HIRD DIVISION

SALVADOR YAPYUCO y G.R. Nos. 120744-46

ENRIQUEZ,
Petitioner,
- versus HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x---------------------------x
MARIO D. REYES, ANDRES S. G.R. No. 122677
REYES and VIRGILIO A.
MANGUERRA,
Petitioners,
- versus HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x--------------------------x
GERVACIO B. CUNANAN, JR. and G.R. No. 122776
ERNESTO PUNO,
Petitioners, Present:
PERALTA, J., Acting Chairperson,*
- versus - BERSAMIN, **
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR., *** and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondents.
June 25, 2012
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to
wanton violence is never justified when their duty could be performed otherwise.
A shoot first, think later disposition occupies no decent place in a civilized society.
Never has homicide or murder been a function of law enforcement. The public
peace is never predicated on the cost of human life.
These are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the June 30, 1995 Decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614 cases for murder, frustrated murder and
multiple counts of attempted murder, respectively. The cases are predicated on a
shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel
Villanueva (Villanueva). Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr.
(Yapyuco) and Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who
were members of the Integrated National Police (INP)[2] stationed at the Sindalan
Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario
Reyes, who were barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively;
Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David,
Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and
Carlos David (David), who were either members of the Civil Home Defense Force
(CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and
Telebastagan. They were all charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and
frustrated murder in three Informations, the inculpatory portions of which read:
Criminal Case No. 16612:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being
then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil
Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually
helping one another, and while responding to information about the
presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance
thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then
and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with deliberate intent to take the life of
Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing
directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S.
Licup and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily

mortal on the different parts of the body, thereby causing the direct and
immediate death of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Criminal Case No. 16613:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being
then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil
Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually
helping one another, and while responding to information about the
presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance
thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then
and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent to kill, attack Eduardo S.
Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican
with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw
jitney ridden by said Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto
G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican, having commenced the commission of
murder directly by overt acts of execution which should produce the
murder by reason of some cause or accident other than their own
spontaneous desistance.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Criminal Case No. 16614:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being
then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil
Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually
helping one another, and while responding to information about the
presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance
thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then
and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent of taking the life of Noel C.
Villanueva, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at
the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C. Villanueva and

inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal and

having performed all the acts which would have produced the crime of
murder, but which did not, by reason of causes independent of the
defendants will, namely, the able and timely medical assistance given to
said Noel C. Villanueva, which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

Hailed to court on April 30, 1991 after having voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities,[6] the accused except Pabalan who died earlier on June 12, 1990,[7] and
Yapyuco who was then allegedly indisposed[8] entered individual pleas of not
guilty.[9] A month later, Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, and at
his arraignment likewise entered a negative plea.[10] In the meantime, Mario Reyes,
Andres Reyes, David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguerra jointly filed a Motion for
Bail relative to Criminal Case No. 16612.[11] Said motion was heard on the
premise, as previously agreed upon by both the prosecution and the defense, that
these cases would be jointly tried and that the evidence adduced at said hearing
would automatically constitute evidence at the trial on the merits.[12] On May 10,
1991, the Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case No. 16612.[13]Yapyuco
likewise applied for bail on May 15, 1991 and the same was also granted on May
21, 1991.[14] Pamintuan died on November 21, 1992,[15] and accordingly, the
charges against him were dismissed.
At the July 4, 1991 pre-trial conference, the remaining accused waived the
pre-trial inquest. [16] Hence, joint trial on the merits ensued and picked up from
where the presentation of evidence left off at the hearing on the bail applications.
The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva,
Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as
guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company
decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious procession had
passed. As they were all inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on
the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and open canals on the
road. With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the back
of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with
headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road, they
met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and
bleeding profusely.[17]

Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim,
allegedly did not see any one on the road flag them down.[18] In open court, Flores
executed a sketch[19] depicting the relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney on the
road, the residence of Salangsang where they had come from and the house
situated on the right side of the road right after the curve where the jeepney had
taken a left turn; he identified said house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron
where the gunmen allegedly took post and opened fire at him and his
companions. He could not tell how many firearms were used. He recounted that
after the shooting, he, unaware that Licup and Villanueva were wounded, jumped
out of the jeepney when he saw from behind them Pamintuan emerging from the
yard of Narons house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced himself
and his companions to be employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead,
Pamintuan reproved them for not stopping when flagged. At this point, he was
distracted when Villanueva cried out and told him to summon Salangsang for help
as he (Villanueva) and Licup were wounded. He dashed back to Salangsangs house
as instructed and, returning to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was also
there, and Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a Sarao jeepney to be
taken to the hospital.[20] This was corroborated by Villanueva who stated that as
soon as the firing had ceased, two armed men, together with Pamintuan,
approached them and transferred him and Licup to another jeepney and taken to
the nearby St. Francis Hospital.[21]
Flores remembered that there were two sudden bursts of gunfire which very
rapidly succeeded each other, and that they were given no warning shot at all
contrary to what the defense would say.[22] He professed that he, together with his
co-passengers, were also aboard the Sarao jeepney on its way to the hospital and
inside it he observed two men, each holding long firearms, seated beside the
driver. He continued that as soon as he and his companions had been dropped off
at the hospital, the driver of the Sarao jeepney immediately drove off together with
his two armed companions.[23] He further narrated that the day after the shooting,
he brought Licup to the Makati Medical Center where the latter expired on April 7,
1988.[24] He claimed that all the accused in the case had not been known to him
prior to the incident, except for Pamintuan whom he identified to be his wifes
uncle and with whom he denied having had any rift nor with the other accused for
that matter, which would have otherwise inspired ill motives. [25] He claimed the
bullet holes on the Tamaraw jeepney were on the passenger side and that there
were no other bullet holes at the back or in any other portion of the vehicle.[26]
Salangsang, also an electrician at the San Miguel Corporation plant,
affirmed the presence of his companions at his residence on the subject date and

time, and corroborated Villanuevas and Flores narration of the events immediately
preceding the shooting. He recounted that after seeing off his guests shortly after
the procession had passed his house and reminding them to proceed carefully on
the pothole-studded roads, he was alarmed when moments later, he heard a volley
of gunfire from a distance which was shortly followed by Flores frantic call for
help. He immediately proceeded to the scene on his bicycle and saw Pamintuan by
the lamppost just outside the gate of Narons house where, inside, he noticed a
congregation of more or less six people whom he could not recognize. [27] At this
point, he witnessed Licup and Villanueva being loaded into another jeepney
occupied by three men who appeared to be in uniform. He then retrieved the keys
of the Tamaraw jeepney from Villanueva and decided to deliver it to his mothers
house, but before driving off, he allegedly caught a glance of Mario Reyes on the
wheel of an owner-type jeepney idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the
same jeepney which he remembered to be that frequently used by Yapyuco in
patrolling the barangay. He claimed he spent the night at his mothers house and in
the morning, a policeman came looking for him with whom, however, he was not
able to talk.[28]
Salangsang observed that the scene of the incident was dark because the
electric post in front of Narons house was strangely not lit when he arrived, and
that none of the neighboring houses was illuminated. He admitted his uncertainty
as to whether it was Yapyucos group or the group of Pamintuan that brought his
injured companions to the hospital, but he could tell with certainty that it was the
Sarao jeepney previously identified by Villanueva and Flores that brought his
injured companions to the hospital.[29]
Daisy Dabor, forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
in Camp Olivas, affirmed that she had previously examined the firearms suspected
to have been used by petitioners in the shooting and found them positive for
gunpowder residue. She could not, however, determine exactly when the firearms
were discharged; neither could she tell how many firearms were discharged that
night nor the relative positions of the gunmen. She admitted having declined to
administer paraffin test on petitioners and on the other accused because the
opportunity therefor came only 72 hours after the incident. She affirmed having
also examined the Tamaraw jeepney and found eleven (11) bullet holes on it, most
of which had punctured the door at the passenger side of the vehicle at oblique and
perpendicular directions. She explained, rather inconclusively, that the bullets that
hit at an angle might have been fired while the jeepney was either at a standstill or
moving forward in a straight line, or gradually making a turn at the curve on the
road.[30]Additionally, Silvestre Lapitan, administrative and supply officer of the

INP-Pampanga Provincial Command tasked with the issuance of firearms and

ammunitions to members of the local police force and CHDF and CVO members,
identified in court the memorandum receipts for the firearms he had issued to
Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Manguerra, Pabalan and Yapyuco.[31]
Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the Makati Medical Center,
examined the injuries of Villanueva and Licup on April 6, 1988. He recovered
multiple metal shrapnel from the occipital region of Villanuevas head as well as
from the posterior aspect of his chest; he noted nothing serious in these wounds in
that the incapacity would last between 10 and 30 days only. He also located a
bullet wound on the front lateral portion of the right thigh, and he theorized that
this wound would be caused by a firearm discharged in front of the victim,
assuming the assailant and the victim were both standing upright on the ground and
the firearm was fired from the level of the assailants waist; but if the victim was
seated, the position of his thigh must be horizontal so that with the shot coming
from his front, the trajectory of the bullet would be upward. He hypothesized that
if the shot would come behind Villanueva, the bullet would enter the thigh of the
seated victim and exit at a lower level.[32]
With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still alive when
examined. On the patient, he noted a lacerated wound at the right temporal region
of the head one consistent with being hit by a hard and blunt object and not a
bullet. He noted three (3) gunshot wounds the locations of which suggested that
Licup was upright when fired upon from the front: one is a through-and-through
wound in the middle lateral aspect of the middle portion of the right leg; another,
through-and-through wound at the middle portion of the right forearm; and third
one, a wound in the abdomen which critically and fatally involved the stomach and
the intestines. He hypothesized that if Licup was seated in the passenger seat as
claimed, his right leg must have been exposed and the assailant must have been in
front of him holding the gun slightly higher than the level of the bullet entry in the
leg. He found that the wound in the abdomen had entered from the left side and
crossed over to and exited at the right, which suggested that the gunman must have
been positioned at Licups left side. He explained that if this wound had been
inflicted ahead of that in the forearm, then the former must have been fired after
Licup had changed his position as a reaction to the first bullet that hit him. He said
that the wound on the leg must have been caused by a bullet fired at the victims
back and hit the jeepney at a downward angle without hitting any hard surface
prior.[33]
Dr. Solis believed that the wound on Licups right forearm must have been
caused by a bullet fired from the front but slightly obliquely to the right of the
victim.Hypothesizing, he held the improbability of Licup being hit on the

abdomen, considering that he might have changed position following the infliction
of the other wounds, unless there was more than one assailant who fired multiple
shots from either side of the Tamaraw jeepney; however, he proceeded to rule out
the possibility of Licup having changed position especially if the gunfire was
delivered very rapidly. He could not tell which of Licups three wounds was first
inflicted, yet it could be that the bullet to the abdomen was delivered ahead of the
others because it would have caused Licup to lean forward and stoop down with
his head lying low and steady.[34]
Finally, Atty. Victor Bartolome, hearing officer at the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) affirmed that the accused police officers Yapyuco,
Cunanan and Puno had been administratively charged with and tried for gross
misconduct as a consequence of the subject shooting incident and that he had in
fact conducted investigations thereon sometime in 1989 and 1990 which
culminated in their dismissal from service.[35] Dolly Porquerio, stenographer at the
NAPOLCOM, testified that at the hearing of the administrative case, Yapyuco
authenticated the report on the shooting incident dated April 5, 1988 which he had
previously prepared at his office. This, according to her, together with the sketch
showing the relative position of the responding law enforcers and the Tamaraw
jeepney at the scene of the incident, had been forwarded to the NAPOLCOM
Central Office for consideration.[36] The Sandiganbayan, in fact, subpoenaed these
documents together with the joint counter-affidavits which had been submitted in
that case by Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno.
Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He
identified himself as the commander of the Sindalan Police Substation in San
Fernando, Pampanga and the superior officer of petitioners Cunanan and Puno and
of the accused Yu whose jurisdiction included Barangays Quebiawan and
Telebastagan. He narrated that in the afternoon of April 5, 1988, he and his men
were investigating a physical injuries case when Yu suddenly received a summon
for police assistance from David, who supposedly was instructed by Pamintuan,
concerning a reported presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. Yapyuco
allegedly called on their main station in San Fernando for reinforcement but at the
time no additional men could be dispatched. Hence, he decided to respond and
instructed his men to put on their uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles with
them.[37]
Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with
Pamintuan who told him that he had earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long
firearms. As if sizing up their collective strength, Pamintuan allegedly intimated

that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes of nearby Del Carmen had also brought
in a number of armed men and that there were likewise Cafgu members convened
at the residence of Naron. Moments later, Pamintuan announced the approach of
his suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the
road at the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make
an inevitable turn. As the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan announced that it
was the target vehicle, so he, with Cunanan and Puno behind him, allegedly
flagged it down and signaled for it to stop. He claimed that instead of stopping, the
jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly inspired him, and his
fellow police officers Cunanan and Puno,[38] to fire warning shots but the jeepney
continued pacing forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and
instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of Narons
house directly at the subject jeepney.[39]
Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and
exclaimed at Pamintuan that they were San Miguel Corporation employees.
Holding their fire, Yapyuco and his men then immediately searched the vehicle but
found no firearms but instead, two injured passengers whom they loaded into his
jeepney and delivered to nearby St. Francis Hospital. From there he and his men
returned to the scene supposedly to investigate and look for the people who fired
directly at the jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney was likewise
gone.[40]
Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay
Quebiawan at the time was in bad shape, as in fact there were several law
enforcement officers in the area who had been ambushed supposedly by rebel
elements,[41] and that he frequently patrolled the barangay on account of reported
sightings of unidentified armed men therein.[42]That night, he said, his group which
responded to the scene were twelve (12) in all, comprised of Cunanan and Puno
from the Sindalan Police Substation, [43] the team composed of Pamintuan and his
men, as well as the team headed by Captain Mario Reyes. He admitted that all of
them, including himself, were armed.[44] He denied that they had committed an
ambuscade because otherwise, all the occupants of the Tamaraw jeepney would
have been killed. [45] He said that the shots which directly hit the passenger door of
the jeepney did not come from him or from his fellow police officers but rather
from Cafgu members assembled in the residence of Naron, inasmuch as said shots
were fired only when the jeepney had gone past the spot on the road where they
were assembled.[46]

Furthermore, Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any

one of the accused after the incident because he was at the time very confused; yet
he did know that his co-accused had already been investigated by the main police
station in San Fernando, but the inquiries did not include himself, Cunanan and
Puno.[47] He admitted an administrative case against him, Cunanan and Puno at the
close of which they had been ordered dismissed from service; yet on appeal, the
decision was reversed and they were exonerated. He likewise alluded to an
investigation independently conducted by their station commander, S/Supt.
Rolando Cinco. [48]
S/Supt Rolando Cinco, then Station Commander of the INP in San
Fernando, Pampanga acknowledged the volatility of the peace and order situation
in his jurisdiction, where members of the police force had fallen victims of
ambuscade by lawless elements. He said that he himself has actually conducted
investigations on the Pamintuan report that rebel elements had been trying to
infiltrate the employment force of San Miguel Corporation plant, and that he has
accordingly conducted clearing operations in sugarcane plantations in the
barangay. He intimated that days prior to the incident, Yapyucos team had already
been alerted of the presence of NPA members in the area. Corroborating Yapyucos
declaration, he confessed having investigated the shooting incident and making a
report on it in which, curiously, was supposedly attached Pamintuans statement
referring to Flores as being married to a resident of Barangay Quebiawan and
found after surveillance to be frequently visited by NPA members. He affirmed
having found that guns were indeed fired that night and that the chief investigator
was able to gather bullet shells from the scene. [49]
Cunanan and Puno did not take the witness stand but adopted the testimony
of Yapyuco as well as the latters documentary evidence.[50] Mario Reyes, Andres
Reyes, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguera, waived their right to present evidence
and submitted their memorandum as told.[51]
The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had acted
in the regular and lawful performance of their duties in the maintenance of peace
and order either as barangay officials and as members of the police and the CHDF,
and hence, could take shelter in the justifying circumstance provided in Article 11
(5) of the Revised Penal Code; or whether they had deliberately ambushed the
victims with the intent of killing them.[52] With the evidence in hand, it found
Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as coprincipals in the separate offense of homicide for the eventual death of Licup
(instead of murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16612) and of attempted
homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva (instead of frustrated murder as

charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted the rest in those cases. It
acquitted all of them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in
respect of Flores, Panlican, De Vera and Calma. The dispositive portion of
the June 30, 1995 Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I.

In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,

Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario
Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio
Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as co-principals in the offense of Homicide, as defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and
crediting all of them with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, without any aggravating circumstance present or
proven, each of said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision correccional, as the minimum, to TWELVE (12)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the
deceased victim Leodevince Licup in the amounts ofP77,000.00 as
actual damages and P600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and
to pay their proportionate shares of the costs of said action.

II.

In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insufficiency of evidence, all the

accused charged in the information, namely, Salvador
Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto
Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Carlos David y Baez, Ruben
Lugtu y Lacson, Moises Lacson y Adona, Renato Yu y Barrera,
Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are
hereby acquitted of the offense of Multiple Attempted Murder
charged therein, with costs de oficio.

III.

