PINOTE vs AYCO

Facts
Judge Ayco allowed the defense in People vs Vice Mayor Salvador to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses even
in the absence of State Prosecutor Pinote who was prosecuting the case.
Pinote was undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center hence his absence. On the subsequent hearings, he refused to
cross-examine the two defense witnesses despite being ordered by the judge, he maintaining that the bbproceedings conducted in his
absence were void.
Judge considered the prosecution to have waived it right to cross examine. Hence, an administrative complaint was lodged by Pinote
against Ayco.
R: considering the prosecution to have waived presenting evidence, respondent justifies the same on complainants failure to formally
offer the evidence for the prosecution despite several extensions of time granted for the purpose. No substantial prejudice was suffered
by the prosecution for complainant was permitted to cross examine the two defense witnesses but he refused to do so.
Office of the Court Administrator: finds respondent to have breached Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure
and accordingly recommends that he be reprimanded therefor, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.
Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the public prosecutor.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he
being merely the complaining witness. It is on this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is
necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people.
Respondents act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of complainant public prosecutor or a private
prosecutor designated for the purpose is thus a clear transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by subsequently giving the
prosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses.
Respondents intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot
justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process, so is the State.

RICARZE vs. CA, PP, CALTEX, PCIBANK

[515 SCRA 302; February 9, 2007]
Facts:
Petitioner was employed as a collector-messenger by City Service Corporation, adomestic corporation engaged in messengerial services.
He was assigned to the main officeof Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Makati. His primary task was to collect checks payableto Caltex
and deliver them to the cashier. He also delivered invoices to Caltexs customers.Caltex filed a criminal complaint against petitioner for
estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The manager of its Banking and Insurance Department, Romano,alleged that while
his department was conducting a daily electronic report from PCIBank,one of its depositary banks, it was discovered that unknown to the
department, a companycheck in the amount of P5,790,570.25 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, had been clearedthrough PCIB. An
investigation also revealed that two other checks were also missing andthat his signature and that of another signatory, Goquinco, were
forgeries. A check, in theamount of P1,790,757.25 likewise payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, was also cleared throughthe same bank. This
check was likewise not issued by Caltex, and the signatures appearingthereon had also been forged. Upon verification, it was uncovered
that the checks weredeposited at the BDO in the name of a regular customer of Caltex, Gutierrez. Gutierrez,however, disowned the
savings account as well as his signatures on the dorsal portionsthereof. He also denied having withdrawn any amount from said savings
account. Furtherinvestigation revealed that said savings account had actually been opened by petitioner; theforged checks were
deposited and endorsed by him under Gutierrezs name. A bank tellerfrom the BDO positively identified petitioner as the person who
opened the savings accountusing Gutierrezs name.Petitioner further averred that unless the Informations were amended to change
theprivate complainant to PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced. He pointed out,however, that the Informations can no longer
be amended because he had already beenarraigned under the original Informations. He insisted that the amendments of theInformations
to substitute PCIB as the offended party for Caltex would place him in double jeopardy.PCIB, through SRMO, opposed the motion. It
contended that the PCIB had re-creditedthe amount to Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been subrogatedto the
rights and interests of Caltex as private complainant. Consequently, the PCIB isentitled to receive any civil indemnity which the trial court
would adjudge against theaccused. Moreover, the re-credited amount was brought out on cross-examination by RamonRomano who
testified for the Prosecution. PCIB pointed out that petitioner had marked inevidence the letter of the ACCRA Law Office to PCIBank and
the credit memo sent by PCIB toCaltex.
Issue:
WON there is a valid subrogation between Caltex and PCIBANK.

Held:
The argument of the petitioner that there is no way where PCIBANK subrogated tothe rights of Caltex, considering that he has no
knowledge of the subrogation much lessgave his consent to it and further posits that if subrogation was proper, then the chargesagainst
him should be dismissed because the two informations being defective and void dueto false allegations, is misplaced. The Court agrees
with respondent PCIBs comment thatpetitioner failed to make a distinction between legal and conventional subrogation.Subrogation is
the transfer of all the rights of the creditor to a third person, who substituteshim in all his rights. It may either be legal or conventional.
Legal subrogation is that whichtakes place without agreement but by operation of law because of certain acts. Instances of legal

subrogation are those provided in Article 1302 of the Civil Code. Conventionalsubrogation, on the other hand, is that which takes place
by agreement of the parties. Thus,petitioners acquiescence is
not
necessary for subrogation to take place because the instantcase is one of legal subrogation that occurs by operation of law, and without
need of thedebtors knowledge. Thus, being subrogated to the right of Caltex, PCIB, through counsel, has the right tointervene in the
proceedings, and under substantive laws is entitled to restitution of itsproperties or funds, reparation, or indemnification

Eduardo G. Ricarze vs. CA, Caltex Phils. Inc., PCIBank

G.R. No. 160451, February 9, 2007

Facts:
Eduardo Ricarze (employed as a collector-messenger of City Service Corporation) is assigned to collect checks
payable to Caltex. He opened a bank account in the name of Dante Gutierrez, a regular customer of Caltex, forged
the signatures on the dorsal portions of the stolen check and deposited it in that same bank account. He was
charged by the officers of Caltex with estafa through falsification of commercial documents. In the original
information filed by the prosecutor, Caltex appeared to be the offended party because the prosecutor was not
informed that PCIBank credited certain amount to Caltex. After arraignment and plea, PCIBank appeared as the
complainant. Ricarze averred that the information can no longer be amended because he had already been
arraigned under the original information, and that doing so would place him in double jeopardy. On one hand,
PCIBank contended that PCIBank had re-credited the amount to Caltex to the extent of the indemnity, hence, the
PCIBank had been subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as private complainant.

