The British Tank Detachment at

Cambrai
Lessons Learned and Lost Opportunities
by Major David P. Cavaleri
And therefore I consider that we
were not beaten by the genius of Marshal Foch, but by General Tank, in
other words, a new weapon of war...
General der Infanterie A.D.H. von Zwehl, Die
Schlachten im Sommer, 1918, am der Westfront.

On September 15, 1916, the British

Expeditionary Force under the command of General Sir Douglas Haig employed tanks in support of infantry operations during the Battle of the
Somme. In a previous article (ARMOR,
November/December 1995), I discussed the decision-making process behind Haigs commitment of tanks at
that time. This article analyzes the British development of mechanized doctrine leading up to the November 1917
Battle of Cambrai and the impact of
the lessons learned from that operation.
In the final analysis, the British selectively applied certain lessons to immediate tactical problems, but failed to
grasp the implications of mechanized
operations for the future.
At the end of September, 1916, Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Elles took command of the British Tank Detachment.
He was described by his primary staff
officer, Major J.F.C. Fuller, as boyish
and reckless in danger; perhaps a better
soldier than a strategist, yet one who
could profit from the cooperation of his
advisors, and one who was universally
loved and trusted by his followers.1
Historian Douglas Orgill looked beyond Elles personality and wrote that
Elles represented a bridge between the
new military knowledge and the old
soldierly virtues.2 Despite Elles personal leadership qualities, however,
Major Fuller was the one responsible
for developing doctrine and training
programs.
At their first meeting in late 1916,
Elles stated that this show [the Tank
Detachment] badly wants pulling together; it is all so new that one hardly
knows which way to turn.3 Elles
charged Fuller with creating a sense of

26

discipline and esprit de corps in the detachment. Fuller regarded this mission
as a three-part problem. First, he had to
instill a sense of discipline, which he
pursued via a series of lectures on the
subject. Second, he had to instruct the
officers in new doctrine. And third, he
had to reorganize the detachment so as
to maximize the use of its equipment.
Fuller was an infantry officer with a
reputation for being a highly efficient
staff officer. In February 1917, he published a training manual entitled
Training Note #16, designed to
standardize all training practices in the
detachment.4 Fuller organized the manual in nine sections: detachment organization, operations, tactics, cooperation with other arms, preparations for
offensives, supply, communication, reinforcements, and camouflaging. Calling the tank a mobile fortress, which
could escort the infantry into the enemys defenses, and from behind which
they could sally forth and clean up his
trenches,5 he believed that tanks were
capable of a more offense-oriented role
than had been demonstrated during the
Somme operation.
In June, 1917, Fuller produced a document entitled Projected Bases for the
Tactical Employment of Tanks in
1918. In this study, he drew on the results of ineffective tank employment
during the battles of the Somme (September 1916), Arras (April 1917), and
Messines (June 1917). Fuller advanced
three points based on his analysis. The
first was that the tanks effectiveness
was related directly to the terrain over
which it operated. The second was that,
if properly employed, tanks were capable of executing a penetration which
could allow for a breakthrough by follow-on cavalry and infantry forces. The
third principle was that the success of
any tank penetration required a surprise
artillery bombardment not to exceed
forty-eight hours in duration.6 Fuller
expanded on Ernest D. Swintons concepts in his belief that tanks were capa-

ble of more than strongpoint and wire

obstacle reduction. He soon became
the leading advocate, wrote B.H Liddell Hart, of the tanks wider potentialities as a means to revive mobile
warfare, instead of merely as a modernized battering ram for breaking
into entrenched defenses.7
Later in 1917, Fuller proposed an operation to British General Headquarters
designed to test the validity of his
ideas. Fullers initial recommendation
proposed a raid of no more than a few
hours duration, designed to penetrate
enemy defenses, capture prisoners, and
shake up the defenders. In an August
1917 paper entitled Tank Raids, he
summarized the objectives of just such
a limited raid as Advance, hit and retire; its objective being to destroy the

