or manually flown by a trained operator. Chief Lares
Drone Possibilities The U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agency has deployed unarmed and unmanned drones along
the U.S. and Mexican border. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has given permission to the U.S. Customs
and Border Patrol agency to use unarmed and unmanned military Predator drones for observation, but have
restricted the flight area to the border areas for monitoring only. Chaotic Moon Studios is a mobile software and
design and development company from Austin, Texas. They have experimented with an unmanned drone carrying
Taser technology that can deploy a non-lethal stunning shock to a suspect. The combining of these technologies has
a lot of promise for domestic law enforcement patrol. Such technology could be used by the Department of
Corrections to patrol prison exercise yards and stop violence when it occurs, without having to deploy deadly force
to stop a prison fight or riot. U.S. Laws on Small Unmanned Commercial Aircraft On March 6, 2014, National Safety
aircraft by the end of the year. As technologies progress that could benefit U.S. domestic law enforcement efforts,
U.S. lawmakers will have to weigh in with concerns over privacy issues
and the pending new FAA policy on unmanned drones flying over American
national airspace.
wake of the September 2001 terror attacks. Today the American people are now
safe from the federal governments collection of their personal data, said Sen. Mike
Lee of Utah, the bills chief GOP proponent in the Senate. The House approved the
bill, known as the USA Freedom Act, in May. The bill will require the NSA and Federal
Bureau of Investigation to obtain phone records for most counterterror
investigations and other probes on a case-by-case basis from telecommunications
companies. This would end the nine-year-old practice underpinned by
Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which allowed the NSA to hold the
telephone records of millions of Americans, regardless of any persons
background or behavior. The bulk data collection didnt include the content of
the calls themselves.
(Zheyao, J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, Winter, "War Powers for
the Fourth Generation: Constitutional Interpretation in the Age of Asymmetric
Warfare", The Georgetown Journal of Law Public Policy 7 Geo. J.L. 26 Pub. Poly 373,
Lexis)
round can hope for success in another, not just the formal right to vote and
nominate candidates for office. Where democratic systems produce permanent
winners and permanent losers (see Read 2009b), the case is altered and the
capacity of a democratic system to expand power for all participants becomes
doubtful.
2AC No Spillover
Theres no spillover
Jack Balkin, The Atlantic, 9/3/13, What Congressional Approval Won't Do: Trim
Obama's Power or Make War Legal,
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/what-congressional-approval-wont-dotrim-obamas-power-or-make-war-legal/279298/
Wouldnt congressional refusal make the United States look weak, as critics
including Senator John McCain warn loudly? Hardly. The next dictator who acts
rashly will face a different situation and a different calculus. The UN
Security Council or NATO may feel differently about the need to act. There may be
a new threat to American interests that lets Obama or the next president
offer a different justification for acting. It just wont matter very much
what Obama said about red lines in the past. World leaders say provocative
things all the time and then ignore them. Their motto is: That was then,
and this is now.
If Congress turns him down, wont Obama be undermined at home, as other
critics claim? In what sense? It is hard to see how the Republicans could be
less cooperative than they already are. And its not in the interest of
Democrats to fault a president of their own party for acceding to what Congress
wants instead of acting unilaterally.
Some commentators argue (or hope) that whatever happens, Obamas request for
military authorization will be an important precedent that will begin to restore the
constitutional balance between the president and Congress in the area of war
powers. Dont bet on it. By asking for congressional authorization in this case,
Obama has not ceded any authority that he or any other president has previously
asserted in war powers.
It is naive to think that the next time a president wants to send forces
abroad without congressional approval, he or she will be deterred by the fact
that Barack Obama once sought congressional permission to bomb Syria. If a
president can plausibly assert that any of the previous justifications apply -including
those offered in the Libya intervention -the case of Syria is easily distinguishable.
Perhaps more to the point, Congress still cannot go to the courts to stop the
president, given existing legal precedents. Congress may respond by
refusing to appropriate funds, but that is a remedy that they have always
had -and have rarely had the political will to exercise.
The most important limit on presidential adventurism is political, not legal.
It will turn less on the precedent of Syria than on whether the last
adventure turned out well or badly.
The hegemonic model also reduces the need for executive branch
flexibility, and the institutional competence terrain shifts toward the
courts. The stability of the current U.S.-led international system depends
on the ability of the U.S. to govern effectively. Effective governance
depends on, among other things, predictability. n422 G. John Ikenberry
analogizes America's hegemonic position to that of a "giant corporation"
seeking foreign investors: "The rule of law and the institutions of policy
making in a democracy are the political equivalent of corporate
transparency and [*155] accountability." n423 Stable interpretation of the
law bolsters the stability of the system because other nations will know
that they can rely on those interpretations and that there will be at least
some degree of enforcement by the United States. At the same time, the
separation of powers serves the global-governance function by reducing the ability
of the executive branch to make "abrupt or aggressive moves toward other states."
n424 The Bush Administration's detainee policy, for all of its virtues and faults,
was an exceedingly aggressive departure from existing norms, and was
therefore bound to generate intense controversy. It was formulated quickly,
by a small group of policy-makers and legal advisors without consulting
Congress and over the objections of even some within the executive branch. n425
Although the Administration invoked the law of armed conflict to justify its detention
of enemy combatants, it did not seem to recognize limits imposed by that law. n426
Most significantly, it designed the detention scheme around interrogation
rather than incapacitation and excluded the detainees from all legal
protections of the Geneva Conventions. n427 It declared all detainees at
Guantanamo to be "enemy combatants" without establishing a regularized process
for making an individual determination for each detainee. n428 And when it
established the military commissions, also without consulting Congress,
the Administration denied defendants important procedural protections.
n429 In an anarchic world characterized by great power conflict, one could
make the argument that the executive branch requires maximum
flexibility to defeat the enemy, who may not adhere to international law. Indeed,
the precedents relied on most heavily by the Administration in the enemy
combatant cases date from the 1930s and 1940s - a period when the international
system was radically unstable, and the United States was one of several great
powers vying for advantage. n430 But during that time, the executive branch faced
much more exogenous pressure from other great powers to comply with
international law in the treatment of captured enemies. If the United States strayed
too far from established norms, it would risk retaliation upon its own soldiers or
other consequences from [*156] powerful rivals. Today, there are no such
constraints: enemies such as al Qaeda are not great powers and are not
likely to obey international law anyway. Instead, the danger is that American
rule-breaking will set a pattern of rule-breaking for the world, leading to
instability . n431 America's military predominance enables it to set the
rules of the game. When the U.S. breaks its own rules, it loses legitimacy.
Gene Healy is a vice president at the Cato Institute and the author of The Cult of the
Presidency, The CATO Institute, June 2011, "Book Review: Hail to the Tyrant",
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/book-review-hail-tyrant
Legal checks have been relaxed largely because of the need for centralized,
relatively efficient government under the complex conditions of a modern dynamic
economy and a highly interrelated international order. Whats more, the authors
insist, America needs the legally unconstrained presidency both at home (given an
increasingly complex economy) and abroad (given the shrinking of global
distances).
These are disputed points, to say the least. If Friedrich Hayek was at all correct
about the knowledge problem, then if anything increasing economic
complexity argues for less central direction . Nor does the fact that we face a
highly interrelated international order suggest that were more vulnerable than we
were in 1789, as a tiny frontier republic surrounded by hostile tribes and great
powers. Economic interdependence and the rise of other modern industrial
democracies means that other players have a stake in protecting the global
trading system.
Posner and Vermuele coin the term tyrannophobia, which stands for unjustified
fear of executive abuse. That fear is written into the American genetic code: the
authors call the Declaration of Independence the ur-text of tyrannophobia in the
United States. As they see it, thats a problem because the risk that the public will
fail to trust a well-motivated president is just as serious as the risk that it will trust
an ill-motivated one. They contend that our inherited skepticism toward power
exacerbates biases that lead us to overestimate the dangers of unchecked
presidential power. Our primate brains exaggerate highly visible risks that fill us
with a sense of dread and loss of control, so we may decline to cede more power to
the president even when more power is needed.
Fair enough in the abstract but Posner and Vermuele fail to provide a single
compelling example that might lead you to lament our allegedly atavistic
tyrannophobia. And they seem oblivious to the fact that those same irrational
biases drive the perceived need for emergency government at least as
much as they do hostility towards it . Highly visible public events like the 9/11
attacks also instill dread and a perceived loss of control, even if all the available
evidence shows that such incidents are vanishingly rare. The most recent year for
which the U.S. State Department has data, 2009, saw just 25 U.S. noncombatants
worldwide die from terrorist strikes. I know of no evidence suggesting that
unchecked executive power is what stood between us and a much larger
death toll .
Posner and Vermuele argue that only the executive unbound can address
modernitys myriad crises. But they spend little time exploring whether
unconstrained power generates the very emergencies that the executive branch
uses to justify its lack of constraint. Discussing George H.W. Bushs difficulties
convincing Congress and the public that the 1991 Gulf Wars risks were worth it,
they comment, in retrospect it might seem that he was clearly right. Had that war
been avoided, though, there would have been no mass presence of U.S. troops on
Saudi soil Osama bin Ladens principal recruiting device, according to Paul
Wolfowitz and perhaps no 9/11.
