1956: missed opportunity or new path?

Contemporary History, March-May 2013

Delia Usai, 160597

1956: MISSED OPPORTUNITY OR NEW PATH?

Turning point in Cold War history

1956 is particularly relevant in the Cold War history, especially related to three events and to the
same number of geopolitical areas: the post-war history problems of Central and Eastern Europe,
the history of the Soviet Union and world communism and the history of international relations, in
particular regarding the Suez canal crisis.
In the context of the history of the world communism, 1956 has a key role. The years after Stalins
death have been interpreted in terms of a new way of Soviet Union policy and as an era of possible
reconciliation between the superpowers and within the USSRs influence sphere countries. The
early post-Stalin era in reality was characterized by rapid domestic flux in the Soviet Union and by
reconsideration of Soviet foreign policy. Stalins successors stressed the necessity and possibility to
build a new international order based not anymore on strict contraposition, but on shared opinions
and possible coexistence among very different countries and social styles. This does not necessarily
mean, however, that the early post-Stalin era was a lost opportunity to end the Cold War.
In this scenario, 1956 represents the focus point of these new possibilities, but in the same time it
shows the difficulties in the application of a new course for the Cold War: in this sense we analyze
1956 as a turning point in the West-East conflict. In fact, 1956 started with a great hope of possible
coexistence and reconciliation, but it ended showing the strength and the irreconciliability of the
conflict. Moreover, it opened the way to a new era for the Cold War, moving the battle scenario
from Europe to the Third World. In this sense 1956 represents the starting point of a more global
Cold War.

1956: missed opportunity or new path?

Contemporary History, March-May 2013
Delia Usai, 160597

KHRUSHCHEVS SECRET SPEECH: FIRST ATTEMPT TO RECONCILIATION

As we had mention, 1956 started with a first attempt to reconcile West and East thanks to the ideas
of Nikita Khrushchev, who succeeded to Stalin as secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in 1953.
Khrushchev started a season of changes in Soviet Union policy, with the liberation of one million
prisoners from gulags, and improvements in the economic situations of people, thanks to a bigger
availability of private houses and consumer goods. Moreover, the new Soviet leadership was sure
about the necessity to lower the international tension and to open new ways to the diplomacy. This
period was defined by the Soviet poet Ilja Erenburg as the Soviet society thaw, the start of a new
era.
This idea of a new era became stronger in the occasion of the XX Congress of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, settled in February 1956, when Khrushchev exalted the notion of peaceful
coexistence and the idea of "different paths to socialism", minimizing Moscows strong influence
on Eastern European countries. Most important, he launched a de-Stalinization campaign,
denouncing Stalins crimes and demolishing the myth of the leader. In a speech read during a secret
meeting the night of 24th February, Khrushchev affirmed that
Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation, and patient cooperation with people, but by
imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. []

[He] used extreme methods and mass repressions at a time when the revolution was already
victorious []. It is clear that here Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his
brutality, and his abuse of power. Instead of proving his political correctness and mobilizing the
masses, he often chose the path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual

1956: missed opportunity or new path?

Contemporary History, March-May 2013
Delia Usai, 160597

enemies, but also against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the party and the
Soviet Government.1

Khrushchev sharply criticized the cult of the individual and spoke about the many negative
phenomena generated by this cult, so alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, without deny the
essence of the revolution and of the Soviet State: in fact, the role of the party and of the nation in
the development of the Soviet society was considered sacred by Khrushchev. He continued
Our historical victories were attained thanks to the organizational work of the party, to the many
provincial organizations, and to the self-sacrificing work of our great nation. These victories are
the result of the great drive and activity of the nation and of the party as a whole; they are not at all
the fruit of the leadership of Stalin, as the situation was pictured during the period of the cult of the
individual.2

Although it was secret, Khrushchev speech was diffused rapidly around the world. The original
report of the speech, numbered '218017', had been given, marked 'not for publication', to inform the
membership of regional and local CPSU organisations. The original copy was made available to
selected readers at the top of the Central Committee building. The Polish party decided -alone in the
bloc- to disseminate a text locally. Another copy, designated 'exclusively for inner-party use,' was
largely diffused by printers (who were instructed to exceed the official run) and numerous private
duplicates were made, circulating into the black market. In addition, the Warsaw Party Secretary
Staszewski handed copies 'hot off the press' to correspondents of Le Monde, Herald Tribune and
New York Times.

Khrushchevs secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, February
25, 1956 ,http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1956khrushchev-secret1.html
2

Ibidem
3

1956: missed opportunity or new path?

