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Stefan Bauschard

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DDI Backdoors - Gaurav

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

Notes
Encryption Back Doors
Encryption cracking refers to literally figuring out the codes being used to conduct the
exchange in order to intercept the exchanged communication.
Another way to access the communication is to have a back door security code that
would enable a third party to access the communication. At least in the past, at least
the providers of the keys have been able to access the communication by retaining a
back door.

Stanford Computer Science Project, no date, The Ethics (or not) of government
surveillance, http://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/cs201/projects/ethics-ofsurveillance/tech_encryptionbackdoors.html DOA: 3-22-15

A "backdoor" in computing is a method of bypassing the normal method of


authentication. Backdoors are usually inserted into a program or algorithm
before it is distributed widely. They are often hidden in part of the design of the
program or algorithm. In cryptography specifically, a backdoor would allow an
intruder to access the encrypted information without having the correct
credentials. The backdoor would either a) allow the intruder to guess the access
key based on the context of the message or b) allow the intruder to present a
skeleton key that will always grant him access.
Now the companies that provide the communications services, such as Yahoo and
Apple, do not even have access to these back doors, making it impossible for them to
provide it to anyone, including the government.

Philip Swartz, Washington Times October 17, 2014, FBI claims 'dark' smartphone
technology could hinder good guys,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/16/fbi-claims-darksmartphone-technology-could-hinder/?page=all DOA: 3-21-15

Technological data are becoming so encrypted that law enforcement


agents are now having difficulty legally obtaining the information they
need to catch criminals, the head of the FBI warned Thursday. "Some believe
that law enforcement, especially the FBI, has the ability to access
phenomenal information at any time. That is the product of too much
television," said FBI Director James Comey. "Even with lawful authority, the
'going dark' problem is we may not be able to access the information and
the data that we need," he said. Mr. Comey said he is increasingly worried

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
that encryption technology prominently featured in the latest
generations of smart phones will leave the user's information
inaccessible to outside parties - even law enforcement personnel with a
legitimate search warrant.

Gaurav Varma

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Encryption Af

Background
Private companies are making their encryption systems more
accessible
The Observer (England), June 8, 2014, John Naughton: Even a password on steroids
won't keep the spies out, The Observer (England), June 8, 2014, John Naughton: Even
a password on steroids won't keep the spies out, http://www.4-traders.com/GOOGLEINC-C-16118013/news/GOOGLE-C--John-Naughton-Even-a-password-on-steroids-wontkeep-the-spies-out-18559223/ DOA: 3-22-15
The technology that Google will use is public key encryption, and it's been around for a
long time and publicly available ever since 1991, when Phil Zimmermann created PGP
(which stands for pretty good privacy ). From then on, anyone who really wanted to communicate securely
could have used PGP. The problem was (and is) that it's technically fiddly and you have to know what you're doing.

And the persons with whom you wish to communicate securely also need to know
what they're doing, and have PGP software installed at their end. Public key encryption
is one of the great inventions of the 20th centu ry. At its heart is a simple idea - that
while it's trivially easy to multiply two very large numbers together, it's
computationally very difficult to factorise the resulting product - ie to deduce what the
original two numbers were. Each user has two large numbers, which serve as keys one kept private, and the other made publicly available to anyone who wishes to
communicate with him or her. PGP is terrific, but user-friendly it ain't, which is why most internet users
balked at deploying it. The result was that the world's electronic communications flowed back and forth on media that
were about as confidential as seaside postcards, thereby making it trivially easy for snoopers, both official and

Google's plan is to make PGP user-friendly by incorporating


it as an extension in its Chrome browser so that encryption (and decryption) are never
more than a click or two away.
unofficial, to do their dastardly work.

The government has been engaging in encryption cracking to


gain access to the keys necessary to continue its surveillance
John Naughton, March 8, 2015, The Guardian, Don't trust your phone, don't trust
your laptop - this is the reality that Snowden has shown us;
Edward Snowden's astute revelations show that no electronic communications device from hard disks to sim cards - is trustworthy,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/08/edward-snowden-trustphone-laptop-sim-cards DOA: 3-20-15
a few recent revelations suggest that we may now be getting down to bedrock. Two
concern the consummate hacking capabilities of the NSA and its overseas franchises. The first
- which came not from Snowden but from Kaspersky, a computer security firm - showed that
for at least 14 years a unit in the NSA had succeeded in infecting the firmware that
controls hard disk drives with malicious software that is able to persist even through
reformatting of the disks. Firmware is computer code embedded in a read-only silicon chip. It's what
transforms a disk from a paperweight into a storage device. The hack is significant: the Kaspersky
researchers who uncovered this said its ability to subvert hard-drive firmware
But

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
"surpasses anything else" they had ever seen. Being able to compromise firmware
gives an attacker total control of the system in a way that is stealthy and lasting, even
through software updates. Which means that the unsuspecting victim can never get
rid of it. If you think this has nothing to do with you, the compromised drives were manufactured
by most of the leading companies in the disk-drive business, including Western Digital,
Seagate, Toshiba, IBM, Micron and Samsung . Check your laptop specifications to see which one of
these companies made the drive. The second revelation, last month, came from a GCHQ presentation
provided by Snowden and reported in online publication the Intercept. Documents
showed that a joint NSA/GCHQ team had hacked into the internal computer network of
Gemalto, the world's largest manufacturer of sim cards, stealing, in the process,
encryption keys used to protect the privacy of mobile communications internationally.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

Development
This af eliminates backdoor requirements but should also eliminate encryption
cracking by the NSA--- solves for circumvention cases

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

1ACCase

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Encryption Af

1ACPlan Texts
3 possible plans
The United States federal government should provide warrants
to companies to install encryption back doors.
Ron Wyden, December 18, 2014, Wyden, D-Ore., is a member of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, Best defense against massive data theft, With hackers running
rampant, why would we poke holes in data security?
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1215-wyden-backdoor-for-cell-phones20141215-story.html DOA: 3-21-15)//GV
Hardly a week goes by without a new report of some massive data theft that has put
financial information, trade secrets or government records into the hands of computer
hackers. The best defense against these attacks is clear: strong data encryption and
more secure technology systems. The leaders of U.S. intelligence agencies hold a diferent view. Most prominently,
James Comey, the FBI director, is lobbying Congress to require that electronics manufacturers create intentional security holes - socalled back doors - that would enable the government to access data on every American's cellphone and computer, even if it is

there are no magic keys that can be used only by good


guys for legitimate reasons. There is only strong security or weak security . Americans are
protected by strong encryption. Unfortunately,

demanding strong security for their personal data. Comey and others are suggesting that security features shouldn't be too strong,
because this could interfere with surveillance conducted for law enforcement or intelligence purposes. The problem with this logic is that

building a back door into every cellphone, tablet, or laptop means deliberately creating
weaknesses that hackers and foreign governments can exploit. Mandating back doors
also removes the incentive for companies to develop more secure products at the time
people need them most; if you're building a wall with a hole in it, how much are you going invest in locks and barbed wire?
What these officials are proposing would be bad for personal data security and bad for business and must be opposed by Congress.

The United States Supreme Court should overrule the ACE vs FCC
decision on the grounds of the 4th amendment.
The United States federal government should bar itself from
requiring software makers to insert built-in backdoors to bypass
encryption.
New York Times Editorial Board, September 21, 2013, Close the NSAs Back
Doors, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/22/opinion/sunday/close-the-nsas-backdoors.html?_r=1&
Representative Rush Holt, Democrat of New Jersey, has introduced a bill that would, among other
provisions, bar the government from requiring software makers to insert built-in ways to
bypass encryption. It deserves full Congressional support. In the meantime, several Internet companies,
including Google and Facebook, are building encryption systems that will be much more difficult for the N.S.A. to
penetrate, forced to assure their customers that they are not a secret partner with the dark side of their own
government.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

1ACInherency
The NSA is permitted to crack encryption in the status quo
David Sanger, April 12, 2014, Obama lets N.S.A. exploit online security flaws,
officials say, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/13/us/politics/obama-lets-nsa-exploitsome-internet-flaws-officials-say.html DOA: 3-21-15
Obama has decided that
when the National Security Agency discovers major flaws in Internet security , it should - in
most circumstances - reveal them to assure that they will be fixed, rather than keep mum so that the flaws
can be used in espionage or cyberattacks, senior administration officials said over the weekend. But Mr. Obama
carved a broad exception for ''a clear national security or law enforcement need ,'' the
officials said on Saturday, a loophole that is likely to allow the N.S.A. to continue to
exploit security flaws both to crack encryption on the Internet and to design
cyberweapons. The White House has never publicly detailed Mr. Obama's decision, which he made in January as
Stepping into a heated debate within the United States intelligence agencies, President

he began a three-month review of recommendations by a presidential advisory committee on what to do in response to


recent disclosures about the National Security Agency. But elements of the decision became evident on Friday, when
the White House denied that it had any prior knowledge of the Heartbleed bug, a newly known hole in Internet security
that sent Americans scrambling last week to change their online passwords. The White House statement said that when
such flaws are discovered, there is now a ''bias'' in the government to share that knowledge with computer and
software manufacturers so a remedy can be created and distributed to industry and consumers.

NSA hacking the networks of leading companies to break


encryption
John Naughton, March 8, 2015, The Guardian, Don't trust your phone, don't trust
your laptop - this is the reality that Snowden has shown us; Edward Snowden's astute
revelations show that no electronic communications device - from hard disks to sim
cards - is trustworthy,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/08/edward-snowden-trustphone-laptop-sim-cards DOA: 3-20-15
a few recent revelations suggest that we may now be getting down to bedrock. Two
concern the consummate hacking capabilities of the NSA and its overseas franchises. The first which came not from Snowden but from Kaspersky, a computer security firm - showed that for at
least 14 years a unit in the NSA had succeeded in infecting the firmware that controls
hard disk drives with malicious software that is able to persist even through
reformatting of the disks. Firmware is computer code embedded in a read-only silicon chip. It's what transforms a disk
from a paperweight into a storage device. The hack is significant: the Kaspersky researchers who
uncovered this said its ability to subvert hard-drive firmware "surpasses anything else"
they had ever seen. Being able to compromise firmware gives an attacker total control
of the system in a way that is stealthy and lasting, even through software updates.
Which means that the unsuspecting victim can never get rid of it . If you think this has nothing to do
with you, the compromised drives were manufactured by most of the leading companies
in the disk-drive business, including Western Digital, Seagate, Toshiba, IBM, Micron and
Samsung. Check your laptop specifications to see which one of these companies made the drive. The second
revelation, last month, came from a GCHQ presentation provided by Snowden and reported in
online publication the Intercept. Documents showed that a joint NSA /GCHQ team had
But

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
hacked into the internal computer network of Gemalto, the world's largest
manufacturer of sim cards, stealing, in the process, encryption keys used to protect
the privacy of mobile communications internationally.

NSA has been working on the Bullrun program to crack


encryption
David Sanger, April 12, 2014, Obama lets N.S.A. exploit online security flaws,
officials say, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/13/us/politics/obama-lets-nsa-exploitsome-internet-flaws-officials-say.html DOA: 3-21-15
At the center of that technology are the kinds of hidden gaps in the Internet - almost always created by mistake or oversight - that
Heartbleed created. There is no evidence that the N.S.A. had any role in creating Heartbleed, or even that it made use of it. When the
White House denied prior knowledge of Heartbleed on Friday afternoon, it appeared to be the first time that the N.S.A. had ever said
whether a particular flaw in the Internet was - or was not - in the secret library it keeps at Fort Meade, Md., the headquarters of the

documents released by Edward J. Snowden, the former N.S.A. contractor, make


it clear that two years before Heartbleed became known, the N.S.A. was looking at ways to accomplish
exactly what the flaw did by accident. A program code-named Bullrun was part of an
efort to crack or circumvent encryption on the web .
agency and Cyber Command. But

Government can crack encryption now


Bloomberg, October 2, 2014, Apple's encryption will slow not stop snooping by
cops and spies, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-02/apple-sencryption-will-slow-not-stop-cops-and-spies DOA: 3-20-15
while
revelations about government spying show the National Security Agency (NSA) can break or
bypass encryption for terrorism investigations , said Jonathan Turley, a constitutional-law
professor at The George Washington University Law School. "Citizens should not assume that these encryption devices will
necessarily prevent government from intercepting communications," Turley said in a phone interview. "If history is any guide, the
government will find a way to penetrate these devices."
Those assertions "are wildly exaggerated" because police can still obtain evidence through traditional court warrants

NSA engages in encryption cracking to spy on Americans


Activist Post, September 7, 2013, http://endthelie.com/2013/09/06/nsa-and-gchqcrack-encryption-covertly-influence-companies-consider-ordinary-americansadversaries/
NSA and GCHQ crack encryption; consider ordinary Americans 'adversaries', NSA and
GCHQ crack encryption; consider ordinary Americans 'adversaries' The campaign
waged by the National Security Agency (NSA) and the UK's Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to undermine all Internet privacy and security
goes far beyond even what was previously revealed. In the latest top secret
documents revealed by Edward Snowden, it is also revealed that the agencies consider
ordinary citizens 'adversaries.' Some of the most noteworthy aspects of the latest
documents, reported on by The Guardian, Pro Publica and The New York Times include:
This year alone, $254.9 million was allocated to a program that 'actively engages US

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
and foreign IT industries to covertly influence and/or overtly leverage their commercial
products' designs.' The companies involved in this program are unknown. Previously,
tech giants issued cleverly worded denials when confronted with the reports on the
PRISM program. A 10-year-old NSA program aimed at breaking encryption technologies
had a major breakthrough in 2010 when 'vast amounts' of data collected through
dragnet taps on the world's fiber-optic cables became newly 'exploitable.' An internal
memo noted that when British analysts were made aware of the NSA's program,
'Those not already briefed were gobsmacked!' The NSA's capability to break
encryption is kept under a thick veil of secrecy. 'Do not ask about or speculate on
sources or methods,' stated one document aimed at analysts. Strong decryption
programs are described by the NSA as 'price of admission for the US to maintain
unrestricted access to and use of cyberspace.' Some of these programs involve bruteforce cracking, others involve direct collaboration with technology companies and
internet service providers. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence
responded on Friday, claiming that the U.S. intelligence community would be failing at
their job if they didn't seek to crack encryption. 'It should hardly be surprising that our
intelligence agencies seek ways to counteract our adversaries' use of encryption,' the
response states. However, the document clearly refers to the general consumer as an
adversary. 'These design changes make the systems in question exploitable through
Sigint [signals intelligence] collection [...] with foreknowledge of the modification,' the
document states. 'To the consumer and other adversaries, however, the systems'
security remains intact.'

NSA Engaging in Encryption Cracking


Business Insider, 10-14, 13, http://www.businessinsider.com/nsa-snowden-hackers3-22-15
At a recent conference in Aspen, NSA Chief Keith Alexander said about tracking
terrorist activities on the web, "you need the haystack to find the needle." Well,
despite the rather obvious fact that the NSA has access to the haystack a
euphemism for all web communications it still relies on hackers to find the needle.
That's because the web is largely still encrypted. Recent stories have indicated that
the NSA has pulled out all stops to degrade encryption putting plants in the right
positions in the tech industry, coercing companies to insert backdoors in software and
hardware, etc. The NSA takes those routes because brute force attacks on encryption
with the NSA's super computers guessing umpteen passwords a millisecond
simply cannot keep up with current encryption technology. Even Edward Snowden said
encryption still works. So the NSA has constructed an elite group of hackers to attack
target computers what they call "end point" exploitation prior to communications
entering the encrypted ether of the Internet. Matthew M. Aid of Foreign Policy writes
that despite the massive collection capabilities of the NSA, its secretive hacking subunit called TAO, Tailored Access Operations is the ultimate force to be reckoned
with in the cyber-espionage landscape. Even its name Tailored Access implies a
reliance on software exploitation. From Foreign Policy: According to sources familiar
with the organization's operations, TAO has been enormously successful over the past

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12 years in covertly inserting highly sophisticated spyware into the hard drives of over
80,000 computer systems around the world, although this number could be much
higher. The NSA's reliance on these elite hackers explains why the agency makes
regular appearances at hacking conferences like DefCon and BlackHat. There is simply
no substitute for exploiting a target's computer in order to intercept all
communications prior to those communications leaving the computer and becoming
encrypted. It's the cyber equivalent of the 1960s police tactic of bugging a suspect's
rotary phone they get the info right at the source. Aid reports that the NSA also
often pays outside services what we've taken to referring to as "hacker
mercenaries" to provide these software exploits (known as "Zero Day Exploits,"
since no one knows they exist yet). Since the Snowden disclosures, Aid notes, many of
TAO's targets have updated their software, so the NSA's listening capability is going
dark. Nonetheless, every software has an exploit waiting to be found, and TAO has
proven incredibly capable of finding them.

Wired, 3-15, 13, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/f_nsadatacenter/


But this is more than just a data center, says one senior intelligence official who until
recently was involved with the program. The mammoth Blufdale center will have
another important and far more secret role that until now has gone unrevealed. It is
also critical, he says, for breaking codes. And code-breaking is crucial, because much
of the data that the center will handlefinancial information, stock transactions,
business deals, foreign military and diplomatic secrets, legal documents, confidential
personal communicationswill be heavily encrypted. According to another top official
also involved with the program, the NSA made an enormous breakthrough several
years ago in its ability to cryptanalyze, or break, unfathomably complex encryption
systems employed by not only governments around the world but also many average
computer users in the US. The upshot, according to this official: Everybodys a target;
everybody with communication is a target. For the NSA, overflowing with tens of
billions of dollars in post-9/11 budget awards, the cryptanalysis breakthrough came at
a time of explosive growth, in size as well as in power. Established as an arm of the
Department of Defense following Pearl Harbor, with the primary purpose of preventing
another surprise assault, the NSA sufered a series of humiliations in the post-Cold War
years. Caught ofguard by an escalating series of terrorist attacksthe first World
Trade Center bombing, the blowing up of US embassies in East Africa, the attack on
the USS Cole in Yemen, and finally the devastation of 9/11some began questioning
the agencys very reason for being. In response, the NSA has quietly been reborn. And
while there is little indication that its actual efectiveness has improvedafter all,
despite numerous pieces of evidence and intelligence-gathering opportunities, it
missed the near-disastrous attempted attacks by the underwear bomber on a flight to
Detroit in 2009 and by the car bomber in Times Square in 2010there is no doubt that
it has transformed itself into the largest, most covert, and potentially most intrusive
intelligence agency ever created.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

NSA cracks most encryption


Arab News, September 7, 2013 NSA cracked most online encryption,
http://news.yahoo.com/report-nsa-cracked-most-online-encryption-075457559-politics.html)//GV
The National Security Agency, working with the British government, has secretly been
unraveling encryption technology that billions of Internet users rely upon to keep their
electronic messages and confidential data safe from prying eyes, according to
published reports based on internal US government documents. The NSA has
bypassed or cracked much of the digital encryption used by businesses and everyday
Web users, according to reports Thursday in The New York Times, Britain's Guardian
newspaper and the nonprofit news website ProPublica. The reports describe how the
NSA invested billions of dollars since 2000 to make nearly everyone's secrets available
for government consumption. In doing so, the NSA built powerful supercomputers to
break encryption codes and partnered with unnamed technology companies to insert
"back doors" into their software, the reports said. Such a practice would give the
government access to users' digital information before it was encrypted and sent over
the Internet.

NSA cracking encryption


The International Herald Tribune, September 7, 2013, N.S.A. foils encryption protection
around globe; Experts say the U.S. hunt for 'back doors' may have serious
consequences, p. 4)//GV
The United States faced new pressure on Friday to justify its vast electronic
surveillance programs following the disclosure that the National Security Agency is
using supercomputers, technical trickery, court orders and persuasion to undermine
the tools protecting everyday communications in the Internet age. According to newly
disclosed documents, the agency has circumvented or cracked much of the encryption
that guards global commerce and banking systems, protects sensitive data like trade
secrets and medical records, and secures the e-mails, Web searches, Internet chats
and phone calls made from around the world. Many users assume - or have been
assured by Internet companies - that their data is safe from prying eyes, and the
N.S.A. wants to keep it that way. The agency treats its recent successes in deciphering
protected information as among its most closely guarded secrets, restricted to those
cleared for a highly classified program code-named Bullrun, according to the
documents, provided by Edward J. Snowden, the former N.S.A. contractor. Beginning in
2000, as encryption tools were gradually blanketing the Web, the N.S.A. invested
billions of dollars in a clandestine campaign to preserve its ability to eavesdrop.
Having lost a public battle in the 1990s to insert its own ''back door'' in all encryption,
it set out to accomplish the same goal by stealth. The agency, according to the
documents and interviews with industry officials, deployed custom-built, superfast
computers to break codes and began collaborating with technology companies in the
United States and abroad to build entry points into their products. The documents do

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not identify which companies have participated. The N.S.A. hacked into target
computers to snare messages before they were encrypted. And the agency used its
influence as the world's most experienced code maker to covertly introduce
weaknesses into the encryption standards followed by hardware and software
developers around the world. ''For the past decade, N.S.A. has led an aggressive,
multipronged efort to break widely used Internet encryption technologies,'' said a
2010 memo describing a briefing about N.S.A. accomplishments for employees of its
British counterpart, Government Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ.
''Cryptanalytic capabilities are now coming online. Vast amounts of encrypted Internet
data which have up till now been discarded are now exploitable.'' Representative Rush
D. Holt Jr., a Democrat from New Jersey who is also a physicist, said Friday that he
believed the N.S.A. was overreaching and could hurt American interests. ''We pay
them to spy,'' Mr. Holt said. ''But if in the process they degrade the security of the
encryption we all use, it's a net national disservice.'' Mr. Holt proposed legislation that
would prohibit the N.S.A. from installing so-called back doors into encryption. Marc
Rotenberg, executive director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, a civil
liberties group in Washington, said the dilemma posed by the N.S.A.'s eforts against
encryption begin with its dual role: eavesdropping on foreign communications while
protecting American communications. ''Invariably the two missions collide,'' he said.
''We don't dispute that their ability to capture foreign intelligence is quite important.
The question is whether their pursuit of that mission threatens to undermine the
security and privacy of Internet communications.'' An intelligence budget document
makes clear that the efort to defeat encryption technology is still going strong. ''We
are investing in groundbreaking cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat adversarial
cryptography and exploit Internet traffic,'' the director of national intelligence, James
R. Clapper Jr., wrote in his budget request for the current year. The N.S.A.'s success in
defeating many of the privacy protections ofered by encryption does not change the
rules that prohibit the deliberate targeting of Americans' e-mails or phone calls without
a warrant. But it shows that the agency, which was sharply rebuked by a federal judge
in 2011 for violating the rules and misleading the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, cannot necessarily be restrained by privacy technology. N.S.A. rules permit the
agency to store any encrypted communication, domestic or foreign, for as long as the
agency is trying to decrypt it or analyze its technical features. The N.S.A., which has
specialized in code-breaking since its creation in 1952, sees that task as essential to
its mission. If it cannot decipher the messages of foreign adversaries, the United
States will be at serious risk, agency officials say. Some experts say the N.S.A.'s
campaign to bypass and weaken communications security may have serious
unintended consequences. They say the agency is working at cross-purposes with its
other major mission, apart from eavesdropping: ensuring the security of U.S.
communications. Some of the agency's most intensive eforts have focused on the
encryption in universal use in the United States, including the protection used on
smartphones. Many Americans rely on such protection every time they send an e-mail
or buy something online. For at least three years, one document says, GCHQ of Britain,
almost certainly in close collaboration with the N.S.A., has been looking for ways into
protected traffic of the most popular Internet companies: Google, Yahoo, Facebook and
Microsoft's Hotmail. By 2012, GCHQ had developed ''new access opportunities'' into

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Encryption Af
Google's systems, according to the document. ''The risk is that when you build a back
door into systems, you're not the only one to exploit it,'' said Matthew D. Green, a
cryptography researcher at Johns Hopkins University. ''Those back doors could work
against U.S. communications, too.'' Paul Kocher, a leading cryptographer who helped
design the SSL protocol, recalled how the N.S.A. lost the heated national debate in the
1990s about inserting into all encryption a government back door called the Clipper
Chip. ''And they went and did it anyway, without telling anyone,'' Mr. Kocher said. He
said he understood the agency's mission but was concerned about the danger of
allowing it unbridled access to private information. ''The intelligence community has
worried about 'going dark' forever, but today they are conducting instant, total
invasion of privacy with limited efort,'' he said. ''This is the golden age of spying.'' The
documents are among more than 50,000 shared by The Guardian with The New York
Times and ProPublica, the nonprofit news organization. They focus primarily on GCHQ
but include thousands either from or about the N.S.A. Intelligence officials asked The
Times and ProPublica not to publish this article, saying that it might prompt foreign
targets to switch to new forms of encryptionor communications that would be harder
to collect or read. The news organizations removed some specific facts but decided to
publish the article because of the value of a public debate about government actions
that weaken the most powerful tools for protecting the privacy of Americans and
others. The full extent of the N.S.A.'s decoding capabilities is known only to a limited
group of top analysts. The files show that the agency is still stymied by some
encryption, as Mr. Snowden suggested in a question-and-answer session on The
Guardian's Web site in June. ''Properly implemented strong crypto systems are one of
the few things that you can rely on,'' he said, though cautioning that the N.S.A. often
bypasses the encryption altogether by targeting the computers at one end or the
otherand grabbing text before it is encrypted or after it is decrypted. The agency's
success depends on working with Internet companies - by getting their voluntary
collaboration, forcing their cooperation with court orders or surreptitiously stealing
their encryption keys or altering their software or hardware. According to an
intelligence budget document leaked by Mr. Snowden, the N.S.A. spends more than
$250 million a year on its Sigint Enabling Project, which ''actively engages the U.S. and
foreign IT industries to covertly influence and/or overtly leverage their commercial
products' designs'' to make them ''exploitable.'' Sigint is the abbreviation for signals
intelligence, the technical term for electronic eavesdropping. By this year, the Sigint
Enabling Project had found ways inside some of the encryption chips that scramble
information for businesses and governments, either by working with chip-makers to
insert back doors or by surreptitiously exploiting existing security flaws, according to
the documents. The 2013 N.S.A. budget request highlights ''partnerships with major
telecommunications carriers to shape the global network to benefit other collection
accesses'' - that is, to allow more eavesdropping. Since Mr. Snowden's disclosures
ignited criticism of overreach and privacy infringements by the N.S.A., U.S. technology
companies have faced scrutiny from customers and the public over what some see as
too cozy a relationship with the government. In response, some companies have
begun to push back against what they describe as government bullying. Google, Yahoo
and Facebook have pressed for permission to reveal more about the government's
secret requests for cooperation. One small e-mail encryption company, Lavabit, shut

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
down rather than comply with the agency's demands for what it considered
confidential customer information; another, Silent Circle, ended its e-mail service
rather than face similar demands. In efect, facing the N.S.A.'s relentless advance, the
companies surrendered.

NSA continues to exploit software vulnerabilities for spying


purposes
Joseph Menn, Reuters, May 16, 2014, Obamas spying reforms fail to satisfy experts,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/16/us-cyber-summit-reformsidUSBREA4F0MX20140516
(Reuters) - Obama administration actions to change some of the National Security
Agency's surveillance practices after the leaks of classified documents by contractor
Edward Snowden are falling short of what many private cyber experts want. Top
government experts told the Reuters Cybersecurity Summit this week they would be
more transparent about spying activity. Non-government guests, however, said the
administration was not doing enough to advance Internet security. For instance, last
December a White House review commission called for a drastic reduction in the NSA's
practice of keeping secret the software vulnerabilities it learns about and then
exploiting them for spying purposes. White House cybersecurity advisor Michael Daniel
said at the conference that he would chair the interagency group charged with
weighing each newly discovered software flaw and deciding whether to keep it secret
or warn the software maker about it. "The policy has been in place for a number of
years, but it was not as active as we decided that it should be," Daniel said. Now, he
said, "there is a process, there is rigor in that process, and the bias is very heavily
tilted toward disclosure." Commission member Peter Swire told the summit he was
pleased by the formal process for debating vulnerability use, but others said there
were too many loopholes. In an April 28 White House blog post, Daniel wrote that the
factors the interagency group would consider included the likelihood that the
vulnerability would be discovered by others and how pressing was the need for
intelligence. "That is the loophole that swallows the entire policy, because there's
always going to be an important national security or law enforcement purpose," Chris
Soghoian, a technology policy analyst with the American Civil Liberties Union said at
the summit. Some security experts active in the market for trading software flaws said
they had seen no sign that U.S. purchases were declining. "There's been no change in
the market at all as far as we can see," said Adriel Desautels, chief executive of
Netragard Inc, which buys and sells programs taking advantage of undisclosed flaws.

NSA trying to crack encryption


Der Spiegel, December 28, 2014, Inside the NSAs War on Internet Security,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-securitya-1010361.html DOA: 12-28-14

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
It's a suggestion unlikely to please some intelligence agencies. After all, the Five Eyes
alliance -- the secret services of Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the
United States -- pursue a clear goal: removing the encryption of others on the Internet
wherever possible. In 2013, the NSA had a budget of more than $10 billion. According
to the US intelligence budget for 2013, the money allocated for the NSA department
called Cryptanalysis and Exploitation Services (CES) alone was $34.3 million.