ARMOR November-December 1996

enemys personnel and guns, to demoralize and disorganize him, and not to
capture ground or hold terrain.8
Unfortunately, such a plan had little
to recommend it to GHQ; the limited
tactical gains were outweighed by the
potential loss of surprise and vehicles.
However, the Third Army Commander,
General Julius Byng, read the proposal
and recognized its potential. He developed a plan which incorporated Fullers basic concepts but which had
much larger objectives, especially regarding the capture of territory.
Byng wanted the focus of the operation to be the communications center at
Cambrai; once that town was captured
he could then release his cavalry to the
northwest to raid behind German lines.
Byngs plan relied on the tanks to

penetrate the defense and assumed that

such a break-in would automatically result in a cavalry breakthrough. His plan
meticulously prepared for the initial
break-in, but discounted the fact that at
that stage of the year, he lacked adequate reserves to follow through. Even
if the operation was successful in effecting a break-in of the outpost and
battle zones, he would not be able to
penetrate into the rearward zone to
launch his cavalry.9
Haig ultimately decided on an advance with limited objectives in the vicinity of Cambrai, but not necessarily
focused on the town itself. He revised
Byngs plan to concentrate on the
Bourlon Ridge which, if captured,
would provide British forces with excellent observation of the battle and

ARMOR November-December 1996

rearward zones. Unwilling to discount completely the possibility of a

breakthrough, Haig nevertheless retained the option to terminate the operation at the end of forty-eight hours
unless clear progress was evident.10 By
October, 1917, Fuller had revised his
original Tank Raids proposal to incorporate Byngs and Haigs guidance.
These new plans featured the tank in a
spearhead-type role.
By mid-November 1917, the staff at
GHQ had finalized the plans for the
Cambrai attack. The sector was constricted by two canals, the Canal du
Nord on the left and the Canal de lEscaut on the right, six miles apart. The
initial attack area included a number of
small villages and two dominant ridgelines, the Flesquieres and Bourlon. The

27

Hindenburg trench system in this sector

was over five miles deep, complete
with dugouts, machine gun posts, wire
obstacles, antitank ditches in excess of
twelve feet wide, and supporting artillery batteries.11
The Hindenburg Line proper ran in a
northwesterly direction for almost six
miles from the Scheldt Canal at Banteux to Havrincourt. The line then
turned north for four miles to Mouvres.
Roughly one mile behind this first line
lay the Hindenburg Reserve Line, and
an additional three and a half miles behind that lay the Beaurevoir, Masnieres
and Marquian Lines.12
The final plan called for the tanks to
penetrate the Hindenburg Line between
the two canals, pass the cavalry
through the gap, then continue forward
and assist the infantry in seizing Bourlon Wood and the town of Cambrai.
The tanks and infantry would continue
to expand the penetration while the
cavalry raided support units in the
rearward zone and beyond.13 Fuller
expressed concern over the suitability
of the terrain beyond the battle zone
and over the lack of reserves available
to exploit any breakthrough, but the
plan stood as written.14 The Cambrai
plan was a mixture of traditional operation and innovative thinking. The plan
of attack dispensed with the traditional
long duration artillery bombardment
and instead, the 1,003 supporting artillery guns were to conduct a brief sup-

28

pressive bombardment, concentrating

on counter-battery and smoke-screen
fire. Once the assault began in earnest,
the artillery would shift to the creeping
barrage pattern similar to that designed
by General Rawlinson for the 1916
Somme operation. The tanks were assigned the mission of breaching the
trenches and wire obstacles and leading
the attack, precluding the need for an
intense preparatory bombardment.
Byng anticipated a breakthrough
which would allow the cavalry to pass
through to the rearward zone in order
to raid the enemys communications,
disorganize his system of command,
damage his railways, and interfere as
much as possible with the arrival of his
reinforcements.15 The final plan reflected the level of development which
British mechanized doctrine had
reached under Fuller; Haig was willing
to commit the tanks to a crucial role
and expected them to accomplish more
than obstacle reduction. At the same
time, the exploitation and disruption
role stayed with the cavalry who remained vulnerable on a battlefield replete with machine guns and artillery.
Fuller divided the six-mile-wide offensive sector into a series of objectives, each of which was further subdivided, based on the number of strongpoints, into tank section attack areas.
He assigned a three-tank section, along
with an infantry section, to each attack
area. Each tank carried a bundle of