Posner and Vermuele are slightly more perceptive when it comes to the home front,
letting drop as an aside the observation that because of the easy-money policy that
helped inflate the housing bubble, the Fed is at least partly responsible for both the
financial crisis of 2008-2009 and for its resolution. Oh, well I guess were even,
then.
Sometimes, the authors are so enamored with the elegant economic models they
construct that they cant be bothered to check their work against
observable reality . At one point, attempting to show that separation of powers is
inefficient, they analogize the Madisonian scheme to a market in which two firms
must act in order to supply a good, concluding that the extra transaction costs of
cooperation make the consumer (taxpayer) no better off and probably worse off
than she would be under the unitary system.
But the government-as-firm metaphor is daffy . In the Madisonian vision,
inefficiency isnt a bug, its a feature a check on the facility and excess of lawmaking the diseases to which our governments are most liable, per Federalist
No. 62. If the firm in question also generates public bads like unnecessary
federal programs and destructive foreign wars and if the consumer (taxpayer)
has no choice about whether to consume them he might well favor constraints
on production.
From Franklin Roosevelt onward, weve had something close to vertical integration
under presidential command. Whatever benefits that system has brought, its
imposed considerable costs not least over 100,000 U.S. combat deaths
in the resulting presidential wars . That system has also encouraged hubristic
occupants of the Oval Office to burnish their legacies by engaging in humanitarian
war an oxymoron, according to Posner. In a sharply argued 2006 Washington
Post op-ed, he noted that the Iraq War had killed tens of thousands of innocents and
observed archly, polls do not reveal the opinions of dead Iraqis.
No impact---flex is self-defeating
2AC No Impact
Theories of fourth gen warfare wrong- historically inaccurate,
empty concept, and doesnt describe the current WOT
Echevarria 05
(Antulio J. II, Director of Research, Director of National Security Affairs, and Acting
Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department at the Strategic
Studies Institute, November, FOURTH-GENERATION WAR AND OTHER MYTHS, p. 25, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub632.pdf) /wyo-mm
Fourth Generation War (4GW) emerged in the late 1980s, but has become
popular due to recent twists in the war in Iraq and terrorist attacks
worldwide. Despite reinventing itself several times, the theory has several
fundamental flaws that need to be exposed before they can cause harm
to U.S. operational and strategic thinking. A critique of 4GW is both fortuitous
and important because it also provides us an opportunity to attack other
unfounded assumptions that could influence U.S. strategy and military doctrine. In
brief, the theory holds that warfare has evolved through four
generations: 1) the use of massed manpower, 2) firepower, 3) maneuver, and
now 4) an evolved form of insurgencythat employs all available networkspolitical,
economic, social, militaryto convince an opponents decisionmakers that their
strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly. The notion of 4GW first
appeared in the late 1980s as a vague sort of out of the box thinking, and it
entertained every popular conjecture about future warfare. However, instead of
examining the way terrorists belonging to Hamas or Hezbollah (or now Al Qaeda)
actually behave, it misleadingly pushed the storm-trooper ideal as the
terrorist of tomorrow. Instead of looking at the probability that such
terrorists would improvise with respect to the weapons they usedbox
cutters, aircraft, and improvised explosive devicesit posited high-tech
wonder weapons. The theory went through a second incarnation when
the notion of nontrinitarian war came into vogue; but it failed to
examine that notion critically. The theory also is founded on myths about
the so-called Westphalian system and the theory of blitzkrieg. The
theory of 4GW reinvented itself once again after September 11, 2001
(9/11), when its proponents claimed that Al Qaeda was waging a 4GW
against the United States. Rather than thinking critically about future
warfare, the theorys proponents became more concerned with
demonstrating that they had predicted the future. While their
recommendations are often rooted in common sense, they are undermined
by being tethered to an empty theory . What we are really seeing in the
war on terror, and the campaign in Iraq and elsewhere, is that the increased
dispersion and democratization of technology, information, and
finance brought about by globalization has given terrorist groups
greater mobility and access worldwide. At this point, globalization seems to
aid the nonstate actor more than the state, but states still play a central role in
the support or defeat of terrorist groups or insurgencies. We would do well to
abandon the theory of 4GW altogether, since it sheds very little, if any,
light on this phenomenon.
As first illustrated by the military strategist Colonel John Boyd, constitutional decision-making in the realm of war
powers in the fourth generation should consider the implications of the OODA Loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, and
Act.44 In the era of fourth-generational warfare, quick reactions, proceeding through the OODA Loop rapidly, and
disrupting the enemy's OODA loop are the keys to victory. "In order to win," Colonel Boyd suggested, "we should
operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries."145 In the words of Professor Creveld, "[b]oth
organizationally and in terms of the equipment at their disposal, the armed forces of the world will have to adjust
themselves to this situation by changing their doctrine, doing away with much of their heavy equipment and
circumstances where war is undesirable (which is, admittedly, most of the time, especially against other nation-
In America's
current situation , however, in the midst of the conflict with al-Qaeda and other
No impact
Col. Dr. Frans Osinga, 2007; Royal Netherlands Air Force;
immediately apparent what the equivalent actors the terroristcriminal symbiosis of John Robb are to the various Sunni and Shiite rogues perpetrating the daily atrocities in the
streets of Baghdad or the to gangs in Columbia and Nigeria.
Theoretically flawedEchevarria 05
(Antulio J. II, Director of Research, Director of National Security Affairs, and Acting
Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department at the Strategic
Studies Institute, November, FOURTH-GENERATION WAR AND OTHER MYTHS, p. 25, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub632.pdf) /wyo-mm
This monograph argues that we need to drop the theory of 4GW altogether;
it is fundamentally and hopelessly flawed , and creates more confusion than
it eliminates. To be sure, the concept rightly takes issue with the networkcentric
vision of future warfare for being too focused on technology and for overlooking
the countermeasures an intelligent, adaptive enemy might employ. 2 However,
the model of 4GW has serious problems of its own: it is based on poor
history and only obscures what other historians, theorists, and analysts
already have worked long and hard to clarify. Some 4GW proponents, such
as Colonel Thomas Hammes, author of The Sling and the Stone, see the theory
as little more than a vehicle, a tool, to generate a vital dialogue aimed at
correcting deficiencies in U.S. military doctrine, training, and organization.3
For his part, Hammes is to be commended for his willingness to roll up his sleeves
and do the hard work necessary to promote positive change. However, the tool
that he employs undermines his credibility. In fact, the theory of 4GW
only undermines the credibility of anyone who employs it in the hope of
inspiring positive change. Change is taking place despite, not because of, this
theory. Put differently, if the old adage is true that correctly identifying the problem
is half the solution, then the theorists of 4GW have made the problem twice as
hard as it should be.
Republican, although at different rates of acceleration. The second current has been the relentless campaign of the right wing of
the Republican Party since 1981 to steer the capacities of our national government toward the fulfillment of a conservative social,
economic, and foreign policy agenda. Together, the growing concentration of executive power and the
perfect storm has put the design of our democratic republic at risk, upending many of the norms and
informal institutional practices that have helped to sustain the Madisonian checks and balances in our national government, at
least since the end of World War II. The campaign for partisan predominance has sometimes entailed the assertion of
congressional or judicial power in constitutionally dubious waysmost notably, the impeachment of President Clinton and the
Supreme Courts decision in Bush v. Gore. Its gravest implications for day-to-day governance, however, arise from the
conjoining of partisanship with the attempted aggrandizement of presidential authority. In order to further its
claims of presidential authority arguably more dubious than any since the end of the Vietnam War. After the Republicans took
control of Congress in 1994, President Clinton likewise made claims for the presidential control of domestic regulatory policy
making that were nearly unprecedented in substance and certainly unparalleled in volumehoping, no doubt, to reassert his
relevance on the national political stage. The Clinton-era developments illustrate one of the great
States and presumably the Soviet Union made agreements throughout the Cold War
with foreign friends, backed by the promise to use force if necessary.
Some of these arrangements were concluded by Executive Agreement,
open or secret; others were simply off the record. Some agreements allowed for
American bases on the ally's territory, some even for positioning nuclear weapons there. In light of this, Ely may still
be right in saying that the United States is party to no agreement that binds it, automatically and without
But the multiplication of agreements and
troops and pre-positioned nuclear weapons, almost all without initial
congressional oversight, meant that the Executive alone, based on an
exigency theory, had effectively committed the nation to probable war in
the event these troops or bases or allies were attacked. A few critics warned of this problem,
n104 but most observers seemed focused on the tactical advantages of
our having lined up new allies. Surprisingly, Ely's expansion of the "repelling sudden attacks"
constitutional deliberation, to go to war for an ally.
formula
n105
n103
might well permit most of these wars, authorized in the first instance on the president's say-so alone.