NSA working to weaken encryption


Der Spiegel, December 28, 2014, Inside the NSAs War on Internet Security,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-securitya-1010361.html DOA: 12-28-14
But how do the Five-Eyes agencies manage to break all these encryption standards
and systems? The short answer is: They use every means available. One method is
consciously weakening the cryptographic standards that are used to implement the
respective systems. Documents seen by SPIEGEL show that NSA agents travel to the
meetings of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), an organization that develops
such standards, to gather information but presumably also to influence the discussions
there. "New session policy extensions may improve our ability to passively target two
sided communications," says a brief write-up of an IETF meeting in San Diego on an
NSA-internal Wiki. This process of weakening encryption standards has been going on
for some time. A classification guide, a document that explains how to classify certain
types of secret information, labels "the fact that NSA/CSS makes cryptographic
modifications to commercial or indigenous cryptographic information security devices
or systems in order to make them exploitable" as Top Secret. Cryptographic systems
actively weakened this way or faulty to begin with are then exploited using
supercomputers. The NSA maintains a system called Longhaul, an "end-to-end attack
orchestration and key recovery service for Data Network Cipher and Data Network
Session Cipher traffic." Basically, Longhaul is the place where the NSA looks for ways
to break encryption. According to an NSA document, it uses facilities at the Tordella
Supercomputer Building at Fort Meade, Maryland, and Oak Ridge Data Center in Oak
Ridge, Tennessee. It can pass decrypted data to systems such as Turmoil -- a part of
the secret network the NSA operates throughout the world, used to siphon of data.
The cover term for the development of these capabilities is Valientsurf. A similar
program called Gallantwave is meant to "break tunnel and session ciphers." In other
cases, the spies use their infrastructure to steal cryptographic keys from the
configuration files found on Internet routers. A repository called Discoroute contains
"router configuration data from passive and active collection" one document states.
Active here means hacking or otherwise infiltrating computers, passive refers to
collecting data flowing through the Internet with secret NSA-operated computers. An
important part of the Five Eyes' eforts to break encryption on the Internet is the
gathering of vast amounts of data. For example, they collect so-called SSL handshakes
-- that is, the first exchanges between two computers beginning an SSL connection. A
combination of metadata about the connections and metadata from the encryption
protocols then help to break the keys which in turn allow reading or recording the now

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Encryption Af
decrypted traffic. If all else fails, the NSA and its allies resort to brute force: They hack
their target's computers or Internet routers to get to the secret encryption -- or they
intercept computers on the way to their targets, open them and insert spy gear before
they even reach their destination, a process they call interdiction.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

1ACEconomy Advantage
Advantage __ is the economy___ internal links
*side note-internal link 5 is crappy

1st is consumer distrust


NSA backdoors create consumer distrust with international
businesses--- It undercuts global connectivity and spills over
internationally
Trevor Timm 15, Trevor Timm is a Guardian US columnist and executive director of
the Freedom of the Press Foundation, a non-profit that supports and defends
journalism dedicated to transparency and accountability. 3-4-2015, "Building
backdoors into encryption isn't only bad for China, Mr President," Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/04/backdoors-encryption-chinaapple-google-nsa)//GV
Want to know why forcing tech companies to build backdoors into encryption is a terrible idea? Look no further than President Obamas
stark criticism of Chinas plan to do exactly that on Tuesday. If only he would tell the FBI and NSA the same thing. In a stunningly short-

the FBI - and more recently the NSA - have been pushing for a new US law that would force tech
companies like Apple and Google to hand over the encryption keys or build backdoors
into their products and tools so the government would always have access to our
communications. It was only a matter of time before other governments jumped on the
bandwagon, and China wasted no time in demanding the same from tech companies a
few weeks ago. As President Obama himself described to Reuters, China has proposed an expansive new
anti-terrorism bill that would essentially force all foreign companies,
including US companies, to turn over to the Chinese government
mechanisms where they can snoop and keep track of all the users of those
services. Obama continued: Those kinds of restrictive practices I think would ironically hurt
the Chinese economy over the long term because I dont think there is any US or
European firm, any international firm, that could credibly get away with that wholesale
turning over of data, personal data, over to a government. Bravo! Of course these are the exact
arguments for why it would be a disaster for US government to force tech companies to do
the same. (Somehow Obama left that part out.) As Yahoos top security executive Alex Stamos told NSA director Mike Rogers in a
sighted move,

public confrontation last week, building backdoors into encryption is like drilling a hole into a windshield. Even if its technically

other countries will


inevitably demand access for themselves. Companies will no longer be in a position to say no, and even
possible to produce the flaw - and we, for some reason, trust the US government never to abuse it -

if they did, intelligence services would find the backdoor unilaterally - or just steal the keys outright. For an example on how this works,
look no further than last weeks Snowden revelation that the UKs intelligence service and the NSA stole the encryption keys for millions
of Sim cards used by many of the worlds most popular cell phone providers. Its happened many times before too. Security expert Bruce
Schneier has documented with numerous examples, Back-door access built for the good guys is routinely used by the bad guys.

what happens when China or


Russia also demand backdoors from tech companies, but Rogers didnt have an answer prepared at all. He
Stamos repeatedly (and commendably) pushed the NSA director for an answer on

just kept repeating I think we can work through this. As Stamos insinuated, maybe Rogers should ask his own staf why we actually
cant work through this, because virtually every technologist agrees backdoors just cannot be secure in practice. (If you want to further
understand the details behind the encryption vs. backdoor debate and how what the NSA director is asking for is quite literally
impossible, read this excellent piece by surveillance expert Julian Sanchez.) Its downright bizarre that the US government has been
warning of the grave cybersecurity risks the country faces while, at the very same time, arguing that we should pass a law that would
weaken cybersecurity and put every single citizen at more risk of having their private information stolen by criminals, foreign

Forcing backdoors will also be disastrous for the US economy as it


would be for Chinas. US tech companies - which already have suffered billions
governments, and our own.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
of dollars of losses overseas because of consumer distrust over their
relationships with the NSA - would lose all credibility with users around the world if
the FBI and NSA succeed with their plan. The White House is supposedly coming out with an official policy on
encryption sometime this month, according to the New York Times but the President can save himself a lot of time and just apply his

If he knows backdoors in encryption are bad for


cybersecurity, privacy, and the economy, why is there even a debate?
comments about China to the US government.

International business linkages are the lynchpins for markets,


jobs, FDI, trade, and overall growth
Area Development December, 2012, "Participation in the Global Economy Keeps U.S.
Economy Growing," Area Development,
http://www.areadevelopment.com/BusinessGlobalization/December2012/globalparticipation-grows-US-economy-1259168.shtml)//GV
A study recently released by The Business Roundtable and the United States Council
for International Business comes to the conclusion that the success of U.S. companies
in the global economy directly relates to economic growth and job creation here at
home. Authored by Matthew Slaughter, Ph.D., of the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth, American Companies and Global Supply
Networks: Driving U.S. Economic Growth and Jobs by Connecting with the World, shows how globally engaged U.S.
companies, their international operations, and supply networks are linked to U.S.
economic growth and employment. Despite ongoing economic uncertainties, this study underscores the fact that
millions of good American jobs are created when companies engage in growing global
markets via international trade and investment, Slaughter says. The benefits of global
engagement impact all levels of our economy , not just those companies engaged in
international commerce. The study, which profiled Dow Chemical Co., Coca-Cola Co., ExxonMobil, FedEx Corp., IBM,
Procter & Gamble, and Siemens, comes to the following conclusions: (1) globally engaged U.S. companies are the
driving force in U.S. capital investment, R&D, and international trade, which in turn
foster U.S. economic growth and the creation of well-paying jobs; (2) in order to access new customers and innovative
ideas and continue to grow, these companies must participate in the global economy; and (3) global growth supports further hiring,
investment, and R&D at these companies

U.S. facilities, while also creating jobs at other U.S.


companies, often small- and medium-sized, within their global supply chains. The
success of globally engaged U.S. companies has a direct and very positive impact on
Main Street USA, says John Engler, president of Business Roundtable. To encourage and enable our
companies to seek new markets and succeed anywhere in the world , we need tax, trade, and
investment policies that reflect todays competitive global economy . The benefits at home are
enormous. factor.

2nd is data localization


NSA backdoors cause data localizationit spills over and kills
international businesses
Richard Adhikari, 7-16-2015, "The Fallout From the NSA's Backdoors Mandate," No
Publication, http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/81530.html)//GV

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
The United States National Security Agency (NSA)

is widely believed to have mandated high-tech vendors


build backdoors into their hardware and software. Reactions from foreign governments
to the news are harming American businesses and, some contend, may result in the breakup of
the Internet. For example, Russia is moving to paper and typewriters in some cases to move
certain types of information, Private.me COO Robert Neivert told the E-Commerce Times. Governments
are pushing to enact laws to force the localization of data -- generally meaning they
won't allow data to be stored outside their borders to protect citizens against NSA-type
surveillance -- a move that's of particular concern to American businesses, according to a
Lawfare Research paper. That's because they deem U.S. firms untrustworthy for having provided the NSA with access to the data of their
users. Revisiting the Tower of Babel? "There's an increased use of networks on behalf of Europe and other allies that do not pass through

Some countries are even proposing to break


up the Internet. However, "people who say these things threaten the Internet itself are misunderstanding things," Jonathan
U.S. companies or U.S.-controlled networks," Neivert said.

Sander, strategy & research officer of Stealthbits Technologies, told the E-Commerce Times. "The Internet produces too much wealth for
too many people and organizations for anyone, including the U.S., to threaten it." The U.S. economy "is one of the best weapons we
have in the technology war," Sander continued. The U.S. market "is too big for foreign governments to ignore," which is why foreign
companies continue doing business with the U.S. Concern has been expressed about invasions of privacy through surveillance, but this
issue is "a matter of policy" and there are diferences in how citizens of diferent countries approach it, Sander pointed out. "In the EU
and, to a lesser extent [Australia and New Zealand], privacy is an issue at the ballot box so there are laws reflecting that." In the U.S.,
however, privacy "has yet to seriously break through as an issue, so there has been less motion," Sander remarked. Massive Cost to U.S.
Businesses In August of last year, the German government reportedly warned that Windows 8 could act as a Trojan when combined with
version 2.0 of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), a specification for a secure cryptoprocessor. The TPM is included in many laptops and
tablets, and the concern is that TPM 2.0 makes trusted computing functions mandatory rather than opt-in as before, meaning it can't be
disabled. Further, it can let Microsoft establish a backdoor into the device it's in. Microsoft's response was that OEMs can turn of the TPM
in x86 computers. The German government will end its contract with Verizon; Brazil has decided to replace its fighter jets with ones
made by Sweden's Saab instead of Boeing; and Web hosting firm Servint Corp. reported a 30 percent decline in overseas business since
the NSA leaks first made news in June 2013. "There is both diplomatic and economic backlash against these tactics," Robyn Greene,
policy counsel at New America's Open Technology Institute, told the E-Commerce Times. It's difficult to establish an exact dollar amount,
but "experts

have estimated that losses to the U.S. cloud industry alone could reach
(US)$180 billion over the next three years," Greene said. "Additionally, major U.S. tech
companies like Cisco and IBM have lost nearly one-fifth of their business in emerging
markets because of a loss of trust." Foreign companies are using their non-U.S. status
to advertise themselves as more secure or protective of privacy, Greene remarked. The Other Side
of the Story On the other hand, Cisco's share of the service provider router and carrier Ethernet market bounced back strongly after an
unusually weak Q2, primarily because of a strong performance in the Asia-Pacific and the EMEA regions, SRG Research reported. "Cisco
is in a league of its own, with a global presence,

credibility and product range that cannot be matched

by its competitors," John Dinsdale, managing director and chief analyst at SRG, told the E-Commerce Times. "When demand
increases, there is only a rather short list of vendors who can satisfy it, and Cisco clearly has the strongest story to tell." In addition, the
allegations that U.S. high-tech firms built backdoors into their products are not true, contended Philip Lieberman, president of Lieberman

"I have never seen any cooperation between U.S.-owned software or hardware
manufacturers to insert backdoors into their products for the use of the NSA ," Lieberman told
Software.

the E-Commerce Times. "The damage that such an inclusion would cause to the company that did so would be catastrophic and

With its backdoors, the NSA "broke the foundational


element of trust, and that's something very difficult to recover from. [It has] in efect
destroyed the trusted and secure reputation of U.S. companies," said Neivert. "More and more we
probably unrecoverable." Rebuilding Faith and Trust

will see U.S. tech companies focusing on distinguishing their products and services with heightened security oferings and working to
achieve legislative reforms that would rein in [surveillance practices]. That's the case with the Reform Government Surveillance Coalition
and tech industry trade associations that represent thousands of companies," New America's Open Technology Institute's Greene added

Data localization causes protectionism and hamstrings


businesses, tech innovation, trade, manufacturing, causing
collapse
Chander and Le 15 (Director, California International Law Center, Professor of
Law and Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall Research Scholar, University of California, Davis;

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
Free Speech and Technology Fellow, California International Law Center; A.B., Yale
College; J.D., University of California, Davis School of Law, Anupam Chander and Uyn
P. L, DATA NATIONALISM, EMORY LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 64:677,
http://law.emory.edu/elj/_documents/volumes/64/3/articles/chander-le.pdf)
Economic Development Many governments believe that by forcing companies to localize data within national borders, they will
increase investment at home. Thus, data localization measures are often motivated, whether explicitly or not, by desires to

data localization raises costs for local


businesses, reduces access to global services for consumers, hampers local startups, and interferes with the use of the latest tech nological advances. In an Information
Age, the global flow of data has become the lifeblood of economies across
the world. While some in Europe have raised concerns about the transfer of data abroad, the European Commission has
recognized the critical importance of data flows notably for the transatlantic economy.209 The Commission
observes that international data transfers form an integral part of commercial
exchanges across the Atlantic including for new growing digital businesses, such as
social media or cloud computing, with large amounts of data going from the EU to
the US.210 Worried about the efect of constraints on data flows on both global information sharing and economic
promote local economic development. In fact, however,

development, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has urged nations to avoid barriers to the
location, access and use of cross-border data facilities and functions when consistent with other fundamental rights, in order to
ensure cost efectiveness and other efficiencies.211 The worry about the impact of data localization is widely shared in the
business community as well. The value of the Internet to national economies has been widely noted.212 Regarding Brazils
attempt to require data localization, the Information Technology Industry Council, an industry association representing more than
forty major Internet companies, had argued that in-country data storage requirements would detrimentally impact all economic
activity that depends on data flows.213 The Swedish government agency, the National Board of Trade, recently interviewed
fifteen local companies of various sizes across sectors and concluded succinctly that trade

cannot happen
without data being moved from one location to another.214 Data localization, like
most protectionist measures, leads only to small gains for a few local enterprises
and workers, while causing significant harms spread across the entire economy. The
domestic benefits of data localization go to the few owners and employees of data centers and the few companies servicing these
centers locally. Meanwhile, the harms of data localization are widespread, felt by small, medium, and large businesses that are
denied access to global services that might improve productivity. In response to Russias recently passed localization law, the NGO
Russian Association for Electronic Communications stressed the potential economic consequences, pointing to the withdrawal of
global services and substantial economic losses caused by the passing of similar laws in other countries.215 For example, besides
the loss of international social media platforms, localization would make it impossible for Russians to order airline tickets or
consumer goods through online services. Localization requirements also seriously afect Russian companies like Aeroflot because
the airline depends on foreign ticket-booking systems.216 Critics worried, at the time, that the Brazilian data localization
requirement would deny[] Brazilian users access to great services that are provided by US and other international
companies.217 Marilia Marciel, a digital policy expert at Fundao Getulio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro, observes, Even Brazilian

Data localization afects domestic innovation


by denying entrepreneurs the ability to build on top of global services based
abroad. Brasscom, the Brazilian Association of Information Technology and
Communication Companies, argues that such obligations would hurt[] the
countrys ability to create, innovate, create jobs and collect taxes from the proper
use of the Internet.219 Governments implementing in-country data mandates
imagine that the various global services used in their country will now build
infrastructure locally. Many services, however, will find it uneconomical and even too risky to establish local servers in
companies prefer to host their data outside of Brazil.218

certain territories.220 Data centers are expensive, all the more so if they have the highest levels of security. One study finds Brazil

Building a data
center in Brazil costs $60.9 million on average, while building one in Chile and the
United States costs $51.2 million and $43 million, respectively.222 Operating such
a data center remains expensive because of enormous energy and other expenses
averaging $950,000 in Brazil, $710,000 in Chile, and $510,000 in the United
States each month.223 This cost discrepancy is mostly due to high electricity costs and heavy import taxes on the
to be the most expensive country in the Western hemisphere in which to build data centers.221

equipment needed for the center.224 Data centers employ few workers, with energy making up three-quarters of the costs of
operations.225 According to the 2013 Data Centre Risk Indexa study of thirty countries on the risks afecting successful data
center operationsAustralia, Russia, China, Indonesia, India, and Brazil are among the riskiest countries for running data

Not only are there significant economic costs to data localization, the
potential gains are more limited than governments imagine . Data server farms are hardly
centers.226

significant generators of employment, populated instead by thousands of computers and few human beings. The significant initial
outlay they require is largely in capital goods, the bulk of which is often imported into a country. The diesel generators, cooling

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
systems, servers, and power supply devices tend to be imported from global suppliers.227 Ironically, it is often American suppliers
of servers and other hardware that stand to be the beneficiaries of data localization mandates.228 One study notes, Brazilian
suppliers of components did not benefit from this [data localization requirement], since the imported products dominate the

data localization requirements can in fact


increase merchandise trade deficits. Furthermore, large data farms are enormous
consumers of energy,230 and thus often further burden overtaxed energy grids .
They thereby harm other industries that must now compete for this energy, paying
higher prices while potentially sufering limitations in supply of already scarce
power. Cost, as well as access to the latest innovations, drives many e-commerce
enterprises in Indonesia to use foreign data centers . Daniel Tumiwa, head of the Indonesian Emarket.229 By increasing capital purchases from abroad,

Commerce Association (IdEA), states that [t]he cost can double easily in Indonesia.231 Indonesias Internet start-ups have
accordingly often turned to foreign countries such as Australia, Singapore, or the United States to host their services. One report
suggests that many of the tools that start-up online media have relied on elsewhere are not fully available yet in Indonesia.232
The same report also suggests that a weak local hosting infrastructure in Indonesia means that sites hosted locally experience

as the Vietnamese government attempts to foster


entrepreneurship and innovation,234 localization requirements efectively bar startups from utilizing cheap and powerful platforms abroad and potentially handicap
Vietnam from join[ing] in the technology race.235 Governments worried about transferring data abroad at the same time
delayed loading time.233 Similarly,

hope, somewhat contradictorily, to bring foreign data within their borders. Many countries seek to become leaders in providing
data centers for companies operating across their regions. In 2010, Malaysia announced its Economic Transformation Program236
to transform Malaysia into a world-class data center hub for the Asia-Pacific region.237 Brazil hopes to accomplish the same for
Latin America, while France seeks to stimulate its economy via a Made in France digital industry.238 Instead of spurring local
investment, data localization can lead to the loss of investment. First, theres the retaliation efect. Would countries send data to
Brazil if Brazil declares that data is unsafe if sent abroad? Brasscom notes that the Brazilian Internet industrys growth would be
hampered if other countries engage in similar reactive policies, which can stimulate the migration of datacenters based here, or
at least part of them, to other countries.239 Some in the European Union sympathize with this concern. European Commissioner
for the Digital Agenda, Neelie Kroes, has expressed similar doubts, worrying about the results for European global competitiveness
if each country has its own separate Internet.240 Then theres the avoidance efect. Rio de Janeiro State University Law Professor
Ronaldo Lemos, who helped write the original Marco Civil and is currently Director of the Rio Institute for Technology and Society,
warns that the localization provision would have caused foreign companies to avoid the country altogether: It

could end
up having the opposite efect to what is intended, and scare away companies that
want to do business in Brazil.241 Indeed, such burdensome local laws often lead companies to launch overseas, in
order to try to avoid these rules entirely. Foreign companies, too, might well steer clear of the country in order to avoid
entanglement with cumbersome rules. For example, Yahoo!, while very popular in Vietnam, places its servers for the country in

In these ways we see that data localization mandates can backfire


entirely, leading to avoidance instead of investment. Data localization
requirements place burdens on domestic enterprises not faced by those operating
in more liberal jurisdictions. Countries that require data to be cordoned of
complicate matters for their own enterprises, which must turn to domestic services
if they are to comply with the law. Such companies must also develop mechanisms to segregate the data they
Singapore.242

hold by the nationality of the data subject. The limitations may impede development of new, global services. Critics argue that
South Koreas ban on the export of mapping data, for example, impedes the development of next-generation services in Korea:
Technology services, such as Google Glass, driverless cars, and information programs for visually-impaired users, are unlikely to
develop and grow in Korea. Laws made in the 1960s are preventing many venture enterprises from advancing to foreign markets

The harms of data localization for local businesses are not


restricted to Internet enterprises or to consumers denied access to global services.
via location/navigation services.243

As it turns out, most of the economic benefits from Internet technologies accrue to traditional businesses. A McKinsey study
estimates that about seventy-five percent of the value added created by the Internet and data flow is in traditional industries, in

The potential economic impact across the major sectors


healthcare, manufacturing, electricity, urban infra-structure, security,
agriculture, retail, etc.is estimated at $2.7 to $6.2 trillion per year.245 This is
particularly important for emerging economies , in which traditional industries remain predominant. The
Internet raises profits as well, due to increased revenues, lower costs of goods sold, and lower administrative costs.246 With
data localization mandates, traditional businesses will lose access to the many
global services that would store or process information ofshore.
part through increases in productivity.244

3rd is intellectual property theft

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

Government mandated backdoors cause cyber-espionage,


attacks, and intellectual property theft
Davis et al 14 (Terry, MicroSystems Automation Group, and Peha, Jon M. Carnegie
Mellon University, and Burger, Eric, Georgetown University, and Camp, L. Jean, Indiana
University Bloomington - School of Informatics and Computing and Lubar, Dan,
RelayServices Risking it All: Unlocking the Backdoor to the Nation's Cybersecurity
Social Science Research Network, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2468604)
Government policies can afect greatly the security of
commercial products, either positively or negatively. There are a number of methods by which a government
HOW A GOVERNMENT MIGHT WEAKEN SECURITY

might afect security negatively as a means of facilitating legal government surveillance. One inexpensive method is to exploit preexisting weaknesses that are already present in commercial software, while keeping these weaknesses a secret. Another method is to
motivate the designer of a computer or communications system to make those systems easier for government agencies to access.
Motivation may come from direct mandate or financial incentives. There are many ways that a designer can facilitate government

the system may be equipped with a backdoor. The company that


the government agency that requests it would know the

access once so motivated. For example,


creates it and, presumably,

backdoor, but not the products (or services) purchaser(s). The hope is that the government agency will use this feature when it is
given authority to do so, but no one else will. However, creating a backdoor introduces the risk that other
parties will find the vulnerability, especially when capable adversaries, who are
actively seeking security vulnerabilities, know how to leverage such weaknesses .
History illustrates that secret backdoors do not remain secret and that the more
widespread a backdoor, the more dangerous its existence . The 1988 Morris worm,3 the first widespread
Internet attack, used a number of backdoors to infect systems and spread widely. The backdoors in that case were a set of secrets then
known only by a small, highly technical community. A single, putatively innocent error resulted in a large-scale attack that disabled
many systems. In recent years, Barracuda had a completely undocumented backdoor4 that allowed high levels of access from the
Internet addresses assigned to Barracuda. However, when it was publicized, as almost inevitably happens, it became extremely unsafe,
and Barracudas customers rejected it. One example of how attackers can subvert backdoors placed into systems for benign reasons
occurred in the network of the largest commercial cellular operator in Greece.5 Switches deployed in the system came equipped with

Some unknown attacker was


able to install software, and made use of these embedded wiretapping features to
surreptitiously and illegally eavesdrop on calls from many cell phones including
phones belonging to the Prime Minister of Greece, a hundred high-ranking Greek
dignitaries, and an employee of the U.S. Embassy in Greece before the security breach finally was discovered. In
built-in wiretapping features, intended only for authorized law enforcement agencies.

essence, a backdoor created to fight crime was used to commit crime. BROADER USE AND ABUSE OF BACKDOORS Another way to
facilitate surveillance by weakening security is to install malware, which typically performs functions invisibly, regardless of the
commands or configurations of the customers, owners, or users of a product. Malware can be used to install backdoors, but it can also
be used for much more. One common use is to take over machines to sell their processing and communication capacity. Criminals use
malware for this purpose, creating networks or machines controlled by a remote entity. These networks are called botnets. Another
common form of malware is spyware, which exports information to an outside entity without the system owners knowledge or
informed consent. Like backdoors, people other than those who install it can use the malware. And like all other systematic
weaknesses, the more broadly this weakness is installed, the more the infrastructure and the innocent are at risk. A more passive way
of creating backdoors is not to disclose vulnerabilities of a system or technology when those vulnerabilities are discovered. A robust
black market exists for these vulnerabilities. According to one report, an undisclosed vulnerability in widely used commercial software
sells for $160,000, on average, on the black market.6 WEAK SECURITY IS DANGEROUS Improving the ability of law enforcement and
intelligence agencies to conduct electronic surveillance is part of a strategy to limit threats from criminals, foreign powers and terrorists.
At the same time, strengthening the cybersecurity of systems that private citizens and corporate entities use and engage also limits

Weak cybersecurity creates opportunities for


sophisticated criminal organizations, hostile nation-states, and well-funded, non-state
actors. Well-funded criminal organizations will turn to cybercrime for the same reasons
they turn to illegal drugs: money and greed. The costs imposed on the rest of us are
substantial. The consequences of malicious cyber activities take many forms
including direct financial losses (e.g., fraudulent use of credit cards); intellectual property theft; theft
of sensitive business information; opportunity costs, such as lost productivity when a
threats from criminals, foreign powers, and terrorists.

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computer system is taken down; and the damage to a companys reputation when
others learn its systems have been breached or are vulnerable to compromise. One
recent study estimates these costs range from $24 billion to $120 billion per year in
the United States.7 Not only are individuals and enterprises attacked but also federal, state and local governments.8
Weakened security can only increase the high cost of defending against cybercrime. Of course, some technically sophisticated
organizations are challenging the security of American computer and communications systems for reasons other than mere financial

Finding and exploiting security vulnerabilities is part of how international espionage


is conducted in the 21st century, as is clearly demonstrated by recent revelations
about Chinese government activities. In addition to economic advantage, foreign governments that compromise
gain.

the security of contractors to the U.S. Defense Department may use what they learn to improve their ofensive and defensive military

Moreover, as we saw from cyberattacks in Estonia and Georgia, cyberattacks


on civilian systems can be highly disruptive to nations and possibly a force multiplier
for military or dissident action. The more foreign powers can learn about security
vulnerabilities in critical U.S. systems, the more vulnerable the U nited States is. Worse yet,
such malicious behavior is no longer just the domain of nation states. Terrorist organizations also could launch
cyberattacks against critical systems. Weakened security only can increase the risk of
cyber-espionage, cyberattack, and cyberterrorism. If weakened security in
commercial products and services is the result of a national policy (as opposed to other causes,
such as human error or corporate interests) and that national policy is known or suspected, the
weakened security does additional harm to the nation. Similarly, weakened security in
support of consumer advertising has the potential to jeopardize the viability of a
companys product. Customers naturally will prefer products and services from companies that they believe are immune
from such policies and implements. Such U.S. policies could realize a significant negative impact
on U.S. competitiveness in the information technology sector . For example, Forrester Research Inc.
estimates that recent allegations about U.S. activities may reduce U.S. technology sales
overseas by as much as $180 billion, or 25 percent of information technology
services, by 2016.9 As the U.S. information technology sector accounts for a significant portion of the U.S. economy and
capabilities.

many high-paying jobs, we suggest such policies are counter to U.S. economic interests in the Information Age.

International IP theft causes decline growth, tech, and


innovation
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2013 (The IP Commission Report,The
National Bureau of Asian Researchhttp://www.ipcommission.org/report/ip_commission_report_052213.pdf) // JRW
The Impact of International IP Theft on the American Economy Hundreds of billions of
dollars per year. The annual losses are likely to be comparable to the current annual
level of U.S. exports to Asiaover $300 billion. The exact figure is unknowable, but private and
governmental studies tend to understate the impacts due to inadequacies in data or scope. The members of the
Commission agree with the assessment by the Commander of the United States Cyber Command and Director of the

the ongoing theft of IP is the greatest


transfer of wealth in history. Millions of jobs. If IP were to receive the same protection
overseas that it does here, the American economy would add millions of jobs. A drag
on U.S. GDP growth. Better protection of IP would encourage significantly more R&D
investment and economic growth. Innovation. The incentive to innovate drives
productivity growth and the advancements that improve the quality of life. The threat
of IP theft diminishes that incentive. Long Supply Chains Pose a Major Challenge Stolen IP
National Security Agency, General Keith Alexander, that

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represents a subsidy to foreign suppliers that do not have to bear the costs of
developing or licensing it. In China, where many overseas supply chains extend, even ethical multinational
companies frequently procure counterfeit items or items whose manufacture benefits from stolen IP, including
proprietary business processes, counterfeited machine tools, pirated software, etc.International IP Theft Is Not Just a

Russia, India, and other countries constitute important actors in a


worldwide challenge. Many issues are the same: poor legal environments for IPR,
protectionist industrial policies, and a sense that IP theft is justified by a playing field
that benefits developed countries. The Role of China Between 50% and 80% of the problem. The
Problem in China.

major studies range in their estimates of Chinas share of international IP theft; many are roughly 70%, but in specific
industries we see a broader range. The evidence. Evidence comes from disparate sources: the portion of court cases in
which China is the destination for stolen IP, reports by the U.S. Trade Representative, studies from specialized firms and

Why does China stand out? A core


component of Chinas successful growth strategy is acquiring science and technology .
It does this in part by legal meansimports, foreign domestic investment, licensing,
and joint venturesbut also by means that are illegal. National industrial policy goals
in China encourage IP theft, and an extraordinary number of Chinese in business and
government entities are engaged in this practice . There are also weaknesses and
biases in the legal and patent systems that lessen the protection of foreign IP. In
addition, other policies weaken IPR, from mandating technology standards that favor
domestic suppliers to leveraging access to the Chinese market for foreign companies
technologies.
industry groups, and studies sponsored by the U.S. government.

