Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
IACThe case
: This is a petition for certiorari for an interpretation of RA 4200 or Anti-wiretapping Act
Facts:
y
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel
Montebon were in the livingroom of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault
y
That same morning, Laconico, another lawyer, telephoned the appellant to come to his
office and advise him on thesettlement of the direct assault case because his regular
lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
y
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the
telephone conversation through atelephone extension so as to hear personally the
proposed conditions for the settlement
y
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to
the conditions, which thelatter answered in affirmative. Complainant then told Laconico to
wait for instructions on where to deliver themoney, he told Laconico to give the money to
his wife but the latter insisted insisted that complainant himself shouldreceive the money.
And when he received the money at a restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of
thePhilippine Constabulary.
y
Appellant Laconico executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard
complainant demand P8,000.00for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault.
Complainant then charged Laconico with violation of RA 4200 forlistening to the telephone
conversation without complainant's consent.
y
The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic
Act No. 4200. The two wereeach sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs
y
The
Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the
communication betweenthe omplainant and Laconico was private in nature therefore was
covered by RA 4200; and that the petitioneroverheard such communication without the
knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extensiontelephone which was
used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant
andLaconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.
Issue: WON
extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its
use to overhear a privateconversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
Held: No.Ruling:
y
Our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as
government authorities orrepresentatives of organized groups from installing devices in
order to gather evidence for use in court or tointimidate, blackmail or gain some
unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening,
in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No.
4200 or othersof similar nature.
We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or
arrangements
M O N D A Y, D E C E M B E R 1 4 , 2 0 0 9
World Health Organization v. Aquino 48 SCRA 243
Facts:
Herein petitioner, in behalf of Dr. Verstuyft, was allegedly suspected by the
Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers of carrying dutiable
goods under the Customs and Tariff Code of the Philippines. Respondent
Judge then issued a search warrant at the instance of the COSAC officers for
the search and seizure of the personla effects of Dr. Verstuyft notwithstanding
his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized by the Executive
branch of the government.
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised the respondent
judge that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his
personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant
to the Host Agreement and further requested for the suspension of the search
warrant. The Solicitor General accordingly joined the petitioner for the quashal
of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied
the quashal.
Issue:
Whether or not personal effect of WHO Officer Dr. Verstuyft can be exempted
from search and seizure under the diplomatic immunity.
Ruling:
The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is
entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host
Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine
Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of
the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to
diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.
It recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation
of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and
courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch
of government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized by
the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the
duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate
suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General
in this case, or other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so
exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarass
the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction
and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search
warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner
Verstuyft.
source: Dr. Carlos Legislador
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 207175
coconut plantation only to discover that about thirty three (33) coconut trees
(subject trees) had been cut down. The coco lumber were no longer in the
area. They took photographs of the stumps left by the men.
The defense, on the other hand, presented Atanacio Avanzado
(Atanacio),accused Ramirez, petitioner Magsumbol, Barangay Captain Pedro
Arguelles (Brgy. Captain Arguelles)and accused Inanoria, to substantiate its
claim of innocence for all the accused.
Atanacio testified that he authorized his brothers-in-law, Magsino and
Magsumbol, to cut down the coconut trees within the boundary of his property,
which was adjacent to the land co-owned by Menandro. Atanacio admitted
that he had never set foot on his property for about 20 years already and that
he was not present whenthe cutting incident happened.
Defense witness Brgy. Captain Arguelles testified that on January 28, 2002,
Magsumbol, Magsino, Ramirez, and Inanoria came to his office seeking
permission to cut down the coconut trees planted on the land of Atanacio.
All the accused vehemently denied the charges against them. Ramirez and
Magsumbol claimed that only the coconut trees which stood within the land
owned by Atanacio, a relative of the private complainant, were cut down on
that morning of February 1, 2002. Ramirez added that he was a coco lumber
trader and that Atanacio offered to sell the coconut trees planted on his lot.
Magsumbol claimed that he took no part in the felling of the coconut trees but
merely supervised the same. He claimed that he did not receive any
remuneration for the service he rendered or a share from the proceeds of the
coco lumbers sale. Inanoria likewise denied participation in the cutting down
of the coconut treesbut confirmed the presence of Magsumbol and Magsino at
the site to supervise the accomplishment of the work being done thereat.
Inanoria corroborated the narration of Magsumbol and Ramirez that all the
felled trees were planted inside the lot owned by Atanacio. Inanoria intimated
that Menandro included him in the complaint for theft due to his refusal to
accede to latters request for him to testify against his co-accused in relation
to the present criminal charge.4
Ruling of the RTC
On March 15, 2011, the RTC rendered its decision 5 stating that the
prosecution was able to establish with certitude the guilt of all the accused for
the crime of simple theft. The RTC rejected the defense of denial invoked by
the accused in the face of positive identification by Caringal pointing to them
as the perpetrators of the crime. It did not believe the testimony of Atanacio
and even branded him as biased witness on account of his relationship with
accused Magsino and Magsumbol. The trial court adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding all the accused Erasmo
Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo Magsumbol and Bonifacio Ramirez
guilty as charged and applying the Indeterminate sentence law, the court
hereby sentences them to suffer an imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months and 1
Issues:
Bewailing his conviction, Magsumbolfiled the present petition before this Court
and imputes to the CA the following
ERRORS:
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS
OF LAW WHEN IT FOUND THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
THEFT UNDER ARTICLE 308 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, IN THAT:
I
NO COMPETENT EVIDENCEWAS ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE THAT THE COCONUT TREES THAT WERE CUT WERE BEYOND
THE PROPERTY OWNED BY ATANACIO AVANZADO; and
II
MALICE AND INTENT TO GAIN, AS ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF THEFT,
ARE NOT PRESENT IN THE CASE AT HAND.8
The Courts Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to
the credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the
reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of
observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies.
Though it is true that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal, this rule, however, is not a hard and fast one. The exception is
observed if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood,
or misapplied some factor circumstance of weight and substance that would
have cast doubt on the guilt of the accused.9 The said exception apparently
exists in the case at bench.
It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes the elements of each crime
under the RPC, while the elements in turn unravel the particular requisite acts
of execution and accompanying criminal intent. In the case at bench,
petitioner Magsumbol and his co-accused were convicted by the CA of the
crime of theft of damaged property under paragraph (2) of Article 308 of the
RPC which provides:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.: xxxx
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. xxxxx;
audience again from Menandro, but the latter refused to talk to him
anymore.13
Both the RTC and the CA chose to brush aside the foregoing unrebutted
testimony of Atanacio for being unreliable and considered him a biased
witness simply because he is related by affinity to Magsumbol and Magsino.
Family relationship, however, does not by itself render a witness testimony
inadmissible or devoid of evidentiary weight. 14 To warrant rejection of the
testimony of a relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that, independently
of the relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or
that improper or evil motives had moved the witness to incriminate the
accused falsely.15
The relationship of Atanacio to the accused, per se, does not impair his
credibilty.1wphi1 It bears stressing that while Magsumbol and Magsino are
Atanacios brothers-in-law, Menandro ishis cousin. Considering that both the
accused and the accuser are Atanacios relatives, and purportedly both have
bearing with regard to his decision, why would then Atanacio support one over
the other? The logical explanation could only be that Atanacio had indeed
ordered Magsumbol and Magsino to cut the trees on his land. The Court is
convinced that Atanacio was telling the truth.
If, indeed, in the course of executing Atanacios instructions, Magsumbol and
his co-accused encroached on the land co-owned by Menandro, because
they missed the undetectable boundary between the two lots, and cut down
some of Menandros trees, such act merely constituted mistake or judgmental
error. The following pronouncement in the case of Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan16 may serve as a guidepost, to wit:
If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person
committing the act, no malice or criminal intent can be rightfully imputed to
him. x x x. Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to
exist. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the
criminal mind is wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or mistake as to
particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from felonious
responsibility. The exception of course is neglect in the discharge of duty or
indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to criminal intent, for in this
instance, the element of malicious intent is supplied by the element
ofnegligence and imprudence.17
[Emphasis supplied]
The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation where Magsumbol and his
co-accused even sought prior permission from Brgy. Captain Arguelles to cut
down the coconut trees which was done openly and during broad daylight
effectively negated malice and criminal intent on their part. It defies reason
that the accused would still approach the barangay captain if their real
intention was tosteal the coconut trees of Menandro. Besides, criminals would
usually execute their criminal activities clandestinely or through stealth or
strategy to avoid detection of the commission of a crime or a wrongdoing.
The findings of this Court in this case should not create the mistaken
impression that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should always
be looked at with askance. The point is that courts should carefully scrutinize
the prosecution evidence to make sure that no innocent person is
condemned. An allegation, or even a testimony, that an act was done should
never be hastily accepted as proof that it was really done. Evidence adduced
must be closely examined under the lens of a judicial microscope to ensure
that conviction only flows from moral certainty that guilt has been established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Here, that quantum of proof has not been satisfied.1wphi1 The prosecution
miserably failed to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt that Magsumbol,
together with his co-accused, damaged the property or Menandro with malice
and deliberate intent and then removed the felled coconut trees from the
premises.
