Constitutional Law II Reviewer PDF

Constitutional
Law II Reviewer
Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez,
Magno, Renes, Salanguit,
Salayog, Teves
D 2015 | Prof. Gwen Grecia-De Vera
Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015

Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 1
[Page 01]
Introduction to the Course
[Page 02]
Due Process of Law

Due Process of Law (vis--vis the other powers of the State)
Due Process of Law (Definition)
[Page 07]
Equal Protection of the Law
[Page 09]
Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
[Page 19]
Privacy of Communication and Correspondence
[Page 20]
Writ of Habeas Corpus
[Page 21]
Liberty of Abode and Travel
[Page 23]
Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment
[Page 24]
Freedom of Speech and of Expression
[Page 29]
Freedom of the Press

Freedom to Assembly, Association and to Petition
[Page 31]
Access to Information
[Page 33]
Freedom of Religion and Non-establishment of Religion
[Page 39]
Eminent Domain
[Page 42]
Contracts Clause
Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder
Non-Imprisonment for Debt and Involuntary Servitude
Free Access to Courts and Quasi-Judicial Bodies

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEWER 1
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE COURSE
A. SOURCE OF RIGHTS: Is the Bill of Rights the only source of rights?
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan: EO 1 created the PCGG which has the power to (1)
conduct investigations regarding ill-gotten wealth; (2) promulgate such rules as may
be necessary to investigate. In this case, PCGG investigated charges of ill-gotten
wealth against Major General Josephus Ramos, and subsequently confiscated items
and communication facilities from his alleged mistress, Elizabeth Dimaano on March 3,
1986.
Issue: WoN the Bill of Rights was operative during the interregnum from February 26,
1986 (the day Corazon C. Aquino took her oath as President) to March 24, 1986
(immediately before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution)? NO, the Bill of
Rights was not operative, thus private respondent Dimaano cannot invoke
the right against unreasonable search and seizure and the exclusionary
right. HOWEVER, the constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the
warrant. Did the raiding team exceed its authority, and therefore the seizure of
Dimaanos items is null and void and must be returned? YES.
Ratio: The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. (Interregnum: after the actual take-over of power by the revolutionary
government). BUT the protection afforded to individuals under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Universal Declaration of Human Rights
remained in effect during this time. During the interregnum, directives of the
revolutionary government were supreme law because there was no constitutionally
limited extent/scope of such directives. During the interregnum, a person cannot
invoke any right under the BoR because there was neither a Constiution nor a BoR
during the interregnum. If the BoR of 1973 Constitution remained operative during
the interregnum, that would render void all sequestration orders issued by PCGG
before adoption of 1987 Constitution.
J. Punos DISSENT: The Bill of Rights is NOT the only source of rights. In its
absence, the people can still invoke their inherent rights under natural law.
As the right to revolt is a right recognized in natural law, it is under this same natural
law that Dimaano has a right against unreasonable search and seizure. Filipinos
during that one month from February 25 to March 24, 1986 were NOT stripped naked
of all their rights, including their natural rights as human beings. With the
1
Guide:
BOLD FONT for Constitutional Articles and Sections
Underlined the important words, phrases and provisions
Yellow highlight for case titles, and following that will be the MAIN DOCTRINE. Issues, Ratio
decidendis, Dissents, Arguments will be indicated by Green highlight.
extraordinary circumstances before, during and after the EDSA Revolution, the
Filipinos simply found themselves without a constitution, but certainly not without
fundamental rights.
B. HEIRARCHY OF RIGHTS UNDER BILL OF RIGHTS: Primacy of Human
Rights
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills. Co:
5 BASIC CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES:

1. Preservation and enhancement of dignity of the human being is most
important in a democracy.
2. BoR is designed to protect and preserve ideals of liberty, equality and
security against assault of opportunism
J. Jackson: Purpose of the BoR is to withdraw certain subjects
from viccisitudes of political controversy and establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts.
3. Freedom of expression and of assembly is included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people.
J. Douglas: Liberties of one are liberties of all; liberties of one are
not safe unless all liberties are protected.
4. Rights of free expression, assembly and petition are not only civil but also
political rights.
5. BoR primarily protects human rights, which are imprescriptible.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration
at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police.
PBMEO confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or
rally cannot be cancelled. Despite PBMs pleas, the petitioners and their 400 members
proceeded with the demonstration. PBM filed a charge against petitioners and other
employees who composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875
(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.'
Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.
Issue: PBM reasoned that it would suffer loss and damage by reason of employees
absence, arguing preservation of property rights. Is this a valid ground for the
dismissal of employees? NO.
Ratio: Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of
the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated
in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights
freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances over property rights has been sustained. To regard the
demonstration as a violation of the CBA stretches unduly the compass of the CBA; a
potent means of inhibiting speech, inflicts moral and mortal wounds on Constitutional
guarantees.
Property and property rights can be lost through prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible.

II. DUE PROCESS OF LAW (vis--vis the other powers of the State)
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
Ichong vs. Hernandez The State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property,
provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or
standard, as always, is reason.
KEY CONCEPTS:
A. As limitation on the fundamental powers of the State
Due process and equal protection are two of the most important limitations in the
fundamental powers of the State. The three fundamental powers of the State are
inherent; it inheres in a State by virtue of its being. It is not a power granted by the
Constitution. Instead, the Constitution provides certain limitations on the exercise of
these powers, foremost of which is due process and equal protection.
To appreciate how due process works, it is first necessary to define the fundamental
powers of the State. Due process and equal protection serve as a limit to these
powers.
B. Fundamental powers of the State
1. POLICE POWER
Definition:
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro: The police power of the state is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the law of overruling
necessity. It is that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.
Ichong vs. Hernandez: As [police power] derives its existence from the very existence
of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to
be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive
and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable.
Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of
society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field
and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public
interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended
human foresight. x x x So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of
the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The
most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause .
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assn v. City of Manila: Police power has
been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent, and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Ordinance number 4760 is beyond the powers of
municipal board to enact insofar as it regulates motels; unconstitutional and violative
of due process.
SC: Ordinance is not unconstitutional. Police power measures designed to safeguard
morals should not be nullified purely on conjecture. Alarming increase in the rate of
prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila is traceable to the existence of motels.
The ordinance only proposes to check on the clandestine harboring of guests and
discourage establishments from operating illegally.
People vs. Pomar: By reason of the constant growth of public opinion in a developing
civilization, the term police power has never been, and we do not believe can be,
clearly and definitely defined and circumscribed. x x x [Hence] a definition of the
police power of the State must depend upon the particular law and the particular facts
to which it is to be applied. x x x Mr. Justice Cooley says: The police power is the
power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for
the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subject of the same.
Although it is a growing and expanding power, police power] cannot grow faster than
the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the
peoples law the constitution.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Pomar is in violation of Section 13 in connection with
Section 15 of Act #1371 because while he granted his pregnant employee her leave,
he refused to pay her corresponding regular wages.
SC: Law is unconstitutional and void because it takes account of the necessities of
only one party to the contract and ignores the necessities of the employer. He is
precluded under penalty from adjusting compensation to the differing merits of
employees. The employer and employee must have equality of rights, and only
legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of
contract.
Liberty in this case includes:
1. Right to labor
2. Right to refuse labor
White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila: Police power, while incapable of an exact
definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its

comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient
and flexible response as the conditions warrant.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Challenges validity of Manila Ordinance 7774
(ordinance prohibiting short-time admission rates and wash-up rate schemes) because
it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement, invalid exercise of police
power, unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
SC: Ordinance is unconstitutional because it denies the legitimate activities curtailing
liberty of citizens
legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting adults

legitimate uses for wash rates or renting out room for twice a day
The ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by
patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate
actions.
Behavior ordinance seeks to curtail is already prohibited.
Test for valid exercise:

LAWFUL SUBJECT: Interest of the general public (as distinguished from a particular
class)
LAWFUL MEANS: Means employed is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and is not unduly oppressive.
The exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property
of any person is subject to the judicial inquiry. And the principal yardsticks against
which such exercise must be measured are the due process clause and the equal
protection clause.
IN GENERAL: Restrictions found in the BoR are directed against the state. They do
not govern the relations between private persons.
EXCEPTION: Almost all the protections against the state found in the BoR have been
made applicable as civil law to relations between private persons through Article 32 of
the Civil Code.
2. EMINENT DOMAIN
Definition: power of the State to forcibly take private property for public use upon
payment of just compensation.
Requisites:
Necessity the necessity must be of public character. Political question
when power is exercised by Congress, generally justiciable when exercised
by a delegate (except when grant is grant of authority for special purpose).
Private property all private property capable of ownership may be
expropriated, except money and choses in action. It may include services.
Private property devoted for public use is also a proper subject of
expropriation.
Taking see case of Republic v. Castelvi for requisites of taking. See also:
Association of Small Landowners case.
Public use includes not only use directly available to the public but also
those which redound to their indirect benefit. See Heirs of Ardona v. Reyes.
Just compensation the full and fair equivalent of the property taken; the
fair market value of the property.
Due process of law the property owner must be given an opportunity to
be heard in the determination of the fair market value of the property.
3. TAXATION
Definition: power by which the State raises revenue to defray the necessary
expenses of the Government. It is the enforced proportional contributions from
persons and property, levied by the State by virtue of its sovereignty, for the support
of the government and for all its public needs.
Limitations
Public purpose
Should not be confiscatory
Uniformity of taxation
Exemption of government from taxation
C. Life, Liberty, Property
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills, Co., Inc
Hierarchy of rights - Primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized because these freedom are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society and the threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions. They need breathing space to survive,
permitting government regulation only with narrow specificity. Human rights are
imprescriptible.
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro

Definition of liberty - Liberty, as understood in democracies, is not license; it
is liberty regulated by law. Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater food of the peace and order of society and the general
well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled
license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of
citizens would, if exercised without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are
also and equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. xxx
None of these right can be taken except by due process of law .
DUE PROCESS
D. Definition of Due Process
The earliest articulations of the due process clause seem to combine both substantive
and procedural aspects of due process. See the following examples:
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro Due process of law means simply, first that there
shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its
operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of
the state or to all of a class

PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Rubi, et al are illegally deprived of their liberty due to
Sec 2145 of Administrative Code of 1917 (section 2145 in a nutshell: provincial
governors can direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up habitation on unoccupied
public lands; refusal amounts to imprisonment)
SC: Law is valid. Regarding religious discrimination:
Term non-Christian = natives of Philippine islands of low grade of
civilization
Does not discriminate based on religious differences but on geographical
area
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad: To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf
of the public, it must appear, first that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, requires such interference, and second,
that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose,
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. x x x [The determination of the
legislature] as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or
conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Act #2972 (in a nutshell, it is unlawful for account
books to be in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect) is
in violation of the constitutional rights of Chinese merchants, domiciled in the
Philippines.
SC: Law is valid and constitutional because the permissible construction is that the
law does not specify what books shall be kept; law only intended to require keeping of
books as were necessary in order to facilitate governmental inspection for tax
purposes. Under this construction, the Chinese are not singled out as special subjects
for discriminating and hostile legistlation.
Due process at its core simply means reasonable application, or the absence of
arbitrariness.
See People v. Cayat, Rubi v. Provincial Board:
a. Law is prescribed in harmony with the powers of the legislature
b. Law is reasonable in its application
c. Enforced according to regular methods of procedure
d. Applicable alike to all citizens of a state or all of a class
Ichong v. Hernandez : The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of
legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. x x x [T]he guaranty of due
process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real
and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Retail is common, ordinary occupation, gainful and
honest and beyond power of legislature to prohibit.
SC: This argument rests on the assumption that they practiced in a creditable
manner, without injury to citizens, which they didnt. Thus, the exclusion of aliens is
not unreasonable. This is necessary to free the national economy from alien
dominance.
Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assn v. City of Manila: [Due process]
furnishes a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.x x x It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively pit, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. x x x Correctly it has
been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting
idea of fair play.
Requirements progressed as understanding of due process became more refined:
Broad articulation above is often repeated in cases where rational basis test
is applied
Rational basis is most often applied by the SC in analysis of cases (for the
most part, the court has been deferential due to the presumption of
constitutionality).
E. Procedural Due Process vs. Substantive Due Process
The distinction between procedural due process and substantive due process was
discussed in:
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila: The due process guaranty has traditionally
been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government,

procedural due process and substantive due process. Procedural due process
refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person
of life, liberty or property. Procedural due process concerns itself with government
action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private
sphere.
[But the due process clause is not limited to procedural aspects.] Substantive due
process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires on
whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life,
liberty, or property.
It is to this question of WoN substantive due process was afforded that the different
levels of scrutiny may be applied (rational basis, immediate/intermediate review, and
strict scrutiny)
F. Different Levels of Review (White Light v. Manila case)
Three levels of review when an exercise of police power is being challenged as
violative of a constitutional right (esp. due process):
Rational basis: laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a
legitimate government interest
Economic/commercial/property legislation
Anything that would satisfy the court that the law is not
unreasonable/arbitrary, etc.
Is there public interest/welfare involved?

Is the means reasonably necessary to accomplish the

purpose?
Presumption of validity of laws
Strict scrutiny: Compelling state interest. The focus is on compelling,

rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less
restrictive means for achieving that interest.
Fundamental liberties those dealing with freedom of the mind
or person, or restricting the political process
Compelling state interest:
Does the state have a compelling reason/interest to

reach into such legislation
infringing into the private domain?
Is there no other alternative?