Contemporary History, March-May 2013
Delia Usai, 160597

The worldly diffusion of Khrushchev speech gave birth to a point of non-return: in fact, from this
moment it was impossible to underestimate or hide the brutal and oppressive character of the Soviet
socialism. Moreover the self-denounce made by the secretary of the Soviet Communist Party and
the following reforms put in place by the Kremlin gave the impression that the Soviet Union was
finally mature for a awareness of its limits and errors, and for this reason ready to open a diplomatic
path with the West. The option of a dtente, a relaxation of West-East conflict was at its first steps,
although the diffidence of Western powers. What did happen then to change this mood and put in
danger the desiderable relaxation?
The denounce of the most violent methods of the Soviet leadership and the auspicability of a
national way to the socialism had strong repercussions on Eastern European countries, included in
the Soviet Unions sphere of influence. By criticizing Stalin, Khrushchev had opened both the
Russian party and the communist parties in Eastern Europe to further criticism. In particular Poland
perceived the XX Congress as a launch of a democratisation of its political and economic life.
Polish reactions showed the nation had understood it properly: The healthy wave of criticism, the
increased volume of discussions at party and non-party meetings, discussions in the press-the whole
great debate in which practically all of us are participating-proves that a never-ending, national
conference of political activists on the problems of socialism is taking place.3 said the Polish Prime
Minister Cyrankiewicz during the spring session of Polish Parliament. Workers uprisings in Poland
were violently repressed by USSRs police forces, which killed many protesters. Reforms and
autonomy were not compatible with the control that Moscow wanted to continue to maintain.
But the best example of Soviet Union unchanged methods and imposition were showed in the
repression of the Hungarian uprisings of 1956.

Polish Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz 1956, quoted from Kemp-Welch Tony, Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' and Polish
Politics: The Spring of 1956
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1956: missed opportunity or new path?

Contemporary History, March-May 2013
Delia Usai, 160597

HUNGARY CRISIS: FAILURE OF KHRUSHCHEVS NEW COURSE

Western critics of the idea of peaceful coexistence pointed to the ensuing events of 1956 in Eastern
Europe as proof that there was, in reality, no such thing as "peaceful coexistence". The 1956
Hungarian insurrection was the first blood signal of the erosion of the regimes founded in Eastern
Europe according to the Soviet model.
Hungary was a country ripe for an anti-communist revolution because its experience of
sovietisation had been especially harsh. In June Rakosi, the secretary of the Hungarian Communist
Party faithful to Moscow and responsible of the bloodiest purges in eastern Europe, was replaced.
His resignation emboldened students and journalists to be more active and critical in politics. They
started a series of intellectual forums about political themes, which became very popular. In
October mass anti-Soviet demonstrations took place in Budapest: in the night of 23rd October
200.000 protesters removed the Stalins bronze statue and the crowds placed Hungarian flags in
Stalins boots. The Soviet Ambassador in Hungary, Yuri Andropov, immediately asked Moscow to
send troops because the Hungarian military was unable to put down the revolt. Initially Khrushchev
was very reluctant to send troops to Hungary, and he sent some Soviet delegates to negotiate and try
to find a peaceful compromise. We now know, from declassified Soviet archival materials, that
Khrushchev and his colleagues initially decided on 30 October 1956 to let the Communist regime in
Hungary collapse and to pull all Soviet troops out of Hungary: but, the 1st November, after had
received reports about the quickly deteriorating situation and the decision of the leader of the revolt,
Nagy, to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact, Moscow launched Operation Whirlwind with
the mission of crushing the revolution and of restoring a pro-Soviet Communist regime. 60.000
Soviet troops quickly and brutally gained control of the situation. Almost 4.000 Hungarians and 700

1956: missed opportunity or new path?

Contemporary History, March-May 2013
Delia Usai, 160597

Soviets died in the fighting. Many thousands of Hungarians were arrested; 26.000 of these were
brought before the Hungarian courts, 22.000 were sentenced, 13.000 imprisoned, and several
hundred executed. Hundreds were also deported to Soviet Union; 200.000 fled Hungary as refugees
The key factor in this Khrushchevs decision was Hungarys withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact: the
leadership in Moscow was favourable to negotiate reforms, but was completely unwilling to lose a
satellite state. The sending of the troops intended to prevent Hungary from breaking away from the
socialist camp.4 The maintenance of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe was one of the principal
goals of USSR foreign policy. The loss of Hungary would have politically hurt, if not destroyed,
Khrushchev5.
Whatever was the reason of such a decision, the important aspect of the Soviet repression of
Hungarian uprising is the fact that it was conducted exactly trough the brutal methods typical of
Stalins policy, that Khrushchev had so much criticized in his secret speech. Hungary revolution is
the perfect example of the reality of USSR administration: although all the Khrushchev
expectations and aspirations for a better conduct of the relations between Moscow and its satellite
states, he cannot put in danger the survival of the Soviet bloc and of the control on Eastern Europe.
Without this control Moscow would had lost its fundamental strategic card in front of the American
nuclear superiority. Moreover, no Western country took into account the hypothesis to obstacle in
some way the Soviet action.
The iron curtain showed to be impassable and unchangeable. The bipolar equilibrium in 1956 was
accepted also because no one could see a possible alternative. The Hungarian revolution and its
suppression confirmed the idea that the "peaceful coexistence" was still far away. The Stalinist
legacy in Eastern Europe endured for another 35 years.

4
5

Soviet General Malashenko quoted from Streicker Sarah, Soviet intervention in the Hungarian revolution of 1956
Streicker Sarah, Soviet intervention in the Hungarian revolution of 1956
6

1956: missed opportunity or new path?