In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,

Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario
Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio
Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as co-principals in the offense Attempted Homicide, as
defined and penalized under Article 249, in relation to Article 6,
paragraph 3, both of the Revised Penal Code, and crediting them
with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without
any aggravating circumstance present or proven, each of said
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as the minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the offended party Noel Villanueva in the amount

of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages,

plus P120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their
proportionate share of the costs of said action.
SO ORDERED.[53]

The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to

Villanueva and which brought the eventual death of Licup has been committed by
petitioners herein willfully under the guise of maintaining peace and order; [54] that
the acts performed by them preparatory to the shooting, which ensured the
execution of their evil plan without risk to themselves, demonstrate a clear intent to
kill the occupants of the subject vehicle; that the fact they had by collective action
deliberately and consciously intended to inflict harm and injury and had voluntarily
performed those acts negates their defense of lawful performance of official
duty;[55] that the theory of mistaken belief could not likewise benefit petitioners
because there was supposedly no showing that they had sufficient basis or probable
cause to rely fully on Pamintuans report that the victims were armed NPA
members, and they have not been able by evidence to preclude ulterior motives or
gross inexcusable negligence when they acted as they did;[56] that there was
insufficient or total absence of factual basis to assume that the occupants of the
jeepney were members of the NPA or criminals for that matter; and that the
shooting incident could not have been the product of a well-planned and wellcoordinated police operation but was the result of either a hidden agenda concocted
by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and Pamintuan, or a hasty and amateurish
attempt to gain commendation.[57]
These findings obtain context principally from the open court statements of
prosecution witnesses Villanueva, Flores and Salangsang, particularly on the
circumstances prior to the subject incident. The Sandiganbayan pointed out that the
Tamaraw jeepney would have indeed stopped if it had truly been flagged down as
claimed by Yapyuco especially since as it turned out after the search of the vehicle
they had no firearms with them, and hence, they had nothing to be scared of. [58] It
observed that while Salangsang and Flores had been bona fide residents of
Barangay Quebiawan, then it would be impossible for Pamintuan, barangay
captain no less, not to have known them and the location of their houses which
were not far from the scene of the incident; so much so that the presence of the
victims and of the Tamaraw jeepney in Salangsangs house that evening could not
have possibly escaped his notice. In this regard, it noted that Pamintuans Sworn
Statement dated April 11, 1988 did not sufficiently explain his suspicions as to the
identities of the victims as well as his apparent certainty on the identity and

whereabouts of the subject Tamaraw jeepney. [59] It surmised how the defense,
especially Yapyuco in his testimony, could have failed to explain why a large
group of armed men which allegedly included Cafgu members from neighboring
barangays were assembled at the house of Naron that night, and how petitioners
were able to identify the Tamaraw jeepney to be the target vehicle. From this, it
inferred that petitioners had already known that their suspect vehicle would be
coming from the direction of Salangsangs house such knowledge is supposedly
evident first, in the manner by which they advantageously positioned themselves at
the scene to afford a direct line of fire at the target vehicle, and second, in the fact
that the house of Naron, the neighboring houses and the electric post referred to by
prosecution witnesses were deliberately not lit that night.[60]
The Sandiganbayan also drew information from Flores sketch depicting the
position of the Tamaraw jeepney and the assailants on the road, and concluded that
judging by the bullet holes on the right side of the jeepney and by the declarations
of Dr. Solis respecting the trajectory of the bullets that hit Villanueva and Licup,
the assailants were inside the yard of Narons residence and the shots were fired at
the jeepney while it was slowly moving past them. It also gave weight to the
testimony and the report of Dabor telling that the service firearms of petitioners
had been tested and found to be positive of gunpowder residue, therefore indicating
that they had indeed been discharged.[61]
The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming
circumstantial evidence pointing to the culpability of petitioners: the nature and
location of the bullet holes on the jeepney and the gunshot wounds on the victims,
as well as the trajectory of the bullets that caused such damage and injuries;
particularly, the number, location and trajectory of the bullets that hit the front
passenger side of the jeepney; the strategic placement of the accused on the right
side of the street and inside the front yard of Narons house; the deliberate shutting
off of the lights in the nearby houses and the lamp post; and the positive ballistic
findings on the firearms of petitioners. [62]
This evidentiary resum, according to the Sandiganbayan, not only fortified
petitioners admission that they did discharge their firearms, but also provided a
predicate to its conclusion that petitioners conspired with one another to achieve a
common purpose, design and objective to harm the unarmed and innocent
victims. Thus, since there was no conclusive proof of who among the several
accused had actually fired the gunshots that injured Villanueva and fatally
wounded Licup, the Sandiganbayan imposed collective responsibility on all those
who were shown to have discharged their firearms that night petitioners

herein.[63] Interestingly, it was speculated that the manner by which the accused
collectively and individually acted prior or subsequent to or contemporaneously
with the shooting indicated that they were either drunk or that some, if not all of
them, had a grudge against the employees of San Miguel Corporation; [64] and that
on the basis of the self-serving evidence adduced by the defense, there could
possibly have been a massive cover-up of the incident by Philippine Constabulary
and INP authorities in Pampanga as well as by the NAPOLCOM.[65] It likewise
found very consequential the fact that the other accused had chosen not to take the
witness stand; this, supposedly because it was incumbent upon them to
individually explain their participation in the shooting in view of the weight of the
prosecution evidence, their invocation of the justifying circumstance of lawful
performance of official duty and the declaration of some of them in their affidavits
to the effect that they had been deployed that evening in the front yard of Narons
residence from which the volley of gunfire was discharged as admitted by
Yapyuco himself.[66]
As to the nature of the offenses committed, the Sandiganbayan found that
the qualifying circumstance of treachery has not been proved because first, it was
supposedly not shown how the aggression commenced and how the acts causing
injury to Villanueva and fatally injuring Licup began and developed, and second,
this circumstance must be supported by proof of a deliberate and conscious
adoption of the mode of attack and cannot be drawn from mere suppositions or
from circumstances immediately preceding the aggression. The same finding holds
true for evident premeditation because between the time Yapyuco received the
summons for assistance from Pamintuan through David and the time he and his
men responded at the scene, there was found to be no sufficient time to allow for
the materialization of all the elements of that circumstance.[67]
Finally as to damages, Villanueva had testified that his injury required leave
from work for 60 days which were all charged against his accumulated leave
credits;[68] that he was earning P8,350.00 monthly;[69] and that he had
spent P35,000.00 for the repair of his Tamaraw jeepney.[70] Also, Teodoro Licup
had stated that his family had spentP18,000.00 for the funeral of his
son, P28,000.00 during the wake, P11,000.00 for the funeral plot and P20,000.00
in attorneys fees for the prosecution of these cases.[71] He also submitted a
certification from San Miguel Corporation reflecting the income of his deceased
son.[72] On these bases, the Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners, jointly and
severally, to indemnify (a) Villanueva P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory
damages and P120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate
costs of the action, and (b) the heirs of deceased Licup in the amount

of P77,000.00 as actual damages and P600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages,

plus the proportionate costs of the action.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the present
recourse.
In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayans finding of
conspiracy and labels the same to be conjectural. He points out that the court a
quo has not clearly established that he had by positive acts intended to participate
in any criminal object in common with the other accused, and that his participation
in a supposed common criminal object has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. He believes the finding is belied by Flores and Villanueva, who saw him at
the scene only after the shooting incident when the wounded passengers were
taken to the hospital on his jeepney.[73] He also points out the uncertainty in the
Sandiganbayans declaration that the incident could not have been the product of a
well-planned police operation, but rather was the result of either a hidden agenda
concocted against the victims by the barangay officials involved or an amateurish
attempt on their part to earn commendation. He theorizes that, if it were the latter
alternative, then he could hardly be found guilty of homicide or frustrated
homicide but rather of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated
homicide. [74] He laments that, assuming arguendo that the injuries sustained by the
victims were caused by his warning shots, he must nevertheless be exonerated
because he responded to the scene of the incident as a bona fide member of the
police force and, hence, his presence at the scene of the incident was in line with
the fulfillment of his duty as he was in fact in the lawful performance thereof a fact
which has been affirmed by the NAPOLCOM en banc when it dismissed on appeal
the complaint for gross misconduct against him, Cunanan and Puno. [75] He also
invokes the concept of mistake of fact and attributes to Pamintuan the
responsibility why he, as well as the other accused in these cases, had entertained
the belief that the suspects were armed rebel elements.[76]
In G.R. No. 122677, petitioners Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes
claim that the Sandiganbayan has not proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
and the assailed decision was based on acts the evidence for which has been
adduced at a separate trial but erroneously attributed to them. They explain that
there were two sets of accused, in the case: one, the police officers comprised of
Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno and, two, the barangay officials and CHDFs
comprised of David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and themselves who had waived the
presentation of evidence. They question their conviction of the charges vis-avis the acquittal of David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu who, like them, were barangay

officials and had waived their right to present evidence in their behalf. They
emphasize in this regard that all accused barangay officials and CHDFs did not
participate in the presentation of the evidence by the accused police officers and,
hence, the finding that they too had fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney is hardly
based on an established fact.[77] Also, they believe that the findings of fact by the
Sandiganbayan were based on inadmissible evidence, specifically on evidence
rejected by the court itself and those presented in a separate trial. They label the
assailed decision to be speculative, conjectural and suspicious and, hence,
antithetical to the quantum of evidence required in a criminal
prosecution.[78] Finally, they lament that the finding of conspiracy has no basis in
evidence and that the prosecution has not even shown that they were with the other
accused at the scene of the incident or that they were among those who fired at the
victims, and neither were they identified as among the perpetrators of the crime. [79]
In G.R. No. 122776, Cunanan and Puno likewise dispute the finding of
conspiracy. They claim that judging by the uncertainty in the conclusion of the
Sandiganbayan as to whether the incident was the result of a legitimate police
operation or a careless plot designed by the accused to obtain commendation,
conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. This, because they
believe the prosecution has not, as far as both of them are concerned, shown that
they had ever been part of such malicious design to commit an ambuscade as that
alluded to in the assailed decision. They advance that as police officers, they
merely followed orders from their commander, Yapyuco, but were not privy to the
conversation among the latter, David and Pamintuan, moments before the
shooting. They posit they could hardly be assumed to have had community of
criminal design with the rest of the accused.[80] They affirm Yapyucos statement
that they fired warning shots at the subject jeepney,[81] but only after it had passed
the place where they were posted and only after it failed to stop when flagged
down as it then became apparent that it was going to speed away as supposedly
shown by bullet holes on the chassis and not on the rear portion of the
jeepney. They also harp on the absence of proof of ill motives that would have
otherwise urged them to commit the crimes charged, especially since none of the
victims had been personally or even remotely known to either of them. That they
were not intending to commit a crime is, they believe, shown by the fact that they
did not directly aim their rifles at the passengers of the jeepney and that in fact,
they immediately held their fire when Flores identified themselves as employees of
San Miguel Corporation. They conceded that if killing was their intent, then they
could have easily fired at the victims directly.[82]

Commenting on these petitions, the Office of the Special Prosecutor stands

by the finding of conspiracy as established by the fact that all accused, some of
them armed, had assembled themselves and awaited the suspect vehicle as though
having previously known that it would be coming from Salangsangs residence. It
posits that the manner by which the jeepney was fired upon demonstrates a
community of purpose and design to commit the crimes charged.[83] It believes that
criminal intent is discernible from the posts the accused had chosen to take on the
road that would give them a direct line of fire at the target as shown by the
trajectories of the bullets that hit the Tamaraw jeepney.[84] This intent was
supposedly realized when after the volley of gunfire, both Flores and Licup were
wounded and the latter died as a supervening consequence.[85] It refutes the
invocation of lawful performance of duty, mainly because there was no factual
basis to support the belief of the accused that the occupants were members of the
NPA, as indeed they have not shown that they had previously verified the
whereabouts of the suspect vehicle. But while it recognizes that the accused had
merely responded to the call of duty when summoned by Pamintuan through
David, it is convinced that they had exceeded the performance thereof when they
fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney occupied, as it turned out, by innocent individuals
instead.[86]
As to the contention of Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes and Manguerra that the
evidence adduced before the Sandiganbayan as well the findings based thereon
should not be binding on them, the OSP explains that said petitioners, together
with Pamintuan, David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu, had previously withdrawn their
motion for separate trial and as directed later on submitted the case for decision as
to them with the filing of their memorandum. It asserts there was no denial of due
process to said petitioners in view of their agreement for the reproduction of the
evidence on the motion for bail at the trial proper as well as by their manifestation
to forego with the presentation of their own evidence.The right to present witnesses
is waivable. Also, where an accused is jointly tried and testifies in court, the
testimony binds the other accused, especially where the latter has failed to register
his objection thereto.[87]
The decision on review apparently is laden with conclusions and inferences
that seem to rest on loose predicates. Yet we have pored over the records of the
case and found that evidence nonetheless exists to support the penultimate finding
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
I.

It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records that petitioners were at

the situs of the incident on the date and time alleged in the Informations. Yapyuco,
in his testimony which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno as well as Manguerra,
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes in their affidavits which had been offered in
evidence by the prosecution,[88] explained that their presence at the scene was in
response to the information relayed by Pamintuan through David that armed rebel
elements on board a vehicle described to be that occupied by the victims were
reportedly spotted in Barangay Quebiawan. It is on the basis of this suspicion that
petitioners now appeal to justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal
Code and under the concept of mistake of fact. Petitioners admit that it was not by
accident or mistake but by deliberation that the shooting transpired when it became
apparent that the suspect vehicle was attempting to flee, yet contention arises as to
whether or not there was intention to harm or even kill the passengers aboard, and
who among them had discharged the bullets that caused the eventual death of
Licup and injured Villanueva.
The first duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify
the criminal.[89] To this end, the prosecution in these cases offered in evidence the
joint counter-affidavit[90] of Andres Reyes and Manguerra; the counteraffidavit[91] of Mario Reyes; the joint counter-affidavit[92] of Cunanan and Puno;
the counter-affidavit[93]of Yapyuco; and the joint counter-affidavit[94] of Yapyuco,
Cunanan and Puno executed immediately after the incident in question. In brief,
Cunanan and Puno stated therein that [their] team was forced to fire at the said
vehicle when it accelerated after warning shots were fired in air and when it
ignored Yapyucos signal for it to stop;[95] in their earlier affidavit they, together
with Yapyuco, declared that they were constrained x x x to fire directly to (sic) the
said fleeing vehicle.[96] Yapyucos open court declaration, which was adopted by
Cunanan and Puno, is that he twice discharged his firearm: first, to give warning to
the subject jeepney after it allegedly failed to stop when flagged down and second,
at the tires thereof when it came clear that it was trying to escape.[97] He suggested
substantiating the implication in his affidavit that it was the whole team [which
fired] at the fleeing vehicle [98] that the bullets which hit the passenger side of the
ill-fated jeepney could have come only from the CHDFs posted inside the yard of
Naron where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes admitted having taken
post while awaiting the arrival of the suspect vehicle.[99]
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes, relying on their affidavits, declared that it
was only Manguerra from their group who discharged a firearm but only into the
air to give warning shots,[100] and that it was the policemen [who] directly fired
upon the jeepney.[101] Manguerra himself shared this statement.[102] Yet these
accounts do not sit well with the physical evidence found in the bullet holes on the
passenger door of the jeepney which Dabor, in both her report and testimony,

described to have come from bullets sprayed from perpendicular and oblique
directions. This evidence in fact supports Yapyucos claim that he, Cunanan and
Puno did fire directly at the jeepney after it had made a right turn and had already
moved past them such that the line of fire to the passengers thereof would be at an
oblique angle from behind. It also bolsters his claim that, almost simultaneously,
gunshots came bursting after the jeepney has passed the spot where he, Cunanan
and Puno had taken post, and when the vehicle was already right in front of the
yard of Narons house sitting on the right side of the road after the curve and where
Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes were positioned, such that the line of
fire would be direct and perpendicular to it.[103]
While Dabors ballistics findings are open to challenge for being
inconclusive as to who among the accused actually discharged their firearms that
night, her report pertaining to the examination of the ill-fated Tamaraw jeepney
affirms the irreducible fact that the CHDFs posted within the yard of Narons house
had indeed sprayed bullets at the said vehicle. Manguerra, Mario Reyes and
Andres Reyes seek to insulate themselves by arguing that such finding cannot be
applied to them as it is evidence adduced in a separate trial. But as the OSP noted,
they may not evade the effect of their having withdrawn their motion for separate
trial, their agreement to a joint trial of the cases, and the binding effect on them of
the testimony of their co-accused, Yapyuco.[104]
Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is
admissible only against said accused, but is inadmissible against the other
accused. But if the declarant or admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial
admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during the trial and the other accused is
accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, the admission is
admissible against both accused because then, it is transposed into a judicial
admission.[105] It is thus perplexing why, despite the extrajudicial statements of
Cunanan, Puno and Yapyuco, as well as the latters testimony implicating them in
the incident, they still had chosen to waive their right to present evidence when, in
fact, they could have shown detailed proof of their participation or nonparticipation in the offenses charged. We, therefore, reject their claim that they had
been denied due process in this regard, as they opted not to testify and be crossexamined by the prosecution as to the truthfulness in their affidavits and,
accordingly, disprove the inculpatory admissions of their co-accused.
II.
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or
lawful exercise of a right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code
rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the
lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the offense

committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or

the lawful exercise of such right or office.[106] The justification is based on the
complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as
guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed with criminal intent or with fault
or negligence.[107] Where invoked, this ground for non-liability amounts to an
acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury or has committed the
offense charged for which, however, he may not be penalized because the resulting
injury or offense is a necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty or
the lawful exercise of his right or office. Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the
accused relative to the crime charged were indeed lawfully or duly performed; the
burden necessarily shifts on him to prove such hypothesis.
We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code do not obtain in this case.
The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a
legitimate law enforcement operation. No objection is strong enough to defeat the
claim that all of them who were either police and barangay officers or CHDF
members tasked with the maintenance of peace and order were bound to, as they
did, respond to information of a suspected rebel infiltration in the locality. Theirs,
therefore, is the specific duty to identify the occupants of their suspect vehicle and
search for firearms inside it to validate the information they had received; they may
even effect a bloodless arrest should they find cause to believe that their suspects
had just committed, were committing or were bound to commit a crime. While, it
may certainly be argued that rebellion is a continuing offense, it is interesting that
nothing in the evidence suggests that the accused were acting under an official
order to open fire at or kill the suspects under any and all circumstances. Even
more telling is the absence of reference to the victims having launched such
aggression as would threaten the safety of any one of the accused, or having
exhibited such defiance of authority that would have instigated the accused,
particularly those armed, to embark on a violent attack with their firearms in selfdefense. In fact, no material evidence was presented at the trial to show that the
accused were placed in real mortal danger in the presence of the victims, except
maybe their bare suspicion that the suspects were armed and were probably
prepared to conduct hostilities.
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA
members and whether or not they were at the time armed, are immaterial in the
present inquiry inasmuch as they do not stand as accused in the prosecution at
hand. Besides, even assuming that they were as the accused believed them to be,
the actuations of these responding law enforcers must inevitably be ranged against

reasonable expectations that arise in the legitimate course of performance of

policing duties. The rules of engagement, of which every law enforcer must be
thoroughly knowledgeable and for which he must always exercise the highest
caution, do not require that he should immediately draw or fire his weapon if the
person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit without danger should be his
next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged pride. Police
work requires nothing more than the lawful apprehension of suspects, since the
completion of the process pertains to other government officers or agencies.[108]
A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as
is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance,
prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily
harm.[109] United States v. Campo[110] has laid down the rule that in the performance
of his duty, an agent of the authorities is not authorized to use force, except in an
extreme case when he is attacked or is the subject of resistance, and finds no other
means to comply with his duty or cause himself to be respected and obeyed by the
offender. In case injury or death results from the exercise of such force, the same
could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing the death of the offender if the
officer had used necessary force.[111] He is, however, never justified in using
unnecessary force or in treating the offender with wanton violence, or in resorting
to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise.[112] People v.
Ulep[113] teaches that
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only
as a last resort, and under circumstances indicating that the offender
cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe
police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It
may be true that police officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma
when pressured by a situation where an immediate and decisive, but
legal, action is needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment
and discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties must
be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable
limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they
must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and within
the spirit and purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy
law enforcement officers who indiscriminately employ force and
violence upon the persons they are apprehending. They must always bear
in mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against
whom society must be protected, these criminals are also human beings
with human rights.[114]