Presumption is not forcefully enforced in this analysis/test
Immediate scrutiny: important government interest. Governmental
interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive
measures is considered
Issues of gender and legitimacy
Important state interest - does not rise to the level of compelling
state interest so as to remove the presumption of constitutionality
No local jurisprudence applying this test yet
Strict scrutiny was applied in determining whether the requirements of substantive

due process were met in an ordinance challenged as unconstitutional in White Light.
The requirements of due process that must concur (as held in that case) are:
Interest of the public generally, as opposed to a class;
Means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights;
No other alternative less intrusive of private rights can work;
Reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment.
G. Substantive Due Process in Publication of Laws
Tanada v. Tuvera: [The publication of laws] "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person

may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
H. Cardinal Requirements of Due Process in Administrative Proceedings
As enumerated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations : The cardinal primary
rights which must be respected in administrative proceedings are as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
Right to hearing, which includes the right to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof.
The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
The decision must have something to support itself.
The evidence used to support a finding or conclusion should be substantial.
Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
The tribunal must act on its own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate
in arriving at a decision.
The tribunal must render its decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for
the decisions rendered.
Lumiqued vs. Estrada: In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is to
explain ones side. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due
process as long as the party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due
course. A public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guarantee
of due process of law for it is a public trust or agency.
I. Due Process in Academic Disciplinary Proceedings
As enumerated in Non vs. Dames, there are withal minimum standards which must be
met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process [in academic disciplinary
proceedings], and these are, that:
a. The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
b. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired;
c. They shall be informed of the evidence against them;
d. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
e. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
J. Due Process in Labor Cases
The Labor Code requires twin requirements of NOTICE and HEARING for a VALID
DISMISSAL. However, the Court in Serrano v. NLRC clarified that this procedural due
process requirement is not constitutional but merely statutory, hence a violation of
such requirement does not render the dismissal void. Hence:
Serrano vs. NLRC: There are three reasons why, on the other hand, violation by the
employer of the notice requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process
resulting in the nullity of the employee's dismissal or layoff. x x x

Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental
powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private power, such as the
termination of employment under the Labor Code. x x x
b. Notice and hearing are required under the Due Process Clause before the
power of organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. This is
obviously not the case of termination of employment under Art. 283. x x x
c. The third reason why the notice requirement under Art. 283 cannot be
considered a requirement of the Due Process Clause is that the employer
cannot really be expected to be entirely an impartial judge of his own
cause.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Isetann Dept. Store phased out the entire security and
got an independent security agency, thus Serrano was dismissed. He argues that his
dismissal was illegal given that he was given his notice of termination on the same
day his services were terminated, when the notice should have been given 1 month
prior according to Art. 238 of the LC.
SC: Petition granted and Isetann is ordered to pay petitioner separation pay. Failure
to comply with the notice requirement is not a denial of due process, but a mere
failure to observe a procedure for termination of employment makes termination
merely ineffectual.
a.
Agabon vs. NLRC Where dismissal is for a just cause, lack of statutory due process
should not nullify the dismissal, but the employer should indemnify employee for
violation of statutory rights.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: They were dismissed because private respondents
refused to give them assignments unless they agreed to work on a pakyaw basis;
the private respondents did not comply with twin requirements of notice and hearing.
SC: In this case, the dismissal is for a just or authorized cause but due process was
not observed. Serrano did not consider the full meaning of Labor Code Art. 279,
maning the termination is illegal only if it is not for any justified or authorized cause.
Payment of backwages is justified only if employee was unjustly terminated. The due
process under the labor code has two aspects:
Substantive: valid and authorized causes of termination under LC
Procedural: manner of dismissal
Statutory due process should be differentiated from failure to comply with
constitutional due process.
Statutory: protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just
cause after notice and hearing
Constitutional: protects individuals from government and assures him his
rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings.
Philcomsat vs. Alcuaz: The power of the state to regulate conduct and business of
public utilities is limited insofar as its not the owner of the property or has general
power of management. Hence, any regulation which operates as effective confiscation
of private property is void because its against the due process and equal protection
clauses.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Under EO 546, NTC issued an order requiring
PHILCOMSAT to: (1) apply for a requisite certificate of public convenience and
necessity; (2) change modified rates by reducing to 15%. PHILCOMSAT now argues
that this order violates due process because there was no notice and hearing.
SC: Order is null and void. It was premised on a superficial finding of fact without
affording the petitioner the benefit of explanation as to what aspects of the financial
statements warranted a rate reduction. The rate-fixing order of NTC does not exempt
it from notice and hearing.
K. Other Concepts
Third party standing
The right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided
three important criteria are satisfied:
1. The litigant must have suffered an injury-in-fact
2. The litigant must have a close relation to the third party;
3. There must exist some hindrance to the third partys ability to protect his
or her own interest. (White Light Corporation v. City of Manila)
Overbreadth Doctrine
Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the
overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even
constitutionally guaranteed rights. (White Light Corporation v. City of
Manila)
A governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep

unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
(Estrada v. Sandiganbayan)
Void for Vagueness Doctrine

A statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand
what conduct is prohibited by the statute. A statute or act may be said to
be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in
two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid;
and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
[This doctrine] can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is
utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a
saving clause or by construction. The test in determining whether a criminal
statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct. It must be stressed,
however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude. (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan)

Statutory vs. Constitutional Due Process
Due process under the Labor Code, like constitutional due process, has two
aspects: substantive (i.e. the valid and authorized causes of employment
termination), and procedural (i.e. the manner of dismissal). . . Breaches of
these due process requirements violate the Labor Code, not the
Constitution. Therefore, statutory due process should be differentiated from
failure to comply with constitutional due process.
Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and
assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings;

while statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing
Rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause
after notice and hearing. (Agabon v. NLRC)
III. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

KEY CONCEPTS:
A. Definition
Ichong v. Hernandez: The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor
and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of

inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object
to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand
absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
Regarding objections to alien participation in retail trade:
Mere fact of alienage is root cause of distingction between alien and
national as trader
Alien owes allegiance to his own country so he lacks in spirit of
sympathy/consideration for Filipino customers
The manipulative practices of aliens justify the legislative classification
adopted in retail trade measure.
Regarding difference in alien aims as sufficient basis for distinction:
Objectionable characteristics of alien retailers which are actual and real are
sufficient grounds for legislative classification.
Can citizenship be basis for classification? YES
Difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes basis for
reasonable classification in exercise of police power.
Dumlao v. COMELEC: The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is

subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another
class.xxx It does not forbid legal classification. What it forbids is classification which is
arbitrary and unreasonable.
PETITIONER DUMLAOS ARGUMENT: Assails constitutionality of BP 52, Sec. 4 as
discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process. The law in question
provides special disqualification to those who are retired provincial, municipal or city
officials who have received their retirement benefits, who shall have been 65 yo at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected.
SC: BP 52, Sec. 4 is constitutional.There is reason to disqualify a retired 65 yo elective
official because the need for new blood assumes relevance. Purpose of the law is to
allow young blood in local governments; classification is therefore based on
substantial distinction.
PETITIONER IGOTS ARGUMENT: Questioning accreditation of some political
parties by respondent as contrary to the Constitution that provides that a bonafide
candidate shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.

SC: BP 52, Sec. 4, Par. 2 is null and void. It contravenes the constitutional
presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office
on grounds that charges have been filed against him. It condemns before hearing.
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission: Arbitrariness is challenged by the due process

clause but if an act partakes of an unwarranted prejudice, the equal protection clause
applies. Substantial similarity suffices as long as all the requirements for valid
classification are achieved and all those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: EO 1 (or the creation of the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010) violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution, officials and personnel of the previous administration,
even as it excludes those of other administrations.
SC: EO 1 should be struck down because it violative of the equal protection rights.
The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Not
to include past administration similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness. OSCs
enumerated differences of the Arroyo administrtation is not substantial enough to
merit restriction of investigation to previous administration only.
Brown vs. Board of Education: The denial of admission to minor children of Negro
race to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting racial
segregation was ruled in this case to be violative of the equal protection clause.
Separation of Negro children from others solely because of race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community. This case overturned the Plessy vs.
Ferguson doctrine which upheld the separate but equal doctrine, meaning, that
equality of treatment is accorded when races are provided substantially equal
facilities, even though these facilities be separate.
Tecson vs. COMELEC: The distinction on legitimate and illegitimate children rests on
real differences, but real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real
differences may justify distinction for one purpose, but not for another purpose. To
disqualify an in illegitimate child from holding public office is to punish him for
indiscretion of parents no justice and rationality in this distinction, hence violation of
the equal protection clause.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Since FPJ was an illegitimate child, he followed the
citizenship of his American mom, Bessie Kelly. Thus, he cannot run for the presidency.
SC: Such pronouncement violates the equal protection clause twice.
a. it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate and illegitimate child
b. it would an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father
and illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
B. Requisites of Valid Classification
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. It is enumerated in People v. Cayat and Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
Commission, that the classification must:
a. Rest on substantial distinctions;
b. Be germane to the purposes of the law;
c.
d.
Not be limited to existing conditions only; and

Must apply equally to all members of the same class.
The test for valid classification articulated in Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc
City is substantially the same:
a. Classification is based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences;
b. These are germane to the purpose of the law;
c.
The classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of present;
d. The classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
Examples of Valid Classification
Valid
People v. Cayat
Ichong v. Hernandez
Dumlao v. COMELEC
Invalid
Philippine Judges Assn v. Prado
Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City
C. Standard of Review
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime introduced a modification in equal protection

jurisprudence by using the three-level review/scrutiny heretofore used in due process
cases (rational basis, immediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny). So that, in effect, the level
of review when it comes to equal protection challenges may follow the following
format:
Whether the State was justified in making a classification at all. Three level scrutiny
Deferential or Rational Basis Scrutiny - the challenged classification
needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state
interest
Most liberal test + the most used test
Applied to most subjects
Middle-tier or Intermediate Scrutiny - the government must show that
the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the
classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest
Usually applied to: suspects classifications (gender or illegitimacy)
Strict Judicial Scrutiny - a legislative classification which impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and
the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest.
Usually applied to: cases involving classifications based on race,
national origin, religion, alienage, denial of the right to vote,
migration, access to courts, other rights recognized as
fundamental
Whether the classification was valid. --> usual test in EPC cases: test of valid
classification

III. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES - ARTICLE III, SECTION 2
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES OF 4TH AMENDMENT AND SECTION 2, ARTICLE
III
Katz vs. US (1967)
Scope of 4th amendment:
The 4th amendment protects people not simply areas against
unreasonable search and seizure
The 4th amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but also
extends as well to the recording of oral statements, over-heard without any
trespass under local property law.
Overturning the Olmstead doctrine:
Olmstead doctrine: absent penetration of a constitutionally protected
area is legal under the 4th amendment
Terry vs. Ohio (1967)
The heart of the 4th amendment: The right against unreasonable searches and
seizure belong to citizens. No right is more sacred or is more guarded than right of an
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from restraint and
interference.
People vs. Marti (1991)
In the absence of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the state.
The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against private individuals, this article
serves as a protection against the State
The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the
State. It does not concern itself with relations between individuals
What the Bill of Rights does is to declare the forbidden zones in the private
sphere inaccessible to any power holder (Fr. Bernas, as quoted by the case
in deliberations by the Constitutional Commission)
Warrant is needed if the government requests for the search and
seizure: but, if at the behest of a private person or establishment
for its own private purposes, the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be invoked.
Alvarez vs. CFI (1937)

Power of State to Search and Seize: necessary for public welfare
Must be exercised and enforced without violating constitutionally granted
rights of the citizens
It is the highest duty and privilege of the court to protect the citizen and
the maintenance of his constitutionally granted rights
General rule: Laws authorizing searches and seizures must be
strictly construed (favouring the citizen)
SEARCH WARRANT
Search warrant (definition)
An order in writing
Issued in the name of the People of the Philippines
Signed by a judge or justice of peace
Directed to a peace officer: commanding him to search for personal
property and bring it before the court
JUDICIAL ORDER COURT ISSUANCE
Katz vs. US (1967)
There is a need of a judicial order
The judicial order of a search and seizure warrant serves as a safeguard
which limits government agents in their actions. Self-restrain of police force
is not sufficient.
The omission of judicial authorization bypasses the safeguards provided by
an objective predetermination of probable cause. It substitutes instead the
far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event-justification for the search
Reasonableness of search warrant is a judicial question
Determination of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a search
warrant is a judicial question which is based on the following circumstances:
Existence of probable cause
The manner of the search
The place or thing searched
The character of articles produced
Roan vs. Gonzales (1986)
Illegal items can be seized if search is valid
In this case the search is not valid
There was no valid search warrant
Absent such warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived
The court determined it was not a valid warrant

REQUIREMENTS OF A SEARCH WARRANT
OATH
Nala vs. Barroso, Jr. (2003)

a. Probably cause is present
b. Such presence is determined personally by the judge
c. The complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally
examined by the judgment
In writing or under oath or affirmation
d. The applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them
e. The warrant specifically describes the person and place to be searched and
the person and things to be seized (based on Rule 126, Rules of Court on
Criminal Procedure, Sections 4 and 5)

Oath (definition)
Any form of attestation that he is bound in conscience to perform an act
faithfully and truthfully; or
An outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or
promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God
PROBABLE CAUSE AND PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF APPLICANTS

Such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection to the offense are in the place ought ot be searched.
Must be based on the personal knowledge of complainant or
applicant
As stated in:
Burgos vs. AFP (1984)
People vs. Malmstead (1991)
Nala vs. Barroso, Jr. (2003) Determining probable cause:
The magistrate must make an exhaustive and probing examination of
witnesses and applicant and not merely routine or pro forma examination
An affidavit must be sufficient in order to establish probable cause
Burgos, Sr. vs. AFP (1984)
Affidavit insufficient when:
a. The requirement of personal knowledge by complainant and witnesses is
not met (upheld Alvarez vs. CFI)
b. The purpose of having personal knowledge by the complainant and
witnesses and the sufficiency of the warrant is to convince the magistrate
seeking the issuance of the warrant that there is probable cause
Requisites of an oath
It must refer to facts
Such facts are of personal knowledge of the petitioner or applicant or
witnesses
NOT HEARSAY
Test of sufficiency of an oath
Whether or not it was drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged against the
affiant and he be held liable for damages.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF A JUDGE
Bache vs. Ruiz (1971)
Personally examination (why needed)
It is necessary to enable the judge to determine whether or not there exists
a probable cause
In this case there was no personal examination of the judge
The determination of probable cause calls for an exercise of judgment after

a judicial appraisal of the facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in
the absence of any rule to the contrary
How to personally examine (to determine probable cause)

There must be opportunity to observe the demeanor of those to be
examined
There must be follow-up questions
People vs. Marti (1991)
Modifications were introduced in the 1987 Constitution regarding the
issuance of a warrant and the corresponding responsibility of a judge in the
issuance
What the judge must do:
Not simply rehash contents of affidavit
Must make his own extensive inquiry on the existence of personal
knowledge on the part of the applicant/witnesses

Lim vs. Felix (1991)

Issuance of a warrant of arrest
Placer vs. Villanueva: the judge may rely upon a fiscals certification of the
existence of a probable cause on the basis thereof, may issue a warrant of
arrest
Personal determination of probable cause (Requisite Procedure)
Judge will personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the Fiscal regarding the existence of a probable cause and on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest
If on the basis thereof, finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
report of the fiscal and require the submission of supporting affidavits of the
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a
probable cause
But, in the case of Lim vs. Felix, the judge didnt evaluate the
probable cause personally it was the provincial prosecutor who
determined the probable cause. There was no basis for the judge
to determine probable cause because records of the case were
still in Masbate, he did not know of the events which transpired,
he only had the certification of the prosecutor and denied the
transmittal of the evidence on the ground that the mere
certification for him was enough basis.
Preliminary investigations
It must be determined whether the investigation shall be for:
1. Sufficient ground to file information
2. Examination or determination of a probable cause
Roan vs. Gonzales 1986
Purpose of personal examination of judge
To strengthen the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure
Questions regarding contents of affidavit is not sufficient
There must be own searching questions
There must be taking of depositions in writing attached to the record with
the affidavit
1.
The judge in this case just questioned whether the complaint and
witnesses understood what was written in the affidavit
Sufficiency of depositions
Examination must be probing and exhaustive to establish probable cause
1. Own inquiry regarding intent and justification of the application
The judge must make his own inquiry and not simply rehash contents of an
affidavit
PARTICULARITY OF A WARRANT
Stonehill vs. Diokno (1967)
GENERAL WARRANTS evil sought to be remedied by Constitution
Constitution wants to outlaw general warrants
General warrants would place the sanctity of the domicile and privacy of
communication at the mercy of the whims and caprice of peace officers
Issuance of general warrants may be for fishing expeditions
1. It is when the applicant has no evidence and uses the warrant to
procure evidence
2. This is not allowed because lack of particularity of affidavit would
be impossible for the determination of probable cause
General rule: the warrant must contract the particular place to be searched and
person or thing to be seized
The affidavit must be sufficient in order to establish probable cause
The affidavit must contain the particular items, person and place
Exception: If the nature of the goods to be seized cannot be particularly determined.
The nature of the thing is general in description
The thing is not required of a very technical description
There must a specific offense alleged in the application of a warrant
Must not be abstract averments
1. Consequence of this: impossible for judge to have issued
warrants upon probable cause
2. Probable cause: presupposes that particular acts or specific
omissions violating provisions of criminal law
There must be only one offense in each warrant
Previous rule: As discussed in Stonehill vs. Diokno, the Rules of Court
which was not yet amended regarding particularity of a warrant which
allowed to include violations in relation to one specific offense
Now, as amended by the ROC, no search warrant shall issue for more
than one specific offense
General warrants not allowed
GENERAL WARRANT IF: If the language used in a search warrant is all
embracing as to include all conceivable records of the accused, which if
seized, could possible render his (Bache Co., Incs) business inoperative

