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Guido Governatori
Antonino Rotolo
University of Torino
Italy
guido@di.unito.it
NICTA
Australia
guido@governatori.net
University of Bologna
Italy
antonino.rotolo@unibo.it
University of Luxembourg
Luxembourg
leendert@vandertorre.com
Abstract
If compliance with a norm does not achieve its purpose, then
its applicability must dynamically be restricted or expanded.
Legal interpretation is a mechanism from law allowing norms
to be adapted to unforeseen situations. We model this mechanism for norms regulating computer systems by representing
the purpose of norms by social goals and by revising the constitutive rules dening the applicability of norms. We illustrate the interpretation mechanism by examples.
Legal Interpretation
Norms have a conditional structure such as b1 , . . . , bn O l
(if b1 , . . . , bn hold, then l is obligatory); an agent is compliant with respect to this norm if l is obtained whenever
b1 , . . . , bn is derived. Most logical models of legal reasoning
assume that conditions of norms give a complete description
of their applicability (Sartor 2005). However, this assumption is too strong, due to the complexity and dynamics of
the world. Norms cannot take into account all the possible
conditions where they should or should not be applied, giving rise to the so called penumbra: a core of cases which
can clearly be classied as belonging to the concept. By
a penumbra of hard cases, membership of the concept can
be disputed. Moreover, not only the world changes, giving
rise to circumstances unexpected to the legislator who introduced the norm, but even the ontology of reality can change
with respect to the one constructed by the law to describe
the applicability conditions of norms. See, e.g., the problems concerning the application of existing laws to privacy,
intellectual property or technological innovations in healthcare.
To cope with unforeseen circumstances, the judicial system, at the moment in which a case concerning a violation is
discussed in court, is empowered to interpret, i.e., to change
norms, under some restrictions not to go beyond the purpose
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Example
In this section we describe the interpretation process using
an example, rst considering a scenario of norm restriction
and second a norm expansion. Suppose Mary enters a park
with her bike, thus apparently violating rule r2 above about
vehicles circulation. Police stops her when she is still on
her bike in the park and nes her. Mary thinks this is unreasonable and sues the municipality because she thinks that
here the category vehicle should not cover bikes.
In the rst case the conceptual domain T of the normative
system, corresponding to a set of constitutive rules, allows
us to derive that any bike a is indeed a vehicle. The goal
of the norm r2 is reducing pollution G (r2 ) = pollution. In
court, the judge has to establish if Mary violated r2 or not.
If T is the case, the judge could argue that Mary should
be ned, as r2 clearly applies to her:
But suppose that the judge can show that, if Marys case
fulls the applicability conditions of r2 (Marys bike is a
vehicle) then a goal which is incompatible with the goal assigned to r2 would be promoted. Since G (r2 ) = pollution,
prohibiting to circulate with bikes in parks would encourage
people to get around parks by car and then walk. This would
be against the goal of r2 and so the judge has good reasons
to exclude that bikes are vehicles when r2 should be applied.
Accordingly, when arguing in this way, the judge may interpret r2 by reducing its applicability conditions as far as
Marys case is concerned. He thus contracts T in order to
obtain in T that Marys bike is not a vehicle in the context
of the current situation, by adding a defeater r4 blocking the
Vehicle(x) conclusion: r4 : Bike(x), Park(y) ;c Vehicle(x)
and by stating that r4 is stronger than r0 : = {r0 r4 }.
In the second case, consider the conceptual domain T to
exclude that bikes are vehicles and the goal of r2 could be
the safety of people walking in the park (pedestrian safety):
T ={r3 : 2 wheels(x), Transport(x), Engine(x) c Bike(x),
r5 : Bike(x) ;c Vehicle(x),
r6 : Transport(x), Engine(x) c Vehicle(x)}
={r6 r5 }
564
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