4th is vulnerability
Cyber-attacks and consequences cost billions of dollars to US
companies
(Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., November 2014, 68-9;6
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/Complete%20Report.PDF) //JRW
Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Theft Cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property (IP) and commercial espionage are

the annual cost of cyber crime


and cyber espionage is estimated to account for between $24 billion and $120 billion
(or 0.2 to 0.8 percent of GDP), and results in the loss of as many as 200,000 U.S. jobs
annually.220 The Chinese governments engagement in cyber espionage for commercial
advantage was exposed on May 19, 2014, when the U.S. Department of Justice
charged five PLA officers for cyber-enabled theft and other related ofenses committed
against six U.S. victims, including Westinghouse Electric Co. (Westinghouse), U.S. subsidiaries of SolarWorld AG
among the biggest risks facing U.S. companies today. In the United States,

(SolarWorld), United States Steel Corp. (U.S. Steel), Allegheny Technologies Inc. (ATI), Alcoa Inc., and the United Steel,
Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (USW or

PLA Unit 61398 * 222 officers Wang Dong, Sun Kailiang,


Wen Xinyu, Huang Zhenyu, and Gu Chunhui hacked, or attempted to hack, into the victims
computers to steal information that would be useful to competitors in China, including
Steelworkers Union).221 According to the indictment,

SOEs.223 One victim, SolarWorld, subsequently petitioned the U.S. Department of Commerce to investigate the

the indictment as they directly related to SolarWorlds ongoing trade dispute over
imports of solar products from China.224 The Chinese government strongly denied what it called the
fabricated allegations, 225 and within days of the indictment, China retaliated both economically and
allegations made in

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politically against the United States. The Chinese government suspended participation
in a U.S.-China Cyber Working Group, which was established in 2013 as a bilateral
dialogue on cyber security.226 China also announced that its government offices were
forbidden from using Microsofts Windows 8 operating system and ordered security
checks on foreign IT products and services seemingly directed at U.S. companies,
including Cisco Systems.227 Likewise, the PBOC and the Chinese Ministry of Finance
asked banks to replace IBM servers with those produced by domestic brands to protect
financial security.228 In the same week, the Chinese government instructed SOEs to
sever ties with U.S. consulting companies, including McKinsey, Boston Consulting
Group, Bain & Company, and Strategy & Co. (formerly known as Booz & Co.), and
urged SOEs to establish teams of domestic consultants out of fears that U.S.
consultants are government spies.229 Chinese entities have long been engaging in
cyber-enabled theft against U.S. companies for commercial gain; however, the May 19
indictment represents the first ever charges against known state actors for infiltrating
U.S. commercial targets by cyber means .230 In addition, the indictment states that Chinese firms
hired the same PLA Unit where the defendants worked to provide information technology services. 231 This
established a channel through which the Chinese firms could issue tasking orders to the PLA defendants to engage in
cyber theft and commercial espionage. For example, in one case, according to the indictment, a Chinese SOE hired the

Of the 141 organizations


allegedly compromised by PLA Unit 61398 since 2006, 81 percent were located or
headquartered in the United States.233 In June 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted Chinese
PLA Unit to build a secret database to hold corporate intelligence. 232

energy firm Sinovel for cyber-enabled IP theft committed against Massachusetts-based American Superconductor
(AMSC).* Florida-based biofuel company Algenol, which is developing technology that converts algae into fuels while
decreasing greenhouse gas emissions, fell victim to more than 39 million hacking attempts since mid-2013.234
According to Algenols technology chief, 63,000 hacking attempts came from China, of which 6,653 attempts came
from IP addresses identified by cyber security firm Mandiant as belonging to PLA Unit 61398.235 Algenols investigation
also identified Alibabas cloud computing subsidiary Aliyun as an originator of hacking attempts, though Alibaba
claimed that Algenol mischaracterized ordinary Internet traffic as hacking attempts.236

5th is internet governance


NSA backdoors undercuts US internet credibility, causes harmful
regs, and hampers integration
Kehl 14 (Danielle Kehl et al, July 2014. Policy Analyst at New Americas Open
Technology Institute (OTI); Kevin Bankston is the Policy Director at OTI; Robyn Greene
is a Policy Counsel at OTI; and Robert Morgus is a Research Associate at OTI.
Surveillance Costs: The NSAs Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom &
Cybersecurity,
http://oti.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Surveilance_Costs_Fina
l.pdf)
there were questions from the beginning about whether the United States would hold
itself to the same high standards domestically that it holds others to internationally , 178
the American government has successfully built up a policy and programming agenda
in the past few years based on promoting an open Internet . 179 These eforts include raising concerns
Although

over Internet repression in bilateral dialogues with countries such as Vietnam and China, 180 supporting initiatives
including the Freedom Online Coalition, and providing over $120 million in funding for groups working to advance
Internet freedom supporting counter-censorship and secure communications technology, digital safety training, and
policy and research programs for people facing Internet repression. 181 However,

the legitimacy of these

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efforts has been thrown into question since the NSA disclosures began . Trust
has been the principal casualty in this unfortunate afair, wrote Ben FitzGerald and Richard Butler in December 2013.
The

American public, our nations allies, leading businesses and Internet users around
the world are losing faith in the U.S. governments role as the leading proponent of a
free, open and integrated global Internet . 182 Prior to the NSA revelations, the United States was
already facing an increasingly challenging political climate as it promoted the Internet Freedom agenda in global
Internet governance conversations. At the 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), the U.S.
and diverse group of other countries refused to sign the updated International Telecommunications Regulations based
on concerns that the document pushed for greater governmental control of the Internet and would ultimately harm
Internet Freedom. 183 Many observers noted that the split hardened the division between two opposing camps in the
Internet governance debate: proponents of a status quo multistakeholder Internet governance model, like the United
States, who argued that the existing system was the best way to preserve key online freedoms, and those seeking to
disrupt or challenge that multistakeholder model for a variety of political and economic reasons, including governments

proposals for
more governmental control over the network could be understood as attempts by
authoritarian countries to more efectively monitor and censor their citizens , which
allowed the U.S. to reasonably maintain some moral high ground as its delegates
like Russia and China pushing for greater national sovereignty over the Internet. 184 Many of the

walked out of the treaty conference. 185 Although few stakeholders seemed particularly pleased by the outcome of the
WCIT, reports indicate that by the middle of 2013 the tone had shifted in a more collaborative and positive direction
following the meetings of the 2013 World Telecommunications/ICT Policy Forum (WTPF) and the World Summit on
Information Society + 10 (WSIS+10) review. 186 However, the Internet governance conversation took a dramatic turn
after the Snowden disclosures. The annual meeting of the Freedom Online Coalition occurred in Tunis in June 2013, just
a few weeks after the initial leaks. Unsurprisingly, surveillance dominated the conference even though the agenda
covered a wide range of topics from Internet access and afordability to cybersecurity. 187 Throughout the two-day
event, representatives from civil society used the platform to confront and criticize governments about their monitoring

NSA surveillance would continue to be the focus of international


convenings on Internet Freedom and Internet governance for months to come, making civil
society representatives and foreign governments far less willing to embrace the
United States Internet Freedom agenda or to accept its defense of the multistakeholder model of
practices. 188

Internet governance as a anything other than self-serving. One can come up with all kinds of excuses for why US
surveillance is not hypocrisy. For example, one might argue that US policies are more benevolent than those of many
other regimes And one might recognize that in several cases, some branches of government dont know what other
branches are doing and therefore US policy is not so much hypocritical as it is inadvertently contradictory, wrote Eli

the
NSA is galvanizing opposition to Americas internet freedom agenda. 189 The
scandal revived proposals from both Russia and Brazil for global management of
technical standards and domain names, whether through the ITU or other avenues.
Even developing countries, many of whom have traditionally aligned with the U.S. and
prioritize access and afordability as top issues, dont want US assistance because
they assume the equipment comes with a backdoor for the NSA. They are walking
straight into the arms of Russia, China, and the ITU. 190 Consequently, NSA surveillance
has shifted the dynamics of the Internet governance debate in a potentially
destabilizing manner. The Snowden revelations have also been well-received by those who seek to
Dourado, a researcher from the Mercatus Center at George Mason University in August 2013. But the fact is that

discredit existing approaches to Internet governance, wrote the Center for Democracy & Technologys Matthew
Shears. There has been a long-running antipathy among a number of stakeholders to the United States governments
perceived control of the Internet and the dominance of US Internet companies. There has also been a long-running
antipathy, particularly among some governments, to the distributed and open management of the Internet. 191
Shears points out that evidence of the NSAs wide-ranging capabilities has fueled general concerns about the current
Internet governance system, bolstering the arguments of those calling for a new government-centric governance order.
At the UN Human Rights Council in September 2013, the representative from Pakistanspeaking on behalf of Cuba,
Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Ecuador, Russia, Indonesia, Bolivia, Iran, and Chinaexplicitly linked the revelations
about surveillance programs to the need for reforming Internet governance processes and institutions to give
governments a larger role. 192 Surveillance issues continued to dominate the conversation at the 2013 Internet
Governance Forum in Bali as well, where debates on child protection, education and infrastructure were overshadowed
by widespread concerns from delegates who said the publics trust in the internet was being undermined by reports of

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US and British government surveillance. 193 Further complicating these conversations is the fact that several of the
institutions that govern the technical functions of the Internet are either tied to the American government or are
located in the United States. Internet governance scholar Milton Mueller has described how the reaction to the NSA

in
addition to revealing the scale and scope of state surveillance and the preeminent role
of the United States and its partners, the NSA disclosures may push other states
toward a more nationally partitioned Internet and threaten in a very
fundamental way the claim that the US had a special status as neutral steward of
Internet governance. 194 These concerns were publicly voiced in October 2013 by the heads of a number of
disclosures has become entangled in an already contentious Internet governance landscape. Mueller argues that,

key organizations, including the President of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and
the chair of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), in the Montevideo Statement on the Future of Internet
Cooperation. Their statement expressed strong concern over the undermining of the trust and confidence of Internet
users globally due to recent revelations of pervasive monitoring and surveillance and called for accelerating the
globalization of ICANN and Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions, towards an environment in which all
stakeholders, including 22 all governments, participate on an equal footing. 195 In particular, the process of
internationalizing ICANNwhich has had a contractual relationship with the Commerce Departments National
Telecommunications and Information Association (NTIA) since 1998has progressed in recent months. 196

That destroys the global economy


McDowell 12 (FCC Chair, Comm'r. McDowell's Congressional Testimony, 5/31,
http://www.fcc.gov/document/commr-mcdowells-congressional-testimony-5-31-2012)
It is a pleasure and an honor to testify beside my friend, Ambassador Phil Verveer. First, please allow me to dispense quickly and
emphatically any doubts about the bipartisan resolve of the United States to resist eforts to expand the International
Telecommunication Unions (ITU) authority over Internet matters. Some ITU officials have dismissed our concern over this issue as
mere election year politics. Nothing could be further from the truth as evidenced by Ambassador Verveers testimony today as well as
recent statements from the White House, Executive Branch agencies, Democratic and Republican Members of Congress and my friend
and colleague, FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski. We are unified on the substantive arguments and have always been so. Second,

it is

important to define the challenge before us. The threats are real and not imagined,
although they admittedly sound like works of fiction at times. For many years now,
scores of countries led by China, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and many others, have
pushed for, as then-Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said almost a year ago, international control of the
Internet through the ITU.1 I have tried to find a more concise way to express this issue, but I cant seem to improve upon
now-President Putins crystallization of the efort that has been afoot for quite some time. More importantly, I think we should take
President Putin very seriously. 1 Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Working Day, GOVT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDN,
http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/15601/ (June 15, 2011) (last visited May 14, 2012). Six months separate us from the renegotiation

What proponents of
Internet freedom do or dont do between now and then will determine the fate of the
Net, afect global economic growth and determine whether political liberty can
proliferate. During the treaty negotiations, the most lethal threat to Internet freedom may not come
from a full frontal assault, but through insidious and seemingly innocuous expansions of
intergovernmental powers. This subterranean efort is already under way. While influential ITU Member States have put
of the 1988 treaty that led to insulating the Internet from economic and technical regulation.

forth proposals calling for overt legal expansions of United Nations or ITU authority over the Net, ITU officials have publicly declared that
the ITU does not intend to regulate Internet governance while also saying that any regulations should be of the light-touch variety.2
But which is it? It is not possible to insulate the Internet from new rules while also establishing a new light touch regulatory regime.
Either a new legal paradigm will emerge in December or it wont. The choice is binary. Additionally, as a threshold matter, it is curious
that ITU officials have been opining on the outcome of the treaty negotiation. The ITUs Member States determine the fate of any new
rules, not ITU leadership and staf. I remain hopeful that the diplomatic process will not be subverted in this regard. As a matter of
process and substance, patient and persistent incrementalism is the Nets most dangerous enemy and it is the hallmark of many
countries that are pushing the proregulation agenda. Specifically, some ITU officials and Member States have been discussing an alleged
worldwide phone numbering crisis. It seems that the world may be running out of phone numbers, over which the ITU does have some
jurisdiction. 2 Speech by ITU Secretary-General Tour, The Challenges of Extending the Benefits of Mobile (May 1,
2012),http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/press_releases/index.aspx?lang=en (last visited May 29, 2012). 2 Today, many phone numbers
are used for voice over Internet protocol services such as Skype or Google Voice. To function properly, the software supporting these
services translate traditional phone numbers into IP addresses. The Russian Federation has proposed that the ITU be given jurisdiction
over IP addresses to remedy the phone number shortage.3 What is left unsaid, however, is that potential ITU jurisdiction over IP

Stefan Bauschard
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addresses would enable it to regulate Internet services and devices with abandon. IP addresses are a fundamental and essential
component to the inner workings of the Net. Taking their administration away from the bottomup, non-governmental, multi-stakeholder
model and placing it into the hands of international bureaucrats would be a grave mistake. Other eforts to expand the ITUs reach into
the Internet are seemingly small but are tectonic in scope. Take for example the Arab States submission from February that would
change the rules definition of telecommunications to include processing or computer functions.4 This change would essentially
swallow the Internets functions with only a tiny edit to existing rules.5 When ITU leadership claims that no Member States have
proposed absorbing Internet governance into the ITU or other intergovernmental entities, the Arab States submission demonstrates that
nothing could be further from the truth. An infinite number of avenues exist to 3 Further Directions for Revision of the ITRs, Russian
Federation, CWG-WCIT12 Contribution 40, at 3 (2011), http://www.itu.int/md/T09-CWG.WCIT12-C-0040/en (last visited May 29, 2012)
(To oblige ITU to allocate/distribute some part of IPv6 addresses (as same way/principle as for telephone numbering, simultaneously
existing of many operators/numbers distributors inside unified numbers space for both fixed and mobile phone services) and
determination of necessary requirements.). 4 Proposed Revisions, Arab States, CWG-WCIT12 Contribution 67, at 3 (2012),
http://www.itu.int/md/T09CWG.WCIT12-C-0067/en (last visited May 29, 2012). 5 And Iran argues that the current definition already
includes the Internet. Contribution from Iran, The Islamic Republic of Iran, CWG-WCIT12 Contribution 48, Attachment 2 (2011),
http://www.itu.int/md/T09-CWG.WCIT12C-0048/en (last visited May 29, 2012). 3 accomplish the same goal and it is camouflaged
subterfuge that proponents of Internet freedom should watch for most vigilantly. Other examples come from China. China would like to
see the creation of a system whereby Internet users are registered using their IP addresses. In fact, last year, China teamed up with
Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to propose to the UN General Assembly that it create an International Code of Conduct for Information
Security to mandate international norms and rules standardizing the behavior of countries concerning information and cyberspace.6
Does anyone here today believe that these countries proposals would encourage the continued proliferation of an open and freedomenhancing Internet? Or would such constructs make it easier for authoritarian regimes to identify and silence political dissidents? These
proposals may not technically be part of the WCIT negotiations, but they give a sense of where some of the ITUs Member States would
like to go. Still other proposals that have been made personally to me by foreign government officials include the creation of an
international universal service fund of sorts whereby foreign usually state-owned telecom companies would use international
mandates to charge certain Web destinations on a per-click basis to fund the build-out of broadband infrastructure across the globe.

the U.S. and likeminded proponents of Internet freedom and prosperity across the globe should resist
eforts to expand the powers of intergovernmental bodies over the Internet 6 Letter dated 12
Google, iTunes, Facebook and Netflix are mentioned most often as prime sources of funding. In short,

September 2011 from the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, Item 93 of the provisional agenda - Developments in the field of information and
telecommunications in the context of international security, 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Annex (Sep. 14,
2011), http://www.cs.brown.edu/courses/csci1800/sources/2012_UN_Russia_and_China_Code_o_Conduct.pdf (last visited May 29, 2012).

such a scenario
would be devastating to global economic activity , but it would hurt the
developing world the most. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and I look forward to your
even in the smallest of ways. As my supplemental statement and analysis explains in more detail below,

questions. Thank you, Chairman Walden and Ranking Member Eshoo, for holding this hearing. Its topic is among the most important
public policy issues afecting global commerce and political freedom: namely, whether the International Telecommunication Union (ITU),
or any other intergovernmental body, should be allowed to expand its jurisdiction into the operational and economic afairs of the
Internet. As we head toward the treaty negotiations at the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) in Dubai in
December, I urge governments around the world to avoid the temptation to tamper with the Internet. Since its privatization in the early

the Internet has flourished across the world under the current deregulatory
framework. In fact, the long-standing international consensus has been to keep
governments from regulating core functions of the Internets ecosystem. Yet, some
nations, such as China, Russia, India, Iran and Saudi Arabia, have been pushing to reverse this course by
giving the ITU or the United Nations itself, regulatory jurisdiction over Internet governance. The ITU is
1990s,

a treaty-based organization under the auspices of the United Nations.1 Dont take my word for it, however. As Russian Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin said almost one year ago, the goal of this well-organized and energetic efort is to establish international control over the
Internet using the monitoring and supervisory capabilities of the [ITU].2 Motivations of some ITU Member states vary. Some of the
arguments in support of such actions may stem from frustrations with the operations of Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN). Any concerns regarding ICANN, however, should not be used as a pretext to end the multi-stakeholder model that has
served all nations especially the developing world so well. Any reforms to ICANN should take place through the bottom-up multistakeholder process and should not arise through the WCITs examination of the International Telecommunication Regulations (ITR)s.
Constructive reform of the ITRs may be needed. If so, the scope of any review should be limited to traditional telecommunications
services and not expanded to include information services or any form of Internet services. Modification of the current multistakeholder
Internet governance model may be necessary as well, but we should all work together to ensure no intergovernmental regulatory
overlays are placed into this sphere. Not only would nations surrender some of their national sovereignty in such a pursuit, but they
would sufocate their own economies as well, while politically paralyzing engineering and business decisions within a global regulatory
body. 1 History, IThttp://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/history.aspx">U, http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/history.aspx (last visited May 14,
2012). 2 Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Working Day, GOVT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDN,
http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/15601/ (June 15, 2011) (last visited May 14, 2012). Every day headlines tell us about

Not only
must governments, including our own, tighten their fiscal belts, but they must also
spur economic expansion. An unfettered Internet offers the brightest ray of
hope for growth during this dark time of economic uncertainty, not more
industrialized and developing nations alike that are awash in debt, facing flat growth curves, or worse, shrinking GDPs.

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regulation. Indeed, we are at a crossroads for the Internets future. One path holds great
promise, while the other path is fraught with peril. The promise, of course, lies with
keeping what works, namely maintaining a freedom-enhancing and open Internet
while insulating it from legacy regulations. The peril lies with changes that would
ultimately sweep up Internet services into decades-old ITU paradigms. If successful,
these eforts would merely imprison the future in the regulatory dungeon of the past.
The future of global growth and political freedom lies with an unfettered
Internet. Shortly after the Internet was privatized in 1995, a mere 16 million people were online worldwide.3 As of early 2012,
approximately 2.3 billion people were using the Net.4 Internet connectivity quickly evolved from being a
novelty in industrialized countries to becoming an essential tool for commerce and
sometimes even basic survival in all nations, but especially in the developing world.
Such explosive growth was helped, not hindered, by a deregulatory construct.
Developing nations stand to gain the most from the rapid pace of deployment and
adoption of Internet technologies brought forth by an Internet free from
intergovernmental regulation. By way of illustration, a McKinsey report released in January examined the Nets efect
on the developing world, or aspiring countries.5 In 30 specific aspiring countries studied, including Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria,
Turkey and Vietnam,6 Internet penetration has grown 25 percent per year for the past five years, compared to only five percent per year
in developed nations.7 Obviously, broadband penetration is lower in aspiring countries than in the developed world, but that is quickly
changing thanks to mobile Internet access technologies. Mobile subscriptions in developing countries have risen from 53 percent of the
global market in 2005 to 73 percent in 2010.8 In fact, Cisco estimates that the number of mobile-connected devices will exceed the
worlds population sometime this year.9 Increasingly, Internet users in these countries use only mobile devices for their Internet
access.10 This trend has resulted in developing countries growing their global share of Internet users from 33 percent in 2005, to 52
percent in 2010, with a projected 61 percent share by 2015.11 The 30 aspiring countries discussed earlier are home to one billion

The efect that rapidly growing Internet connectivity is


having on aspiring countries economies is tremendous. The Net is an economic
growth accelerator. It contributed an average 1.9 percent of GDP growth in aspiring
countries for an estimated total of $366 billion in 2010.13 In some developing economies, Internet connectivity has
contributed up to 13 percent of GDP growth over the past five years .14 In six aspiring countries
Internet users, half of all global Internet users.

alone, 1.9 million jobs were associated with the Internet.15 And in other countries, the Internet creates 2.6 new jobs for each job it

The best path forward is the


one that has served the global economy so well, that of a multi-stakeholder governed
Internet. One potential outcome that could develop if pro-regulation nations are
successful in granting the ITU authority over Internet governance would be a
partitioned Internet. In particular, fault lines could be drawn between countries that will choose to continue to live under the
disrupts.16 I expect that we would all agree that these positive trends must continue.

current successful model and those Member States who decide to opt out to place themselves under an intergovernmental regulatory

A balkanized Internet would not promote global free trade or increase living
standards. At a minimum, it would create extreme uncertainty and raise costs for all
users across the globe by rendering an engineering, operational and financial morass.
regime.

For instance, Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) recently announced placing many of their courses online for

The uncertainty and economic and engineering chaos associated with


a newly politicized intergovernmental legal regime would inevitably drive up costs as
cross border traffic and cloud computing become more complicated and
vulnerable to regulatory arbitrage. Such costs are always passed on to the end user consumers and may very
free for anyone to use.

well negate the ability of content and application providers such as Harvard and MIT to ofer first-rate educational content for free.

Nations that value freedom and prosperity should draw a line in the sand
against new regulations while welcoming reform that could include a non-regulatory role for the ITU. Venturing into
the uncertainty of a new regulatory quagmire will only undermine developing nations the most.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

Slowdown in growth causes extinction


Richard N. Haass 13, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, 4/30/13, The
World Without America, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/repairing-theroots-of-american-power-by-richard-n--haass
The most critical threat facing the United States now and for the foreseeable future is
not a rising China, a reckless North Korea, a nuclear Iran, modern terrorism, or climate change. Although all of these constitute
potential or actual threats, the biggest challenges facing the US are its burgeoning debt, crumbling infrastructure, second-rate primary
and secondary schools, outdated immigration system, and slow economic growth in short, the domestic foundations of
American power . Readers in other countries may be tempted to react to this judgment with a dose of schadenfreude, finding more than a little satisfaction in Americas
Let me posit a radical idea:

difficulties. Such a response should not be surprising. The US and those representing it have been guilty of hubris (the US may often be the indispensable nation, but it would be better if
others pointed this out), and examples of inconsistency between Americas practices and its principles understandably provoke charges of hypocrisy. When America does not adhere to the
principles that it preaches to others, it breeds resentment. But, like most temptations, the urge to gloat at Americas imperfections and struggles ought to be resisted. People around the globe
should be careful what they wish for.

Americas failure to deal with its internal challenges would come at a

steep price. Indeed, the rest of the worlds stake in American success is nearly as large as that of the US itself. Part of the reason is economic. The US economy still accounts for
about one-quarter of global output. If US growth accelerates, Americas capacity to consume other
countries goods and services will increase , thereby boosting growth around the world. At a time
when Europe is drifting and Asia is slowing , only the US (or, more broadly, North America) has the
potential to drive global economic recovery . The US remains a unique source of innovation. Most of the worlds citizens communicate with
mobile devices based on technology developed in Silicon Valley; likewise, the Internet was made in America. More recently, new technologies developed in the US greatly increase the ability
to extract oil and natural gas from underground formations. This technology is now making its way around the globe, allowing other societies to increase their energy production and decrease
both their reliance on costly imports and their carbon emissions. The US is also an invaluable source of ideas. Its world-class universities educate a significant percentage of future world

the US has long been a leading example of what market economies and
democratic politics can accomplish. People and governments around the world are far more
likely to become more open if the American model is perceived to be succeeding. Finally,
the world faces many serious challenges, ranging from the need to halt the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, fight climate change, and maintain a functioning world economic order that
promotes trade and investment to regulating practices in cyberspace, improving global health,
leaders. More fundamentally,

and preventing armed conflicts. These problems will not simply go away or sort
themselves out . While Adam Smiths invisible hand may ensure the success of free markets, it is powerless in the
world of geopolitics . Order requires the visible hand of leadership to formulate and
realize global responses to global challenges. Dont get me wrong: None of this is meant to suggest that the US can deal efectively
with the worlds problems on its own. Unilateralism rarely works. It is not just that the US lacks the means; the very nature of contemporary global problems suggests that only collective

multilateralism is much easier to advocate than to design and


implement. Right now there is only one candidate for this role: the US. No other country has
the necessary combination of capability and outlook. This brings me back to the argument that the US must
put its house in order economically, physically, socially, and politically if it is to have the resources
needed to promote order in the world. Everyone should hope that it does: The alternative to a world led by the US
is not a world led by China, Europe, Russia, Japan, India , or any other country, but rather a
world that is not led at all . Such a world would almost certainly be characterized by chronic crisis and
conflict. That would be bad not just for Americans, but for the vast majority of the planets inhabitants.
responses stand a good chance of succeeding. But

Tech innovation is key to sustainable growth- it avoids


biodiversity collapse, disease, famine, poverty, and extinction
Brent Barker, electrical engineer, and manager of corporate communications for the
Electric Power Research Institute and former industrial economist and staf author at
SRI International and as a commercial research analyst at USX Corporation, 2K

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
Technology and the Quest for Sustainability, EPRI Journal, Summer 2000, Vol. 25, p.
8-17
accelerating productivity is not an option but rather an imperative for the future. It is
necessary in order to provide the wealth for environmental sustainability , to support an aging population
in the industrialized world, and to provide an economic ladder for developing nations . The second area
of opportunity for technology lies in its potential to help stabilize global population at 1012 billion sometime in the twenty-first century, possibly as early as 2075. The key is economics. Global
communications, from television to movies to the Internet, have brought an image of the comfortable
life of the developed world into the homes of the poorest people, firing their own
aspirations for a better quality of life, either through economic development in their own country
or through emigration to other countries. If we in the developed world can make the basic tools of prosperity-infrastructure, health care, education, and law--more accessible and afordable , recent history suggests that the
cultural drivers for producing large families will be tempered , relatively quickly and without
From a social standpoint,

coercion. But the task is enormous. The physical prerequisites for prosperity in the global economy are electricity and communications.
Today, there are more than 2 billion people living without electricity, or commercial energy in any form, in the very countries where
some 5 billion people will be added in the next 50 years. If for no other reason than our enlightened self-interest, we should strive for
universal access to electricity, communications, and educational opportunity. We have little choice, because the fate of the developed

opportunity for
technology is in decoupling population growth from land use and , more broadly, decoupling
economic growth from natural resource consumption through recycling, end-use
efficiency, and industrial ecology. Decoupling population from land use is well under way. According to Grubler, from
world is inextricably bound up in the economic and demographic fate of the developing world. A third, related

1700 to 1850 nearly 2 hectares of land (5 acres) were needed to support every child born in North America, while in the more crowded
and cultivated regions of Europe and Asia only 0.5 hectare (1.2 acres) and 0.2 hectare (0.5 acre) were needed, respectively. During the
past century, the amount of land needed per additional child has been dropping in all areas of the world, with

Europe and

North America experiencing the fastest decreases. Both crossed the "zero threshold" in the past few decades,
meaning that no additional land is needed to support additional children and that land
requirements will continue to decrease in the future. One can postulate that the pattern of returning
land to nature will continue to spread throughout the world, eventually stemming and
then reversing the current onslaught on the great rain forests. Time is critical if vast
tracts are to be saved from being laid bare, and success will largely depend on how rapidly
economic opportunities expand for those now trapped in subsistence and frontier
farming. In concept, the potential for returning land to nature is enormous. Futurist and scholar Jesse Ausubel of the Rockefeller
University calculates that if farmers could lift average grain yields around the world just to the level of today's average U.S. corn grower,
one-half of current global cropland--an area the size of the Amazon basin--could be spared. If agriculture is a leading indicator, then the

with shrinking agricultural


land requirements, water distribution and use around the world can be greatly altered ,
continuous drive to produce more from less will prevail in other parts of the economy Certainly

since nearly two-thirds of water now goes for irrigation. Overall, the technologies of the future will, in the words of Ausubel, be "cleaner,
leaner, lighter, and drier"--that is, more efficient and less wasteful of materials and water. They will be much more tightly integrated
through microprocessor-based control and will therefore use human and natural resources much more efficiently and productively.
Energy intensity, land intensity, and water intensity (and, to a lesser extent, materials intensity) for both manufacturing and agriculture
are already heading downward. Only in agriculture are they falling fast enough to ofset the surge in population, but, optimistically,
advances in science and technology should accelerate the downward trends in other sectors, helping to decouple economic
development from environmental impact in the coming century. One positive sign is the fact that recycling rates in North America are
now approaching 65% for steel, lead, and copper and 30% for aluminum and paper. A second sign is that economic output is shifting
away from resource-intensive products toward knowledge-based, immaterial goods and services. As a result, although the U.S. gross
domestic product (GDP) increased 200-fold (in real dollars) in the twentieth century, the physical weight of our annual output remains
the same as it was in 1900. If anything, this trend will be accelerating. As Kevin Kelly, the editor of Wired magazine, noted, "The
creations most in demand from the United States [as exports] have lost 50% of their physical weight per dollar of value in only six
years.... Within a generation, two at most, the number of people working in honest-to-goodness manufacturing jobs will be no more than

Even
pollution shows clear signs of being decoupled from population and economic growth .
the number of farmers on the land--less than a few percent. Far more than we realize, the network economy is pulling us all in."