Hence, we must reckon with a dictum of the law, in dubilis reus est
absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed December 14, 2012
Decision and the May 6, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 34431 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Eduardo
Magsumbol is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES*
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D.
Brion, per Special Order No. 1881, dated November 25, 2014.
1
Id. at 31-32.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 24.
Rollo, p. 29.
Id. at 5.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Id. at 905.
People vs Gonzales
Criminal Law I-E Prof. Arreza
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the physician who
conducted the autopsyon the body, Paja, the patrolmen and constabulary
members who joined in the investigation, the widow,and Huntoria.Dr. Rojas
testified that he performed the autopsy at around 11:20 a.m. on Feb. 1981
after thedeceased was taken to the municipal hall. He found 4 puncture
wounds, 7 stab wounds, 4 incisions, and1 laceration; five of these were fatal
wounds. Rojas admitted one of two possibilities:Only one weapon might have caused all the woundsMultiple instruments were used due to the number and
different characteristics
The brunt of the prosecutions case rested on Huntorias alleged eyewitness account of the
incident, which was as follows:Testified on July 27, 1982; at 5 pm on Feb. 21, 1981, he left his work at Brgy.
Central, andwalked home, taking a short-cut.While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses home at around 8:00 pm, he heard
cries for help. Curiosity prompted him to approach the place where the shouts
were from.15-20 m away from the scene, he hid himself behind a clump of banana trees,
and saw allthe accused ganging upon the deceased near a threshing
platform. He said he clearlyrecognized all the accused as the place was
awash in moonlight.After stabbing and hacking the victim, the accused lifted his body and carried
it to the house.Huntoria then left home. Upon reaching his house, he related
what he saw to his wife andmother before going to sleep.Eight months after the incident, bothered by his conscience and the fact that
his father wasa tenant of the deceased, he thought of helping the widow. Out
of his own volition, he
travelled to the widows houise, and related to her what he saw.
Except Fausta who admitted killing the deceased as he was trying to rape
her, the rest deniedparticipation in the crime. The appellant claimed that he
was asleep in his house which was onekilometre away from the scene of the
crime, and he knew of the crime only when his grandchildrenwent to his
house that night.
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the
prosecutions version.
Onappeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellant contended that the trial court
erred in convicting him onthe basis of the testimony of the lone witness, and in
not appreciating his defense of alibi. The Courtfound no merit in the
errors, and rejected defense of alibi. Worsening this is that the appellate
courtfound the sentence erroneous, and upgraded the penalty to that of
murder
There is nothing in the findings or the evidence that establishes the criminal
liability of theappellant as a principal for direct participation under Art. 17,
para. 1 of the Revised PenalCode.Furthermore, there is nothing in the findings or evidence that inculpates him
by inducement,under paragraph 2 of the same article. Based on the definition
of felonies in Art. 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, the prosecutions evidence could not establish intent nor fault. Recall
that the elements of felonies include:
o
An act or omission
o
Act or omission must be punishable
o
Act is performed or omission incurred by deceit or faultThe lone witness could not properly establish any acts or omissions done by
the appellant.He stated that he does not know who hacked or stabbed the
victim, thus implying that hedoes not know what the appellant did. With this,
the essential elements of felonies may noteven be present.Furthermore, the fact that there were five stab wounds and six accused would
imply thatone of them may not have caused a grave wound (especially given
the statement of thephysician). This may have been the appellant, and given
that there is no evidence that the
appellant caused any of the wounds, coupled with the prosecutions failure to prove the
presence of conspiracy (that is, how many people actually took part in the
killing), itweakens the arguments against the appellant.On the lone witness:Huntorias credibility as a witness is tarnished by two points:
o
He came out eight months after the killing. He claims that he feared for his
life, butthere was no proof that he was being threatened, nor was the length of
timereasonable given the circumstances.
o
He is not exactly a disinterested/neutral witness. He admitted to being a
tenant of the deceased, and stated that one of the reasons why he testified
was because thevictim was his landlord.-
Under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the source of his livelihood
from hislandlord. As such, they would do everything to get the landlords to
their favour. Posing as a
Criminal Law I-E Prof. Arrezawitness would have been a convenient way to
do this, especially as he ceased to beemployed as early as May 1981.Finally,
based on Philippine customs and traditions, it is unlikely for the appellant to
be in thescene of the crime, as under our family culture, aging parents are
usually sheltered and insulated frompossible harm. It is improbable for the
accused to bring their aging father when they were clearly inbetter shape than
he was, and it was unlikely for the appellant to offer his services as they were
more orless enough to handle what could have been a perceived
enemy.Although alibi is a weak defense, in cases like this where the
participation of the appellant is notclear, it may be considered. In light of
the evidence on record, it may be sufficient for an acquittal.Decision of the CA
is reversed and set aside. Appellant acquitted. Costs de officio.Prepared
byAntonio Miguel Bartolome
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33345 November 20, 1978
MARCELA M. BAGAJO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE GERONIMO R. MARAVE, Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch 11, and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Diosdado Bacolod for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General, for respondents.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review, under Republic Act 5440, the decision of
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental in
Criminal Case No. OZ-95 affirming the judgment of conviction rendered
against petitioner by the Municipal Court of Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental and
imposing upon her the penalty to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs, for the crime of slight
physical injuries.
The background facts as found by the trial court as follows:
In the afternoon of April 1, 1970, at about 2 o'clock, petitioner who was a
teacher, left her classroom to go to the principal's office. While the teacher
was thus out of the room, complainant Wilma Alcantara, one of her pupils, left
her desk and went to chat with Lilibeth Purlas, a classmate, while leaning over
the desk of Ponciano Navarro, another classmate. At that juncture, a fourth
classmate, Benedicta Guirigay passed near Wilma, who suddenly raised her
leg causing the former to stumble on it and fall down, her head hitting the
edge of the desk, her stomach a sharp pointed umbrella and her knee a nail
of the desk. She fainted. At that precise moment, petitioner was entering the
room. She asked Wilma what happened but the latter denied having anything
to do with what had just taken place. Petitioner thereupon became angry and,
with a piece of "bamboo stick" which she was using as a pointer whipped
Wilma behind her legs and her thigh, thereby causing the following injuries,
according to the medical certificate presented in evidence:
1. Linear bruises at the middle half of the dorsal surface of both
legs. it is about four inches in length and 1/4 centimeter in width.
There are three on the right leg and two on the left leg.
2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at
the lower third of the dorsal surface of the right thigh.
she meant to punish Wilma and somehow make her feel such punishment
may be true, but We are convinced that the means she actually used was
moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent
intent. The nature of the injuries actually suffered by Wilma, a few linear
bruises (at most 4 inches long and cm. wide) and the fact that petitioner
whipped her only behind the legs and thigh, show, to Our mind, that indeed
she intended merely to discipline her. And it cannot be said, that Wilma did not
deserve to be discipline. In other words, it was farthest from the thought of
petitioner to commit any criminal offense. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit
rea.
Nothing said above is intended to mean that this Court sanctions generally the
use of corporal punishment by teachers on their pupils. All that We hold here
is that in the peculiar circumstances of the instant case before Us, there is no
indication beyond reasonable doubt, in the evidence before the trial court, that
petitioner was actuated by a criminal design to inflict the injuries suffered by
complainant as a result of her being whipped by petitioner. What appears is
that petitioner acted as she did in the belief as a teacher exercising authority
over her pupil inloco parentis, she was within her rights to punish her
moderately for purposes of discipline. Whether or not she exceeded the
degree of moderation permitted by the laws and rules governing the
performance of her functions is not for Us, at this moment and in this case, to
determine.
Absent any applicable precedent indicative of the concept of the disciplinary
measures that may be employed by teachers under Section 150 of the
Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual quoted above, We feel it is wiser to
leave such determination first to the administrative authorities.
After several deliberations, the Court has remained divided, such that the
necessary eight (8) votes necessary for conviction has not been obtained.
Accordingly, the petitioner -accused is entitled to acquittal. ,
WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby acquitted, with costs de oficio, without
prejudice to her being dealt with administratively or in a civil case for damages
not resulting exdelicto.
Castro, C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Santos, JJ., concurs in the dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar.
Separate Opinions
and pupil, professor and student, are fixed by government, regulations and
those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be
countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities
of the Heart and mind of the pupil or student," even as Article 349 recognizes
teachers and professors as among those who exercise substitute parental
authority. Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual further
categorically forbids "the use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping,
jerking, or pushing pupils about)."
It cannot be contended then that teachers in the exercise of their authority
in loco parentis may, without incurring criminal liability inflict moderate
corporal punishment. The power to inflict moderate punishment on children is
vested by Article 316 of the Civil Code exclusively, in the parents.
The petitioner might be entitled to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances
in her favor such as having acted with obfuscation, but in the face of the
express provisions of law she may not be absolved of the proven charge.