Thus, in People v. Tabag,[115] where members of the Davao CHDF had

killed four members of a family in their home because of suspicions that they were
NPA members, and the accused sought exoneration by invoking among others the
justifying circumstance in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court in
dismissing the claim and holding them liable for murder said, thus:
In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5
and 6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, for the massacre of the
Magdasals can by no means be considered as done in the fulfillment of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of an office or in obedience to an order
issued by a superior for some lawful purpose. Other than suspicion,
there is no evidence that Welbino Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn,
and their children were members of the NPA. And even if they were
members of the NPA, they were entitled to due process of law. On
that fateful night, they were peacefully resting in their humble home
expecting for the dawn of another uncertain day. Clearly, therefore,
nothing justified the sudden and unprovoked attack, at nighttime, on the
Magdasals. The massacre was nothing but a merciless vigilante-style
execution.[116]

Petitioners rationalize their election to aim their fire directly at the jeepney
by claiming that it failed to heed the first round of warning shots as well as the
signal for it to stop and instead tried to flee. While it is possible that the jeepney
had been flagged down but because it was pacing the dark road with its headlights
dimmed missed petitioners signal to stop, and compound to it the admitted fact that
the passengers thereof were drunk from the party they had just been to, [117] still, we
find incomprehensible petitioners quick resolve to use their firearms when in fact
there was at least one other vehicle at the scene the Sarao jeepney owned by
Yapyuco which they could actually have used to pursue their suspects whom they
supposedly perceived to be in flight.
Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the law. Only absolute necessity
justifies the use of force, and it is incumbent on herein petitioners to prove such
necessity. We find, however, that petitioners failed in that respect. Although the
employment of powerful firearms does not necessarily connote unnecessary force,
petitioners in this case do not seem to have been confronted with the rational
necessity to open fire at the moving jeepney occupied by the victims. No
explanation is offered why they, in that instant, were inclined for a violent attack at
their suspects except perhaps their over-anxiety or impatience or simply their
careless disposition to take no chances. Clearly, they exceeded the fulfillment of

police duties the moment they actualized such resolve, thereby inflicting Licup
with a mortal bullet wound, causing injury to Villanueva and exposing the rest of
the passengers of the jeepney to grave danger to life and limb all of which could
not have been the necessary consequence of the fulfillment of their duties.
III.
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact
faces certain failure. In the context of criminal law, a mistake of fact is a
misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission
which is the subject of the prosecution.[118] Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact
is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the
crime.[119] It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only
general intent.[120] The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant,[121] and
it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person. [122] A
proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and
reasonable;[123] (b) that it be a matter of fact;[124] and (c) that it negate the
culpability required to commit the crime[125] or the existence of the mental state
which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.[126]
The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found
in United States v. Ah Chong,[127] but in that setting, the principle was treated as a
function of self-defense where the physical circumstances of the case had mentally
manifested to the accused an aggression which it was his instinct to repel. There,
the accused, fearful of bad elements, was woken by the sound of his bedroom door
being broken open and, receiving no response from the intruder after having
demanded identification, believed that a robber had broken in. He threatened to kill
the intruder but at that moment he was struck by a chair which he had placed
against the door and, perceiving that he was under attack, seized a knife and fatally
stabbed the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Charged with homicide,
he was acquitted because of his honest mistake of fact. Finding that the accused
had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court explained:
x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake
in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every
crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have
proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor
from criminal liability, provided always there is no fault or negligence
on his part and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused
must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." x x x

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable

cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing or, in
terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is
founded, if without fault or carelessness he does not believe them he is
legally guiltless of homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life
of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words,
and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite
harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently
sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions
apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is
justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault
or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself
correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be, the law
will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he has
really no occasion for the extreme measure. x x x [128]

Besides, as held in People v. Oanis[129] and Baxinela v. People,[130] the

justification of an act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact,
must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the accused. [131] Thus, Ah
Chong further explained that
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this
jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a
mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from
criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which
would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had
known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act.
To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that
under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always
that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or
bad faith.[132]

IV.
This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated
homicide has been established beyond cavil of doubt. The precept in all criminal
cases is that the prosecution is bound by the invariable requisite of establishing the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the evidence of the accused. The weakness
of the defense of the accused does not relieve the prosecution of its responsibility
of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[133] By reasonable doubt is meant that

doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after

such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. [134] The
overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the
accused, but whether it entertains reasonable doubt as to his guilt.[135]
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable
doubt either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive
evidence.[136] Corpus delicticonsists of two things: first, the criminal act and
second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act. [137] In homicide (by dolo)
as well as in murder cases, the prosecution must prove: (a) the death of the party
alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some
other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide;
and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally
responsible for the act which produced the death. In other words, proof of
homicide or murder requires incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial,
that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice), that is, with intent to
kill. Such evidence may consist in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the
nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words
uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the
victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to
kill is conclusively presumed.[138] In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the
crime is homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal
law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds
the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof. [139] Evidence of intent
to kill is crucial only to a finding of frustrated and attempted homicide, as the same
is an essential element of these offenses, and thus must be proved with the same
degree of certainty as that required of the other elements of said offenses.[140]
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the
prosecution. It is interesting that, in negating the allegation that they had by their
acts intended to kill the occupants of the jeepney, petitioners turn to their coaccused Pamintuan, whose picture depicted in the defense evidence is certainly an
ugly one: petitioners affidavits as well as Yapyucos testimony are replete with
suggestions that it was Pamintuan alone who harbored the motive to ambush the
suspects as it was he who their (petitioners) minds that which they later on
conceded to be a mistaken belief as to the identity of the suspects. Cinco, for one,
stated in court that Pamintuan had once reported to him that Flores, a relative of his
(Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with NPA members and that the San Miguel
Corporation plant where the victims were employed was being penetrated by NPA
members. He also affirmed Yapyucos claim that there had been a number of
ambuscades launched against members of law enforcement in Quebiawan and in

the neighboring areas supposedly by NPA members at around the time of the
incident. But as the Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate that Pamintuan
had died during the pendency of these cases even before his opportunity to testify
in court emerged.[141]
Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill motives evades relevance
and materiality. Motive is generally held to be immaterial inasmuch as it is not an
element of a crime. It gains significance when the commission of a crime is
established by evidence purely circumstantial or otherwise inconclusive.[142] The
question of motive is important in cases where there is doubt as to whether the
defendant is or is not the person who committed the act, but when there is no doubt
that the defendant was the one who caused the death of the deceased, it is not so
important to know the reason for the deed.[143]
In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did
not intend to kill anyone of the victims, admit having willfully discharged their
service firearms; and the manner by which the bullets concentrated on the
passenger side of the jeepney permits no other conclusion than that the shots were
intended for the persons lying along the line of fire. We do not doubt that instances
abound where the discharge of a firearm at another is not in itself sufficient to
sustain a finding of intention to kill, and that there are instances where the
attendant circumstances conclusively establish that the discharge was not in fact
animated by intent to kill. Yet the rule is that in ascertaining the intention with
which a specific act is committed, it is always proper and necessary to look not
merely to the act itself but to all the attendant circumstances so far as they develop
in the evidence.[144]
The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand
rifle and .30 caliber carbine.[145] While the use of these weapons does not always
amount to unnecessary force, they are nevertheless inherently lethal in nature. At
the level the bullets were fired and hit the jeepney, it is not difficult to imagine the
possibility of the passengers thereof being hit and even killed. It must be stressed
that the subject jeepney was fired upon while it was pacing the road and at that
moment, it is not as much too difficult to aim and target the tires thereof as it is to
imagine the peril to which its passengers would be exposed even assuming that the
gunfire was aimed at the tires especially considering that petitioners do not appear
to be mere rookie law enforcers or unskilled neophytes in encounters with lawless
elements in the streets.
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and
the firearms employed, the likelihood of the passenger next to the driver and in fact
even the driver himself of being hit and injured or even killed is great to say the
least, certain to be precise. This, we find to be consistent with the uniform claim of
petitioners that the impulse to fire directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to

them that it was proceeding to evade their authority. And in instances like this,
their natural and logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by firing upon the
tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt. The
evidence we found on the jeepney suggests that petitioners actuations leaned
towards the latter.
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on
Licup who was seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying
the wheel, together with all the consequences arising from their deed. The
circumstances of the shooting breed no other inference than that the firing was
deliberate and not attributable to sheer accident or mere lack of skill. Thus, Cupps
v. State[146] tells that:
This rule that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and
natural consequences of his own acts, is applied even in capital
cases. Because men generally act deliberately and by the
determination of their own will, and not from the impulse of blind
passion, the law presumes that every man always thus acts, until the
contrary appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have killed
another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not of themselves
show that it was not intended, but was accidental, it is presumed
that the death of the deceased was designed by the slayer; and the
burden of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise.

V.
Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with
the deliberate intent of killing Licup and Villanueva, hence we dismiss Yapyucos
alternative claim in G.R. No. 120744 that he and his co-petitioners must be found
guilty merely of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated
homicide. Here is why:
First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal
negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence,
the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being the incident of
another act performed without malice.[147] People v. Guillen[148] and People v.
Nanquil [149] declare that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. And in People v. Castillo,[150] we
held that that there can be no frustrated homicide through reckless negligence

inasmuch as reckless negligence implies lack of intent to kill, and without intent to
kill the crime of frustrated homicide cannot exist.
Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found
by the Sandiganbayan, likewise militates against their claim of reckless
imprudence.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when
two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they
had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is
proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment
of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.
Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished and
unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation
in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose.[151]
Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period
prior to the occurrence. From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time
of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were
united in its execution.[152] The instant case requires no proof of any previous
agreement among petitioners that they were really bent on a violent attack upon
their suspects. While it is far-fetched to conclude that conspiracy arose from the
moment petitioners, or all of the accused for that matter, had converged and
strategically posted themselves at the place appointed by Pamintuan, we
nevertheless find that petitioners had been ignited by the common impulse not to
let their suspect jeepney flee and evade their authority when it suddenly occurred
to them that the vehicle was attempting to escape as it supposedly accelerated
despite the signal for it to stop and submit to them. As aforesaid, at that point,
petitioners were confronted with the convenient yet irrational option to take no
chances by preventing the jeepneys supposed escape even if it meant killing the
driver thereof. It appears that such was their common purpose. And by their
concerted action of almost simultaneously opening fire at the jeepney from the
posts they had deliberately taken around the immediate environment of the
suspects, conveniently affording an opportunity to target the driver, they did

achieve their object as shown by the concentration of bullet entries on the

passenger side of the jeepney at angular and perpendicular trajectories.Indeed,
there is no definitive proof that tells which of all the accused had discharged their
weapons that night and which directly caused the injuries sustained by Villanueva
and fatally wounded Licup, yet we adopt the Sandiganbayans conclusion that since
only herein petitioners were shown to have been in possession of their service
firearms that night and had fired the same, they should be held collectively
responsible for the consequences of the subject law enforcement operation which
had gone terribly wrong.[153]
VI.
The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as coprincipals in the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for
the death of Licup and for the non-fatal injuries sustained by Villanueva, and that
they deserve an acquittal together with the other accused, of the charge of
attempted murder with respect to the unharmed victims.[154] The allegation of
evident premeditation has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt because the
evidence is consistent with the fact that the urge to kill had materialized in the
minds of petitioners as instantaneously as they perceived their suspects to be
attempting flight and evading arrest. The same is true with treachery, inasmuch as
there is no clear and indubitable proof that the mode of attack was consciously and
deliberately adopted by petitioners.
Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished
by reclusion temporal whereas an attempt thereof, under Article 250 in relation to
Article 51, warrants a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed for
principals in a consummated homicide. Petitioners in these cases are entitled to the
ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being no
aggravating circumstance proved and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the Sandiganbayan has properly fixed in Criminal Case No. 16612 the range of the
penalty from six (6) years and one (1) day, but should have denominated the same
as prision mayor, not prision correccional, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal.
However, upon the finding that petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16614 had
committed attempted homicide, a modification of the penalty is in order. The
penalty of attempted homicide is two (2) degrees lower to that of a consummated
homicide, which is prision correccional. Taking into account the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence
to be meted out on petitioners is within the minimum period of prision

correccional, which is six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional, whereas the minimum of the sentence, which
under the Indeterminate Sentence Law must be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed for the offense, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to
six (6) months of arresto mayor.
We likewise modify the award of damages in these cases, in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence, and order herein petitioners, jointly and severally, to
indemnify the heirs of Leodevince Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual
damages and P50,000.00 in moral damages. With respect to Noel Villanueva,
petitioners are likewise bound to pay, jointly and severally, the amount
of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral
damages. The award of exemplary damages should be deleted, there being no
aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crimes.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 27,
1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614, the indeterminate sentence is hereby
modified to Two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as the
maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum.
(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs
of Leodevince Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00
in moral damages, as well as Noel Villanueva, in the amount of P51,700.00 as
actual and compensatory damages, and P20,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5272

March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused himself, because from the very
nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these
facts was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the
weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the
material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place
Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some
40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house
except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch
running along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy
growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a
measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat
insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened
on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying
to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the
noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along
the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and
called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been
placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced
the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into
the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the
defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell
down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing
that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to
bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of which took place in a
house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife
under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had
an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had
left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibaez, servants employed at
officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and
Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and
Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach,
whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a
ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief
was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say
who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound
on the following day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating
circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow
without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx

xxx

xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for
the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as
the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an
intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he
would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means
of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon
to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first
blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the
property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the
part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife
to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as
to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would
constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To
this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always
that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the
law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the
presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal
provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a
crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to
commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240;
Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Ishamvs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met.,
500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal
intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has
been said that since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and
expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor
may be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described
therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats
of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and
offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of
the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an
essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are
those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these
exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference
whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do
harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the
disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which
is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in

its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded
from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful act committed be
different from that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is
a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no
crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word
"crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant,
being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act
which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and
recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1,
p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention there is no crime . . . in order to
affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere
of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made
use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from the operation of the will
and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his
three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary
element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the commission of an act defined
and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial
court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors
therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be
punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall
constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty
of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being subject to the rules
prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those contained
in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider
proper.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its
provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence,
does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and
American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than
intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal
malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation,
"wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in
a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining
crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or
willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward
a particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and
cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily,"
willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that
reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent
must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this
doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In controversies between private
parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal
mind. So that
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without
which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow
that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of
every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed
by
Legal maxims. The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied
to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were
so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In
this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or
ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a
man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind
keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the
innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from
his neighbors does not offend. And
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another to deserve punishment
for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which
the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even
infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost
confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one
of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the law
itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs.
286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption
of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be
administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature
to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer.
Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless the intention of
the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute
will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has
been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil
purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law,
sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise
that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here isIgnorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in
point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded
from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part;
and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1
Den. C., 387; P. vs.Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625;
Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to whether
he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to
him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on
his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing
or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe
them he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately
extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the
doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a
man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is
misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish
him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law,
sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised
as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life,
but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life
and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them
to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the
facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances,
proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a
necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption
established in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design against him, and under that
supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either
manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to
the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand,
and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a
club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the
pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more
criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so
attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded a doctrine which would entirely take
away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to
judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p.
160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the
facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of his wife, without other light
than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person
whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he
turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a
blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and
left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his
identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who
confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness,
demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in selfdefense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of
Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for
the employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty
months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court,
under the following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was
surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without
being able to distinguish with which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire
light in the room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his
existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended
himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he

use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed was the one which he
took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which
naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more
assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not
find from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of
article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point
where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!"
because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of
his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding
the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the
victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be
declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the
circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but
only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed
to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court
acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable
mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness,
etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p.
136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown against his window
at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money,
otherwise his house would be burned" because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of
whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same
spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of
law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in
favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for
the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months ofprision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon
appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at
night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family.
(Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in
the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in
imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they
must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he
was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been
wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or
even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger
which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with
which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according to the merits of the case, the crime of
homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully
(voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without malice or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the
acts committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused
that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who
was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive.
By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused should be sentenced to the penalty of one
year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in article 61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the
heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed from.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47722

July 27, 1943

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibaez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan
and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless
imprudence and were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two months of prison
correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from
this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and
Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men.
Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant,
reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping
containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the
telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of
police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of
the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas'
whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two
groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was
supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks,
and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her
paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour.
Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they
were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her
paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire
scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and
innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when
he asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter
brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber
revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of Irene Requinea.
Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the
house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of
Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and upon opening the curtain
covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about
to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta
then fired at Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after having said, "if you are Balagtas stand
up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he had
exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then
apparently watching and picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only because they are vitiated by a natural urge
to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the
latter was apparently watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that
Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at
Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still
lying on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at
once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene
Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And
this, to a certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson
when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the
latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand,
we believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two
appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony will show not only that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that

it contains all indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination, even misleading questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness
having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the
findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on
sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable
inquiry as to his identity. And the question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to
Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties, both of them
believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them
guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the case, the
crime committed by appellants is murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488.
The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong
case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but
received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill
you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and believing that he was then being
attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of
innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of
mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real,
that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these
instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or
opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they
then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited,
found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had
ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable
effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of
action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and
to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender,
overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil,
738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when
the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or
unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary
for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force
or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious
criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for
killing him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is
the principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety
already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places
his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life
of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and
vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an
innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man,
condemnation not condonation should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence,
the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara,
55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni
intencion alguna de daar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la
intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7).
And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence
(People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of
the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance ofalevosia. There is, however, a
mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code.
According to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the
due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present
appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary
consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him
and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment
of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous
inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by
law shall, in such case, be imposed.