Tests of particularity of a search warrant:
When the description is as specific as circumstances will ordinarily allow; or
When the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which
warrant officer may be guided in making search and seizure; or
When the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to
the offense for which the warrant is issued
Burgos Sr. vs. AFP (1984)
Supporting affidavits must contain a specification station with particularity the alleged
subversive material which Burgos has published or is intending to publish.
Mere conclusions of law will not suffice
Being bereft of particularity will not justify issuance of a warrant
Wording in the affidavit: is in possession or has in his control printing
equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents

which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion under PD885

Purpose of the particularity of a search warrant
To prevent the arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant by persons in
authority
SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT
PEOPLE VS. ARUTA (1998) [BIBLE]
a. Search incidental to lawful arrest (ROC Rule 113, Sec. 5)
b. Seizure in plain view
Valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties
The evidence was inadvertently discovered by police who had the
right to be there
Evidence must be immediately apparent
Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search
c.
Search of moving vehicles
d. Consented warrantless search (waiver of right against unreasonable
searches and seizures)
e. Customs search
f.
Stop and frisk
g. Exigent or emergency circumstances
Short facts: P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by an informant that a certain Aling Rosa
(ARUTA) will arrive from Baguio with large volume of marijuana with her via bus
which the informant identified. Aruta descended from the bus, informant points finger
at her and police asked if they could open her bag and check contents. They found it
contained dried marijuana leaves and a bus ticket such were brought to NARCOM
office. Olongapo RTC convicted her in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act (life
imprisonment).
WON it was reasonable search? NO. No probable cause for search incidental to
lawful arrest.
Comparison of Aruta to other cases
Other cases which held that the search was valid
due to presence of probable cause
People vs. Tangliban
Conducted surveillance of victory bus

liner
Person was acting suspiciously
Bag was asked to open
On the spot tip allowed
People vs. Malmstead
Acted suspiciously
No reasonable time to get warrant
He was aboard moving vehicle
People vs. Bagista
Described exact appearance and when

searched, it fitted the description
Moving vehicle and check point
Manlili vs. CA
Surveillance of Kalookan Cemetery

because druggies roam about
Chanced upon a person who
appeared,
based
on
officers
experience, were high on drugs
Arutas Case
probable cause
without
Aruta was not acting

suspiciously
Narcom
had
knowledge
Not suspicious
There was reasonable
time to get warrant
She was just crossing
street
prior
Crossing street,
moving vehicle
No suspicious or illegal
actions by Aruta
not
ARUTA CASE SIMILAR TO AMINUDIN (both are not valid search and seizures)
Why Aruta case doesnt fall under the other categories of valid warrantless search
Not Plain view
The confiscated item was inside the bag
Not moving vehicle
Because she was in the middle of the street descending
a parked bus
Not stop and frisk
There was no way her actions could arouse suspicion
that she was going something illegal
Not exigent or emergency Unlike People vs. De Gracia there is no general,
circumstance
prevailing chaos that would render the Courts inactive
No waiver of right or Silence does not constitute a waiver
consented search
Waiver of an unreasonable search and seizure is not
presumed

SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST
LAWFUL WARRANTLESS ARREST NEEDED TO UNDERSTAND CASES UNDER

THIS SECTION
ROC Rule 113, Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
People vs. Malmstead (1991)
The question in this case was WON the search was valid proceeding from
valid arrest?
The search of Malmsteads personal items were incidental to his arrest
when he was found in possession of illegal drugs (Under ROC Rule 113,
Section 5, par. a) not a valid arrest, hence, not a valid search
The arrest was made on probable cause that he was committing a crime:
Narcom officers received report that a Caucasian will be travelling
by bus out of Sagada area
There was a routine check (this case also falls under search
of moving vehicle)
There was a bulge on his waist prompting Narcom officers for
passport presentation which he vehemently denied presenting
People vs. Aminudin (1988)
Aminudin disembarked from a vessel. An informant pointed his finger at him

saying he was the one who shall bring in drugs. Without an arrest warrant,
the police proceeded to handcuff him and take a look at his belongings and
found what looked like marijuana leaves. An info was filed against him in
violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. WON SEARCH VALID? IT IS NOT
VALID SEARCH BECAUSE ARREST NOT VALID.
OSG invoked Rule 113 Section5, par. b and the court found that the search
was not incidental to a lawful arrest. They had all the info needed for a
warrant but cavalier Narcom officials were complacent and confident. Bill of
rights were ignored. The finger pointed by informant was the only trigger
for the arrest. Aminundin was not doing anything illegal at the point of the
arrest.
People vs. Burgos (1986)
Explanation of Sec. 5 (a) of ROC Rule 113
This provision requires that the officer arresting has personal
knowledge of the act.
The offense must also be committed in his present
In this case there is no personal knowledge. It came from

informant Cesar Masamlok
At the time of the arrest Burgos was plowing his field, without
weapon hes not committing a crime
The information regarding the gun came from the wife and the
subversive documents from Burgos
Explanation of Sec. 5 (b) of ROC Rule 113

Reasonable ground of an informant is not enough for officers to arrest an
accused. There must be in fact a crime committed it must be an
undisputed fact
Essential precondition: that a crime has been committed
In this case the crime has not yet been ascertained

They were still fishing for evidence against Burgos
Chimel vs. California (1969)

Police may search without a warrant only the immediate area around the suspect
from which he could obtain a weapon or destroy evidence. But a person's entire
dwelling cannot be searched merely because he is arrested there.
Immediate area: reasonable only to the defendants person
Nearby weapons he could grab to attack the officer
What he has in his pockets
Reason for allowable search of the person without warrant:
Reasonable for officer to confiscate whatever may be used to threaten his
life or limb
There is no justification for routinely searching rooms other than that which
is where the lawful arrest is
The 4th amendment did not allow a search to beyond that of the area of the
person arrested
SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE
Papa vs. Mago (1968)
Upheld United States Carroll doctrine

The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a
ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not

practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which a warrant must be sought.
Reasons for allowing warrantless search of moving vehicles
Swift and powerful
Numbers of automobiles increased
Can be used for the successful commission of a crime
Provides for silent approach and swift escape of criminals
CHECKPOINT SEARCH
Valmonte vs. De Villa (1990)
Checkpoints
Security measures of the state
State has the right to defend itself from enemies and pursue program of
development under its Police Power
The State has the authority and the right to select reasonable measures and
means for best achieving its goals
Checkpoint search:
It is only a brief detention or brief hassle
Only required to answer 1-2 questions
In US courts: checkpoints are less intrusive because they are conducted in
one area
Reasonable Checkpoint search:
The vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to body search
The inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search.
The routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of right
against unreasonable searches and seizures
Warrantless checkpoint searches
These searches are not objected because it is founded on public interest,
safety and necessity
No warrant is needed because of mobility of vehicles
CUSTOMS SEARCH
Papa vs. Mago (1968)
The police are allowed to conduct warrantless searches in behalf of the Department of
Customs. They are authorized to: examine, open any box, trunk, other
containers when he has reasonable cause to believe that such items were
hidden from customs search
Sec. 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code states that no warrant is required for
police or authorized persons to pass, enter, search any land, enclosure, building,
warehouse, store, vessels, aircrafts, vehicles but not dwelling.
Purpose of customs search:
The purpose of the seizure of the Customs bureau was to verify whether or
no Custom duties and taxes were paid for their importation
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
Police authorities may seize without warrant illegally possessed items found in plain
view.
Requisites of Plain View Search:
The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area
The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent
It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes is
a contraband or otherwise subject to seizure
An earlier case trying to list down cases of allowable search without
warrant (ARUTA IS STILL BIBLE)
Search incidental to lawful arrest
When a person is being frisked for weapons he may use against an officer
Search of moving vehicles
Inspection of a vessel and aircraft
Because of their mobility
Relative ease in fleeing states jurisdiction
When the person knowingly waives objections to an illegal search or agrees
to be searched
Officers may take prohibited items without warrant if they are open to the
eye and hand and the peace officers comes upon them inadvertently
In Roan vs. Gonzales, they were trying to be exempt under #6

but failed because they deliberately sought the illegal firearms

STOP AND FRISK
Terry vs. Ohio (1967)

Stop and frisk rule:
The right of an agent, to protect himself and others, to conduct a carefully limited
search of outer clothing of such persons (as listed below) in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such search is reasonable under the 4 th
amendment:
a. Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the person with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous;
b. Where in the course of the investigation of this behaviour he identifies
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries; and
c.
Where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others safety.
No probable cause
Of all the valid warrantless searches, stop and frisk does not require a
probable cause but a reasonable conclusion by the police officer through
observing unusual conduct of the person to be searched
Test of agents reasonable conclusion: WoN a reasonably prudent man would be
warranted to believe his safety is jeopardized
Seizure (in stop and frisk)
When a police officer accosts an individual and restrains him of his freedom
Search (in stop and frisk)
A careful exploration of outer surfaces of a persons clothing in an attempt to find
weapons
Manalili vs. CA (1997)
Guidelines of Stop and Frisk
a. When police officer observes unusual conduct
b. This conduct leads him to believe, also in light of his experience, that
criminal activity may be afoot
c. The persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous
d. Also, in the course of investigating his behaviour of the man, after
identifying himself as a police officer the man is entitled to a limited
search of outer clothing because:
a. Fear of his own safety
b. Fear of publics safety that a crime might ensue
Definition of stop and frisk: (upheld Terry vs. Ohio)
The right of the police to stop a citizen on the street to interrogate him and
pat him for weapons
Evidence obtained in valid stop and frisk is admissible as evidence
Stop and frisk effective

It is an effective crime prevention in the US for inspecting possible criminal
behaviour
RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE EXERCISED BY
RULE: the legality of the seizure could only be contested by the party whose rights
have been impaired.
The objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal
Cannot be invoked by a third party
A Corporation has a right to exercise right against unreasonable searches
and seizure
The individuals, in forming a corporation, do not waive their right against
unreasonable searches and seizures
The property of a corporation cannot be taken without compensation
Protected by the 14th amendment against unlawful discrimination
Valmonte vs. De Villa (1989)
This right is a personal right
d. Invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed or threatened to
be infringed
WAIVER OF RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE
People vs. Burgos (1986)
Requisites of a waiver:
A right must exist
Person had knowledge of such right
Person has intention to relinquish that right
In this case, mere failure to object to the search and seizure does not
constitute a waiver
There is a presumption against waiver by the courts

VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST 2
People vs. Mengote (1992)
Explanation of Rule 113, Section 5 (a):
The person must be arrested after the offense has been committed
Must be committed in the presence of a police officer
Both are not evident in the case of Mengote. Mengote was only
looking from side to side holding his abdomen he was not
committing any criminal act
His act was not suspicious enough to suggest he is about to
commit a crime
Explanation of Rule 113, Section 5 (b):

The arresting officers need personal knowledge of the crime
Condition precedent: that a crime has in fact been committed
The arresting officers had no personal knowledge of the facts

indicating that Mengote already committed a crime suspicion is
not enough
A crime has yet to be committed
People vs. Manlulu (1994)
A crime was committed 1am, but there was still no search and seizure warrant when
the arresting officer detained the accused at 7pm .
Explanation of Rule 113, Section 5 (b):
There was no personal knowledge of the arresting officer in this case
Patrolman only personally gathered information

Sufficient knowledge does not constitute as personal knowledge
A crime was not in fact has just been committed: The persona must be
immediately arrested after the commission of the offense
In this case it was already 17 hours (but Manlulu is still guilty

because of strong testimony of credible witness)
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Exclusionary rule (definition)
Exclusion of evidence illegally obtained
Reason for Exclusionary Rule:
The exclusionary rule is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against the right to unreasonable searches and
seizures
This is also essential to the right to privacy
Please see Rule 113, Section 5 which was inserted under Valid Warrantless Search
Purpose of Exclusionary Rule:

To deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effective way by removing the incentive to disregard i
Right to object use of evidence: The exclusive right (of the accused)
Like the right against unreasonable searches and seizure this is a personal
right which could not be invoked by third parties
In this case, Stonehill is a member of the corporation and invoked the right
to exclude evidence procured against the Corporation. It should be the
corporation and not Stonehill who should have invoked the right, insofar as
the items seized in the premises of the corporation.
Rule: If government action invaded rights of a corporation, not affecting the personal
rights of individuals, then the corporation and not the other individuals can invoke this
right.
Such search and seizure will be unlawful if the rights of persons
(personal property had been seized) and their privacy disturbed.
People vs. Mengote (1992)
Illegally obtained evidence could not be admitted because it is a fruit of a poisonous
tree
General Rule: there is an absolute prohibition of presentation of evidence obtained
in violation of Art. 3 Section 2
Exception: when the search is preceded by a valid warrantless arrest under ROC
113, Section 5
RULES OF COURT: RULE 126 - SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Section 1. Search warrant defined. A search warrant is an order in writing issued in
the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace
officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring
it before the court.
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application
for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the
judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region
where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be
made in the court where the criminal action is pending.
Section 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together
with the affidavits submitted.
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is satisfied of the
existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause
to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in
the form prescribed by these Rules.
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and
authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part
of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant to liberate himself or any
person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Section 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two
witnesses. No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except
in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the
absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality.
Section 9. Time of making search. The warrant must direct that it be served in the
day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place
ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at
any time of the day or night.
Section 10. Validity of search warrant. A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10)
days from its date. Thereafter, it shall be void.
Section 11. Receipt for the property seized. The officer seizing the property under
the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the
premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of
such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found
the seized property.
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and
proceedings thereon.
(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the
warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall
ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom
the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the
return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has
been complied with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The
judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the
log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result,
and other actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.
Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file.
A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby
may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been
instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and
resolved by the court that issued search warrant. However, if such court failed to
resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the
motion shall be resolved by the latter court.

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE
Section 3.
(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Morfe v. Mutuc first recognized that there is a constitutional right to privacy. It

is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty. It is
inherent in the concept of limited government.
Ople v. Torres
has enumerated several provisions of the constitution where

the right of privacy is enshrined (penumbras):
a. Sec. 3 Privacy of communication
b. Sec. 1 Life, liberty and property
c. Sec. 2 Unreasonable searches and seizures
d. Sec. 6 Liberty of abode
e. Sec. 8 Right to form associations
f. Sec. 17 Right against self-incrimination
Privacy in General
In the United States, the right of privacy is not recognized explicitly in the
Constitution. Its protection is guaranteed because it is seen as a peripheral
right, within the penumbra of constitutional amendments. These constitutional
guarantees create zones of privacy.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, prior to the issue regarding the right to privacy, an
issue on standing was raised against the appellants who were physicians who
prescribed a contraceptive thereby violating a statute. The US SC granted 3rd
party standing and held that: 'certainly the accessory should have standing
to assert that the offense which he is charged with assisting is not, or cannot
constitutionally be, a crime. x x x The rights of husband and wife, pressed
here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are
considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation
to them.'
The Court first recognized the right of association stated in the First
Amendment because the Court saw marriage as an association: 'Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to
the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life,
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as
any involved in our prior decisions.'
According to the US SC, the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy
is protected from governmental intrusion. Specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance. Without those peripheral rights, the specific
rights would be less secure. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The
case concerned a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by
fundamental constitutional guarantees and the prohibition on the use of
contraceptives has maximum destructive impact on that relationship. Thus, by
a vote of 7-2, the prohibition was held to be unconstitutional, violating marital
privacy.
In the country, the essence of privacy is the right to be let alone.
Ople v. Torres has also indicated that zones of privacy are recognized and
protected in our laws:

Civil code
RPC
Anti-Wiretapping Law
Security Deposits Act
Intellectual Property Code
Limitations
By lawful order of the Court;
Public safety or public order requires otherwise, as may be provided by

law (Sec 3, Art III)
Zulueta v. CA: The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is
Ayer Productions PTY. LTD. V. Capulong (hint: Enrile Case) : The right to
if there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety or order

requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. The law insures absolute
freedom of communication between the spouse by making it privileged.
They may not testify for or against the other without consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists (Rule 130, Sec 22). And they
may not be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions (Rule 130, Sec 24).
be let alone is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a persons

privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a
public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be
published about him constitute matters of a public character. The interest
sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from
unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs
and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate
public concern.