[*1743] For the most part, however, Ely consistently argues that
surely as the Johnson Administration was brought down by its bull-headed escalation. On many occasions since
the Cold War-era interventions were different from the presidential wars of a simpler time. Jefferson may have
violated the Constitution in ordering ships against the pirates of the Barbary Coast, and Polk certainly did in
overzealously [*1744] ordering troops into Mexico, n110 but both episodes were essentially one-shot deals. By
contrast, Presidents leading America in the Cold War possessed greater institutional strength. The bureaucratic and
budget revolutions of the New Deal and World War II had strengthened their hands. They commanded a huge,
powerfully armed Navy and a standing Army (still a novelty at the time), a Department of Defense that received a
fair percentage of the GDP, and a national security apparatus that included far-reaching intelligence and covert
operations capacities. Allowing this strengthened postwar Executive to assume war powers risked not only an
imprudent war here or there in the "American Lake," but large-scale imbalances in our system of limited
borrowing required to finance it all. n111 If the rationale for these abuses was ever strong, it is dissipated now that the Cold War has ended.
Foreign policy thinkers correctly warn that the world remains dangerous,
but few of them, and no lawyers, would argue that vigilance against this
danger requires an unchecked Executive.
2AC Executive CP
will be speaking at Columbia Law School, at the invitation of the Law Review editors who worked on our two articles
in 2012. Over the weekend, we also finalized a new article, which Professor Dorf briefly described here yesterday. In
it, we extend our ongoing analysis of the constitutional issues surrounding the debt ceiling. The short-hand versions
of the two main sections of the article are: (1) Yes, there really is a trilemma, and (2) No, the debt ceiling is still not
binding, even if everyone knows that they are creating a trilemma when they pass the spending and taxing laws.
The latter point is important because already-existing trilemmas (such as the one that Congress and the President
faced last month, before the Republicans capitulated by passing their "Debt Ceiling Amnesia Act") do not exist when
there are no appropriated funds for the President to spend. (Strictly speaking, there would be a trilemma if even the
minimal level of emergency spending required by law during a government shutdown could only be financed by
borrowing in excess of the debt ceiling. But given that most of the tax code is enacted on a continuing basis -- that
is, unlike spending, tax provisions generally do not expire on a particular date -- there will generally be enough
money coming in to finance emergency operations without having to borrow.) Every spending/taxing agreement,
therefore, potentially necessitates issuing enough net new debt to require an increase in the debt ceiling. When that
happens, one could invoke something like the "last in time" rule, but we conclude that the problem should not be
the
more fundamental question is how to preserve the separation of powers. As
we point out, Congress might actually want to give away its legislative powers ,
thus putting the political blame on the President for unpopular cuts (a point
resolved by relying upon a legal canon that is generally used for rationalizing inconsistent laws. Rather,
that Professor Scott Bauries at the University of Kentucky College of Law calls "learned legislative helplessness") --
but their desire to pass the buck is actually all the more reason not to let
them do so. With great power comes great responsibility.
political capital. His solid electoral victory means he initially will receive high public support and strong backing
from fellow Congressional partisans, a combination that will allow him much leeway in his presidential appointments
and with his policy agenda. Obama probably enjoys the prospect of a happier honeymoon during his first year than
did George W. Bush, who entered office amidst continuing controversy over the 2000 election outcome.
Presidents usually employ power to disrupt the political order they inherit
in order to reshape it according to their own agendas. Stephen Skowronek argues that presidents
disrupt systems, reshape political landscapes, and pass to successors leadership challenges that are different from
have become more entrenched and elaborate (Drucker 1995) while presidential powers through increased use of
executive orders and legislative delegation (Howell 2003) have also grown. The presidency has more powers in the
early 21st century but also faces more entrenched coalitions of interests, lawmakers, and bureaucrats whose
agendas often differ from that of the president. This is an invitation for an energetic president and that seems to
describe Barack Obama to engage in major ongoing battles to impose his preferences.
comments about dictatorial powers, and Republicans warned of an end to civil liberties as we know them.
President Clinton is running roughshod over our Constitution, said thenHouse Majority Leader Dick Armey.
Indeed,
Congressmen and private citizens besiege the President with demands [*58] that action be taken
on various issues. n273 To make matters worse, once a president has signed an executive order,
he often makes it impossible for a subsequent administration to undo his action without enduring
the political fallout of such a reversal. For instance, President Clinton issued a slew of executive orders on
environmental issues in the weeks before he left office. n274 Many were controversial and the need for the policies
he instituted was debatable. n275 Nevertheless, President Bush found himself unable to reverse the orders without
invoking the ire of environmentalists across the country. n276 A policy became law by the action of one
man without the healthy debate and discussion in Congress intended by the Framers. Subsequent
presidents undo this policy and send the matter to Congress for such debate only at their own
peril. This is not the way it is supposed to be.
Executive position insist that nuclear weapons [*2484] are not constitutionally unique. n74 In
support of their claim, nothing in the text of the Constitution indicates a special classification for
particularly destructive weaponry, nor does the Constitution allow the Congress to override the
President's choice of weapons. n75 Decisions regarding the type of weapons used in war are
considered tactical--of a type supposed to be well within the scope of the Commander in Chief's
power. n76 Furthermore, no congressional law or judicial decision has drawn an instructive
distinction between nuclear and conventional weaponry. n77 Such a distinction would require
artificial constructions distinguishing weapons systems that, despite differences of magnitude
and technology, are basically designed to do the same thing. However, the lack of textual
references to nuclear weapons in the Constitution does not adequately resolve the question of
nuclear war authority. Although nuclear weapons as weapons are indistinguishable in literal
constitutional terms, their uniquely pernicious and lingering effects may nevertheless define their
offensive use as a quintessential act of war and thus constitutionally place them within the sphere
of congressional war power via the War Powers Clause. As critics have noted, there currently
exists no source of constitutional authority or judicial reasoning that would resolve this debate in
favor of either side. n78
The recent history of signing statements demonstrates how public opinion can effectively check presidential
2AC No Solvency
Executive action alone doesnt solve --- doesnt provide
sufficient reassurances
McKelvey, 11 [Benjamin, JD Candidate, Senior Editorial Board, Vanderbilt Journal
of Transnational Law, Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of Suspected
Terrorists: The Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing Power, Vanderbilt Journal
of Transnational Law, November, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1353,
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/2012/06/due-process-rights-and-the-targeted-killingof-suspected-terrorists-the-unconstitutional-scope-of-executive-killing-power/]
The Obama Administrations Reassurances Are Circular and Unsatisfactory The Obama
Administration has addressed the controversy over targeted killing in an effort to assuage concerns over the programs
the Administrations
explanations do little but reiterate the gaping hole in guaranteed due process
protections if Americans are targeted with lethal force.163 In fact, the Administrations attempts to
justify the current response emphasize the desperate need for a clear
constitutionality, including concerns over due process protections.162 However,
what
mechanisms are in place to prevent the unsafe and irresponsible use of
this extraordinary power? Asserting that the program is legal and
responsible without substantiating this assertion rests on notions of
program is legal and responsible.171 But this response only begs the question over targeted killing:
provides no
comply with rules of classified information and covert action, the explanations are
conveyed in limited, abstract, and often awkward terms. They usually raise more questions than they answerand secrecy rules
often preclude the administration from responding to follow-up questions, criticisms, and
charges. As a result, much of what the administration says about its secret
warabout civilian casualties, or the validity of its legal analysis, or the
quality of its internal deliberations seems incomplete, self-serving, and ultimately
non-credible . These trust-destroying tendencies are exacerbated by its persistent resistance to transparency demands from Congress, from
the press, and from organizations such as the aclu that have sought to know more about the way of the knife through Freedom of Information Act
requests.
2AC Delay
Delay executive orders take years
Mayer-prof political science-1 Kenneth, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and
Presidential Power, p. 61, http://www.questiaschool.com/read/103282967?title=With%20the%20Stroke%20of%20a
%20Pen%3a%20Executive%20Orders%20and%20Presidential%20Power)
In contemporary practice, executive orders typically either originate from the advisory structures within the
For
particularly complex or far-reaching orders, the White House will solicit
comment and suggestions from affected agencies on wording and
substantive content. Simple executive orders navigate this process in a few weeks; complex
Executive Office of the President or percolate up from executive agencies desirous of presidential action.
orders can take years , and can even be derailed over an inability to
obtain the necessary consensus or clearances.