For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance above
mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years
of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity
of P2,000, with costs.
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., dissenting:
Anselmo Balagtas, a life termer and notorious criminal, managed to escape and flee form Manila to the provinces. Receiving information to
the effect that he was staying with one Irene in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, the office of the Constabulary in Manila ordered the Provincial
Inspector in Cabanatuan by telegram dispatched on December 25, 1938, to get Balagtas "dead or alive". Among those assigned to the task
of carrying out the said order, were Antonio Z. Oanis, chief of police of Cabanatuan, and Alberto Galanta, a Constabulary corporal, to whom
the telegram received by the Provincial Inspector and a newspaper picture of Balagtas were shown. Oanis, Galanta and a Constabulary
private, after being told by the Provincial Inspector to gather information about Balagtas, "to arrest him and, if overpowered, to follow the
instructions contained in the telegram," proceeded to the place where the house of Irene was located. Upon arriving thereat, Oanis
approached Brigida Mallari, who was then gathering banana stalks in the yard, and inquired for the room of Irene. After Mallari had pointed
out the room, she was asked by Oanis to tell where Irene's paramour, Balagtas, was, whereupon Mallari answered that he was sleeping with
Irene. Upon reaching the room indicated, Oanis and Galanta, after the former had shouted "Stand up, if you are Balagtas," started shooting
the man who was found by them lying down beside a woman. The man was thereby killed, but Balagtas was still alive, for it turned out that
the person shot by Oanis and Galanta was one Serapio Tecson.
Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with having committed murder. The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, however,
convicted them only of homicide through reckless imprudence and sentenced them each to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from 1 year
and 6 months to 2 years and 2 months of prision correctional, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Serapio Tecson in the amount of
P1,000, and to pay the costs. Oanis and Galanta have appealed.
In accomplishing the acts with which the appellants were charged, they undoubtedly followed the order issued by the Constabulary
authorities in Manila requiring the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan to get Balagtas dead or alive, in the honest belief that Serapio Tecson
was Anselmo Balagtas. As the latter became a fugitive criminal, with revolvers in his possession and a record that made him extremely
dangerous and a public terror, the Constabulary authorities were justified in ordering his arrest, whether dead or alive. In view of said order
and the danger faced by the appellants in carrying it out, they cannot be said to have acted feloniously in shooting the person honestly
believed by them to be the wanted man. Conscious of the fact that Balagtas would rather kill than be captured, the appellants did not want to
take chances and should not be penalized for such prudence. On the contrary, they should be commended for their bravery and courage
bordering on recklessness because, without knowing or ascertaining whether the wanted man was in fact asleep in his room, they proceeded
thereto without hesitation and thereby exposed their lives to danger.
The Solicitor-General, however, contends that the appellants were authorized to use their revolvers only after being overpowered by
Balagtas. In the first place, the alleged instruction by the Provincial Inspector to that effect, was in violation of the express order given by the
Constabulary authorities in Manila and which was shown to the appellants. In the second place, it would indeed be suicidal for the appellants
or, for that matter, any agent of the authority to have waited until they have been overpowered before trying to put our such a character as
Balagtas. In the third place, it is immaterial whether or not the instruction given by the Provincial Inspector was legitimate and proper,
because the facts exist that the appellants acted in conformity with the express order of superior Constabulary authorities, the legality or
propriety of which is not herein questioned.
The theory of the prosecution has acquired some plausibility, though quite psychological or sentimental, in view only of the fact that it was not
Balagtas who was actually killed, but an "innocent man . . . while he was deeply asleep." Anybody's heart will be profoundly grieved by the
trade, but in time will be consoled by the realization that the life of Serapio Tecson was not vainly sacrificed, for the incident will always serve
as a loud warning to any one desiring to follow in the footsteps of Anselmo Balagtas that in due time the duly constituted authorities will, upon
proper order, enforce the summary forfeiture of his life.
In my opinion, therefore, the appellants are not criminally liable if the person killed by them was in fact Anselmo Balagtas for the reason that
they did so in the fulfillment of their duty and in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose (Revised Penal Code,
art. 11, pars. 5 and 6). They also cannot be held criminally liable even if the person killed by them was not Anselmo Balagtas, but Serapio
Tecson, because they did so under an honest mistake of fact not due to negligence or bad faith. (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488).
It is true that, under article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended; but said article is clearly inapplicable since the killing of the person who was believed to be
Balagtas was, as already stated, not wrongful or felonious.
The case of U.S. vs. Mendieta (34 Phil., 242), cited by the Solicitor-General, is not in point, inasmuch as the defendant therein, who intended
to injure Hilario Lauigan with whom he had a quarrel, but killed another by mistake, would not be exempted from criminal liability if he actually

injured or killed Hilario Lauigan, there being a malicious design on his part. The other case involved by the prosecution is U.S. vs. Donoso (3
Phil., 234). This is also not in point, as it appears that the defendants therein killed one Pedro Almasan after he had already surrendered and
allowed himself to be bound and that the said defendants did not have lawful instructions from superior authorities to capture Almasan dead
or alive.
The appealed judgment should therefore be reversed and the appellants, Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, acquitted, with costs de
oficio.

HONTIVEROS, J., dissenting:

According to the opinion of the majority, it is proper to follow the rule that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm without regard to his
life which he has, by his conduct, already forfeited," whenever said criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in
danger of imminent attack. Precisely, the situation which confronted the accused-appellants Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta in the
afternoon of December 24, 1938, was very similar to this. It must be remembered that both officers received instructions to get Balagtas
"dead or alive" and according to the attitude of not only the said appellants but also of Capt. Monsod, constabulary provincial inspector of
Nueva Ecija, it may be assumed that said instructions gave more emphasis to the first part; namely, to take him dead. It appears in the
record that after the shooting, and having been informed of the case, Capt. Monsod stated that Oanis and Galanta might be decorated for
what they had done. That was when all parties concerned honestly believed that the dead person was Balagtas himself, a dangerous
criminal who had escaped from his guards and was supposedly armed with a .45 caliber pistol Brigida Mallari, the person whom the
appellants met upon arriving at the house of Irene Requinea, supposed mistress of Balagtas, informed them that said Balagtas was upstairs.
Appellants found there asleep a man closely resembling the wanted criminal. Oanis said: If you are Balagtas stand up," But the supposed
criminal showed his intention to attack the appellants, a conduct easily explained by the fact that he should have felt offended by the intrusion
of persons in the room where he was peacefully lying down with his mistress. In such predicament, it was nothing but human on the part of
the appellants to employ force and to make use of their weapons in order to repel the imminent attack by a person who, according to their
belief, was Balagtas It was unfortunate, however that an innocent man was actually killed. But taking into consideration the facts of the case,
it is, according to my humble opinion, proper to apply herein the doctrine laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488). In the
instant case we have, as in the case supra, an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness on the part of the
accused, who having no time to make a further inquiry, had no alternative but to take the facts as they appeared to them and act
immediately.
The decision of the majority, in recognition of the special circumstances of this case which favored the accused-appellants, arrives at the
conclusion that an incomplete justifying circumstance may be invoked, and therefore, according to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the
imposable penalty should be one which is lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. This incomplete justifying circumstance
is that defined in Article 11, No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, in favor of "a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office." I believe that the application of this circumstance is not proper. Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code provides as
follows:
Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. A penalty lower by one or two degrees than
that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions
required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided that
the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view
of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.
This provision has been copied almost verbatim from Article 84 of the old Penal Code of the Philippines, and which was also taken from
Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
Judge Guillermo Guevara, one of the members of the Committee created by Administrative Order No. 94 of the Department of Justice for the
drafting of the Revised Penal Code, in commenting on Article 69, said that the justifying circumstances and circumstances exempting from
liability which are the subject matter of this article are the following: self-defense, defense of relatives, defense of strangers, state of
necessity and injury caused by mere accident. Accordingly, justifying circumstance No. 5 of Article 11 dealing with the fulfillment of a duty or
the lawful exercise of a right, calling or office, cannot be placed within its scope.
The eminent treatiser of criminal law Mr. Groizard, in his commentary of Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870 which is the source of
Article 69 of our Code says:
Ni tratandose de la imbecilidad, ni de la locura, ni de la menor edad, ni del que obra violentado por una fuerza inrresistible o
impulsado por miedo insuperable de un mal igual o mayor, o en cumplimiento de un deber, o en el ejercito legitimo de un
derecho, oficio o cargo, o en virtud de obediencia debida, ni del que incurre en alguna omision hallandose impedido por causa
legitima o insuperable, puede tener aplicacion al articulo que comentamos. Y la razon es obvia. En ninguna de estas execiones
hay pluralidad de requisitos. La irrespondabilidad depende de una sola condicion. Hay o no perturbacion de la razon; el autor del
hecho es o no menor de nueve aos; existe o no violencia material o moral irresistible, etc., etc.; tal es lo que respectivamente
hay que examinar y resolver para declarar la culpabilidad o inculpabilidad. Es, por lo tanto, imposible que acontezca lo que el
texto que va al frente de estas lineas rquiere, para que se imponga al autor del hecho la penalidad excepcional que establece;
esto es, que falten algunos requisitos de los que la ley exige para eximir de responsabilidad, y que concurran el mayor numero de
ellos, toda vez que, en los casos referidos, la ley no exige multiples condiciones.

It must be taken into account the fact according to Article 69 a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required by the law to justify the same or exempt
from criminal liability. The word "conditions" should not be confused with the word "requisites". In dealing with justifying circumstance No. 5
Judge Guevara states: "There are two requisites in order that this circumstance may be taken into account: (a) That the offender acted in the
performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) That the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the
performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office." It is evident that these two requisites concur in the present case if we
consider the intimate connection between the order given to the appellant by Capt. Monsod, the showing to them of the telegram from Manila
to get Balagtas who was with a bailarina named Irene, the conduct of said appellants in questioning Brigida Mallari and giving a warning to
the supposed criminal when both found him with Irene, and the statement made by Capt. Monsod after the shooting.
If appellant Oanis is entitled to a reversal of the decision of the court below, there are more reasons in favor of the acquittal of appellant
Galanta. According to the evidence no bullet from the gun fired by this accused ever hit Serapio Tecson. Galanta was armed in the afternoon
of December 24, 1938, with a .45 caliber revolver (Exhibit L). He so testified and was corroborated by the unchallenged testimony of his
superior officer Sgt. Valeriano Serafica. According to this witness, since Galanta was made a corporal of the Constabulary he was given, as
part of his equipment, revolver Exhibit L with a serial No. 37121. This gun had been constantly used by Galanta, and, according to Sgt.
Pedro Marasigan, who accompanied said accused when he took it from his trunk in the barracks on the night of December 24, 1938, upon
order of Captain Monsod, it was the same revolver which was given to the witness with five .45 caliber bullets and one empty shell. Fourteen
unused bullets were also taken from Galanta by Sergeant Serafica, thus completing his regular equipment of twenty bullets which he had on
the morning of December 24, 1938, when Sergeant Serafica made the usual inspection of the firearms in the possession of the noncommissioned officers and privates of the constabulary post at Cabanatuan. Galanta stated that he had fired only one shot and missed. This
testimony is corroborated by that of a ballistic expert who testified that bullets exhibits F and O, the first being extracted from the head of
the deceased, causing wound No. 3 of autopsy report Exhibit C and the second found at the place of the shooting, had not been fired from
revolver Exhibit L nor from any other revolver of the constabulary station in Cabanatuan. It was impossible for the accused Galanta to have
substituted his revolver because when Exhibit L was taken from him nobody in the barracks doubted that the deceased was none other than
Balagtas. Moreover, Exhibit L was not out of order and therefore there was no reason why Galanta should carry along another gun,
according to the natural course of things. On the other hand, aside from wound No. 3 as above stated, no other wound may be said to have
been caused by a .45 caliber revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been caused by a .45
caliber revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been caused by a .45 caliber bullet, but
inasmuch as the diameter of the wound's entrance was only 8 mm., the caliber should be .32 and not .45, because according to the medicolegal expert who testified in this case, a bullet of a .45 caliber will produce a wound entrance with either 11 mm. or 12 mm. diameter. All other
wounds found by the surgeon who performed the autopsy appeared to have been caused by bullets of a lesser caliber. In consequence, it
can be stated that no bullet fired by Galanta did ever hit or kill Serapio Tecson and therefore there is no reason why he should be declared
criminally responsible for said death.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 424

January 27, 1902

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,

vs.
MARCOSA PEALOSA and ENRIQUE RODRIGUEZ, defendants-appellants.
Francisco Rodriguez, for appellants.
Alfredo Chicote, for private prosecutor.
WILLARD, J.:
Article 475 of the prevailing Penal Code provides as follows:
Any minor who shall contract marriage without the consent of his or her parents or of the persons who for such purpose stand in
their stead shall be punished with prision correccional in its minimum and medium degrees.
The accused were convicted in the lower court for the violation of this article, it appearing from the evidence adduced that the accused,
Marcosa Pealosa, was not 21 years of age on the 3rd day of May, 1901, when she married the codefendant, and that she contracted the
marriage without the consent of her father.
Should the judgment appealed from be affirmed if the woman was in fact less than 21 years of age, without taking into consideration what
was her belief concerning her age? Many instances can be called to mind in which there may exist an error in good faith concerning this
point. A man who is about to marry and is ignorant of his exact age seeks and obtains a certified copy of the registry of his baptism. From
this it appears that he was born twenty-one years before the 1st day of June, let us say. He marries on the 15th day of June. It develops later
that the person who took the copy of the registry of baptism read July as June, and as a matter of fact the man in question did not complete
his twenty-one years until the 1st day of July, fifteen days after his marriage. Can such a one be convicted of a violation of article 475? It
would seem that this case is included within those of the article. He was in fact a minor when he married, and he married without the consent
of his parents. It is true that so far as the parent is concerned the offense has been committed, but can the same be said with reference to
the State in the absence of a voluntary violation of the law? Article 1 of the Code does not contain the word "with malice" that are to be found
in the Code of 1822; nevertheless Pacheco, the eminent commentator, has said that those words are included in the word "voluntary" (El
Codigo Penal Concordado y Comentado, Vol. I, folio 74, third edition); and he states positively that crime can not exist without intent.
Other commentators, without being in entire conformity with Pacheco, nevertheless are agreed up to a certain point. Groizard says: "Such is
the general rule; so it is ordinarily." (Codigo Penal de 1870, Vol. I, folio 37.) Viada says that "in the majority of cases, in the absence of intent
there has been no crime; but that there can exist in some cases the latter without the former." (Vol. I, Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870, folio
16.) Silvela says: "In effect if suffices to remember the first article, which states that where there is no intent there is no crime, ... in order to
assert without fear or mistake that in our Code the substance of a crime does not exist if there is not a deed, an act which falls within the
sphere of ethics, if there is not a moral wrong." (Vol. 2, Derecho Penal, folio 169.)
The theory that the absence of the words "with malice" in the prevailing Code has this effect is supported by the provisions of article 568
which says: "He who by reckless negligence commits an act which would constitute a grave crime if malice were present shall be punished,"
etc.
The Supreme Court in several successive sentences has followed the same doctrine: "It is indispensable that this (action) in order to
constitute a crime should carry with it all the malice which the volition and intention to cause the evil which may be the object of the said
crime suppose. (Judgment of May 31, 1882.)
In a cause for falsity the facts involved were that the defendant had married "before the municipal judge of the pueblo of Rubete without other
ceremony than the simple manifestation and expression of his wishes and those of the woman Leonor with whom he married before said
municipal judge; that relying upon that, on account of his ignorance and lack of instruction, on the 27th of June, 1882, and the 5th of April,
1884, in the municipal court of the pueblo of Polopos he registered as legitimate children his sons, Jose and Emilio the offspring of the illicit
union of the defendant and Leonor Gonzalez." For the crime of falsity committed by reckless negligence the Criminal Audiencia of Albunol
condemned the said defendant to the penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor. The Supreme Court annulled said sentence
"considering that whatever might be the civil effects of the registration of his three sons entered by the accused in the Civil and Parochial
Registers, it can not partake of the nature of a crime for lack of the necessary element of volition or intent to offend, essential to every
punishable act or omission; neither did he act with negligence." (Judgment of March 16, 1892.)
In a cause prosecuted against the Chinese Sy-Ticco and against Don Guillermo Partier, in the court of Quiapo, for falsification of trademarks, the Criminal Chamber of the Audiencia of Manila condemned the Chinaman to two years and some months of presidio
correccional, and Partier to one year and some months of similar imprisonment. A writ of error was sued out in the name of Partier. The
Supreme Court annulled this sentence, "considering that the moral element of the crime, or, in other words, existence or nonexistence of

intent and malice in the commission of an act designated and punished by the law as criminal is essentially a question of fact for the
exclusive judgment and determination of the trial court."
Considering that the act charged against the accused, Guillermo Partier, of having printed in his lithographic establishment the
trade-mark of the cigarette packages of the Insular factory by virtue of a supposed order of the owner of said factory, to whose
injury the Chinaman Abelardo Zacarias Sy-Ticco ordered him to do the said fraudulent printing, can not be considered (from the
facts declared proved in the final sentence of acquittal of the Court of First Instance, accepted in its entirety and without any
addition by the Appellate Court) as constituting intentional participation or cooperation in deed of falsification and defraudation
committed by the former, since it does not appear in any part of the sentence that Partier was in connivance with Sy-Ticco nor that
he had any reason to suspect the true character of him who, styling himself the representative of Seor Santa Marina, the owner
of the La Insular factory, gave him the order to print the trade-mark of this factory on the packages, which were to be used to hold
cigarettes. (Judgment of December 30, 1896.)
The judgment of October 4, 1893, is of the same tenor. It is not necessary to hold in this action that no crime mentioned in the Code can exist
without intent. It suffices for the present to decide, as we do decide, that one can not be convicted under article 475 when by reason of a
mistake of fact there does not exist the intention to commit the crime.
It remains for us to apply this principle to the facts of the present case. The defendant has stated that she believed that she was born in
1879; that so her parents had given her to understand ever since her tenderest age; that she had not asked them concerning her age
because her father had given her to so understand since her childhood. Her father was present in the court room as the complaining witness.
If his daughter was deviating from the truth it would have been an easy matter for him to have testified denying the truth of what she had
stated. It is evident that he was interested in the conviction of his daughter, and the fact that the complaining witness did not contradict her
obliges us to accept as true the statements of the witness. Being true, they disclose that she acted under a mistake of fact; that there was no
intention on her part to commit the crime provided for and punished the article 475.
As for the husband, it has been proved that two days before the marriage was celebrated he received a letter from the woman in which she
said that she was 21 years of age. This letter the defendant showed to the clergyman who married them. The woman when the marriage
ceremony was performed took an oath before the clergyman, in the presence of her husband, that she was 21 years of age. The defendant
testifies that he had no suspicion that the woman was a minor. This statement has not been contradicted and we consider that it suffices to
demonstrate that the defendant acted under a mistake of fact, and in conformity with the principle laid down in this opinion he has not been
guilty of a violation of article 475 in connection with article 13, No. 3, nor in any other manner.
The conviction of the defendants in accordance with article 568, together with article 29 of General Orders, No. 58, has not been prayed for,
and even if it had been we do not consider the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction in accordance with this article. Her husband has the
right to accept the sworn statement of the woman. The only person whom she could ask for information was her father, and he had told her
age repeatedly.
For the reasons above set forth the sentence of the lower court is reversed with reference to both defendants, acquitting them freely with
costs of suit de oficio.
It is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Torres, and Mapa, JJ., concur