Economist Paul Portney notes that, with the exception of greenhouse gases, "in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] countries, the favorable experience [with pollution control] has been a triumph of technology That is, the ratio of pollution
per unit of GDP has fallen fast enough in the developed world to ofset the increase in both GDP per capita and the growing number of

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
'capitas' themselves." The fourth opportunity for science and technology stems from their enormous potential to unlock resources not
now available, to reduce human limitations, to create new options for policymakers and businesspeople alike, and to give us new levels
of insight into future challenges. Technically resources have little value if we cannot unlock them for practical use. With technology, we
are able to bring dormant resources to life. For example, it was only with the development of an electrolytic process late in the
nineteenth century that aluminum--the most abundant metal on earth--became commercially available and useful. Chemistry unlocked
hydrocarbons. And engineering allowed us to extract and put to diverse use untapped petroleum and gas fields. Over the course of
history, technology has made the inaccessible accessible, and resource depletion has been more of a catalyst for change than a
longstanding problem. Technology provides us with last-ditch methods (what economists would call substitutions) that allow us to
circumvent or leapfrog over crises of our own making. Agricultural technology solved the food crisis of the first half of the nineteenth
century. The English "steam crisis" of the 1860s, triggered by the rapid rise of coal-burning steam engines and locomotives, was averted
by mechanized mining and the discovery and use of petroleum. The U.S. "timber crisis" that Teddy Roosevelt publicly worried about was
circumvented by the use of chemicals that enabled a billion or so railroad ties to last for decades instead of years. The great "manure
crisis" of the same era was solved by the automobile, which in a few decades replaced some 25 million horses and freed up 40 million
hectares (100 million acres) of farmland, not to mention improving the sanitation and smell of inner cities. Oil discoveries in Texas and
then in the Middle East pushed the pending oil crisis of the 1920s into the future. And the energy crisis of the 1970s stimulated the
development of new sensing and drilling technology, sparked the advance of non--fossil fuel alternatives, and deepened the penetration
of electricity with its fuel flexibility into the global economy Thanks to underground imaging technology, today's known gas resources
are an order of magnitude greater than the resources known 20 years ago, and new reserves continue to be discovered. Technology has
also greatly extended human limits. It has given each of us a productive capability greater than that of 150 workers in 1800, for
example, and has conveniently put the power of hundreds of horses in our garages. In recent decades, it has extended our voice and our

But global
sustainability is not inevitable. In spite of the tremendous promise that technology holds for a sustainable future,
there is the potential for all of this to backfire before the job can be done. There are disturbing
indications that people sometimes turn in fear and anger on technologies, industries, and institutions that
openly foster an ever-faster pace of change . The current opposition to nuclear power genetically altered food,
reach, allowing us to easily send our words, ideas, images, and money around the world at the speed of light.

the globalization of the economy and the spread of American culture should give us pause. Technology has always presented a twoedged sword, serving as both cause and efect, solving one problem while creating another that was unintended and often unforeseen.
We solved the manure crisis, but automotive smog, congestion, and urban sprawl took its place. We cleaned and transformed the cities
with all-electric buildings rising thousands of feet into the sky. But while urban pollution was thereby dramatically reduced, a portion of
the pollution was shifted to someone else's sky. Breaking limits "Limits to growth" was a popular theme in the 1970s, and a best-selling
book of that name predicted dire consequences for the human race by the end of the century. In fact, we have done much better than
those predictions, largely because of a factor the book missed--the potential of new technology to break limits. Repeatedly, human
societies have approached seemingly insurmountable barriers only to find the means and tools to break through. This ability has now

Today's perceived limits, however, look and


are global in nature, multicultural, and larger in scale and complexity than ever
before. Nearly 2 billion people in the world are without adequate sanitation, and nearly
as many are without access to clean drinking water. AIDS is spreading rapidly in the regions
of the world least able to fight it. Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are more than 30%
greater than preindustrial levels and are climbing steadily. Petroleum reserves , expected to be tapped by over a
billion automobiles worldwide by 2015, may last only another 50-100 years. And without careful preservation eforts,
the biodiversity of the planet could become as threatened in this coming century as it
was at the end of the last ice age, when more than 70% of the species of large mammals and
other vertebrates in North America disappeared (along with 29% in Europe and 86% in Australia). All these perceived
limits require innovation of a scope and intensity surpassing humankind's current
commitment. The list of real-world problems that could thwart global sustainability is
long and sobering. It includes war, disease, famine, political and religious turmoil,
despotism, entrenched poverty, illiteracy, resource depletion, and environmental
degradation. Technology can help resolve some of these issues--poverty and disease, resource depletion, and environmental
become a source of optimism, an article of faith, in many parts of the world.
feel diferent. They

impact, for example--but it ofers little recourse for the passions and politics that divide the world. The likelihood is that we will not catch
up and overtake the moving target of global sustainability in the coming century, but given the prospects for technology, which have

We should put our technology to work , striving to lift


more than 5 billion people out of poverty while preventing irreversible damage to the
biosphere and irreversible loss of the earth's natural resources .
never been brighter, we may come surprisingly close.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

1ACCloud computing Advantage


Advantage __ is cloud computing
Government backdoors decimate cloud computing industry and
decks US tech leadership
Zara 13 (Christopher, Financial Contributor @ International Business Times, "Privacy,
Security And The Economy: Why The US Government Cares More About Spying On Your
Email Than Getting You A Job," http://www.ibtimes.com/privacy-security-economy-whyus-government-cares-more-about-spying-your-email-getting-you-job)
Imagine if the U.S. government had created institutional barriers
that hindered the development of the American tech sector in the 1980s and '90s. No
Microsoft or Apple, no Google nor Facebook. What would the world look like today? The short answer is simple: The
stunted growth of Silicon Valley would have allowed tech companies in other countries
to fill the void, to meet the needs of the world that were being fueled by vast
technological change. Fortunately, that hypothetical scenario didnt happen , but according to
Daniel Castro, senior analyst with the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), a modern-day version of it is
taking place as we speak. Castro has been studying the efects that the
government-surveillance scandal could have on the U.S. tech industry . He said that if
privacy-conscious computer users decide that the risks of storing data with a U.S.
company simply outweigh the benefits, the results could be devastating. U.S.
companies, which have really been leaders in this field, will lose their
dominance, he said in a phone interview. And it wont be because of technical inferiority, but because of legal restrictions, or perceptions about
the implications of legal regimes. Earlier this month, Castro released a report showing that the U.S. cloudcomputing industry stands to lose $22 billion to $35 billion during the next few years -all as a result of the National Security Agencys surveillance and the negative press
associated with it. Cloud computing is no niche segment, by the way. According to the technology research firm
Hows this for an alternate reality?

Gartner Inc. (NYSE:IT), the industry is expected to grow 18.5 percent to $131 billion this year. By 2016, consumers will spend $677 billion on cloud services

a sizable chunk of the tech industry is heading into the clouds, which includes
Its the next frontier in
technology, and its one that American companies currently dominate . But that could
change on a dime, Castro warns. Bad press about U.S. tech giants complying with the NSAs
Prism program could scare consumers into going elsewhere to spend that $677 billion. To visualize the
worldwide. Clearly,

everything from third-party email such as Yahoo Mail and Gmail to free software applications like Google Docs.

domino efect that could have, Castro advises to imagine if privacy concerns had tainted Microsoft Corp. (NASDAQ:MSFT) just as Windows was taking of as the
dominant operating system. Instead of having Microsoft as one of these leaders, thered be a French company there, or German or Japanese company, he
said. It would just be a loss to the economy and a loss to all the types of product development and innovation weve seen overall. And in some ways, the

the very idea of frumpy NSA


agents hunched over computer terminals and reading our private emails
could be enough to set the wheels of an exodus in motion. He likened it to the infamous 2005
extent to which the government is or isnt violating our privacy is beside the point. Castro said

incident in which a woman fraudulently claimed to have found a severed finger in a bowl of chili at a Wendys restaurant. Wendys Company (NASDAQ:WEN)
later said that it lost $2.5 million in sales due to all the bad publicity. It didnt matter that it didnt happen, Castro said. It was the visual. It was the image.

there is evidence that Castros doomsday scenario is already


starting to unfold. On Aug. 8, the private email service Lavabit abruptly shut down. The service, which allowed subscribers to send encrypted
Snooped Out Of Business In fact,

email messages, was believed to have been used by the NSA leaker Edward Snowden. Its shutdown was, presumably, the result of a legal skirmish in which the
U.S. government attempted to force the company to hand over private data about its users. In an interview with Democracy Now, Lavabits founder, Ladar
Levison, said he is under a gag order, and cannot share further details. On the Lavabit website, however, he was quite blunt about his feelings: This
experience has taught me one very important lesson: Without congressional action or a strong judicial precedent, I would strongly recommend against anyone
trusting their private data to a company with physical ties to the United States. In other words, if you care about your privacy, forget U.S. tech companies. Go
somewhere else. Its a strong statement but one that didnt surprise Katherine Albrecht, a longtime privacy advocate and co-founder of StartMail, a private
email service that is currently in beta testing. I think this is a terrible thing, she told International Business Times. We have entrepreneurs creating viable

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
and thriving businesses who are being forced to shut down because of this climate were operating in. Ironically, Albrecht takes that position as someone who
stands to gain a competitive edge from the demise of U.S.-based cloud services. StartMail is owned by Surfboard Holding BV, a privately held company based
in the Netherlands, and Albrecht has long touted its overseas location as a selling point for privacy-conscious consumers. Long before Edward Snowden
became a household name, she and her StartMail colleagues set out to develop an encrypted email service that would be truly safe. But they understood that
it needed to be safe not just from the prying eyes of data-collecting behemoths like Google Inc. (NASADAQ:GOOG) and Yahoo Inc. (NASDAQ:YHOO), but from
the U.S. government, which, under the Patriot Act, can force American companies to hand over data. That said, it should come as no surprise that Levisons
decision to shutter Lavabit rather than compromise its users privacy has garnered praise from its marketplace competitors. I was truly grateful to him for
taking that position, Albrecht said, likening Levison to Snowden. Here is the second person now who has fallen on his sword, sacrificing himself for the rest of
us. And Levison and Snowden are not alone with their swords. Following Lavabits abrupt closure, Silent Circle, a rival company that ofered encrypted
communications, made the drastic decision to preemptively shut down its own private email service. Speaking to the MIT Technology Review, Mike Janke, the
companys chief executive, admitted that email can never be truly private. Why? Because metadata -- information about when messages are sent and where
theyre sent to -- cant be encrypted. The basic mechanisms of the Internet prohibit it. Albrecht compares it to sending a piece of snail mail thought the U.S.
Postal Service, which operates under the basic premise that all mail must be properly labeled. I can have a sealed envelope and encase it in lead and lock it
up really tight, but somehow I have to tell the postman where its going, she said. Encrypted email works the same way. Encryption only seals the contents.
Backdoor Men The U.S. government has never been a fan of private encryption services. On its website, the research group Electronic Privacy Information
Center (EPIC) has cataloged more than two decades worth of eforts by the government to restrict and even ban encryption. One report, dated May 1995,
outlines an attempt by then-FBI Director Louis Freeh, who wanted to require companies to provide a trap door that would allow the government to access

More recently,
the FBI has been pushing for updates to the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, or CALEA. The current law requires telephone companies to
make their lines accessible to interception by the U.S. government. But if the FBI gets its way, that
private encrypted information if it needed to. The proposal was a response to the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City.

requirement will extend to electronic communications, and tech companies would then need to provide a backdoor that the government could access. It would
essentially prevent services like what Lavabit was trying to provide from existing in the United States, said Amie Stepanovich, an attorney with EPIC who
specializes in privacy and domestic surveillance. So what exactly is the governments beef with encryption? For one thing, private email services -- like
Albrechts StartMail -- put users in control of their own passwords. That means companies that ofer such services couldnt access their users data even if they
wanted to, which also means that if the FBI, NSA or any government agency came knocking, there would be nothing for them to find. Were not law
enforcement, said Albrecht. If they came and asked us for a users password, wed say, you have to take it up with them. We dont have it. That is a far cry
from services provided by companies such as Gmail. In a Google court filing posted just this month by Consumer Watchdog, attorneys for the tech giant said
Gmail users have no legitimate expectation of privacy when they use the service, which automatically scans messages for the purpose of placing relevant
ads. Google likened the practice to a secretary screening a bosss snail mail before delivering it, an analogy that Albrecht doesnt buy. Ill tell you this, she
said. If the secretary were opening it and photocopying it and sticking it in her briefcase and taking it home, Id have a real problem with that secretary. If Not

That the FBI is looking to squelch private email services doesnt bode well for
the already-tarnished reputation of U.S. tech companies , which took much heat for reportedly complying with
the Prism program despite their denials to the contrary. European firms are seeing the scandal as an opportunity
to gain a competitive advantage, with hopes that such initiatives as Cloud Services Made In Germany and the Sovereign Cloud
Here, Where?

project in France could lure customers away from snooping U.S. spies. But Stepanovich said such ambitions may not be so easy to realize. You also have to ask
yourself if you trust [European] governments as well, she said. The U.K., for example, has been coming out against any revelations about their own
surveillance activities. Castro agrees, saying it will be an uphill climb for any one country to establish itself as being fundamentally diferent from the U.S. in
terms of national security and domestic surveillance. The question becomes: Will one country emerge as the digital Switzerland or the digital Cayman
Islands? he said. Will they set up a regulatory regime that is specifically intended to give their country a domestic advantage for cloud computing? But

just the possibility that the U.S. could lose its cloud-computing dominance should
concern lawmakers far more than it seems to be , Castro said. One reason he released the ITIF report on the potential
economic efects of Prism was to spark a conversation that he believed not enough people are having. (He said President Obama fell short during a recent
speech in which he vowed surveillance reform.) Sure, weve heard plenty about privacy, our civil rights and debates over the Fourth Amendment. But to echo

few people realize the extent to which


snooping and the economy are linked, which is a blind spot evident in the much-publicized NSA slides that Snowden
James Carvilles famous dictum, Its the economy, stupid. The problem is,

leaked to the Washington Post. According to one of those slides, operating costs for the Prism program are just $20 million a year. Ridiculous, Castro said. It

the policy side of this, a cost-benefit analysis that ignores this whole column of
economic consequences.
just reflects a complete failure on

Strong cloud computing is essential to effective climate change


adaptation strategies
Li et al 15 (Zhenlong Li,1 Chaowei Yang,1,* Baoxuan Jin,1,2 Manzhu Yu,1 Kai Liu,1
Min Sun,1 and Matthew Zhan1,3, 1NSF Spatiotemporal Innovation Center, George
Mason University, Fairfax, VA, United States of America 2Yunnan Provincial Geomatics
Center, Yunnan Bureau of Surveying, Mapping, and GeoInformation, Kunming,Yunnan,
China 3Department of Computer Science, University of TexasAustin, Austin, Texas,
United States of America University of Vigo, SPAIN, "Enabling Big Geoscience Data
Analytics with a Cloud-Based, MapReduce-Enabled and Service-Oriented Workflow
Framework," http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4351198/)

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
Geoscience observations and model simulations are generating vast amounts of multidimensional data. Efectively analyzing these data are essential for geoscience studies.
However, the tasks are challenging for geoscientists because processing the massive amount of data
is both computing and data intensive in that data analytics requires complex procedures and multiple
tools. To tackle these challenges , a scientific workflow framework is proposed for big geoscience data
analytics. In this framework techniques are proposed by leveraging cloud computing,
MapReduce, and Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). Specifically, HBase is adopted for storing and managing big
geoscience data across distributed computers. MapReduce-based algorithm framework is developed to support parallel
processing of geoscience data. And service-oriented workflow architecture is built for supporting on-demand complex
data analytics in the cloud environment. A proof-of-concept prototype tests the performance of the framework. Results

this innovative framework significantly improves the efficiency of big


geoscience data analytics by reducing the data processing time as well as simplifying
data analytical procedures for geoscientists. Go to: Introduction Geoscience data are a core component
driving geoscience advancement [1]. Understanding the Earth as a system requires a
combination of observational data recorded by sensors and simulation data produced by numerical
show that

models [2]. Over the past half century humans capability to explore the Earth system has been enhanced with the
emergence of new computing, sensor and information technologies [3]. While the technological advancements
accelerate collecting, simulating and sharing geoscience data, they also produce Big Data for geosciences from at least
two aspects. First, massive amounts of multi-dimensional data recording various physical phenomena are taken by the
sensors across the globe, and these data are accumulated rapidly with a daily increase rate of terabytes to petabytes
[4]. For example the meteorological satellite Himawari-9 collects 3 terabytes data from space every day [5]. Second,
supercomputers enable geoscientists to simulate Earth phenomena with finer spatiotemporal resolution and greater

Effectively processing
and analyzing big geoscience data are becoming critical to challenges such as
climate change, natural disasters, diseases and other emergencies. However, the ever
growing big geoscience data exceed the capacity of computing and data management
technologies [6]. This is particularly true in climate science, which normally produces
space and time coverage, producing large amounts of simulated geoscience data.

hundreds of terabytes of data in model simulations [2,7]. In this paper, we first take big climate data analytics as a
case study to exemplify three challenges in big geoscience data processing and analyzing and then demonstrate how

Climate
change is one of the biggest contemporary concerns for humankind due to its broad impacts
on society and ecosystems worldwide [8]. Information about future climate is critical for
decision makers, such as agriculture planning, emergency preparedness , political
negotiations and intelligence [9]. However, a major problem the decision makers face is
that diferent climate models produce diferent projected climate scenarios due to unknown
our proposed solution could address these challenges. 1.1 A Study Case: Climate Model Sensitivity

model uncertainties. Testing the sensitivity of input parameters of a climate model is a standard modeling practice for
determining the model uncertainties [10]. To do this, perturbed physics ensembles (PPEs) run a model hundreds or
thousands of times with diferent model input parameters, followed by analyses of the model output and input to
identify which parameter is more sensitive to simulated climate changes (diagnostic). Climate@Home
(http://climateathome.com/climate@home) is a project initiated by NASA to advance climate modeling studies [11]. In
this project to study the sensitivity of ModelE (http://www.giss.nasa.gov/tools/modelE/, global climate model developed
by NASA), 300 ensemble model-runs (PPE-300) are required for each experiment, sweeping seven atmospheric
parameters in each model-run input (Table 1). The simulation period is from December 1949 to January 1961 with a 4
x 5 spatial resolution and a monthly time resolution. Each model run generates 10 gigabytes data in four dimensions
(3D space and 1D time) with 336 climatic variables and totally three terabytes of data for the PPE-300 experiment.
Table 1 Table 1 Seven tested atmospheric parameters in the PPE-300 experiment. To identify which of the 336 output
variables are sensitive to the seven input parameters, the three terabytes model output is analyzed. Specifically, the
following steps are taken: S1. Simulation: Run ModelE 300 times sweeping seven input parameters; S2. Preprocess:
Convert model output (monthly .acc files) into NetCDF files, and combine monthly data to reduce the file numbers; S3.
Management: Store and manage the NetCDF files in a file system or database; S4. Process: For each of the 336
variables in each of the 300 runs, calculate the annual global and 10-year mean. S5. Analysis: Conduct linear
regression analysis for each Parameter-Variable (P, V) pair (totally 336*7 pairs) using the 300 runs; and S6.
Visualization: Identify and plot the variables most afected by the parameters. 1.2 Challenges Posed by Geoscience
Data Analytics Geoscience data analytics poses three computing challenges as exemplified in the climate model
sensitivity study case. C1. Big data or data intensity: Storing, managing, and processing massive datasets are grand

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challenge in geosciences [12,13,51]. For example, one PPE-300 experiment produces 3 terabytes of climate data. A
scalable data management framework is critical for managing these datasets. Furthermore, geoscience data analytics
need to deal with heterogeneous data formats (e.g., array-based data, text files, and images), access distributed data
sources, and share the result. Diferent data access protocols (e.g., FTP, HTTP) and data service standards (e.g., WCS,
WFS, and OpenDAP) are normally involved in each steps input/output. Hence, a mechanism to encapsulate these
heterogeneities is essential. C2. Computing intensity: Multi-dimensions and heterogeneous data structures are intrinsic
characteristics of geoscience data [14]. Processing and analyzing these complex big data are computing intensive,
requiring massive amounts of computing resources. In the case study, S4 is computing intensive given the terabytes of
4-D data. A parallelization-enabled algorithm is one key to accelerate these processes. Another computing intensive
aspect is climate simulation (S1), where each model-run requires 5 days to simulate a single 10-year scenario.
Traditional computing cannot finish the 300 model-runs with reasonable efort and time [15]. In addition, parallelization
requires more resources since processing threads are running at the same time. Therefore, supplying adequate
computing resources is another key to tackle the computing intensity challenge. C3. Procedure complexity: Geoscience
data analytics normally require complex steps with a specific sequence [16]. For example, the study case needs six
steps (S1 to S6) from data generation (simulation) to visualization. A workflow platform tailored for handling these
procedures is critical for managing, conducting and reusing the processes. In addition, conducting each step requires
diferent tools, libraries and external processing services. To accomplish an analytics task, geoscientists normally need
to discover appropriate tools/libraries, write their own programs/scripts and deal with Linux command lines. For
example, S2 requires data format conversion tools, and S4 requires specific tools using libraries (e.g., NetCDF-Java,
http://www.unidata.ucar.edu/software/thredds/current/netcdf-java/). And, for S5 and S6, scientists need to program

A mechanism to integrate these heterogeneous tools and


libraries is essential. Cloud computing is a new computing paradigm characterized by its on-demand selfservice, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity and measured service [17]. Cloud computing
provides potential computing solutions to the management, discovery, access,
and analytics of the big geoscience data for intuitive decision support [4].
using R script or other languages.

Ineffective climate adaptation results in extinction


Cribb 14 (Julian, Canberra science writer/expert + founder of Julian Cribb &
Associates, which provides strategic advice and implementation in the public
communication of all branches of science, Human extinction: it is possible? Sydney
Morning Herald, Published: April 2, 2014, p. http://www.smh.com.au/comment/humanextinction-it-is-possible-20140402-zqpln.html)
our own behaviour is liable to be a far more immediate determinant of
human survival or extinction. Above two degrees which we have already locked in the worlds
food harvest is going to become increasingly unreliable , as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
However

Change warned this week. That means mid-century famines in places like India, China, the Middle East and Africa. But what scientists
cannot predict is how humans living in the tropics and subtropics will respond to this form of stress. So let us turn to the strategic and
military think tanks, who like to explore such scenarios, instead. The Age of Consequences study by the US Centre for Strategic and

under a 2.6 degree rise nations around the world will be


overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges, such as pandemic disease. The internal cohesion of
nations will be under great stress as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and
International Studies says that

water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world has the potential to challenge regional and even national

Armed conflict between nations over resources is likely and nuclear war is
possible. The social consequences range from increased religious fervour to outright chaos. Of five degrees which the world is on
course for by 2100 if present carbon emissions continue it simply says the consequences are "inconceivable". Eighteen
nations currently have nuclear weapons technology or access to it, raising the stakes
on nuclear conflict to the highest level since the end of the Cold War. At the same time, with more than 4 billion
identities.

people living in the worlds most vulnerable regions, scope for refugee tsunamis and pandemic disease is also large. It is on the basis of

Schellnhuber science advisor to German President Angela Merkel and


Dyer have warned of the potential loss of most of the human
population in the conflicts, famines and pandemics spinning out of climate impacts .
scenarios such as these that scientists like Peter
Canadian author Gwynne

Whether that adds up to extinction or not rather depends on how many of the worlds 20,000 nukes are let of in the process. These

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issues all involve assumptions about human, national and religious behaviour and are thus beyond the remit of scientific bodies like the
IPCC, which can only hint at what they truly think will happen. So you are not getting the full picture from them. However in a classic
case of improvident human behaviour, a global energy stampede is taking place as oil, gas, coal, tar sands and other miners (who, being
technical folk, understand quite clearly what they are doing to the planet) rush to release as much carbon as possible as profitably as
possible before society takes the inevitable decision to ban it altogether. Thanks to them, humanity isnt sleep-walking to disaster so

Our ultimate
survival will be predicated entirely on our behaviour not only on how well we adapt to
unavoidable change, but also how quickly we apply the brakes.
much as racing headlong to embrace it. Do the rest of us have the foresight, and the guts, to stop them?

Tech leadership is key to US primacy


Baru 9 (Visiting Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore)
(Sanjaya, Year of the power shift?, http://www.indiaseminar.com/2009/593/593_sanjaya_baru.htm)

There is no doubt that economics alone will not determine the balance of global
power, but there is no doubt either that economics has come to matter for
more.The management of the economy, and of the treasury, has been a vital
aspect of statecraft from time immemorial. Kautilyas Arthashastra says, From the
strength of the treasury the army is born. men without wealth do not attain their
objectives even after hundreds of trials Only through wealth can material gains
be acquired, as elephants (wild) can be captured only by elephants (tamed) A
state with depleted resources, even if acquired, becomes only a liability. 4 Hence,
economic policies and performance do have strategic consequences. 5 In the
modern era, the idea that strong economic performance is the foundation of power
was argued most persuasively by historian Paul Kennedy. Victory (in war),
Kennedy claimed, has repeatedly gone to the side with more flourishing
productive base.6 Drawing attention to the interrelationships between economic
wealth, technological innovation, and the ability of states to efficiently mobilize
economic and technological resources for power projection and national defence,
Kennedy argued that nations that were able to better combine military and
economic strength scored over others. The fact remains, Kennedy argued, that
all of the major shifts in the worlds military-power balance have followed
alterations in the productive balances; and further, that the rising and falling of the
various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the
outcomes of the major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone to the
side with the greatest material resources.7 In Kennedys view the geopolitical
consequences of an economic crisis or even decline would be transmitted through
a nations inability to find adequate financial resources to simultaneously sustain
economic growth and military power the classic guns vs butter dilemma.

Decline causes great power wars


Zhang 11 et al., Carnegie Endowment researcher, 2011 (Yuhan, Americas decline:
A harbinger of conflict and rivalry, 1-22,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflictand-rivalry/, ldg)
This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps
alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the worlds largest, the once

the global distribution of


power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal
seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus,

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and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of efective conflict regulation. Over the past
two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military.
Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have
bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western
Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended

However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together


withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an
international order where power is more difuse, American interests and influence can be more readily
challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline
and redistribution result in military confrontation . For example, in the late 19th century Americas
to mute great power conflicts.

emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century,
accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain
rules the waves. Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemispheres security to
become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system
are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some

As a result of such political stability, free


markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this,
many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable
and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as Americas influence declines? Given that
degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society.