Issue:
Whether or not an information can be amended even after the accused had been arraigned and entered his plea.

Holding:
The Supreme Court held that the amendment in the name of the complainant is of form. The test as to whether a
defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would
be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally
applicable to the information in one form as in the other. In this case, the amendment made which does not change
the nature of the crime alleged does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of
an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. As provided
by the Rules of Court, after the entry of the plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court
and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. In the case at bar, the amendment is allowed because it is
settled that the same does not prejudice the rights of Ricarze. In addition, it was held that in case of offenses
against property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as
the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified.

Case 13

PACOY VS. CAJIGAL

G.R. NO. 157472
September 28, 2007

FACTS: On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against Petitioner Jose M. Pacoy.
Upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide.
However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order directing the trial
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder.
Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word Homicide and instead
wrote the word Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion
remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion to Inhibit, he alleged
that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating the
amendment of the charge from Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and existing
jurisprudence. The respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration.

In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code shows that disregard of rank is merely a generic mitigating circumstance which should not
elevate the classification of the crime of homicide to murder.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion and exceeds his jurisdiction in ordering the
amendment of the information from homicide to murder.

HELD:
The petition is not meritorious. The change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal
amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution.

Under Section 14, Rule 110 - Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form
or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the

trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.

While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only change made
was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out
of word Homicide and its replacement by the word Murder. There was no change in the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, we find that the
amendment made in the caption and preamble from Homicide to Murder as purely formal.

Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the accused has already
pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether the
rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the
complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and
when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information. Since the facts
alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the original Information
for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any
possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.

While the respondent judge erroneously thought that disrespect on account of rank qualified the crime to murder,
as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance, we do not find that he committed any grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the amendment of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the
charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was only formal and did not adversely affect any substantial right
of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent
Judge.

MELBA QUINTO VS. DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER PACHECOG.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005Facts: An Information was filed with the
Regional Trial Court that the accused Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault,and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where the three were fishing,
causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die. The respondents filed a demurer to evidence whichthe trial court granted on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. It also held that it could not hold the respondents liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant
evidence to prove their liability for Wilson

s death. The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals insofar as the civil aspect of the case was concerned. The CA ruled
that the acquittal in this case is not merelybased on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the accused-appellees did not commit
the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper.
Acquittalin a criminal action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgmentof acquittal holds that the accused did not commit
the criminal acts imputed tothem.Issue: Whether or not the extinction of respondent

s criminal liability carries withit the extinction of their civil liability.Held: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery ofcivil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.The prime
purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to
isolate himfrom society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain socialorder. The sole purpose of the civil action is the
restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or
felonious act of the accused.The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of thecivil action. However, the civil

action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from where the civil liability may arise does not exist. In thiscase, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of
either respondent to kill the deceased and as held by the the trial court and the CA, the prosecution failed to adduce preponderant
evidence to prove the facts onwhich the civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner hasa cause of action against the
respondents for damages.
MELBA QUINTO VS. DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER PACHECO
G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005
Facts: An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court that the accused Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where the three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die. The
respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It also held that it could not hold the respondents liable for
damages because of the absence of preponderant evidence to prove their liability for Wilsons death. The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals insofar as the civil
aspect of the case was concerned. The CA ruled that the acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the accused-appellees did not
commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a criminal action bars
the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them.
Issue: Whether or not the extinction of respondents criminal liability carries with it the extinction of their civil liability.
Held: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to
reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. The sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended
party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding
in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any illmotive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased and as held by the the trial court and the CA, the prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts
on which the civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action against the respondents for damages.

HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON v. ELVIN CHAN. G.R. No. 157547. February 23, 2011
FACTS:
Eduardo Simon was charged by Elvin Chan of violating BP 22. Chan then commenced a civil action in the MTC for the collection of the principal amount. Chan argued that BP 22
falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code in fraud, for such offense to be civilly tried independently.
The RTC first denied it but the CA later affirmed the action.
ISSUE: Whether the independent civil action is valid.
RULING:
The SC granted the petition and reversed the CA's decision.
Rule 111, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court states clearly that the criminal action of BP 22 also includes the corresponding civil action. This provision was also in the Supreme Court
circular. For Chan to file an independent civil action, the case should have an estafa charged with it.