wood three or four feet in diameter and

weighing over one ton. These were affixed to the front of each vehicle with
chains. The wood was carried to fill in
antitank ditches, thereby allowing the
tank-infantry teams to negotiate three
ditches as they leapfrogged through the
defenses.16
On November 20, 1917, at 0620
hours, British artillery commenced a
suppressive barrage along the six-milewide front. Unlike previous preparatory
barrages, this forty-five minute barrage
was predominantly smoke and high explosive. The artillery concentrated on
suppressing the defenders artillery and
masking the tanks advance. After less
than one hour, the artillery began the
creeping barrage and the tanks moved
forward. The absence of a traditional
preparatory bombardment probably
contributed to the defenders surprise
and to the tanks success in breaching
the first defensive lines.
GHQ allocated 476 tanks to Byngs
Third Army for the Cambrai attack.
Out of this total, 378 were fighting
tanks; 44 were devoted to communications, command and control; and the
remaining 54 were assigned resupply
duties. These last tanks each carried
two tons of supplies and hauled an additional five tons on sledges over the
breached obstacle networks. Fuller estimated that it would have required over
21,000 men to carry a similar resupply
load, which represents a significant

ARMOR November-December 1996

savings in fighting troops who were not

diverted from actual combat duties.17
The tanks were accompanied and followed by elements of six infantry divisions. Waiting behind the safety of the
British trenches were the five divisions
of cavalry which Byng hoped to launch
forward.
The opening stages of the attack were
successful. Masked by smoke and the
creeping barrage, the tanks tore holes
through the wire obstacles and filled in
ditches with the wood. Less than two
hours after the attack began, the British
captured the Hindenburg Main Line
over the six-mile front between the two
woods. By 1130, the Hindenburg Support Line, with the exception of the
ridge at Flesquieres, was in British
hands as well. By the end of the day,
the BEF had penetrated to a depth of
just over four miles, capturing over
5,000 prisoners, with a loss of just over
4,000.18 The first days operation demonstrated the effects of coordinated
tank, infantry, and artillery tactics over
suitable terrain within the parameters
of a well thought-out tactical plan.
But the success of November 20 was
mitigated by several failures. The British lost 179 tanks that day to a combination of enemy fire and mechanical
breakdown. The tank/infantry teams
penetrated to a depth of over four
miles, but not deep enough to qualify
as a breakthrough into the rearward
zone. The cavalry divisions in most
sectors never even made it into the battle, and the few cavalry units committed failed to accomplish anything significant in terms of rear area exploitation. In addition, the operation experienced several instances of degraded coordination between the tanks, infantry,
and artillery. The 51st Infantry Division
fell so far behind the assaulting tanks
that, when the tanks reached the Flesquieres Ridge, the infantry could not
detect the breaches in the wire.
A short while later, 16 tanks, without
the protection of their own infantry
teams, were destroyed by a battery of
German field guns which were out of
range of the tanks weapons.19 This incident illustrates clearly that Fullers
tactics needed refinement. While he
had proven that tanks were capable of
rapid penetration, they were by no
means capable of independent operations.
Haig terminated the Cambrai attack
on November 22, just as he had promised if the offensive failed to result in a
breakthrough. He recognized that the

BEF lacked the reserves needed to continue the attack because of the previous
diversion of five divisions to the Italian
Front at Caporetto.20 One week after
the attack began, he wrote, I have not
got the necessary number of troops to
exploit our success. Two fresh divisions
would make all the difference and
would enable us to break out....21 This
lack of reserves, combined with the
cavalrys inability to achieve a breakthrough on their own, convinced Haig
to end the attack after only limited
gains. It is clear that no one, with perhaps the exception of Fuller himself,
anticipated the extent or rapidity of
success. Swinton reacted to the initial
reports on November 20 with this comment: Im pleased all right, but Im
wondering. I bet that GHQ are just as
much surprised by our success as the
Boche is, and are quite unready to exploit it.22
The lack of available reserves resulted in the loss of British momentum
at Cambrai. The Germans were able to
fall back, regroup, and on November
30 launch a counterattack to eliminate
the new British salient. The Germans
began their attack at 0700 with an intense one-hour-long artillery bombardment, similar to the one used by the
BEF on November 20th. Using proven
sturmabteilung tactics, they succeeded
in reducing the salient on an eight-mile
front in just over three hours. Several
minor successes followed, but they
were unable to execute a rapid or violent breakthrough due to inadequate reserves, British reinforcements, and general troop exhaustion. The counterattack forced the BEF to withdraw partially to stabilize the lines, resulting in
practically no net gain based on the
success of November 20th. By December 7, the lines had stabilized. The Germans had, between November 20 and
December 7, lost 41,000 men and 138
guns. The British had lost 43,000 men,
158 guns, and 213 of their available
tanks.23
In strategic terms, the BEF had gained
nothing. But from a tactical and developmental viewpoint, the battle of Cambrai represents a transition in BEF operations. Because of the complete tactical surprise and significant gains made
in less than 12 hours, several contemporaries mark November 20, 1917, as a
landmark of sorts in the history of warfare. Lloyd George later said that the
battle will go down to history as one
of the epoch-making events of the war,
marking the beginning of a new era in
mechanized warfare.24 Haig credited