The statement in the main opinion (at page 4) that "wheather or not
(petitioner) exceeded the degree of moderation permitted by the laws and
rules governing the performance of her functions is not for Us, at this moment
and in this case, to determine" (but that "We feel it wiser to leave such
determination first to the administrative authorities") appears to be contrary to
the laws and rules which do not permit the infliction of corporal punishment,
moderate or otherwise, by teachers on their pupils but provide for criminal,
civil and administrative sanctions, and contrary to the proven facts, which as
pointed out by Justice Muoz Palma, show that the physical injuries inflicted
by petitioner on her pupil could by no means be described as "moderate"
(even assuming that teachers had the authority to inflict moderate corporal
punishment).
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
The facts in this case are as follows.
Inside a classroom while the teacher was away, an eleven year old girl-pupil
tripped a girl-classmate, causing slight physical injuries to the latter. Upon
being questioned by the teacher in charge who just then came back, the
erring child denied authorship of the misdeed. The teacher became angry
and, with a bamboo stick, whipped the erring child on the buttocks, thighs,
and legs with such violence as to leave on the punished limbs, not welts, but
bruises requiring some four to six days to heal. The medical certificate
described the injuries thus:
1. Linear bruises at the middle of the dorsal surface of both legs.
It is about four inches in length and 1/4 centimeters in width.
There are three on the right leg and 2 on the left leg.
2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at
the lower third of the dorsal surface of the right thigh.
purposely blocked Benedicta with her legs and she fell to the
floor. The accused became angry and whipped Wilma with a
bamboo stick (at pages 1 and 2).
xxx xxx xxx
From the evidence it has been duly proved that while Benedicta
Guirigay was passing near Wilma Alcantara, the latter suddenly
raised her leg and Benedicta stumbled on it and fell to the floor.
She fainted and suffered some injuries. The accused became
very angry got her piece of bamboo stick which she was using
as a pointer stick and with it whipped Wilma several times,
thereby causing on Wilma the physical injuries described by Dr.
Ozarraga in his medical certificate (at page 4; Emphasis
supplied).
In the same manner, the municipal court finds that
... (I)n the instant case, it would appear that the accused Marcela M. Bagajo,
was carried away by her passion or anger in whipping to such an extreme
Wilma Alcantara with a bamboo stick not really apt for the purpose. The victim
of Wilma Alcantara's mischief or naughtiness was Benedicta Guirigay a
working pupil actually living with her(the accused)for some years. ...
The motive of the accused was to avenge the injury to the victim who, as
found by the trial court, has been living with (and working for) the accused
teacher. Will vengeance justify the act?
But assuming that the motive of the accused was really good, does this mean
that criminal intent on her part is thus completely ruled out? WE do not believe
so. A good motive, as we have earlier intimated, is not incompatible with an
unlawful intent. One may be convicted of a crime whether his motive appears
to be good or bad or even though no motive is proven. A good motive does
not prevent an act from being a crime. (People ex rel Hegeman v. Corrigan 87
N.E. 792, 796; 195 N.Y. 1, quoting People v. Molineux supra; Clark, Cr. Law,
sec. 14; People v. Weiss 300 N.Y.S. 249, 255; 252 App. Div. 463). A classic
example is euthanasia or mercy killing. It is condemned by law although the
motive may be to spare a hopeless patient prolonged suffering. And if a father
drowns his child who is five years of age to save it from starving, he is guilty of
parricide though he was actuated by a good motive love for the child
(People v.Kirby 2 Parker Cr. R., N.Y., 28. See also U.S. v. Marmon 45 Fed.
414. Both are cited in The Revised Penal Code, Francisco, supra). The father
or brother of a rape victim, who kills the rapist long after the commission of the
rape. to avenge the victim's defloration, is not exempt from penal liability. A
son killing his sleeping father, who used to beat up his hardworking mother, to
relieve his good mother from so much misery, does not justify the parricide.
So also, if a person cuts off the foot of a mischievous child to prevent if from
doing further mischief with its foot, and thus save it from possible criminal
liability, that person stands liable for physical injuries. True enough, the act
involved in the instant case, which is the beating of a child, is less serious
than those involved in the above-cited cases, but the fact that an act is less
serious than another does not mean that it is not criminal. Other examples
can be catalogued ad infinitum. Thus, our penal code provides specific
penalties for specific crimes, depending, generally, on their seriousness.
II
The Solicitor General further maintains that the act committed by the accused
is not unlawful. "Administering moderate corporal punishment," he says, "is
not so defined as felony by the Revised Penal Code."
But "administering corporal punishment" is a felony, although the Code
categorized it under the more graphic term "slight physical injuries". The
pertinent provision is stated as follows:
Art. 266. Slight physical injuries ... The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and
censure when the offender has caused physical injuries which
do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual
work nor require medical attendance.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied).
In fact, even if no visible injury were caused by the act of administering
punishment, it would still be punished as an illtreatment by deed under
paragraph 3 of the same Article 266.
From the facts found by the trial court, the following material points appear:
(1) the teacher beat the child with a bamboo stick, and (2) the beating caused
physical injuries on the child, consisting of linear bruises requiring some four
to six days to heal. The act of the accused, no doubt, constitutes the very
offense penalized by the cited provision.
Commission of a prohibited act having been indubitably shown, no proof of
criminal intent is necessary. For, "from the felonious acts (of the accused),
freely and deliberately executed, the moral and injurious intent arises
conclusively and indisputably, in the absence of evidence to the contrary"
(People v. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52, 53. See also U.S. v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92;
People v. Abando, 2 CA Rep. 205; paragraph [b], section 5 of Rule 13, Rules
of Court; 16 C.J. 81).
In claiming that she merely acted within the limits of her authority in punishing
the child as the latter's teacher and substitute parent, the accused in effect
invokes the defense of having acted in the lawful exercise of a right under
paragraph 5 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.
The "right" or authority claimed by the teacher is that which supposedly flows
from the civil law concept of "substitute parental authority" exercised by
teachers over their pupils. The argument is that since under Article 349 of the
Civil Code, teachers exercise substitute parental authority, and under Article
316, parents have the power to correct their children and punish them
moderately, it follows logically that teachers can likewise punish the pupils
under their charge. And if parents, in the exercise of their authority, can inflict
corporal punishment on their children, so can teachers on their pupils.
The right of parents to chastise their troublesome, mischievous or disobedient
children must be conceded as it is necessary to the government of families,
and to the good order of society. However, this right was not meant to be a
license for manhandling or physically chastising a misbehaving child. At the
same time that the law has created and preserved this right, in its regard for
the safety of the child, it has prescribed bounds beyond which it shall not be
carried (Johnson v. State, 2 Hump Tenn 283; 36 Am. Dec. 332). Thus, Dean
Francisco, commenting on Article 316 of the Civil Code, observes: "It is to be
noted that the law provides for 'moderate' punishment. Since modern
educational system forbids the use of corporal or physical punishment, this
would be a good test in determining the limitation of the power of parents to
correct and punish their children moderately. Parents should never exceed
the limits of prudence and human sentiments in proceeding against their
children" (Francisco, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated and
Commented, 1953 ed., Book One, pp. 846-857; citing 2 Manresa 22-23; 5
Sanchez Roman 1140; Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, November
26, 1901).
This observation is shared by Professors Garcia and Alba, who maintain that:
"The power to correct and to punish children moderately should be
understood as not including corporal or physical punishment, for otherwise it
will be against modern trends in education and a violation of the provision of
the Revised Penal Code. Prudence and moderation should be the rule" (Civil
Code of the Philippines, 1950 ed., Vol. 1, p. 535).
The abiding love which reigns over families, the native respect which children
bear towards their parents, and the moral ascendancy which parents have
over their children, should give parents enough force to maintain the prestige
of their parental authority. Even if these fail, the law affords parents recourse
to the courts under Act 4002. Under said law, minor children guilty of
disrespect or disobedience may be held criminally liable upon the complaint of
parents. This law is a strong suggestion that parents are not to take the law in
their hands. In our republican set-up, even the government of families is not
beyond the pale of the rule of law.
Indeed sanctions are provided in Article 332 of the Civil Code when parents,
hiding behind the cloak of the parental privilege, "treat their children with
excessive harshness" which is a cause for deprivation or suspension of their
parental authority (see Perez v. Samson, CA, 48 O.G. No. 12, p. 5368). The
procedure therefor is laid down by Rule 99, section 7 of the Rules of Court,
which includes as grounds for such deprivation or suspension when the
parents "unlawfully beat or otherwise habitually maltreat" the child.
Moreover, abusive parents may be proceeded against criminally. It must be
observed that our general law on physical injuries does not exempt parents
(much less teachers) from criminal liability for bodily harm inflicted on children
or pupils as punishment for misconduct. The only concession given to the
parents by law, under Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, is that, in case
of serious physical injuries inflicted in the course of a filial correction, the
circumstance of relationship shall not be considered for the purpose of
imposing the greater penalty. This means that parents shall suffer only the
ordinary penalty provided for assailants who are not related to the offended
party within the specified degrees.