Contemporary History, March-May 2013
Delia Usai, 160597

SUEZ CRISIS: COLD WAR BECAME GLOBAL

From 1952 Egypt was governed by general Gamal Abdel Nasser, who took the power with a coup
detat which removed the Egyptian monarchy. Egypt at that time was still a British protectorate.
Throughout 1955 and 1956 Nasser pursued a number of policies that would frustrate British aims
throughout the Middle East, and result in increasing hostility between Britain and Egypt. Nasser
struck a further blow against Britain by negotiating an arms deal with communist Czechoslovakia in
September 1955 thereby ending Egypt's reliance on Western arms. Later, other members of the
Warsaw Pact also sold arms to Egypt and Syria. In practice, all sales from the Eastern Bloc were
authorised by the Soviet Union, as an attempt to increase Soviet influence over the Middle East.
This caused tensions in the United States because Warsaw Pact nations now had a strong presence
in the region.
The 26 July 1956 the President of Egypt Nasser gave the last strike to Britain deciding to
nationalize the Suez Canal. Britain and France, lost their international power, called for an
international intervention: but US president Eisenhower did not want intervene because he feared to
provoke the hostility of Middle East countries, that could find support on the Soviet Union.
Moreover, America's closest ally in the region, Saudi Arabia, was just as fundamentally opposed to
the Hashemite-dominated Baghdad Pact as Egypt, and the U.S. was keen to increase its own
influence in the region
Britain and France (the latter too had interests in the region) thus organized a tripartite aggression in
alliance with Israel, which was directly threatened by the Soviet army supply to Nasser. The 30th
October the bombing on Egypt started. Eisenhower condemned the military intervention against
Egypt and called for a cease fire. When US menaced Britain to stop its aids, the entire Suez

1956: missed opportunity or new path?

Contemporary History, March-May 2013
Delia Usai, 160597

operation ended with a great failure. In April 1957 the crisis was over and the canal was fully
reopened to shipping.
Nasser did not want to align neither with US nor USSR, but only to maximize his options taking
advantage of the West-East conflict: in fact Nasser's first choice for buying weapons was the United
States, but his frequent anti-Israeli speeches had made it difficult for the Eisenhower administration
to get the approval of Congress to sell weapons to Egypt. Thus Nasser had let it be known in 1954
55 that he was considering buying weapons from the Soviet Union as a way of pressuring the
Americans into selling him arms he desired. Nasser's hope was that faced with the prospect of Egypt
buying Soviet weapons, and thus coming under Soviet influence the Eisenhower administration
would be forced to sell Egypt the weapons he wanted. Khrushchev who very much wanted to win
the Soviet Union influence in the Middle East, was more than ready to arm Egypt if the Americans
proved unwilling.
Although the USSR's position in the crisis was as helpless as was the United States' regarding
Hungary's uprising, Premier Bulganin threatened to intervene on the Egyptian side, and to launch
rocket attacks on Britain, France and Israel. If the Soviet Union did go to war with NATO allies
Britain and France, then the United States would be unable to remain neutral, because the United
States' obligations under NATO would come into effect, requiring them to go to war with the Soviet
Union in defence of Britain and France. From Eisenhower's viewpoint, it was better to end the war
against Egypt rather run the risk of this escalating into the Third World War, in case Khrushchev
was serious about going to war in defence of Egypt.
The Suez crisis thus showed that no one wanted to incurring in destabilizations dangers. The iron
curtain resisted to the crisis because the possibility of a new world war was too terrible to risk the
destabilization of the Cold War.

1956: missed opportunity or new path?

Contemporary History, March-May 2013
Delia Usai, 160597

CONCLUSION

The crisis of Hungarian uprising and Suez Canal demonstrated that the 1956 was the year of a
decisive settling of the bipolar equilibrium in Europe and in the world. Khrushchevs aim to try to
reconcile the West-East conflict reach its failure first in Europe with the brutal suppression of
Hungarian revolution. The attempts to a peaceful coexistence was impossible to reach because
USSR was not disposed to loose its influence on its satellite states. For this reason 1956 cannot be
considered as a failed opportunity to end the Cold War: as the history had demonstrated in the
followed years, the resolution of the ideological conflict was possible only with the disruption of
one of the sides. At the highest point of their power, neither US nor USSR were disposed to
renounce to their influence on Europe.
Secondly, the Suez crisis demonstrated not only that the conflict was irreconcilable, but also that it
was taking a new path. Both US and USSR wanted to spread their control also in the rest of the
world, firstly in the so called Third World: in fact the process of decolonization during the years of
the Cold War gave birth to several new states, still too weak to independently choose their way
towards their future, and for this reason simpler to influence. The governments and liberation
movements in the Third world were becoming actors in the system of international relations. Thus
Cold War extended its battle field in Asia, Africa and Latin America, exactly in the moment when it
reached a substantial stability in its European epicentrum.
From this moment the Cold War became a global conflict.

1956: missed opportunity or new path?

Contemporary History, March-May 2013
Delia Usai, 160597

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