Americas authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the
Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could afect global society in a profoundly

Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic


world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and
strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank
or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East
Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washingtons withering leadership to pursue their own
visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised and, well,
less free and major powers would compete for supremacy . Additionally, such power
plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element . In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power
detrimental way.

declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as

A world without
American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge , the liberal
international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism
devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a
American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973).

future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

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1ACCybersecurity Advantage
Advantage __ is Cybersecurity
Advantage two is cybersecurity
CALEA expanded to the VOIP creates vulnerabilities within the
power grid
Landau 05 (Susan, an American mathematician and engineer, and Professor of Social Science and Policy
Studies at Worcester Polytechnic Institute.[2] She previously worked as a Senior Staf Privacy Analyst at Google.[3] She
was a Guggenheim Fellow[4] and a Visiting Scholar at the Computer Science Department, Harvard University in 2012.
[5] In 20102011, she was a Fellow at the Radclife Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard, where she investigated
issues involving security of government systems, and their privacy and policy implications.[6] From 1999 until 2010,
she specialized in internet security at Sun Microsystems.[7]Security, Wiretapping, and the Internet,
http://privacyink.org/pdf/SWatI.pdf, IEEE COMPUTER SOCIETY)

The Internet has proved a boon to many


industries, and the last decade has seen a massive shift to it as the preferred form of
conducting business. But the Internet is insecure. The network was originally designed to share resources, and neither
security nor wiretapping were considerations in its initial design. Security is a serious concern for Internet
users, which include many private industries that form part of critical infrastructure:
energy companies and the electric-power grid, banking and finance, and health care.
Thats why applying CALEA to VoIP is a mistake : the insecurities that will result are
likely to extend well past VoIP to other aspects of the Internet, and the end result will
be greater insecurity.
What does all of this have to do with computer security?

Cyberattacks attacking the grid collapse global military


operations and cause extinction
Andres and Breetz 11 Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War
College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic
Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, and Hanna Breetz, doctoral
candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Small Nuclear
Reactorsfor Military Installations:Capabilities, Costs, andTechnological Implications,
www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf

vulnerable to purposive attacks. A


report sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security suggests that a coordinated cyberattack on the
grid could result in a third of the country losing powe r for a period of weeks or
months.9 Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure are not well understood . It is not clear, for
instance, whether existing terrorist groups might be able to develop the capability to conduct this type of attack. It is
likely, however, that some nation-states either have or are working on developing the
ability to take down the U.S. grid. In the event of a war with one of these states, it is
possible, if not likely, that parts of the civilian grid would cease to function, taking with
them military bases located in afected regions. Government and private organizations are currently working to
More recently, awareness has been growing that

the grid is

also

secure the grid against attacks; however, it is not clear that they will be successful. Most military bases currently have
backup power that allows them to function for a period of hours or, at most, a few days on their own .

If power

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were not restored after this amount of time, the results could be disastrous. First, military
assets taken offline by the crisis would not be available to help with disaster relief .
Second, during an extended blackout, global military operations could be seriously
compromised ; this disruption would be particularly serious if the blackout was induced
during major combat operations. During the Cold War, this type of event was far less likely because the
United States and Soviet Union shared the common understanding that blinding an opponent with a grid
blackout could escalate to nuclear war . Americas current opponents, however, may
not share this fear or be deterred by this possibility.

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1ACInternet Freedom Advantage


Domestic surveillance decks US credibility regarding Internet
freedom and governance no alt causes
Kehl 14 (Danielle Kehl et al, July 2014. Policy Analyst at New Americas Open
Technology Institute (OTI); Kevin Bankston is the Policy Director at OTI; Robyn Greene
is a Policy Counsel at OTI; and Robert Morgus is a Research Associate at OTI.
Surveillance Costs: The NSAs Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom &
Cybersecurity,
http://oti.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Surveilance_Costs_Fina
l.pdf)
there were questions from the beginning about whether the United States would hold
itself to the same high standards domestically that it holds others to internationally , 178
the American government has successfully built up a policy and programming agenda
in the past few years based on promoting an open Internet . 179 These eforts include raising concerns
Although

over Internet repression in bilateral dialogues with countries such as Vietnam and China, 180 supporting initiatives
including the Freedom Online Coalition, and providing over $120 million in funding for groups working to advance
Internet freedom supporting counter-censorship and secure communications technology, digital safety training, and

the legitimacy of these


efforts has been thrown into question since the NSA disclosures began . Trust
policy and research programs for people facing Internet repression. 181 However,

has been the principal casualty in this unfortunate afair, wrote Ben FitzGerald and Richard Butler in December 2013.
The

American public, our nations allies, leading businesses and Internet users around
the world are losing faith in the U.S. governments role as the leading proponent of a
free, open and integrated global Internet . 182 Prior to the NSA revelations, the United States was
already facing an increasingly challenging political climate as it promoted the Internet Freedom agenda in global
Internet governance conversations. At the 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), the U.S.
and diverse group of other countries refused to sign the updated International Telecommunications Regulations based
on concerns that the document pushed for greater governmental control of the Internet and would ultimately harm
Internet Freedom. 183 Many observers noted that the split hardened the division between two opposing camps in the
Internet governance debate: proponents of a status quo multistakeholder Internet governance model, like the United
States, who argued that the existing system was the best way to preserve key online freedoms, and those seeking to
disrupt or challenge that multistakeholder model for a variety of political and economic reasons, including governments

proposals for
more governmental control over the network could be understood as attempts by
authoritarian countries to more efectively monitor and censor their citizens , which
allowed the U.S. to reasonably maintain some moral high ground as its delegates
like Russia and China pushing for greater national sovereignty over the Internet. 184 Many of the

walked out of the treaty conference. 185 Although few stakeholders seemed particularly pleased by the outcome of the
WCIT, reports indicate that by the middle of 2013 the tone had shifted in a more collaborative and positive direction
following the meetings of the 2013 World Telecommunications/ICT Policy Forum (WTPF) and the World Summit on
Information Society + 10 (WSIS+10) review. 186 However, the Internet governance conversation took a dramatic turn
after the Snowden disclosures. The annual meeting of the Freedom Online Coalition occurred in Tunis in June 2013, just
a few weeks after the initial leaks. Unsurprisingly, surveillance dominated the conference even though the agenda
covered a wide range of topics from Internet access and afordability to cybersecurity. 187 Throughout the two-day
event, representatives from civil society used the platform to confront and criticize governments about their monitoring

NSA surveillance would continue to be the focus of international


convenings on Internet Freedom and Internet governance for months to come, making civil
society representatives and foreign governments far less willing to embrace the
United States Internet Freedom agenda or to accept its defense of the multistakeholder model of
practices. 188

Internet governance as a anything other than self-serving. One can come up with all kinds of excuses for why US
surveillance is not hypocrisy. For example, one might argue that US policies are more benevolent than those of many
other regimes And one might recognize that in several cases, some branches of government dont know what other
branches are doing and therefore US policy is not so much hypocritical as it is inadvertently contradictory, wrote Eli

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the
NSA is galvanizing opposition to Americas internet freedom agenda . 189 The
scandal revived proposals from both Russia and Brazil for global management of
technical standards and domain names, whether through the ITU or other avenues.
Even developing countries, many of whom have traditionally aligned with the U.S. and
prioritize access and afordability as top issues, dont want US assistance because
they assume the equipment comes with a backdoor for the NSA. They are walking
straight into the arms of Russia, China, and the ITU. 190 Consequently, NSA surveillance
has shifted the dynamics of the Internet governance debate in a potentially
destabilizing manner. The Snowden revelations have also been well-received by those who seek to
Dourado, a researcher from the Mercatus Center at George Mason University in August 2013. But the fact is that

discredit existing approaches to Internet governance, wrote the Center for Democracy & Technologys Matthew
Shears. There has been a long-running antipathy among a number of stakeholders to the United States governments
perceived control of the Internet and the dominance of US Internet companies. There has also been a long-running
antipathy, particularly among some governments, to the distributed and open management of the Internet. 191
Shears points out that evidence of the NSAs wide-ranging capabilities has fueled general concerns about the current
Internet governance system, bolstering the arguments of those calling for a new government-centric governance order.
At the UN Human Rights Council in September 2013, the representative from Pakistanspeaking on behalf of Cuba,
Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Ecuador, Russia, Indonesia, Bolivia, Iran, and Chinaexplicitly linked the revelations
about surveillance programs to the need for reforming Internet governance processes and institutions to give
governments a larger role. 192 Surveillance issues continued to dominate the conversation at the 2013 Internet
Governance Forum in Bali as well, where debates on child protection, education and infrastructure were overshadowed
by widespread concerns from delegates who said the publics trust in the internet was being undermined by reports of
US and British government surveillance. 193 Further complicating these conversations is the fact that several of the
institutions that govern the technical functions of the Internet are either tied to the American government or are
located in the United States. Internet governance scholar Milton Mueller has described how the reaction to the NSA

in
addition to revealing the scale and scope of state surveillance and the preeminent role
of the United States and its partners, the NSA disclosures may push other states
toward a more nationally partitioned Internet and threaten in a very
fundamental way the claim that the US had a special status as neutral steward of
Internet governance. 194 These concerns were publicly voiced in October 2013 by the heads of a number of
disclosures has become entangled in an already contentious Internet governance landscape. Mueller argues that,

key organizations, including the President of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and
the chair of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), in the Montevideo Statement on the Future of Internet
Cooperation. Their statement expressed strong concern over the undermining of the trust and confidence of Internet
users globally due to recent revelations of pervasive monitoring and surveillance and called for accelerating the
globalization of ICANN and Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions, towards an environment in which all
stakeholders, including 22 all governments, participate on an equal footing. 195 In particular, the process of
internationalizing ICANNwhich has had a contractual relationship with the Commerce Departments National
Telecommunications and Information Association (NTIA) since 1998has progressed in recent months. 196

Encryption critical to self-expression and freedom on the


Internet
Owen Williams, The Next Web January 13, 2015, David Camerons Plan to Ban
End to End Encryption is Catastrophic for Internet Freedom,
http://thenextweb.com/opinion/2015/01/13/david-camerons-plan-ban-end-endencryption-catastrophic-internet-freedom/ DOA: 2-22-15
users have the right to choose a messaging medium that allows them to
have free speech, without fear of being monitored or tracked . Camerons claims that the government
needs such access to police terrorist activities is flawed at best; freedom of speech is just as important to an
open culture. Frank La Rue, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Its important that

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Expression and Opinion said in 2013: The right to privacy is often understood as an
essential requirement for the realization of the right to freedom of expression. Undue
interference with individuals privacy can both directly and indirectly limit the free
development and exchange of ideas . An infringement upon one right can be both the cause and consequence of
an infringement upon the other. Technology has improved communication across the world rapidly
and enabled new levels of interactions between people who could never have
communicated before. You can argue that such platforms encourage and even help
terrorists organize activities, but that is the exception, not the rule. Freedom of speech
and privacy should not be sacrificed for everyone because of the actions of a few.
Decentralized chat apps like Firechat alongside encrypted app Whatsapp allowed people to chat in close
proximity anonymously without fear of surveillance, which helped coordinate protests
in Hong Kong against the government. What happens when that situation isnt allowed
to exist? The polar opposite happened when it was revealed the FBI and NSA extensively
tracked the Occupy movements communications to help squash the groups protests.

And the practice is modeled world-wide, magnifying all of the


impacts.
John Shinal, March 17, 2015, USA Today, At SXSW, unlikely allies in privacy-law
fight, http://www.pressreader.com/usa/usa-today-internationaledition/20150318/281762742738887/TextView DOA: 3-21-15
Those concerns were heightened in January, after Obama, alongside U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, said law
enforcement and intelligence agencies should not be locked out of encrypted messages. The president's remarks came
after Apple, Google and other tech giants -- stung by criticism of their cooperation with the FBI and NSA -- built stronger

The problem with backdoors -- that is, a


way for governments to use surveillance -- is that they weaken encryption technology.
"Any attempt to weaken encryption via a backdoor will make it easier for bad actors to
get in," says David Campbell, chief security officer of SendGrid, a Boulder, Colo.-based security software start-up.
"It's a huge mistake." It also sets a bad precedent for other governments. "Our government
has asked companies to give them a backdoor," Farenthold says. "But what if China and
other countries ask for it" also? Earlier this year, China did exactly that when they
drafted a new anti-terror law asking for its own backdoor -- a move Obama later
criticized.
encryption technology into their latest smartphone software.

Surveillance backdoors weaken security and are a terrible model


for other governments
John Shinal, March 17, 2015, USA Today, At SXSW, unlikely allies in privacy-law fight,
http://www.pressreader.com/usa/usa-today-internationaledition/20150318/281762742738887/TextView DOA: 3-21-15
Those concerns were heightened in January, after Obama, alongside U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, said law enforcement and
intelligence agencies should not be locked out of encrypted messages. The president's remarks came after Apple, Google and other tech
giants -- stung by criticism of their cooperation with the FBI and NSA -- built stronger encryption technology into their latest smartphone
software.

The problem with backdoors -- that is, a way for governments to use

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surveillance -- is that they weaken encryption technology. "Any attempt to weaken
encryption via a backdoor will make it easier for bad actors to get in ," says David Campbell, chief
security officer of SendGrid, a Boulder, Colo.-based security software start-up. "It's a huge mistake." It also sets a bad
precedent for other governments. "Our government has asked companies to give them
a backdoor," Farenthold says. "But what if China and other countries ask for it" also? Earlier
this year, China did exactly that when they drafted a new anti-terror law asking for its
own backdoor -- a move Obama later criticized

NSA backdoors create set a bad international precedent


Trevor Timm 15, Trevor Timm is a Guardian US columnist and executive director of
the Freedom of the Press Foundation, a non-profit that supports and defends
journalism dedicated to transparency and accountability. 3-4-2015, "Building
backdoors into encryption isn't only bad for China, Mr President," Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/04/backdoors-encryption-chinaapple-google-nsa)//GV
Want to know why forcing tech companies to build backdoors into encryption is a terrible idea? Look no further than President Obamas
stark criticism of Chinas plan to do exactly that on Tuesday. If only he would tell the FBI and NSA the same thing. In a stunningly short-

the FBI - and more recently the NSA - have been pushing for a new US law that
would force tech companies like Apple and Google to hand over the encryption keys or
build backdoors into their products and tools so the government would always have
access to our communications. It was only a matter of time before other governments
jumped on the bandwagon, and China wasted no time in demanding the same from
tech companies a few weeks ago. As President Obama himself described to Reuters, China has proposed an
expansive new anti-terrorism bill that would essentially force all foreign
companies, including US companies, to turn over to the Chinese government
mechanisms where they can snoop and keep track of all the users of those
services. Obama continued: Those kinds of restrictive practices I think would ironically hurt
the Chinese economy over the long term because I dont think there is any US or
European firm, any international firm, that could credibly get away with that wholesale
turning over of data, personal data, over to a government. Bravo! Of course these are the exact
arguments for why it would be a disaster for US government to force tech companies to do
the same. (Somehow Obama left that part out.) As Yahoos top security executive Alex Stamos told NSA director Mike Rogers in a
sighted move,

public confrontation last week, building backdoors into encryption is like drilling a hole into a windshield. Even if its technically
possible to produce the flaw - and we, for some reason, trust the US government never to abuse it -

other countries will

inevitably demand access for themselves. Companies will no longer be in a position to say no, and even
if they did, intelligence services would find the backdoor unilaterally - or just steal the keys outright. For an example on how this works,
look no further than last weeks Snowden revelation that the UKs intelligence service and the NSA stole the encryption keys for millions
of Sim cards used by many of the worlds most popular cell phone providers. Its happened many times before too. Security expert Bruce
Schneier has documented with numerous examples, Back-door access built for the good guys is routinely used by the bad guys.

what happens when China or


Russia also demand backdoors from tech companies, but Rogers didnt have an answer prepared at all. He
Stamos repeatedly (and commendably) pushed the NSA director for an answer on

just kept repeating I think we can work through this. As Stamos insinuated, maybe Rogers should ask his own staf why we actually
cant work through this, because virtually every technologist agrees backdoors just cannot be secure in practice. (If you want to further
understand the details behind the encryption vs. backdoor debate and how what the NSA director is asking for is quite literally
impossible, read this excellent piece by surveillance expert Julian Sanchez.) Its downright bizarre that the US government has been
warning of the grave cybersecurity risks the country faces while, at the very same time, arguing that we should pass a law that would
weaken cybersecurity and put every single citizen at more risk of having their private information stolen by criminals, foreign

Forcing backdoors will also be disastrous for the US economy as it


would be for Chinas. US tech companies - which already have suffered billions of
governments, and our own.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
dollars of losses overseas because of consumer distrust over their
relationships with the NSA - would lose all credibility with users around the world if
the FBI and NSA succeed with their plan. The White House is supposedly coming out with an official policy on
encryption sometime this month, according to the New York Times but the President can save himself a lot of time and just apply his

If he knows backdoors in encryption are bad for


cybersecurity, privacy, and the economy, why is there even a debate?
comments about China to the US government.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

1ACPrivacy advantage
Encryption is a critical technology for individuals to use to
protect the security of their private information. Encryption
cracking undermines this
NYT Editorial Board, September 21, 2013, Close the NSAs Back Doors,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/22/opinion/sunday/close-the-nsas-back-doors.html?
_r=1&
the former N.S.A. contractor, make clear that the agency
has never met an encryption system that it has not tried to penetrate . And it frequently tries
Documents leaked by Edward Snowden,

to take the easy way out. Because modern cryptography can be so hard to break, even using the brute force of the
agencys powerful supercomputers, the agency prefers to collaborate with big software companies and cipher authors,

The New York Times, The Guardian and


ProPublica recently reported that the agency now has access to the codes that protect
commerce and banking systems, trade secrets and medical records, and everyones email and Internet chat messages, including virtual private networks. In some cases,
the agency pressured companies to give it access ; as The Guardian reported earlier this year,
getting hidden access built right into their systems.

Microsoft provided access to Hotmail, Outlook.com, SkyDrive and Skype. According to some of the Snowden documents
given to Der Spiegel, the N.S.A. also has access to the encryption protecting data on iPhones, Android and BlackBerry

These back doors and special access routes are a terrible idea , another example of the
intelligence communitys overreach. Companies and individuals are increasingly putting their
most confidential data on cloud storage services, and need to rely on assurances their
data will be secure. Knowing that encryption has been deliberately weakened will undermine confidence in these
systems and interfere with commerce. The back doors also strip away the expectations of privacy
that individuals, businesses and governments have in ordinary communications. If
back doors are built into systems by the N.S.A., who is to say that other countries spy
agencies or hackers, pirates and terrorists wont discover and exploit them ? The
phones.

government can get a warrant and break into the communications or data of any individual or company suspected of

But crippling everyones ability to use encryption is going too far, just as
the N.S.A. has exceeded its boundaries in collecting everyones phone records rather
than limiting its focus to actual suspects.
breaking the law.

Breaking encryption threatens medical privacy


Health Care Renewal, September 6, 2013 N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of
Privacy on Web, or, If You Contracted V.D. From That Sexy Prostitute At That Vegas
Conference, You Better Not Tell Your Doctor About It)//GV
LENGTH: 853 words There's already a major issue with privacy and protection of
medical records in electronic form. Now this from the New York Times: N.S.A. Able to
Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web By NICOLE PERLROTH, JEFF LARSON and
SCOTT SHANE September 5, 2013 The National Security Agency is winning its longrunning secret war on encryption, using supercomputers, technical trickery, court
orders and behind-the-scenes persuasion to undermine the major tools protecting the
privacy of everyday communications in the Internet age, according to newly disclosed
documents. The agency has circumvented or cracked much of the encryption, or

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
digital scrambling, that guards global commerce and banking systems, protects
sensitive data like trade secrets and medical records, and automatically secures the emails, Web searches, Internet chats and phone calls of Americans and others around
the world, the documents show. But don't worry, your electronic medical records are
secure, and will NEVER be used for political purposes by your adversaries... Beginning
in 2000, as encryption tools were gradually blanketing the Web, the N.S.A. invested
billions of dollars in a clandestine campaign to preserve its ability to eavesdrop.
Having lost a public battle in the 1990s to insert its own 'back door' in all encryption, it
set out to accomplish the same goal by stealth. The agency, according to the
documents and interviews with industry officials, deployed custom-built, superfast
computers to break codes, and began collaborating with technology companies in the
United States and abroad to build entry points into their products. The documents do
not identify which companies have participated. At least we may have gotten faster
PC's as a side result of the research that supported these eforts. ... the agency used
its influence as the world's most experienced code maker to covertly introduce
weaknesses into the encryption standards followed by hardware and software
developers around the world. Some of the agency's most intensive eforts have
focused on the encryption in universal use in the United States, including Secure
Sockets Layer[4], or SSL; virtual private networks[5], or VPNs; and the protection used
on fourth-generation, or 4G, smartphones. Many Americans, often without realizing it,
rely on such protection every time they send an e-mail, buy something online, consult
with colleagues via their company's computer network, or use a phone or a tablet on a
4G network. Might as well just send them a copy of all your communications to spare
them the efort... ... Ladar Levison, the founder of Lavabit, wrote a public letter[6] to
his disappointed customers, ofering an ominous warning. 'Without Congressional
action or a strong judicial precedent,' he wrote, 'I would strongly recommend against
anyone trusting their private data to a company with physical ties to the United
States.' Hey, how about let's ALL have our medical records stored by health IT
companies providing ASP (Application service provider,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Application_service_provider[7]) ofsite EHR hosting
services to hospitals and clinics... From the site "techdirt.com":

Private companies adopting encryption to protect privacy


Teri Robinson, March 2015, SC Magazine, Greenwald says Snowden invoked changes
toward privacy, http://www.scmagazine.com/companies-and-private-citizens-makingchanges-in-privacy-post-snowden/article/401938/ DOA: 3-21-15
Although data security and privacy legislation hasn't evolved yet, "there

have been extreme changes" in


privacy and security itself in the wake of the Edward Snowden document s , Glen Greenwald, the
journalist who worked with Snowden to release information on the NSA mass surveillance program, told attendees at the International
Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP) Privacy Summit in Washington Thursday. In fact, Greenwald said prospective laws are "the

Snowden's revelations helped raise awareness among


individuals that their privacy was being compromised by government. And, he noted
that some companies, such as Apple and Google, are pushing back against
government intrusion/incursion by advocating for encryption - encryption, said Greenwald, "is
a barrier to U.S. government spying - and showing less willingness to collaborate with government to share
least interesting" part of the equation, noting that

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
information on their customers with government agencies. That pushback has prompted "vituperative" comments by government and
law enforcement that he said are "usually reserved for journalists and activists," implying that those companies are "friends of the
terrorists" or are "aiders and abetters of terrorists." Demonizing them, he said, is an attempt to push them back into the more
collaborative relationship technology companies have had with government in the past. Many companies actively worked with the NSA,
ofering "what the law required them to do but also beyond" those requirements. Earlier relationships with the NSA were beneficial, or at
least came at no cost, to those companies. But now that kind of cooperation can cost them in terms of reputation - and business.

NSA back door encryption hacking violates privacy


New York Times Editorial Board, September 21, 2013, Close the NSAs Back Doors,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/22/opinion/sunday/close-the-nsas-back-doors.html?
_r=1&
In 2006, a federal agency, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, helped build an international encryption system to help
countries and industries fend of computer hacking and theft. Unbeknown to the many users of the system, a diferent government arm,
the National Security Agency, secretly inserted a back door into the system that allowed federal spies to crack open any data that was

the former N.S.A. contractor, make clear


that the agency has never met an encryption system that it has not tried to penetrate.
encoded using its technology. Documents leaked by Edward Snowden,

And it frequently tries to take the easy way out. Because modern cryptography can be so hard to break, even using the brute force of
the agencys powerful supercomputers, the agency prefers to collaborate with big software companies and cipher authors, getting

The New York Times, The Guardian and ProPublica recently


reported that the agency now has access to the codes that protect commerce and
banking systems, trade secrets and medical records, and everyones e-mail and
Internet chat messages, including virtual private networks. In some cases, the agency
pressured companies to give it access; as The Guardian reported earlier this year, Microsoft provided access to
hidden access built right into their systems.

Hotmail, Outlook.com, SkyDrive and Skype. According to some of the Snowden documents given to Der Spiegel, the N.S.A. also has

These back doors and special


access routes are a terrible idea, another example of the intelligence communitys overreach. Companies and
individuals are increasingly putting their most confidential data on cloud storage
services, and need to rely on assurances their data will be secure . Knowing that encryption has
been deliberately weakened will undermine confidence in these systems and interfere with commerce. The back doors also
strip away the expectations of privacy that individuals, businesses and governments
have in ordinary communications. If back doors are built into systems by the N.S.A.,
who is to say that other countries spy agencies or hackers, pirates and terrorists
wont discover and exploit them? The government can get a warrant and break into the communications or data of
any individual or company suspected of breaking the law. But crippling everyones ability to use encryption
is going too far, just as the N.S.A. has exceeded its boundaries in collecting everyones
phone records rather than limiting its focus to actual suspects.
access to the encryption protecting data on iPhones, Android and BlackBerry phones.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

1ACRights/Tyranny Advantage
Encryption back doors are abused
Ron Wyden, December 18, 2014, Wyden, D-Ore., is a member of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, Best defense against massive data theft, With hackers running
rampant, why would we poke holes in data security?
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1215-wyden-backdoor-for-cell-phones20141215-story.html DOA: 3-21-15
Tech firms are now investing heavily in new systems, including encryption, to protect
consumers from cyber attacks and rebuild the trust of their customers. As one
participant at my roundtable put it, "I'd be shocked if anyone in the industry takes the
foot of the pedal in terms of building security and encryption into their products."
Built-in backdoors have been tried elsewhere with disastrous results. In 2005, for
example, Greece discovered that dozens of its senior government officials' phones had
been under surveillance for nearly a year. The eavesdropper was never identified, but
the vulnerability was clear: built-in wiretapping features intended to be accessible only
to government agencies following a legal process. Technology is a tool that can be put
to legitimate or illegitimate use. And advances in technology always pose a new
challenge to law enforcement agencies. But curtailing innovation on data security is no
solution, and certainly won't restore public trust in tech companies or government
agencies. Instead we should give law enforcement and intelligence agencies the
resources that they need to adapt, and give the public the data security they demand.