Needless to emphasize, the authority delegated to teachers cannot be greater
than that conferred on parents. Truly, the power exercised by teachers over
pupils is more restrictively, if not more clearly, defined in law. The very chapter
which gives teachers and professors substitute parental authority explicitly
denies them the power to administer corporal punishment, The pertinent
provision of the Civil Code is of the following tenor:
Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil professor and
student, are fixed by government regulations and those of each
school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be
countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best
potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student
(emphasis supplied).
Said admonition is felicitously incorporated in the government regulations
promulgated pursuant to law, namely, the Bureau of Public Schools Service
Manual, the pertinent provision of which reads as follows:
Sec. 150. The use of corporal punishment by teachers
(slapping, jerking, or pushing pupils about), imposing manual
work or degrading tasks as penalty, meting out cruel and
unusual punishments of any nature ... are forbidden (Third
Revision, 1959 ed.).
Under the aforecited rule, the teacher cannot even require the erring pupil to
clean the room or mow the lawn in the campus to discipline him, although
these penalties do not involve physical injury. Neither can the teacher order
the child to stand at the corner of the classroom as it would degrade or
humiliate the child. He cannot even push the pupil about to remind him that
his conduct is reproachable. By what twist of reasoning can we then uphold
the power to apply corporal punishment as a legitimate means of correction?
In the case at bar, the teacher clearly overdid herself. In whipping the child
several times with a bamboo stick, an instrument liable to cause, as in fact it
caused, physical injuries, the accused could not have meant to give
expression to a feeling of nobility. More than inflicting bodily injuries, the
punishment humiliated the child in front of her classmates. In its execution, it
was plainly and simply excessive and brutal. The most that the teacher could
have done under the circumstances was to admonish the child, if she was
certain of her guilt. She could have reported her to her parents and to the
parents of the pupil who was tripped, and in turn, the parents to the injured
child could have reported the tripping incident to the police authorities for the
institution of the proper criminal charges or could have sued the parents of the
erring pupil for civil liability. The teacher pursued none of these available
courses of action. Instead, she chose to take the law in her hands and, in the
process, arrogated unto herself the prerogatives of a prosecutor, judge and
executioner.
From the facts of the case, we therefore cannot find any justification for the
acts of the teacher. The acts committed are not only unauthorized even under
the concept of the substitute parental authority behind which the accused
seeks refuge, but they are precisely the acts teachers are expressly forbidden
to do. The accused acted not to discharge the function of a teacher, but
rather, acted forgetting that she was a teacher.
Parenthetically, the Solicitor General noted that the beating was administered
on "parts of the body which are not vulnerable to any serious injury." But
precisely, the teacher stands accused only of slight physical injuries.
The doctrine enunciated by a division of the Court of Appeals in the 1940
case of People versus Javier (citing the 1908 case of Mansell v. Griffin 1 K.B.
160) that "a teacher in a public elementary school has authority to inflict
corporal punishment on a pupil" (40 OG 18th Supp. 150), has been expressly
revoked by Article 352 of the New Civil Code which took effect on August 30,
1950 and Article 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of Public
Schools aforequoted. Moreover, in the Javier case, the main reason of the
Court of Appeals in acquitting the appellant therein was because the Court of
Appeals
cannot positively conclude that it was appellant's blow that
caused the serious injury. An equally strong probability is that it
was caused by the other boys during their boxing game. As a
matter of fact, the physician who treated Bravo, testifying for the
prosecution, stated that the injuries suffered by Bravo 'must
have been caused by a hard and blunt instrument.' We are
constrained, therefore, to doubt appellant's guilt,
We are inclined to believe appellant's theory that the incident
was magnified in order to find cause for removing him from the
teaching staff of Quinalabasa for reasons appearing
uncontradicted in the record. He was disliked by the residents in
the barrio because he had been requiring his pupils to do plenty
of extracurricular work in school, ... . There was also the desire
of Alejandro Payoyo, a sponsor in the marriage of Hilaria
It should be stressed that the Javier and Padua cases were decided by the
Court of Appeals, whose opinion on questions of law is not binding on the
Supreme Court.
The authority of the parent under paragraph 2 of Article 316 of the Civil Code
"to correct and punish moderately" an erring child, does not include the
infliction of corporal punishment. Neither does the power "to discipline the
child as may be necessary for the formation of his good character" under
Article 45 of the Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Youth
Welfare Code. Moderate punishment must be short of corporal punishment. If
the law intended to authorize the parent to inflict such moderate corporal
punishment it would have provided so expressly as is done in the statutes of
Michigan and Virginia invoked by the Solicitor General, quoting Time
Magazine (July 12, 1972 issue) and relied on by the majority opinion.
The substitute parental authority granted to the teacher over the pupil, does
not include all the rights comprehended in the patria potestas of the natural
parent over the child. For one thing, certainly the teacher cannot demand
support and inheritance from the pupil in the same manner that the teacher is
not under obligation to support the pupil or to recognize the right of the pupil
to inherit from him or even to educate the child at his own expense.
The third paragraph of paragraph 4 of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code
affirms the liability of the parent for serious physical injuries, and only exempts
the parent from the special aggravating circumstances mentioned in the
second paragraph of said paragraph 4 of Article 263 of the Revise Penal
Code. The parent "who shall inflict physical injuries upon his child by
excessive chastisement," does not incur the graver penalties imposed in the
penultimate paragraph of Article 263 by reason of the special aggravating
circumstances. But such parent remains liable for the penalties imposed in
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of said Article 263 for serious physical injuries.
No such leniency is provided for slight physical injuries and maltreatment
inflicted by the parent on the child under Article 266 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The use of corporal punishment in the halls of learning is condemned.
Flogging, even of the most hardened criminals, has long been abandoned as
a form of punishment in penal institutions. So must it be in schools. Respect
for human personality cannot be instilled in the minds of the children when
teachers choose to defile the human body by whipping it. Beating a child to
make him remember his lesson well is reminiscent of the days when slavery
was fashionable and instruments of torture were symbols of authority. The
inhumane dictum of eras past "Spare the rod and spoil the child" had been
deposed by the compassionate precept expressed in Article 352 of the Civil
Code and Section 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of Public
Schools.
Hence, the conviction should be affirmed.
The Majority Opinion discounts the presence of criminal intent and justifies the
act of petitioner as one committed by a teacher exercising authority in loco
parentis under Art. 349 of the Civil Code.
Admittedly, Art. 349 includes a teacher among the persons exercising
substitute parental authority while Art. 350 states that the latter shall exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of a child. However, by the very
provisions of Art. 352 of the same Code it is a condition that as to the relations
between teacher and pupil, in no case shall corporal punishment be
countenanced
The act of petitioner contravenes not only Art. 352 of the Civil Code but also
Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual quoted in pages
2 and 3 of the Opinion under which the use of corporal punishment by
teachers is forbidden.
It is contended in the Opinion that the above provisions are applicable in so
far as the civil and administrative liabilities of petitioner are concerned,
thereby overlooking the fact that the law on substitute parental authority under
which the infliction of the "moderate penalty" is justified, expressly prohibits
the use of corporal punishment by teachers in their relations with their pupils.
But a more basic reason for this dissent is that the legal presumption of
malice is not overthrown by protestation of good faith and honest belief of
petitioner that she was merely imposing discipline, for the findings of the trial
courts, viz: the Municipal Court and the Court of First Instance, attest that
petitioner herein whipped Wilma with a bamboo stick in the "heat of
anger" 6 because Benedicta Guirigay the victim of Wilma's naughtiness or
mischief, was "a working pupil living in the house of the accused (petitioner
now) for several years." 7
In truth, therefore, anger, a desire to avenge the mischief done on her protege
Benedicta, motivated petitioner in striking Wilma with her bamboo stick.
Moreover, I simply cannot agree with the Majority that all that petitioner did
was to impose a "moderate penalty" on Wilma.
Petitioner did not whip or strike at Wilma once or twice, but several times with
such vehemence and force as to produce not one or two but seven linear
bruises on different parts of both legs and right thigh which according to the
doctor would heal barring complications from four to six days. Inflicting
physical injuries, to my mind, is not a "moderately penalty". If an exercise of
discipline was necessary, petitioner could have employed methods short of
bodily punishment which would leave injuries on the person of the recalcitrant
pupil.
Wherefore, I vote for the affirmance of the decision of the trial court.
Separate Opinions
ANTONIO, J., concurring:
The effectiveness of a teacher to exercise authority over her pupil in loco
parentis depends on her ability to enforce discipline. Petitioner had authority
to inflict corporal punishment on a pupil, if the punishment is moderate, not
prompted by bad motive, and is of such a nature that the parent of the child
might expect the child would receive if she did wrong.