Law School, where he teaches and writes about national security law, presidential
power, cybersecurity, international law, internet law, foreign relations law, and
conflict of laws. Before coming to Harvard, Professor Goldsmith served as Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel from 20032004, and Special Counsel to
the Department of Defense from 20022003. Professor Goldsmith is a member of
the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, Why the
Administration Needs to Get Congress on Board for Its Stealth War
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/why-the-administration-needs-to-get-congresson-board-for-its-stealth-war/]
I disagree with Steves claim that we dont know how the government conceives of its authority or the limits on it. The
administration has told us a lot about that in speeches, papers, leaks, and
more, though of course it could give us much more detail. Steve correctly says we neednt trust the governments words. But
note that Steves proposed remedy is a more comprehensive public defense by the Executive Branch. To which one can ask:
public
defense?
of powers can help . One way to make the presidents secret actions and decisions
and authorities legitimate and
on them. GTMO detentions became more legitimate and less controversial after another branch of government, the judiciary,
looked at them and largely agreed with the executives assessment. I dont think judicial review is even conceivably available for
most of our stealth war. But congressional review is. As I once wrote: [A] different adversarial branch of government Congress
can play an analogous role. The congressional intelligence and arms services committees know a lot about the presidents targeting
make Congress
distrust
is to
authorization for the tactics it is now deploying in the war on terrorism. I know, this approach is risky; secrets can spill out;
Congress might give too much or too little authority; and the administration will be tagged with the legacy of making war
permanent. There are plenty of excuses for not forging congressional approval, all of them premised on short-term thinking and a
remarkable paucity of executive branch leadership. At some point soon the pain of not engaging Congress will be greater than the
pain of engaging Congress, and at that point the administration will wish it had gone to Congress sooner.
2AC States CP
drones into the national airspace is done in a manner that supports and
maintains the U.S. government's ability to secure the airspace and
addresses privacy concerns." With special capabilities and enhanced equipment, drones are able to
conduct detailed surveillance, obtaining high-resolution pictures and videos, peering inside high-level windows and
through solid barriers, such as fences, trees, and even walls.
their size, how high they can fly, and their ability to operate
undetected in urban and rural environments. Many people will have no idea that they are subject to surveillance by
small, unmanned vehicles. In addition, drones can track multiple targets across a distance of hundreds of miles and
gather sensitive, personal information using infrared cameras, heat sensors, GPS, automated license-plate readers,
and other sensors. Of course, there is no dispute that drones can play an important role in rescue operations. They
may also be useful for news-gathering. But these beneficial uses should not obscure the very real risks to privacy
created by unmanned aerial vehicles loaded with surveillance technology. Freedom of Information Act cases
pursued by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) reveal that drones may also have the ability to intercept
electronic communications and engage in facial recognition. For these reasons, more than 100 experts and civilliberties organizations petitioned the FAA to develop privacy rules for drones. The FAA denied the petition even after
Congress told the federal agency to develop a "comprehensive plan" for the deployment of drones in civil airspace.
So EPIC has sued the agency to help ensure that appropriate privacy rules are established. We do not believe that a
voluntary "best practices" approach is the right way to establish meaningful privacy safeguards. If the FAA has the
authority to establish legal rules for drone safety, it also has the authority to establish legal rules to limit drone
surveillance. In response to increasing public questions, many states are already enacting laws to limit drone
activities. Most recently, Florida passed a law prohibiting the use of drones to intentionally record images of people
on private property if a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. The law applies to law enforcement and civilian
individuals, and provides civil damages and injunctive relief. These efforts should be encouraged, and
before
sovereignty of airspace of the United States. (2) A citizen of the United States has a public
right of transit through the navigable airspace.40 A navigable airspace is defined as airspace above the minimum
altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations under this subpart . . . including airspace needed to ensure safety in the
takeoff and landing of aircraft.41 The statute places the Federal Aviation Administration in the position of defining
the boundaries of navigable airspace, which it has set at the low end as being 1,000 feet above the highest nearby
obstacles in congested areas and 500 feet above ground level in other, uncongested, areas.42 Pathways to landing
preempt regulations that would impose a patchwork of controls over manned flight operations.45 How far the
federal government can go, or, more precisely, how low the federal government can go for purposes of aviation
regulation, remains a highly contested question.
1AR Perception
Even if the CP is symbolic action it doesnt access our federal
action arguments
Dernbach Professor of Law, Widener University Law School 2002 John Buffalo
state/local government can impose restrictions on the agencies for which it's responsible," an FAA spokesperson
said in an emailed statement. Members in the House and Senate introduced bills in the previous Congress that
would have required police everywhere in the country to obtain a warrant before using drones for surveillance, but
the bills died at the end of the year. "In the states that don't require warrants, it's pretty much a Wild West" in terms
of what's allowed, says Jay Stanley, senior policy analyst at the American Civil Liberties Union. "There's nothing
stopping a police department from using [drones] in all kinds of ways to spy, except for the Constitution." Within
that unregulated "Wild West," police have very different approaches to their drone programs. One of the longestrunning law enforcement drone programs is at the Mesa County Sheriff's Office in Colorado. Ben Miller, its director,
says the department has a 17-page policy that outlines when and how it can use drones and for how long it retains
data. The department has never run a surveillance mission with its drones, Miller says, which are generally used for
search-and-rescue and crime-scene photography. "If we had a need to look into an area where someone would have
a legitimate expectation of privacy, we'd get a warrant," he says. Colorado is one of the states without any
legislation about drones at all, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures, which means that the
limitations on the Mesa County drone program were instituted at the department's prerogative. Unlike the Mesa
County Sheriff's Office, some law enforcement agencies have been less than forthcoming with their drone
police department said the drone was meant for helping bomb technicians access hard-to-reach places, but left the
door open for using the drone to address "dangers such as active shooters, hostage taking, or other such tactical
required police to obtain a warrant to fly drones in any event other than an "emergency situation." But Gov. Jerry
Brown vetoed it in September, because he said the exceptions the bill allowed "appear to be too narrow." While
advocates are worried that law enforcement could use drones in ways that violate citizens' privacy, there's little
fear that they're being abused yet. "Safety restrictions are so strict that most police departments are still using
them in quite limited ways," the ACLU's Stanley said. "This is still an issue of looking down the road to what we
know is coming." The technology is new enough that police groups are still grappling with its implications and
limitations. "We're doing some research right now to come up with some model policy," said John Thompson, deputy
executive director of the National Sheriffs' Association. "We don't have a statement or opinion on it at this point."
Miller, who runs the drone program at the sheriff's office in Mesa County, says he often hears from other law
enforcement agencies who need help getting their drone program off the ground. But there's no formal
coordination: "It's all very word-of-mouth," he said, and suggested that others find him simply by searching the
Internet. For the time being, privacy advocates are not focusing on fighting for federal legislation. "For activists, it's
generally easier to do things at the local and state level," says Nadia Kayyali of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a
privacy and free speech advocacy organization. "Any fight at the local level is more likely to see results, but also
does take a much more significant investment in time."
national rules, because it makes it easier youve got one rule wherever
you are. It also means that the rules apply to federal law enforcement ,
said Bohm, referring to the FBI and other federal enforcement agencies
that would be subject to restrictions, as well. That said, we also sort of live in
this reality where Congress is not moving on drone legislation right now and my
understanding is that were not really expecting it to move, so into that void steps
the states.
primacy, the federal presence in civilian drones and privacy, though minimal, has been on the rise for some time now. This began
with a tiny shift in the FAAs responsibilities. By dint of the Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act of 2012
(FMRA), Congress instructed the FAA to lead several other executive branch agencies in a consequential, tight-timeframe project:
to devise, by no later than late 2015, rules for the safe and wider use of drones inside the United States.27 This was to be a
technical, logistical endeavor; the statutes drone provisions nowhere mentioned privacy.28 That did not stop the agency from
dipping a toe into privacy waters, if somewhat tentatively and at times inconsistently. On one hand, the agency scrupulously
disclaims authority to delve deeply into privacy, instead emphasizing the FAAs longstanding focus on aviation safety. On the other
hand, aviation officials naturally accept that drones pose undeniable privacy challenges, and the dividing line between safety and
the FAA has opted for a rather privacyopportunistic stance. It has put the concept to good use when needed, for example, to explain the agencys slow
progress, in keeping to FMRAs quixotically fast calendar. And in one quite narrow context, the FAA has separately
added privacy to its traditional slate of activities , if only in limited fashion, while making no
privacy is often blurry. Having all this in mind,
The impetus for all this was, ironically enough, FMRA itself. Among many other things, the statute called for limited drone flight at special
test ranges, in advance of the 2015 deadline for broader drone integration. A new fleet of flying robots couldnt be catapulted into American airspace overnight; the policy and logistical
obstacles obviously were far too numerous and far too difficult for that. FMRA therefore called for a gradual transition, during which the FAA would run a type of beta-testing program.