Breaking encryption threatens security and rights


Edward Frenkel, 9-30, is professor of mathematics at UCBerkeley and author of Love
and Math: The Heart of Hidden Reality. Visit his website or follow him on Twitter.
Salon, The Perils of Hacking Math,
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2013/09/nsa_misuse_of_mat
hematics_secret_formulas_and_backdoor_cryptography.html
Recently, I co-authored and published a math paper that solved a 15-year-old mystery.
But, unlike a book or a gadget, the work cannot be copyrighted or bought and sold. In
fact, my co-author and I have made our paper available for free, for the whole world to
see, on arXiv, an online depository of scientific articles. This inherent democracy has
always been the mark of mathematics: It belongs to us all, even if people are not
aware of it. Mathematicians don't expect to be paid for their discoveries; we do math
because we want to understand how the world works. This principle has deep roots in
history as well as in legal systems. No one can own mathematical knowledge; no one
can claim ownership of a mathematical formula or idea as a personal possession.
Though he discovered it, Albert Einstein couldn't patent his famous formula E=mc2. In
the landmark Gottschalk v. Benson decision, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded: A
scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention. ... A
principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these
cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right. ... He

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly
of it which the law recognizes. Unfortunately, this time-honored and essential principle
of freedom of mathematical information is now being compromised. According to
published reports, the National Security Agency has attempted to undermine
mathematical formulas used in widely used encryption systems. They did it both by
using advances made in secret by mathematicians on their payroll and by intentionally
subverting commonly used security protocols by installing "backdoors" that make
these protocols easier to break. The legality and broad implications of the NSA largesale surveillance have already been discussed at great length. My point here, however,
is that tampering with mathematics is by itself a dangerous precedent that raises a
host of legal and ethical issues. We should be especially alarmed by the reported
attempts by the NSA to intentionally undermine cryptosystems. In a nutshell, to
ensure that a third party can't read your email message, credit-card number, or
password, communications sent over the Internet are encrypted. Many cryptosystems
are based on sophisticated mathematical objects called "elliptic curves" (these are
discussed in my new book Love and Math: The Heart of Hidden Reality). There are
plenty of elliptic curves to choose from. A cryptosystem based on a random one is
virtually impregnable and hence protects our privacy. But it turns out that there are
some elliptic curves that look random but actually allow for easy decryption; that's an
example of a backdoor. It's a nontrivial mathematical problem to generate such curves
(equipped with some extra data), but it can be done. And according to the reports, the
NSA has been pushing the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the body
that sets encryption standards in the United States, and various vendors to adopt such
special elliptic curves since as early as 2006, knowing full well that they were prone to
attacks. After these allegations came to light, encryption company RSA Security issued
an unprecedented advisory noting that one of its widely used toolkits is based on the
compromised algorithm and advising clients to stop using it. ecrecy in cryptography is
nothing new. We remember Bletchley Park, where mathematicians such as Alan Turing,
working in secret, were able to decode German communications during World War II.
But whats diferent now is the ubiquity of the security protocols that are being
compromised. Encryption is now woven in the very fabric of our daily lives. Thats why
creation of secret means for breaking commonly used cryptosystems by the
government is so troubling. Furthermore, by secretly installing backdoors into these
systems, the NSA makes all of us more vulnerable to outside attacks. If these
backdoors allow the NSA to easily break these systems, what's to stop other players
from maliciously doing the same? They may steal this information from the NSA or a
rogue on the inside may disclose or sell it. Besides, others may discover these
backdoors on their own. Mathematics is a great equalizer. A young man from India
named Srinivasa Ramanujan received no formal training but in the early 20th century
was able to make dazzling mathematical discoveries that stumped professional
mathematicians. For a more recent example, consider this: In 1973, three
mathematicians working for the U.K.s Government Communications Headquarters
discovered a new method of encryption. Their discovery was kept secret by GCHQ, but
shortly afterward two other mathematicians rediscovered the same thing and
published their result (now called Diffie-Hellman key exchange in their honor). Who's
to say that the sophisticated math the NSA has been keeping secret from the rest of

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
the world will not be discovered by someone else? You can hide a formula, but you
can't prevent others from finding it. One might only need a pencil and a piece of paper
to do that. And once the secret is out in the open, its not just Big Brother that will be
watching usother brothers will be spying on us, intercepting our messages, and
hacking our bank accounts. We live in a new era in which mathematics has become a
powerful weapon. It can be used for goodwe all benefit from technological advances
based on mathbut also for ill. When the nuclear bomb was built, theoretical
physicists who had inadvertently contributed to creating something monstrous were
forced to confront deep ethical questions. What is happening now with mathematics
may have similarly grave implications. Members of my community must initiate a
serious discussion about our role in this brave new world. We need to find mechanisms
to protect the freedom of mathematical knowledge that we love and cherish. And we
have to help the public understand both the awesome power of math and the serious
consequences that await all of us if that power is misused.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

1ACSolvency
Plan solves
Danielle Kehl et al, Senior Policy Analyst at New Americas Open Technology
Institute. Kevin Bankston is a Policy Director at OTI, Robyn Greene is a Policy Counsel
at OTI, Robert Morgus is a Research Associate at OTI, Surveillance Costs: The NSAs
Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity, July 2014, pg 40-1
The U.S. government should not require or request that new surveillance capabilities
or security vulnerabilities be built into communi- cations technologies and services, even
if these are intended only to facilitate lawful surveillance. There is a great deal of evidence that backdoors
fundamentally weaken the security of hardware and software, regardless of whether only the NSA
purportedly knows about said vulnerabilities, as some of the documents suggest. A policy state- ment from the Internet Engineering Task
Force in 2000 emphasized that adding

a requirement for wiretapping will make afected protocol


designs considerably more complex. Experience has shown that complexity almost
inevitably jeopardizes the security of communications. 355 More recently, a May 2013 paper from the
Center for Democracy and Technology on the risks of wiretap modifications to endpoints concludes that deployment of an
intercept capability in communications services, systems and applica- tions poses
serious security risks. 356 The authors add that on balance mandating that endpoint software
vendors build intercept functionality into their products will be much more costly to
personal, economic and governmental security overall than the risks associated with
not being able to wiretap all communications. 357 While NSA programs such as SIGINT Enablingmuch like
proposals from domestic law enforcement agen- cies to update the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) to
require dig- ital wiretapping capabilities in modern Internet- based communications services 358 may aim to promote national security
and law enforcement by ensuring that federal agencies have the ability to intercept Internet communications, they do so at a huge cost

the U.S. government should not mandate or


request the creation of surveillance backdoors in prod- ucts, whether through
legislation, court order, or the leveraging industry relationships to convince companies
to voluntarily insert vulnerabilities. As Bellovin et al. explain, complying with these types of
requirements would also hinder innovation and impose a tax on software
development in addition to creating a whole new class of vulnerabilities in hardware
and software that un- dermines the overall security of the products . 359 An amendment
ofered to the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2015 (H.R. 4435) by Representatives Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) and Rush Holt (D-NJ)
would have prohibited inserting these kinds of vulnerabilities outright. 360 The Lofgren-Holt proposal aimed to
prevent the funding of any intelligence agency, intelligence program, or intelligence related activity that mandates
or requests that a device manufacturer, software developer, or standards organization build in a backdoor to
circumvent the encryption or privacy protections of its prod- ucts , unless there is statutory
to online security overall. Because of the associated security risks,

authority to make such a mandate or request. 361 Although that measure was not adopted as part of the NDAA, a similar amendment
sponsored by Lofgren along with Representatives Jim Sensenbrenner (D-WI) and Thomas Massie (R-KY), did make it into the Houseapproved version of the NDAAwith the support of Internet companies and privacy orga- nizations 362 passing on an overwhelming
vote of 293 to 123. 363 Like Representative Graysons amendment on NSAs consultations with NIST around encryption, it remains to be

these
legislative eforts are a heartening sign and are consistent with recommendations from
the Presidents Review Group that the U.S. govern- ment should not attempt to
deliberately weaken the security of commercial encryption products. Such mandated
vulnerabilities, whether required under statute or by court order or inserted simply by
request, unduly threaten innovation in secure Internet technologies while introducing
security flaws that may be exploited by a variety of bad actors. A clear policy against
seen whether this amendment will end up in the final appropri- ations bill that the President signs. Nonetheless,

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
such vulnerability mandates is necessary to restore international trust in U.S.
companies and technologies.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

2ACCase

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

2ACAdd-ons

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

2AC IPP Add-on


Cyberattacks from China deck competitiveness, innovation, and
economic growth
AZ Gordon, columnist for Stanford Daily, citing a CSIS study, November 2, 2014,
The spies who kill innovation, http://www.stanforddaily.com/2014/11/02/the-spieswho-kill-innovation/
Much has been made of Chinas rise and Americas supposed decline, but these
arguments are generally unsound. American declinists leech of the belief that faster growth today means more
power tomorrow. They assert that Chinas economic rise means that the Middle Kingdom will necessarily supplant Americas global
hegemony with its own. Such declinist arguments discount the type of growth that China is riding out of poverty. Chinas high-speed
swelling is not high-tech progression, argues Stanford scholar Josef Jofe in his book, The Myth of Americas Decline, for China still
clings to industrial labor, the queen of the 19th and 20th centuries. America, despite its faults, is the master of 21st-century economy,
with better universities, technological development and innovation, outpacing China in annual patents by a three-to-one margin. But

China has one sinister advantage that the U.S. still has no clear strategy for deflating :
economic espionage the act of stealing trade secrets and proprietary information
from corporations, often through cybercrime and online criminal acts. As the Internet
connects the world, cybercrime steals from it. Each year, the economy sufers $375$575 billion in losses due to cybercrime, according to a comprehensive study by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS). CSIS reports that the U.S. economy sufers $70-140 billion of those losses ,
more than any other nation does. To put this in perspective, CSIS estimates that those losses amount to
200,000 lost jobs for American workers, roughly the same number of total jobs added in September. The most
committed of cybercrime culprits is China and its Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). According to both independent studies and the U.S.

the PLA routinely steals proprietary information from American corporations


through extensive cyberattacks and then uses this stolen information to provide
Chinese corporations with a competitive advantage over American firms . This
threatens American competitiveness by weakening intellectual property protections for
entrepreneurs and large corporations alike, consequently decreasing the incentive to
invest in innovation. For example, Chinese firms stole American Superconductor Corp.s
software designs for wind turbines, efectively pushing it out of the Asian market.
Similarly, Chinese economic spies have attempted to steal trade secrets from Apple, Ford
Motor and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Such cybertheft also threatens U.S. defense posture, as the PLA
likely poaches American weapon designs and hacks into Americas critical
infrastructure systems.
government,

Innovation solves extinction


Brent Barker, electrical engineer, and manager of corporate communications for the
Electric Power Research Institute and former industrial economist and staf author at
SRI International and as a commercial research analyst at USX Corporation, 2K
Technology and the Quest for Sustainability, EPRI Journal, Summer 2000, Vol. 25, p.
8-17
accelerating productivity is not an option but rather an imperative for the future. It is
necessary in order to provide the wealth for environmental sustainability , to support an aging population
in the industrialized world, and to provide an economic ladder for developing nations . The second area
of opportunity for technology lies in its potential to help stabilize global population at 10From a social standpoint,

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
The key is economics. Global
communications, from television to movies to the Internet, have brought an image of the comfortable
life of the developed world into the homes of the poorest people, firing their own
aspirations for a better quality of life, either through economic development in their own country
or through emigration to other countries. If we in the developed world can make the basic tools of prosperity-infrastructure, health care, education, and law--more accessible and afordable , recent history suggests that the
cultural drivers for producing large families will be tempered , relatively quickly and without
12 billion sometime in the twenty-first century, possibly as early as 2075.

coercion. But the task is enormous. The physical prerequisites for prosperity in the global economy are electricity and communications.
Today, there are more than 2 billion people living without electricity, or commercial energy in any form, in the very countries where
some 5 billion people will be added in the next 50 years. If for no other reason than our enlightened self-interest, we should strive for
universal access to electricity, communications, and educational opportunity. We have little choice, because the fate of the developed

opportunity for
technology is in decoupling population growth from land use and , more broadly, decoupling
economic growth from natural resource consumption through recycling, end-use
efficiency, and industrial ecology. Decoupling population from land use is well under way. According to Grubler, from
world is inextricably bound up in the economic and demographic fate of the developing world. A third, related

1700 to 1850 nearly 2 hectares of land (5 acres) were needed to support every child born in North America, while in the more crowded
and cultivated regions of Europe and Asia only 0.5 hectare (1.2 acres) and 0.2 hectare (0.5 acre) were needed, respectively. During the

Europe and
North America experiencing the fastest decreases. Both crossed the "zero threshold" in the past few decades,
meaning that no additional land is needed to support additional children and that land
requirements will continue to decrease in the future. One can postulate that the pattern of returning
land to nature will continue to spread throughout the world, eventually stemming and
then reversing the current onslaught on the great rain forests. Time is critical if vast
tracts are to be saved from being laid bare, and success will largely depend on how rapidly
economic opportunities expand for those now trapped in subsistence and frontier
farming. In concept, the potential for returning land to nature is enormous. Futurist and scholar Jesse Ausubel of the Rockefeller
past century, the amount of land needed per additional child has been dropping in all areas of the world, with

University calculates that if farmers could lift average grain yields around the world just to the level of today's average U.S. corn grower,
one-half of current global cropland--an area the size of the Amazon basin--could be spared. If agriculture is a leading indicator, then the

with shrinking agricultural


land requirements, water distribution and use around the world can be greatly altered ,
continuous drive to produce more from less will prevail in other parts of the economy Certainly

since nearly two-thirds of water now goes for irrigation. Overall, the technologies of the future will, in the words of Ausubel, be "cleaner,
leaner, lighter, and drier"--that is, more efficient and less wasteful of materials and water. They will be much more tightly integrated
through microprocessor-based control and will therefore use human and natural resources much more efficiently and productively.
Energy intensity, land intensity, and water intensity (and, to a lesser extent, materials intensity) for both manufacturing and agriculture
are already heading downward. Only in agriculture are they falling fast enough to ofset the surge in population, but, optimistically,
advances in science and technology should accelerate the downward trends in other sectors, helping to decouple economic
development from environmental impact in the coming century. One positive sign is the fact that recycling rates in North America are
now approaching 65% for steel, lead, and copper and 30% for aluminum and paper. A second sign is that economic output is shifting
away from resource-intensive products toward knowledge-based, immaterial goods and services. As a result, although the U.S. gross
domestic product (GDP) increased 200-fold (in real dollars) in the twentieth century, the physical weight of our annual output remains
the same as it was in 1900. If anything, this trend will be accelerating. As Kevin Kelly, the editor of Wired magazine, noted, "The
creations most in demand from the United States [as exports] have lost 50% of their physical weight per dollar of value in only six
years.... Within a generation, two at most, the number of people working in honest-to-goodness manufacturing jobs will be no more than

Even
pollution shows clear signs of being decoupled from population and economic growth .
the number of farmers on the land--less than a few percent. Far more than we realize, the network economy is pulling us all in."

Economist Paul Portney notes that, with the exception of greenhouse gases, "in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] countries, the favorable experience [with pollution control] has been a triumph of technology That is, the ratio of pollution
per unit of GDP has fallen fast enough in the developed world to ofset the increase in both GDP per capita and the growing number of
'capitas' themselves." The fourth opportunity for science and technology stems from their enormous potential to unlock resources not
now available, to reduce human limitations, to create new options for policymakers and businesspeople alike, and to give us new levels
of insight into future challenges. Technically resources have little value if we cannot unlock them for practical use. With technology, we
are able to bring dormant resources to life. For example, it was only with the development of an electrolytic process late in the
nineteenth century that aluminum--the most abundant metal on earth--became commercially available and useful. Chemistry unlocked
hydrocarbons. And engineering allowed us to extract and put to diverse use untapped petroleum and gas fields. Over the course of
history, technology has made the inaccessible accessible, and resource depletion has been more of a catalyst for change than a
longstanding problem. Technology provides us with last-ditch methods (what economists would call substitutions) that allow us to
circumvent or leapfrog over crises of our own making. Agricultural technology solved the food crisis of the first half of the nineteenth
century. The English "steam crisis" of the 1860s, triggered by the rapid rise of coal-burning steam engines and locomotives, was averted
by mechanized mining and the discovery and use of petroleum. The U.S. "timber crisis" that Teddy Roosevelt publicly worried about was

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
circumvented by the use of chemicals that enabled a billion or so railroad ties to last for decades instead of years. The great "manure
crisis" of the same era was solved by the automobile, which in a few decades replaced some 25 million horses and freed up 40 million
hectares (100 million acres) of farmland, not to mention improving the sanitation and smell of inner cities. Oil discoveries in Texas and
then in the Middle East pushed the pending oil crisis of the 1920s into the future. And the energy crisis of the 1970s stimulated the
development of new sensing and drilling technology, sparked the advance of non--fossil fuel alternatives, and deepened the penetration
of electricity with its fuel flexibility into the global economy Thanks to underground imaging technology, today's known gas resources
are an order of magnitude greater than the resources known 20 years ago, and new reserves continue to be discovered. Technology has
also greatly extended human limits. It has given each of us a productive capability greater than that of 150 workers in 1800, for
example, and has conveniently put the power of hundreds of horses in our garages. In recent decades, it has extended our voice and our

But global
sustainability is not inevitable. In spite of the tremendous promise that technology holds for a sustainable future,
there is the potential for all of this to backfire before the job can be done. There are disturbing
indications that people sometimes turn in fear and anger on technologies, industries, and institutions that
openly foster an ever-faster pace of change . The current opposition to nuclear power genetically altered food,
reach, allowing us to easily send our words, ideas, images, and money around the world at the speed of light.

the globalization of the economy and the spread of American culture should give us pause. Technology has always presented a twoedged sword, serving as both cause and efect, solving one problem while creating another that was unintended and often unforeseen.
We solved the manure crisis, but automotive smog, congestion, and urban sprawl took its place. We cleaned and transformed the cities
with all-electric buildings rising thousands of feet into the sky. But while urban pollution was thereby dramatically reduced, a portion of
the pollution was shifted to someone else's sky. Breaking limits "Limits to growth" was a popular theme in the 1970s, and a best-selling
book of that name predicted dire consequences for the human race by the end of the century. In fact, we have done much better than
those predictions, largely because of a factor the book missed--the potential of new technology to break limits. Repeatedly, human
societies have approached seemingly insurmountable barriers only to find the means and tools to break through. This ability has now

Today's perceived limits, however, look and


feel diferent. They are global in nature, multicultural, and larger in scale and complexity than ever
before. Nearly 2 billion people in the world are without adequate sanitation, and nearly
as many are without access to clean drinking water. AIDS is spreading rapidly in the regions
of the world least able to fight it. Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are more than 30%
greater than preindustrial levels and are climbing steadily. Petroleum reserves , expected to be tapped by over a
billion automobiles worldwide by 2015, may last only another 50-100 years. And without careful preservation eforts,
the biodiversity of the planet could become as threatened in this coming century as it
was at the end of the last ice age, when more than 70% of the species of large mammals and
other vertebrates in North America disappeared (along with 29% in Europe and 86% in Australia). All these perceived
limits require innovation of a scope and intensity surpassing humankind's current
commitment. The list of real-world problems that could thwart global sustainability is
long and sobering. It includes war, disease, famine, political and religious turmoil, despotism,
entrenched poverty, illiteracy, resource depletion, and environmental degradation.
become a source of optimism, an article of faith, in many parts of the world.

Technology can help resolve some of these issues--poverty and disease, resource depletion, and environmental impact, for example--but
it ofers little recourse for the passions and politics that divide the world. The likelihood is that we will not catch up and overtake the
moving target of global sustainability in the coming century, but given the prospects for technology, which have never been brighter, we

We should put our technology to work, striving to lift more than 5


billion people out of poverty while preventing irreversible damage to the biosphere
and irreversible loss of the earth's natural resources .
may come surprisingly close.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

2ACEconomy Advantage
Localization Bad Protectionism Add-On
Leads to global protectionism prevents global business and leads to trade wars
Chander and Le 15 (Director, California International Law Center, Professor of Law and Martin Luther King, Jr.
Hall Research Scholar, University of California, Davis; Free Speech and Technology Fellow, California International
Law Center; A.B., Yale College; J.D., University of California, Davis School of Law)
Anupam Chander and Uyn P. L, DATA NATIONALISM, EMORY LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 64:677,
http://law.emory.edu/elj/_documents/volumes/64/3/articles/chander-le.pdf)
We leave for a later study a crucial additional concernthe fundamental tension between data localization
and trade liberalization obligations.168 Data localization makes impossible the forms of global
business that have appeared over the last two decades, allowing the provision of information services across
borders. Moreover, protectionist policies barring access to foreign services only invite

reciprocal protectionism from ones trading partners, harming consumers and businesses
alike in the process by denying them access to the worlds leading services.
Trade protectionism destabalizes the globe and escalates to nuclear war
Bernstein 10
[William J Bernstein, PHD, principal in the money management firm Efficient Frontier Advisors, and
economic contributor to several publications, March 18 2010 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ianfletcher/free-trade-vs-protectioni_b_504403.html]

When goods are not allowed to cross borders, soldiers will." --Frederic Bastiat How soon we
forget. For nearly all of recorded history before 1945, Europe, today a peaceful and prosperous region
linked by high-speed trains and ridiculously low airfares, was riven by nearly continuous major
conflicts. In the Second World War's aftermath, it was crystal clear to military, political, and
diplomatic leaders on both sides of the Atlantic that the trade protectionism of the previous several
decades in no small measure contributed to that catastrophe. The U.S. State Department said, in
effect, "never again" and drew up a blueprint for the new world trade order, Proposals for the Expansion of
World Trade and Employment, which soon gave rise to the GATT and the beginnings of the EU. The
arrangement succeeded beyond its wildest expectations and ushered in an era of unparalleled global peace
and prosperity. By 1945, the link between trade conflict and armed conflict had become blindingly
obvious. This was nothing new, of course. The Peloponnesian War saw its genesis in Athens' dependence
on the grain from what is now the Ukraine, which necessitated control of the narrow passages between the
Aegean and Black Seas by the Athenian Empire. In the early seventeenth century Holland and Portugal
fought a remarkable world-wide conflict over the trade in slaves, spices, and sugar. Later in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, Britain and Holland fought no less than four wars, sparked largely by British
protectionist legislation--the Navigation Acts. Southern anger over northern protectionism contributed to the
outbreak of the Civil War nearly as much as did slavery. Those who doubt this would do well to consider that
just thirty years before, the two sides nearly went to war over the Nullification Crisis of 1833, which was
itself directly precipitated by the tariff acts of 1828 and 1832. Mr. Fletcher tries his best to ignore this
historical inevitability of retaliation to tariff increases; he asserts that since our trading partners, particularly
those in Asia, run persistently high trade surpluses vis-a-vis the U.S., they would not dare retaliate. There are
at least three things wrong with this argument. First, in the past, it hasn't worked. During the 1930s, for
example, all nations, including those running trade surpluses, pushed up their tariff rates. Second, it ignores
one of the prime lessons of human history: winners often do not remember, while losers never forget .

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
Centuries of humiliation by the West have scarred the national psyches of both China and
India, and serious misunderstandings can easily ensue. Who controls the Strait of Malacca,
through which flows China's oil supply and European trade? The U.S. Navy. Last, Mr. Fletcher believes that
our politicians can fairly dispense protection broadly across the economy by means of a "flat tariff." Good
luck with that: U.S. trade preferences always have, and always will, go disproportionately to
the prosperous and well connected. Exhibit A: the obscene sugar subsidies and trade preferences
meted out for decades to the wealthy and powerful Fanjul brothers. Do not be misled by those whose naive
belief in the rational self-interest of others will prevent any significant protectionist actions by the United
States. The events of August 1914 demonstrated just how seriously awry the "rational self-interest" of nations
can go, and the Cold War taught us the impossibility of containing even the smallest of
nuclear exchanges. So too has history repeatedly shown that even small tariff increases often lead

to trade wars, and that trade wars can end in Armageddon.

Localization Bad Protectionism Ext


New infrastructure requirements undermines global trade
Chander and Le 15 (Director, California International Law Center, Professor of Law and Martin Luther King, Jr.
Hall Research Scholar, University of California, Davis; Free Speech and Technology Fellow, California International
Law Center; A.B., Yale College; J.D., University of California, Davis School of Law)
Anupam Chander and Uyn P. L, DATA NATIONALISM, EMORY LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 64:677,
http://law.emory.edu/elj/_documents/volumes/64/3/articles/chander-le.pdf)
Imagine an Internet where data must stop at national borders, examined to see whether it is allowed to leave
the country and possibly taxed when it does. While this may sound fanciful, this is precisely the impact of
various measures undertaken or planned by many nations to curtail the flow of data outside their borders.
Countries around the world are in the process of creating Checkpoint Charliesnot just for highly secret
national security data but for ordinary data about citizens. The very nature of the World Wide Web is at stake.
We will show how countries across the world have implemented or have planned dramatic steps to curtail the
flow of information outside their borders. By creating national barriers to data, data localization measures
break up the World Wide Web, which was designed to share information across the globe.4 The Internet is a
global network based on a protocol for interconnecting computers without regard for national borders.
Information is routed across this network through decisions made autonomously and automatically at local
routers, which choose paths based largely on efficiency, unaware of political borders.5
Thus, the services built on the Internet, from email to the World Wide Web, pay little heed to national
borders. Services such as cloud computing exemplify this, making the physical locations for the storage and
processing of their data largely invisible to users. Data localization would dramatically alter this
fundamental architecture of the Internet. Such a change poses a mortal threat to the new kind of
international trade made possible by the Internetinformation services such as those supplied by
Bangalore or Silicon Valley.6
Barriers of distance or immigration restrictions had long kept such services confined within national borders.
But the new services of the Electronic Silk Road often depend on processing information about the user,
information that crosses borders from the users country to the service providers country. Data

localization would thus require the information service provider to build out a physical,
local infrastructure in every jurisdiction in which it operates, increasing costs and other burdens
enormously for both providers and consumers and rendering many of such global services impossible. While
others have observed some of the hazards of data localization, especially for American companies,7 this
Article offers three major advances over earlier work in the area. First, while the earlier analyses have
referred to a data localization measure in a country in the most general of terms, our Article provides a
detailed legal description of localization measures. Second, by examining a variety of key countries around
the world, the study allows us to see the forms in which data localization is emerging and the justifications
offered for such measures in both liberal and illiberal states. Third, the Article works to comprehensively

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
refute the various arguments for data localization offered around the world, showing that data localization
measures are in fact likely to undermine security, privacy, economic development, and innovation where
adopted.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

Leadership prevents localizationIL add-on


US leadership is key to prevent localization requirements
Business Roundtable 12 (group of chief executive officers of major U.S. corporations formed to promote probusiness public policy)
(Promoting Economic Growth through Smart Global Information Technology Policy The Growing Threat of Local Data
Server Requirements, http://businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/Global_IT_Policy_Paper_final.pdf)

Sustained and credible U.S. leadership and multilateral collaboration are necessary to protect
against blanket local data server requirements. BRT recognizes the good work of the United States
and other key trading partners in negotiating well-crafted policies that address the integrated nature of todays
global economy. We want to work with the U.S. government to promote further acceptance and
implementation of these principles.
The E.U.-U.S. Trade Principles for Information and Communication Technology Services and the OECD
Principles for Internet Policy-Making provide a solid foundation for advocating against local data server
requirements. In relevant part, they state:
The E.U.-U.S. Trade Principles for Information and Communication Technology Services Local
Infrastructure: Governments should not require ICT service suppliers to use local infrastructure, or establish
a local presence, as a condition of supplying services.
The OECD Principles for Internet Policy-Making Promoting and Enabling the Cross-Border Delivery of
Services: Suppliers should have the ability to supply services over the Internet on a cross- border and
technologically neutral basis in a manner that promotes interoperability of services and technologies, where
appropriate. Users should have the ability to access and generate lawful content and run applications of their
choice. To ensure cost effectiveness and other efficiencies, other barriers to the location, access and use of
cross-border data facilities and functions should be minimized, providing that appropriate data protection and
security measures are implemented in a manner consistent with the relevant OECD Guidelines and reflecting
the necessary balance among all fundamental rights, freedoms and principles.
BRT and the U.S. government can work together to implement these policy principles and
assess disruptive market and policy trends. As an initial step to doing so, we have chosen to focus on
the very real operating impacts that come from a growth in local data server requirements. At the same time,
we realize that to be fully successful with other countries, the United States must lead by
example and must have a best-practice and consistent position on these matters.
A clearly articulated U.S. position on the appropriate way to minimize barriers to data server location

will allow the United States to advance its position that the unimpeded, free flow of crossborder data is of fundamental importance to the economic competitiveness of U.S.
business, as well as business communities and societies around the world.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

A2: Backdoors dont undermine US companies


Backdoors undermines US Internet companies internationally
David Sanger, April 12, 2014, Obama lets N.S.A. exploit online security flaws,
officials say, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/13/us/politics/obama-lets-nsa-exploitsome-internet-flaws-officials-say.html DOA: 3-21-15
recommendation urged the N.S.A. to get out of the business of weakening
commercial encryption systems or trying to build in ''back doors'' that would make it
far easier for the agency to crack the communications of America's adversaries . Tempting
One

as it was to create easy ways to break codes - the reason the N.S.A. was established by President Harry S. Truman 62 years ago - the

committee concluded that the practice would undercut trust in American software and
hardware products. In recent months, Silicon Valley companies have urged the United States
to abandon such practices, while Germany and Brazil, among other nations, have said they
are considering shunning American-made equipment and software .

Businesses cant sell products that have a back door to the NSA
Center for Democracy & Technology, November 10, 2014, Issue Brief: a
Backdoor to Encryption for Government Surveillance, https://cdt.org/insight/issuebrief-a-backdoor-to-encryption-for-government-surveillance/ DOA; 3-15-15
Consumers outside of the US may be much less inclined to purchase American tech
products that facilitate government surveillance. Consider, for example, the difficulty
US companies would have selling smartphones or network servers in the EU that are
built to enable easy access for the NSA. As a technical matter, it is difficult and
expensive to both build a backdoor security vulnerability and then defend that
vulnerability against unauthorized use. This burden would be heaviest on small
businesses and innovators of new communications services, which may create a
disincentive to encrypt their products and reduce the overall security of users.

Government backdoors damage US business credibility and hurts


our economy
MIT CSAIL TR 7-6 Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Technical Report, July 6, 2015 Harold Abelson, Ross Anderson, Steven M. Bellovin, Josh
Benaloh, Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, John Gilmore, Matthew Green, Susan Landau,
Peter G. Neumann, Ronald L. Rivest, Jefrey I. Schiller, Bruce Schneier, Michael Specter,
Daniel J. Weitzner , http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/97690/MIT-CSAILTR-2015-026.pdf?sequence=8)//GV
there are the broader costs to the economy. Economic growth comes largely from
innovation in science, technology, and business processes. At present, technological
progress is largely about embedding intelligence software and communications
Next,

everywhere. Products and services that used to be standalone now come with a mobile phone app, an online web service, and business
models that involve either ads or a subscription. Increasingly these are also social, so you can chat to your friends and draw them into
the vendors marketing web.

Countries that require these new apps and web services to have

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
their user-to-user communications functions authorized by the government will be at a
significant disadvantage. At present, the world largely uses US apps and services, rather than the government-approved
ones from Russia and China. This provides enormous leverage to US businesses.

International businesses shy away and crush US overseas


businesses
Claire Cain Miller, 3-21-2014, "Revelations of N.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech
Companies," New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/falloutfrom-snowden-hurting-bottom-line-of-tech-companies.html)//GV
SAN FRANCISCO Microsoft has lost customers, including the government of Brazil. IBM is spending more than a billion dollars to build
data centers overseas to reassure foreign customers that their information is safe from prying eyes in the United States government.

tech companies abroad, from Europe to South America, say they are gaining customers that are
shunning United States providers, suspicious because of the revelations by Edward J.
Snowden that tied these providers to the National Security Agencys vast surveillance
program. Even as Washington grapples with the diplomatic and political fallout of Mr. Snowdens leaks, the more urgent
issue, companies and analysts say, is economic. Technology executives, including Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook, raised the
issue when they went to the White House on Friday for a meeting with President Obama. It is impossible to see now the full
economic ramifications of the spying disclosures in part because most companies are
locked in multiyear contracts but the pieces are beginning to add up as businesses
question the trustworthiness of American technology products . The confirmation hearing last week
And

for the new N.S.A. chief, the video appearance of Mr. Snowden at a technology conference in Texas and the drip of new details about

Despite the tech


companies assertions that they provide information on their customers only when
required under law and not knowingly through a back door the perception that
they enabled the spying program has lingered . Its clear to every single tech company
that this is afecting their bottom line, said Daniel Castro, a senior analyst at the Information Technology and
government spying have kept attention focused on an issue that many tech executives hoped would go away.