AQUINO, J., concurring:
The teacher, who inflicted corporal punishment, should be disciplined
administratively. In People vs. Javier, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 150, the Court of
Appeals, per Melencio, J., Briones, Montemayor and Enage, JJ., concurring,
held that a teacher, who inflicted moderate corporal punishment, was not
criminally liable because he had no criminal intent, citing Mansell vs. Griffin, I
K. B. 160. (Justice Torres dissented.)
FERNANDO, J, dissenting:
I find myself in sympathy with the approach taken in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Makasiar not only in view of the humanity that should permeate the
law but also in accordance with the tendency much more manifest of late in
international law to accord greater and greater protection to the welfare of the
young, as an aspect of human rights. Moreover, it is well-settled that the
doctrine parens patriae calls for the state exercising the utmost vigilance to
assure that teachers and educators should refrain from the infliction of
corporal punishment which for me at least is a relic of the past. This is not to
lose sight of the significance of the view stressed in the opinion of Justice
Barredo that criminal intent must be shown to justify a finding of guilt.
Nonetheless, considering the nature and extent of the physical injuries
sustained, as shown in the dissenting opinion of Justice Muoz Palma, the
protestation of good faith on the part of appellant had, for me, lost its
persuasiveness. 'The leading case of People v. Cagoco, 1 where the accused
approached the victim from behind and suddenly struck him with his fist on
the back part of his head causing him to fall backwards, his head striking the
asphalt pavement as a result of which he died a few hours later comes to
mind. It was the ruling of this Court that murder was committed as there
was alevosia, although appellant was entitled to the mitigating circumstance
of lack of intention to commit so great a wrong as that inflicted. 2
Thus I find myself unable to yield concurrence to the acquittal of the accused.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the dissenting opinion of Justice Muoz Palma and vote for
affirmance of the judgment of conviction which liberally imposed a mere fine
the heat of anger a state of mind which could hardly harbor a good motive.
The Court of First Instance expresses its findings thus
It appears that ... (a)t this precise moment, the accused entered
the room and asked Wilma what had happened. Wilma
answered that she had nothing to do with the failing down of
Benedicta. Ponciano reported to the accused that Wilma
purposely blocked Benedicta with her legs and she fell to the
floor. The accused became angry and whipped Wilma with a
bamboo stick (at pages 1 and 2).
xxx xxx xxx
From the evidence it has been duly proved that while Benedicta
Guirigay was passing near Wilma Alcantara, the latter suddenly
raised her leg and Benedicta stumbled on it and fell to the floor.
She fainted and suffered some injuries. The accused became
very angry got her piece of bamboo stick which she was using
as a pointer stick and with it whipped Wilma several times,
thereby causing on Wilma the physical injuries described by Dr.
Ozarraga in his medical certificate (at page 4; Emphasis
supplied).
In the same manner, the municipal court finds that
... (I)n the instant case, it would appear that the accused Marcela M. Bagajo,
was carried away by her passion or anger in whipping to such an extreme
Wilma Alcantara with a bamboo stick not really apt for the purpose. The victim
of Wilma Alcantara's mischief or naughtiness was Benedicta Guirigay a
working pupil actually living with her(the accused)for some years. ...
The motive of the accused was to avenge the injury to the victim who, as
found by the trial court, has been living with (and working for) the accused
teacher. Will vengeance justify the act?
But assuming that the motive of the accused was really good, does this mean
that criminal intent on her part is thus completely ruled out? WE do not believe
so. A good motive, as we have earlier intimated, is not incompatible with an
unlawful intent. One may be convicted of a crime whether his motive appears
to be good or bad or even though no motive is proven. A good motive does
not prevent an act from being a crime. (People ex rel Hegeman v. Corrigan 87
N.E. 792, 796; 195 N.Y. 1, quoting People v. Molineux supra; Clark, Cr. Law,
sec. 14; People v. Weiss 300 N.Y.S. 249, 255; 252 App. Div. 463). A classic
example is euthanasia or mercy killing. It is condemned by law although the
motive may be to spare a hopeless patient prolonged suffering. And if a father
drowns his child who is five years of age to save it from starving, he is guilty of
parricide though he was actuated by a good motive love for the child
(People v.Kirby 2 Parker Cr. R., N.Y., 28. See also U.S. v. Marmon 45 Fed.
414. Both are cited in The Revised Penal Code, Francisco, supra). The father
or brother of a rape victim, who kills the rapist long after the commission of the
rape. to avenge the victim's defloration, is not exempt from penal liability. A
son killing his sleeping father, who used to beat up his hardworking mother, to
relieve his good mother from so much misery, does not justify the parricide.
So also, if a person cuts off the foot of a mischievous child to prevent if from
doing further mischief with its foot, and thus save it from possible criminal
liability, that person stands liable for physical injuries. True enough, the act
involved in the instant case, which is the beating of a child, is less serious
than those involved in the above-cited cases, but the fact that an act is less
serious than another does not mean that it is not criminal. Other examples
can be catalogued ad infinitum. Thus, our penal code provides specific
penalties for specific crimes, depending, generally, on their seriousness.
II
The Solicitor General further maintains that the act committed by the accused
is not unlawful. "Administering moderate corporal punishment," he says, "is
not so defined as felony by the Revised Penal Code."
But "administering corporal punishment" is a felony, although the Code
categorized it under the more graphic term "slight physical injuries". The
pertinent provision is stated as follows:
Art. 266. Slight physical injuries ... The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and
censure when the offender has caused physical injuries which
do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual
work nor require medical attendance.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied).
In fact, even if no visible injury were caused by the act of administering
punishment, it would still be punished as an illtreatment by deed under
paragraph 3 of the same Article 266.
From the facts found by the trial court, the following material points appear:
(1) the teacher beat the child with a bamboo stick, and (2) the beating caused
physical injuries on the child, consisting of linear bruises requiring some four
to six days to heal. The act of the accused, no doubt, constitutes the very
offense penalized by the cited provision.
Commission of a prohibited act having been indubitably shown, no proof of
criminal intent is necessary. For, "from the felonious acts (of the accused),
freely and deliberately executed, the moral and injurious intent arises
conclusively and indisputably, in the absence of evidence to the contrary"
(People v. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52, 53. See also U.S. v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92;
People v. Abando, 2 CA Rep. 205; paragraph [b], section 5 of Rule 13, Rules
of Court; 16 C.J. 81).
In claiming that she merely acted within the limits of her authority in punishing
the child as the latter's teacher and substitute parent, the accused in effect
invokes the defense of having acted in the lawful exercise of a right under
paragraph 5 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.
The "right" or authority claimed by the teacher is that which supposedly flows
from the civil law concept of "substitute parental authority" exercised by
teachers over their pupils. The argument is that since under Article 349 of the
Civil Code, teachers exercise substitute parental authority, and under Article
316, parents have the power to correct their children and punish them
moderately, it follows logically that teachers can likewise punish the pupils
under their charge. And if parents, in the exercise of their authority, can inflict
corporal punishment on their children, so can teachers on their pupils.
The right of parents to chastise their troublesome, mischievous or disobedient
children must be conceded as it is necessary to the government of families,
and to the good order of society. However, this right was not meant to be a
license for manhandling or physically chastising a misbehaving child. At the
same time that the law has created and preserved this right, in its regard for
the safety of the child, it has prescribed bounds beyond which it shall not be
carried (Johnson v. State, 2 Hump Tenn 283; 36 Am. Dec. 332). Thus, Dean
Francisco, commenting on Article 316 of the Civil Code, observes: "It is to be
noted that the law provides for 'moderate' punishment. Since modern
educational system forbids the use of corporal or physical punishment, this
would be a good test in determining the limitation of the power of parents to
correct and punish their children moderately. Parents should never exceed
the limits of prudence and human sentiments in proceeding against their
children" (Francisco, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated and
Commented, 1953 ed., Book One, pp. 846-857; citing 2 Manresa 22-23; 5
Sanchez Roman 1140; Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, November
26, 1901).
This observation is shared by Professors Garcia and Alba, who maintain that:
"The power to correct and to punish children moderately should be
understood as not including corporal or physical punishment, for otherwise it
will be against modern trends in education and a violation of the provision of
the Revised Penal Code. Prudence and moderation should be the rule" (Civil
Code of the Philippines, 1950 ed., Vol. 1, p. 535).
The abiding love which reigns over families, the native respect which children
bear towards their parents, and the moral ascendancy which parents have
over their children, should give parents enough force to maintain the prestige
of their parental authority. Even if these fail, the law affords parents recourse
to the courts under Act 4002. Under said law, minor children guilty of
disrespect or disobedience may be held criminally liable upon the complaint of
parents. This law is a strong suggestion that parents are not to take the law in
their hands. In our republican set-up, even the government of families is not
beyond the pale of the rule of law.
Indeed sanctions are provided in Article 332 of the Civil Code when parents,
hiding behind the cloak of the parental privilege, "treat their children with
excessive harshness" which is a cause for deprivation or suspension of their
parental authority (see Perez v. Samson, CA, 48 O.G. No. 12, p. 5368). The
procedure therefor is laid down by Rule 99, section 7 of the Rules of Court,
which includes as grounds for such deprivation or suspension when the
parents "unlawfully beat or otherwise habitually maltreat" the child.