Drones would fly under controlled conditions, on an interim basis, and furnish data needed to resolve some of the tougher dilemmas posed by more widespread flight. 29 The initiative
would go forward at six test ranges, which had to be selected by a date certainon or about August 12, 2012, as the leading drone advocacy group interpreted FMRAs text. The outfit
therefore complained when that date came and went, though without the FAAs having named any of its six proving grounds.30 In a response sent one month afterwards, the agencys
acting administrator, Michael Huerta, interpreted FMRA differently, and denied having missed any legally set deadline. But Huerta nevertheless justified the slower pace. Privacy
concerns have surfaced as a result of increased [drone] usage, he explained, and this necessitates an extensive review of the privacy impacts of the test site program.31 The
message seemed clear enough. So far as the test sites were concerned, drone work (something very much within FAAs portfolio) was partially privacy work (something pretty well
outside of that portfolio, until then anyway). And privacy work was hard and time- consuming, enough to make for some slow sledding. The agency did make progress, and eventually
completed its privacy workup. The agency named six test range operators in late December 2013.32 And, echoing Huertas earlier letter, the FAAs release announcing the test site
selections also mentioned certain privacy considerations that the FAA had taken into account. In particular, the agency said it had developed privacy rules that test site operators
would have to follow.33 After draft rules were issued, the public was offered an opportunity to comment; the agency then weighed the publics input before formulating some quite
modest, final privacy requirements, in November 2013. They were essentially as follows: before proceeding, site operators would have to sign special contracts with the FAA. The
contracts in turn would obligate each site operator to keep records of all drone flights, and to require each operator to have a written plan for use and retention of drone-collected data.
Relatedly, the contracts also required the site operator: to maintain an openly available privacy policy, the contents of which were left up to the operator, and compliance with which
would be assessed by the operator annually, in a manner accessible to the public; to obey any applicable privacy laws, then existing and subsequently enacted; and to acknowledge that
the FAA might suspend test site authorization, upon the commencement of civil or criminal proceedings by the government, for violation of applicable privacy laws. The FAA might even
terminate the authorization outright, if litigation later demonstrates [that the test sites] operation was in violation of those laws.34 In this way, privacy became part of the FAAs longterm planning for unmanned aircraft. Recall that advocacy groups initially had pushed hard for the FAA to regulate privacy issues in a sweeping fashion. The agency resisted,35 but
acknowledged privacys obvious centrality to the enterprise of bringing more drones to more of Americas airspace. Thus the privacy rules, which, amidst a soup of qualifications and
legalese, still managed to back the FAA into some modest, temporary duties in ensuring solicitude for privacy rights. At least theoretically, for so long as the test sites are in business
until February 2017 at the latest36the FAA can yank the authorizations for sites where egregious privacy violations are committed.37 In that sense, the FAA tenuously has claimed a
new kind of privacy jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is no doubt narrow and time-limitedtwo things the agency has emphasized, in seeking to tamp down expectations and avoid setting
precedents. The final privacy rules govern only the six test sites. They do not commit the FAA to any forms of future privacy activity. Substantively, the rules also are pretty flimsy: site
operators must have privacy policies, but just how rigorous or forgiving is up to the operators alone. Operators also must agree to obey current or future privacy law, mostly the state
laws noted abovebut thats something operators would have to do anyway, whether or not the FAA ever took an interest in test range activities. Finally, the FAAs power to suspend or
rescind test site authorizations is conditioned upon prior action by state law enforcement or other regulators. A lawsuit by a private party, it seems, wont suffice. Regardless of who
brings the case, proving a privacy violation to the FAAs satisfaction might well take considerable time and effort, maybe longer than a given test sites life span. Swish all this around,
and the FAAs privacy standards (such as they are) start to seem pretty undemanding. Still, those standards do exist. Like the FAAs trotting out of privacy as justification for slowly
naming test ranges, they imply a subtle evolution in the FAAs job description, one occasioned by the singular complexity of domestic drone integration. This helps to explain why the
FAA seems to embrace and to run from the concept at the same time. In issuing final test-range rules, the agency stressed the FAAs abiding goal of provid[ing] the safest, most efficient
aerospace system in the world, [something that] does not include regulating privacy.38 Elsewhere in the same document, the agency explained that, by imposing privacy standards on
test site operators, the FAA sought not to enter the privacy arena, but instead only to inform the dialogue among policymakers, privacy advocates, and industry regarding the impact of
UAS technologies on privacy.39 It was literally true that the FAA wasnt making any new rules, and thus not regulating privacy; but clearly it also wasnt rejecting privacy policy as
none of its business. The FAAs roadmap for domestic drone integration, also issued last year, sounds this note: it too denies a regulatory function for the FAA in privacy, while
Congress apparently has caught on to this. Consistent with the above, it quietly
has reaffirmed the FAAs small interest in privacy matters , while nevertheless
acknowledging at least some FAA efforts in the area.40
emphasizing that the agencys job function remains essentially unchanged. Explanatory materials appended to the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2014 observed the primary mission of the FAA is to protect the safety of civil aviation and provide an efficient
national airspace. Nothing in the [document] is intended to change that mission or hinder the FAAs ability to fulfill it.41 These
magic words uttered, Congress still went on to fiddle with the FAAs mission, if only just a little, by asking for it to undertake further
privacy research: Without adequate safeguards, expanded use of UAS and their integration into the national airspace raise a host of
should address the application of existing privacy law to UAS integration; identify gaps in existing law, especially with regard to the
primacy, the federal presence in civilian drones and privacy, though minimal, has been on the rise for some time now. This began
with a tiny shift in the FAAs responsibilities. By dint of the Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act of 2012
(FMRA), Congress instructed the FAA to lead several other executive branch agencies in a consequential, tight-timeframe project:
to devise, by no later than late 2015, rules for the safe and wider use of drones inside the United States.27 This was to be a
technical, logistical endeavor; the statutes drone provisions nowhere mentioned privacy.28 That did not stop the agency from
dipping a toe into privacy waters, if somewhat tentatively and at times inconsistently. On one hand, the agency scrupulously
disclaims authority to delve deeply into privacy, instead emphasizing the FAAs longstanding focus on aviation safety. On the other
hand, aviation officials naturally accept that drones pose undeniable privacy challenges, and the dividing line between safety and
privacy is often blurry. Having all this in mind,
opportunistic stance. It has put the concept to good use when needed, for example, to explain the agencys slow
progress, in keeping to FMRAs quixotically fast calendar. And in one quite narrow context, the FAA has separately
added privacy to its traditional slate of activities , if only in limited fashion, while making no
commitments to follow suit later.
The impetus for all this was, ironically enough, FMRA itself. Among many other things, the statute called for limited drone flight at special
test ranges, in advance of the 2015 deadline for broader drone integration. A new fleet of flying robots couldnt be catapulted into American airspace overnight; the policy and logistical
obstacles obviously were far too numerous and far too difficult for that. FMRA therefore called for a gradual transition, during which the FAA would run a type of beta-testing program.
Drones would fly under controlled conditions, on an interim basis, and furnish data needed to resolve some of the tougher dilemmas posed by more widespread flight. 29 The initiative
would go forward at six test ranges, which had to be selected by a date certainon or about August 12, 2012, as the leading drone advocacy group interpreted FMRAs text. The outfit
therefore complained when that date came and went, though without the FAAs having named any of its six proving grounds.30 In a response sent one month afterwards, the agencys
acting administrator, Michael Huerta, interpreted FMRA differently, and denied having missed any legally set deadline. But Huerta nevertheless justified the slower pace. Privacy
concerns have surfaced as a result of increased [drone] usage, he explained, and this necessitates an extensive review of the privacy impacts of the test site program.31 The
message seemed clear enough. So far as the test sites were concerned, drone work (something very much within FAAs portfolio) was partially privacy work (something pretty well
outside of that portfolio, until then anyway). And privacy work was hard and time- consuming, enough to make for some slow sledding. The agency did make progress, and eventually
completed its privacy workup. The agency named six test range operators in late December 2013.32 And, echoing Huertas earlier letter, the FAAs release announcing the test site
selections also mentioned certain privacy considerations that the FAA had taken into account. In particular, the agency said it had developed privacy rules that test site operators
would have to follow.33 After draft rules were issued, the public was offered an opportunity to comment; the agency then weighed the publics input before formulating some quite
modest, final privacy requirements, in November 2013. They were essentially as follows: before proceeding, site operators would have to sign special contracts with the FAA. The
contracts in turn would obligate each site operator to keep records of all drone flights, and to require each operator to have a written plan for use and retention of drone-collected data.