Right of Privacy v. Freedom of Speech and Communication
Because of the preferred character of the constitutional rights of the

freedom of speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity
vitiates measures of prior restraint upon the exercise of such freedoms.
(Ayer v. Capulong)
Right of privacy of a public figure us necessarily narrower than that of an

ordinary citizen. (Ayer v. Capulong)
Public figure: A person who by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of

living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a
legitimate interest in his doing, his affairs and his character, has become
public personage. Why?
o
They had sought publicity and consented to it, so they could not
complain.
o
Their personalities and their affairs had already become public
and could no longer be regarded as their own private business
o
The press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform
the public about those that have become legitimate matters of
public interest.
BUT: As held in Lagunzad v. Soto, being a public figure does not
automatically destroy in toto a persons right to privacy. In the case at bar,
while it is true that the producer exerted efforts to present a true-to-life
story of Moises Padilla, he admits that he included a little romance in the
film.
The right of freedom of expression indeed occupies a preferred position in
the hierarchy of civil liberties. It is not, however, without limitations:
Clear and present danger rule
Balancing-of-interest test requires a court to take conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a
given situation. (The Court used this in Lagunzad)
Right of Privacy v. Freedom of Access to Information
Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Director-General: Section 7, Article III of the 1987

Constitution grants the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern. Personal matters are exempt or outside the coverage of
the peoples right to information on matters of public concern. The data
treated as strictly confidential under EO 420 being private matters and not
matters of public concern, these data cannot be released to the public or
the press.
Difference with Ople v. Torres:
o
System involved in KMU was not a national system but a system
only for government agencies and GOCSS. Moreover, there is
already an existing ID system within each government agency.

EO 420 will only have to streamline and harmonize it.
EO 420 was within the power of the President to promulgate. The
President has the constitutional power of control over the
executive department. AO 308 (National ID System), however,
was not a mere administrative order but a law. It involved policy
setting, creating rights and duties, which is beyond the power of
the President. It involved a subject that is not appropriate to be
covered by an administrative order.
EO 420 has shown no constitutional infirmity on the right of
privacy because it even narrowly limits the data that can be
collected, recorded and shown as compared to AO 308 which was
not narrowly drawn.
Two-part test to determine the reasonableness of persons expectation of

privacy
Whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of

privacy
Whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable
Note: The factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness
of the expectation. However, other factors, such as customs, physical

surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or
diminish this expectation. ( Ople v. Torres)
Exclusionary Rule (par 2, Sec. 3, Art. III)
Zulueta v. CA: The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a
lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law. Any violation renders the evidence obtained inadmissible.
The exclusion of evidence applies not only to testimonial evidence but also to
documentary and object evidence. (Evidence in Zulueta were documents, i.e.
correspondence with paramours)

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Art. III, Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.
Art. VII, Section 18. x x x In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or
in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
xxx
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not x x x automatically suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected
with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall
be released.
I. Writ of Habeas Corpus
The constitutional guarantee that protects personal liberty would be worthless if
its violation were not immediately remediable in law.
Definition
It is defined as a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to
produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and
cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatever the court
or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf.
Function
Function of the writ: to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary and to relieve a person if such restraint is illegal.
When Available
In cases of illegal detention or restraint; or
In custody cases (even for a corpse)
Primary requisite for its availability is actual deprivation of personal

liberty, or deprivation of right of custody
Barcelon v. Baker SC denied the petition and declared that the conclusion set forth
there existed in the Province of Cavite and Batangas open insurrection against the
constituted authorities, was a conclusion entirely within the discretion of the
legislative and executive branches of the Government, after an investigation of the
facts and that one branch of the US Government in the Philippines had no right to
interfere or inquire into, for the purpose of nullifying the same, the discretionary acts
of another independent depart of the Government. *Note however that the authority
of the Governor-General jointly with the Philippine Commission, to suspend the writ
was not in issue at all. What was in issue was the reviewability of the joint executivelegislative decision regarding the existence of the factual situation which would
warrant suspension. The SC, following the doctrine of separation of powers, refused
to review the act of the two branches.
II. The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
It is the right to have an immediate determination of the legality of
the deprivation of physical liberty.
III. Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
The writ is never suspended. It always issues as a matter of course.
What is suspended is the privilege of the writ, i.e. once the officer
making the return shows to the court that the person detained is being
detained for an offense covered by the suspension, the court may not
enquire further.
Lansang v. Garcia overruled Barcelon v. Baker; Prof. Gwen described

this case as the Marcoss test balloon for the declaration of martial
law
SC said that for the validity of the suspension of the privilege, two
conditions must concur:
That there is invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger
Public safety requires the suspension
In answering the question regarding review, the SC first gave the
general answer that its power was merely to check not to
supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has
gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of
his act. The Courts power rests on whether or not the President
did not act arbitrarily in issuing the writ and not whether or not
the Presidents decision is correct.
SC held that judicial review is available only for the determination
of factual basis for the suspension of the writ.
From Prof. Gwens discussion, she also mentioned that the
requisites of judicial review were relaxed in this case.

Locus standi party can file only when he was suffered

direct and substantial injury.
Exceptions:
Transcendental importance
When the basis of the right is a public one. (example:
right to information)
The 1987 Constitution has removed insurrection and imminent

danger of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion as grounds for the
suspension.
The effect of the suspension of the writ is to prevent courts,
temporarily, from enquiring into the legality of the detention.
It is not enough that the crimes covered by the suspension be those
coming under the constitutional enumeration. For a person to lose the
privilege of the writ, he must be judicially charged.
a. Judicially charged - It is not enough that a complaint is
under investigation by a fiscal or that a charge has been
filed before the public office. It is necessary that the criminal
charge has been filed in court.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ does not suspend the right
to bail.
IV. Limitations
Habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of
confinement. The fact that the restrictions inherent in detention
intrude into the detainees desire to live comfortably does not convent
those restrictions into punishment.
Habeas corpus is no longer available once charges have been filed in
court.
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

Sec. 6 The Liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed
by law shall not be impaired, except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.
From Fr. Bernas Commentaries
Freedom of movement includes 2 rights;
1.
2.
Liberty of abode
a. It may be impaired only upon lawful order of the court
b. The court itself is to be guided by the limits prescribed by law
Example: A condition imposed by the court in connection with the
grant of bail.
Liberty of travel
a. May be impaired even without a lawful order of the court
b. But the appropriate executive officer (who may impair this right)
is not granted arbitrary discretion to impose limitations
c.
He can only do so on the basis of national security, public safety,
or public health and as may be provided by law
d. Impairment of this liberty is subject to judicial review
Cases
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro
Rubi, a Mangyan, contests the forcible relocation of his tribe and people to a
reservation through a writ of habeas corpus. The Court through Justice Malcolm
denies his request on the grounds that the forcible relocation is a valid exercise of
police power. This police power is made legitimate because there exists reasonable
classification with which it can operate namely the difference of culture and
civilization of the non-Christian tribes (which includes the Mangyans) and Christian
peoples of the Philippines. This law was made with the intent and purpose to uplift
the development of (their) culture and civilization. Furthermore, the law does not
specifically single out the Mangyans, rather using the term non-Christian, thus
making it amenable to the equal protection clause.
Villavicencio v. Lukban
This the case of the Mayor of Manila and his act of forcibly rounding up the citys
prostitutes and exiling them to Davao. The women and their relatives file writs of
habeas corpus for the exiles. The Court grants the same, holding the Mayor and the
police under contempt, saying that there is no law or provision with which the Mayor
is granted the power to round up the women and forcibly exile them from the citys
boundaries. The women have their constitutional rights which guarantees liberty of
both abode and travel, rights which the Mayor may not validly impede.

Lorenzo v. Director of Health
A leper contests his forced confinement through a writ of habeas corpus. He presents
to the court that the controlling law re. the confinement (Administrative Code, Sec.
1058) is unconstitutional, and is based on erroneous facts. The Court responds by
saying that this law was enacted by the Legislature as a valid exercise of police
power, with the purpose of preserving public health. It is not violative of the due
process clause because the law outlines specific methods for the control of leprosy.
Further, the most the Court can do is to take judicial notice of the new scientific
findings re. the transmissibility of the disease. These are questions of fact which are
best left to the Legislature to decide on.
Salonga v. Hermoso
Jovito Salonga applied for a certificate of eligibility to travel. However, the Travel
Processing Center withheld the same. Hence, he files for a writ of mandamus to
compel the said government agency to issue it. The Court notes that this is not the
first time that this has happened, as the same exact thing was filed by Salonga, for
the same relief, only in a different set of facts. Even if it was rendered moot and
academic (because the Travel Processing Center subsequently released the certificate
of eligibility), the Court deemed it necessary to lay down various points. One of the
highlights of the keynote address of President Marcos in the Manila World Law
Conference in celebration of the World Peace Through Law Day on August 21, 1977
was the lifting of the ban on international travel. There should be fidelity to such a
pronouncement. This was cited by the Court to give emphasis to the point that the
President himself has pointed to the high accord of the right of travel, and thus the
agencies under him (ie. the Travel Processing Center) must follow suit. The Court
stresses that the Travel Processing Center must exercise the utmost care to avoid the
impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to
travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. The Court notes that
President and Prime Minister Marcos re-emphasized the respect accorded to the
constitutional rights of freedom to travel, saying that it is one of the most cherished.
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals
Manotoc is out on bail, after a series of estafa cases were filed against him and his
corporation. He petitions the court to allow him to leave the country because of
urgent business matters. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the lower courts
to deny this request to leave the country. They stress that bail is a valid impairment of
the right to liberty of abode and travel. Furthermore, the rationale of the bail bond is
for the Court to have security measures that the accused will be present at the trial
whenever he is needed. As such, the bail bond does not equal unrestrained liberty re.
these rights.
Marcos v. Manglapus
This the celebrated case which dealt with the band of president Aquino on former
President Marcos return to the Philippines. The band was challenged as violative of
the right to travel and right to return to ones abode. The Court treated this case
merely as involving the right to travel (because of the reason that the right to return
to ones home is a different right altogether, most notably recognized in international
law, and thus this is not specifically stated in the Constitution). Further explaining this
point, the Court deemed that the right to travel guaranteed by the Constitution
involves the right to travel within the country, but not the right to return to the
country. Since authority to impair the right to travel must be based on law the
President had to be able to point to a law giving her such authority. This is where the
Court, through Justice Cortes, found that in the totality of executive powers, there are
both stated and unstated in the Constitution there are explicit and residual powers.

Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment
1.
Sec. 19 - (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
2.
3.
4.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any

prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under
subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Cruel and Unusual
To be prohibited by this provision, the punishment must not only be unusual, but it
must also be cruel. Cruel and unusual embodied an inseparable pair.
There is no reason why unusual punishments which are not cruel should be
banned.
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of the Constitution.
(Cruel) implies there (is) something inhuman and barbarous, something
more that the mere extinguishment of life.
An early case of cruel and unusual punishment was the case of Weems v. US. Weems
was sentenced to cadena temporal under the old Penal Code. It literally involved
having a chain from ones wrist to ones ankle. The Court deemed it cruel and
unusual, (remembering) that this has come to us from a government of a different
form and genius from ours.
Re. The Abolition of the Death Penalty
Furman v. Georgia is an early case on the American jurisprudence ruling that the
death penalty (imposed in Georgia) is unconstitutional, not because it is cruel and
unconstitutional, but because it vested to the trial court judges the power to impost
death without any bounds or parameters (People v. Echegaray). Here, Justices
Brennan and Marshall filed a dissent in which they considered the death penalty
unconstitutional per se, by measuring capital punishment against what they
considered to be basic principles for judging severe punishment, to wit;
Justice Brennan:
1. A punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of
human beings
2. It must not be applied arbitrarily
3. It must not be unacceptable to contemporary society
4. It must not be excessive it must serve a penal purpose more effectively
than a less severe punishment would
Justice Marshall:
There are certain punishments which inherently involve so much and and
suffering that civilized people cannot tolerate them
There are unusual punishments in the sence of being previously unknown
for a given offense
A penalty may be cruel and unusual because it is excessive and serves no
legislative purpose
A punishment that is not excessive and possessing a legislative purpose
may nevertheless be unvalid if popular sentiment abhors it
Father Bernas notes that these tests by Justices Brennan and Marshall were taken into
deep consideration by the 1986 Constitutional Commission. The Commission
subsequently voted for the abolishment of the death penalty in the 1987 Constitution.
But it is important to note that this does not prevent the legislature from re-imposing
it at some future time. An amendment adds that the legislature may re-impose it if
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it.
People v. Echegaray
Echegaray ruled that the import of the grant of power to Congress to restore the
death penalty requires
1. That Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes
2. That Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as
heinous in accordance with the definition xxx and designate crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which the latter case, death
can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in
court that characterize the crime to be heinous
3. That Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes
In upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty, the Court declares, xxx the
death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have
committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or
criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses
from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined
and honest citizenry, and because they have so caused irreparable and substantial
injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose
actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be
permanently prevented from doing so.
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice
The Court cites various rpecedents as to why death penalty is not unconstitutional re.
the change from electrocution to lethal injection, to wit;
1. Harden v Director of Prisons: "Punishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within
the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishments of life."

2. State of Nevada v Gee Jon: "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is
calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or
suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of
course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go
unpunished."
3. Ex Parte Granviel: The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a
convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the
necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely. What is cruel and unusual is not fastened to the obsolete but
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice and must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.
4. Stanford v Kentucky: The primary indicator of society's standard of decency
with regard to Capital Punishment is the response of the country's
legislature to the sanction.
Hence, for as long as the Death Penalty remains in our statute books and meets the
most stringent requirements provided by the Constitution, we must confine our
inquiry to the legality of RA No. 8177. The legislature's substitution of the mode of
carrying out the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection infringes no
constitutional rights of Echegaray.
Freedom of Speech, Expression, the Press and the Right to Peaceable

Assembly
Art. III, Sec. 4
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or
of the press, or the right of the people peaceable to assemble and petition
the government for redress of grievances.
Gitlow v. New York (1925)

J. Sanford
Benjamin Gitlow was indicted for statutory crime of criminal anarchy in this case,
the act of advocating through printing, publishing, editing or circulating documents
advocating doctrines of the overthrow of givernment. He was a member of the Left
Wing Section of the Socialist Party and arranged for the publishing or a Manifesto
published in The Revolutionary Age, the official organ of the Left Wing. Copies were
also sold from his office and was responsible for its circulation. The Manifesto
espoused, in plain and unequivocal language, the need for a Communist Revolution by
a militant and revolutionary Socialism based on class struggle and mobilization of
proletariat action. He was convicted of the charges against him and of the main
rationale that he advocated, through the Manifesto, the overthrow and destruction of
the State. The jury rejected the defense that it was a mere academic and harmless
discussion of the advantages of communism and advanced socialism.
Gitlow questions the constitutionality of the statute on criminal anarchy as a violation
of the fourteenth amendment or the due process clause and specifically on the reach
of the first amendment to include freedom of speech.
SUPREME COURT HELD:
It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the
press which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak
or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and
unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents
the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.
ON THE STATES EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER:
That a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those
who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public
welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or
disturb the public peace, is not open to question.
State may punish utterances endangering the foundations of organized
government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means.
These imperil its own existence as a constitutional State. Freedom of
speech and press does not protect disturbances to the public peace
or the attempt to subvert the government. It does not protect
publications or teachings which tend to subvert or imperil the
government or to impede or hinder it in the performance of its
governmental duties.

