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The Case of R. J. Reynolds
ABSTRACT: The paper reacts against the strict separation between dialectical and rhetor-
ical approaches to argumentation and argues that argumentative discourse can be analyzed
and evaluated more adequately if the two are systematically combined. Such an integrated
approach makes it possible to show how the opportunities available in each of the dialec-
tical stages of a critical discussion have been used strategically to further the rhetorical aims
of the speaker or writer. The approach is illustrated with the help of an analysis of an ‘adver-
torial’ published by R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company.
In spite of their initial close connection, since Aristotle there has been a
distinct division between rhetoric and dialectic. The conceptual frame-
work for the study of rhetoric was provided in the Rhetoric by Aristotle’s
‘argumentative’ definition of rhetoric as an ability or capacity (dynamis)
in each case to see the available means of persuasion. 6 Beside the Aris-
totelian perspective, an Isocratian tradition developed that concentrated
more on style and literary aspects. In Cicero’s De oratore these aspects
are integrated in the Aristotelian framework. Until the seventeenth century
western history of the theory of rhetoric is foremost Ciceronian; after its
rediscovery in the fifteenth century, Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria became
the major classical authority on rhetoric in education (Kennedy, 1994, pp.
158, 181).7
Dialectic was by the sophists seen as eristic, while Plato viewed dialectic
296 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN AND PETER HOUTLOSSER
Because deciding to smoke or not to smoke is something you should do when you
don’t have anything to prove.
Think it over.
After all, you may not be old enough to smoke. But you’re old enough to think.
in other words, that the opinions on this matter are indeed divided. Reynolds
leaves conspicuously unmentioned the readily available, much stronger and
also more obvious arguments that smoking can become an addiction and
that you can get cancer from it. The reason for this will be clear: if the
firm would commit itself to these arguments, this would leave Reynolds
with an awkward dialectical inconsistency. The health argument would
strongly undermine the credibility of the standpoint that adults should be
allowed to smoke – a standpoint that Reynolds, as a tobacco company, is,
of course, also committed to.
Thus the arguments advanced for the standpoint that young people
should not smoke are – in a perverse way – selected for their incapacity
to contribute to the defence of the – official – standpoint that young people
should not smoke. By advancing arguments that so evidently do not support
the disputed standpoint, Reynolds evokes the topos ‘If there are only bad
reasons for not doing something, then there are no good reasons for not
doing it.’ This leads the young reader to the following reconstruction of
the desired conclusion:
(1) (There are no good reasons for young people not to smoke)
1.1a–b Smoking has always been an adult custom and even for adults
smoking has become controversial
(1.1a–b′) (These are the only reasons why young people should not
smoke)
(1.1a–b″) (They are bad reasons)
(1.1a–b′′′) (If there are only bad reasons for refraining from doing some-
thing, then there are no good reasons for not doing it)
It is evident that Reynolds intends to convey (1) as an implication, but has
not committed itself to (1). It is now clear why there is no need for that:
it can be left to the young readers to draw this conclusion for themselves.
Having thus ‘argued’ why young people should not smoke, Reynolds
returns – viewed analytically – to the opening stage of the discussion for
an acknowledgement of a concession: ‘We know that giving this kind of
advice to young people can sometimes backfire.’ On the face of it, the
acknowledgement is followed by reasoning aimed at preventing the dreaded
effect from occurring: ‘But if you take up smoking just to prove you’re an
adult, you’re really proving just the opposite.’ On closer inspection,
however, a different effect must be aimed for, because that warning will
not be very effective. Reynolds suggests that young people who take up
smoking only do so to prove that they are adults. Strictly speaking,
however, they say that those who take up smoking only to prove that they
are adults prove exactly the opposite. In other words, when you take up
smoking for some other reason there is no problem. Then you don’t prove
that you are not an adult. The addition of ‘just’ even allows you to take
up smoking to prove that you are an adult as long as you also have other
reasons to do so. In sum, you are almost always in the right.
The concluding stage of this implicit discussion too is a manifestation
302 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN AND PETER HOUTLOSSER
6. CONCLUSION
NOTES
1
Although we restrict our use of the term argumentation to verbal attempts at convincing
others, this does not mean that we object to referring in a more metaphorical sense to ‘argu-
mentation’ in cases where a persuasion process takes wholly or partly place by using images
or other non-verbal means.
RHETORICAL ANALYSIS 303
2
In the pragma-dialectical research programme, argumentative discourse is approached with
four basic metatheoretical, or methodological, starting points: the subject matter under inves-
tigation is to be ‘externalized’, ‘socialized’, ‘functionalized’, and ‘dialectified’.
3
See for some empirical confirmation of this claim van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Meuffels
and Verburg (1997). Of course, arguers may also pursue goals that are foreign to resolving
a difference – e.g. being perceived as nice or wise. But, purportedly, argumentative discourse
is always aimed at resolving a difference.