Relatedly, the contracts also required the site operator: to maintain an openly available privacy policy, the contents of which were left up to the operator, and compliance with which
would be assessed by the operator annually, in a manner accessible to the public; to obey any applicable privacy laws, then existing and subsequently enacted; and to acknowledge that
the FAA might suspend test site authorization, upon the commencement of civil or criminal proceedings by the government, for violation of applicable privacy laws. The FAA might even
terminate the authorization outright, if litigation later demonstrates [that the test sites] operation was in violation of those laws.34 In this way, privacy became part of the FAAs longterm planning for unmanned aircraft. Recall that advocacy groups initially had pushed hard for the FAA to regulate privacy issues in a sweeping fashion. The agency resisted,35 but
acknowledged privacys obvious centrality to the enterprise of bringing more drones to more of Americas airspace. Thus the privacy rules, which, amidst a soup of qualifications and
legalese, still managed to back the FAA into some modest, temporary duties in ensuring solicitude for privacy rights. At least theoretically, for so long as the test sites are in business
until February 2017 at the latest36the FAA can yank the authorizations for sites where egregious privacy violations are committed.37 In that sense, the FAA tenuously has claimed a
new kind of privacy jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is no doubt narrow and time-limitedtwo things the agency has emphasized, in seeking to tamp down expectations and avoid setting
precedents. The final privacy rules govern only the six test sites. They do not commit the FAA to any forms of future privacy activity. Substantively, the rules also are pretty flimsy: site
operators must have privacy policies, but just how rigorous or forgiving is up to the operators alone. Operators also must agree to obey current or future privacy law, mostly the state
laws noted abovebut thats something operators would have to do anyway, whether or not the FAA ever took an interest in test range activities. Finally, the FAAs power to suspend or
rescind test site authorizations is conditioned upon prior action by state law enforcement or other regulators. A lawsuit by a private party, it seems, wont suffice. Regardless of who
brings the case, proving a privacy violation to the FAAs satisfaction might well take considerable time and effort, maybe longer than a given test sites life span. Swish all this around,
and the FAAs privacy standards (such as they are) start to seem pretty undemanding. Still, those standards do exist. Like the FAAs trotting out of privacy as justification for slowly
naming test ranges, they imply a subtle evolution in the FAAs job description, one occasioned by the singular complexity of domestic drone integration. This helps to explain why the
FAA seems to embrace and to run from the concept at the same time. In issuing final test-range rules, the agency stressed the FAAs abiding goal of provid[ing] the safest, most efficient
aerospace system in the world, [something that] does not include regulating privacy.38 Elsewhere in the same document, the agency explained that, by imposing privacy standards on
test site operators, the FAA sought not to enter the privacy arena, but instead only to inform the dialogue among policymakers, privacy advocates, and industry regarding the impact of
UAS technologies on privacy.39 It was literally true that the FAA wasnt making any new rules, and thus not regulating privacy; but clearly it also wasnt rejecting privacy policy as
none of its business. The FAAs roadmap for domestic drone integration, also issued last year, sounds this note: it too denies a regulatory function for the FAA in privacy, while
Congress apparently has caught on to this. Consistent with the above, it quietly
has reaffirmed the FAAs small interest in privacy matters , while nevertheless
acknowledging at least some FAA efforts in the area.40
emphasizing that the agencys job function remains essentially unchanged. Explanatory materials appended to the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2014 observed the primary mission of the FAA is to protect the safety of civil aviation and provide an efficient
national airspace. Nothing in the [document] is intended to change that mission or hinder the FAAs ability to fulfill it.41 These
magic words uttered, Congress still went on to fiddle with the FAAs mission, if only just a little, by asking for it to undertake further
privacy research: Without adequate safeguards, expanded use of UAS and their integration into the national airspace raise a host of
should address the application of existing privacy law to UAS integration; identify gaps in existing law, especially with regard to the
encompassing, state-law-preempting privacy statute. Exhibit A is Congresss command to the FAA to study privacy
issues further, following the agencys issuance of FAAenforced privacy rules for test sites; Exhibit B, the White
Houses order and forthcoming NTIA principles. The latter reportedly will not address all privacy dilemmas
associated with all forms of unmanned surveillance. Instead, after consulting with various stakeholders, NTIA
eventually will issue voluntary privacy guidelines, which in turn will apply to commercial drone operations only, and
which, as before, will reserve the defense of private privacy largely to background law.43 It is easy to imagine
Congress could
condition authorization to fly on a pledge to respect privacy. The FAA
might insist that before receiving permission to operate an unmanned
aircraft, a business or individual first would have to commit to observing
applicable privacy laws.44 Thereafter, the FAA would have discretion to rescind the operators flight
policy ideas that would keep the above architecture intact. By way of example,
credentials, upon submission of proof that a court or similar body has faulted the operator for serious privacy
violations under state law. The seriousness criterion here also couldand, so as not to jack up the cost of
deploying a critical technology too much, likely shouldbe made stiff enough so as to capture only the worst
any FAA measure affecting privacy. For example, hobbyists model aircraft are mostly exempted from FAA
regulation.46 Going forward, how you feel about the evident regulatory gap probably has to do with how you feel
about likely sources and locations of unmanned aerial surveillance. Thus, if you worry most about rampant
Quadcopter eavesdropping, then the above proposal might not do that much to assuage you; such machines
seemingly can be operated as model aircraft, and thus require no FAA license. Conversely, an FAA-based
oversight approach to privacy might help considerably, if you predict that the most intrusive surveillance
technologies will be paired with larger-sized dronesthat is, drones likely to come within the FAAs jurisdiction, and
to require operator certification and training.47 A proposal like the above (or one like it) would mean only
fashion, either. Instead the states would do the regulating, and afterwards, private litigants and state regulators
would do the litigating and state courts the adjudicating. The FAA would only get into the mix afterwards, and only
in the most deserving of cases. Of course, that the above or any other policy change would fit nicely with existing
Take the idea sketched out above. The largest companies have the greatest ability to acquire the most
sophisticated unmanned aircraft, and thus also to engage in the most far-reaching surveillance. It happens that
those same companies could be best situated to withstand the kinds of ex post remedies courts typically impose
upon rampant privacy violatorsinjunctions, money damages, and the like. In that respect, the scheme above
might prove helpful, by deterring the worst privacy violations not the marginal or the really bad, but the worstin
advance of wholesale domestic drone integration, and in advance of long and uncertain litigation in state courts.
(Col. Dawn M.K. Zoldi, USAF, is Chief of Operations Law at Headquarters Air Combat
Command. On the Front Lines of the Home Front: The Intersection of Domestic
Counterterrorism Operations and Drone Legislation
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2379143) Henge
B. Federal LegislationInformation Collection Against this backdrop of state legislative activity, federal
legislators have also introduced drone proposals. To a great extent, these mimic
state requirements with regards to prohibitions, exceptions, operational restrictions, and
violation ramifications.45 The Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance
Act of 2013 is short and simple, similar to several of the state bills. While it would apply to persons or
entities acting under the authority of the United States, the focus appears to be on law enforcement.46 As with
allowing for patrol of borders, exigent circumstances, danger to life, pursuit of fleeing felons, to prevent
destruction of evidence, and to thwart imminent terrorist attack .47 It also allows for civil liability
and injunction in the same terms used by most states, to obtain all appropriate relief to prevent or remedy a
violation of this Act.48
encompassing, state-law-preempting privacy statute. Exhibit A is Congresss command to the FAA to study privacy
issues further, following the agencys issuance of FAAenforced privacy rules for test sites; Exhibit B, the White
Houses order and forthcoming NTIA principles. The latter reportedly will not address all privacy dilemmas
associated with all forms of unmanned surveillance. Instead, after consulting with various stakeholders, NTIA
eventually will issue voluntary privacy guidelines, which in turn will apply to commercial drone operations only, and
which, as before, will reserve the defense of private privacy largely to background law.43 It is easy to imagine
Congress could
condition authorization to fly on a pledge to respect privacy. The FAA
policy ideas that would keep the above architecture intact. By way of example,
any FAA measure affecting privacy. For example, hobbyists model aircraft are mostly exempted from FAA
regulation.46 Going forward, how you feel about the evident regulatory gap probably has to do with how you feel
about likely sources and locations of unmanned aerial surveillance. Thus, if you worry most about rampant
Quadcopter eavesdropping, then the above proposal might not do that much to assuage you; such machines
seemingly can be operated as model aircraft, and thus require no FAA license. Conversely, an FAA-based
oversight approach to privacy might help considerably, if you predict that the most intrusive surveillance
technologies will be paired with larger-sized dronesthat is, drones likely to come within the FAAs jurisdiction, and
to require operator certification and training.47 A proposal like the above (or one like it) would mean only
fashion, either. Instead the states would do the regulating, and afterwards, private litigants and state regulators
would do the litigating and state courts the adjudicating. The FAA would only get into the mix afterwards, and only
in the most deserving of cases. Of course, that the above or any other policy change would fit nicely with existing
Take the idea sketched out above. The largest companies have the greatest ability to acquire the most
sophisticated unmanned aircraft, and thus also to engage in the most far-reaching surveillance. It happens that
those same companies could be best situated to withstand the kinds of ex post remedies courts typically impose
upon rampant privacy violatorsinjunctions, money damages, and the like. In that respect, the scheme above
might prove helpful, by deterring the worst privacy violations not the marginal or the really bad, but the worstin
advance of wholesale domestic drone integration, and in advance of long and uncertain litigation in state courts.
