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Facts: The Accused-appellant seeks the reversal of the decision of the RTC finding her
guilty of RA 6425. The other accused were acquitted.
That on April 29, 1997, the accused-appellant together with the other accused offer
for sale of marijuana fruiting tops to SPO 3 Jamisolamin. They were arrested through
entrapment.
The accused-appellant contends that there was no payment made, the contract of sale
was not consummated and inevitably the accused-appellant can not be convicted for
the illegal sale of prohibited drug.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of RA 6425 despite the fact that
there was no contract of sale?
Held: Yes. Under Section 4, Art. II of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, the act of selling or acting as broker in a sale of
marijuana and other prohibited drugs consummates the crime. More specifically, it
punishes the mere act of delivery of prohibited drugs after the offer to buy by the
entrapping officer has been accepted by the seller. Thus, contrary to the theory of
CAPARAS, proof of actual payment of money is not an indispensable requisite to
support a conviction for sale of prohibited drug. What is material in the prosecution
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.
FACTS: The accused-appellee filed an appeal from the decision of the RTC finding him
guilty of four counts of violation of RA 7160. That on July 1, 1997 the accused
actuated by lewd design committed acts of lasciviousness upon his daughter 17 years
old by kissing, mashing her breast and touching her private parts against her will and
consent. The other incidents committed on July 2, 3, and 26, 1997. It was during
these short of periods of time while his common law wife was out of the house that the
abuses took place. The accused wrote her a letter from his detention cell asking for
forgiveness. Accused had a defense of denial and alibi.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo erred in finding the prosecution's version more
credible and in convicting him despite the implied pardon given by complainant.
Whether or not there is a factual basis for the trial court to consider his plea of
forgiveness in his letter to complainant as an implied admission of guilt.
HELD:
1. No. Complainant's testimony was straightforward and free from contradiction as to
any material point. We also accord great weight to the findings of the trial court having
heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during
trial. On the other hand, accused-appellant's simple denial of the crime charged is
inherently weak. It is negative evidence which cannot overcome the positive
testimonies of credible witnesses. For accused-appellants denial to prevail it must be
buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability and there is none
2. The Court disagrees, evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he had
committed some wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to
an attempt to compromise. Under the circumstances, accused-appellants plea of
forgiveness should be received as an implied admission of guilt.