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4445

February 28, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANUEL BERONILLA, FILIPINO VELASCO, POLICARPIO PACULDO, and JACINTO ADRIATICO,defendants-appellants.
Agripino A. Brillantes, Valera, Eufemio and Bernardez for appellants.
Prospero C. Sanidad and Claro M. Recto for defendant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jaime R. de los Angeles and Martiniano P. Vivo for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an appeal by accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Abra (Criminal Case No. 70) convicting them of murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal in the evening of April 18, 1945,
in the town of La Paz , Province of Abra.
Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak of war, and continued to serve as Mayor during the Japanese
occupation, until March 10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because of an attempt upon his life by unknown persons. On December 18,
1944, appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold, regimental commander of the 15th
Infantry, Philippine Army, operating as a guerrilla unit in the province of Abra. Simultaneously with his appointment as Military Mayor,
Beronilla received copy of a memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold to all Military Mayors in Northern Luzon, authorizing them "to appoint a
jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason, espionage, or the aiding and abetting (of ) the enemy" (Exhibit 9). He also received
from the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry a list of all puppet government officials of the province of Abra (which included Arsenio Borjal,
puppet mayor of La Paz), with a memorandum instructing all Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints
from people of the municipality for collaboration with the enemy (Exhibit 12-a).
Sometime in March, 1945, while the operations for the liberation of the province of Abra were in progress, Arsenio Borjal returned to La Paz
with his family in order to escape the bombing of Bangued. Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions, placed Borjal under custody and asked the
residents of La Paz to file complaints against him. In no time, charges of espionage, aiding the enemy, and abuse of authority were filed
against Borjal; a 12-man jury was appointed by Beronilla, composed of Jesus Labuguen as chairman, and Benjamin Adriatico, Andres Afos,
Juanito Casal, Santiago Casal, Benjamin Abella, Servillano Afos, Mariano Ajel, Felimon Labuguen, Felix Murphy, Pedro Turqueza, and
Delfin Labuguen as members; while Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda were named prosecutors, Policarpio Paculdo as clerk of the jury, and
Lino Inovermo as counsel for the accused. Later, Atty. Jovito Barreras voluntarily appeared and served as counsel for Borjal. Sgt. Esteban
Cabanos observed the proceedings for several days upon instructions of Headquarters, 15th Infantry. The trial lasted 19 days up to April 10,
1945; the jury found Borjal guilty on all accounts and imposed upon him instruction from his superiors. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records
of the case to the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry for review. Said records were returned by Lt. Col. Arnold to Beronilla on April 18, 1945
with the following instructions:
HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP
In the Field

16 April 1945

Msg. No. 337

Subject: Arsenio Borjal, Charges Against
To: Military Mayor of La Paz, Abra.
1. Returned herewith are the papers on the case of Arsenio Borjal.
2. This is a matter best handled by your government and whatever disposition you make of the case is hereby approved.

(Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
Commanding

Received April 18, 1945, 10:35 a.m.

(Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA

Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra
(Exhibit 8, 8-a)
and on the night of the same day, April 18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal. Jacinto Adriatico acted as executioner and
Antonio Palope as grave digger. Father Luding of the Roman Catholic Church was asked to administer the last confession to the prisoner,
while Father Filipino Velasco of the Aglipayan Church performed the last rites over Borjal's remains. Immediately after the execution,
Beronilla reported the matter to Col. Arnold who in reply to Beronilla's report, sent him the following message:
HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP
In the Field

22 April 1945

Msg. No. 398

Subject: Report and information Re Borjal case
To: Military Mayor Beronilla
1. Received your letter dated 18 April 1945, subject, above.
2. My request that you withhold action in this case was only dictated because of a query from Higher Headquarters regarding
same. Actually, I believe there was no doubt as to the treasonable acts of the accused Arsenio Borjal and I know that your trial
was absolutely impartial and fair. Consequently, I Can only compliment you for your impartial independent way of handling the
whole case.

(Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
Commanding

Received April 26, 1947 7:00 a.m.

(Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA
Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra
(Exhibit 21, 21-a)
Two years thereafter, Manuel Beronilla as military mayor, Policarpio Paculdo as Clerk of the jury, Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda as
prosecutors, Jesus Labuguen, Delfin Labuguen, Filemon Labuguen, Servillano Afos, Andres Afos, Benjamin Adriatico, Juanito Casel,
Santiago Casel, Mariano Ajel, Felix Murphy, Benjamin Abella, and Pedro Turqueza as members of the jury, Jacinto Adriatico as executioner,
Severo Afos as grave digger, and Father Filipino Velasco as an alleged conspirator, were indicted in the Court of First Instance of Abra for
murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the execution of Arsenio Borjal. Soon thereafter, the late President Manuel A. Roxas
issued Executive Proclamation No. 8, granting amnesty to all persons who committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Defendant Jesus Labuguen, then a master
sergeant in the Philippine Army, applied for and was granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission, Armed Forces of the Philippines
(Records, pp. 618-20). The rest of the defendant filed their application for amnesty with the Second Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, who
denied their application on the ground that the crime had been inspired by purely personal motives, and remanded the case to the Court of
First Instance of Abra for trial on the merits.
Upon motion of defense counsel, the case against defendant Jesus Labuguen, who had been granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was ordered provisionally dismissed: defendant Juan Balmaceda was discharged from the
information so that he might be utilized as state witness, although actually he was not called to testify; while the case against defendants
Antonio Palope (the grave digger) and Demetrio Afos( a boloman) was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.
Trial proceeded against the rest of the defendants; and on July 10, 1950, the Court below rendered judgment, acquitting the members of the
jury and the grave digger Antonio Palope on the ground that they did not participated in the killing of Arsenio Borjal; acquitting defendants
Jesus Labuguen, Felix Alverne, Severo Afos, and Lauro Parado upon insufficiency of evidence to establish their participation in the crime;
but convicting defendants Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico as conspirator and co-principals of
the crime of murder, and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal toreclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Arsenio Borjal jointly and severally in the amount of P4,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and each to pay one fourth of the costs. In convicting said defendants the Court a quo found that while the crime committed by
them fell within the provisions of the Amnesty Proclamation, they were not entitled to the benefits thereof because the crime was committed

after the expiration of the time limit fixed by the amnesty proclamation;: i.e., that the deceased Arsenio Borjal was executed after the
liberation of La Paz, Abra.
In view of the sentence meted by the Court below, the accused Beronilla, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico appealed to this Court.
The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest, prosecution and trial of the late Arsenio Borjal were done pursuant
to express orders of the 15th Infantry Headquarters. (Exhibit 9 and 12-a), instructing all military mayors under its jurisdiction to gather
evidence against puppet officials and to appoint juries of at least 12 bolomen to try the accused and find them guilty by two thirds vote. It is to
be noted that Arsenio Borjal was specifically named in the list of civilian officials to be prosecuted (Exhibit 12-b).
In truth, the prosecution does not seriously dispute that the trial and sentencing of Borjal was done in accordance with instructions of superior
military authorities, altho it point to irregularities that were due more to ignorance of legal processes than personal animosity against Borjal.
The state, however, predicates its case principally on the existence of the radiogram Exhibit H from Col. Volckmann, overall area
commander, to Lt. Col. Arnold, specifically calling attention to the illegality of Borjal's conviction and sentence, and which the prosecution
claims was known to the accused Beronilla. Said message is as follows:
"Message:
VOLCKMANN TO ARNOLD CLN UNDERSTAND THAT MUNICIPALITIES OF ABRA HAVE ORGANIZED JURY SYSTEM PD
BELIEVE THAT THIS BODY IS ILLEGAL AND CANNOT TRY PUNISHMENTS THEREOF PD SPECIFIC INSTANCE IS
BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION FRO PROPER AND IMMEDIATE ACTION ON ONE ARSENIO BORJAL OF LA PAZ WHO
HAS BEEN TRIED CMA CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO BE HANGED PD REPORT ACTION TAKEN BY YOU ON THIS
MATTER PD MSG BEGINS CLN"
(EXH. H)
The crucial question thus becomes whether or not this message, originally sent to Arnold's quarters in San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, was relayed
by the latter to appellant Beronilla in La Paz, Abra, on the morning of April 18, 1945, together with the package of records of Borjal's trial that
was admittedly returned to and received by Beronilla on that date, after review thereof by Arnold (Exhibit 8-8-a). Obviously, if the Volckmann
message was known to Beronilla, his ordering the execution of Borjal on the night of April 18, 1945 can not be justified.
We have carefully examined the evidence on this important issue, and find no satisfactory proof that Beronilla did actually receive the
radiogram Exhibit H or any copy thereof. The accused roundly denied it. The messenger, or "runner", Pedro Molina could not state what
papers were enclosed in the package he delivered to Beronilla on that morning in question, nor could Francisco Bayquen (or Bayken), who
claimed to have been present at the delivery of the message, state the contents thereof.
The only witness who asserted that Beronilla received and read the Volckmann message, Exhibit H, was Rafael Balmaceda, a relative of
Borjal, who claimed to have been, as Beronilla's bodyguard, present at the receipt of the message and to have read it over Beronilla's
shoulder. This testimony, however, can not be accorded credence, for the reason that in the affidavit executed by this witness before Fiscal
Antonio of Abra (Exhibit 4), Balmaceda failed to make any mention of the reading, or even the receipt, of the message. In the affidavit, he
stated:
Q. In your capacity as policeman, do you know of any usual occurrence that transpired in La Paz, Abra? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you state what is the event? A. On April 17, 1945, I was assigned as guard at the Presidencia where Mayor Arsenio
Borjal is confined. On the 18th of April, 1945, six bolomen came to me while I was on duty as guard, that Mayor Borjal should be
tied, on orders of Mayor Beronilla, Mayor Borjal wanted to know the reason why he would be tied, as he had not yet learned of the
decision of the jury against him. Mayor Borjal wrote a note to Mayor Beronilla, asking the reason for his being ordered to be tied. I
personally delivered the note of Borjal to Mayor Beronilla. Mayor Beronilla did not answer the note, but instead told me that I
should tie Mayor Borjal, as tomorrow he would die, as he cannot escape. I returned to the Presidencia, and Mayor Borjal was tied,
as that was the ordered of Mayor Beronilla.
The plain import of the affidavit is that the witness Rafael Balmaceda was not with Beronilla when the message arrived, otherwise Beronilla
would have given him his orders direct, as he (Balmaceda) testified later at the trial. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that having learned of
the contents of the Volckmann message, Balmaceda should not have relayed it to Borjal , or to some member of the latter's family,
considering that they were relatives. In addition to Balmaceda was contradicted by Bayken, another prosecution witness, as to the hatching
of the alleged conspiracy to kill Borjal. Balmaceda claimed that the accused-appellants decided to kill Borjal in the early evening of April 18,
while Bayken testified that the agreement was made about ten o'clock in the morning, shortly after the accused had denied Borjal's petition to
be allowed to hear mass.
Upon the other hand, Beronilla's conduct belies his receipt of the Volckmann message. Had he executed Borjal in violation of superior
orders, he would not have dared to report it to Arnold's headquarters on the very same day, April 18th, 1945, as he did (Exhibit 20), half an
hour after the execution. And what is even more important, if Borjal was executed contrary to instructions, how could Lt. Colonel Arnold on
April 21, 1945, write in reply (Exhibit 21, 21-a) "I can only compliment you for your impartial but independent way of handling the whole case"
instead of berating Beronilla and ordering his court martial for disobedience?

Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that can not now be ascertained, failed to transmit the Volckmann message to
Beronilla. And this being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal must be rejected, because the accused had no need to
conspire against a man who was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death.
The state claims that the appellants held grudges against the late Borjal. Even so, it has been already decided that the concurrence of
personal hatred and collaboration with the enemy as motives for a liquidation does not operate to exclude the case from the benefits of the
Amnesty claimed by appellants, since then "it may not be held that the manslaughter stemmed from purely personal motives" (People vs.

G. R. Nos. L-2011 and 2267, June 30, 1951). Actually, the conduct of
the appellants does not dispose that these appellants were impelled by malice
(dolo). The arrest and trial of Borjal were made upon express orders of the
higher command; the appellants allowed Borjal to be defended by counsel,
one of them (attorney Jovito Barreras) chosen by Borjal's sister; the trial lasted
nineteen (19) days; it was suspended when doubts arose about its legality,
and it was not resumed until headquarters (then in Langangilang, Abra)
authorized its resumption and sent an observer (Esteban Cabanos, of the S-5)
to the proceedings, and whose suggestions on procedure were followed; and
when the verdict of guilty was rendered and death sentence imposed, the
records were sent to Arnold's headquarters for review, and Borjal was not
punished until the records were returned eight days later with the statement of
Arnold that "whatever disposition you make of the case is hereby approved"
(Exhibit 8), which on its face was an assent to the verdict and the sentence.
The lower Court, after finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had really committed
treasonable acts, (causing soldiers and civilians to be tortured, and hidden
American officers to be captured by the Japanese) expressly declared that
"the Court is convinced that it was not for political or personal reason that the
accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal" (Decision, p. 9; Record, p. 727).
Barrioquinto,*

It appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that the accused-appellants acted upon orders, of a superior officers that
they, as military subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or
negligence on their part, we can not say that criminal intent has been established (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507; Peo. vs. Pacana, 47 Phil.,
48; Sent. of the Tribunal Supremo of Spain, 3 July 1886; 7 January 1901; 24 March 1900; 21 Feb. 1921; 25 March 1929). Actus non facit
reum nisi mens si rea.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by
such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequence, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit
reum, nisi mens rea-a crime is not committed if the minds of the person performing the act complained of be innocent. (U. S. vs.
Catolico, 18 Phil., 507).
But even assuming that the accused-appellant did commit crime with they are charged, the Court below should not have denied their claim to
the benefits of the Guerrilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 (42 Off. Gaz., 2072)on the ground that the slaying of Arsenio Borjal took place after
actual liberation of the area from enemy control and occupation. The evidence on record regarding the date of liberation of La Paz, Abra, is
contradictory. The Military Amnesty Commission that decided the case of one of the original accused Jesus Labuguen, held that La Paz,
Abra, was liberated on July 1, 1945, according to its records; and this finding was accepted by Judge Letargo when he dismissed the case
against said accused on March 15, 1949. On the other hand, Judge Bocar and Hilario, who subsequently took cognizance of the case, relied
on Department Order No. 25, of the Department of the Interior, dated August 12, 1948, setting the liberation of the Province of Abra on April
4, 1945, fifteen days before Borjal was slain. The two dates are not strictly contradictory; but given the benefit of the Presidential directive to
the Amnesty Commissions (Adm. Order No. 11, of October 2, 1946) that "any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the
(amnesty) proclamation shall be resolved in favor of the accused" (42 Off. Gaz., 2360), as was done inPeople vs. Gajo, Phil., 107 46 Off.
Gaz., (No. 12) p. 6093.
For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellants are acquitted, with costs de oficio.
Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
*

89 Phil., 414.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24978

March 27, 1926

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FERNANDO DE FERNANDO, defendant-appellant.
W. A. Armstrong for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This appeal has been taken by the defendant Fernando de Fernando from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, in
which he was held guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty years cadena temporal, to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased Buenventura Paulino in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the costs, by virtue of a complaint filed by the fiscal charging with the
said crime.
As a basis for his appeal the accused assigns the following errors as committed by the trial court: (1) in holding that the acts committed by
the accused constituted the crime for murder; (2) in not holding that the accused was exempt from criminal liability and in not acquitting him.
At the trial the following facts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: Before the day of the crime several Moro prisoners had escaped from
the Penal Colony of San Ramon, Zamboanga. The residents of the barrio of Municahan of the municipality of Zamboanga were alarmed by
the presence of three suspicious looking persons who were prowling around the place. The accused Fernando de Fernando who, at that
time, was a municipal policeman, when passing in front of the house of one Remigio Delgado, was called by the latter's daughter Paciencia
Delgado, who stated that her father wished to see him. When the policeman came up the house Remigio Delgado informed him that three
unknown and suspicious looking persons, dressed in blue, prowling around his house. The accused remained in the said house talking with
Paciencia Delgado, both being seated on a bench near the window. While they were thus talking, at about 7 o'clock at night, there appeared
in the dark, at about 4 meters from the stairs, a person dressed in dark clothes, calling "Nong Miong." At the time the accused nor Paciencia
Delgado knew who was thus calling. The accused inquired what he wanted but instead of answering he continued advancing with bolo in
hand. Upon seeing this Fernando de Fernando took out his revolver and fired a shot in the air. As he saw that the unknown continued to
ascend the staircase he fired at him. The unknown disappeared and ran to the house of a neighbor Leon Torres, where, after placing upon a
table the bolos that he carried, he fell on the floor and expired. Remigio Delgado, who was in the kitchen and had recognized the voice of the
unknown, on hearing the shots ran into the parlor, took hold of the arm of the defendant and asked him why he had fired at Buenventura
Paulino. Fernando de Fernando only said "Let me go, that is a cross eyed person" and immediately repaired to the house of the teniente of
the barrio, Santiago Torres, from where he telephoned to the chief of police advising him of what had happened. When the body was
examined it was found that a bullet had penetrated the base of the neck at the right, imbedding itself in the left side under the skin.
The status of the accused on the night in question was that of an agent of the law, to whom notice had been given of the presence of
suspicious looking persons who might be the Moro prisoners who had escaped from the Penal Colony of San Ramon. The appearance of a
man, unknown to him, dressed in clothes similar in color to the prisoner's uniform who was calling the owner of the house, and the silence of
Paciencia Delgado, who did not at the time recognize the man, undoubtedly caused the accused to suspect that the unknown man was one
of the three persons that the owner of the house said were prowling around the place. The suspicion become a reality in his mind when he
saw that the man continued ascending the stairs with a bolo in his hand, not heeding his question as to who he was. In the midst of these
circumstances and believing undoubtedly that he was a wrongdoer he tried to perform his duty and first fired into the air and then at the
alleged intruder. But it happened that what to him appeared to be wrongdoer was the nephew of the owner of the house who was carrying
three bolos tied together. At that psychological moment when the forces of far and the sense of duty were at odds, the accused was not able
to take full account of the true situation and the bundle of bolos seemed to him to be only one bolo in the hands of a suspicious character
who intended to enter the house. There is, however, a circumstance that should have made him suspect that the man was not only a friend
but also a relative of the owner of the house from the fact he called "Nong Miong," which indicated that the owner of the house might be an
older relative of the one calling, or an intimate friend; and in not asking Paciencia Delgado who was it was that was calling her father with
such familiarity, he did not use the ordinary precaution that he should have used before taking such fatal action.
Taking into consideration the estate of mind of the accused at the time, and the meaning that he gave to the attitude of the unknown person,
in shooting the latter he felt that he was performing his duty by defending the owners of the house against an unexpected attack, and such
act cannot constitute the crime of murder, but only that of simple homicide. He cannot be held guilty, however, as principal with malicious
intent, because he though at the time that he was justified in acting as he did, and he is guilty only because he failed to exercise the ordinary
diligence which, under the circumstances, he should have by investigating whether or not the unknown man was really what he though him
to be. In firing the shot, without first exercising reasonable diligence, he acted with reckless negligence.