THE TESTS EMPLOYED IN THE ANALYSIS OF FREE SPEECH
ON UTTERANCES OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL: A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
That utterances inciting to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful
means, present a sufficient danger of substantive evil to bring their punishment within
the range of legislative discretion, is clear.
In this case, Schenk v. US was cited, and the clear and present danger test
was used to affirm Gitlows conviction.
The dangerous tendency test was also first established in this
case.
Rust v. Sullivan (1991)

J. Rehnquist
In this case, what was being questioned was the constitutionality of Section 1008 of
the Public Health Service Act specifies that none of the federal funds appropriated
under the Act's Title X for family-planning services "shall be used in programs where
abortion is a method of family planning", instituted by Respondent Sullivan, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services. The regulations promulgated by respondent
also prohibited projects receiving these funds from not only providing abortions, but
also counseling, advising, or promoting the idea that a woman seek an abortion.
Petitioners are Title X grantees and doctors who supervise Title X funds suing on
behalf of themselves and their patients.
Clear and Present Danger Test

Defined in Schenk v. US as the following:
Schenk v. US (1919)
Schenk was Secretary of the Socialist Party and responsible for printing, distributing,
and mailing leaflets to prospective military draftees advocating the opposition to being
drafted into military services during the first world war. He was indicted for violation
of the Espionage Act. He questioned the constitutionality of the statute and claims
that it violated his First Amendment rights.
Petitioners questioned the regulation on the ground of violation of the First

Amendment on free speech, by discriminating "all discussion about abortion as a
lawful option -- including counseling, referral, and the provision of neutral and
accurate information about ending a pregnancy -- while compelling the clinic or
counselor to provide information that promotes continuing a pregnancy to term."
SUPREME COURT HELD:
The government may choose to fund one program at the exclusion of another. The
decision of the legislature not to fund or subsidize abortion, does not necessarily
infringe upon the exercise of this right.
By requiring that the Title X grantee engage in abortion-related activity
separately from activity receiving federal funding, Congress has not denied
it the right to engage in abortion-related activities. Congress has merely
refused to fund such activities out of the public fisc, and the Secretary has
simply required a certain degree of separation from the Title X project in
order to ensure the integrity of the federally funded program
The decision is NOT a content-based restriction on speech. The focus of the
main decision is on the scope of the regulation.
Family planning counseling does not, by definition, include abortion. By this
same reasoning, prenatal care discussions are also prohibited in these
programs.
As such, the regulations were found to be within the permissible scope of
legislative and police power.
The question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree.
COURT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE STATUTE

When a nation is at war many things that might be said
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and
that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right. It seems to be admitted that if an actual
obstruction of the recruiting service were proved, liability for
words that produced that effect might be enforced.
If the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) its tendency
and the intent with which it is done are the same, we
perceive no ground for saying that success alone
warrants making the act a crime.
Abrams v. US (1919)
The defendants, all born in Russia but had been living in the US for at least 5 years,
were convicted of printing and throwing from windows in a New York City building 2
types of leaflet one in English, and the other in Yiddish that claimed them as
revolutionists and denounced the war efforts of the US against Soviet Russia. They
were charged and convicted under the Espionage Act of 1917, particularly in
conspiring to unlawfully utter language that would incite disloyalty, contempt, and
disrepute on the government, as well as incite resistance to US war efforts. They
questioned the validity of the statute for being in violation of their First Amendment
Rights.
COURT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE STATUTE

[W]hile the immediate occasion for this particular outbreak of
lawlessness, on the part of the defendant alien anarchists, may
have been resentment caused by our government sending troops
into Russia as a strategic operation against the Germans on the
eastern battle front, yet the plain purpose of their

propaganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis of the

war, disaffection, sedition, riots, and, as they hoped,
revolution, in this country for the purpose of embarrassing
and if possible defeating the military plans of the government in
Europe.
But it is not necessary to a decision of this case to
consider whether such distinction is vital or merely
formal, for the language of these circulars was obviously
intended to provoke and to encourage resistance to the
United States in the war, as the third count runs, and, the
defendants, in terms, plainly urged and advocated a resort
to a general strike of workers in ammunition factories for
the purpose of curtailing the production of ordnance and
munitions necessary and essential to the prosecution of
the war as is charged in the fourth count.
Dissenting Opinion of J. Holmes
The United States constitutionally may punish speech that

produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger
that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the
United States constitutionally may seek to prevent
This power is greater in time of war.
HOWEVER: against dangers peculiar to war, as against others,
the principle of the right to free speech is always the same. It is
only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to
bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to
the expression of opinion where private rights are not
concerned.
Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the
mind of the country. Now nobody can suppose that the
surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown
man, without more, would present any
immediate danger that its opinions would hinder
the success of the government arms or have any
appreciable tendency to do so. Publishing those
opinions for the very purpose of obstructing, however,
might indicate a greater danger and at any rate would
have the quality of an attempt.
NO INTENT WAS PROVEN.
Advocacy of Abstract Doctrine Test

Defined in Yates v. US as the following:
[I]t was nevertheless incumbent on the court to make clear in

some fashion that the advocacy must be of action and not merely
abstract doctrine.
The essential distinction is that those to whom the advocacy is

addressed must be urged to do something, now or in the future,
rather than merely to believe in something.
Imminent Action or Direct Incitement Test

Defined in Brandenburg v. Ohio as the following:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do

not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)
Appellant, a Ku Klux Klan leader, was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism
statute for "advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage,
violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or
political reform" and for "voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group or
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal
syndicalism." He was filmed in a KKK rally with several men in robes and hoods,
carrying firearms, burning crosses, making speeches with regards to exacting revenge
against niggers and Jews and the Congress supposedly suppressing the white
Caucasian race.
COURT REVERSED HIS CONVICTION AND STATUTE IS HELD

UNCONSTITUTIONAL
[T]he mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or
even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not
the same as preparing a group for violent action and
steeling it to such action."
A statute which fails to draw this distinction
impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It sweeps
within its condemnation speech which our Constitution
has immunized from governmental control.
IN THIS CASE: Freedoms of speech and press do not permit
a State to forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action.
Concurring Opinion of J. Douglas
There must be a distinction between restraint on action and

restraint on speech.
When one reads the opinions closely and sees when and how
the "clear and present danger" test has been applied, great
misgivings are aroused. First, the threats were often loud but
always puny and made serious only by judges so wedded to the

status quo that critical analysis made them nervous. Second, the
test was so twisted and perverted in Dennis as to make the trial
of those teachers of Marxism an all-out political trial which was
part and parcel of the cold war that has eroded substantial parts
of the First Amendment.
The line between what is permissible and not subject to
control and what may be made impermissible and subject
to regulation is the line between ideas and overt acts.
Example: falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater
J. Douglas says on this: This is, however, a classic
case where speech is brigaded with action. They are
indeed inseparable and a prosecution can be
launched for the overt acts actually caused.
Apart from rare instances of that kind, speech is,
I think, immune from prosecution. Certainly there
is no constitutional line between advocacy of abstract
ideas as in Yates and advocacy of political action as in
Scales. The quality of advocacy turns on the depth of
the conviction; and government has no power to invade
that sanctuary of belief and conscience.
Mentioned in this case were precedents that merely employed the dangerous
tendency rule as a basis for judgment. J. Sanford had this to say about them:
In other words, when the legislative body has determined generally, in the
constitutional exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a certain kind
involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be punished,
the question whether any specific utterance coming within the
prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to bring about the
substantive evil, is not open to consideration. It is sufficient that the
statute itself be constitutional and that the use of the language
comes within its prohibition.
Balancing of Interests Test
Defined in the dissenting opinion of J. Castro in Gonzales v. Comelec:

In enunciating a standard premised on a judicial balancing of the
conflicting social values and individual interests competing for
ascendancy in legislation which restricts expressionthe
"balancing" test requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given
situation or type of situation.
In the actual application of the "balancing-of-interests"
test, the crucial question is: how much deference
should be given to the legislative judgment?
Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured
by Congressional power restricting the individual's freedom, and
the social importance and value of the freedom so restricted, "are
to be judged in the concrete, not on the basis of abstractions," a
wide range of factors are necessarily relevant in ascertaining the
point or line of equilibrium. Among these are:
(a) the social values and importance of the specific
aspect of the particular freedom restricted by the
legislation;
(b) the specific thrust of the restriction, i.e., whether
the restriction is direct or indirect, whether or not the
persons affected are few;
(c) the value and importance of the public interest
sought to be secured by the legislation the reference
here is to the nature and gravity of the evil which
Congress seeks to prevent;
(d) whether the specific restriction decreed by Congress
is reasonably appropriate and necessary for the
protection of such public interest; and
(e) whether the necessary safeguarding of the public
interest involved may be achieved by some other
measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Also found in the citation made by J. Castro in Gonzales v. Comelec:
Salonga v. Pano (1985)

Government tried to implicate Sen. Salonga on the bombings in Manila based on
Salongas remark in an interview that there will be violent events if Pres. Marcos does
not implement reforms in his administration. He was charged with subversion.
COURT SAYS THERE WAS NO POLITICAL SUBVERSIVE ACTION TAKEN

Court determines that there must be a difference between:
Abstract teaching for a resort to force or violence
Speech that would prepare a group for violent action
and steel it to such action
In this case: There was merely political discussion
There was also NO LINK of Salonga to any subversive
organization or actions made in furtherance of the
destabilization of the government.
Dangerous Tendency Rule/Test
Defined by BERNAS as the following:

Speech may be curtailed or punished when
dangerous tendency which the State has a right to
requires, for speech to be punishable, is there
connection between speech and the evil being
apprehended.
it creates a
preventAll it
be a rational
sought to be
Gitlow v. New York (supra)

"The theory of balance of interests represents a wholly pragmatic

approach to the problem of First Amendment freedom, indeed, to
the whole problem of constitutional interpretation. It rests on the
theory that it is the Court's function in the case before it when it
finds public interests served by legislation on the one hand, and
First Amendment freedoms affected by it on the other, to balance
the one against the other and to arrive at a judgment where the
greater weight shall be placed. If on balance it appears that
the public interest served by restrictive legislation is of
such a character that it outweighs the abridgment of
freedom, then the Court will find the legislation valid. In
short, the balance-of-interests theory rests on the basis
that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not even
those stated in the First Amendment, and that they may be
abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and
important public interests."
Gonzales v. Comelec (1969)

Petitioners Cabigao, incumbent councilor of Manila and Vice-Mayoral candidate, and
Gonzales, a political leader, question the validity of 2 sections of RA 4880 prohibiting
the early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign and
partisan political activity. They argue that the nomination of candidates and fixing of
period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and and convenience
which only political parties can regulate or curtail among themselves; that limitations
of these through police power absent a clear and present danger to State would
violate constitutional rights.
COURT UPHELD THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTE

Although the challenged statute could have been more narrowly
drawn as to not fall under the problems of the overbreadth
doctrine, it is still constitutional. It is a necessary and appropriate
response not merely to a clear and present danger but to an
actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive
partisanship, dishonesty, corruption, violence that has marred
election campaigns and partisan political activity.
Simple expression of opinions and thoughts concerning election
SHALL NOT BE considered as part of election campaign and
nothing in the Act shall be understood to prevent any person
from expressing views on a current political problem on issues or
from mentioning names of candidates he supports.
Dissenting opinion of J. Castro:
In my view, the "balancing-of-interests" approach is more appropriately

used in determining the constitutionality of Sections 50-A and 50-B. Both
the "dangerous tendency" and "clear and present danger" criteria have
minimum relevancy to our task of appraising these provisions. Under these
two tests, the statute is to be assayed by considering the degree of
probability and imminence with which "prolonged election campaigns"

would increase the incidence of "violence and deaths," "dominion of the rich
in the political arena" and "corruption of the electorate."
Although 50-A remains constitutional, 50-B must be struck down as
unconstitutional.
I reach a different conclusion with respect to Section 50-B. Here, the
restraint on the freedoms of expression, assembly and association is direct.
Except within the "open seen" of 120 and 90 days preceding the election,
the statute prevents and punishes by heavy criminal sanction
speeches, writings, assemblies and associations intended to promote or
oppose the candidacy of any person aspiring for an elective public office, or
which may be deemed a direct or an indirect "campaign" or as
"propaganda" for or against a political party. The prohibition reaches not
only "a relative handful of persons;" 25 applies to any person "whether or
not a voter or candidate," and to any group of persons "whether or not a
political party or political committee." The effect of the law, therefore, is to
impose a comprehensive and prolonged prohibition of speech of a particular
content, except during the 120 or 80 days, respectively, immediately
preceding an election
TAKE NOTE: Under the first proviso, it "simple expressions of opinion
and thoughts concerning the election shall not be considered as
part of an election campaign."
From the precise use of the word "simple" may be rationally
drawn an inference that "non-simple" expressions fall within the
proscription of election campaigns. But the law conspicuously
fails to lay dawn a standard by which permissible
electioneering. How simple is "simple"?
In the absence of such a standard, every speaker or writer
wishing to make publicly known his views concerning the election
and his preferences among the candidates, must speak at his
own peril.
He could carefully choose his word's with the intention of
remaining within the area of speech left permissible by Section
50-B. But, in the nature of things, what and who can
provide him assurance that his words, "simple
expressions of opinion and thoughts concerning the
election" as they may be, will not be understood by his
audience or at least by some of them, or by the
prosecuting officers of the Government, or by the courts
even, as a "speech" or "commentary" "for or against the
election of ... a candidate for public office," or at least an
indirect solicitation of votes?

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing information. On

public questions there should be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate.
A) PRIOR RESTRAINT / CENSORSHIP / SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT

- Prior restraint: official government restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.
- Forms:
a) system of licensing
b) movie censorship
c) judicial prior restraint/injunction against publication
d) license taxes
- There are exceptions to prohibition of prior restraint; it is not absolute. One
example/scenario is when a nation is at war.
- The free speech and press clause also prohibits systems of subsequent punishment
which have the effect of unduly curtailing expression.
NEAR v. MINNESOTA: The statute which perpetually enjoined the defendants "from
producing, editing, publishing, circulating, having in their possession, selling or giving
away any publication whatsoever which is a malicious, scandalous or defamatory
newspaper, as defined by law" is unconstitutional. The statute must be tested by its
operation and effect: the object of the statute is not punishment, in the ordinary
sense, but suppression of the offending newspaper or periodical. The statute not only
operates to suppress the offending newspaper or periodical but to put the publisher
under an effective censorship. Prior restraint violates the 14 th Amendment and the
freedom of the press. Liberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the
Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from
previous restraints or censorship. Public officers, whose character and conduct remain
open to debate and free discussion in the press, find their remedies for false
accusations in actions under libel laws providing for redress and punishment, and not
in proceedings to restrain the publication of newspapers and periodicals.
GROSJEAN v. AMERICAN PRESS CO.: The license tax on gross receipts derived from
advertisements carried in the newspapers with a weekly circulation of more than
20,000 copies operates as a prior restraint in a double sense. First, its effect is to
curtail the amount of revenue realized from advertising, and, second, its
direct tendency is to restrict circulation. It is seen to be a deliberate and calculated
device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is
entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties. Judge Cooleys test regarding
censorship: "The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely,
but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and
general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the
people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens." The protection of freedom
of the press is not limited to any particular way of abridging it.
NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. UNITED STATES: Any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity. The dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the
BURGOS SR. v. CHIEF OF STAFF: The closure of the premises of We Forum and
Metropolitan Mail and the seizure of their printing equipment is in the nature of
previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed
under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to
express themselves in print.
BRANDENBURG v. OHIO: Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute was declared
unconstitutional because that statute broadly prohibited the mere advocacy of
violence. The mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral
necessity for a resort to force and violence is not the same as preparing a group for
violent action and steeling it to such action. A statute which fails to draw this
distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. It sweeps within its condemnation speech which our
Constitution has immunized from governmental control.
B) LIBEL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND PUBLIC FIGURES
- In the US, the constitutional guarantee requires a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice.
- Actual malice: It means with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not.
- We follow this rule in the Philippines. However, public figures are not unprotected. If
the utterances are false, malicious, or unrelated to a public officers performance of
his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest, the utterance may give rise to
criminal and civil liability.
NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. SULLIVAN: Libelous statements in paid ads are usually not
protected. However, in this case, it is protected because it served as an important
outlet for promulgation of info and ideas by persons who wish to exercise their
freedom of speech although not members of the press. NY Times Privilege: libelous
utterances concerning public figures, even public officials, must be governed by the 1 st
and 14th Amendment privilege. The 1st Amendment secures freedom of expression
upon public discussions. Debate on public issues should be uninhabited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes sharp
attacks on the government and public officials. Criticism of official conduct does not
lose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective criticism and hence
diminishes the officials reputation.
C) OBSCENITY IN THE PRESS
ROTH v. UNITED STATES: Obscenity in the press is not protected under the 1 st
Amendment. The reason why the guarantees of speech and press were granted in the
first place was in order to better facilitate public discussion; it is hard to see how libel,
profanity, and obscenity could be used in the light of the reason stated above. Also,

the Roth Test was put forward as the proper test in obscenity cases: the test in each
case is the effect of the book, picture or publication considered as a whole, not upon
any particular class, but upon all those whom it is likely to reach. In other words, you
determine its impact upon the average person in the community. This is the proper
test because it considers the object as a whole, as well as it interpolates it to the
standards of society as a whole.
MEMOIRS OF A WOMAN OF PLEASURE v. ATTY. GENERAL: This case expounded on
the Roth Test. It laid down three elements: 1) The dominant theme is prurient in
interest 2) It is patently offensive and it affronts community standards 3) It is utterly
without social redeeming value. The 3 requirements/criteria must be applied
independently. The book was held to be not obscene since it had some redeeming
social value.
D) LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
IN RE LOZANO: "Judicial proceedings, in a case which the law requires to be
conducted in secret for the proper administration of justice, should never be, while
the case is on trial, given publicity by the press." (sub judice rule) License or abuse of
liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true
sense. As important is the maintenance of the Judiciary. The administration of Justice
and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and
neither should be violated by the other.
MTRCB v. ABS-CBN: All television programs, including public affairs program, news
documentary and socio-political editorials, are subject to MTRCBs power of review
under Sec. 3(b) of PD 1986. TV programs are more accessible to the public than
newspapers, and thus the liberal regulation of the latter cannot apply to the former.
MTRCBs power to review TV programs under Sec. 3(b) of PD 1986 is not prior
restraint and does not violate ABS-CBNs constitutional freedom of expression and of
the press. The only exceptions to MTRCBs power of review are TV programs
imprinted or exhibited by the RP government and newsreels.
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
- Since the right of assembly and petition is equally as fundamental as freedom of
expression, the standards for allowable impairment of speech and press are also used
for assembly and petition.
PRIMICIAS v. FUGOSO: A grant of unregulated and unlimited power to grant or refuse
a permit for the use of streets and other public places for processions, parades, or
meetings, would be null and void because it is violative of the peoples right to
freedom of assembly. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly. The applicant Primicias has the right to a permit (to hold a
public meeting) which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latter's
reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used
for the purpose, with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure
convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate
and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The word "regulate," as used in
section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code, means and includes the power to
control, to govern, and to restrain, but is not synonymous with "suppress" or
"prohibit.
REYES v. BAGATSING: Freedom of assembly is not to be limited/denied except on a
showing of clear and present danger of substantive evil which the state has a right to
prevent. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the
safety and convenience of the people in the use of public spaces has never been
regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as safeguards to good order. A
licensing official (mayor) has the discretion to determine WoN licenses should be
granted, but its not unfettered discretion: the assumption is that the permit if for a
specific place. The exercise of such a right is not to be abridged on the plea that it
may be exercised in some other place (the choice of the place is in itself part of the
peoples right to expression/assembly, e.g. significance of US embassy).
NAVARRO v. VILLEGAS: Freedoms of assembly and petition are said to be the cognate
rights to the freedom of speech, in that it complements and provides for the same
objective (to facilitate political change, keep the government honest, keep the public
united and vigilant, etc. etc.), but in different manners. Freedom to assembly and
petition are not absolute rights, and are therefore subject to regulation. For freedom
of assembly, the dangerous tendency test and the clear and present danger test may
be applied, depending on the discretion of the Court. Freedom of assembly must be
given much leeway and to be interpreted to have the widest scope possible. But once
violence breaks out and happens, with which the executive branch has the right to
police and regulate, it may validly do so, without any infringement on constitutional
grounds. However, fear or apprehension of an impending outbreak of violence is NOT
a valid ground for police power there must be violence first. The right to
demonstrate (is) not accorded the same privilege as freedom of speech and of the
press.
PHIL. BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES v. PHIL. BLOOMING MILLS: Hierarchy of rights:
the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. To
regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as
evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining
agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as
well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition.

RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Sec. 7 - The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
This right does not mean unbridled freedom to information. Rather, this right is given
by the Constitution subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. In
determining the allowable scope to access to official records, it is important to keep in
mind that Sec. 7 guarantees only one general right -- the right to information on
matter of public concern. Thus the right to information on matter of public concern is
both the purpose, and the limit of the right to access public documents. Accoding to
Chavez v. PCGG , the ff. are recognized limitations of the right to information;
1. National security matters
2. Trade secrets and banking transactions
3. Criminal matters or classified law enforcement matters
4. Other confidential matters
Subido v. Ozaeta
Subido, a newspaper journalist, wants access to the Registry of Deeds, with which the
examine which lands are sold to resident aliens. The Court does not believe that
liberty of the press is involved in this case. The Registrys refusal does not constitute
censorship, and they are correct in saying that freedom of information is not
guaranteed by the Constitution. In construing the law that provides for Subidos right
to access the information he seeks, the Court cites: All records relating to registered
lands in the office of the Register of Deeds shall be open to the public subject to such
reasonable regulations as may be prescribed xxx Now, the Court does not construe
this power to make regulations to be the same as the power to prohibit. Further, the
Court adds that unless it is clear that the purpose is unlawful, or just sheer, idle
curiosity, Subido must be able to be allowed access to such records.
Baldoza v. Dimaano
This concerns the filing of an administrative complaint before the Supreme Court,
because allegedly, the Municipal Judge of Taal, Batangas refused to let some officers
of the municipality look over the records of the court docket. The Court found that
after a careful scrutiny of the communications between the municipal officials and the
judge, it was found out that there was no showing of abuse of authority on the part of
the judge. He actually allowed the complainants to view and see the docket reports,
subject only to certain rules and regulations that he may impose. The communications
would show that the complainants actually knew of these rules and regulations, and
that they readily consented. Further, although the Court concedes that the right to
information is applicable in this case, nevertheless it issues a warning that such
records of sensitive material are to be properly kept by the judiciary in order to
maintain that only the proper parties those with legitimate and legal interest have
access to these records. This is to safeguard these records from the prying eyes of
curiosity and to avoid the dirty hands of politics.
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission
Legaspi seeks the records of two employees of the CSC to ascertain whether or not
they are indeed qualified for their respective positions. This case holds that the mere
fact that petitioner is a citizen, he satisfies the requirement to have standing to have
access to information regarding public matters. In defining what public matters are,
the Court holds that the concept defies a standard definition, but nevertheless
encompasses the broad spectrum of subjects that the public may or would want to
know because either;
1. These directly affect their lives
2. Or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizen
The Court further holds that it is the burden of the government to prove that there is
a compelling interest with which to impair this right to information a burden it has
failed to overthrow in this case.
Neri v. Senate Committee
This case is where then NEDA Sec. Neri invoked executive privilege to refrain from
answering specific questions by the Senate Committees pertaining to the NBN-ZTE
deal under then President Macapagal-Arroyo. This case most notably differentiated
Presidential Communications Privilege from Deliberative Process Privilege, to wit;
Presidential Communications Privilege - applies to decision-making of the
President; rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the
President's unique constitutional role; applies to documents in their entirety, and
covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones; meant to
encompass only those functions that form the core of presidential authority
Requisites:
1. The communications relate to a " quintessential and non-delegable power"
of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with
other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2. The communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President.
Under the "operational proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of President Arroyo's cabinet.
3. There is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Deliberative Process Privilege applied to decision-making of executive officials;
rooted in common law privilege; that there is a "governmental privilege against public
disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
security matters."

J. Punos Dissent Function Impairment Test - the Court weighs how the disclosure
of the withheld information would impair the President's ability to perform his
constitutional duties more than nondisclosure would impair the other branch's ability
to perform its constitutional function. Factors to be considered in determining the
strength of the presumption of confidentiality of Presidential communications. They
pertain to the nature of the disclosure sought, namely:
Time of disclosure, whether contemporaneous disclosure or open
deliberation, which has a greater chilling effect on rendering candid
opinions, as opposed to subsequent disclosure;
Level of detail, whether full texts or whole conversations or summaries;
Audience, whether the general public or a select few;
Certainty of disclosure, whether the information is made public as a matter
of course or upon request
Frequency of disclosure
Form of disclosure, whether live testimony or recorded conversation or
affidavit. The type of information should also be considered, whether
involving military, diplomatic or national security secrets.
Akbayan v. Aquino
This case concerns the petition of a number of Congressmen and private individuals to
access the full text of both the drafts of the negotiations and the final text of the
JPEPA treaty. Usec. Aquino subsequently presents the final text, but still withholds the
drafts of the negotiations.
The Court notes that since the right to information is not absolute, there are readily
some exceptions; one of which would be privileged communication. These are those
which by their nature and their content are recognized by the other departments of
the government as exempt from the need for disclosure to the public. The Court
however notes that executive privilege is valid depending on the grounds which were
used to invoke it.
Here, the Court notes that since what the petitioners are asking for are the drafts of
the negotiations, disclosing the same would pose some serious problems. It is in the
nature of negotiations to be done in secrecy as to afford the two contracting parties
the liberality with which they can perform their give-and-take offers and counteroffers. It would be quite dangerous and impractical wherein every move or every offer
are given the spotlight and thus an outpouring of public scrutiny. The negotiations are
rolling stones which change from day to day. The Court sees the need why Aquino
wanted the petitioners to wait until the negotiations have been finished.
In addition to this matter, it is also in the nature of negotiations with foreign countries
and powers to be held in secret, and this secrecy has long been recognized to be not
violative of the Constitution. This would be because diplomacy cannot be done in any
other way, because if there is public scrutiny as to their every move, the negotiations,
as well as the trust of the delegates to their co-delegates are paralyzed in their every
move.
The Court closely compares the nature of executive privilege in negotiations with
those accorded to judicial deliberations which are also done in secrecy. Thus they
would uphold the merits of negotiations done in secrecy, because it better facilitates
the movement of ideas and counter-ideas, as well as the moves and counter-moves of
the participants.
Deliberative Process Privilege - Petitioners contend that the president should have
kept the public informed of the negotiations, or at the very least Congress posted on
the important matters attendant the issue. However, what she did was to keep out
everyone, effectively closing out everyones ability to participate in such an important
matter. The Court shoots this down saying it is within the constitutional power
as well as recognized in well-settled jurisprudence that the President alone
has the power to negotiate with foreign powers. Attendant foreign policy, he
dominates the field, and it is up to his decision and influence in which direction the
foreign policy of the nation will set its sights to. The Constitution presents a limitation
in which the Senate has to give its concurrence to any treaty to make it valid and
binding, but this does not take away the Presidents power to negotiate. He
alone does it, and no other department can invade this well settled power.
This power falls under the Deliberative Process Privilege.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Article III, Section 5: No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for
the exercise of civil or political rights.
In General
Estrada v Escritor
Case: Escritor worked as a clerk at court. Estrada filed an administrative complaint
against her on the grounds of immoral conduct because she lives with a man who is
not her lawful husband. Her main defense was her free exercise of religion as believer
in Jehovahs Witness.
Ruling: Case remanded for the application of the Compelling State Interest Test in
2003 but in 2006 the Court ruled that the State was not able to prove any compelling
state interest necessary to override Escritors freedom to practice her religion and that
the action taken against her by State wasnt proved to be the least intrusive means to
achieve their purpose
Definition of religion
David v Beason - reference to ones views of his relations to his Creator and to
the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of
obedience to his will.
Torasco v Watkins - expanded religion to non-theistic beliefs such as Buddhism
or Taoism
US v Seager - used the four creed criteria to qualify as religion
-there must be belief in God or some parallel belief that occupies a central place
in the believers life
-the religion must involve a moral code transcending individual belief (cant be
purely subjective)
-demonstrable sincerity in belief is necessary bit the court must not inquire into
the truth or reasonableness of the belief
-there must be associational ties
Purpose - to protect and promote religious liberty

Free exercise - this is the end sought
Establishment - mandates separation of church and state necessary to
achieve free exercise
Hierarchy of
3. Religious
4. Religious
5. Religious
Protection Afforded
belief and conviction
speech and expressive religious conduct
conduct (excludes expressive conduct)
Two Standards used in Deciding Religion Clause Cases
1. Separation - protects the principle of church-separation with a rigid reading of

the principle
a. Strict Separation
-the wall of separation is mean to protect the state from the church
-there is an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and state
-there is hostility between the two
b. Strict Neutrality or tamer separation
-requires the state to be neutral in its relation with groups of religious
believer; the relationship is not necessarily adversarial
-allow for interaction between church and state, but is strict with regard to
state action which would threaten the integrity of religious commitment
-the basis of government action has a secular criteria and religion may bot
be used as a basis for classification of purposes
-public policy and the constitution require the government to avoid religionspecific policy
2. Benevolent Neutrality and the Doctrine of Accommodation
- protects religious realities, tradition and established practice with a flexible
reading of the principle of separation of church and state
-the wall is meant to protect the church from the state
-it allows interaction between the two and actually permits religious
exercise without interference
The Doctrine of Accommodation - this allows the government to take
religion into account when creating government policies to allow

people to exercise their religion w/o hindrance. The effect they want to
achieve is to remove a burden on ones exercise. The government may
take religion into account to exempt, when possible, from generally
applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs
and practices would be infringed, or to create without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish.