Innovation Foundation, who predicted that the United States cloud computing industry could lose $35 billion by 2016. Forrester
Research, a technology research firm, said the losses could be as high as $180 billion, or 25 percent of industry revenue, based on the
size of the cloud computing, web hosting and outsourcing markets and the worst case for damages. The business efect of the
disclosures about the N.S.A. is felt most in the daily conversations between tech companies with products to pitch and their wary

The topic of surveillance, which rarely came up before, is now the new
normal in these conversations, as one tech company executive described it. Were hearing
customers.

from customers, especially global enterprise customers, that they care more than ever about where their content is stored and how it is
used and secured, said John E. Frank, deputy general counsel at Microsoft, which has been publicizing that it allows customers to store
their data in Microsoft data centers in certain countries. At the same time, Mr. Castro said, companies say they believe the federal
government is only making a bad situation worse. Most of the companies in this space are very frustrated because there hasnt been
any kind of response thats made it so they can go back to their customers and say, See, this is whats diferent now, you can trust us
again, he said. In some cases, that has meant forgoing potential revenue. Though it is hard to quantify missed opportunities, American
businesses are being left of some requests for proposals from foreign customers that previously would have included them, said James
Staten, a cloud computing analyst at Forrester who has read clients requests for proposals. There are German companies, Mr. Staten
said, explicitly not inviting certain American companies to join. He added, Its like, Well, the very best vendor to do this is IBM, and
you didnt invite them. The result has been a boon for foreign companies. Runbox, a Norwegian email
service that markets itself as an alternative to American services like Gmail and says it does not comply with foreign court orders
seeking personal information, reported a 34 percent annual increase in customers after news of the N.S.A. surveillance. Brazil and the
European Union, which had used American undersea cables for intercontinental communication, last month decided to build their own
cables between Brazil and Portugal, and gave the contract to Brazilian and Spanish companies. Brazil also announced plans to abandon
Microsoft Outlook for its own email system that uses Brazilian data centers. Mark J. Barrenechea, chief executive of OpenText, Canadas
largest software company, said an anti-American attitude took root after the passage of the Patriot Act, the counterterrorism law passed
after 9/11 that expanded the governments surveillance powers. But the volume of the discussion has risen significantly postSnowden, he said. For instance, after the N.S.A. surveillance was revealed, one of OpenTexts clients, a global steel manufacturer based
in Britain, demanded that its data not cross United States borders. Issues like privacy are more important than finding the cheapest
price, said Matthias Kunisch, a German software executive who spurned United States cloud computing providers for Deutsche Telekom.

Security
analysts say that ultimately the fallout from Mr. Snowdens revelations could mimic
Because of Snowden, our customers have the perception that American companies have connections to the N.S.A.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
what happened to Huawei, the Chinese technology and telecommunications company, which was forced to
abandon major acquisitions and contracts when American lawmakers claimed that the
companys products contained a backdoor for the Peoples Liberation Army of China
even though this claim was never definitively verified.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

A2: Cloud computing not k2 Tech innovation


Cloud computing is key to broader tech innovation
Kehl et al 14 (Danielle Kehl is a Policy Analyst at New Americas Open Technology Institute

(OTI). Kevin Bankston is the Policy Director at OTI, Robyn Greene is a Policy Counsel at OTI, and
Robert Morgus is a Research Associate at OTI)
(New Americas Open Technology Institute Policy Paper, Surveillance Costs: The NSAs Impact
on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity, July 2014)

It appears that little consideration was given over the past decade to the potential
economic repercussions if the NSAs secret pro- grams were revealed.38 This
failure was acutely demonstrated by the Obama Administrations initial focus on
reassuring the public that its programs primarily afect non-Americans, even
though non-Americans are also heavy users of American companies products.
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg put a fine point on the issue, saying that the
government blew it in its response to the scandal. He noted sarcasti- cally: The
government response was, Oh dont worry, were not spying on any Americans.
Oh, wonderful: thats really helpful to companies [like Facebook] trying to serve
people around the world, and thats really going to inspire confidence in American
internet companies.39 As Zuckerbergs comments reflect, certain parts of the
American technology industry are particularly vulnerable to international backlash
since growth is heavily dependent on foreign markets. For example, the U.S. cloud
computing industry has grown from an estimated $46 billion in 2008 to $150
billion in 2014, with nearly 50 percent of worldwide cloud-computing revenues
com- ing from the U.S.40 R Street Institutes January 2014 policy study concluded
that in the next few years, new products and services that rely on cloud computing
will become increasingly pervasive. Cloud computing is also the root of
development for the emerging generation of Web-based applicationshome
security, out- patient care, mobile payment, distance learning, efficient energy use
and driverless cars, writes R Streets Steven Titch in the study. And it is a
research area where the United States is an undisputed leader.41 This trajectory
may be dramatically altered, however, as a consequence of the NSAs surveillance
programs.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

A2: No Impact
Econ collapse causes nuclear war
Harris and Burrows 9 - Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor
in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NICs Long
Range Analysis Unit Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Efects of the Financial Crisis
http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf, AM)
Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely
to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample
Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more

the Great Depression is not likely to be


repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful efects
on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in
1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions(think League of
instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that

Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth

potential for greater conflict could grow would


seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environmentas they
century. For that reason, the ways in which the

would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will
remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorisms appeal will decline if economic growth
continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the
difusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the worlds most dangerous capabilities within their reach.

Terrorist groupsin 2025willlikely be a combination of descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational


structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent

become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence


of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The
most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S.
military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons is not
inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new
security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and
consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent
collections of the angry and disenfranchised that

relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear

conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella


could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines
between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of
Iran. Episodes of low intensity

potential nuclear rivals

combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian

will produce inherent difficulties

missile systems also


in achieving reliable indications and warning of an
impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and

uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather


than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that
the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge,
particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of
renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their
future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in
interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy
resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime.
Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale
for naval buildups and modernization eforts, such as Chinas and Indias development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal
stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for
multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle

cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly


difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
East,

Best studies prove the correlation


Royal 10 - Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S.
Department of Defense, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the
Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and
Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of
external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline
and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and
national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's

rhythms in the global economy are associated with


the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one
pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could
usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about
power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a
relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for
conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately.
(1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that

Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among
major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and
security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that
'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues
that interdependent states arc likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations.

if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace


items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be
inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for
decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others
have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a
national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict
and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn . They write. The
linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually
reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the
favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which
international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9>
Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism
(Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to
external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting
government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising
from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate
external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' efect . Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995),
However,

and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti)
correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc
greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being
removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic
performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In
summary, rcccni

economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship
links economic decline with external conflict al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection
between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more

perspectives that link economic


interdependence with a decrease inthe likelihood of externalconflict,such as those
mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence
instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the
occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view
presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.
attention. This observation is not contradictory to other

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

2ACCloud Computing Advantage

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

A2: Tech leadership not K2 Primacy


Tech leadership drives American primacy
Weiss 14 Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, Professor
Emeritus in Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney,
Honorary Professor of Political Science at Aarhus University. (Linda, America Inc.?:
Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State, Cornell University Press,
4/1/14, p. 1-3)//
what accounts for Americas transformative capacity? Where do its breakthrough innovations come
My answer traces the relationship between high technology, national security, and
political culture. It advances three interlinked propositions regarding the role of the NSS as technology
enterprise and commercialization engine; its geopolitical drivers; and the institutional consequences of an
antistatist constraint. The national security state as technology enterprise. First,
America's capacity for transformative innovation derives not merely from the entrepreneurship of its
private sector, or simply from the state as such, but from the national security state a particular cluster of federal
agencies that collaborate closely with private actors in pursuit of security-related objectives. The NSS is a wholly new
postwar creation that is geared to the permanent mobilization of the nation's science
and technology resources for military primacy, and here I document and explain why it has had to
So

from?

become increasingly involved in commercial undertakings. Although centered on defense preparedness, the NSS is a good deal broader

In addition to its defense core in the Department


of Defense, the NSS comprises several other components created at the height of the
Cold War to pursue, deliver, or underwrite innovation in the service of securing
technological supremacy. Although some are designated as "civilian" in their ori- gins, evolution, and current mix of
than the military, yet narrower than the state as a whole.

activities, these NSS components remain deeply enmeshed in national security or dual-use functions (as we shall see in chapter 2).4
Acting as commander in chief, the president sits at the peak of this complex, supported by the Oval Office and, in particular, the Office
of Science and Technology Policy. In sum, I discuss NSS activities not in the more popular sense of a surveillance state, but as a national
"technology enterprise" in which the military is the central, but far from exclusive, actor. In telling this Story, I demonstrate and account
for a major shift in NS.S innovation programs and policies that involved the national security agencies cultivating and undertaking
commercialization ventures. (c. 1945 up to the 1970s), this process of fostering commercially relevant (general-purpose or dual-use)
technologies took both direct and indirect forms. Then (especially from the 1980s onward) it also took a more proactive form, via
patenting and licensing reforms and cooperative agreements to transfer technology from the federal labs to the private sector, via the
launching of new procurement and joint innovation initiatives, and via the creation of new venture capital (VC) schemes. By placing
greater emphasis on commercialization opportunities, some of these incentives sought to sweeten collaboration with the DOD and other
security-related agencies, and thus to increase NISS influence over the direction of technology. A significant problem for the NSS has
been that since the late 1970s, it has become progressively more challenging to enlist innovative companies in the private sector to
work on security-related projects. While traditional defense suppliers grew increasingly large and specialized in systems integration, by
the 1970s the more innovative producer companiesabove all, critical suppliers Of integrated circuitshad begun to pull away from the
federal market. Attracting nondefense firms to do defense work was at one time easy because the government market (in
semiconductors and computers, for instance) was so much larger than the private market, and healthy profits could be made. But by the
mid- 1970s commercial markets had come into their own, leading firms to reorient production to suit the more standardized demand.
One consequence of lacking the earlier pull power Of massive demand is that NISS agencies have had to create new incentives to foster
private-sector collaboration. One of the major incentives intended to reattract the private sector is the inclusion of commercial goals in
NSS technology policies. Commercial viability therefore has to stand alongside security and technological supremacy in NSS policy. For
instance, if a firm works with an agency to create a technology, service, or prototype for use by the U.S. Army, it will also be encouraged
from the outset of the project to create a similar product for the commercial market. In this way, and many more, the NSS has
progressively been drawn into promoting commercial innovation for security reasons. One implication, demonstrated in some detail, is
that the NISS has achieved a much broader reach than commonly implied by the notion Of a military-industrial complex. Geopolitical

What are the drivers of the NSS technology enterprise? Geopolitics and related
threat perceptions have been the original catalyst for NSS formation and its
evolution as an innovation engine. This state- (and technology-) building dynamic has occurred in three broad
drivers.

phases: the Cold War, the rise of Japan as techno-security challenge, and the post-9/11 era of asymmetric threats. The NSS emerged
and expanded in fits and starts after World War II in response to a perceived international threat, emanating from the Soviet Union, that
proved both enduring and persistent. It is instructive to note that in this phase the NSS bears at least some comparison with the
erstwhile "developmental states" of Northeast Asia. They too emerged in response to an intensely perceived security threat, from
neighboring China and North Korea, but instead sought national security more broadly via economic improvement, or industrial catchup. Living on the fault lines of the Cold War in the presence of a credible and unyielding security threat exerted an unusual pressure on
the East Asian states to pursue security by building economic strength. More distinctively in the case of Japan, Peter Katzenstein has

Stefan Bauschard
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developed the argument that, against the backdrop of terrible defeat, domestic power struggles succeeded in reorienting Japan's
conception of security in favor Of economic rather than military strength. Thus the Japanese state practices a form of "technological
national security" in order to ensure against its resource dependence and reduce its exposure to international supply disruptions
(Katzenstein 1996, 2005; also Samuels 1994). Fundamental motivations drawn from diferent historical experiences thus serve to

America's
national security State has been geared to the pursuit of technological superior , not for
reasons of national independence, economic competitiveness, or resource dependency, but in order to maintain
American primacy. For the United States, the experience of World War Il drove home
the point that science and technology (S&T) was a game changerthe key to winning
the warand that future preparedness would depend on achieving and sustaining
technological superiority. Geopolitics is thus the driver, not economics. I emphasize this point
underline a unique feature of the NSS. In contrast to Japan (and the East Asian developmental states more generally),

because many analysts have viewed the Pentagon as the source of an industrial policy that is pursued beneath the radar6a claim that

the NSS was tasked with


ensuring the technology leadership of the United States for the purpose of national
defense. Even as the Soviet menace retreated, security proved paramount as the U.S. confronted a newly resurgent Japan that
this book disputes since it mistakes the nature of the primary driver. From its inception,

threatened to dethrone it as the regnant technology power. Appreciating the strength and intensity of the U.S. security focus means
never underestimating the significance of this point: as long as U.S. military strategy continues to rely on a significant technology lead
over its adversaries (real or potential), threats to that lead can never be simply (or even primarily) a commercial mattereven when the
NSS "goes commercial.

Stefan Bauschard
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A2: No impact to C/A


Effective climate adaptation solves global conflict
Smith 7 (Dan Smith, Professor of Peace and Conflict at the University of Manchester,
Secretary General of International Alert, Former Director of the International Peace
Research Institute, A Climate Of Conflict: The links between climate change, peace
and war, November 2007, http://www.internationalalert.org/sites/default/files/publications/A_climate_of_conflict.pdf)
Climate change is the latest hot topic on the international agenda. Even before the Nobel Peace Prize for 2007 was
awarded to the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and to Al Gore, the issues profile was rising. At the
end of 2006, Sir Nicholas Stern headed a major review of the economics of global warming for the UK government and
gained considerable media coverage.1 In 2007 the IPCC itself produced its Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) with major
media attention as each of its three working groups issued their findings.2 The AR4 has moved the climate change
debate along in several ways. First, it reflects a major increase in the degree of scientific consensus about the reality of
climate change and, second, growing consensus that it is caused by human activity. Third, the AR4 emphasizes that the
consequences of climate change are already unfolding and, fourth, it makes long-term projections about the extent and
physical consequences of climate change that are more serious and far reaching than in previous reports. The evidence
and arguments of the international scientific body will be neither queried nor extended in this report. Our starting point
is the IPCCs finding that climate change and its consequences are not topics for the long-term future alone they are
upon us. Some governments and international organisations are developing strategies to address the causes of climate
change and mitigate global warming by reducing carbon emissions and energy consumption. But mitigation, even if
taken up immediately and on a massive scale, cannot prevent the initial efects of global warming from unfolding

Climate change is
upon us and there is an urgent need to work out how to adapt to it. This is the
next step in governmental policy. There have been some moves in this direction, with the 2006 Stern
through world weather systems and afecting the lives of hundreds of millions of people.

Review ofering policy-makers a comprehensive assessment of the impact climate change will have on the global

Adaptation and Vulnerability also ofers valuable


analysis of the implications of the physical efects of climate change across the world .
This report sets out to look further into these consequences of consequences of
climate change. It looks at their socio-political efects particularly in fragile states and their
implications for the risk of violent conflict. The people for whom the knock-on social consequences
economy. Working Group II of the IPCC on Impacts,

of climate change will be most serious and hardest to adapt to are largely those living in poverty, in under-developed

the impact of the physical consequences will


interact with a mix of these economic, social and political factors to produce a low
capacity to adapt and a high risk of serious consequences such as widespread
malnutrition and starvation, mass migration or violent conflict. These fragile states
thus face a double-headed problem: that of climate change and violent conflict. If nothing is done, the
relationship between the two parts of the problem will be mutually and negatively
reinforcing. There is a real risk that climate change will compound the propensity
for violent conflict which, in turn, will leave communities poorer, less resilient and less able to cope with the
consequences of climate change. But there is also an opportunity here: if it is targeted and
appropriately addressed, this vicious circle can be transformed into a virtuous one . If
communities can enhance their ability to adapt to consequences of climate
change, this will help reduce the risk of violence. And peacebuilding activities, which address
and unstable states, under poor governance. For them,

socio-economic instability and weak governance, will leave communities better placed to adapt to the challenges of
climate change which, in turn, will result in more peaceful societies regardless of how climate change unfolds. Indeed,
climate change ofers an opportunity for peacebuilding, for it is an issue that can unite otherwise divided and
unreconciled communities.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

2ACCybersecurity Advantage

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

2AC Overview
Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure crush military
effectiveness and cause extinction thats Andres
Military operations solve all conflict so theres only a risk of the
DA
Kagan and OHanlon 7
Frederick Kagan and Michael OHanlon, Freds a resident scholar at AEI, Michael is a senior fellow in foreign policy at
Brookings, The Case for Larger Ground Forces, April 24, 2007,
http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424_Kagan20070424.pdf

wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to erupt in many
places where the current relative calm is tenuous . To view this as a strategic military
challenge for the United States is not to espouse a specific theory of Americas role in the
world or a certain political philosophy . Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view
We live at a time when

of American foreign policy makers since World War II that overseas threats must be countered before they can directly
threaten this countrys shores, that the basic stability of the international system is essential to American peace and

no country besides the United States is in a position to lead the way in


countering major challenges to the global order . Let us highlight the threats and their
consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those that involve key strategic
regions of the world such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia, or key potential threats to American security,
such as the spread of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the global Al Qaeda/jihadist
movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to
halt its eforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections . What will
happen if the USor Israeligovernment becomes convinced that Tehran is on the
verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? North Korea, of course, has already done so, and
the ripple efects are beginning to spread . Japans recent election to supreme power of a
leader who has promised to rewrite that countrys constitution to support increased armed forces
and, possibly, even nuclear weapons may well alter the delicate balance of fear in
Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now,
SinoTaiwanese tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and Pakistan,
Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the U nited States, and so on. Meanwhile, the worlds
nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to Americas Bible Belt to its bastions of
liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on ofer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically,
continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key
prosperity, and that

Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either
side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there
truly was lostbut the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable
for the moment, although a major Taliban ofensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed

over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a
very unsettled and quite dangerous place , with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a
much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this international environment is to
develop armed forces capable of protecting Americas vital interests throughout this
dangerous time. Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missionsincluding not
from the recognition that,

only deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with potential hotspots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait,
and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
operations. For todays US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on relearning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a largeenough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnel intensive missions such as the ones now under way in
Iraq and Afghanistan.

Kills the economy, causes nuclear meltdowns, and nuclear war


all cause extinction
Guterl, executive editor Scientific American, 11/28/12
(Fred, Armageddon 2.0, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists)
The world lived for half a century with the constant specter of nuclear war and its potentially
devastating consequences. The end of the Cold War took the potency out of this
Armageddon scenario, yet the existential dangers have only multiplied. Today the
technologies that pose some of the biggest problems are not so much military as commercial. They
come from biology, energy production, and the information sciences -- and are the very technologies that
have fueled our prodigious growth as a species. They are far more seductive than nuclear weapons ,
and more difficult to extricate ourselves from. The technologies we worry about today
form the basis of our global civilization and are essential to our survival. The mistake
many of us make about the darker aspects of our high-tech civilization is in thinking that we have plenty of time to

There may be a
limited window of opportunity for preventing catastrophes such as pandemics, runaway climate
change, and cyber attacks on national power grids. Emerging diseases. The influenza pandemic of 2009 is a case in
address them. We may, if we're lucky. But it's more likely that we have less time than we think.

point. Because of rising prosperity and travel, the world has grown more conducive to a destructive flu virus in recent years, many public health officials
believe. Most people probably remember 2009 as a time when health officials overreacted. But in truth, the 2009 virus came from nowhere, and by the time it
reached the radar screens of health officials, it was already well on its way to spreading far and wide. "H1N1 caught us all with our pants down," says flu expert
Robert G. Webster of St. Jude Children's Research Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee. Before it became apparent that the virus was a mild one, health officials
must have felt as if they were staring into the abyss. If the virus had been as deadly as, say, the 1918 flu virus or some more recent strains of bird flu, the
result would have rivaled what the planners of the 1950s expected from a nuclear war. It would have been a "total disaster," Webster says. "You wouldn't get
the gasoline for your car, you wouldn't get the electricity for your power, you wouldn't get the medicines you need. Society as we know it would fall apart."
Climate change. Climate is another potentially urgent risk. It's easy to think about greenhouse gases as a long-term problem, but the current rate of change in
the Arctic has alarmed more and more scientists in recent years. Tim Lenton, a climate scientist at the University of Exeter in England, has looked at climate
from the standpoint of tipping points -- sudden changes that are not reflected in current climate models. We may already have reached a tipping point -- a
transition to a new state in which the Arctic is ice-free during the summer months. Perhaps the most alarming of Lenton's tipping points is the Indian summer
monsoon. Smoke from household fires, and soot from automobiles and buses in crowded cities, rises into the atmosphere and drifts out over the Indian Ocean,
changing the atmospheric dynamics upon which the monsoon depends -- keeping much of the sun's energy from reaching the surface, and lessening the power
of storms. At the same time, the buildup of greenhouse gases -- emitted mainly from developed countries in the northern hemisphere -- has a very diferent
efect on the Indian summer monsoon: It makes it stronger. These two opposite influences make the fate of the monsoon difficult to predict and subject to
instability. A small influence -- a bit more carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and a bit more brown haze -- could have an outsize efect. The Indian monsoon,
Lenton believes, could be teetering on a knife's edge, ready to change abruptly in ways that are hard to predict. What happens then? More than a billion people
depend on the monsoon's rains. Other tipping points may be in play, says Lenton. The West African monsoon is potentially near a tipping point. So are
Greenland's glaciers, which hold enough water to raise sea levels by more than 20 feet; and the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, which has enough ice to raise sea
levels by at least 10 feet. Regional tipping points could hasten the ill efects of climate change more quickly than currently projected by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. Computer hacking. The computer industry has already made it possible for computers to handle a variety of tasks without human

Autonomous computers, using techniques formerly known as artificial intelligence, have begun to
exert control in virtually every sphere of our lives. Cars, for instance, can now take action to avoid
intervention.

collisions. To do this, a car has to make decisions: When does it take control? How much braking power should be
applied, and to which wheels? And when should the car allow its reflex-challenged driver to regain control? Cars that

Autonomous
computers can make our lives easier and safer, but they can also make them more dangerous. A case
in point is Stuxnet, the computer worm designed by the US and Israel to attack Iran's nuclear fuel program. It is a
watershed in the brief history of malware -- the Jason Bourne of computer code, designed for maximum autonomy
drive themselves, currently being field tested, could hit dealer showrooms in a few years.

and efectiveness. Stuxnet's creators gave their program the best training possible: they stocked it with detailed
technical knowledge that would come in handy for whatever situation Stuxnet could conceivably encounter. Although

Stuxnet
was built to survive and carry out its mission even if it found itself cut of. The uranium
centrifuges that Stuxnet attacked are very similar in principle to the generators that power
the software included rendezvous procedures and communication codes for reporting back to headquarters,

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
the US electrical grid. Both are monitored and controlled by programmable-logic computer chips. Stuxnet
cleverly caused the uranium centrifuges to throw themselves of-balance, inflicting enough damage to set the Iranian

A similar piece of malware installed on the computers that


the generators at the base of the Grand Coulee Dam would likewise cause them to
shake, rattle, and roll -- and eventually explode. If Stuxnet-like malware were to insinuate itself into a few hundred
nuclear industry back by 18 months or more.
control

power generators in the United States and attack them all at once, the damage would be enough to cause blackouts on

With such widespread destruction, it could take many months to


restore power to the grid. It seems incredible that this should be so, but the worldwide capacity to
manufacture generator parts is limited. Generators generally last 30 years, sometimes 50, so normally
there's little need for replacements. The main demand for generators is in China, India, and
other parts of rapidly developing Asia. That's where the manufacturers are -- not in the United States.
the East and West Coasts.

Even if the United States, in crisis mode, put full diplomatic pressure on supplier nations -- or launched a military

the capacity to ramp up production would be


severely limited. Worldwide production currently amounts to only a few hundred generators per year. The
consequences of going without power for months, across a large swath of the United States,
would be devastating. Backup electrical generators in hospitals and other vulnerable facilities
would have to rely on fuel that would be in high demand. Diabetics would go without their insulin;
invasion to take over manufacturing facilities --

heart attack victims would not have their defibrillators; and sick people would have no place to go. Businesses would
run out of inventory and extra capacity.

Grocery stores would run out of food, and deliveries of all sorts

would virtually cease (no gasoline for trucks and airplanes, trains would be down ). As we saw
with the blackouts caused by Hurricane Sandy, gas stations couldn't pump gas from their tanks, and fuel-carrying

the economy would virtually cease,


and if power failed over a large enough portion of the country, simply trucking in supplies from elsewhere
would not be adequate to cover the needs of hundreds of millions of people. People
would start to die by the thousands, then by the tens of thousands, and eventually the millions. The loss
of the power grid would put nuclear plants on backup, but how many of those systems would fail, causing
meltdowns, as we saw at Fukushima? The loss in human life would quickly reach, and
perhaps exceed, the worst of the Cold War nuclear-exchange scenarios. After eight to 10
days, about 72 percent of all economic activity, as measured by GDP, would shut down, according
trucks wouldn't be able to fill up at refueling stations. Without power,

to an analysis by Scott Borg, a cybersecurity expert.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

A2: Encryption Cant Be Cracked


NSA can crack encryption codes faster than Apple realizes
David Sanger & Brian Chen, September 26, 2014, New York Times New iPhone
blocks surveillance with unique user code; Encryption can stymie law enforcement
and intelligence agencies, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/technology/iphonelocks-out-the-nsa-signaling-a-post-snowden-era-.html?_r=0 DOA: 3-21-15
Breaking the code, according to an Apple technical guide, could take ''more than 5]
years to try all combinations of a six-character alphanumeric passcode with lowercase
letters and numbers.'' (Computer security experts question that figure, because Apple
does not fully realize how quickly the N.S.A. supercomputers can crack codes.)