The crime committed by the caused, therefore, is homicide through reckless negligence defined and punished in article 568, in relation with
article 404, of the Penal Code, the penalty prescribed by law arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correcional in its minimum
degree.
In view of the foregoing and reversing the appealed judgment, the accused is held guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless
negligence, and he is sentenced to suffer one year prision correcional, to pay the amount of P500 to the heirs of the deceased as an
indemnity, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the costs and with credit of one-half of the preventive imprisonment already
suffered. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Street, Malcom, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1477

January 18, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.
Mariano A. Albert for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Francisco A. Carreon for appellee.
PER CURIAM, J.:
This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in case No.
2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple
frustrated murder, as charged in the information, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the of the deceased Simeon Valera
(or Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained in the information.
Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by the honorable Buenaventura
Ocampo who, after the submission of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, rendered judgment as above stated.
In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and before arraignment, counsel de oficio for the accused moved that
the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The court, notwithstanding that it had found out from the answers of the accused to questions
propounded to him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering from any mental derangement, ordered that Julio
Guillen be confined for Hospital, there to be examined by medical experts who should report their findings accordingly. This was done, and,
according to the report of the board of medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen
was not insane. Said report (Exhibit L), under the heading "Formulation and Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14, reads:
FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since admission. There was not a single moment during his whole 24
hours daily, that he was not under observation.
The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated above. The veracity of this motivation was determined in the
Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was successful was checked up the day after the test. The narco-synthesis proved not
only reveal any conflict or complex that may explain a delusional or hallucinatory motive behind the act.
Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio C. Guillen. He was found to be
intelligent, always able to differentiate right from wrong, fully aware of the nature of the crime he committed and is equally decided
to suffer for it in any manner or form.
His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and conversation relative thereto, the motives, temptations and
provocations that preceded the act, were all those of an individual with a sound mind.
On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction and once arriving at a decision he executes, irrespective of
consequences and as in this case, the commission of the act at Plaza Miranda.
What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is his commission of some overt acts. This is seen not only in the
present instance, but sometime when an employee in la Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout Mr. Manzano, a
Span-wanted to abuse the women cigar makers, and felt it his duty to defend them. One time he ran after a policeman with a knife
in hand after being provoked to a fight several times. He even challenged Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime before when
Mr. Nueno was running for a seat in the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, after hearing him deliver one of his apparently
outspoken speeches.
All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a weakness of censorship especially in relation to rationalization about
the consequences of his acts.
In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that Julio C. Guillen is not insane but is an individual with a personality
defect which in Psychiatry is termed, Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority.

Final Diagnosis
Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis.
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and notwithstanding the contrary opinion of one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked by
the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court ruled that Guillen, not being insane, could be tired, as he was tired, for the offenses
he committed on the date in question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel for the accused, the Solicitor General and their respective
memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement between the prosecution and the defense, as to the essential facts which caused the filing
of the present criminal case against this accused. Those facts may be stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affirmed with any particular political group, has voted for the
defeated candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed the office of President of
the Commonwealth and subsequently President of the President of the Philippine Republic. According to Guillen, he became disappointed in
President Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him during the presidential election campaign;
and his disappointment was aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas, instead of looking after the interest of his country,
sponsored and campaigned for the approval of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President Roxas, the opportunity presented itself on the
night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big crowd,
President Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen prominent in government and
politics, stood on a platform erected for that purpose and delivered his speech expounding and trying to convince his thousand of listeners of
the advantages to be gained by the Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting American citizens the same rights granted to
Filipino nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost said firearm, which was duly licensed, he
thought of two hand grenades which were given him by an American soldier in the early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two
bottles of whisky. He had likewise been weighing the chances of killing President Roxas, either by going to Malacaan, or following his
intended victim in the latter's trips to provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon) where the President was scheduled to speak, but
having encountered many difficulties, he decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on the night of
March 10, 1947.
On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez whom he requested to prepare for him a document (Exhibit B), in
accordance with their pervious understanding in the preceding afternoon, when they met at the premises of the Manila Jockey Club on the
occasion of an "anti-parity" meeting held there. On account of its materially in this case, we deem it proper to quote hereunder the contents
of said document. An English translation (Exhibit B-2) from its original Tagalog reads:
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I planned it, and I carried it out all by myself alone. It took me
many days and nights pondering over this act, talking to my own conscience, to my God, until I reached my conclusion. It was my
duty.
I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And had I expected to lives to spare, I would not have hesitated either
ton sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which was the welfare of the people.
Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the loss of their husbands, of their sons, and there are millions now
suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their hopes were frustrated.
I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man to be blamed for all this: he had deceived the people, he had
astounded them with no other purpose than to entice them; he even went to the extent of risking the heritage of our future
generations. For these reasons he should not continue any longer. His life would mean nothing as compared with the welfare of
eighteen million souls. And why should I not give up my life too if only the good of those eighteen million souls.
These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I am willing to bear up the consequences of my act. I t matters not
if others will curse me. Time and history will show, I am sure, that I have only displayed a high degree of patriotism in my
performance of my said act.
Hurrah for a free Philippines.
Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.

May God pity on me.

Amen.

JULIO C. GUILLEN

A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the request of Guillen by his nephew, was handed to him only at about 6
o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which reason said Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned, because he was in a hurry for that meeting
at Plaza de Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a paper bag which also contained peanuts. He
buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot located close to the platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose
he stood on the chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance of about seven meters, he hurled the grenade at the President when
the latter had just closed his speech, was being congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the platform.
General Castaeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and without losing his presence of mind, kicked it away
from the platform, along the stairway, and towards an open space where the general thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm;
and, covering the President with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to the ground and exploded
in the middle of a group of persons who were standing close to the platform. Confusion ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was
found that the fragments of the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) who died on the following day as the result of
mortal wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio
Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two hours after the occurrence. It appears that one Angel Garcia, who was
one spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who was standing next to him hurled an object at the platform and, after the explosion, ran
away towards a barber shop located near the platform at Plaza de Miranda. Suspecting that person was the thrower of the object that
exploded, Garcia went after him and had almost succeeded in holding him, but Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and
managed to escape. Garcia pursued him, but some detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal and the author of the explosion,
placed him under arrest. In the meantime, while the City Mayor and some agents of the Manila Police Department were investigating the
affair, one Manuel Robles volunteered the information that the person with whom Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he
(Manuel Robles) was acquainted with Julio Guillen for the previous ten years and had seen each other in the plaza a few moments previous
to the explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within two hours after the occurrence, found in his home at
1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia, as the same person who hurled towards
the platform the object which exploded and whom Garcia tried to hold when he was running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his responsibility, although at the same time he tried to justify his action
in throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also indicated to his captors the place where he had hidden his so called last will quoted above
and marked Exhibit B, which was then unsigned by him and subsequently signed at the police headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he had buried (Exhibit C-1) the other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in
the presence of witnesses he signed a statement which contained his answers to question propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the
Manila Police, who investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E). From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we are satisfied that it tallies
exactly with the declarations and made by him on the witness stand during the trial of this case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors are assigned allegedly committed by the trial court, namely: first,
"in finding the appellant guilty of murder for the death of Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant guilty of the complex crime of
murder and multiple frustrated murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of article 49 of the Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty to
be imposed upon the accused"; andfourth, "in considering the concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of
public authorities in the commission of crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements made by the accused, shows beyond any shadow of doubt that, when
Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him two hand grenades, to put into execution his preconceived plan to assassinate President
Roxas, he knew fully well that, by throwing one of those two hand grenades in his possession at President Roxas, and causing it to explode,
he could not prevent the persons who were around his main and intended victim from being killed or at least injured, due to the highly
explosive nature of the bomb employed by him to carry out his evil purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by the trial judge (page 96 of transcript) supports our conclusion. He
stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the President, but that it did not make any difference to him if there
were some people around the President when he hurled that bomb, because the killing of those who surrounded the President was
tantamount to killing the President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the President being loyal to the President, were

identified with the latter. In other word, although it was not his main intention to kill the persons surrounding the President, he felt no
conjunction in killing them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the President.
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in
regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio
Maglalang, and that he should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the different felonies committed, the sum total of which shall
not exceed three times the penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime in accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable for all the
consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to
another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the
words of Viada, "in order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice nor intention to cause injury should
intervene; where such intention exists, the act should qualified by the felony it has produced even though it may not have been the intention
of the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced.' (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by
this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43
Phil., 232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme Court of Spain:
Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco de B a comprar tabaco, y habiendose negado este a darselo al
fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar entre ambos disputa alguna; pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de hora, hallandose el estanquero
despachando a C, se oye la detonacion de un arma de fuego disparada por A desde la calle, quedando muertos en el acto C y el
estanquero; supuesta la no intencion en A de matar a C y si solo al estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y la
de c de imprudencia temeraria? La Sala de lo Criminal de la Auudiencia de Granada lo estimo asi, y condeno al procesado a
catorse anos de reclusion por el homivcidio y a un ao de prision correctional por la imprudencia. Aparte de que la muerte del
estanquero debio calificarse de assesinato y no de homicidio, por haberse ejecutado con aleviosa. es evidente que la muerte de
C, suponiendo que no se propusiera ejecutaria el procesado, no pudo calificarse de imprudencia teme raria, sino que tambien
debio declararsele responsable de la misma, a tenor de lo puesto en este apartado ultimo del articulo; y que siendo ambas
muertes producidas por un solo hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio imponerse al reo la pena del delito de asesinato en el
grado maximo, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la pena de muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente que en el
antedicha sentencia, aparte de otros articulos del Codigo, se infringio por la Sala la disposicion de este apartado ultimo del
articulo muy principalmente, y asi lo declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18 junio de 1872. (Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada,
5th Ed., p. 42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The case before us is clearly governed by the first
clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a throwing highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two
grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder, of which President Roxas,
Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the case of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court
held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the
defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put up defense against the
attack, or become aware of it. In the same case it was held that the qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken into
the account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who became his victim.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand grenade at him with the intention to kill him,
thereby commencing the commission of a felony by over acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we qualify the injuries caused on the four other persons already
named as merely attempted and not frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is abundant proof that , in violation of the provisions of article 148 of the Revised
Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed among others the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts were
directed towards the execution of his main purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his failure to redeem his electoral campaign promises,
by throwing at him in his official capacity as the Chief Executive of the nation the hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate
allegation charging Guillen with the commission of said offense, we shall refrain making a finding to that effect.
The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with the single act of throwing a hand grenade at
the President, was attended by the various aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, without any mitigating circumstance. But
we do not deem it necessary to consider said aggravating circumstances because in any event article 48 of the Revised Penal Code above-

quoted requires that the penalty for the most serious of said crimes be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. (Art. 248.)
It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the extreme penalty provided by it upon the facts and circumstances
hereinabove narrated.
The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby do so by a unanimous vote. The death
sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, under authority of the Director of Prisons, on such
working day as the trial court may fix within 30 days from the date the record shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL,

G.R. No. 151258

Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x-------------------------x
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -

THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO
ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR.,
JUNEL
ANTHONY
AMA,
ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO,
VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA
III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME
MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO
MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI,
VICENTE
VERDADERO,
ETIENNE
GUERRERO,
JUDE
FERNANDEZ,
AMANTE
PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN,
PERCIVAL
BRIGOLA,
PAUL
ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL
B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR.,
ADEL
ABAS,
JOSEPH
LLEDO, andRONAN DE GUZMAN,
Respondents.
x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 154954

FIDELITO DIZON,

G.R. No. 155101

Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x-------------------------x
GERARDA H. VILLA,

G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus -

MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA

II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN
RAMOS,
CRISANTO
CRUZ
SARUCA,
JR., and ANSELMO
ADRIANO,
Respondents.

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
February 1, 2012

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo Lenny Villa the victim in this case
on 10 February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing.[1] Due in
large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were
organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This widespread
condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which became effective
in 1995, that would criminalize hazing.[2] The intent of the law was to discourage
members from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity,
organization, or association.[3] Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the

exculpatory implications of consent and initial innocent act in the conduct of

initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.[4]
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the
country.[5] Within a year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths
emerged those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul
Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in
Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito
Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the
University of the Philippines in Baguio City.[6]
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this
case the general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to
observe a fundamental principle in our criminal justice system [N]o act constitutes
a crime unless it is made so by law.[7] Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even
if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it
cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As
interpreters of the law, judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being
swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the elements of
the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258
(Villareal v. People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No.
155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
FACTS
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)[8] and the
trial court,[9] are as follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila
University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris
Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam
Belleza, Bienvenido Bien Marquez III, Roberto Francis Bert Navera, Geronimo
Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members
of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They
all proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the
house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to
expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be
physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were

scheduled to last for three days. After their briefing, they were brought to the
Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats
and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and
walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans
delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional
forms of Aquilan initiation rites. These rites included the Indian Run, which
required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row
delivering blows to the neophytes; the Bicol Express, which obliged the neophytes
to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while
the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the Rounds, in which the
neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the Aquilans
charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites),
while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on
their thighs by two Aquilans; and the Auxies Privilege Round, in which the
auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes.
During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity
principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were
made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required
to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever they would
give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon,
the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them
physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner
of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the
initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members[10] Fidelito
Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be
reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially
refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the
initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then
subjected the neophytes to paddling and to additional rounds of physical pain.
Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him
sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and
difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no
longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the
initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner.
They then slept at the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys

shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these
rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that
Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They
removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm.
When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following
35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)

Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
Efren de Leon (De Leon)
Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
Michael Musngi (Musngi)
Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
Antonio General (General)
Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
Adel Abas (Abas)

26.

Percival Brigola (Brigola)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1.

Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)

Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were

jointly tried.[11] On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in
Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to
be resolved first.[12]
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case
No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code.[13] A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or
on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine
accused commenced anew.[14]
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)[15] set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified
the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual
participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following
Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1.

Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo,

Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim,
Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas,
and Brigola (Victorino et al.) were acquitted, as their individual guilt
was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

2.

Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama,

Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were
found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to
20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the
heirs of the victim the sum of 30,000 as indemnity.

3.

Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio

Villareal were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having
found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced
them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17
years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify,
jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of 50,000
and to pay the additional amount of 1,000,000 by way of moral
damages.

On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the
charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to
speedy trial.[16]Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the
trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano.[17]On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 &
90153[18] reversed the trial courts Orders and dismissed the criminal case against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to
speedy trial.[19]

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were
individually brought before this Court.

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly
committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520
first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond
reasonable doubt.[20]
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner
Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the
Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the
subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the
death of the accused.

G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People

Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari,
questioning the CAs Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30
August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.[21] Petitioner sets forth two main issues first,
that he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial courts forfeiture of
his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process
when the CA did not apply to him the same ratio decidendi that served as basis of
acquittal of the other accused.[22]
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited
Dizons right to present evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to
present evidence on an earlier date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer
presented separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right should not
have been considered as waived because he was justified in asking for a
postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing
dates and in fact insisted that he was ready to present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise
been acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts were also part of the
traditional initiation rites and were not tainted by evil motives.[23] He claims that
the additional paddling session was part of the official activity of the fraternity. He
also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the
initiation rites decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so Mr.
Villareal proceeded to do the paddling.[24]Further, petitioner echoes the argument
of the Solicitor General that the individual blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal
could not have resulted in Lennys death.[25] The Solicitor General purportedly
averred that, on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by
Lenny could not be considered fatal if taken individually, but if taken collectively,
the result is the violent death of the victim.[26]
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill
will. He claims that Lennys father could not have stolen the parking space of
Dizons father, since the latter did not have a car, and their fathers did not work in
the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space was the alleged
ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a stolen
parking space were only part of the psychological initiation. He then cites the
testimony of Lennys co-neophyte witness Marquez who admitted knowing it was
not true and that he was just making it up.[27]

Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated
by his show of concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the
testimony of one of the neophytes, who mentioned that the former had kicked the
leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny to prevent the latters
chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino, helped Lenny
through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his
alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and
concern for the victims well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision
dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No.
15520, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.)
of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries.[28] According
to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have been no
conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been
criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should
have been upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victims death, petitioner
posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of
homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[29] The said article
provides: Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable.
According to the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial courts finding
of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of
the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying
for the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated
17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153.[30] The Petition involves the
dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano.