Moreover, abusive parents may be proceeded against criminally. It must be
observed that our general law on physical injuries does not exempt parents
(much less teachers) from criminal liability for bodily harm inflicted on children
or pupils as punishment for misconduct. The only concession given to the
parents by law, under Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, is that, in case
of serious physical injuries inflicted in the course of a filial correction, the
circumstance of relationship shall not be considered for the purpose of
imposing the greater penalty. This means that parents shall suffer only the
ordinary penalty provided for assailants who are not related to the offended
party within the specified degrees.
Needless to emphasize, the authority delegated to teachers cannot be greater
than that conferred on parents. Truly, the power exercised by teachers over
pupils is more restrictively, if not more clearly, defined in law. The very chapter
which gives teachers and professors substitute parental authority explicitly
denies them the power to administer corporal punishment, The pertinent
provision of the Civil Code is of the following tenor:
Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil professor and
student, are fixed by government regulations and those of each
school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be
countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best
potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student
(emphasis supplied).
Said admonition is felicitously incorporated in the government regulations
promulgated pursuant to law, namely, the Bureau of Public Schools Service
Manual, the pertinent provision of which reads as follows:
Sec. 150. The use of corporal punishment by teachers
(slapping, jerking, or pushing pupils about), imposing manual
work or degrading tasks as penalty, meting out cruel and
unusual punishments of any nature ... are forbidden (Third
Revision, 1959 ed.).
Under the aforecited rule, the teacher cannot even require the erring pupil to
clean the room or mow the lawn in the campus to discipline him, although
these penalties do not involve physical injury. Neither can the teacher order
the child to stand at the corner of the classroom as it would degrade or
humiliate the child. He cannot even push the pupil about to remind him that
his conduct is reproachable. By what twist of reasoning can we then uphold
the power to apply corporal punishment as a legitimate means of correction?
In the case at bar, the teacher clearly overdid herself. In whipping the child
several times with a bamboo stick, an instrument liable to cause, as in fact it
caused, physical injuries, the accused could not have meant to give
expression to a feeling of nobility. More than inflicting bodily injuries, the
punishment humiliated the child in front of her classmates. In its execution, it
was plainly and simply excessive and brutal. The most that the teacher could
have done under the circumstances was to admonish the child, if she was
certain of her guilt. She could have reported her to her parents and to the
parents of the pupil who was tripped, and in turn, the parents to the injured
child could have reported the tripping incident to the police authorities for the
institution of the proper criminal charges or could have sued the parents of the
erring pupil for civil liability. The teacher pursued none of these available
courses of action. Instead, she chose to take the law in her hands and, in the
process, arrogated unto herself the prerogatives of a prosecutor, judge and
executioner.
From the facts of the case, we therefore cannot find any justification for the
acts of the teacher. The acts committed are not only unauthorized even under
the concept of the substitute parental authority behind which the accused
seeks refuge, but they are precisely the acts teachers are expressly forbidden
to do. The accused acted not to discharge the function of a teacher, but
rather, acted forgetting that she was a teacher.
Parenthetically, the Solicitor General noted that the beating was administered
on "parts of the body which are not vulnerable to any serious injury." But
precisely, the teacher stands accused only of slight physical injuries.
The doctrine enunciated by a division of the Court of Appeals in the 1940
case of People versus Javier (citing the 1908 case of Mansell v. Griffin 1 K.B.
160) that "a teacher in a public elementary school has authority to inflict
corporal punishment on a pupil" (40 OG 18th Supp. 150), has been expressly
revoked by Article 352 of the New Civil Code which took effect on August 30,
1950 and Article 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of Public
Schools aforequoted. Moreover, in the Javier case, the main reason of the
Court of Appeals in acquitting the appellant therein was because the Court of
Appeals
cannot positively conclude that it was appellant's blow that
caused the serious injury. An equally strong probability is that it
was caused by the other boys during their boxing game. As a
matter of fact, the physician who treated Bravo, testifying for the
prosecution, stated that the injuries suffered by Bravo 'must
have been caused by a hard and blunt instrument.' We are
constrained, therefore, to doubt appellant's guilt,
Court of Appeals. It is worthy to note that in said case, despite the fact that the
Court of Appeals found in the Padua case that the appellant was infuriated by
the act of the teacher in slapping her niece, it did not consider said anger of
the appellant as a mitigating circumstance.
It should be stressed that the Javier and Padua cases were decided by the
Court of Appeals, whose opinion on questions of law is not binding on the
Supreme Court.
The authority of the parent under paragraph 2 of Article 316 of the Civil Code
"to correct and punish moderately" an erring child, does not include the
infliction of corporal punishment. Neither does the power "to discipline the
child as may be necessary for the formation of his good character" under
Article 45 of the Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Youth
Welfare Code. Moderate punishment must be short of corporal punishment. If
the law intended to authorize the parent to inflict such moderate corporal
punishment it would have provided so expressly as is done in the statutes of
Michigan and Virginia invoked by the Solicitor General, quoting Time
Magazine (July 12, 1972 issue) and relied on by the majority opinion.
The substitute parental authority granted to the teacher over the pupil, does
not include all the rights comprehended in the patria potestas of the natural
parent over the child. For one thing, certainly the teacher cannot demand
support and inheritance from the pupil in the same manner that the teacher is
not under obligation to support the pupil or to recognize the right of the pupil
to inherit from him or even to educate the child at his own expense.
The third paragraph of paragraph 4 of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code
affirms the liability of the parent for serious physical injuries, and only exempts
the parent from the special aggravating circumstances mentioned in the
second paragraph of said paragraph 4 of Article 263 of the Revise Penal
Code. The parent "who shall inflict physical injuries upon his child by
excessive chastisement," does not incur the graver penalties imposed in the
penultimate paragraph of Article 263 by reason of the special aggravating
circumstances. But such parent remains liable for the penalties imposed in
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of said Article 263 for serious physical injuries.
No such leniency is provided for slight physical injuries and maltreatment
inflicted by the parent on the child under Article 266 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The use of corporal punishment in the halls of learning is condemned.
Flogging, even of the most hardened criminals, has long been abandoned as
a form of punishment in penal institutions. So must it be in schools. Respect
for human personality cannot be instilled in the minds of the children when
teachers choose to defile the human body by whipping it. Beating a child to
make him remember his lesson well is reminiscent of the days when slavery
was fashionable and instruments of torture were symbols of authority. The
inhumane dictum of eras past "Spare the rod and spoil the child" had been
deposed by the compassionate precept expressed in Article 352 of the Civil
Code and Section 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of Public
Schools.
Hence, the conviction should be affirmed.
MUOZ PALMA, J., dissenting:
Petitioner Marcela M. Bagajo seeks a review of a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental convicting her of slight physical injuries and
imposing upon her a fine of Fifty (P50.00) Pesos.
It is not disputed that petitioner, a classroom teacher in a public school,
whipped with a piece of bamboo stick a pupil by the name of Wilma Alcantara
inflicting upon her the following injuries:
1. Linear bruises at the middle half of the dorsal surface of both
legs. It is about four inches in length and centimeter in width.
There are three on the right leg and two on the left leg.
2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at
the lower third of the dorsal surface of the right thigh.
The above lesions, if without complication, may heal in four to
six days. (page 2, Majority Opinion)
Petitioner claims that she is not criminally liable as her act was without any
criminal intent because she was simply trying to discipline her pupil Wilma
who tripped a classmate Benedicta Guirigay causing the latter to stumble and
fall down.
The Majority Opinion following the recommendations of the Solicitor General
sets aside the conviction and acquits petitioner, holding, inter alia:
. . . All that We hold here is that in the peculiar circumstances of
the instant case before Us, there is no indication beyond
reasonable doubt, in the evidence before the trial court, that
petitioner was actuated by a criminal design to inflict the injuries
suffered by complainant as a result of her being whipped by
petitioner. What appears is that petitioner acted as she did in the
belief that as a teacher exercising authority over her pupil
in loco parentis, she was within her rights to punish her
moderately for purposes of discipline. ... (pp. 3-4, Majority
Opinion)
I am constrained to dissent from the majority, briefly for the following reasons:
The act of inflicting physical injuries upon another is a felony, as it is
punishable by law. 1 Every felonious act is in turn presumed to be voluntary
with all three elements present, to wit: freedom, intelligence, intent (dolus) or
fault (culpa). 2Freedom is overcome by evidence of force or
bodily punishment which would leave injuries on the person of the recalcitrant
pupil.
Wherefore, I vote for the affirmance of the decision of the trial court.
taken by Pat. Maranan from his pocket. After Pat. Maranan had
brought out the twenty-peso bill (Exh. E) and the two aluminum
foils (Exhs. B-1 and B-2), he typed something. While Pat.
Maranan was typing, accused Khan asked his wife to call his
brother-in-law Roger de los Santos, who was a patrolman in the
South Sector at Fort Bonifacio. While Pat. Maranan was typing,
Capt. Paile and Pat. Mangila were present. Pat. Basco arrived
about half an hour later and that was the first time that he saw
Pat. Basco. When Pat. Roger de los Santos arrived, he told his
brother-in-law that the two aluminum foils and the P 20-bill were
not really recovered from him. Pat. de los Santos talked to Pat.