(Col. Dawn M.K. Zoldi, USAF, is Chief of Operations Law at Headquarters Air Combat
Command. On the Front Lines of the Home Front: The Intersection of Domestic
Counterterrorism Operations and Drone Legislation
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2379143) Henge
B. Federal LegislationInformation Collection Against this backdrop of state legislative activity, federal
legislators have also introduced drone proposals. To a great extent, these mimic
state requirements with regards to prohibitions, exceptions, operational restrictions, and
violation ramifications.45 The Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance
Act of 2013 is short and simple, similar to several of the state bills. While it would apply to persons or
entities acting under the authority of the United States, the focus appears to be on law enforcement.46 As with
allowing for patrol of borders, exigent circumstances, danger to life, pursuit of fleeing felons, to prevent
destruction of evidence, and to thwart imminent terrorist attack .47 It also allows for civil liability
and injunction in the same terms used by most states, to obtain all appropriate relief to prevent or remedy a
violation of this Act.48
arguing for state-by-state regulation of informationgathering that implicates First Amendment values does not preclude consideration of
federal data privacy protection along the lines of the European Unions Data Protection Directive,
information.48 Thus
which governs the way personal data is processed, moved, and stored.49 Third, this Essay does not intend to wrest
the Federal
Aviation Administration should use its licensing programs to solve perhaps
the biggest puzzle of drone regulation: how to provide notice or at least
transparency to those being observed so they can determine whether they
have been subjected to a privacy violation. Unlike surveillance by camera phone or most
safety or other basic aviation licensing matters from the Federal Aviation Administration. And
forms of CCTV, drone surveillance will often provide no visible notice to the watched party if the drone is high up in
the sky.50 As Representative Ed Markey proposed in a draft bill, the FAA could, as part of its licensing scheme,
require that those using drones for surveillance submit a data collection statement indicating when, where, and for
footage or data gathered about them. Both of these provisions are included in the proposed Markey bill.
Alternatively, or in addition to this scheme, the federal government could require drone radio frequency
identification (RFID) license plates to track the location of drones at any given time.52 Tracking drones is
essential to establishing whether a tort has occurred in any given state. Fourth, states should decriminalize the use
of basic privacy-protective technologies. It may surprise many to learn that a large number of states have anti-mask
laws that criminalize mask-wearing in public, except under certain circumstances.53 Such laws prevent individuals
from choosing to avoid surveillance in public places, inhibiting individuals expressive choices about whether to
remain anonymous. In a world of increasing surveillance, giving more agency to the watched will justify maintaining
protection of the expressive freedom of the watchers.
2AC Security K
2AC Framework
First, Our Interpretation: The resolution asks the question of
desirability of USFG action. The Role of ballot is to say yes or
no to the action and outcomes of the plan.
Second, is reasons to prefer:
(___) A. Aff Choice, any other framework or role of the ballot
moots 9 minutes of the 1ac
(___) B. It is predictable, the resolution demands USFG action
(___) C. It is fair, Weigh Aff Impacts and the method of the
Affirmative versus the Kritik, its the only way to test
competition and determine the desirability of one strategy
over another
Finally, It is a voter for competitive equityprefer our
interpretation, it allows both teams to compete, other roles of
the ballot are arbitrary and self serving
2AC Util
And, Evaluate consequences for your decisionany other
framing opens up the possibility for worse forms of violence
Jeffrey C. Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Director of the
Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Spring
2002, Dissent, Vol. 49, No. 2
As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah
Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts
political responsibility . The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a
kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see
that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what
one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with
morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such
tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral
good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a
world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of
powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from
the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially
immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose
certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as
much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the
effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most
significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is
often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of
communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be
sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the
effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and
historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It
alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it
undermines political effectiveness.
2AC Realism
States will inevitably competefailure to compete destabilizes
the international system and causes violence
Mearscheimer 2001
[John J., Prof. of Pol. Sci @ U. of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Warfare]
Great powers fear each other. They regard each other with suspicion, and
they worry that war might be in the offing. They anticipate danger. There is
little room for trust among states. For sure, the level of fear varies across time
and space, but it cannot be reduced to a trivial level. From the perspective of any
one great power, all other great powers are potential enemies. This point is
illustrated by the reaction of the United Kingdom and France to German
reunification at the end of the Col War. Despite the fact that these three states had
been close allies for almost forty-five years, both the United Kingdom and France
immediately began worrying about the potential danger of a united Germany . The
basis for this fear is that in a world where great powers have the capability to
attack each other and might have the motive to do so any state bent on
survival must be at least suspicious of other states and reluctant to trust
them. Add to this the 911 problem the absence of a central authority to which a
threatened state can turn for help and states have even greater incentive to fear
each other. Morever, there is no mechanism, other than the possible self-interest of
third parties, for punishing an aggressor. Because it is sometimes difficult to deter
potential aggressors, states have ample reason not to trust other states and to be
prepared for war with them. The possible consequences of falling victim to
aggression further amplify the importance of fear as a motivating force in
world politics. Great powers do not compete with each other as if international
marketplace. Political competition among states is a much more dangerous
business than mere economic intercourse, the former can lead to war, and war
often means mass killing on the battlefield as well as mass murder of
civilians. In extreme cases, war can even lead to the destruction of states . The
horrible consequences of war sometimes cause states to view each other
not just as competitors, but as potentially deadly enemies. Political
antagonism, in short, tends to be intense because the stakes are great. States in
the international system also aim to guarantee their own survival. Because
other states are potential threats, and because there is no higher authority to come
to their rescue when they dial 911, states cannot depend on others for their own
security. Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and
therefore it aims to provide for its own survival. In international politics, God
helps those who help themselves. This emphasis on self-help does not preclude
states from forming alliances. But alliances are only temporary marriages of
convenience: todays alliance partner might be tomorrows enemy, and todays
enemy might be tomorrows alliance partner. For example, the United States fought
with China and the Soviet Union against Germany and Japan in World War II, but
soon thereafter flip-flopped enemies and partners and allied with West Germany
and Japan against China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. States
operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own
self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of
other states, or the so-called international community. The reason is simple : it
pays to be selfish in a self-help world. This is true in the short term as well as
in the long term, because if a state loses in the short run, it might not be
around for the long haul. Apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of other
states, and a ware that they oeprate in a self-help system, states quickly
understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most
powerful state in the system. The stronger a state is relative to its
potential rivals, the less likely it is that any of those rivals will attack it
and threaten its survival. Weaker states will be reluctant to pick fights with more
powerful states because the weaker states are likely to suffer military defeat.
Indeed, the bigger the gap in power between any two states, the less likely
it is that the weaker will attack the stronger. Neither Canada nor Mexico, for
example, would countenance attacking the United States, which is far more
powerful than its neighbors. The ideal situation is to be the hegemon in the system.
As Immanuel Kant said, It is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to
arrive at a condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world, if
that were possible. Survival would then be almost guaranteed.
2AC Security K
No impact threat construction isnt sufficient to cause wars
Kaufman, Prof Poli Sci and IR U Delaware, 9
(Stuart J, Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli
Case, Security Studies 18:3, 400 434)
Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly
present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed. Ethnic narratives and
fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass
publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that
hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a
wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by
prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of
hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes
and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the
result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat
that results in violence.
A virtue of this symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why ethnic peace
is more common than ethnonationalist war. Even if hostile narratives, fears, and
opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites
skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group
lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile
narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization,
and a security dilemma.