Three situations of accommodation:

1. Accommodation is required to preserve free exercise protections and not
unconstitutionally infringe on religious liberty or create penalties for religious freedom
Framework: THREE-STEP PROCESS:
Has the statute or government action created a burden on the free
exercise of religion?
-look into the sincerity and centrality of the claimants belief
Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this
infringement of religious liberty?
-government must show its legitimate purpose and that they are compelling
-interest of the state vs religious liberty; the greater the interest of the
states interest, the more the belief would have to overcome it
Has the state in achieving legitimate purposes used the least intrusive
means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than
necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state?
2. Accommodation is permissible, the state may, but is not required to, accommodate
religious interests
3. Accommodation is prohibited, establishment concerns prevail over potential
accommodation interests
separation between the church and the state. This is what can be seen in the
following provisions:
Preamble
Tax exemption on church property
Salary of religious officers in government
Optional religious instructions
Saying that the Constitution mandates this approach doesnt mean that the Court
ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes against it. It only
means that the Court will not be hostile or indifferent towards religious belief and
practices, it will strive to accommodate when it can within constitutional limits. It also
means that the Court will not quickly dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause
because the conduct in question is said to offend a law or the orthodox view, for this
is the protection afforded by the religion clauses (meaning, in the absence of
legislation granting exemption from a law of general applicability, the Court can carve
out an exemption when the religion clauses justify it).
Why choose to be an Accommodationist?
Most consistent with the language of the 1 st Amendment

It best achieves its purpose
Its interpretation is particularly necessary to protect minority religions
Its the most practical way to deal with a pluralistic nation with various beliefs
The Religion Clauses

In cases involving the two religion clauses, the courts must balance them against
each other. They must review all the relevant facts and determine whether there is a
sufficiently strong free exercise right that should prevail over the Establishment clause
problem. The case stated that modern society is characterized by the expanding
regulatory arm of government that reaches a variety of areas of human conduct and
an expanding concept of religion. As such, the societal values the religion clauses
intended to protect must be considered in their interpretation and resolution of the
tension between free exercise and establishment.
The Philippines adopts the Benevolent Neutrality Approach in

interpreting its Religious Clauses in the Constitution
Using the cardinal rule of in constitutional construction that the constitution must
be interpreted as a whole and the seemingly conflicting provisions must be reconciled
and harmonized in a manner that will to all of them full force and effect, the case
stated that the framers intended to adopt this approach.
Looking at the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitution, it will be
revealed that the Filipinos did not intend to erect a high and impregnable wall of
Applying the Compelling State Interest Test in Limiting the

Exercise of Religious Liberty
"immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community" and "infringement of religious freedom only to the
smallest extent necessary" to justify limitation of religious freedom
religious exercise may be indirectly burdened by a general law which
has for its purpose and effect the advancement of the state's secular
goals, provided that there is no other means by which the state can
accomplish this purpose without imposing such burden.
"compelling state interest" test which grants exemptions when general
laws conflict with religious exercise, unless a compelling state interest
intervenes.
The case of Estrada v Escritor stated that this test is proper
where the conduct involved purely arises from religious belief. Its the one
that is used because the conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human
conduct has different effects on the states interests; some effects may be
immediate and short-term while other, delayed and far reaching.
This was compared to the cases of American Bible and Iglesia
where the clear and present danger and the grave and imminent danger
tests were applied since speech has discernible or immediate effects.
Religious clauses and morality

The morality referred in the law such the Civil Service Law or the Code of
Professional Responsibility, is public and necessarily secular; not religious. With this,
government action (including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal
law) must have a secular purpose. The government proscribes this conduct because it
is detrimental to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of
human society and not because such conduct is proscribed by any religion.
Although the morality in law is secular, since the standard of benevolent
neutrality is adopted, there is room for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it doesnt offend compelling state interests.

Free Exercise Clause
Power of State to Regulate (Estrada v Escritor)
The Free Exercise Clause affords absolute protection to individual religious
convictions. However the government is able to regulate the times, places and
manner of its exercise (Cantwell v Conneticut). Under the Free Exercise Clause,
religious belief is absolutely protected, religious speech and proselytizing are highly
protected but subject to restraints applicable to non-religious speech, and
unconventional religious practice receives less protection; nevertheless conduct, even
if its violates a law, could be accorded protection.
Free Exercise Clause Tests
Belief-action test- (Reynolds v US and Cantwell v Conneticut)
Using this test, regulation of religiously dictated conduct would be upheld no matter
how central it was to the exercise of religion and no matter how insignificant was the
government's non-religious regulatory interest so long as the government is
proscribing action and not belief.
Ruling: Law is valid as a means of attaining national unity and thus forced
them to salute to the flag.
Barnette case: same facts
Ruling: Saluting was a form of utterance and the believers ought to be
exempted saying that the freedom of worship (and speech) are susceptible
only of restriction to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which
the state may lawfully protect.this wasnt explicitly stated to be a test
Two-part balancing test - (Braunfeld v Brown)

a. Plaintiff should show that the regulation placed a real burden on his religious
exercise
b. Burden would be upheld only if the state showed that it was pursuing an overriding
secular goal by the means which imposed the least burden on religious practices.
Case: WON Sunday closing laws should be applied to Jews who believe that
they should observe another day as Sabbath and abstain from commercial
activity on Saturday.
Ruling: Burdens were an indirect effect of the law which had an overriding
secular purpose and said that it would be violative of the Free Exercise
Clause only if there were alternative ways of achieving the states interest.
Reynolds case: Petitioner was a Mormon and claims that it was his duty to
have several wives.
Ruling: Convicted of biagamy.
This allows absolute protection to belief but not action; put differently the government
may interfere with practice but not belief.
Cantwell case: Petitioner challenges a state law which prohibits door to door
solicitation for any religious or charitable cause without prior approval of a
state agency.
Ruling: Law invalidated, saying that the approval was necessarily censorship
of religion
prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause.
belief.
This furthers the Reynolds ruling and allows both protection of belief and also
freedom to act for the propagation.
Two concepts: freedom to believe and freedom to act; the 1 st is absolute while the
second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.
In every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a
permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.
Deliberate-inadvertent Distinction test - (Minersville School District v Gobitis

and West Virginia v Barnette)
One must make a distinction between deliberate state interference of religious
exercise for religious reasons which was plainly unconstitutional and governments
inadvertent interference with religion in pursuing some secular objective
Gobitis case: Jehovahs Witnesses believers refused to salute to the flag in a
public school program.
Compelling State Interest text and Exemption Doctrine - (Sherbert v Verner

and Wisonsin v Yoder)
Sherbert case: Petitioner refused to work on Saturdays due to religious
Ruling: Court allowed exemption; saying that In this highly sensitive
constitutional area, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.'
This test is similar to the two-part balancing test but this one stresses that the interest
must be paramount and compelling to override ones free exercise claim.
When general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemption ought to be
granted unless compelling state interest intervenes.
Wisconsin case: Amish parents question the compulsory law on high school
attendance; saying that they didnt allow their children secular education of
their kids over 8th grade.
Ruling: Convicted
Here, the court stresses that belief and action cannot be confined in logic-tight
compartments. Reading through this, I think what the case is trying to say is that
there is difficulty in balancing which of the highest order interest of the state can
overbalance legitimate claims of the free exercise of religion.

Rational Basis Test - (Oregon Department of Human Resources v Smith)

Case: The Native American Church members were drug rehabilitation
counselors for a private social service agency and they ingested a
hallucinogenic drug called peyote at their sacramental ceremony and were
fired and not given unemployment compensation, saying it was a jobrelated misconduct.
Ruling: we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally
applicable criminal law.
The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially

harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, cannot
depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's
spiritual development. To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law
contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs except where the
State's interest is "compelling" - permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a
law unto himself," - contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.
This test states that the free exercise of religion can only be upheld if it is claimed in
conjunction with other protections.
J. Carpios agrees with this test in his 2006 dissent.
Important Cases under the Free Exercise Clause
American Bible v City of Manila
Case: ABS sold bibles and the City required them to secure a permit to pay a
license as well as tax.
Ruling: The Ordinance is valid but was not applicable ABS; saying that the
"government is not precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character
even if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or sect" and to apply
it to them would be a restraint of its religious profession and worship. .
Religion has been spoken of as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to its Creator. It has reference to one's views of his relations to His
Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence to His being and character,
and obedience to His Will
The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any
restraints of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of
expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent.
Note: Clear and Present Danger Test wasnt actually applied.
Ebralinag v Div. of Schools

Case: Petitioners refuse to salute to the flag and sing the National Anthem
because they believe that these acts constitute worship, which they claim they
only offer to their god.
Ruling: Forcing them to do so would be violative of their fundamental right to
religious exercise and thus, are exempted from engaging in those external rights.
Religious exercise is a fundamental right. The only justification for a prior restraint or
limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and
imminent danger, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any
other legitimate public interest, that the state has a right to prevent.
Note: The court cites Gerona and says that the decision in that case which had similar
facts to this one was uncalled for considering that believers of the Jehovah witness
constitute only a small portion of the population and it wont shake up the nation
which would then produce citizens with no sense of patriotism and love of country.
But forcing them to salute the flag would actually do that.
Pamil v Teleron
Case: Petitioner seeks the removal of Respondent Mayor because he was a
Father (priest) and is contrary to the Administrative Code, which disallows
ecclesiastics to be part of the municipal office.
Ruling: Technically, the Code is inconsistent with religious freedom but the
required votes were not met to declare it unconstitutional.
The Court cites Torcaso v Watkins which requires a belief in God to be part of an
office of the State in saying that this is essentially a religious test which allowed for
their exclusion in office.
Iglesia ni Cristo v CA
Case: INC had a show in ABS but MTRCB reviewed this and X-rated it.
Ruling: Court said yes to reviewing but annulled the X-rating, saying that it was a
form of suppression on the free exercise of religion.
Religious freedom had a preferred status. They discussed that freedom to believe is
absolute but the freedom to act on ones belief, where it affects the public, is subject
to the authority of the state; that religious freedom gave religious liberty and not civil
immunity.
Freedom to believe- a person is free to believe or not as he wants since
religion is really a matter of faith
Freedom to act on ones belief-in externalizing these beliefs in acts or omission
that affect the public, his actions become subject to the authority of the State; in that
it can exercise police power over him.
Applied the Clear and Present Danger Test since it was said to be closest connected
with the freedom of speech. As such, it is the governments burden to discharge the

presumption of invalidity of the prior restraint it imposed on Iglesia. However, they
failed to do this.
This test can be applied because the issue is about the content and
not the manner the speech was delivered.
Swaggart v Board
The Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable tax. The
burden caused on religious freedom caused by the tax was just similar to any other
economic imposition that might make the right to disseminate religious doctrines
costly.
Gerona v Sec of Education

In deciding these kinds of cases, the courts must determine whether a certain ritual is
religious or not. Religious freedom will not be upheld if it clashes with established
institutions of society and with the law such that when the law of general applicability
incidentally burdens the exercise of ones religion, ones right to religious freedom
cannot justify exemption from the compliance with the law.
Ruling: yes, the school was merely furthering the states legitimate interest
in getting children safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools
(child benefit theory)
It was stated there that the government cannot: set up a church, pass laws which aid
religions or prefer one over the other, force anyone to go or remain in a church or
profess a certain belief or disbelief, levy tax to support a religion, participate in the
affairs of religious organizations and vice versa. The wall between the Church and the
State must be kept high and impregnable.
Lemon v Kurtzman - The Lemon Test requires a challenged policy to meet

the following criteria to pass scrutiny under the Establishment Clause
Three-pronged test
Statute must have a secular legislative purpose
Primary or principal effect must be one that neither advances or inhibits
religion
Must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion
Victoriano v Elizaide Rope Workers Union

It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to
the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may
be justified and only to the smallest extent necessary.
Tests mentioned which may limit the extent of religious freedom
-immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community
-general law which advances states secular law may indirectly burden
religious exercise, provided that there is no other means by which the
state can accomplish the purpose w/o imposing such burden
-compelling state interest
German v Barangan
Reiterated the doctrine that the freedom of belief of choice of religion cant be denied
or restrained; only the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same
action can be restrained.
In this case, the court actually ruled that the petitioners could not invoke religious
freedom because they lacked good faith.
Non-establishment Clause
Important Cases under the Establishment Clause
Everson v Board of Education - 1st case wherein the Court adopted
Jeffersons metaphor of a wall of separation between church and state
Case: WON the local school could reimburse parents for expenses in
transporting their kids to and from Catholic Schools, regardless of religion
Case: WON a statutory program providing publicly funded reimbursement

for the cost of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in
secular subjects and salary supplements to teachers in parochial schools in
unconstitutional
Ruling: yes, as it fosters excessive entanglement between government and
religion
Engel v Vitale
Case: WON the policy of voluntary recitation of a brief generic prayer by
kids in the public is valid
Ruling: no, a union of government and religion tends to destroy
government and to degrade religion
To withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause, the statute must have a
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advance nor inhibits religion.
Aglipay v Ruiz
Case: Supreme Head of a Church seeks to prevent Director of Posts from
issuing postage stamps.
Ruling: Allow the Director to issue the stamps because there is no showing
of religious purpose in the questioned law
Religious freedom is not just toleration. Religion is a profession of faith to an active

power that binds and elevates man to his creator.
The Philippines has recognized the influence of religion in society through
Constitutional Clauses such as
-the Preamble when the people implored the aid of Divine Providence

- the exemption from taxation of the properties devoted to religious
purposes exclusively
-creation of the legal holidays such as the Holy Week, Christmas
-optional religious instruction
-those which relate to polygamy and bigamy
The Court is not precluded from pursuing a valid objective secular in character even if
incidental result would be favourable to a religion or sect.
Bro. Velarde v SJS

Case: Petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the acts of
religious leaders who they allege were endorsing religious candidates.
Ruling: The petitioners were not able to fulfil the requisites in discussing the
constitutionality of a case.
The petitioners were not able to present a justiciable controversy; not being ripe for
judicial determination. The petition was based on mere speculation that these acts
might be done in the upcoming elections.
Because of this, the petitioners also dont have a cause of action which has 3
elements
-right in favour of the plaintiff
-obligation on respondents part to respect that right
-breach of obligation
They also lack legal standing. It cant be a taxpayers suit because it has no relation to
taxation and it cant be that theyd suffer a decrease of votes since theyre not even a
registered party.
Their petition did not have a statement of fact nor did it ask for any relief.
The SC scolds the RTC because they didnt have the Fundamental Requirements of a
Decision such as the facts and the dispositive.
-Statement of the Case
-Statement of Facts
-Issues or Assignments of Errors
-Court Ruling
-Dispositive Portion
Excessive Entanglement Test
This term was briefly used in Estrada v Escritor which was then describing the Lemon
Test. So, I browsed Lemon v Kurtzman
Case: WON public assistance to private schools (some of which were religious); this
included paying for salaries of teachers of secular subjects and purchasing teaching
supplies for secular purposes, were valid
Ruling: This case held that the statutes in question were invalid considering that the
relationship it fosters is one pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction
of church schools, and hence of churches
This test seems to discuss that there can only be a certain degree of entanglement
between the state and the church; meaning that they should not intrude unto each
others business.
In order to determine whether the government entanglement with religion is
excessive, the courts must examine the character and purposes of the institutions that
are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting
relationship between the government and the religious authority.
Looking at the laws in this case, the court states that there is an inherent conflict in
the situation wherein the State is paying for the salaries of teachers who are religious
agents and thus, work under the control of religious officials. Essentially, the
government was given inspection powers to see which part of the expenditures were
devoted to secular education and religious activity which would ultimately create an
intimate and continuous relationship between the church and state.
-These programs would somehow benefit the religious organizations that
are involved.