Maranan, telling him 'Pare, I think it was not right that you do
that to my brother-in-law since those things were not really
recovered from him.' Pat. Maranan told Pat. de los Santos to talk
to Capt. Paile and they talked to each other for about 6-7
minutes. While his brother-in-law was talking to Capt. Paile, a
person unknown to the accused approached, and asked him
how much money he could raise to settle the case. The accused
inquired why money would be asked from him when there was
no truth about the charge. The man moved away from him.
The accused Alejanro Khan denied that he negotiated with Pat.
Basco regarding the purchase by the latter of marijuana which
started at the back of Jose Rizal College, and claimed that he
saw Pat. Basco at it the Makati detachment about half an hour
after their arrival He likewise denied that Pat. Maranan got the
twenty-peso bill (Exh. E) from his wallet together with one gram
of marijuana. He likewise denied title testimony of Capt. Paile to
the effect that he said to the former 'Captain pasensiya na naipit
lang ako kung kaya ako umulit.The accused submitted two
pictures depicting the store of Aling Chit and the basketball court
(Exhs. 1 and 2). The store of Aling Chit where he was drinking
was only five houses away from his residence and the
basketball court was across the store of Aling Chit separated by
railroad tracks. (pp. 18-20, Rollo)
Fortunato Agustin corroborated the testimony of the accused-appellant. He
testified:
xxx xxx xxx
... [T]hat on January 16,1984, at about 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, he, Ali Khan, and Boy Hipolito were in the store of Aling
Chit located at Daang Bakal, Pasig, Metro Manila. They were
drinking soft drinks and eating popcorn. Four persons in civilian
clothes suddenly rushed to them. They were ordered to stand up
and were frisked one by one. After two persons had frisked the
three of them, the four persons left together with the accused
Alejandro Khan. Nothing was found in his person nor in the
person of Boy Hipolito and Alejandro Khan. From the time the
four persons approached them until the time they brought Ali
Khan to the Ford Fierra, two or three minutes elapsed, and
during that period of time there was no conversation between
them and the two persons who frisked them. After the four
persons had left together with Alejandro Khan, Hipolito went to
the house of Ali Khan to inform his parents what happened to
their son. Upon reaching the house of Ali Khan, Hipolito
informed Ali's brother-in-law, Pat. Rogelio de los Santos, about
what happened to Ali Khan. Driving a jeepney, he together with
Pat. de los Santos, his wife, and the wife of Alejandro Khan,
went to the Narcom detachment at Edison Street, Makati, Metro
Manila. His three companion went inside the office of the
Narcom detachment while he remained in the jeep. After one
hour, more or less, his companions came out and they went
home to Mandaluyong. (p. 21, Rollo)
The accused also presented as his witness Pfc. Rogelio de los Santos, his
brother-in-law who testified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
... [Tlhat he and his companions arrived 30 minutes earlier at the
Narcom detachment at Edison St., Makati, when Capt. Paile and
his companions arrived. Pat. de los Santos introduced himself
as a policeman also, and he was advised to go upstairs. Pat.
Maranan who was ahead followed by Capt. Paile knocked at the
door which was opened by Pat. Mangila whom he came to know
because Capt. Paile introduced him to the group. Alejandro
Khan was investigated by Pat. Maranan. The accused Ali Khan
told him that nothing was taken from him and that he had not
done anything wrong. Upon being so informed, he talked to
Capt. Paile who told him that they were conducting an operation
and that it happened that his brother-in-law was in the store and
was taken by the group. He was told by Capt. Paile to talk to
Pat. Maranan and upon doing so, the latter did not answer and
told him to just wait outside. Thereafter, Ali Khan's wife went to
him saying that Pat. Maranan was already placing foils, of which
he did not know if they contained marijuana and the twenty-peso
bill which they were asking his brother-in-law to sign. He went
inside the investigation room and told Maranan 'Brod, wala
naman kayong nakuha sa tao bakit lalagyan ninyo yan,' Pat.
Maranan told him to talk to Capt. Paile and when he talked to
Capt. Paile, the latter told him to talk to Pat. Maranan, since he
was the investigator. Pat. de los Santos did not do anything
more.
Pfs. de los Santos further declared that he saw Pat. Basco
among the group of Capt. Paile when they arrived at the
Headquarters. Thereafter, he, and his wife and Fortunato
Furthermore, the prosecution witnesses were all law enforces and are,
therefore, presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of
proof to the contrary (People v. Gamayon, 121 SCRA 642; People v. Patog,
144 SCRA 429; People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483; and People v. de
Jesus, supra). The records show that the police officers had previous
knowledge of Ali Khan's activities as a drug pusher and went to Daang Bakal
precisely to apprehend him in the act.
The fact that Pats. Maranan and Mangila did not mention in their testimonies
the negotiation between Pat. Basco and the appellant prior to the actual
transaction of sale of marijuana by the appellant for the P20.00 given by Pat.
Basco does not weaken the prosecution's evidence. Each of the officers was
given a role in the "buy-bust operation." Pat. Basco was designated to
transact with the appellant. Maranan and Mangila were designated to arrest
the appellant during the actual transaction while other members of the team
were sent ahead to conduct surveillance of the area.
The appellant insinuates ill-motive on the part of the police officers who
testified against him. According to him, three years ago there was an incident
involving him and a policeman named Pat. Carlos Villaruel from Mandaluyong
wherein charges and counter-charges were filed before the Police
Commission and the latter told him that he would not stop until he finds him
(the appellant) behind bars. The appellant now contends that Villaruel is a
"compadre" of a member of the raiding team who was responsible in egging
the team to conduct the particular operation against the accused-appellant.
This alleged ill-motive is not credible. Apart from narrating the incident with
Villaruel, the appellant did not present sufficient evidence to substantiate this
charge. In fact, based on his statements in his brief, his knowledge as to the
relationship between Villaruel and one of the police officers who testified
against him is only hearsay. Thus, he states: "This kind of relation is hard to
prove but such an information is gathered from the very mouth of another
member of the Makati Detachment."
The records show that the appellant was guilty as charged. We agree with the
trial court to the effect that:
The Court cannot give credence to the version of the accused.
The prosecution has clearly and satisfactorily proven beyond
per-adventure of doubt that the accused had sold to Pat. Braulio
Basco two foils of dried marijuana leaves at about 7:20 in the
evening of January 16, 1984 at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila. Pat. Braulio Basco, Pat. Reynaldo Maranan and
Enrico Mangila corroborated each other substantially as to how
they entrapped the accused Policarpio Khan. The presumption
of innocence of the accused has been overcome. (p. 22, Rollo)
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
G.R. No. L-13789 June 30, 1960 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. MELECIO
AQUINO, ET AL.
108 Phil 814:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-13789. June 30, 1960.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MELECIO
AQUINO alias DARNA and EUGENIO CORTEZ alias
RAMON, Defendants-Appellants.
Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Solicitor Rafael P.
Caiza for Appellee.
Isidro F. Fojas for appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY DISCREDITED BY TRIAL COURT AS FAR AS
ONE OF THE ACCUSED IS CONCERNED; WEIGHT OF THE SAME
TESTIMONY WITH RESPECT TO THE OTHER ACCUSED. Since the
widow appears to be the star witness of the prosecution whose testimony was
given much weight in pinning liability on appellants, the Supreme Court would
not be consistent and true to logic and fairness if it would now reach a verdict
of conviction against them on the strength of the same testimony which was
discredited by the court insofar as one of their co-accused in the same case is
concerned.
2. ID.; GUILT NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; ACQUITTAL.
Although the witnesses testified that they saw appellants in the group of
huks who on the date of the murder inquired about the whereabouts of the
deceased, and heard shots coming from the direction where the deceased
was taken by the huks, since there is nothing in their testimony that would in
the least indicate that they actually took part in killing or inflicting the fatal
wounds upon the deceased, they should be acquitted.
It also appears that at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of the day of the
occurrence, certain huk elements in Calaca, Batangas, separated into two
groups. One group headed by Mangubat was composed of Rudy, Rogelio,
Marcelo, Filomeno Casal and others, while the other headed by Silva was
composed of Malaya, Kidlat, Eugenio Cortez, Melecio Aquino and Danilo. The
Mangubat group went to barrio Coral while the Silva group went southwest
towards the direction of barrio Pantay. The Mangubat group asked food from
the people of Coral for their supper and while they were eating at about 7:00
oclock in the evening they heard several gunshot from barrio Pantay which
made them entertain the fear that some of their companions had an encounter
with the authorities. The Silva group later arrived in Coral thus joining the
Mangubat group.
At about 9:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, Filomeno Casal heard
Silva and Mangubat talk about the killing of Juan Mendoza. Silva told
Mangubat that he ordered Mendoza to lie down and when the latter refused
he shot him. He left a letter beside the body of Mendoza. Casal also heard
that Mendoza was killed because he reported the huks to the authorities as a
result of which the latter were able to surprise the group of Silva.
An autopsy on the body of Juan Mendoza was made by Dr. Antonio E. Platon,
President of the 8th Sanitary Division, Lemery, Batangas, who found several
fatal wounds which caused his instant death.