4
For the rhetorical, dialectical and logical perspectives on argumentation, see Wenzel
(1990). We use the words ‘rhetorical,’ ‘dialectical,’ and ‘logical’ as theoretical terms, not
as denotations of specific kinds of practices or texts.
5
We do not follow Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in differentiating between dialectical
discussion as ‘a sincere quest for the truth’ and rhetorical debate in which the protagonists
‘are chiefly concerned with the triumph of their own viewpoint’ (1969, p. 38).
6
According to Poulakos and others, there is also a sophistic rhetoric, which is to be dis-
tinguished from Aristotelian rhetoric, but Schiappa (1991) questions the concept of a sophistic
rhetoric.
7
See for the classical background of the study of rhetoric Kennedy (1994). In later years
there were a philosophically-oriented persuasion rhetoric, inspired by Aristotle and Whately,
and an elocutionary, decorative, belletristic rhetoric. As Gaonkar (1990) explains, in the
United States there is also a tradition stemming from Burke, in which the frontiers of rhetoric
are expanded from ‘persuasion’ to ‘identification-as-an-explanation-for-social-cohesion’.
According to Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs (1997, p. 213), modern-day
persuasion theories, ‘which are heavily oriented to analysis of attitude formation and change,’
bear little resemblance to Aristotle’s rhetoric.
8
According to Mack, with the foundation of the universities, dialectic became from
the thirteenth century onwards the ‘intellectually dominant part of the trivium, while
rhetoric was left with the important practical task of teaching official letter-writing’ (1993,
p. 8).
9
Among the dialectical theories of argumentation with a formal character are Hamblin’s
(1970) and Barth and Krabbe’s (1982) ‘formal dialectic’ (based on the dialogue logic of the
Erlangen School) and the formal approach of the fallacies by Woods and Walton (1989).
Influential functional and contextual rhetorical approaches are Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca’s (1969) ‘new rhetoric’ and some well-known traditions in American speech com-
munication and philosophy (see van Eemeren et al., 1996, Ch. 7).
10
Reboul (1991, p. 46) observes that for antistrophos the translators ‘donnent [. . .]
tantôt “analogue”, tantôt “contrepartie” ’. He adds: ‘Antistrophos: il est gênant qu’un livre
commence avec un terme aussi obscur!’
11
According to Reboul, in the first chapter Aristotle wrote ‘que la rhétorique est le “rejeton”
de la dialectique, c’est à dire son application, un peu comme la médécine est une applica-
tion de la biologie. Mais ensuite, il la qualifie comme une “partie” de la dialectique’ (1991,
p. 46).
12
According to Mack, Agricola’s work is unlike any previous rhetoric or dialectic: ‘[He]
has selected materials from the traditional contents of both subjects’ (1993, p. 122).
In Meerhoff’s (1988, p. 273) view, ‘pour Agricola, [. . .] loin de réduire la dialectique
à la seule recherche de la vérité rationelle, il entend parler de celle-ci en termes de
communication’.
13
See for connections between rhetoric and dialectic, among others, Mack (1993), Meerhoff
(1988), and van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1997).
14
According to Simons (1990), rhetoric is, most neutrally, the study and the practice of
persuasion. Kienpointner (1995, p. 453) points out that many scholars see rhetoric as ‘a rather
narrow subject dealing with the techniques of persuasion and/or stylistic devices’, but others
conceive of rhetoric as ‘a general theory of argumentation and communication’ (while still
others deny that rhetoric is a discipline at all).
15
How suppression of presence can be used strategically, is clearly illustrated in Edward
304 FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN AND PETER HOUTLOSSER
Kennedy’s ‘Chappaquidick speech.’ See van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, and Jacobs
(1993, pp. vii–xi), and van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1997).
16
Ultimately, the rationale of adaptation to audience demand is that rhetoric has to deal
with the requirements of actors in the context of social interaction, as is in fact already implied
by the pragmatic aspect of pragma-dialectics.
17
In Leff’s view (1999a), the figure of prolepsis serves dialectical and rhetorical functions.
Lincoln uses it strategically to create a synthesis that involves a transcendence of the posi-
tions that were taken before.
18
There are specific ‘confrontation strategies,’ such as ‘humptydumptying’ – defining the
difference ‘to one’s own content.’ There are also specific ‘opening strategies,’ such as ‘first
listing all the things that we do agree about.’ Well-known ‘argumentation strategies’ are
referring to a particular authority, and pointing out all kinds of undesirable consequences of
adopting the opponent’s standpoint. A notorious ‘concluding strategy’ is stressing the ‘need
for consensus,’ which can obviously not be met if the listener or reader does not accept the
speaker’s or writer’s standpoint.
19
This analysis is to a large extent based on van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, and
Jacobs (1997); see also van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999).
REFERENCES