Due to several pending incidents, the trial court ordered a separate trial for
accused Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S.
Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after
proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall
have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C38340 involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993.
For various reasons, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March
2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9
accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the
accused failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of
time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the
original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were still in
the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.

ISSUES
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence constitutes
denial of due process;
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano for violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial
court and adjudicated the liability of each accused according to individual
participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced
Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.
DISCUSSION
Resolution on Preliminary Matters

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending
resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for
personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast,
criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior
to final judgment. The term personal penalties refers to the service of personal or
imprisonment penalties,[31] while the term pecuniary penalties (las pecuniarias)
refers to fines and costs,[32] including civil liability predicated on the criminal
offense complained of (i.e., civil liabilityex delicto).[33] However, civil liability
based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the
accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.[34]
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal
liability for both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability
directly arising from the delict complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby
dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception
of evidence for accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September;
and the 5thand 12 of October 1993.[35] The Order likewise stated that it will not
entertain any postponement and that all the accused who have not yet presented
their respective evidence should be ready at all times down the line, with their
evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when required
shall therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence.[36]
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in
open court that his client Antonio General would no longer present separate
evidence. Instead, the counsel would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other
accused who had already testified.[37] Because of this development and pursuant to
the trial courts Order that the parties should be ready at all times down the line, the
trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date 25 August
1993 instead of his originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to
start two weeks later, or on 8 September 1993.[38] Counsel for accused Dizon was
not able to present evidence on the accelerated date. To address the situation,
counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear in a
previously scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on the

dates originally assigned to his clients.[39] The trial court denied the Manifestation
on the same date and treated the Constancia as a motion for postponement, in
violation of the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court.[40] Consequently,
the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a
waiver of that right.[41]
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of
law when the trial court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him,
the postponement of the 25 August 1993 hearing should have been considered
justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were not supposed to start until
8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He posits that he
was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also points out that
he did not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact
insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court.
Thus, he contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of
presentation of evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than
the Constitution itself.[42] Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in ones
defense,[43] as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every
stage of the proceedings.[44]
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of
the defenses presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June
1995 hearing was cancelled due to lack of quorum in the regular membership of
the Sandiganbayans Second Division and upon the agreement of the parties. The
hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel
failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an Order
directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation
of his surety bond. The Order further declared that he had waived his right to
present evidence because of his nonappearance at yesterdays and todays scheduled
hearings. In ruling against the Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of
Court, Crisostomos non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely
a waiver of his right to be present for trial on such date only and not for the
succeeding trial dates
xxxxxxxxx

Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not

have been deemed as a waiver of his right to present evidence. While
constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be
coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not
voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel the right to present
evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the
prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the
present case, the court is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally
made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence.
In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the consequences
of another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first
explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and consequences
of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply
went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence without even
allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case
involving a grave penalty is not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of
the accused and his counsel is indispensable so that the court could personally
conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.[46] (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present
evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the
contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since
counsel for another accused General had made a last-minute adoption of
testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was
not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court preassigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to
impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the
five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his preassigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to due process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver
of the right to present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a
finding of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case
to the trial court.[47] In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have adequately
been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or irregularity
has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid
waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment
is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.[48]

We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to

resolve the case at bar. Neither can we see any procedural unfairness or irregularity
that would substantially prejudice either the prosecution or the defense as a result
of the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his
Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what
he is really contesting in his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the
trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of
Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that all actions of the petitioner were part of
the traditional rites, and that the alleged extension of the initiation rites was not
outside the official activity of the fraternity.[49] He even argues that Dizon did not
request for the extension and he participated only after the activity was
sanctioned.[50]
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one
judge or justice to another at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme
Court. Remanding the case for the reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon
would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This case has been going on for
almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key facts necessary to
decide the case have already been determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano should not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to
speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She points out that the accused
failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case against them, and
that they asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed the case against
their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial court denied
the respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano,
because it found that the prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the
movement of this case when the original records and the evidence it may require
were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals.[51]
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections
14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[52] This right requires that there
be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays.[53] The right is
deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements
of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being
tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.[54] In determining the right of the
accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of
the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.[55] The conduct

of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed.[56] Also to be considered
are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right,
and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.[57]
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case
pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal. [58] As
a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a
violation of the principle of double jeopardy.[59] As we have previously discussed,
however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari lies.[60] The rule
on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the
order of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.[61] Rather, grave abuse of
discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double
jeopardy from attaching.[62]
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case
against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation
of their right to speedy trial. The court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the
following factors contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case
below:
xxxxxxxxx
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of
Appeals and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the
court a quo requiring them to secure certified true copies of the same.
xxxxxxxxx
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that
contributed to the delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We
nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this
case x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the
records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions
failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring it to secure
certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact that
as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring
the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records
of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the
said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an

Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the
prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied with. It appears,
however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the
disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the said
court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5,
2002, or for a period of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the
part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution
and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by
petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court
did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time.
This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the
constitution frowns upon x x x.[63] (Emphasis supplied)

This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was
filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon,
Concepcion, and De Vera.[64] On 29 November 1993, they were all
arraigned.[65] Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28
March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.[66]
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval
or inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of
the accused amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases a clear
violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases.[67] Thus, we
held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in
the disposition of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court
found the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal
complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy
disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where the
Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's
duty to act promptly on complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs.
Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in not quashing the information which was filed six years after the
initiatory complaint was filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to
a speedy disposition of the case. So it must be in the instant case, where the
reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade
already.[68] (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R.

SP No. 89060 that accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since
there is nothing in the records that would show that the subject of this Petition
includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this
ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It
dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated
either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused the accused cannot again be charged with the same or an identical
offense.[69] This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and
conscience.[70] It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the
common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.[71] It
found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United States, and
in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen,[72] viz:
Article III Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular
constitutional right, provides as follows:[73]
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a
bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit
the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.

The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the
judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either
through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal
by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.[74] The
requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid

complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant
pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case
against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendants
express consent.[75]
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, [a] verdict
of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such
acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same
offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily,
it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of
harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated
trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an
acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a
conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying
the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.[76] We further
stressed that an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal.[77]
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the
lower courts acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the
latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived
of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of
due process;[78] (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;[79] or (3) where there has
been a grave abuse of discretion.[80]
The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.[81] Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a
patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of
law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility;[82] or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as
to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice.[83] In such an event, the
accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.[84]
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the
reversal of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et
al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a
misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, the decision of

the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private complainant
and petitioner were denied due process of law when the public respondent
completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioners Comment x x x.[85] Allegedly, the CA
ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set aside
the finding of conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code.[86] The Solicitor General also assails the finding that the
physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well as the
appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to hazing.[87]
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and
reweigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.[88] In People
v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court
simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.[89] Mere
errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ
of certiorari.[90] Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are
constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted fraternity
members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical
injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy
similarly applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the
accused.[91]We have also recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to
correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power
to dispense justice.[92] The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of
discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug, the CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of
the fatal wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries
sustained by the victim as a result of the physical punishment heaped on him
were serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of the victim, there
can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or the
medical attendance required. To do so, at this stage would be merely
speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense and

the severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor,
the length of this period must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in
much the same manner as the same act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No.
4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when proof of the said period is absent, the crime
committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries [People v. De los
Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this
Court is constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson,
Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not serious, in
nature.[93] (Emphasis supplied and citations included)

The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa[94] in finding that
the four accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to
the CA, because of the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to
determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance required.[95] The
reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case would reveal that
the accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries, because the
victims injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required medical
attendance.[96] Furthermore, he did not die.[97] His injuries were not even
serious.[98] Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered
physical injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently
inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its
own findings of fact. According to the court, the four accused were found to
have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such initiation
rites on the person of Villa.[99] It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officers
findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the multiple traumatic
injuries he suffered from the initiation rites.[100]Considering that the CA found that
the physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,[101] it
was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical
injuries, which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be
liable for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that
intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial felonious act,
such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the
victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing
the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries
punished under Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for

culpable felonies is therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive

exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised
Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies
should be based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of a person,
punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for
culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that
these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each
other, in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries
when actual death occurs.[102]
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their
acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs
own findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of
the multiple injuries he suffered,[103] the only logical conclusion is that criminal
responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly
participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of
bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for
slight physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy,
we therefore give due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a
crime, the intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a
felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling
against the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of homicide, as it
was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries they had
intentionally inflicted.[104]
The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that
there could have been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa,
had knowingly consented to the conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The
accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the consequences of
their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused Victorino et al. were
acquitted; 4 of them Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight physical injuries; and
the remaining 2 Dizon and Villareal were found guilty of homicide.

The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the
perpetrator clearly commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain
advantage over, to harm maliciously, or to get even with, the victim. Rather, the
case involves an ex ante situation in which a man driven by his own desire to join a
society of men pledged to go through physically and psychologically strenuous
admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand
how our criminal laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we
deem it necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts shaping
intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and psychological
initiations widely known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought. [105] The
classical theory posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an
absolute free will to choose between good and evil.[106] It asserts that one should
only be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
unimpaired.[107]The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that humans are
rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the
principles of pleasure and pain.[108] They refrain from criminal acts if threatened
with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in
committing the crime.[109] Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and
moral blame of the actor.[110] The identity of mens rea defined as a guilty mind, a
guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent is the predominant
consideration.[111] Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits.[112] In order
for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means
of dolo or malice.[113]
The term dolo or malice is a complex idea involving the elements
of freedom, intelligence, and intent.[114] The first element, freedom, refers to an act
done with deliberation and with power to choose between two things.[115] The
second element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine the morality of
human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit
act.[116] The last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain
act.[117]
The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the
state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.[118] It refers to the
purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.[119] It does not
refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result
of the act.[120] While motive is the moving power that impels one to action for a

definite result, intent is the purpose of using a particular means to produce the
result.[121] On the other hand, the term felonious means, inter alia, malicious,
villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.[122] With these
elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer
to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying
a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus
malus that the act or omission be done willfully, maliciously, with deliberate evil
intent, and with malice aforethought.[123] The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of is innocent.[124] As is required of the other elements of a felony, the
existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[125]
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy
to attach. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it is to be interpreted to refer
only to felonies committed by means of doloor malice. The phrase coming to an
agreement connotes the existence of a prefaced intent to cause injury to another, an
element present only in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal
negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being
simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. [126] Here, a
person performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence,
lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act. [127] Verily, a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is
inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa.[128]
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital
ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of
homicide.[129] Beingmala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of
malice or dolo[130] immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries.[131] Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred,
unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. [132] Furthermore, the
victims death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or
suicide.[133] If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent
but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence the act must be qualified as
reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.[134]

Hazing and other forms of initiation rites

The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.[135] It is said
that, throughout history, hazing in some form or another has been associated with
organizations ranging from military groups to indigenous tribes.[136] Some say that
elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages, during which new
students who enrolled in European universities worked as servants for
upperclassmen.[137] It is believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient
Greece,[138] where young menrecruited into the military were tested with pain or
challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for
battle.[139] Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these
values of ancient Greek civilization.[140] According to a scholar, this concept lends
historical legitimacy to a tradition or ritual whereby prospective members are
asked to prove their worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they seek
to attain membership through hazing.[141]
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student
wishing to join an organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte
for a particular chapter.[142] The neophyte period is usually one to two semesters
long.[143] During the program, neophytes are required to interview and to get to
know the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter history; to understand the
principles of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point average; to
participate in the organizations activities; and to show dignity and respect for their
fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and alumni members. [144] Some
chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts during
the entire neophyte stage.[145]
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that
serves as prerequisite for admission to an organization.[146] In hazing, the recruit,
pledge, neophyte, initiate, applicant or any other term by which the organization
may refer to such a person is generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating
situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or
activities.[147] It encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade,
abuse, or physically endanger those who desire membership in the
organization.[148] These acts usually involve physical or psychological suffering or
injury.[149]
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more
than a century ago, our national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a secret society
namedKataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The
Highest and Most Venerable Association of the Sons and Daughters of the

Nation).[150] TheKatipunan, or KKK, started as a small confraternity believed to be

inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or sodalities
approved by the Catholic Church.[151] The Katipunans ideology was brought home
to each member through the societys initiation ritual.[152] It is said that initiates
were brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a
series
of
[153]
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve.
They were
made to go through vigorous trials such as pagsuot sa isang lungga or
[pagtalon] sa balon.[154] It would seem that they were also made to withstand the
blow of pangherong bakal sa pisngi and to endure a matalas na punyal.[155] As a
final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign membership
papers with the his own blood.[156]
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the
Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the
following instances, the manner of hazing in the United States was jarringly similar
to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth
classmen to do exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent
physical damage; to eat or drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways to
humiliate themselves.[157] In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got involved in a
congressional investigation of hazing at the academy during his second year at
West Point.[158]
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidatevictim was injured during the shriners hazing event, which was part of the
initiation ceremonies for Hejaz membership.[159] The ritual involved what was
known as the mattress-rotating barrel trick.[160] It required each candidate to slide
down an eight to nine-foot-high metalboard onto connected mattresses leading to a
barrel, over which the candidate was required to climb.[161] Members of Hejaz
would stand on each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en
route to the barrel.[162]
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina, were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned
paratrooper jump wings directly onto the neophyte paratroopers chests. [163] The
victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain as others pounded the spiked
medals through the shirts and into the chests of the victims.[164]

In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University

chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship
program.[165] The fraternity members subjected the pledges to repeated physical
abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the chest, and the back;
caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use of
a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and knees;
various kicks and punches to the body; and body slamming, an activity in which
active members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and dropped them to
the ground.[166] The fraternity members then put the pledges through a sevenstation circle of physical abuse.[167]
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing
by fraternity members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in
Alabama.[168]The hazing included the following: (1) having to dig a ditch and jump
into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit;
(2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often onto
walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter,
and yerks (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5)
doing chores for the fraternity and its members, such as cleaning the fraternity
house and yard, being designated as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing
regularly at 2 a.m. meetings, during which the pledges would be hazed for a couple
of hours; and (7) running the gauntlet, during which the pledges were pushed,
kicked, and hit as they ran down a hallway and descended down a flight of
stairs.[169]
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim
Sylvester Lloyd was accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the
Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.[170] He participated in initiation activities, which
included various forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological coercion
and embarrassment.[171]
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiatevictim suffered injuries from hazing activities during the fraternitys initiation
rites.[172] Kenner and the other initiates went through psychological and physical
hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200 times. [173]
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida sought
initiation into the campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the
2005-06 academic year.[174] The pledges efforts to join the fraternity culminated in
a series of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones, together with other
candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and

buttocks.[175] In these rituals described as preliminaries, which lasted for two

evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his buttocks.[176] During the last
two days of the hazing, the rituals intensified.[177] The pledges sustained roughly
210 cane strikes during the four-night initiation.[178] Jones and several other
candidates passed out.[179]
The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial birth by
fire, through which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves
his or her worth.[180] Some organizations even believe that hazing is the path to
enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the organization to establish unity
among the pledgesand, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of
the organization.[181] Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities;
improved academic performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking
opportunities; and the esprit dcorp associated with close, almost filial, friendship
and common cause.[182]

Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.

The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in
the military.[183] The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so
prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful or
not.[184] It was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law,
criminalizing conduct whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person
therefrom.[185]
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the
efforts of the Committee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar
organizations, that states increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or
criminalizing hazing.[186] As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal or civil
statutes proscribing hazing.[187]Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a
misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even the most severe
situations.[188] Only a few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony
in case death or great bodily harm occurs.[189]
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing
that results in death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony. [190] In a Class 4
felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year and
not more than three years.[191] Indiana criminal law provides that a person who
recklessly,
knowingly,
or
intentionally

performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal
recklessness, a Class D felony.[192]
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly
weapon.[193] As an element of a Class C felony criminal recklessness resulting in
serious bodily injury, death falls under the category of serious bodily injury. [194] A
person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed term of between
two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4)
years.[195] Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the
act creates a substantial risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in
which case it becomes a Class C felony.[196] A Class C felony provides for an
imprisonment term not to exceed seven years.[197]
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony. [198] An
individual adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a
state jail for any term of not more than two years or not less than 180
days.[199] Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the hazer is
guilty of a third-degree felony.[200] A person who has been convicted of a thirddegree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed five
years.[201] West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be
deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties
provided therefor.[202] In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing
results
in
the
death
of
another.[203] A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed
10 years, or both.[204]
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited
remedies, as there was no hazing statute.[205] This situation was exemplified
in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballous family resorted
to a civil action for wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in South
Carolina until 1994.[206]
The existence of animus interficendi or intent to
kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation rites
does not automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If
it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with a
guilty mind whether or not there is a contextual background or factual premise they
are still criminally liable for intentional felony.

The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that
with the exception of Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug did not have the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the
other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial
court and found that the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill
Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of
homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been motivated by ill
will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his fathers parking space had
been stolen by the victims father.[207] As to Villareal, the court said that the accused
suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a
hand in the death of Villareals brother.[208] The CA then ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very
clear that they acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is
unrebutted and so for the death of Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal must
and should face the consequence of their acts, that is, to be held liable for the
crime of homicide.[209] (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.

The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez
to determine the existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the
context in which the supposed utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary
to reproduce the relevant portions of witness Marquezs testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngis] room and we were briefed
as to what to expect during the next three days and we were
told the members of the fraternity and their batch and we were
also told about the fraternity song, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house and we were made to
ride a van and we were brought to another place in Kalookan
City which I later found to be the place of Mariano Almeda,
sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our
arms and then the driver of the van and other members of the
Aquilans who were inside left us inside the van, sir.

xxxxxxxxx
Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, Villa akin ka,
Asuncion Patay ka and the people outside pound the van,
rock the van, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice
these remarks uttered upon your arrival?
Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in
their voices, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through and
through, what were the voices or utterances that you heard?
Witness Villa akin ka, Asuncion patay ka, Recinto patay ka sa amin, etc., sir.
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue during
the rocking of the van which lasted for 5 minutes?
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being
inflicted, was there any utterances by anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some were
encouraging others who were pounding and beating us, it
was just like a fiesta atmosphere, actually some of them
enjoyed looking us being pounded, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether matigas
pa yan, kayang-kaya pa niyan.
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that
you quote?

Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances

simultaneously, I could not really pin point who uttered those
words, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this
Bicol Express?
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the
utterances that you remember?
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh,
he would say that and I quote ito, yung pamilya nito ay
pinapatay yung kapatid ko, so that would in turn sort of
justifying him in inflicting more serious pain on me. So instead
of just walking, he would jump on my thighs and then after on
was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that this guy,
his father stole the parking space of my father, sir. So, thats
why he inflicted more pain on Villa and that went on, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?
Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of
having your family have his brother killed, what was your
response?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just
making it up sir. So he said that I knew nothing of that
incident. However, he just in fact after the Bicol Express, he
kept on uttering those words/statements so that it would in turn
justify him and to give me harder blows, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that Lenny
Villas father stole the parking space allotted for his father,
do you recall who were within hearing distance when that
utterance was made?
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.

xxxxxxxxx
Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were different
people who heard from time to time, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation
against Lenny Villas father was made?
Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us
and when Lenny Villas turn, I heard him uttered those
statements, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villas father?
Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villas thighs and sometime he
stand up and he kicked his thighs and sometimes jumped at it,
sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You mentioned
also that accusations made by Dizon you or your family had
his brother killed, can you inform this Honorable Court
what exactly were the accusations that were charged
against you while inflicting blows upon you in particular?
Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I knew
that his family who had his brother killed, and he said that his
brother was an NPA, sir so I knew that it was just a story
that he made up and I said that I knew nothing about it and
he continued inflicting blows on me, sir. And another
incident was when a talk was being given, Dizon was on
another part of the pelota court and I was sort of looking and
we saw that he was drinking beer, and he said and I
quote: Marquez, Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo
diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking
kapatid, yari ka sa akin, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What else?

Witness Thats all, sir.

Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a
physician came around as promised to you earlier?
Witness No, sir.[210] (Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:

Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have you
stated that there was a briefing that was conducted immediately
before your initiation as regards to what to expect during the
initiation, did I hear you right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.
Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to
expect during the initiation?
Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we
would be mocked at, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc.,
and the likes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical
contact?
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to
school. All the bruises would be limited to our arms and legs,
sir. So, if we wear the regular school uniforms like long
sleeves, it would be covered actually so we have no thinking
that our face would be slapped, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have bruises
on your body but that will be covered?

Witness Yes, sir.

JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect
that would create bruises to your body?
Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling
or paddle, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation
procedures is psychological in nature?
Witness Combination, sir.[211] (Emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical
initiation, meaning body contact, is that correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological initiation,
correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated to
terrify you, scare you, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation
intended to, I repeat, terrify you, frighten you, scare you
into perhaps quitting the initiation, is this correct?
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he said
or he was supposed to have said according to you that your
family were responsible for the killing of his brother who was
an NPA, do you remember saying that?
Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by
Dizon that you did not believe him because that is not true,
correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the
purpose as I have mentioned before, terrifying you, scaring
you or frightening you into quitting the initiation, this is
correct?
Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was
saying those things was because he wanted to inflict injury.
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct?
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he
was hitting me.
Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same
forms of initiation by all the initiating masters? You said that
earlier, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked
you said something similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon?
Witness No, sir.
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the
masters would run on your thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating
masters not only on you but also on the other neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of initiation
was administered by one master, was also administered by
one master on a neophyte, was also administered by
another master on the other neophyte, this is correct?
Witness Yes, sir.[212] (Emphasis supplied)

According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the
CA to Dizon and Villareal were baseless,[213] since the statements of the accused
were just part of the psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of
the neophytes; that [t]here is no element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido
Marquez; and that the harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part of
tradition concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members during their
initiation rites.[214]
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of
substantial proportion on the part of the CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon for
those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it was
the CAs primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa,
thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat,
according to Bienvenido Marquezs testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon
who uttered both accusations against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no
participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It was Boyet
Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquezs] thigh; and who told witness Marquez, [I]to,
yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko. It was also Dizon who jumped on
Villas thighs while saying, [T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my
father. With the testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no basis for
concluding the existence of intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to
the entire factual milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate
and understand the testimony of witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes
were briefed that they would be subjected to psychological pressure in order to
scare them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated.
They heard fraternity members shout, Patay ka, Recinto, Yari ka, Recinto,
Villa, akin ka, Asuncion, gulpi ka, Putang ina mo, Asuncion, Putang ina nyo,
patay kayo sa amin, or some other words to that effect.[215] While beating the
neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the formers purported NPA
brother, and then blamed Lenny Villas father for stealing the parking space of
Dizons father. According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including those
of the accused Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation employed by the
Aquila Fraternity.[216]
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting psychological
pressure was through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He
concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could justify giving the neophytes harder

blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing. Even one of the
neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up.

The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of

hazing. In fact, during the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing
Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of
interpellations on why we included the phrase or psychological pain and
suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but
the recruit or neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already
described yesterday, like playing the Russian roulette extensively to test the
readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or recruit to continue his desire
to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organizationor playing
and putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the recruit or
neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing outside,
asking him to jump outside after making him turn around several times but the
reality is that he will be made to jump towards the inside portion of the building
these are the mental or psychological tests that are resorted to by these
organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who appeared during the
public hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental aberration, that
they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want to
prevent.[217] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not be
automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa.
Rather, it must be taken within the context of the fraternitys psychological
initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established whether the fathers
of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would lend
credence to the veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony of Lennys co-neophyte,
Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he knew it was not
true and that [Dizon] was just making it up.[218] Even the trial court did not give
weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: [T]he cumulative
acts of all the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict
physical harm as part of the fraternity initiation rites x x x. [219] The Solicitor
General shares the same view.

Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of

homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence
of intent to kill.Animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there
is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.[220] Instead, we adopt and
reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of
the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.[221]
The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious
intent to injure not proven beyond reasonable
doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the
Solicitor General then posits that since all of the accused fraternity members
conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them
should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised
Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to
266 of the Revised Penal Code,[222] the employment of physical injuries must be
coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious
intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the
accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus
iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily
functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus
iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the
elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of
the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.[223]
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances[224] that the mere infliction of
physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically
liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v. People,[225] the accused teacher, using
a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs and thighs as a form
of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal
punishment. In reversing the trial courts finding of criminal liability for slight
physical injuries, this Court stated thus: Independently of any civil or
administrative responsibility [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had

done with criminal intent the means she actually used was moderate and that she
was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent. Considering the
applicable laws, we then ruled that as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any
criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil. In People v. Carmen,[226] the
accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of
Fatima under the guise of a ritual or treatment plunged the head of the victim into a
barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and
stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of nervous
breakdown by expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing him. The
collective acts of the group caused the death of the victim. Since malicious intent
was not proven, we reversed the trial courts finding of liability for murder under
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the accused should be
held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article
365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds initial acts of
inflicting physical pain on the neophytes were attended by animus
iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled that
malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and external acts of the
accused.[227] What persons do is the best index of their intention.[228] We have also
ruled that the method employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body
on which the injury was inflicted may be determinative of the intent of the
perpetrator.[229] The Court shall thus examine the whole contextual background
surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the
commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told
that there would be physical beatings, that the whole event would last for three
days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were subjected to
traditional initiation rites, including the Indian Run, Bicol Express, Rounds, and
the Auxies Privilege Round. The beatings were predominantly directed at the
neophytes arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present
comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize
and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once
again subjected to traditional initiation rituals. When the rituals were officially
reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to
another traditional ritual paddling by the fraternity.

During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes.
The auxiliaries protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and
shielding them from those who were designated to inflict physical and
psychological pain on the initiates.[230] It was their regular duty to stop foul or
excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to pump their legs in order that
their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity
or round; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give
them whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent.[231] A few days before
the rites, he asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila
Fraternity.[232] His father knew that Lenny would go through an initiation process
and would be gone for three days.[233] The CA found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented
to undergo physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration
of facts, they voluntarily agreed to join the initiation rites to become members of
the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were given briefings on
what to expect. It is of common knowledge that before admission in a fraternity,
the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made aware that
traditional methods such as mocking, psychological tests and physical
punishment would take place. They knew that the initiation would involve
beatings and other forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and
opportunity to quit at any time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness
Navera testified that accused Tecson told him that after a week, you can already
play basketball. Prosecution witness Marquez for his part, admitted that he
knew that the initiates would be hit in the arms and legs, that a wooden
paddle would be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms
and legs. Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation without consenting
neophytes.[234] (Emphasis supplied)

Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the first
day, Lenny continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing
clear malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus
iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the specific acts of punching,
kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were done
voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements
of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental
ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the
contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition.

Although the additional rounds on the second night were held upon the insistence
of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the consent of
the head of the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity members still participated
in the rituals, including the paddling, which were performed pursuant to tradition.
Other than the paddle, no other weapon was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The
targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of
roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific
purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the
initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who
wished to join the fraternity went through the same process of traditional initiation;
there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a different
treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely
different from common crimes.[235] The totality of the circumstances must therefore
be taken into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical
injuries was rooted may also be determined by Lennys continued participation in
the initiation and consent to the method used even after the first day. The following
discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all, are already
punished under the Revised Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and it results in
death, the charge would be murder or homicide.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be
frustrated homicide or serious physical injuries.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse
does so it can be penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new
offense under this definition of the crime of hazing?

SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either

composing a sorority, fraternity or any association from making this requirement
of initiation that has already resulted in these specific acts or results, Mr.
President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land
that no group or association can require the act of physical initiation before a
person can become a member without being held criminally liable.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that
imposition? Because the distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a
mere organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an initiation into a club or
organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts that resulted in death, et
cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage
hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or
more charges or offenses, because these very same acts are already punishable
under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling
difference: When a person or group of persons resort to hazing as a
requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to commit a
wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific
crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if
one files a case, then the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if
the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the act of
hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter
the sororities or fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called
hazing. Because, initially, these fraternities or sororities do not even consider
having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are even
committed initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That
is why there is need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang
fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong
makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o
pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong

neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng

murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa
mga kabataan na: Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at
kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the
distinguished Sponsor. But I am again disturbed by his statement that the
prosecution does not have to prove the intent that resulted in the death, that
resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of
lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of
the accused in proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a
novel situation where we create the special crime without having to go into
the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to
initiate, then there is no offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits
that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have a new society or
a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts
that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by
intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the
basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being
criminalized because in the context of what is happening in the sororities and
fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will admit that their intention
is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting
physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred,
discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the
masters intended to kill or the masters intended to maim. What is important is the
result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the
physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, We did not have the
intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not
have any intention to kill or maim.
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged
therefore with the ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where
the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the elements if they are
separate offenses.
xxxxxxxxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that

initiated and a person died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill
if it becomes a law, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not
anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x
xx
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to
prove intent to kill or not?

SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if

that occurs, there is no need to prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It
should be hazing, Mr. President. [236] (Emphasis supplied)

During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue
of whether to include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law,
Senator Lina further clarified thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection
to the inclusion of sodomy as one of the conditions resulting from hazing as
necessary to be punished. However, the act of sodomy can be committed by two
persons with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of
sodomy forced into another individual by another individual. I move, Mr.
President, that sodomy be modified by the phrase without consent for purposes of
this section.
SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy
with the concept that it is only going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done
without consent will change a lot of concepts here. Because the results from
hazing aggravate the offense with or without consent. In fact, when a person
joins a fraternity, sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be with
or without the consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person joins a
sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate the crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the
malpractices that attend initiation which may have been announced with or

without physical infliction of pain or injury, Mr. President. Regardless of

whether there is announcement that there will be physical hazing or whether
there is none, and therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity is
of no moment. What is important is that there is an infliction of physical
pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from
himself if he joins a fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the State, the
individual, or the parents of the victim can run after the perpetrators of the
crime, regardless of whether or not there was consent on the part of the
victim.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the
distinguished Gentleman from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that society
sometimes adopts new mores, traditions, and practices.

In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of
some individuals when they do their acts in private as we do not take a peek into
the private rooms of couples. They can do their thing if they want to make love in
ways that are not considered acceptable by the mainstream of society. That is not
something that the State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that
the act may even be entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The
infliction of pain may be done with the consent of the neophyte. If the law is
passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable because the
neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator
said, Well, he allowed it upon himself. He consented to it. So, if we allow that
reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent of the victim, then we
would not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we pass
this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the
infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to
prohibit. That the defense of consent will not apply because the very act of
inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable
act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely
aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going
to nullify the criminal nature of the act.

So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the
offense if it is committed without consent of the victim, then the whole
foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment?
(Silence.) The Chair hears none; the same is approved.[237]
(Emphasis supplied)

Realizing the implication of removing the states burden to prove intent,

Senator Lina, the principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the
idea of intent or whether there it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a
radical amendment if that is the point that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a
special law on hazing. We will not include this anymore under the Revised
Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that suggestion, Mr.
President.[238](Emphasis supplied)

Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and
the core principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress
did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on
hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by
Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing unique as against typical
crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently
wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lennys parents
would not have consented[239] to his participation in Aquila Fraternitys initiation
rites if the practice of hazing were considered by them asmala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate
Justice (now retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent
history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive
of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by custom, as
criminal.[240] Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement
nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or the conduct of initiation rites through
physical and/or psychological suffering has not been traditionally criminalized.
Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law;
hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt

on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the

accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to
rule against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on
Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of
malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala
in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the unique nature
of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that
the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The
Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault
(culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without
malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results
by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the
person committing it.[241] In this case, the danger is visible and consciously
appreciated
by
the
actor.[242] In
contrast, simple
imprudence
or
negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or
material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill.[243] Here, the
threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. [244]
The test[245] for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an
act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer
the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do
so constitutes negligence.[246]
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with
recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree
of the danger involved.[247] If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of
causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that
particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or
avoid damage or injury.[248] In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is

required.[249] It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or

diligence that may be required of an individual, from a transitory glance of care to
the most vigilant effort.[250] The duty of the person to employ more or less degree
of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.[251]
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure
secondary to multiple traumatic injuries.[252] The officer explained that cardiac
failure refers to the failure of the heart to work as a pump and as part of the
circulatory system due to the lack of blood.[253] In the present case, the victims
heart could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its
requisite blood and oxygen.[254] The deprivation was due to the channeling of the
blood supply from the entire circulatory system including the heart, arteries, veins,
venules, and capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing the
formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots.[255] The multiple hematomas were
wide, thick, and deep,[256] indicating that these could have resulted mainly from
injuries sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the
like.[257] Repeated blows to those areas caused the blood to gradually ooze out of
the capillaries until the circulating blood became so markedly diminished as to
produce death. [258] The officer also found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas,
intestines, and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic
organ in the lungs, were pale due to the lack of blood, which was redirected to the
thighs and forearms.[259] It was concluded that there was nothing in the heart that
would indicate that the victim suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or
disease.[260]
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas arms and thighs,
resulting from repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital
organs and led to his eventual death. These hematomas must be taken in the light
of the hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity. According to
the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched, kicked, elbowed,
kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms, legs, and
thighs.[261] They were also paddled at the back of their thighs or legs;[262] and
slapped on their faces.[263] They were made to play rough basketball.[264] Witness
Marquez testified on Lenny, saying: [T]inamaan daw sya sa spine.[265] The NBI
medico-legal officer explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative
effect of the multiple injuries suffered by the latter.[266] The relevant portion of the
testimony is as follows:

Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross
examinations of defense counsels that the injuries that you
have enumerated on the body of the deceased Lenny Villa
previously marked as Exhibit G-1 to G-14 individually by
themselves would not cause the death of the victim. The
question I am going to propound to you is what is the
cumulative effect of all of these injuries marked from Exhibit
G-1 to G-14?
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So, it
is not fair for us to isolate such injuries here because we are
talking of the whole body. At the same manner that as a car
would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in
human approach is to interpret all those injuries in whole and
not in part.[267]

There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members
were drinking during the initiation rites.[268]
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount
to recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must
be remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause
them injury in the process.[269] With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused
are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medicolegal officer found that the victims death was the cumulative effect of the injuries
suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in
and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been
prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused Dizon
and Villareal restrained themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation rites.
Although
this
point
did
not
matter
in
the
end,
as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the
reopened initiation rites having in mind the concept of seniority in fraternities the
implication of the presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review in future
legislation. We further note that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated
during Lennys initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress, for
legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the
fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members
during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable
penalties.

It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose the

misery of hazing and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There
must be a better way to establish kinship. A neophyte admitted that he joined the
fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it offered, such
as tips during bar examinations.[270] Another initiate did not give up, because he
feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a
choice.[271] Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila
Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances,
they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the
hands to which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and
Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity
members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable
by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).[272] Since there was no law prohibiting
the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing
laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove,
beyond
reasonable
doubt,
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon
Lenny Villa.[273] As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally
extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the
applicability of the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the
modification of criminal liability from slight physical injuries to reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to accused
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the
amounts of 50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and 1,000,000 as moral
damages, to be jointly and severally paid by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also
awarded the amount of 30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally paid by
accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death
of the victim.[274] In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,[275] we sustain the
CAs award of indemnity in the amount of 50,000.

The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages,

including expenses incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long as
the claim is supported by tangible documents.[276] Though we are prepared to
award actual damages, the Court is prevented from granting them, since the
records are bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were incurred or
proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not
interpose any claim for actual damages.[277]
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered
on account of the victims death.[278] This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of
the Civil Code, which provides that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate
descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.[279] Thus, we hereby we
affirm the CAs award of moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding
petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET
ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 finding Antonio
Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson
guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries is also MODIFIED and SET
ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony
Ama, Renato
Bantug,
Jr., and
Vincent
Tecson
are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months ofprision correccional, as maximum. In addition,
accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil
indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount
of 1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from
the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction.[280]Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is
hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080,
dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano,
are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case
against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the

amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the
presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.