Scenario generation has its origins in the Cold War when strategic analysts developed the method for helping to think
futuristically about driving forces, chains of events, or possible trigger points that might lead to conflict between the Warsaw
Pact and NATO, and how, if this occurred, the conflict might proceed. In essence, scenario generation was used to
plot logically plausible possibilities and then to model responses, strategic positioning
strategies, and to formulate war-fighting and contingency plans . Cold War scenario generation
was said to be so successful in modeling circumstances of possible nuclear confrontation with
devastating and mass annihilation outcomes, that policy makers were moved to develop the
doctrine of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) and various avoidance strategies to avert the possibility of
nuclear confrontation.64 The essence of scenario generation is defined by Geoff Coyle as a justified and traceable
sequence of events which might plausibly be imagined to occur in the future.65 Importantly, scenarios are not
forecasts, preferences or predictions, but plausible, challenging descriptions of what might
happenin the form of a set of stories about alternative futures .66 To this end, scenario analysis builds
on many of the techniques of the Delphi method. But rather than use intermediaries to design survey questionnaires, identify
experts and synthesize and interpret responses, scenario generation allows experts to develop scenarios
that lay bare assumptions and the rationale on which interpretations are made , and to
develop possible sketches of anticipated events and their probable time lines. The thinking
behind this is to allow those who utilize scenarios to make informed decisions and to evaluate
the scenarios generated relative to the assumptions on which they have been based. Apart from
the military, some of the first institutions to employ scenario generation were commercial organizations. The Royal Dutch Shell
Company, for example, pioneered scenario analysis under the auspices of three prominent individuals, Peter Schwartz, Kees van
der Heijden and Peter Checkland.67 However, despite some 30 years of scenario generation no formal models exist; indeed the
notion of formal techniques is actively resisted. Rather, scenario generation stresses creative, imaginary,
challenging discourses about possible futures by looking at the dominant drivers of societal
change and risk. These are normally categorized under the well known PEST acronym (political, economic, social and
technological factors) as the primary drivers of change and risk, and primary determinations of future worlds, processes and
events. Scenarios, however, are not used to write the future but to outline possibilities in
relation to key decisions that need to be taken today and of the possible future implications of
these decisions given a constantly changing environment. It is, in this sense, an attempt to
map possible trajectories and outcomes and logically construct images of cause and effect so
that the ramifications of decision making can be understood in terms of its collateral
implications and consequences. Peter Schwartz encapsulated the process with the provocative title of his book: The
art of the Long View.68 The precise methods associated with scenario generation are numerous and the method employed
normally contingent on the intended purpose. Angela Wilkinson and Esther Eidinow, for example, suggest that scenario
generation falls into four discrete categories: identified objectives, known constitutive / environmental elements; formally
mapped trajectories; scenarios generated. 2. Inductive Method: Development of a series of scenarios from an assemblage of a
series of possible events. 3. Incremental Approach: Develops images and maps and describes an official futureor the one the
organization thinks most likely to emerge, and then develops scenarios on the basis of decisions and how they will interact with
the official future and their possible consequences and effects. 4. Normative Approach: Starts with a set of characteristics of
assumed conditions, or a scenario framed in a forward time horizon, and works backwards to see what it requires (decisions,
events, processes, attributes) to get there and if this is feasible.69 Peter Schwartz suggested that just as novels have themes
which provide continuity, logical connections, and thus a central narrative enabling interpretation and assessment, scenarios too
need a theme. But what? Schwartz suggested several themes; challenge and response, for example: Perhaps Londons position
as a centre for financial services is challenged by Frankfurt or Tokyo; what are the drivers and uncertainties which will affect the
viability of a strategic response? Other themes suggested included winners and losers or infinite possibility. The theme is not
important per se, but a tool providing a catalyst or fulcrum via which to stress test the assumptions, the logicality of outcomes,
the implications of strategic decisions and the risks and opportunities that might present. As with other third generation
approaches, scenario analysis is not a panacea, offering both insights but also displaying limitations. It embraces lateral creative
thinking and challenges organizations (commercial, non-commercial and state based) to think about alternative futures or
events otherwise not anticipated. To the extent that it is able to do this successfully, it has obvious advantages for
contingency planning, risk identification, mitigation planning and risk avoidance. It thus
helps various commercial, state and non-commercial actors to navigate uncertainty and risk
environments rather than stumble upon them without due thought to management and
response. The normal caveats about such approaches apply, however: the quality of the analysis is directly proportionate to
the quality of the analysts; interpretative discretion if not managed and appropriately tested and checked, can derail the
construction of quality scenarios and their utility.
than fighting such a war of attrition aggressively is to pretend youre not in one while your enemy keeps on killing
you. Even the occupation of Iraq is a war of attrition. Were doing remarkably well, given the restrictions under
claims that were not for the frustration, deprivation, and misery of the Palestinian people, the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) would not commit acts of terrorism. A typical intellectual argument excusing PLO terror reasons:
Shying away from analyzing the motives for terror, or the political, economic and historical environments that
breed it, overlooks the often symbiotic relationship between a terrorist and the governments and policies he fights
against. Others go one step further and turn an explanation into a justification. Yassir Arafat, the Chairman of the
PLO Executive Committtee, argued: The use of the pro-Israeli media of the word terrorism does not intimidate us,
especially when it is used by forces that have colonialized peoples for hundreds of years, and accused freedom
fighters of being terrorists when they fought against occupation, terrorism and racial discrimination until they won
their independence. Regrettably, this justification has gained considerable support at the United Nations.
Benzion Netanyahu, the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, has written in response: The typical stratagem at
the United Nations, for example, has been to justify terrorism by calling it a struggle for national liberation. This is
perverse enough in itself, because terrorism is always unjustifiable, regardless of professed or real goals. But it is
perverse in another way. For the real goals of terrorists are in practice related to their methods. History has
repeatedly given us advance warning. Those who deliberately butcher women and children do not have liberation in
mind. It is not only that the ends of terrorists do not justify the means that they chose. It is that the choice of means
indicates what the true ends are. Far from being fighters for freedom, the terrorists are the forerunners of a new
tyranny. It is instructive to note that the French Resistance did not resort to the systematic killing of German women
and children, well within reach in occupied France. A few years later, in Algeria, the FLN showed no such restraint
against French occupation. France, of course, is today a democracy. Algeria is mearly another of the despotisms
purports to represent the Palestinian people, a group with options for non-violent political action and resources
including wealth and education. Yet the PLO deliberately engages in terrorist acts while eschewing all other means
of political redress. Any Arab leader showing the slightest inclination towards accommodation with Israel has risked
assassination. Thus, PLO terror should be recognized as a cause for, not the result of, Palestinian frustration,
desperation, and misery.
Yet this argument relies on Schmitts controversial model of politics, as outlined eloquently but unconvincingly in his
resolve conflicts in the courts or juridical system narrowly understood; at other times it is directed against any legal
legal devices
have undoubtedly played a positive role in taming or at least minimizing the
potential dangers of harsh political antagonisms . In the Cold War, for example,
international law contributed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts which otherwise
might have exploded into horrific violence , even if attempts to bring such conflicts
before an international court or tribunal probably would have failed .22 Second, Schmitt
regulation of intense conflict. The former argument is surely stronger than the latter. After all,
dwells on the legal inconsistencies that result from modifying the traditional state-centered system of international
law by expanding protections to non-state fighters. His view is that irregular combatants logically enjoyed no
protections in the state-centered Westphalian model. By broadening protections to include them, international law
helps undermine the traditional state system and its accompanying legal framework. Why is this troubling? The
most obvious answer is that Schmitt believes that the traditional state system is normatively superior to recent
attempts to modify it by, for example, extending international human rights protections to individuals against
states. 23 But what if we refuse to endorse his nostalgic preference for the traditional state system? Then a
sympathetic reading of the argument would take the form of suggesting that the project of regulating irregular
combatants by ordinary law must fail for another reason: it rests on a misguided quest to integrate incongruent
models of interstate relations and international law. We cannot, in short, maintain core features of the (statecentered) Westphalian system while extending ambitious new protections to non-state actors. This is a powerful
century England or the United States, for example, one quickly identifies liberal elements coexisting uneasily
alongside paternalistic and authoritarian (e.g., the law of slavery in the United States), monarchist, as well as
republican and communitarian moments. The same may be said of the legal moorings of the modern welfare state,
which arguably rest on a hodgepodge of socialist, liberal, and Christian and even Catholic (for example, in some
Schmitt identifies a deep tension between the classical quest for codified and stable law and the empirical reality of
a social world subject to permanent change: The tendency to modify or even dissolve classical [legal] conceptsis
general, and in view of the rapid change of the world it is entirely understandable (12). Schmitts postwar writings
include many provocative comments about what contemporary legal scholars describe as the dilemma of legal
obsolescence. 25 In The Partisan, he suggests that the great transformations and modifications in the
technological apparatus of modern warfare place strains on the aspiration for cogent legal norms capable of
regulating human affairs (17; see also 4850). Given the ever-changing character of warfare and the fast pace of
change in military technology, it inevitably proves difficult to codify a set of cogent and stable rules of war. The
Geneva Convention proviso that legal combatants must bear their weapons openly, for example, seems poorly
attuned to a world where military might ultimately depends on nuclear silos buried deep beneath the surface of the
earth, and not the success of traditional standing armies massed in battle on the open field. Or what does the
requirement mean of an insignia visible from afar in night battle, or in battle with the long-range weapons of
modern technology of war? (17). As I have tried to show elsewhere, these are powerful considerations deserving
Schmitt is probably right to argue that the enigma of legal obsolescence takes on special
seems uninterested in the
slightest possibility that we might successfully adapt the process of lawmaking to
our dynamic social universe. To be sure, he discusses the motorization of lawmaking in a fascinating
1950 publication, but only in order to underscore its pathological core.27 Yet one possible resolution
of the dilemma he describes would be to figure how to reform the process
whereby rules of war are adapted to novel changes in military affairs in order to
minimize the danger of anachronistic or out-of-date law. Instead, Schmitt
simply employs the dilemma of legal obsolescence as a battering ram
against the rule of law and the quest to develop a legal apparatus suited to the
special problem of irregular combatants.
of close scrutiny;
Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable
explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are
likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex,
they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most
analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations
theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of causality
since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war ; we should instead
redirect our activities toward discovering explanationsa term that implies multiple causes
of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.
It is also a
possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living , they believe
they do . And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not
been worth living, their future lives will be better . They may be mistaken about this.
utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself.
They may hold false expectations about the future. From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to
assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of ones
genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then
theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we
live better lives than we do. My
for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not
worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill
ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should
do, each one of us . My conjecture is that we should not commit suicide. The explanation
is simple. If I kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will
optimistic. Let us just
happen: ... suicide survivors confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such
as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to
of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by
committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).