ESTEBAN YAU vs RICARDO SILVERIO G.R.

158848 February 4, 2008

ARTURO MACAPAGAL vs HON. IRENEO LEE GAKKO, ESTEBAN YAU et al.
February 4, 2008

G.R. 171994

FACTS:
Estaban Yau bought a Promissory Note from Philfinance, issued by Philippine Shares Corporation (PSC)
for P1.6M. Philfinance issued the corresponding post dated checks as return of investment. The checks
bounced. When Yau complained, PSC denied having issued the promissory note.
Yau then filed a complaint with the RTC of Cebu for recovery of the value of the promissory note against
Philfinance and its board of directors, among them was Ricardo Silverio and Arturo Macapagal. All
defendants, except Pablo Carlos, were declared in default.
Defendants then filed a MR of the order declaring them in default. It was denied by the trial court and the
defendants filed a Certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that the order of
default was justified. The dismissal became final and executory*(F&E).
The trial court ruled in favor of Esteban Yau. Pablo Carlos and Philfinance filed an appeal to the CA.
Meanwhile the other defendants appeal was dismissed for failure to pay docket fees. The order of
dismissal became F&E. A writ was then issued pursuant to the decision.
Eventually the defendants bank deposits were garnished and Silverios share in the manila polo club was
sold at public auction. As the judgment was only partially satisfied, the writ was enforced against the
other defendants, including Macapagal.
Silverio and Macapagal took different courses of action. Macapagal filed a certiorari and prohibition
which was dismissed on the ground of res judicata (CAs dismissal of their petition on Order of default).
Silverio filed petition for reinstatement of his Appeal and annulment of Writ which was denied on the
ground that the Order of the RTC dismissing the Notice of Appeal had become final and executory.
Macapagal then filed with SC a petition for review on Certiorari. Silverio filed a similar petition. Both
cases were consolidated because they arose out of the same facts. The SC upheld the decision of the CA
and dismissed their petition. The MR denied, the decision attained finality.

G.R. 171994
The sheriff then resumed enforcement of the writ of
the RTC decision.
Macapagal filed a motion to quash the writ on the
ground that its life has already expired.
It was denied by the trial court which held that
there was effective interruption in the
implementation of the writ because of Macapagals
action to the CA and the SC.
He filed a certiorari with the CA which dismissed
the action. MR denied, hence this action.

G.R.158848
In Philfinance and Pablo Carlos appeal, the CA
modified the decision and deleted award for lost
income and interest. (became F&E)
Sheriff levied Silverios property in Makati, it was
auctioned and the winner was YAU.
Silverio filed an OMNIBUS motion praying that
levy, execution and auction be declared void,
alleging FUNCTUS OFICIO (writs life expired). It
was denied by the trial court. MR denied. Silverio
filed certiorari with the CA which GRANTED his
petition and reversed the Order declaring the levy,
auction and sale VOID.
YAUs MR was denied, hence this action.

The case was consolidated by the Supreme Court because of identity of parties.

ISSUE: W/N the decision rendered by the RTC can no longer be enforced because more than five years
have already lapsed from its finality.
HELD: ESTEBAN YAUs petition is GRANTED. MACAPAGALs petition is DENIED.

It is clear from Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure that a judgment may be
executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final
and executory. Thereafter, before barred by the statute of limitations, by action. But there are
instances where Courts allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years upon
meritorious grounds.
In computing the time limit for enforcing a final judgment, the GENERAL RULE IS that there
should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a
definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a
supersedeas, by the death of a party or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the
debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias. Thus, the
time during which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the said time will be extended by
any delay occasioned by the debtor.
Here, the judgment of the trial court sought to be executed became final and executory on
December 26, 1991. The writ of execution was issued on September 17, 1992. It could not be
enforced for the full satisfaction of the judgment within the five-year period because Macapagal
and Silverio filed with the CA and SC petitions challenging the trial courts judgment and the
writ of execution. Such petitions suspended or interrupted the further enforcement of the writ.
Because of their maneuvers, there has been a delay of sixteen (16) years in the enforcement of
such judgment, reckoned from its finality on December 26, 1991 up to the present. Indeed, the
enforcement of the trial courts judgment by motion has been interrupted by the acts of
Macapagal and Silverio the judgment debtors.
Every litigation must come to an end. While a litigants right to initiate an action in court is fully
respected, however, once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final
judgment, he should not be permitted to initiate similar suits hoping to secure a favorable ruling,
for this will result to endless litigations detrimental to the administration of justice.