Does the police power of the state include the power to promote religious solidarity?

The police power of the State does not include the power to promote religious
solidarity because laws, such as in the case at bar i.e. RA XBYZ, tend to impose invalid
exercise of police power. It actually collides with the peoples constitutional rights as
guaranteed in Article III. The end does not justify the means, as they say. 1The Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses as expressed in the Bill of Rights were not designed to serve
contradictory purposes. They have a single goal to promote freedom of individual religious
beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from
inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the
Establishment Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for
religious beliefs and practices. The two religion clauses were intended to deny government
the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and
practices. The legislature, having the ultimate authority in exercising the states police power,
would recognize religions and their practices and would consider them, when practical, in
enacting laws of general application. But when the legislature fails to do so, religions that are
threatened and burdened may turn to the courts for protection.

1 Estrada v Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651 (2006)

Do Sections 2, 3 and 5 of R.A. XBYZ violate the Bill of Rights?

Sections 2, 3 and 5 of R.A. XBYZ violate the Bill of Rights.

Section 2 of said law explicitly states that funds shall be provided to support joint
religious celebrations especially in government functions. Furthermore, it provides that all
government programs, including all court proceedings, must always begin with an
ecumenical prayer representing the Catholic, Protestant and Muslim religions. These parts are
violative of Sec. 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The lawful means afforded by the law are unconstitutional. Firstly, instituting
measures and incentives to bring people of different faiths together is a violation to the nonestablishment clause as accorded in one of the two principal parts of Section 5 in the Bill of
Rights. It is contrary to the purpose of the non-establishment clause which is expressed
through voluntarism and insulation of the political process from interfaith dissension.
Voluntarism as a value is both personal and social. As a personal value, it is nothing more
than the inviolability of the human conscience which is protected by the free exercise clause.
As a social value, protected by the non-establishment clause, it means that the growth of a
religious sect as social force must come from the voluntary support of its members because of
the belief that both spiritual and secular society will benefit if religions are allowed to
compete on their own intrinsic merit without benefit of official patronage. Instituting
measures and incentives to bring people of different faiths together is directly or indirectly
tantamount to compelling them to gather together. This signifies lack of volunteerism on
getting them to pursue a dialogue. In such a case, their consent in getting them to agree in the
engagement may be vitiated through undue influence on the part of the commission in
charged to facilitate such talk.
Jurisprudence indicates that the non-establishment clause prohibits all government
that might redound to the benefit of religion. To be allowable, government aid must have a
(1) secular legislative purpose; (2) must have a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religions; and (3) must not require excessive entanglement with recipient institutions.
The act of encouraging religious solidarity by instituting measures and incentives to
bring people of different faiths together so that they can understand each other better and
pursue dialogue instead of conflict does not serve its secular legislative purpose because its
primary effect either advances or inhibits the liberty of the people to exercise their religion.
Bringing people of different faiths together in order to pursue dialogue collides with the
constitutional guarantee of 2freedom not to associate. Freedom of association is an aspect of
freedom of expression and of belief. The inclusion of an individual in a dialogue imposes
upon him a burden on his religious exercise and commitment, and that it may significantly
affect his associational ties with the other member of his religious group.

2 Boy Scouts of America v Dale (2000)

Providing funds and support in joint religious celebrations expresses a violation of the nonestablishment principle contemplated not only in the Bill of Rights, but also in Article VI,
Section 29 (2) saying: No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister,
or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the Armed Forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium. The said provision is accorded in the limitation of powers set
upon the Congress considering that the latter has the control of the expenditure of public
funds. Given that the limits have been explicitly provided in the Constitution, appropriating
funds for the enforcement of this law, in which it may redound to the benefit of the religious
institutions, is plainly unconstitutional. This is also breaches the wall between the Church and
the State. Article II, Section 6 says: The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
The Board of Education v. Emerson (1946) interpreted the clause as: 3Neither a State nor
the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. The standard of separation which may
take in the form of the theory of Strict Separation as produced in the line of US jurisprudence
anchors on the premise that an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and
state needs to be erected. Religious institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or
indirect, from the state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens
the programs placed on believers.
Likewise, starting all government programs, and even in court proceedings, with an
ecumenical prayer representing the Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim religions may require
excessive entanglement with the religious group; consequently violating the establishment
clause of Section 5 of the Bill of Rights. In Engel v. Vitale (1962), the Supreme Court ruled
that nondenominational prayer in public schools violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment (Freedom to Religion). Similarly, allowing any governmental function with
a prayer shall mean government interference with religion. Since Filipinos adhere to a wide
variety of beliefs, it is not appropriate for the government to endorse any particular belief
system (i.e. Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim religions).
Sec. 3 of R.A. XBYZ is violative of the Bill of Rights.
It provides an amendment to Articles 132 and 133 of the Revised Penal Code,
punishing illegal acts regarding the interruption of religious worship and offending of the
religious feelings, respectively. This amendment increased by two degrees the original
punishment for both acts should any commit them. Instead of initially having Prision
Correcional as punishment for both, such has been worsened to Reclusion Temporal and is
further qualified to Reclusion Perpetua should there be any violence employed.
Such amendment is tantamount to cruel punishment, protected against by Art. 19, Art.
III of the 1987 Constitution.
3 Board of Education v. Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1946)

The main guides that may be used to gauge whether certain punishments are cruel
include that 1. A punishment must not be too severe that it degrades the dignity of human
beings, 2. It must not be arbitrarily applied, 3. It must be socially unacceptable and 4. It must
not be excessive, i.e., it must serve a penal purpose more effectively than a less severe
punishment would. Sec. 3 fulfills the fourth standard because it is excessive in nature and that
it serves a penal purpose more effective than a less severe punishment would.

Sec. 5 violates Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.

In essence, Sections 2 and 3 form a primordial purpose of the entire enactment. The
contention is that both sections are void for violating the pertinent Constitutional provisions
on the rights of the people. Therefore, the law itself cannot stand on its own. Its invalidation
should be sustained. As a matter of statutory construction, the very essence of RA XBYZ
rests on Sections 2 and 3 of said law. Section 5 should also be invalidated because it provides
that the unconstitutionality of any section of the law does not invalidate the entire law which
has been established as not in accordance to legal basis. The plaintiffs maintain that Section 5
of R.A. XBYZ because of such proposed contentions.