ARMOR November-December 1996

the use of tanks at Cambrai with making it possible to dispense with artillery preparation, and so to conceal our
intentions from the enemy up to the actual moment of attack,25 and stated
that the tanks penetration of the Hindenburg Line had a most inspiring
moral effect on the Armies I command... the great value of the tanks in
the offensive has been conclusively
proved.26 Swinton, not surprisingly,
claimed some credit for the success of
November 20th. It has an added interest, he wrote, in that it was upon the
lines here laid down [reference made to
his February 1916 Notes on the Employment of Tanks.] that the epochmaking Battle of Cambrai was
fought....27
The combination of surprise, suitable
terrain, adequate numbers of tanks, coordinated artillery bombardment, resourceful preparation and, most importantly, comprehensive planning resulted
in a major penetration of enemy lines.
The lessons learned in the areas of
economy in men per weapon, in men
per yard of front, in casualties, artillery
preparation, cavalry personnel, ammunition, and battlefield labor were important.28 While there was no denying
the significance of the event, the British failed to convert the early success
of November 20th, and Fuller set out to
determine exactly why. Fuller and the
General Staff of the Third Army developed a list of lessons learned based on
the Cambrai operation.29 Six of the
most significant lessons, several of
which remain applicable to present-day
combined arms operations as well, appear below:
1. Tank units and infantry units must
maintain close liaison during offensive
operations. Haig used the incident at
Flesquieres Ridge as an example of this
lesson: This incident shows the importance of infantry operating with tanks
and at times acting as skirmishers to
clear away hostile guns....
2. Keep large reserves of tanks to replace unexpected losses in any sector.
3. The present model tank is mechanically unable to deal with enemy
parties in upper stories of houses.
4. Tanks must not outdistance supporting infantry this allows enemy
to hide and reappear. This was a contributing factor in the cavalrys failure
on November 20th.
5. Infantry must not expect too much
from tanks they must assist the
tanks with protection this requires
continuous combined arms training.

29

6. Tanks used in small numbers are

only frittered away. If it is desired to
continue the advance with tanks on the
second day, a completely new formation of tanks should be earmarked.30
Historian John Terraine alluded to this
when he stated the tanks [at Cambrai]
had shown their effectiveness for
breaking into even a very elaborate and
strong trench position. Breaking
through was another matter.31
In May, 1918, Fuller published an important doctrine study entitled The
Tactics of the Attack as Affected by the
Speed and Circuit of the Medium D
Tank, more commonly referred to as
simply Plan 1919.32 His analysis
called for the initial penetration of the
outpost and battle zones by tanks.
Once into the rearward zone, the
tanks would seek out the enemys command and control systems and artillery
support, thereby assuming the role of
the cavalry.33 This plan represented a
further innovation on tactics beyond
those employed in September 1916 and
November 1917. Fuller advocated the
destruction of systems, rather than the
elimination of enemy troop concentrations, and believed the end result
would be the same: the crippling of the
enemys will and capacity to fight. His
futuristic concept was based on the
speed, maneuverability, and firepower
capabilities of the Medium D tank, and
he assumed, mistakenly, that the military establishment would agree with
him. In order to execute his plan, Fuller
required a force of over 5,000 tanks, an
increase in Tank Corps personnel from
17,000 to 37,000, and a willingness on
the part of the military to replace the
horse-mounted cavalry with tanks.34
Despite the success of November 20,
1917, Fullers Plan 1919 was too
radical for the leadership to endorse,
and it never progressed beyond the
theoretical stage. What Plan 1919
represents is the continuing development of mechanized doctrine. The limited success of November 20th demonstrated the capabilities of tanks; in July
1918 at the Battle of Hamel, and later,
in August, 1918, at the Battle of
Amiens, the British Tank Corps had
opportunities to demonstrate the potential for tank operational success on an
increasingly greater offensive scale.
The Battle of Cambrai provides a picture of the tanks development from infantry support weapons with limited offensive potential to weapons employed
on the point of the offensive. They had
proven capable of clearing a path for
the infantry into the main defensive