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

A2: No Cascade
Interconnectivity means small disruptions cascade
Wilhusen and Trimble 12
(Statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director Information Security Issues David C. Trimble, Director Natural Resources
and Environment, Challenges in Securing the Modernized Electricity Grid February 28, 2012, GAO Testimony Before
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives,
GAO-12-507T)

threats to systems supporting critical infrastructures are evolving and growing. In a


February 2011 testimony, the Director of National Intelligence noted that there had been a
dramatic increase in cyber activity targeting U.S. computers and systems in the previous
year, including a more than tripling of the volume of malicious software since 2009.
Varying types of threats from numerous sources can adversely afect computers,
software, networks, organizations, entire industries, and the Internet itself . These
include both unintentional and intentional threats, and may come in the form of
targeted or untargeted attacks from criminal groups, hackers, disgruntled employees,
hostile nations, or terrorists. The interconnectivity between information systems , the
Internet, and other infrastructures can amplify the impact of these threats , potentially
afecting the operations of critical infrastructures, the security of sensitive information,
and the flow of commerce. Moreover, the smart grids reliance on IT systems and networks exposes
the electric grid to potential and known cybersecurity vulnerabilities, which could be
exploited by attackers.
The

Stefan Bauschard
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A2: No Attackers
Yes attackers heres a list
Bodenheimer 12
(David, partner in the law firm of Crowell & Moring LLP in the DC office where he heads the Homeland Security Practice
and specializes in Government Contracts, False Claims Act, Privacy, and Cybersecurity, Cyberwarfare in the Stuxnet
Age Can Cannonball Law Keep Pace With the Digital Battlefield? Winter 2012, The SciTech Lawyer, Volume 8, Number
3)

Now that cyberweapons have been field-tested, virtually no one expects Stuxnet to be
the last attack. As Dr. Lewis testified, [c]yber attack will be like the airplanewith in a
few years, no self respecting military will be without this capability.25 Major US
adversaries are developing the capacity for cyberattacks on critical infrastructure: One
is the threat of cyber attack. Many nation states, like Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran , have
ofensive cyber attack capabilities, while terrorist groups like Hezbolla and al Qaeda
continue to work to develop capabilities to attack and destroy critical infrastructure like
the electric grid through cyber attacks .26 Indeed, some US ofcials have predicted that major cyberattacks are
given the promised retaliation against the U.S. for the Stuxnet work that destroyed Iranian nuclear
centrifuges.27 The distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks on Estonia and Georgia during disputes with Russia
and the coordinated hacking attacks on Google to access accounts of Chinese dissidents provide realworld examples
that the age of cyberwar has already arrived. Given this new reality, the private sector needs to gear up for the risks
that come with a cyberwar world.
nearly a certainty,

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

A2: No collapse military


Grid failure shuts down US military operations
Paul Stockton 11, assistant secretary of defense for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Afairs, Ten Years
After 9/11: Challenges for the Decade to Come, http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=7.2.11

The cyber threat to the DIB is only part of a much larger challenge to DoD . Potential
adversaries are seeking asymmetric means to cripple our force projection, warfighting,
and sustainment capabilities, by targeting the critical civilian and defense supporting
assets (within the United States and abroad) on which our forces depend. This challenge is not
limited to man-made threats; DoD must also execute its mission-essential functions in
the face of disruptions caused by naturally occurring hazards.20 Threats and hazards to
DoD mission execution include incidents such as earthquakes, naturally occurring
pandemics, solar weather events, and industrial accidents, as well as kinetic or virtual
attacks by state or non-state actors. Threats can also emanate from insiders with ties
to foreign counterintelligence organizations, homegrown terrorists, or individuals with
a malicious agenda. From a DoD perspective, this global convergence of unprecedented threats and hazards,
and vulnerabilities and consequences, is a particularly problematic reality of the post-Cold War world. Successfully
deploying and sustaining our military forces are increasingly a function of
interdependent supply chains and privately owned infrastructure within the United States
and abroad, including transportation networks, cyber systems, commercial corridors, communications pathways,
and energy grids. This infrastructure largely falls outside DoD direct control . Adversary
actions to destroy, disrupt, or manipulate this highly vulnerable homeland- and foreignbased infrastructure may be relatively easy to achieve and extremely tough to
counter. Attacking such soft, difuse infrastructure systems could significantly afect
our military forces globally potentially blinding them, neutering their command and
control, degrading their mobility, and isolating them from their principal sources of
logistics support. The Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) under Mission Assurance seeks to improve
execution of DoD assigned missions to make them more resilient. This is accomplished through the assessment of the
supporting commercial infrastructure relied upon by key nodes during execution. By building resilience into the system
and ensuring this support is well maintained, DoD aims to ensure it can "take a punch as well as deliver one."21 It also
provides the department the means to prioritize investments across all DoD components and assigned missions to the

The commercial
power supply on which DoD depends exemplifies both the novel challenges we face and the
most critical issues faced by the department through the use of risk decision packages (RDP).22

great progress we are making with other federal agencies and the private sector. Todays commercial electric power
grid has a great deal of resilience against the sort of disruptive events that have traditionally been factored into the

the grid will increasingly confront threats beyond that traditional design
basis. This complex risk environment includes: disruptive or deliberate attacks, either
physical or cyber in nature; severe natural hazards such as geomagnetic storms and
natural disasters with cascading regional and national impacts (as in NLE 11); long supply
chain lead times for key replacement electric power equipment; transition to
automated control systems and other smart grid technologies without robust security;
and more frequent interruptions in fuel supplies to electricity-generating plants. These
risks are magnified by globalization, urbanization, and the highly interconnected
nature of people, economies, information, and infrastructure systems . The department
is highly dependent on commercial power grids and energy sources. As the largest
grids design. Yet,

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
consumer of energy in the United States, DoD is dependent on commercial electricity
sources outside its ownership and control for secure, uninterrupted power to support
critical missions. In fact, approximately 99 percent of the electricity consumed by DoD
facilities originates ofsite, while approximately 85 percent of critical electricity
infrastructure itself is commercially owned. This situation only underscores the importance of our
partnership with DHS and its work to protect the nations critical infrastructure a mission that serves not only the
national defense but also the larger national purpose of sustaining our economic health and competitiveness. DoD has
traditionally assumed that the commercial grid will be subject only to infrequent, weather-related, and short-term
disruptions, and that available backup power is sufficient to meet critical mission needs. As noted in the February 2008

neither the grid nor


on-base backup power provides sufficient reliability to ensure continuity of critical
national priority functions and oversight of strategic missions in the face of a long term
(several months) outage.23 Similarly, a 2009 GAO Report on Actions Needed to Improve the Identification and
Management of Electrical Power Risks and Vulnerabilities to DoD Critical Assets stated that DoD mission-critical
assets rely primarily on commercial electric power and are vulnerable to disruptions in
electric power supplies.24 Moreover, these vulnerabilities may cascade into other critical
infrastructure that uses the grid communications, water, transportation, and
pipelines that, in turn, is needed for the normal operation of the grid, as well as its
quick recovery in emergency situations. To remedy this situation, the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, In most cases,

Force recommended that DoD take a broad-based approach, including a focused analysis of critical functions and
supporting assets, a more realistic assessment of electricity outage cause and duration, and an integrated approach to
risk management that includes greater efficiency, renewable resources, distributed generation, and increased
reliability. DoD Mission Assurance is designed to carry forward the DSB recommendations. Yet, for a variety of reasons

DoD has limited ability to manage electrical power


demand and supply on its installations . As noted above, DHS is the lead agency for critical infrastructure
technical, financial, regulatory, and legal

protection by law and pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7. The Department of Energy (DOE) is the
lead agency on energy matters. And within DoD, energy and energy security roles and responsibilities are distributed
and shared, with diferent entities managing security against physical, nuclear, and cyber threats; cost and regulatory

production and delivery of electric


power to most DoD installations are controlled by commercial entities that are
regulated by state and local utility commissions. The resulting paradox: DoD is
dependent on a commercial power system over which it does not and never will
exercise control.
compliance; and the response to natural disasters. And of course,

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

A2: No Impact to Cyberterror


Modern society depends on strong cyber security to survive.
Sebastian 09 (Rohan,- research for the office of Virginia Senator Mark Warner CS Computer Science from
UVA, 6-24 The Federal Governments Role in Preserving Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure)

Critical
infrastructure includes areas like the water and food supply, telecommunications,
nuclear power, transportation, banking, and energy ---areas crucial to the functioning of
society. However, remote access to critical infrastructure from cyberspace has placed these
systems at risk of destruction by other countries, malicious actors, or terrorists. This
The intersection of critical infrastructure and cyberspace has presented many challenges to policymakers.

analysis proposes three options that the federal government can implement: strengthening partnerships between the public and
private sectors, integrating resources under a White House official, and increasing collaboration between levels of critical infrastructure.
After scrutinizing these options under the criteria of political feasibility, industry acceptance, and efficacy, this analysis recommends

Critical infrastructure includes areas


such as transportation, water supplies, public health, telecommunications, energy,
banking and finance, emergency and information services, nuclear facilities, food
supplies, and defense and chemical industries (Motef & Parfomak, 2004). According to the Department of
that the federal government pursue a combination of all three policy options.

Homeland Securitys National Strategy for Homeland Security, critical infrastructure consists of assets, systems, and networks,
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating efect on
security, national economic security, public health or safety, or any combination thereof (Homeland Security Council, 2007). Figure 1

critical infrastructures
comprise the foundation for the modern economy and national security , so the federal
government shares responsibility for protecting them. However, the government rests in a precarious position because the
private sector owns about eighty percent of critical infrastructure (Forest, 2006, p. 78). Furthermore, about eighty
illustrates the myriad of infrastructures and their interdependencies with one another. Simply put,

percent of all American commerce occurs on privately owned telecommunications networks, primarily the Internet (Theohary, 2009, p.
20).

Even the most valuable national defense systems rely on privately owned
telecommunications Several government officials have emphasized the catastrophic efects of
compromised cybersecurity. Paul Kurtz, an advisor on President Obamas transition team, warned of a cyber Katrina,
a cataclysm in which government agencies would fail to coordinate after a cyber attack and
would subsequently collapse (Epstein, 2009). In fact, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair stated that
cyber attacks against financial sectors and physical infrastructure could severely
impact the national economy and disturb energy sources like oil and electricity for an
indefinite period (Annual Threat Assessment, 2009). Beyond threatening the private sector, intruders have been specifically targeting
the federal governments information technology infrastructure. A report by the International Business Machines Corporation revealed
that of the 237 million security attacks carried out in the first half of 2005, more than twenty-two percent, the highest percentage
against any given group, aimed for government agencies (Fitzgerald, 2006, p. 57). Between 2008 and March 2009, the number of
attacks against federal computer networks swelled about forty percent (Smith, 2009). The Department of Defense dubbed the militarys

the American militarys Achilles heel (Defense Science Board, 2008). Any kind
the private sector since it owns about eighty
percent of the nations critical infrastructure . . Industry acceptance and political
obstacles could obstruct the way to success . This options efectiveness is directly tied to
political feasibility and industry acceptance .
electronic information infrastructure

of long term solution to cybersecurity threats must consider

This could collapse civilization.


Adhikari 09 (Richard,- leading journalist on advanced-IP issues for several major publications, including The
Wall Street Journal Civilization's High Stakes Cyber-Struggle: Q&A With Gen. Wesley Clark (ret.))
The conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan, to name the most prominent, are taking their toll on human life and
limb. However,

the escalating cyberconflict

among nations

is far more dangerous, argues retired


It's a matter of

general Wesley Clark, who spoke with TechNewsWorld in an exclusive interview. . .

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
thousands of probes a day, in and out, against systems that belong to obvious targets like the United
States Department of Defense; not-so-obvious targets like banks and energy companies; and
individual consumers or taxpayers. . We are, as a civilization, quite vulnerable to
disruption, and this security problem doesn't just afect one nation but the whole global economic infrastructure.
You can't conceive of the threats from the point of view of a traditional war. Cyber-eforts are ongoing today; we're in a
cyber-struggle today. We don't know who the adversaries are in many cases, but we know what

continued economic vitality and, ultimately, global civilization.

the stakes are:

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

A2: Redundant Communications


Empirically awful
Sater 11
Daniel Sater, Research Fellow at Global Green USAs Security and Sustainability Office, August 2011, Military Energy
Security: Current Eforts and Future Solutions, globalgreen.org/docs/publication-185-1.pdf

The underlying problem is the assumption that the commercial grid is a safe and reliable
source of power. Given that 99% of the power used by military bases comes from the
civilian grid, this is a dangerous assumption to make. The assumption of reliability
afects the robustness of backup systems . Diesel generators, with limited fuel supply, are the most
common source of backup power on military installations and often do not prioritize power to critical loads. In the event
of a blackout, generators will supply power to the entire base instead of prioritizing electricity to vital command and
control functions, wasting precious fuel on non-critical sources. The DOD has failed to adapt its fuel strategy to the

Bases in the US and abroad that host functions that are


critical in strategic and tactical terms and must function 24/7 often have larger backup systems
with more fuel supply, but nevertheless remain ill prepared to cope with a long-term outage15 .
evolving role of military installations.

The loss of power at a military installation can have disastrous effects. In


October 2010, at Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, a power outage caused the Air Force to lose
communication with 50 nuclear missiles for approximately 45 minutes.16 Although backup
systems were in place and an Air Force official said that the base never lost the ability to launch the missiles, the
dangers are obvious. In January 2011, the Fort Kamehameha Wastewater Treatment Plant at Joint Base Pearl
Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii experienced a power disruption that caused the release of 110,000
gallons of treated but un-disinfected effluent into the waters surrounding the base. The
health department warned swimmers and boaters to avoid the area for several days.17 After the Fukushima nuclear
disaster in Japan, Misawa Air Force Base required an airlift of extra generators to the base so that it could continue its

The power outage caused the


loss of internet and phone service, leaving the base isolated , and shut down gas station pumps
normal operations as well as act as a hub for search and rescue missions.

that became even more important as the air base had to transport search and rescue teams to the disaster site.18

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

A2: Backup Generators


Generators are too short-term

Andres 11
Richard B. Andres, Energy Security Chair, Institute for National Strategic Studies
Professor of National Security Strategy, National War College, National Defense
University, October 4, 2011, "SECURE GRID 11",
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/Secure%20Grid%20'11%20After-Action
%20Report.pdf

The Military According to USNORTHCOM, its bases at the installation level are not normally provided real time
advance warning of an impending GMD. Certain missions directly impacted by space weather do currently receive
forecasts and warnings. However, notice to installations to ensure readiness of the support infrastructure may be
necessary as well. It is essential that bases hosting critical missions have sufficient electrical power to sustain

Though many
installations possess dieselpowered electrical generators, they have limited diesel fuel
storage. In the event of a widespread grid outage, fuel supplies could dwindle rapidly,
thereby impacting the ability of installations to conduct primary missions.
independent continuous operations even if the surrounding commercial power grid is lost.

They dont last empirics


Annie Snider 12, E&E reporter, Pentagon still can't define 'energy security,' much less achieve it, January 16,
http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/01/16/1

Katrina humbled U.S. military bases in 2005, cutting power at air towers,
training facilities and command centers just as it did everywhere else along the Gulf Coast. The
Naval Construction Battalion Center in Gulfport, Miss., for example, a staging ground for regional relief
operations after the storm, needed relief itself after running for two weeks on backup power
systems. And Keesler Air Force Base near Biloxi, Miss., lost its airfield lights and had to
scramble to keep its hospital running after a generator was swamped. While diesel
Hurricane

generators kept critical missions going during Katrina, the storm provided a wakeup call for Pentagon leaders

the electric grid, which provides 99 percent of the energy that


bases consume. Could bases withstand a power outage that outlasts their three-to-seven-days' supply of diesel
concerned about terror attacks on

for backup systems? Is it wise for the military to rely on the same power plants and transmission lines that feed homes

A terrorist attack that caused a long-term grid disruption "could


significantly afect our military forces globally -- potentially blinding them, neutering
their command and control, degrading their mobility and isolating them from their
principal sources of logistics support," Paul Stockton, the Pentagon's assistant secretary for homeland
and businesses?

defense, wrote recently in the online journal Homeland Security Afairs. A board of outside experts tasked by the

there are significant gaps in DOD's


ability to prevent and respond to major electrical outages. "Critical national security
and homeland defense missions are at an unacceptably high risk of extended outages
from failure of the grid," the Defense Science Board concluded. "The grid is fragile, vulnerable,
near its capacity limit, and outside of DOD control . In most cases, neither the grid nor onDepartment of Defense to study the issue found in a 2008 report that

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
base backup power provides sufficient reliability to ensure continuity of critical
national priority functions and oversight of strategic missions in the face of long-term
(several months) outage." And while the Pentagon has joined interagency eforts to beef up grid security, experts
say solutions remain elusive. Four years after the Defense Science Board report, DOD has yet to
define what "energy security" means at its bases, let alone how to assure it , according to
dozens of interviews with military officials, lawmakers, defense energy experts, project developers and utilities. How
DOD ultimately answers these questions will not only determine the limits of U.S.
defenses; it is also likely to send waves through civilian energy and technology
industries.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

Topicality

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

2ACT - Surveillance
In order to topically curtail encryption cracking, Affirmative
teams need to win that encryption cracking is a form of
surveillance. There are a number of Affirmative arguments in
defense of this.
First, the government is engaging in surveillance of companies
when it takes the encryption codes.
Second, encryption cracking is what the government does as
part of its surveillance operations. Just as the process of
surveillance involves activities such as storing collected data on
computers and installing cameras, the process of surveillance
involves cracking encryption.
Third, contextually, encryption cracking is a form of surveillance.
Karlin Lillington, January 22, 2015, Irish Times, World Without Data Encryption
unimaginable, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-37591772.html DOA: 2-21-15
If the national legislatures of the United Kingdom and United States decide their
leaders are right, and laws are passed to cripple encryption and permit other forms of
mass surveillance, the world - especially the business world - will become a very
strange, more vulnerable and difficult-to- regulate place.

Given the strength of this new encryption technology, the


government wants a back door to provide access to the new,
strengthened encryption technology.
Encryption Back Doors and Topicality

Installing encryption back doors in a way to undermine


encryption, but it is important to distinguish it from efforts to
literally crack the code. For topicality purposes, however, it is
very similar.
First, although the government has not yet been given
legislative authority for inserting the encryption back doors,
there is evidence that the government is dong this now.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
Stanford Computer Science Project, no date, The Ethics (or not) of government
surveillance, http://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/cs201/projects/ethics-ofsurveillance/tech_encryptionbackdoors.html DOA: 3-22-15
The NSA, as the US governments cryptologic intelligence agency, is often suspected
of implementing encryption backdoors. The most substantive accusation against the
NSA was made in November 2007, after the release of the 2007 NIST official standard
for random-number generators.NIST Special Publication 800-90, NISTs 2007 official
standard for random number generators, is believed to have included a secret
backdoor on the behalf of the NSA. The 800-90 report describes four diferent
techniques for "Deterministic Random Bit Generators" (DRBGs) based on pre-existing
cryptographic primitives. Each of the four techniques is diferent; one relies on hash
functions, one on keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), one on block
ciphers and one on elliptic curves.

Second, contextually, these are referred to as surveillance back


doors. these damage internet security, undermines
cybersecurity
Teri Robinson, SC Magazine, July 2014, OTI report exposes economic costs of NSA
spying, http://www.scmagazine.com/oti-report-exposes-economic-costs-of-nsaspying/article/363660/ DOA: 3-21-15
And, the study noted, by weakening key encryption standards, allegedly inserting
surveillance backdoors into "widely used hardware and software products," being slow
to report software security vulnerabilities and participating in a "variety of ofensive
hacking operations," the NSA has roundly damaged internet security. To mitigate the
economic and foreign policy damage caused by NSA surveillance activities, OTI made
a number of recommendations, including "strengthening privacy protections for both
Americans and non-Americans" and "providing for increased transparency around
government surveillance, both from the government and companies." The report also
noted that the U.S. should take steps to restore trust in cryptography standards
through the National Institute of Standards and Technology. The U.S. government must
not "undermine cybersecurity" by putting surveillance backdoors into tech products
and should commit to eliminating vulnerabilities rather than stockpiling them.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

2ACT - Domestic
US cant require foreign software to have an accessible backdoor
Hewitt 15 (Carl, Security without Mandatory Backdoors CCSD, https://hal.archivesouvertes.fr/hal-01152495/)

In fact, the NSA/FBI mandatory backdoor proposal has already increased mistrust by
foreign governments and citizens alike, with the consequence[4] that companies can
be required to hire their own independent cyberauditors and/or submit to cyberaudits
by foreign governments to ensure that exports do not have backdoors accessible by
the US government. [20][26] Likewise, every government can require that IoT sold in
their country do not have backdoors accessible to other governments.[4]

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

Disadvantages

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

2ACTerrorism DA
Backdoors dont provide any meaningful information prevent
terrorism- other areas of surveillance solve the link
Mark Jaycox and Seth Schoen, 5-22-2013, Mark is a Legislative Analyst for EFF.
His issues include user privacy, civil liberties, surveillance law, and "cybersecurity."
Seth Schoen has worked at EFF over a decade, creating the Staf Technologist position
and helping other technologists understand the civil liberties implications of their
work, EFF staf better understand technology related to EFF's legal work, and the
public understand what products they use really do. "The Government Wants A
Backdoor Into Your Online Communications," Electronic Frontier Foundation,
https://www.ef.org/deeplinks/2013/05/caleatwo)//GV
Government Wants A Backdoor Into Your Online Communications According to the New York
a proposal by the FBI to introduce legislation
dramatically expanding the reach of the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, or CALEA. CALEA forces telephone companies to provide backdoors
to the government so that it can spy on users after obtaining court approval , and was
The

Times, President Obama is "on the verge of backing"

expanded in 2006 to reach Internet technologies like VoIP. The new proposal reportedly allows the FBI to listen in on any conversation
online, regardless of the technology used, by mandating engineers build "backdoors" into communications software. We urge EFF
supporters to tell the administration now to stop this proposal, provisionally called CALEA II. The rumored proposal is a tremendous blow
to security and privacy and is based on the FBI's complaint that it is "Going Dark," or unable to listen in on Internet users'
communications. But the FBI has ofered few concrete examples and no significant numbers of situations where it has been stymied by
communications technology like encryption. To the contrary, with the growth of digital communications, the FBI has an unprecedented
level of access to our communications and personal data; access which it regularly uses. In an age where the government claims to

backdoors into our communications makes our infrastructure weaker.


Backdoors also take away developers' right to innovate and users' right to protect their
privacy and First Amendment-protected anonymity of speech with the technologies of their choice. The FBI's dream of
an Internet where it can listen to anything, even with a court order, is wrong and
inconsistent with our values. One should be able to have a private conversation online, just as one can have a private
conversation in person. The White House is currently debating whether or not to introduce the bill. Here's why it shouldn't: There's
Little Darkness: Few Investigations Have Been Thwarted The starting point for new
legislation should be a real, serious, and well-documented need . Despite the FBI's
rhetoric, there are few concrete examples of the FBI's purported need to expand its
already efficient all-seeing eye. Current law requires annual reporting by the Department of Justice (DOJ)
regarding the use of the government's wiretapping powers ; the report includes statistics on how often
want to beef up Internet security, any

Federal law enforcement has been impeded in a court-authorized investigation by encryption or has been unable to access

These statistics show that this has happened only rarely. In its most recent
reportfrom 2010DOJ reported that encryption had only been encountered all of 12
times. Did the encryption stop the investigation, or even prevent the wiretappers from
figuring out what was being said? No. The report admits that in all of these instances,
police were able to obtain the plain text of communications . Previous years' numbers are similar.
Aside from government reports, in 2012 telecommunications companies also revealed
that a very low percentage of law enforcement requests for user information were
rejected. In AT&T's case, only 965 out of over 250,000 requests for user information
were rejected. Overall, the available public statistics don't appear to support the FBI's
claims about its inability to access communications. Law Enforcement Already Has Unprecedented Access
communications.

Any requested expansion of FBI surveillance authority has to consider the overall ability of law enforcement to investigate crimes. What
the FBI doesn't mention when pushing new backdoors into our communications is that now, due to the shift to digital communications,
law enforcement has an unprecedented level of access to, and knowledge of, the public's communications, relationships, transactions,

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
whereabouts, and movements. Law enforcement now can gain 24/7 monitoring of most people's movements using cell phone location
data. But that's just the beginning. A glance at the Wall Street Journal's multi-year What They Know project shows some of the treasure

By accessing these databases and by using new


electronic surveillance technologies law enforcement already has visibility into almost
every aspect of our online and offline livescapabilities beyond the wildest dreams of
police officers just a few decades ago. Indeed, former White House Chief Counselor for Privacy Peter Swire and
troves of data that are being maintained about all of us.

Kenesa Ahmad argued persuasively in 2011 that, overall, "today [is] a golden age for surveillance"regardless of whether law
enforcement is assured of automatic access to each and every kind of communication, and regardless of whether individuals sometimes
succeed in using privacy technologies to protect themselves against some kinds of surveillance. First, there's information obtained from
cell phones. In July 2012, the New York Times reported that federal, state, and local law enforcement officials had requested all kinds of
cell phone dataincluding mappings of suspects locationsa staggering 1.3 million times in the previous year. Cell phone companies
can create what amounts to detailed maps of our locations and turn them over to law enforcement. Even without asking for cell phone
providers' direct assistance, law enforcement has considerable ability to use mobile devices to track us. Federal and state law
enforcement have made extensive use of IMSI catchers (also popularly called stingrays, after the brand name of one such device).
These devices can act as a fake cell phone tower, observing all devices in a certain area to find a cell phone's location in real-time, and

Laws compelling companies to divulge user information


accompany these techniques. For instance, National Security Letters, served on communications service
providers like phone companies and ISPs, allow the FBI to secretly demand stored data about ordinary
Americans' private communications and Internet activity without any meaningful
oversight or prior judicial review. And Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act allows for secret
court orders to collect tangible things that could be relevant to a government
investigation. The list of possible tangible things the government can obtain is seemingly limitless, and could include
everything from drivers license records to Internet browsing patterns. The FBI has even broken into individuals'
computers to collect data from inside the computers themselves. More backdoors aren't needed. Backdoors
Make Us Weaker and More Vulnerable CALEA II will force companies with messaging services from Google
to Twitter to video game developersto insert backdoors into their platforms . But backdoors only
make us weaker and more vulnerable. It's ironic that CALEA II may be proposed only months after Congress
pushed cybersecurity legislation to protect our networks. The notion of mandating backdoors in software
is the antithesis of online security, which is why some academics have called it a
ticking time bomb. A proposal to expand backdoors into communications software
ensures that online hackers, communications company insiders, and nation-states
have a direct entrance to attackand steal fromcompanies and government
agencies. In one notorious example, someone exploited backdoors in a Greek phone company's systems and recorded sensitive
perhaps even intercept phone calls and texts.

conversations involving the Prime Minister. Wiretapping backdoors even afect national security. In 2012, Wired revealed the NSA's
discovery and concern that every telephone switch for sale to the Department of Defense had security vulnerabilities due to the legallymandated wiretap implementation. If politicians are serious about online security, they will not make these security blunders even worse
by bringing more sensitive communication technologies under CALEA's scope. Just last week, an ad hoc group of twenty renowned
computer security experts issued a report explaining their consensus that CALEA II proposals could seriously harm computer security.
These experts said that a requirement to weaken security with deliberate backdoors amounts to developing for our adversaries
capabilities that they may not have the competence, access or resources to develop on their own. And now the Washington Post has

intruders, allegedly working on behalf of the Chinese government, broke into


Google's existing surveillance systems. (In this case, the report says that the intruders learned who was targeted
by these systems, rather than accessing the contents of the targets' accounts or communicationsbut it's easy to see that
wiretap contents would ultimately represent an even bigger target, and a bigger prize.
reported that

Even more exciting would be the prospect of remotely activating new wiretaps against victims of an intruder's choice.)

Ways for law enforcement to get non-encrypted information to


fight crimes
David Sanger & Brian Chen, September 26, 2014, New York Times (New iPhone
blocks surveillance with unique user code; Encryption can stymie law enforcement

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
and intelligence agencies, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/technology/iphonelocks-out-the-nsa-signaling-a-post-snowden-era-.html?_r=0 DOA: 3-21-15)
concerns about Apple's new encryption to hinder law enforcement
seemed overblown. He said there were still plenty of ways for the police to get customer data for investigations. In the
example of a kidnapping victim, the police can still request information on call records and
geolocation information from phone carriers like AT&T and Verizon Wireless. ''Eliminating the
iPhone as one source I don't think is going to wreck a lot of cases,'' he said. ''There is such a mountain of other
evidence from call logs, email logs, iCloud, Gmail logs. They're tapping the whole
Internet.''
Mr. Zdziarski said that

No evidence where breaking encryption was necessary to


prevent terrorism
Center for Democracy & Technology, November 10, 2014, Issue Brief: a Backdoor to
Encryption for Government Surveillance, https://cdt.org/insight/issue-brief-a-backdoorto-encryption-for-government-surveillance/ DOA; 3-15-15
The government has not yet produced an actual case in which decrypting a device was
essential to attaining a conviction. In his recent speech, Director Comey cited several
terrible crimes where cell phone evidence came into play, but in every one of these
cases the evidence on the phone was not critical to the conviction and the government
had other ways of obtaining the data it sought. When a reporter asked Director Comey
for a real-life instance when ability to access data on a phone was critical to rescuing
an individual, he responded, I havent found one yet despite canvassing state and
local law enforcement for examples.

Government can get information from other sources


Center for Democracy & Technology, November 10, 2014, Issue Brief: a Backdoor to
Encryption for Government Surveillance, https://cdt.org/insight/issue-brief-a-backdoorto-encryption-for-government-surveillance/ DOA; 3-15-15
If information is encrypted in one place, it is often available from another source. For
example, emails or text messages on an encrypted phone can be retrieved from the
email service provider or the phone company. Many smartphones are backed up to the
cloud, where the data can be obtained from the service provider through legal process.
In addition, law enforcement may be able to compel a suspect to decrypt information
or devices with a search warrant. The government must generally obtain a warrant
prior to searching a smartphone.

Hackers and thieves can exploit any encryption back door


Center for Democracy & Technology, November 10, 2014, Issue Brief: a Backdoor to
Encryption for Government Surveillance, https://cdt.org/insight/issue-brief-a-backdoorto-encryption-for-government-surveillance/ DOA; 3-15-15

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af
A fundamental problem with a backdoor is that there is no way to control who goes
through it. If the US government can exploit a backdoor security vulnerability to access
a consumers device, so will malicious hackers, identity thieves, and foreign
governments. This will devastate the security of not just individual consumers around
the world, but also the many businesses that use American commercial tech products
day-to-day. Ultimately, this mandate would have the efect of actually enabling
cybercrime and undermining national security.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af

2ACPolitics DA
Bipartisan support for NSA restrictions: recent votes prove
backdoors are unpopular
Coca 6/12 (Onan Coca is a graduate of Liberty University (2003) and earned his M.Ed.
at Western Governors University in 2012. Freedom Force: Bipartisan House Votes for
Further Restrictions on Surveillance on Americans! Published June 12 th, 2015.
Accessed June 29th, 2015. http://freedomforce.com/4275/bipartisan-house-votes-forfurther-restrictions-on-surveillance-on-americans/) KalM
the House voted yesterday to pass additional restrictions on the
intelligence community in an efort to protect innocent Americans from being spied on.
Congressmen Thomas Massie (R-KY and Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) came together to prepare
the Massie-Lofgren amendment to defund surveillance backdoors. Their amendment
passed with a confusingly bipartisan vote, 255 174. I say confusingly because 109
In another win for freedom,

Republicans voted for it, 134 Republicans voted against it almost a 50 50 split. On the Democrat side, things were
less confused but still split, as 146 Democrats voted for the amendment and 40 voted against it! (You can see the roll

The House just voted for


additional restrictions on surveillance! Today, the House of Representatives passed the
Massie-Lofgren amendment to defund two surveillance backdoors that currently
allow intelligence agencies access to Americans private data and correspondence
without a warrant. The amendment, which is part of the Fiscal Year 2016 Department of Defense appropriations
call vote here.) Heres what Massie said about it on Facebook: Huge News:

bill (H.R. 2685), passed 255-174.

Stefan Bauschard
Encryption Af