Eminent Domain
Article III, Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
Diclipio Earth v Gozun
Case: Petitioners question the RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act), DAO 96-40 and
the FTAA for it allows unlawful taking without just compensation and that it allows the
foreign company to take over the mining operations.
Ruling: PD 512, Sec 1 granted the qualified mining operators the authority to exercise
eminent domain and since this grant of authority is deemed incorporated in RA 7942,
Sec 76, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter provision is a taking provision.
There is no basis to say that the law does not provide for payment of just
compensation. Citing the case of La Bugal, the Court says that the laws provide for
sufficient safeguards which ultimately still let the State control the operations. Also,
the Constitution used the word involving, thus, the intent was not to exclude other
forms of assistance and that the service contracts were not deconstitutionalized just
because it wasnt used in the Constitution.
De Knecht v Bautista
Case: Petitioners ask that the DPWH stick to the original plan in extending EDSA by
using Cuneta Ave. Instead of the Del Pan St. where they lived.
Ruling: Based on the report done by the Human Settlement Commission, Line 1 had
against is the factors of cost and social impact while Line 2 had against it
functionality. The citizens right of due process was violated; DPWH acted with grave
abuse of discretion. Wanting to minimize social impact is not a justifiable reason to
expropriate lands. The report stated that the DPWH shouldve gave more details of
the plan and of payment of just compensation, as well as, to have a public hearing
before taking action for expropriation.
Heirs of Ardona v Reyes
Case: Petitioners question the expropriation of the lands granted to the Philippine
Tourism Authority to make a sports complex, clubhouse, picnic area etc.; saying that
nowhere in the Constitution is this said to be allowed. They claim that it was not for
public use and that it violates the non-impairment clause.
Ruling: Though tourism is not specifically written in the Constitution, does not make
it a limit in the exercise of the power of eminent domain; those mentioned such as for
agriculture merely underscores the magnitude of the problem sought in this area.
Furthermore, public use is not interpreted as used by the public as that is too
restrictive but as whatever may be for the general welfare. Lastly, the non-impairment
clause has never been a bar to the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
EPZA v Dulay
Case: Petitioners question Judge Dulays assignment of a committee to determine the
amount of just compensation they needed to pay for on the land they expropriated.
Ruling: All the PDs in this case (76. 464. 794. 1533.) are declared unconstitutional
because it states that the basis for just compensation shall be the current and fair
market value declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value as

determined by the Assessor, whichever is lower when this is that task of the court.
Sumulung v Guerrero
Case: Petitioners assails the constitutionality of PD 1224 for being violative of due
process, saying that they were deprived of their property w/o notice and hearing and
that it failed to prove that the expropriation was for public use and no just
compensation was provided.
Ruling: It was proved to be for public use since it is a basic human need but there
were no determination of just compensation and that there was no due process thus,
the case was remanded.
Eminent Domain
Three provisions of the (1973) Constitution which directly provide for the exercise of
the power of eminent domain;
a) Section 2, Article IV: private property shall not be taken for public use
without
just
compensation.
b) Section 6, Article XIV: the State, in the interest of national welfare or
defense and upon payment of just compensation to transfer to public
ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the
government.
c) Section 13, Article XIV: the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon
payment of just compensation the expropriation of private lands to be
subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens.
Visayan Refining Co. v Camus from Heirs of Ardona v Reyes
The power of eminent domain doesnt depend on a specific grant in the constitution
because it is inherent in sovereignty and exists in a sovereign state w/o any
recognition in the constitution. The provisions relating to taking of property for public
use do not implicitly grant this power but limit it which would otherwise be without
limit; the constitutional restraint being public use and just compensation.
The non-impairment clause has never been a barrier to the exercise of police power
and likewise eminent domain.
Sumulong v Guerrero
Allowing immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property w/o
giving the owner his day in court is violative of due process.
EPZA v Dulay
Its violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the
valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong.

Private property
De Knetch v Bautista
It is recognized that the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what
private property should be taken
JM Tuason v Land Tenure Administration from De Knetch v Bautista
A landowner is covered by the mantle of protection due process affords. It is a
mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness. There is recognition that the power of
Congress designates the particular property to be taken and how much may be
condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, however, it is still a judicial
question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is
two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals.
The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other
private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use.
Lawmakers have determined the public policy that the power of eminent domain may
be exercised in the promotion and development of Philippine tourism. The lease of
store spaces in underpasses of streets built on expropriated land does not make the
taking for a private purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlines
and shipping companies are still for public use.
the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection clause will not allow.
Guido v Rural progress Administration from Sumulong v Guerrero

The test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of the
land and not the number of people who stood to be benefited. There has evolved a
clear pattern of adherence to the number of people benefited test.
In PD 1224, the state acting through the NHA is vested with broad
discretion to designate the particular properties to be taken for socialized housing
purposes.
Public use
Dipido v Gozun
The taking to be valid must be for public use .
Public use - synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare and public
convenience.
Mining industry plays a pivotal role in the economic development of the
country and is a vital tool in the governments thrust of accelerated recovery. Mining
is an industry which is of public benefit.
De Knetch v Bautista
In a choice between people on one hand and progress & development on the other, it
must be remembered that in deciding favour of the latter, one must be mindful that
progress & development are carried out by the State precisely and ultimately for the
benefit of its people.
The strict construction of public use as literally used by the public is too restrictive.
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes
the scope of government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and
correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public
purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We have never been a
laissez faire State, and the necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power
are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources.
Citing Chief Justice Fernando, As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the
power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least
Sumulong v Guerrero
The public use requirement is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing
conditions.
The socialized housing granted by PD 1224 for middle and lower class
members of society was declared to fall within the confines of public use since
shortage in housing is a matter of state concern.

Taking
Just compensation
Dipido v Gozun
Republic v Castellvi from Dipido v Gozun

Requisites of taking in eminent domain:
The expropriator must enter a private property
Entry must be for more than a momentary period
Entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority
Property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated
on injuriously affected
Utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Dipido v Gozun
Eminent Domain
-inherent right of the state (and of those
entities to which the power has been
lawfully delegated) to condemn private
property to public use upon payment of
just compensation
- the power of eminent domain often
results in the appropriation of title to or
possession of property, it need not
always be the case.
-taking may include trespass without
actual eviction of the owner, material
impairment of the value of the property
or prevention of the ordinary uses for
which the property was intended such as
the establishment of an easement.
Police Power
- power of the state to promote public
welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property
-property condemned under police power
is usually noxious or intended for a
noxious
purpose;
hence,
no
compensation shall be paid.
-property rights of private individuals are
subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state.
-in the exercise of its police power
regulation, the state restricts the use of
private property, but none of the property
interests in the bundle of rights which
constitute ownership is appropriated for
use by or for the benefit of the public.
-use of the property by the owner was
limited, but no aspect of the property is
used by or for the public.
-deprivation of use can in fact be total
and it will not constitute compensable
taking if nobody else acquires use of the
property or any interest therein.
Where a property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof
would be injurious to public welfare, or where property is destroyed because its
continued existence would be injurious to public interest, there is no compensable
taking. However, when a property interest is appropriated and applied to some public
purpose, there is compensable taking.
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial

function.
Looking at RA 7942 and DAO 96-40, it is clear that the courts are not
excluded from taking cognizance of expropriation cases. The disagreement referred to
in Section 107 does not involve the exercise of eminent domain, but a situation
wherein the permit holders are allowed by the surface owners entry into the latters
lands and disagreement ensues as regarding the proper compensation for the allowed
entry and use of the private lands. Noticeably, the provision points to a voluntary sale
or transaction, but not to an involuntary sale.
EPZA v Dulay
Municipality of Daet v CA: Just compensation means the equivalent for the value of
the property at the time of its taking. It means a fair and fun equivalent for the loss
sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to
the expropriating entity.
Garcia v CA: In estimating the market value, all the capabilities of the property and all
the uses to which it may be applied or for which it is adapted are to be considered
and not merely the condition it is in the time and the use to which it is then applied by
the owner. PD 76, 464, 794, 1533 which base just compensation on the market value
determined by the owner or Assessor, whichever is lower was declared
unconstitutional since it is an impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives
because the court would be relegated to stating the lower value of the property as
stated by the owner or assessor.
The courts still have the power and authority to appoint commissioners for the
purpose of determining just compensation. The valuation in the decree may only
serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation,
but it does not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be
awarded and how to arrive at such amount.
Sumulong v Guerero
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time o f the taking. All the
facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and
capabilities should be considered. It means fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained. Values given by assessors are usually uniform. The idea of expropriation
never occurs until a demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so.
EPZA v Dulay
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee

Rights that private property may not be taken for public use
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate
determination shag prevail over the court's findings ; the courts cant
from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
in the Bill of
without just
that its own
be precluded

CONTRACTS CLAUSE
ART III, SEC 10 No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
Rutter v Esteban (1953)
Moratorium law it is an extraordinary device to save the credit structure of
a society. It provides for the suspension of rights and remedies of creditors incumbent
upon some extraordinary circumstance.
-Valid exercise of police power of the state and not violative of
the constitution.
Test of Constitutionality of a moratorium law:
Determination of the reasonableness of the period of suspension of the
rights and the remedies of the creditors.
Law must refer to the remedy and not to a specific substantive right of
any one individual.
The state may postpone the remedy but cannot destroy it.
The alteration or the impairment that the moratorium law changes in
the contract must not be burdened with restrictions and conditions
that would make the remedy hardly pursuing.
RA 342 is unconstitutional because of the unreasonable period which it
prescribes (8 years).
Ilusorio v Court of Agrarian Reforms (1966)
Sec 14, RA 1199 Change of system: the tenant shall have the right to
change the tenancy contract from one of share tenancy to the leasehold tenancy and
vice versa and from one crop sharing arrangement to another of the share tenancy
xxx
The prohibition in constitutional provisions against impairing the obligations
of contracts is not absolute. Such provisions are restricted to contracts with respect
to property or some object of value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a
court of justice, and have no application to a statute relating to public objects within
the domain of the general legislative powers of the state, and involving public right
and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. They do not prevent proper
exercise by the state of its police powers.
RA 1199 was passed in compliance with the constitutional mandate that
the promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all
the people should be the concern of the state (Art II, Sec 5) and that the state shall
regulate the relations between landlord and tenant xxx in agriculture xxx. (Art XIV,
Sec. 6)
Caleon v Agus Development Corp(1992)
Non impairment clause
-Limited exercise of police power for the interest of public health, safety,
morals of state.
- In spite of constitutional prohibition, the state continues to possess
authority to safeguard interests of the public
- Every contract affecting public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that
it contains an implied reservation of police power as a postulate of the existing legal
order.
Exemption to non-impairment clause
- This power can be activated anytime to change provisions of a contract or
abrogate it entirely for promotion and protection of general welfare. such an act will
not militate against the non-impairment clause of the constitution.
EX POST FACTO LEGISLATION AND BILL OF ATTAINDER
ART III, SEC 22 No ex-post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
Ex post facto law
One which makes an action done before the passing of the law and
which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or
One which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed; or
One which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed;
One which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant
Assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect
imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was
lawful
Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
- Ex post facto clause prohibits only retrospective penal laws.
Bill of Attainder
Is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial.
Essential elements of a bill of attainder
1. There must be a law.
2. The law imposes a penal burden on a named individual or easily
ascertainable members of a group.
3. The penal burden is imposed directly by the law without judicial trial.

NON IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
Lozano v Martinez (1986)
ART III, SEC 18
(1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment
for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted
Involuntary Servitude
-It is every condition enforced or compulsory service of one to another no
matter under what form such servitude may be disguised.
Exceptions to the rule against involuntary servitude
Involuntary servitude may be imposed as a punishment for a crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted
In the interest of national defense all citizens may be compelled by law to
render personal military or civil service
A return to work order
Ganaway v Guillen (1922)
Abolition of imprisonment for debt was brought about by the force of public
opinion which looked with abhorrence on statutory provision whih permitted cruel
imprisonment of debtors. The people sought to prevent use ofthe power of the state
to coerce the payment of debts.
Serafin v Lindayag (1975)
Outright dismissal is warranted for the complaint against Serafin since its
elementary that the non payment of debt is NOT A CRIMINAL ACT.
US v Cara (1917)
Consti provision prohibiting imprisonment or debt applies to actions on
contracts, express or implied.
Prohibition does not extend to actions for torts, fines, penalties arising from violating
penal laws.
Statute relieving from imprisonment for debt is not intended to take away the right to
enforce criminal statutes and punish wrongful embezzlement or conversions of
money.
Does not prevent state from imposing a sentence for a crime which requires
the restoration of the sum of money wrongfully converted in violation of a criminal
statute.
Ajeno v Inserto
Constitutional provision is applicable only to money debts arising from
contractual obligations
Organic provisions relieving from imprisonment for debt were intended to

prevent commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex
contractu. The inhibition was never meant to include damages arising in actions e
delicto.
It is within the prerogative of the law making body to proscribe certain acts deemed
pernicious and inimical to public welfare.
US v Pompeya (1915)
Phil. Legislature has power to legislate upon all subjects affecting the
people which has not been delegated to congress or expressly prohibited by said
organic act. The conditions of Act no 1309 must exist in the complaint. -- not
applicable to all persons and to every condition.
The complaint must show that the person charged belongs to the class of
persons to which the law is applicable. Absence of such, the courts would be unable
to impose the penalty of the law because defendant might belong to an exempt class.
Caunca v Salazar (1949)
The fact that no physical force was exerted to keep her from leaving
Salazars house does not make less the deprivation of Flores personal freedom which
includes freedom to movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another and
freedom to choose ones residence.
An employment agency cannot curtail an employees freedom of movement,
even though it advanced money to that employee.
FREE ACCESS TO COURTS AND QUASI JUDICIAL BODIES
ART III, SEC 11
Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Access to justice
Access to courts
Adequate legal assistance
Those protected include low paid employees, domestic servants and
laborers. They need not be persons so poor that they must be supported at public
expense.
It suffices that plaintiff is indigent.

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Constitutional

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015

Introduction to the Course

Due Process of Law

Equal Protection of the Law

Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

Privacy of Communication and Correspondence

Writ of Habeas Corpus

Liberty of Abode and Travel

Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment

Freedom of Speech and of Expression

Freedom of the Press

Freedom of Religion and Non-establishment of Religion

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015

5 BASIC CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES:

Ratio: Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015

definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015

Test for valid exercise:

Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015

been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government,

legitimate government interest

Is there public interest/welfare involved?

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015

Is the means reasonably necessary to accomplish the

Strict scrutiny: Compelling state interest. The focus is on compelling,

Does the state have a compelling reason/interest to

Is there no other alternative?

Strict scrutiny was applied in determining whether the requirements of substantive

applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person

Lumiqued vs. Estrada: In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is to

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015

A governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep

Void for Vagueness Doctrine

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015

assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings;

III. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of

Dumlao v. COMELEC: The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015

Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission: Arbitrariness is challenged by the due process

Not be limited to existing conditions only; and

Serrano v. Gallant Maritime introduced a modification in equal protection

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015

Alvarez vs. CFI (1937)

The court determined it was not a valid warrant

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015

Nala vs. Barroso, Jr. (2003)

Alvarez vs. CFI (1937)

PROBABLE CAUSE AND PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF APPLICANTS

In this case there was no personal examination of the judge

The determination of probable cause calls for an exercise of judgment after

How to personally examine (to determine probable cause)

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015

Lim vs. Felix (1991)

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015

equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents

Roan vs. Gonzales (1986)

People vs. Tangliban

Conducted surveillance of victory bus