30

zone and demonstrated the potential to

advance further. During the inter-war
period, mechanized doctrine would
vacillate between those who believed
tanks should remain auxiliary to the infantry and those who were willing to
take the doctrine to a higher level. Interestingly enough, it was the British
who elected to revert back to the early
philosophy, while the Germans, under
General Heinz Guderian, explored the
potential for expanded mechanized operations. In retrospect, the decision by
both sides is logical. The British had
won the war using traditional strategies
augmented by innovative equipment
and tactics, and therefore had little inclination to change. The Germans, on
the other hand, had lost; their tactics
had proven ineffective on the large
scale of the Western Front, and they
had everything to gain by adopting
new equipment and strategies.

19
Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier, p. 209.
20
Robert Blake (ed.), The Private Papers of
Douglas Haig, 1914-1919, (London: Eyre and
Spottiswoode, 1952), p. 265.
21

Ibid.

22

Ernest D. Swinton, Eyewitness: being personal reminiscences of certain phases of the

Great War, including the genesis of the tank,
(New York: Arno Press, 1972), p. 266.
23
Wilson, p. 492; see also David Eggenberger,
A Dictionary of Battles (New York: Thomas Y.
Crowell Company, p. 1967), p. 73.
24
David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of
David Lloyd George, (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1933), p. 102.
25

Boraston, p. 157.

26

Ibid., p. 173.

27

Swinton, pp. 171-172.

28

Arch Whitehouse, Tank, (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1960), p. 93.
29
Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier, pp. 218-219.

Notes
1
J.F.C. Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional
Soldier, (London: I. Nicholson and Watson,
1936), p. 88.
2

Douglas Orgill, The Tank: Studies in the Development and Use of a Weapon, (London:
Heinemann Publishing Co., 1970), p. 31.
3
Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier, p. 87.
4

Ibid., p. 96ff.

Ibid., p. 97.

Ibid., pp. 129-130.

B.H. Liddell Hart, The Memoirs of Captain

Liddell Hart, Vol. 1, (London: Cassell and
Company, Ltd., 1965), p. 87.

30

Blake, p. 269.

31

John Terraine, White Heat: The New Warfare 1914-1918, (London: Sidgewick and Jackson, 1982), p. 242.
32
Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier, pp. 332-335.
33
Robert H. Larson, The British Army and the
Theory of Armored Warfare, 1918-1940, (New
York: University of Delaware Press, 1984), p.
90; see also Orgill, p. 89; see also Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier, p. 321.
34
Orgill, p. 89; see also Fuller, Memoirs of an
Unconventional Soldier, Appendix I, pp. 334335.

Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier, pp. 172-175; see also Trevor Wilson, The
Myriad Faces of War, (New York: B. Blackwell, 1986), p. 488.
9

Orgill, pp. 35-36; see also Wilson, p. 488.

10

Wilson, pp. 488-489; see also J.H. Boraston,

Sir Douglas Haigs Despatches, Dec 1915-April
1919, (New York: Charles Scribners Sons,
1927, pp. 152-153.
11

Ibid.

12

Boraston, pp. 153-154.

13

Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier, pp. 181-182.

14

Ibid.

15

Boraston, p. 153.

16

J.F.C. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War, (London: John Murray, 1920), pp. 136-153; see also
Wilson, p. 489.
17
Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier, p. 198.
18

Boraston, p. 157; see also Wilson, p. 490.

Major David P. Cavaleri holds

a B.A. from Eastern Nazarene
College at Quincy, Massachusetts (1982) and an M.A. in History from the University of Missouri at Columbia, Missouri
(1993). He earned his commission in 1983 through the Officer
Candidate School at Fort Benning, Ga. He is a graduate of
several Department of the Army
schools, and is now attending
the U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College at Ft.
Leavenworth, Kan. He just
completed serving as an Assistant Professor of History at the
U.S. Military Academy at West
Point, New York.

ARMOR November-December 1996