Appellants defense is alibi. Melecio Aquino testified that in the evening of July
25, 1953, he left barrio Payapa, Lemery, Batangas, with Primo Matienzo and
Modesto Mercado to bring money to a certain old man in Mt. Banahaw. They
arrived there on August 10, 1953. After giving the money to the old man, he
and his companions on August 16, 1953 left for Batangas.
Eugenio Cortez declared that the whole day of August 13, 1953 he was in the
farm owned by Pedro Palacio in barrio Dao, Balayan, Batangas; that said
farm is about one-third of a kilometer distant from his house in the same
barrio; that at about 6:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, he returned
to his home where he rested and conversed with Mariano Besas and Carlito
de Suyo until 9:00 oclock at night; and that he slept afterwards and woke up
at 6:00 oclock in the morning of the following day.
We note that the information filed in this case accuses six men as the ones
who plotted the killing of the deceased Juan Mendoza, among them, besides
the two appellants, were Engracio Barquio and Nicanor Miranda alias Danilo,
but apparently separate trials were held as to them. Barquio was acquitted in
Criminal Case No. 182 in a decision rendered on February 23, 1956, while
Miranda was also provisionally acquitted on the ground that the principal
witnesses for the prosecution were not able to identify the said accused. In
reaching a verdict of acquittal in the case against Barquio, the trial court failed
to give credence to the testimony of the widow, Rita Endaya, who was the star
witness for the prosecution, observation:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The identification made before the Court by the prosecution witnesses of the
accused as one of the six armed men who took and killed Juan Mendoza on
August 31, 1953, is put into serious doubt by certain established facts of
record. It appears herein that on August 15, 1953 or two days after the
incident, Rita Endaya executed a sworn statement before the Municipal Mayor
of Calaca, Batangas (Exhibit 3). In said affidavit Rita Endaya, in answer to a
question whether there was anyone among the persons who entered her
house whom she knew, declared, Wala po (Nobody) (Exhibit 3-A). When
asked if before the shooting she had noticed armed men in the vicinity of her
house, she again replied, Wala po (Nobody) (Exhibit 3-B). Further, she
stated that the two persons who went up her house were dressed in fatigue
uniforms (Exhibit 3-d). All of these statements materially contradicted her
subsequent narration that she recognized the accused to be one of the
persons who went up her house, and that she saw the six armed men who
approached her and asked for her husband before the shooting, and that
Engracio Barquio was then dressed in khaki. It appears strange to the Court
that Rita Endaya would so declare in her affidavit executed two days after the
incident that she did not know anybody among the persons who entered her
house, if it is true that, according to her, she already knew Engracio Barquio
long before the incident because he had been going to her house to ask for
food from her husband and had in fact eaten in her house no less than thirty
times."cralaw virtua1aw library
Since in the instant case the widow appears also to be the star witness of the
prosecution whose testimony was given much weight in pinning liability on
appellants, we wonder whether this Court would be consistent and would be
true to logic and fairness if it would now hold that on the strength of the same
testimony which was discredited by the court insofar as one of the appellants
co-accused in the same case is concerned, would reach a verdict of
conviction against said appellants. Of course, it may be said that when the
widow executed her affidavit on August 15, 1953 (Exhibit 3), two days after
the occurrence, wherein she said that she did not know the men who went to
her house on August 13, 1953, she was afraid that if she would disclose their
names she might be liquidated by them, as in fact she gave that explanation
in open court, but that is no reason for her not to tell the truth because, apart
from the fact that she could ask for protection from the authorities, it was her
duty to help in the apprehension and prosecution of the killers. In fact, the
suspects were only apprehended more than two years after the occurrence.
But who are the other witnesses for the prosecution? One of them is Primo
Alvarez who declared that when he accompanied the six men in looking for
Juan Mendoza he recognized among them appellant Melecio Aquino who was
one of the two who went to the house of Ceferino Manalo and appellant
Eugenio Cortez who was one of those who went to the house of Macario
Manalo. Another witness is Ceferino Manalo who also pointed to Melecio
Aquino as one of those who went near his yard when he was conversing with
Juan Mendoza. Another witness is Maximo Endaya who testified that he
recognized the face of Eugenio Cortez as one of those who approached him
while he was sitting on the stairs of the house of Macario Manalo. It is true
that these witnesses testified that they saw appellants as among those who
belonged to the group of huks who on the date in question inquired about the
Oriel Magno, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the
Philippines, respondents.
Paras, J:
Facts:
10.SECOND DIVISION
JOEY P. MARQUEZ,
Petitioner,
- versus -
THE
SANDIGANBAYAN
5TH
Promulgated:
DIVISION
and
THE
OFFICE OF
January 31, 2011
THE
SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR,
Respondents.
X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
From the records, it appears that as a result of the Report on the Audit
of Selected Transactions and Walis Ting-ting for the City of Paraaque
for the years 1996 to 1998, conducted by the Special Audit Team of the
Commission on Audit (COA), several anomalies were discovered
involving Marquez, then City Mayor and Chairman of the Bids and
Awards committee of Paraaque City; and Ofelia C. Caunan (Caunan),
Head of the General Services Office of said city.
It was found that, through personal canvass and without public bidding,
Marquez and Caunan secured the procurement of several thousand
rounds of bullets of different calibers that were grossly overpriced from
VMY Trading, a company not registered as an arms and ammunitions
dealer with either the Firearms and Explosives Division of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) or the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI).
Before the SB-4th Division, to prove its case, the prosecution presented
five (5) witnesses, namely: 1] COA State Auditor IV Fatima Valera
On January 13, 2006, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence
consisting of Exhibits A to FFFF, and their sub-markings. All of the
evidence offered were admitted by the anti-graft court on March 22,
2006.
Marquez, on the other hand, in his Omnibus Motion dated April 1, 2008,
moved, among others, for the inhibition of Associate Justice Gregory
Ong (Justice Ong) and Associate Justice Jose Hernandez (Justice
Hernandez) and for the referral of the disbursement vouchers,
purchase requests and authorization to the NBI. Associate Justice
Hernandez and Associate Justice Ong inhibited themselves but the
request of Marquez that the questioned documents be referred to the
NBI was not acted upon.
In the subject February 11, 2009 Resolution, the anti-graft court denied
the motion of Marquez. Citing Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court,[9] it was of the view that while resort to the expert opinion of
handwriting experts would be helpful in the examination of alleged
forged documents, the same was neither mandatory nor indispensable,
since the court can determine forgery from its own independent
examination.
ISSUE
THAT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN 5TH DIVISION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT ISSUED ITS RESOLUTIONS RESPECTIVELY
DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 AND MAY 20, 2009 DENYING
THE PETITIONERS MOTION TO REFER PROSECUTIONS
EVIDENCE FOR EXAMINATION BY THE QUESTIONED
DOCUMENTS SECTION OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION WHICH DENIAL IS IN VIOLATION OF HIS
RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AND HIS TWIN
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION OF LAW.
Those availing of the remedy of certiorari must clearly show that the
trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. By grave abuse of
discretion, it means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. In sum, for the
extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary
or whimsical exercise of power.[10]
While the Constitution does not specify the nature of this opportunity,
by necessary implication, it means that the accused should be allowed
reasonable freedom to present his defense if the courts are to give
form and substance to this guaranty. Should the trial court fail to accord
an accused reasonable opportunity to submit evidence in his defense,
the exercise by the Court of its certiorari jurisdiction is warranted as this
amounts to a denial of due process.
In this case, the defense interposed by the accused Marquez was that
his signatures in the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and
authorizations were forged. It is hornbook rule that as a rule, forgery
cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence[11] and the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging forgery.[12]
At any rate, any finding of the NBI will not be binding on the graft
court. It will still be subject to its scrutiny and evaluation in line with
Section 22 of Rule 132. Nevertheless, Marquez should not be deprived
of his right to present his own defense. How the prosecution, or even
the court, perceives his defense to be is irrelevant. To them, his
defense may seem feeble and his strategy frivolous, but he should be
allowed to adduce evidence of his own choice. The court should not
control how he will defend himself as long as the steps to be taken will
not be in violation of the rules.
requests and authorization to the NBI. Since the latter was not acted
upon, he filed the subject Motion to Refer Prosecutions Evidence for
Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation reiterating his plea, this time with the SB5th Division.
If this case has been delayed, it is because of the denial of the simple
request of Marquez. If it was granted in the first instance, the trial of the
case would have proceeded smoothly and would have been over by
now. If the Court were to deny this petition and Marquez would be
convicted for having failed to prove forgery, he could not be prevented
from crying that he was prevented from presenting evidence in his
defense.
The fact that Marquez did not raise this issue with the COA is
immaterial and irrelevant. His failure or omission to do so may affect
the appreciation and weight of his defense, but it should not bar him
from insisting on it during his turn to adduce evidence.
The fact that the documentary exhibits were already formally offered
and duly admitted by the anti-graft court cannot preclude an
examination of the signatures thereon by the defense. With proper
handling by court personnel, this can easily be accomplished by the
NBI expert examiners.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
11,
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice