Facts

On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit
court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the
Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office.
The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall
(who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they were not delivered
before the expiration of Adamss term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions,
claiming that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adamss term.
William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied
directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jeffersons Secretary of
State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme
Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to any courts appointed, or persons holding office,
under the authority of the United States.
Issues
1.

Does Marbury have a right to the commission?

2.

Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?

3.

Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and therefore void?

4.

Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified
in Article III of the Constitution?

5.
Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)
1.

Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.

The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executives constitutional power of appointment
has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the person
possessing the power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective
when signed by President Adams.
2.
Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy.The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties
of government is to afford that protection.
Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty,
the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by
signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of
the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the
signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to the office, he has a
consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which the
laws of the country afford him a remedy.
3.
Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and therefore void.
It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the
Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is
superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the
case to which they both apply.
4.
No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is
specified in Article III of the Constitution.
The Constitution states that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other
cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction. If it had been intended to leave it in the
discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts
according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If
Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared
their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be
appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance.

5.

No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.

It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause
already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to
courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain
an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.
Disposition
Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesnt get the commission.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10520

February 28, 1957

LORENZO M. TAADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,

vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO,
MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and
disbursing officer,respondents.
Taada, Teehankee and Macapagal for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr. for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petitioner Lorenzo M. Taada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of the Citizens
Party, whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines,
was one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate, at the General elections held in
November, 1955, in which Pacita Madrigal Warns, Lorenzo Sumulong, Quintin Paredes, Francisco Rodrigo,
Pedro Sabido, Claro M. Recto, Domocao Alonto and Decoroso Rosales, were proclaimed elected.
Subsequently, the elections of this Senators-elect-who eventually assumed their respective seats in the
Senate-was contested by petitioner Macapagal, together with Camilo Osias, Geronima Pecson, Macario
Peralta, Enrique Magalona, Pio Pedrosa and William Chiongbian-who had, also, run for the Senate, in said
election-in Senate Electoral Case No. 4, now pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal. .
The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf of
the Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano Primicias, as members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of petitioner Senator Taada, on behalf of the Citizens Party,
said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said Tribunal. Then, upon nomination of Senator
Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Taada and
Sumulong, the Senate choose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as
members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz
and Catalina Cayetano, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as
supposed member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his recommendation of said respondent; and (2)
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively to Senator
Delgado, as supposed member of said Electoral Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.
Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Taada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted the case at
bar against Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and
Placido Reyes, as well as Fernando Hipolito, in his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate consists of
23 Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M. Taadabelonging to the Citizens Party; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco
and Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath
of office therefor", said respondents had "acted absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are
unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising the powers of members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal"; that, consequently, the appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano,
Serapio and Reyes, as technical assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who
caused said appointments to be made-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void;
and that Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are about to take cognizance of Electoral Case
No. 4 of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in nullification of the rights of petitioner
Lorenzo M. Taada, both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as representative of the Citizens
Party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado
Macapagal and his co-protestants to have their election protest tried and decided-by an Electoral Tribunal
composed of not more than three (3) senators chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the
largest number of votes in the Senate and not more than the (3) Senators upon nomination of the Party having
the second largest number of votes therein, together, three (3) Justice of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five members belonging to the
Nacionalista Party, which is the rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the Petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and
his co-protestants in Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5) Nacionalista Senators having been
nominated and chosen in the manner alleged.. hereinabove.".

Petitioners pray that:.

"1. Upon petitioners' filing of bond in such amount as may be determined by this Honorable Court, a writ of
preliminary injunction be immediately issued directed to respondents Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A.
Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, restraining them from
continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied by
them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the
salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this
action.
"2. After hearing, judgment be rendered ousting respondent Mariano J. Cuenco Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo
Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes from the aforementioned public offices in the
Senate Electoral Tribunal and that they be altogether excluded therefrom and making the Preliminary injunction
permanent, with costs against the respondents.".
Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the
legality, and validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and
Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said respondents Senators. Respondents,
likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of
jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and
(b) that the petition states no cause of action, because "petitioner Taada has exhausted his right to nominate
after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators", because said petitioner is in
estoppel, and because the present action is not the proper remedy. .
I. Respondents assail our jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon the ground that the power to choose six (6)
Senators as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred by the Constitution upon
the Senate, despite the fact that the draft submitted to the constitutional convention gave to the respective
political parties the right to elect their respective representatives in the Electoral Commission provided for in
the original Constitution of the Philippines, and that the only remedy available to petitioners herein "is not in the
judicial forum", but "to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion.".
We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike the
cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192)-relied upon by the
respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or
indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution
provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the
latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, Suanes
vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.).
Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who
shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the
authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put
it:.
"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the
other hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have been validly exercised. In performing the latter
function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch of the, government, since the
determination of the validity of an act is not the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the one case we
are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are
merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or attented by either
an executive official or the legislative." (Judicial Self-Limitation by Finkelstein, pp. 221, 224, 244, Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 39; emphasis supplied,).
The case of Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra) cited by respondent refutes their own pretense. This Court
exercised its jurisdiction over said case and decided the same on the merits thereof, despite the fact that it
involved an inquiry into the powers of the Senate and its President over the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the
personnel thereof. .
Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines.
Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress 1
And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two
Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one
of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions.
Thus, in the exercise of the so-called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of the defunct
National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former Electoral Commission under the

original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra), and annulled certain acts of the Executive 3
as incompatible with the fundamental law.
In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring
into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass
upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law
and paving the way to its eventual destruction. 4.
Neither are the cases of Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1) and Cabili vs. Francisco (88 Phil., 654), likewise,
invoked by respondents, in point. In the Mabanag case, it was held that the courts could not review the finding
of the Senate to the effect that the members thereof who had been suspended by said House should not be
considered in determining whether the votes cast therein, in favor of a resolution proposing an amendment to
the Constitution, sufficed to satisfy the requirements of the latter, such question being a political one. The
weight of this decision, as a precedent, has been weakened, however, by our resolutions in Avelino vs. Cuenco
(83 Phil., 17), in which this Court proceeded to determine the number essential to constitute a quorum in the
Senate. Besides, the case at bar does not hinge on the number of votes needed for a particular act of said
body. The issue before us is whether the Senate-after acknowledging that the Citizens Party is the party,
having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, to which party the Constitution gives the right to
nominate three (3) Senators for the Senate electoral Tribunal-could validly choose therefor two (2) Nacionalista
Senators, upon nomination by the floor leader of the Nacionalista Party in the Senate, Senator Primicias
claiming to act on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate.
The issue in the Cabili case was whether we could review a resolution of the Senate reorganizing its
representation in the Commission on Appointments. This was decided in the negative, upon the authority of
Alejandrino vs. Quezon (supra) and Vera vs. Avelino (supra), the main purpose of the petition being "to force
upon the Senate the reinstatement of Senator Magalona in the Commission on Appointments," one-half (1/2)
of the members of which is to be elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation of the
political parties therein. Hence, the issue depended mainly on the determination of the political alignment of the
members of the Senate at the time of said reorganization and of the necessity or advisability of effecting said
reorganization, which is a political question. We are not called upon, in the case at bar, to pass upon an
identical or similar question, it being conceded, impliedly, but clearly, that the Citizens Party is the party with
the second largest number of votes in the Senate. The issue, therefore, is whether a right vested by the
Constitution in the Citizens Party may validly be exercised, either by the Nacionalista Party, or by the
Committee on Rules for the Senate, over the objection of said Citizens Party.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The only ground upon which respondents' objection to the jurisdiction of this Court and their theory to the effect
that the proper remedy for petitioners herein is, not the present action, but an appeal to public opinion, could
possibly be entertained is, therefore, whether the case at bar raises merely a political question, not one
justiciable in nature.
In this connection, respondents assert in their answer that "the remedy of petitioners is not in the judicial forum,
but, to use petitioner, Taada's own words, to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion' (p. 81, Discussion on
the Creation of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, February 21, 1956)." This allegation may give the impression that
said petitioner had declared, on the floor of the Senate, that his only relief against the acts complained of in the
petition is to take up the issue before the people- which is not a fact. During the discussions in the Senate, in
the course of the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, on February 21, 1956, Senator Taada was
asked what remedies he would suggest if he nominated two (2) Nacionialista Senators and the latter declined
the, nomination. Senator Taada replied:.
"There are two remedies that occur to my mind right now, Mr. Senator; one is the remedy open to all of us that
if we feel aggrieved and there is no recourse in the court of justice, we can appeal to public opinion. Another
remedy is an action in the Supreme Court. Of course, as Senator Rodriguez, our President here, has said one
day; "If you take this matter to the Supreme Court, you will lose, because until now the Supreme Court has
always ruled against any action that would constitute interference in the business of anybody pertaining to the
Senate. The theory of separation of powers will be upheld by the Supreme Court." But that learned opinion of
Senator Rodriguez, our President, notwithstanding, I may take the case to the Supreme Court if my right herein
is not respected. I may lose, Mr. President, but who has not lost in the Supreme Court? I may lose because of
the theory of the separation of powers, but that does not mean, Mr. President, that what has been done here is
pursuant to the provision of the Constitution." (Congressional Record, Vol. III, p. 339; emphasis supplied.).
This statement did not refer to the nomination, by Senator Primicias, and the election, by the Senate, of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of said Tribunal. Indeed, said nomination and election took place
the day after the aforementioned statement of Senator Taada was made. At any rate, the latter announced
that he might "take the case to the Supreme Court if my right here is not respected.".

As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue before us is
political or not. In this connection, Willoughby lucidly states:.
"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the
province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore,
discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are
exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as
to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers.
"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political
departments of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations
of public or political policy. These considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the
legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the
Constitution or by, statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to
recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations, together with
the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts." (Willoughby on the Constitution of
the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis supplied.).
To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from which we quote:.
"It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent
that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or
statutory provisions.
"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor to determine what matters, fall within its
scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial questions, which
under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." (16
C.J.S., 413; see, also Geauga Lake Improvement Ass'n. vs. Lozier, 182 N. E. 491, 125 Ohio St. 565; Sevilla
vs, Elizalde, 112 F. 2d 29, 72 App. D. C., 108; emphasis supplied.).
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain amendments to the Constitution are invalid
for non-compliance with the procedure therein prescribed, is not a political one and may be settled by the
Courts. 5 .
In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.W. 408), the nature of political question was considered carefully. The
Court said:.
"At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are political, and not
judicial. If this is correct, the court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing board would then
be final, regardless of the actual vote upon the amendment. The question thus raised is a fundamental one; but
it has been so often decided contrary to the view contended for by the Attorney General that it would seem to
be finally settled.
xxx

xxx

x x x.

" .. What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter
which, is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically
delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act.
See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. R.
A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E.
683, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will
pass a law or submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial control
over such matters, not merely because they involve political question, but because they are matters which the
people have by the Constitution delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers
delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the
power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are of a political
nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under his control. But every
officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject him to the restraining and
controlling power of the people, acting through the courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature.
One department is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary is the department which is charged
with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all official action. The recognition
of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain and America, is necessary, to the end that the government
may be one of laws and not men'-words which Webster said were the greatest contained in any written
constitutional document." (pp. 411, 417; emphasis supplied.).

In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide
whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest
number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate
that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the
second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The
Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be
mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity
the proceedings in connection therewith.
".. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where
the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may
determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether
such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16
C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied.).
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the
principal issue raised by the parties herein.
II. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid
and lawful?.
Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:.
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party
having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein.
The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Emphasis supplied.).
It appears that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate of the Philippines consists of twenty
three (23) members of the Nacionalista Party and one (1) member of the Citizens Party, namely, Senator
Taada, who is, also, the president of said party. In the session of the Senate held on February 21, 1956,
Senator Sabido moved that Senator Taada, "the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to
nominate .. three (3) members" of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III,
pp. 328-329), referring to those who, according to the provision above-quoted, should be nominated by "the
party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate. Senator Taada objected formally to this
motion upon the-ground: (a) that the right to nominate said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal belongs,
not to the Nacionalista Party of which Senator Sabido and the other Senators are members-but to the Citizens
Party, as the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, so that, being devoid of authority to
nominate the aforementioned members of said Tribunal, the Nacionalista Party cannot give it to the Citizens
Party, which, already, has such authority, pursuant to the Constitution; and (b) that Senator Sabido's motion
would compel Senator Taada to nominate three (3) Senators to said Tribunal, although as representative of
the minority party in the Senate he has "the right to nominate one, two or three to the Electoral Tribunal," in his
discretion. Senator Taada further stated that he reserved the right to determine how many he would nominate,
after hearing the reasons of Senator Sabido in support of his motion. After some discussion, in which Senators
Primicias, Cea, Lim, Sumulong, Zulueta, and Rodrigo took part, the Senate adjourned until the next morning,
February 22, 1956 (Do., do, pp. 329, 330, 332-333, 336, 338, 339, 343).
Then, said issues were debated upon more extensively, with Senator Sumulong, not only seconding the
opposition of Senator Taada, but, also, maintaining that "Senator Taada should nominate only one" member
of the Senate, namely, himself, he being the only Senator who belongs to the minority party in said House (Do.,
do., pp. 360-364, 369). Thus, a new issue was raised - whether or not one who does not belong to said party
may be nominated by its spokesman, Senator Taada - on which Senators Paredes, Pelaez, Rosales and
Laurel, as well as the other Senators already mentioned, expressed their views (Do., do., pp. 345, 349, 350,
354, 358, 364, 375). Although the deliberations of the Senate consumed the whole morning and afternoon of
February 22, 1956, a satisfactory solution of the question before the Senate appeared to be remote. So, at
7:40 p.m., the meeting was suspended, on motion of Senator Laurel, with a view to seeking a compromise

formula (Do., do., pp. 377). When session was resumed at 8:10 p.m., Senator Sabido withdrew his motion
above referred to. Thereupon, Senator Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, nominated, and the
Senate elected, Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Subsequently, Senator Taada stated:.
"On behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body, I nominate the only Citizens Party member in
this Body, and that is Senator Lorenzo M. Taada.".
Without an objection, this nomination was approved by the House. Then, Senator Primicias stood up and said:.
"Now, Mr. President, in order to comply with the provision in the Constitution, the Committee on Rules of the
Senate-and I am now making this proposal not on behalf of the Nacionalista Party but on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of the Senate-I nominate two other members to complete the membership of the Tribunal:
Senators Delgado and Cuenco.".
What took place thereafter appears in the following quotations from the Congressional Record for the Senate.
"SENATOR TAADA. Mr. President.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Quezon.
"SENATOR TAADA. I would like to record my opposition to the nominations of the last two named gentlemen,
Senators Delgado and Cuenco, not because I don't believe that they do not deserve to be appointed to the
tribunal but because of my sincere and firm conviction that these additional nominations are not sanctioned by
the Constitution. The Constitution only permits the Nacionalista Party or the party having the largest number of
votes to nominate three.
"SENATOR SUMULONG. Mr. President.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Rizal.
"SENATOR SUMULONG. For the reasons that I have stated a few moments ago when I took the floor, I also
wish to record my objection to the last nominations, to the nomination of two additional NP's to the Electoral
Tribunal.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Esta dispuesto el Senado a votar? (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que esten
conformes con la nominacion hecha por el Presidente del Comite de Reglamentos a favor de los Senadores
Delgado y Cuenco para ser miembros del Tribunal Electoral, digan, si. (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que no lo
esten digan, no (Silencio.) Queda aprobada." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 377; emphasis
supplied.).
Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the
Nacionalista Party-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made
without power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said party, and the election by the Senate, of
Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be members
thereof, must necessarily be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate,
and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens Party, to which Senator Taada belongs and which he represents.
Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall
be compose of nine (9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after the nomination of three (3) Senators by
the majority party, and their election by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator
Taada nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more
Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents
were chosen by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias and the
Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law, relative to the number of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure
members of said body, and the appointment of their co-respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful.
At the outset, it will be recalled that the proceedings the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal began
with a motion of Senator Sabido to the effect that "the distinguished gentleman from Quezon, the President of
the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate the three Members" of said Tribunal. Senator Primicias
inquired why the movant had used the word "privilege". Senator Sabido explained that the present composition
of the Senate had created a condition or situation which was not anticipated by the framers of our Constitution;
that although Senator Taada formed part of the Nacionalista Party before the end of 1955, he subsequently

parted ways with" said party; and that Senator Taada "is the distinguished president of the Citizens Party,"
which "approximates the situation desired by the framers of the Constitution" (Congressional Record for the
Senate Vol. III, pp. 329-330). Then Senator Lim intervened, stating:.
"At present Senator Taada is considered as forming the only minority or the one that has the second largest
number of votes in the existing Senate, is not that right? And if this is so, he should be given this as a matter of
right, not as a matter of privilege. .. I don't believe that we should be allowed to grant this authority to Senator
Taada only as a privilege but we must grant it as a matter of right." (Id., id., p. 32; emphasis supplied.).
Similarly, Senator Sumulong maintained that "Senator Taada, as Citizens Party Senator, has the right and not
a mere privilege to nominate," adding that:.
".. the question is whether we have a party here having the second largest number of votes, and it is clear in
my mind that there is such a party, and that is the Citizens Party to which the gentleman from Quezon belongs.
.. We have to bear in mind, .. that when Senator Taada was included in the Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953, it
was by virtue of a coalition or an alliance between the Citizens Party and the Nacionalista Party at that time,
and I maintain that when Senator Taada as head of the Citizens Party entered into a coalition with the
Nacionalista Party, he did not thereby become a Nacionalista because that was a mere coalition, not a fusion.
When the Citizens Party entered into a mere coalition, that party did not lose its personality as a party separate
and distinct from the, Nacionalista Party. And we should also remember that the certificate of candidacy filed by
Senator Taada in the 1953 election was one to the effect that he belonged to the Citizens Party .." (Id., id., p.
360; emphasis supplied.).
The debate was closed by Senator Laurel, who remarked, referring to Senator Taada:.
"..there is no doubt that he does not belong to the majority in the first place, and that, therefore, he belongs to
the minority. And whether we like it or not, that is the reality of the actual situation-that he is not a Nacionalista
now, that he is the head and the representative of the Citizens Party. I think that on equitable ground and from
the point of view of public opinion, his situation .. approximates or approaches what is within the spirit of that
Constitution. .. and from the point of view of the spirit of the Constitution it would be a good thing if we grant the
opportunity to Senator Taada to help us in the organization of this Electoral Tribunal (Id., id., p. 376; emphasis
supplied.).
The foregoing statements and the fact that, thereafter, Senator Sabido withdrew his motion to grant Senator
Taada the "privilege" to nominate, and said petitioner actually nominated himself "on behalf of the Citizens
Party, the minority party in this Body"-not only without any, objection whatsoever, but, also, with the approval of
the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senate has regarded the
Citizens Party, represented by Senator Taada, as the party having the second largest number of votes in said
House.
Referring, now, to the contention of respondents herein, their main argument in support of the mandatory
character of the constitutional provision relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is
that the word "shall", therein used, is imperative in nature and that this is borne out by an opinion of the
Secretary of Justice dated February 1, 1939, pertinent parts of which are quoted at the footnote. 6.
Regardless of the respect due its author, as a distinguished citizen and public official, said opinion has little, if
any, weight in the solution of the question before this Court, for the practical construction of a Constitution is of
little, if any, unless it has been uniform .." 6a Again, "as a general rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt
and ambiguity that the doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction has any application". As a
consequence, "where the meaning of a constitutional provision is clear, a contemporaneous or practical
executive interpretation thereof is entitled to no weight, and will not be allowed to distort or in any way change
its natural meaning." The reason is that "the application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is
more restricted as applied to the interpretation of constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory
provisions", and that, "except as to matters committed by the Constitution, itself to the discretion of some other
department, contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a
doubtful case." Hence, "if in the judgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further
application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy, it may he rejected." (16 C.
J. S., 71-72; emphasis supplied.) 6b.
The aforemention opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not backed up by a, "uniform" application of the view
therein adopted, so essential to give thereto the weight accorded by the rules on contemporaneous
constructions. Moreover, said opinion tends to change the natural meaning of section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution, which is clear. What is more, there is not the slightest doubt in our mind that the purpose and
spirit of said provisions do not warrant said change and that the rejection of the latter is demanded by
paramount considerations of public policy. .

The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondent herein is that, while, it relies upon the
compulsory nature of the word "shall", as regards the number of members of the Electoral Tribunals, it ignores
the fact that the same term is used with respect to the method prescribed for their election, and that both form
part of a single sentence and must be considered, therefore, as integral portions of one and the same thought.
Indeed, respondents have not even tried to show and we cannot conceive-why "shall" must be deemed
mandatory insofar as the number of members of each Electoral Tribunal, and should be considered directory
as regards the procedure for their selection. More important still, the history of section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution and the records of the Convention, refute respondents' pretense, and back up the theory of
petitioners herein.
Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, when they faced the task
of providing for the adjudication of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
Legislative Department, Dr. Jose M. Aruego, a member of said Convention, says:.
"The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the organic laws which left to the lawmaking
body the determination of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members was not altogether
satisfactory. There were many complaints against the lack of political justice in this determination; for in a great
number of cases, party interests controlled and dictated the decisions. The undue delay in the dispatch of
election contests for legislative seats, the irregularities that characterized the proceedings in some of them,
and the very apparent injection of partisanship in the determination of a great number of the cases were
decried by a great number of the people as well as by the organs of public opinion.
"The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in the performance of this function assigned
to it in the organic laws was by no means great. In fact so blatant was the lack of political justice in the
decisions that there was, gradually built up a camp of thought in the Philippines inclined to leave to the courts
the determination of election contests, following the practice in some countries, like England and Canada.
"Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of the convention." (The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. 1, pp. 257-258; emphasis supplied.).
This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. Thus, in its session of February 22, 1956,
Senator Sumulong declared:.
".. when you leave it to either House to decide election protests involving its own members, that is virtually
placing the majority party in a position to dictate the decision in those election cases, because each House will
be composed of a majority and a minority, and when you make each House the judge of every election protest
involving any member of that House, you place the majority in a position to dominate and dictate the decision
in the case and result was, there were so many abuses, there were so main injustices: committed by the
majority at the expense and to the prejudice of the minority protestants. Statements have been made here that
justice was done even under the old system, like that case involving Senator Mabanag, when he almost
became a victim of the majority when he had an election case, and it was only through the intervention of
President Quezon that he was saved from becoming the victim of majority injustices.
"It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old system, but the record will show that those cases
were few and they were the rare exceptions. The overwhelming majority of election protests decided under the
old system was that the majority being then in a position to dictate the, decision in the election protest, was
tempted to commit as it did commit many abuses and injustices." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol.
111, p. 361; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of Representatives, said:.
".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed
of nine members: Three of them belonging to the party having the largest number of votes, and three from the
party having the second largest number votes so that these members may represent the party, and the
members of said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to a party, Mr.
President, there ground to believe that decisions will be made along party lines." (Congressional Record for the
Senate, Vol. III, p. 351; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our Constitution, expressed himself as follows:.
"Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the election, the returns and the qualifications of the
members of the legislative bodies, I heard it said here correctly that there was a time when that was given to
the corresponding chamber of the legislative department. So the election, returns and qualifications of the
members, of the Congress or legislative body was entrusted to that body itself as the exclusive body to
determine the election, returns and qualifications of its members. There was some doubt also expressed as to
whether that should continue or not, and the greatest argument in favor of the retention of that provision was
the fact that was, among other things, the system obtaining in the United States under the Federal Constitution

of the United States, and there was no reason why that power or that right vested in the legislative body should
not be retained. But it was thought that would make the determination of this contest, of this election protest,
purely political as has been observed in the past." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 376;
emphasis supplied.).
It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate contested the accuracy of the views thus
expressed.
Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional provision quoted above, Dr. Aruego
states:.
"The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon the hope and belief that the abolition of
Party line because of the equal representation in this body of the majority and the minority parties of the
National Assembly and the intervention of some members of the Supreme Court who, under the proposed
constitutional provision, would also be members of the same, would insure greater political justice in the
determination of election contests for seats in the National Assembly than there would be if the power had
been lodged in the lawmaking body itself. Delegate Francisco summarized the arguments for the creation of
the Electoral Commission in the following words:.
"I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the hands of members not only of the majority
party but also of the minority party, there is already a condition, a factor which would make protests decided in
a non-partisan manner. We know from experience that many times in the many protests tried in the House or in
the Senate, it was impossible to prevent the factor of party from getting in. From the moment that it is required
that not only the majority but also the minority should intervene in these questions, we have already enough
guarantee that there would be no tyranny on the part of the majority.
`But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me most, and that is the intervention of three
justices. So that with this intervention of three justices if there would be any question as to the justice applied
by the majority or the minority, if there would be any fundamental disagreement, or if there would be nothing
but questions purely of party in which the members of the majority as well as those of the minority should wish
to take lightly a protest because the protestant belongs to one of said parties, we have in this case, as a check
upon the two parties, the actuations of the three justices. In the last analysis, what is really applied in the
determination of electoral cases brought before the tribunals of justice or before the House of Representatives
or the Senate? Well, it is nothing more than the law and the doctrine of the Supreme Court. If that is the case,
there will be greater skill in the application of the laws and in the application of doctrines to electoral matters
having as we shall have three justices who will act impartially in these electoral questions.
`I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact that in electoral protests it is impossible to
set aside party interests. Hence, the best guarantee, I repeat, for the administration of justice to the parties, for
the fact that the laws will not be applied rightfully or incorrectly as well as for the fact that the doctrines of the
Supreme Court will be applied rightfully, the best guarantee which we shall have, I repeat, is the intervention of
the three justices. And with the formation of the Electoral Commission, I say again, the protestants as well as
the protestees could remain tranquil in the certainty that they will receive the justice that they really deserve. If
we eliminate from this precept the intervention of the party of the minority and that of the three justices, then
we shall be placing protests exclusively in the hands of the party in power. And I understand, gentlemen, that in
practice that has not given good results. Many have criticized, many have complained against, the tyranny of
the majority in electoral cases .. I repeat that the best guarantee the fact that these questions will be judged not
only by three members of the majority but also by three members of the minority, with the additional guarantee
of the impartial judgment of three justices of the Supreme Court." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution
by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263; emphasis supplied.).
The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this Court, in Angara vs. Electoral
Commission (63 Phil., 139), he asserted:.
"The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority-men
mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political
development of other countries of the world. When, therefore they deemed it wise to create an Electoral
Commission as a constitutional organ and invested with the exclusive function of passing upon and
determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have
done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened
peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which
the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of
the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98
against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral
Commission is the expression of the wisdom `ultimate justice of the people'. (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural
Address, March 4, 1861.).

"From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its
totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its
members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of
contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long felt need of determining legislative contests
devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention,
to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which
both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations
was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the
Supreme Court," (Pp. 174-175.) 7.
As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention, Delegates Conejero and Roxas said:.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomite de Siete.
"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?" El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto. "El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como
esta el draft., dando tres miembrosala mayoria, y otros t?-es a la minyoryia y atros a la Corte Suprerma, no
cree su Senoria que este equivale pricticamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta cotistuido en esa forma, tanto los
miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Saprema consideration la
cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunbo.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Senoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria
como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidisrno?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
supra, pp. 168-169; emphasis supplied.).
It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the
establishment, first, of an Electoral Commission, 8 and then 9 of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of
Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting
members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party
having the largest number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of votes, in the National
Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given the same number of representatives in the Electoral
Commission or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the adjudication
of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said
body the same number of representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the
former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.
This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. In fact, Senator
Sabido-who had moved to grant to Senator Taada the privilege" to make the nominations on behalf of party
having the second largest number of votes in the Senate-agrees with it. As Senator Sumulong inquired:.
"..I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely thought of creating this
Electoral Tribunal so as to prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant majority in the Tribunal."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 330; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Sabido replied:.
"That is so, .." (Id., p. 330.).
Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:.
".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between
the two parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral
Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is the ideal situation." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol.
III, p. 349; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were: .
"..The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority become members of
the Tribunal it is hoped that they will become aware of their judicial functions, not to protect the protestants or
the protegees. It is hoped that they will act as judges because to decide election cases is a judicial function.
But the framers of, the Constitution besides being learned were men of experience. They knew that even
Senators like us are not angels, that we are human beings, that if we should be chosen to go to the Electoral
Tribunal no one can say that we will entirely be free from partisan influence to favor our party, so that in, case

that hope that the three from the majority and the three from the minority who will act as Judges should result
in disappointment, in case they do not act as judges but they go there and vote along party liner, still there is
the guarantee that they will offset each other and the result will be that the deciding vote will reside in the
hands of the three Justices who have no partisan motives to favor either the protestees or the protestants. In
other words, the whole idea is to prevent the majority from controlling and dictating the decisions of the
Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote will be wielded by the Congressmen or Senators who are
members the Tribunal but will be wielded by the Justices who, by virtue of their judicial offices, will have no
partisan motives to serve, either protestants, or protestees. That is my understanding of the intention of the
framers of the Constitution when they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal.
xxx

xxx

x x x.

"My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure
impartially and independence in its decision, and that is sought to be done by never allowing the majority party
to control the Tribunal, and secondly by seeing to it that the decisive vote in the Tribunal will be left in the
hands of persons who have no partisan interest or motive to favor either protestant or protestee."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 362-363, 365-366; emphasis supplied.).
So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political parties in the Electoral Tribunals, that several
members of the Senate questioned the right of the party having the second largest number of votes in the
Senate and, hence, of Senator Taada, as representative of the Citizens Party-to nominate for the Senate
Electoral Tribunal any Senator not belonging to said party. Senators Lim, Sabido, Cea and Paredes maintained
that the spirit of the Constitution would be violated if the nominees to the Electoral Tribunals did not belong to
the parties respectively making the nominations. 10.
It is not necessary, for the purpose of this decision, to determine whether the parties having the largest, and
the second largest, number of votes in each House may nominate, to the Electoral Tribunals, those members
of Congress who do not belong to the party nominating them. It is patent, however, that the most vital feature
of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of said parties therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be
maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. In the words of the members
of the present Senate, said feature reflects the "intent" "purpose", and "spirit of the Constitution", pursuant to
which the Senate Electoral Tribunal should be organized (Congressional Record for the Senate, pp. 330, 337,
348-9, 350, 351, 355, 358, 362-3, 364, 370, 376).
Now then, it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims as to the construction or interpretation of
statutes is to discover the true intention of the law" (82 C. J. S., 526) and that.
"As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof,
and whatever is within the spirit of statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter, while that
which is within the letter, but not within the spirit of a statute, is not within the statute; but, where the law is free
and clear from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit." (82 C. J.
S., 613.).
"There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a statute may in all circumstances
be distinguished from those which are mandatory. However, in the determination of this question, as of every
other question of statutory construction, the prime object is to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative
intent must be obtained front all the surrounding circumstances, and the determination does not depend on the
form of the statute. Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its object, and the
consequences which would result from construing it one way or the other, and the statute must be construed in
connection with other related statutes. Words of permissive character may be given a mandatory significance
in order to effect the legislative intent, and, when the terms of a statute are such that they cannot be made
effective to the extent of giving each and all of them some reasonable operation, without construing the statute
as mandatory, such construction should be given; .. On the other hand, the language of a statute, however
mandatory in form, may be deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best be carried out by such
construction, and the legislative intent does not require a mandatory construction; but the construction of
mandatory words as directory should not be lightly adopted and never where it would in fact make a new law
instead of that passed by the legislature. .. Whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether
the thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing required, or is a mere matter of form, and what is a
matter of essence can often be determined only by judicial construction. Accordingly, when a particular
provision of a statute relates to some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of
convenience rather than substance, or where the directions of a statute are given merely with a view to the
proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of business, it is generally regarded as directory, unless followed by words
of absolute prohibition; and a statute is regarded as directory were no substantial rights depend on it, no injury
can result from ignoring it, and the purpose of the legislative can be accomplished in a manner other than that
prescribed, with substantially the same result. On the other hand, a provision relating to the essence of the
thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation of a statute,
which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way shows that the legislature intended a compliance

with such provision to be essential to the validity of the act or proceeding, or when same antecedent and prerequisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power, or must be performed before certain other powers
can be exercise, the statute must be regarded as mandatory. (Id., pp. 869-874.) (See also, Words and
Phrases, Vol. 26, pp. 463-467; emphasis supplied.).
What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of
section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party
from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between
the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said
Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection
of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence
of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof
are null and void. 11.
It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present
composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our Constitution (Congressional Record for the
Senate, Vol. III, pp. 329, 342, 349, 354, 359, 375). Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and
the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be
decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by
the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the second largest
number of votes in the House concerned.
Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the
Citizens Party 12 has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Taada felt he should nominate, for the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party. The same is, thus, numerically
handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Taada did not nominate other
two Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position, therein, of the
Citizens Party. Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the
same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court. With the absolute
majority thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be
entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the
decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the
door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of
election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly
strove to forestall. 13.
This does not imply that the honesty, integrity or impartiality of Senators Cuenco and Delgado are being
questioned. As a matter of fact, when Senator Taada objected to their nomination, he explicitly made of record
that his opposition was based, not upon their character, but upon the principle involved. When the election of
members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made dependent upon the nomination of the political parties
above referred to, the Constitution thereby indicates its reliance upon the method of selection thus established,
regardless of the individual qualities of those chosen therefor. Considering the wealth of experience of the
delegatesto the Convention, as lawyers of great note, as veteran politicians and as leaders in other fields of
endeavor, they could not, and did not, ignore the fact that the Constitution must limit itself to giving general
patterns or norms of action. In connection, particularly, with the composition of the Electoral Tribunals, they
believed that, even the most well meaning individuals often find it difficult to shake off the bias and prejudice
created by political antagonisms and to resist the demands of political exigencies, the pressure of which is
bound to increase in proportion to the degree of predominance of the party from which it comes. As above
stated, this was confirmed by distinguished members of the present Senate. (See pp. 25-28, 33, 34, supra.).
In connection with the argument of the former Secretary of Justice to the effect that when "there is no minority
party represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority disappears", the following
observations of the petitioners herein are worthy of notice:.
" Under the interpretation espoused by the respondents, the very frauds or terrorism committed by a party
would establish the legal basis for the final destruction of minority parties in the Congress at least. Let us
suppose, for example, that in the Senate, the 15 or 16 senators with unexpired terms belong to the party A. In
the senatorial elections to fill the remaining 8 seats, all the 8 candidates of party A are proclaimed elected
through alleged fraud and/or terrorism. (The ouster of not less than 3 senators-elect in the elections held since
liberation attests to the reality of election frauds and terrorism in our country.) There being no senator or only
one senator belonging to the minority, who would sit in judgment on the election candidates of the minority
parties? According to the contention of the respondents, it would be a Senate Electoral Tribunal made up of
three Supreme Court Justices and 5 or 6 members of the same party A accused of fraud and terrorism. Most
respectfully, we pray this Honorable Court to reject an interpretation that would make of a democratic

constitution the very instrument by which a corrupt and ruthless party could entrench itself in power the
legislature and thus destroy democracy in the Philippines.
xxx

xxx

x x x.

".. When there are no electoral protests filed by the Minority party, or when the only electoral protests filed are
by candidates of the majority against members-elect of the same majority party, there might be no objection to
the statement. But if electoral protests are filed by candidates of the minority party, it is at this point that a need
for a check on the majority party is greatest, and contrary to the observation made in the above-quoted
opinion, such a cheek is a function that cannot be successfully exercised by the 3 Justices of the Supreme
Court, for the obvious and simple reason that they could easily be outvoted by the 6 members of the majority
party in the Tribunal.
xxx

xxx

x x x.

"In the case of the cited opinion of Secretary Abad Santos rendered in 1939, it, did not appear that there were
minority party candidates who were adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice and who could
have brought a test case to court." (Emphasis supplied.).
The defenses of waiver and estoppel set up against petitioner Taada are untenable. Although "an individual
may waive constitutional provisions intended for his benefit", particularly those meant for the protection of his
property, and, sometimes, even those tending "to secure his personal liberty", the power to waive does not
exist when "public policy or public morals" are involved. (11 Am. Jur. 765; I Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
pp. 368-371). The procedure outlined in the Constitution for the organization, of the Electoral Tribunals was
adopted in response to the demands of the common weal, and it has been held that where a statute is founded
on public policy, those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its provisions" (82 C. J. S., 874).
Besides, there can be no waiver without an intent to such effect, which Senator Taada did not have. Again,
the alleged waiver or exhaustion of his rights does not justify the exercise thereof by a person or party, other
than that to which it is vested exclusively by the Constitution.
The rule estoppel is that "whenever a party has, by his declaration, act or omissions, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in a litigation
arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it" (Rule 69, sec. 68 [a], Rules of Court).
In the case at bar, petitioner Senator Taada did not lead the Senate to believe that Senator Primicias could
nominate Senators Cuenco and Delgado. On the contrary, said petitioner repeatedly asserted that his was the
exclusive right to make the nomination. He, likewise, specifically contested said nomination of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado. Again, the rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law, about the truth of
which the other party is ignorant (see Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, pp. 490, 495). Such is
not the nature of the situation that confronted Senator Taada and the other members of the Senate. Lastly,
the case of Zandueta vs. De la Costa (66 Phil., 615), cited by respondents, is not in point. Judge Zandueta
assumed office by virtue of an appointment, the legality of which he later on assailed. In the case at bar, the
nomination and election of Senator Taada as member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal was separate, distinct
and independent from the nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the
party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof
to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the
exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that
neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one
having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on
Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of
said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.
As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not
prepared to hold, however, that their appointments were null and void. Although recommended by Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its
Chairman, presumably, with the consent of the majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or, pursuant to
the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is
an internal matter falling within the jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe
that it will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4) respondents abovementioned,
conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and
Francisco A. Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they are
not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are hereby, enjoined from exercising the powers

and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate
Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards
respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Without special
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., and Felix, JJ., concur.

Paras, C.J., dissenting:.

In 1939, Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution provided that "There shall be an Electoral
Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest
number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein." As all the
members of the National Assembly then belonged to the Nacionalista Party and a belief arose that it was
impossible to comply with the constitutional requirement that three members of the Electoral Commission
should be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes, the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice was sought on the proper interpretation of the constitutional provision involved. Secretary of Justice
Jose A. Santos accordingly rendered the following opinion:.
"Sir:.
"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of January 24, 1939, thru the office of His
Excellency, the President, in which you request my opinion as `to the proper interpretation of the following
provision of Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution':.
`There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice, and of six members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the
party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes
therein.'.
"You state that `as all the members of the present National Assembly belong to the Nacionalista Party, it is
impossible to comply with the last part of the provision which requires that three members shall be nominated
by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Assembly.'.
"The main features of the constitutional provision in question are: (1) that there shall be an Electoral
Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
members chosen by the National Assembly; and that (2) of the six members to be chosen by the National
Assembly, three shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes and three by the party
having the second largest number of votes.
"Examining the history of the constitutional provision, I find that in the first two drafts it was provided that the
Electoral Commission shall be composed of `three members elected by the members of the party having the
largest number of vote three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes,
and three justices of the Supreme Court ..(Aruego, The Framing of the Phil. Const., pp. 260-261). But as finally
adopted by the Convention, the Constitution explicitly states that there shall be `six members chosen by the
National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, an and
three by the party having the second largest number of votes' (Aruego, The Framing of the Phil. Const., pp.
271-272).
"From the foregoing changes in the phraseology of the provision, it is evident that the intention of the framers
of our Constitution was that there should invariably be six members from the National Assembly. It was also
intended to create a non-partisan body to decide any partisan contest that may be brought before the
Commission. The primary object was to avoid decision based chiefly if not exclusively on partisan
considerations.
"The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the constitutional mandate that the Assembly is
entitled to six members in the Electoral Commission. When for lack of a minority representation in the
Assembly the power to nominate three minority members cannot be exercised, it logically follows that the only
party the Assembly may nominate three others, otherwise the explicit mandate of the Constitution that there
shall be six members from the National Assembly would be nullified.
"In other words, fluctuations in the total membership of the Commission were not and could not have been
intended. We cannot say that the Commission should have nine members during one legislative term and six

members during the next. Constitutional provisions must always have a consistent application. The
membership of the Commission is intended to be fixed and not variable and is not dependent upon the
existence or non-existence of one or more parties in the Assembly.
"`A cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should receive a consistent and uniform
interpretation, so they shall not be taken to mean one thing at one time and another thing at another time, even
though the circumstances may have so changed as to make a different rule after desirable (11 Am. Jur. 659).
"It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention in giving representation to the minority
party in the Electoral Commission was to safeguard the rights of the minority party and to protect their
interests, especially when the election of any member of the minority party is protested. The basic philosophy
behind the constitutional provision was to enable the minority party to act as a check on the majority in the
Electoral Commission, with the members of the Supreme Court as the balancing factor. Inasmuch, however, as
there is no minority party represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority party
disappears. It is a function that is expected to be exercised by the three Justices of the Supreme Court.
"To summarize, considering the plain terms of the constitutional provision in question, the changes that it has
undergone since it was first introduced until finally adopted by the convertion, as well as, the considerations
that must have inspired the Constitutional Convention in adopting it as it is, I have come to the conclusion that
the Electoral Commission should be composed of nine members, three from the Supreme Court and six
chosen by the National Assembly to be nominated by the party in power, there being no other party entitled to
such nomination.".
Pursuant to the foregoing opinion of February 1, 1939, the Electoral Commission was formally organized, with
six members of the National Assembly all belonging to the same party and three Justices of the Supreme
Court. Constitutional amendments were introduced and duly adopted in 1940, and the Electoral Commission
was replaced by an Electoral Tribunal for each house of Congress. It is now provided that "Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each house, three upon nomination of the party
having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein.
The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Article VI, Section 11, of the
Constitution.).
If there was any doubt on the matter, the same was removed by the amendment of 1940 the framers of which
may be assumed to have been fully aware of the one-party composition of the former National Assembly which
gave rise to the abovequoted opinion of the Secretary of Justice. When instead of wording the amendment in
such a form as to nullify said opinion, Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution not only did not substantially
depart from the original constitutional provision but also positively and expressly ordains that "Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members," the intent has become clear and mandatory that at all times the
Electoral Tribunal shall have nine Members regardless of whether or not two parties make up each house of
Congress.
It is very significant that while the party having the second largest number of votes is allowed to nominate three
Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, it is not required that the nominees should belong
to the same party. Considering further that the six Members are chosen by each house, and not by the party or
parties, the conclusion is inescapable that party affiliation is neither controlling nor necessary.
Under the theory of the petitioners, even if there were sufficient Members belonging to the party having the
second largest of votes, the latter may nominate less than three or none at all; and the Chief Justice may
similarly designate less than three Justices. If not absurd, would frustrate the purpose of having an ideal
number in the composition of the Electoral Tribunal and guarding against the possibility of deadlocks. It would
not be accurate to argue that the Members of the Electoral Tribunal other than the Justices of the Supreme
Court would naturally vote along purely partisan lines, checked or fiscalized only by the votes of the Justices;
otherwise membership in the Tribunal may well be limited to the Justices of the Supreme Court and so others
who are not Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives. Upon the other hand, he framers of
the Constitution-not insensitive to some such argument-still had reposed their faith and confidence in the
independence, integrity and uprightness of the Members of each House who are to sit in the Electoral
Tribunals and thereby expected them, as does everybody, to decide jointly with the Justices of the Supreme
Court election contests exclusively upon their merits.
In view of the failure or unwillingness of Senator Lorenzo M. Taada of the Citizens Party, the party having the
second largest number of votes in the Senate, to nominate two other Members of the Electoral Tribunal, the
Senate was justified, in obedience to the constitutional mandate, to choose-as it did-said two Members.
I vote to dismiss the petition.

Endencia, J., concurs.

LABRADOR, J., dissenting:.
I dissent and herewith proceed to explain my reasons therefor.
The constitutional provision, in pursuance of which Senators Cuenco and Delgado were elected by the Senate
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is as follows:.
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party
having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein.
The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Section II, Article VI of the Constitution.).
I hold that the above provision, just as any other constitutional provision, is mandatory in character and that
this character is true not only of the provision that nine members shall compose the tribunal but also that which
defines the manner in which the members shall be chosen. Such a holding is in accord with well-settled rules
of statutory construction.
"As a general proposition, there is greater likelihood that constitutional provisions will be given mandatory
effect than is true of any other class of organic law. Indeed, such a construction accords with the generally
acknowledged import of constitutional fiat; that its character is such as to require absolute compliance in all
cases without exception. And the very principles of our institutions, involving as they do concepts of
constitutional supremacy, are such as to form reasonable grounds for a presumption that the framers of a
constitution intended that just such efficacy be given to it .." (Sec. 5807, Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol.
3, p.84.).
The majority helds that as Senator Taada, the only member of the Senate who does not belong to the
Nacionalista Party, has refused to exercise the constitutional privilege afforded him to nominate the two other
members the Senate may not elect said two other members. And the reason given for this ruling is the
presumed intention of the constitutional provision to safeguard the interests of the minority. This holding is
subject to the following fundamental objections. In the first Place, it renders nugatory the provision which fixes
the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal at nine, a provision which is admittedly a mandatory
provision. In the second place, it denies to the Senate the power that the constitutional provision expressly
grants it, i. e., that of electing the members of the Electoral Tribunal so in effect this right or prerogative is
lodged, as a consequence of the refusal of the minority member to nominate, in the hands of said member of
the minority, contrary to the constitutional provision. In the third place, it would make the supposedly procedural
provision, the process of nomination lodged in the minority party in the Senate, superior to and paramount over
the power of election, which is in the whole Senate itself. So by the ruling of the majority, a procedural
provision overrides a substantive one and renders nugatory the other more important mandatory provision that
the Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine members. In the fourth place, the majority decision has by
interpretation inserted a provision in the Constitution, which the Constitutional Convention alone had the power
to introduce, namely, a proviso to the effect that if the minority fails or refuses to exercise its privilege to
nominate all the three members, the membership of the Electoral Tribunal shall thereby be correspondingly
reduced. This arrogation of power by us is not justified by any rule of law or reason.
I consider the opinion of the Senate that the refusal of Senator Taada to nominate the two other members
must be construed as a waiver of a mere privilege, more in consonance not only with the constitutional
provision as a whole, but with the dictates of reason. The above principle (of waiver) furnishes the remedy by
which two parts of the constitutional provision, that which fixes membership at nine and that which outlines the
procedure in which said membership of nine may be elected, can be reconciled. Well known is the legal
principle that provisions which in their application may nullify each other should be reconciled to make them
both effective, if the reconciliation can be effected by the application of other legal principles. The reconciliation
is brought about in this case by the principle of waiver.
While I agree with the majority that it is the duty of this Court to step in, when a constitutional mandate is
ignored, to enforce said mandate even as against the other coordinate departments, this is not the occasion for
it to do so, for to say the least it does not clearly appear that the form and manner in which the Senate
exercised its expressly recognized power to elect its members to the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been
clearly violative of the constitutional mandate.
______________________________.

1 Casanovas vs. Hord, 8 Phil., 125; Omo vs. Insular Gov't., 11 Phil., 67; Weigall vs. Shuster, 11 Phil., 340;
Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil., 44; Hamilton vs. McGirr, 30 Phil., 563; Compania Gral. de Tabacos vs. Board of
Public Utility Commissioners, 34 Phil., 136; Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883; Concepcion vs. Paredes,
42 Phil 599; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 42 Phil., 749; U. S. vs. Ang Tan Ho, 43 Phil., 1; People vs. Pomar, 46 Phil.,
440. Agcaoili vs. Saguitan, 48 Phil., 676; Gov't. vs. Springer, 50 Phil., 259; Gov't. us. Agoncillo, 50 Phil., 348;
Gov't. vs. El Hogar Filipino, 50 Phil, 399; Manila Electric vs. Pasay Transp., 57 Phil., 600; Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, supra; People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Vargas vs. Rilloraza, 45 Off. Gaz., 3847; Endencia vs.
David, 49 Off. Gaz., A822; Rutter vs. Esteban, 49 Off. Gaz., 1807; Comm. investment vs. Garcia, 49 Off. Gaz.,
1801; Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 137; Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333; Hepburn vs. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603;
Knox vs. Lee, 12 Wall. 457; Civil Rights Cases [U. S. vs. M. Stanley; U. S. vs. M. Ryan, U. S. vs. S. Nichols; U.
S. vs. Singleton; Robinson vs. and Charleston Railroad Co.], 109 U. S. 3 Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust
Co. 157 U. S. 429, 158 U. S. 601; Fairbanks vs. U. S., 181 U. S. 286.
2 Which, insofar as pertinent to the issues in the case at bar, is substantially identical to each of the Electoral
Tribunals under the Constitution as amended.
3 Araneta vs. Dinglasan, Barredo vs. Commission on Elections, and Rodriguez vs. Teasurer of the Philippines,
84 Phil., 368, 45 Off. Gaz., 4411, 4457; Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista, 85 Phil., 101, 47 Off. Gaz., 2356;
Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil., 740, 47 Off. Gaz., 1778; De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil., 289, 48 Off. Gaz.,
1787; Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil., 456, 49 Off. Gaz., 93; Jover Ledesma vs. Borra, 93 Phil., 506, 49 Off. Gaz.,
2765; Ramos vs. Avelino, 97 Phil., 844, 51 Off. Gaz., 5607.
______________________________ 4 "From the very nature of the American system
of government with Constitutions prescribing the jurisdiction and powers of each of the three branches of
government, it has devolved on the judiciary to determine whether the acts of the other two departments are in
harmony with the fundamental law. All the departments are of the government are unquestionably entitled and
compelled to judge of the Constitution for themselves; but, in doing so, they act under the obligations imposed
in the instrument, and in the order of time pointed out by it. When the, judiciary has once spoken, if the acts of
the other two departments are held to be unauthorized or despotic, in violation of the Constitution or the vested
rights of the citizen, they cease to be operative or binding.
xxx

xxx

x x x.

"Since the Constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary as well as the other departments of
government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the court are not at liberty to overlook or
disregard its commands. It is their duty in authorized proceedings to give effect to the existing Constitution and
to obey all constitutional provisions irrespective of their opinion as to the wisdom of such provisions.
"In accordance with principles which are basic, the rule is fixed that the duty in a proper case to declare a law
unconstitutional cannot be declined and must be performed in accordance with the deliberate judgment of the
tribunal before which the validity of the enactment is directly drawn into question. When it is clear that a statute
transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the
act unconstitutional cause they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the
courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as
Chief Justice Marshal said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so
adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the
Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not
decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in
disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals." (11 Am. Jur., pp. 712-713, 713-715; emphasis supplied).
5 Rich vs. Board of Canvassers, 59 N. W. 183; State vs. McBride, 29 Am. Dec. 636; Collier vs. Frierson, 24
Ala. 100; State vs. Swift, 69 Ind. 505; State vs. Timme, 11 N.W. 785; Prohibition and Amendment Cases, 24
Kan. 700; Kadderly vs. Portland, 74 Pac. 710; Koehler vs. Hill, 14 N. W. 738; State vs. Brockhart, 84 S. W.
1064; University vs. Melver, 72 N. C. 76; Westinghausen vs. People, 6 N.W. 641; State vs. Powell, 27 South,
927; Bott vs. Wurtz, 43 Atl. 744; Rice vs. Palmer, 96 S. W. 396; State vs. Tooker, 37 Pac. 840.
6 "The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the, constitutional mandate that the
Assembly is entitled to six in the Electoral Commission. When for lack of a minority representation in the
Assembly the power to nominate three minority members cannot be exercised, it logically follows that the only
party in the Assembly may nominate three others, otherwise the explicit mandate of the Constitution that there
shall be six members from the National Assembly would be nullified.
"In other words, fluctuations in the total membership of the Commission were not and could have been
intended; We cannot say that the Commission should have nine members during one legislative term and six
members during the next. Constitutional provisions must always have a consistent application. The
membership of the Commission is intended to be fixed and not variable and is not dependent upon the
existence or non-existence of one or more parties in the Assembly.

`A cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should receive a consistent and uniform interpretation,
so they shall not be taken to mean one thing at one time and another thing at another time, even though the
circumstance may have so changed as to make a different rule seem desirable (11 Am. Jur. 659).'.
"It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention in giving representation to the minority
party in the Electoral Commission was to safeguard the rights of the minority party and to protect their
interests, especially when the election of any member of the minority party is protected. The basic philosophy
behind the constitutional provision was to enable the minority party to act as a check on the majority of the
Electoral Commission, with the members of the Supreme Court as the balancing factor. Inasmuch, however, as
there is no minority party represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority party
disappears. It is a function that is expected to be exercised by the three Justices of the Supreme Court.
"To summarize, considering the plain terms of the constitutional provision in question, the changes that it has
undergone since it was first introduced until finally adopted by the Convention, as well as the considerations
that must have inspired the Constitutional Convention in adopting it as it is, I have come to the conclusion that
the Electoral Commission should be composed of nine members, three from the Supreme Court and six
chosen by the National Assembly to be nominated by the party in power, there being no other party entitled to
such nomination." Annex A to the Answers pp. 2-3.
6a Since 1939, when said opinion was rendered, the question therein raised has not been taken up or
discussed, until the events leading to the case at bar (in February 1956).
6b "Thus, in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra)-in which the respondents maintained that the Electoral
Commission formed part of the National Assembly, citing in support thereof the principle of contemporaneous
and practical construction-this Court deemed it unnecessary to refute the same in order to adopt the opposite
view.
7 Senator Laurel reiterated this view on the floor of the Senate, on February 22. 1956, in the following
language:.
"And hence this provision that we find in the Constitution, three to represent, in the manner prescribed in the
Constitution, the party that received the highest number of votes, meaning the majority party which is the
Nacionalista Party now, and three to represent the party receiving the next highest number of votes therein,
meaning the minority party, the party receiving the next highest number of votes. But there was a great deal of
opinion that it would be better if this political organization, so far as the legislative department is concerned,
could be tempered by a sort of a judicial reflection which could be done by drafting three, as to each Electoral
Tribunal, from the Supreme Court. And that, I think, was the reason because a great majority of the delegates
to the constitutional convention accepted that principle. That is why we have nine members in each electoral
tribunal, in the House and in the Senate. And one reason that I remember then and I am speaking from
memory, Mr. President, was that it is likely that the three members representing a party would naturally favor
the protestants or protestees, and so on. So it would be better that even on that hypothesis or on that
supposition it would be better, in case they annul each other because three votes in favor or three votes
against, depending on the party of the protestants or the protestees, that the Supreme Court decide the case
because then it would be a judicial decision in reality. Another reason is founded on the theory that the Justices
of the Supreme Court are supposed to be beyond influence, although that may not be true. But having reached
the highest judicial position of the land, these persons would likely act impartially." (Congressional Record for
the Senate Vol. III, p. 376.).
8 When the legislative power was vested in a unicameral body, known as the National Assembly.
9 Upon the substitution of the National Assembly by a bicameral Congress, consisting of the Senate and the
House of Representatives.
10 Senator Lim said:.
"But in the spirit, Your Honor can see very well that those three should belong to the party having the second
largest number of votes, precisely, as Your Honor said, to maintain equilibrium because partisan considerations
naturally enter into the mind and heart of a senator belonging to a particular party. Although grammatically, I
agree with Your Honor, Your Honor can see that the spirit of the provision of the Constitution is clear that the
three must come from the party having the highest number of votes and the other three nominated must
belong to the party having the second highest number of votes. Your Honor can see the point. If we allow Your
Honor to back up your argument that equilibrium should be maintained, because partisan considerations enter
when one is with the majority party, and that no party should prevail, Your Honor should also have to consider
that the spirit of the Constitution is precisely to obviate that to the extent that the only three can be nominated
from the party having the largest number of votes and three from the party having the second largest number
of votes." (Congressional Record of the Senate, Vol. Ill, p, 337; emphasis supplied.).

The statement of Senator Sabido was:.

".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between
the two parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral
Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is the ideal situation.".
xxx

xxx

x x x.

".. I said that the ideal composition in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution is that those
participating in the electoral tribunal shall belong to the members of the party who are before the electoral
tribunal either as protestants or protestees, in order to insure impartiality in the proceeding and justice in the
decision that may be finally rendered." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 349, 352; emphasis
supplied.).
_ Senator Cea declared:.
".. the original purpose of the Constitution is to nominate only members of the two major parties in the Senate
in the Electoral Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 350; emphasis supplied.).
The words of Senator Paredes were:.
".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed
of nine members three of them belonging to the party having largest number of votes, and three from, the party
having the second largest number of votes so that these members my represent the party, and the members of
said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to a party, Mr. President,
there is ground to believe that decisions will be made along party lines." (Congressional Record for the Senate,
Vol. III, p. 351; emphasis supplied.).
11 The need of adopting this view is demanded, not only by the factors already adverted to, but, also, by the
fact that constitutional provisions, unlike statutory enactments, are presumed to be mandatory, "unless the
contrary is unmistakably manifest." The pertinent rule of statutory construction is set forth in the American
Jurisprudence as follows:.
"In the interpretation of Constitutions, questions frequently arise as to whether particular sections are
mandatory or directory. The courts usually hesitate to declare that a constitutional provision is directory merely
in view of the tendency of the legislature to disregard provisions which are not said to be mandatory.
Accordingly, it is the general rule to regard constitutional provisions as mandatory, and not to leave any
direction to the will of a legislature to obey or to disregard them. This presumption as to mandatory quality is
usually followed unless it is unmistakably manifest that the provisions are intended to be merely directory. The
analogous rules distinguishing mandatory and directory statutes are of little value in this connection and are
rarely applied in passing upon the provisions of a Constitution.
"So strong is the inclination in favor of giving obligatory force to the terms of the organic law that it has even
been said that neither by the courts nor by any other department of the government may any provision of the
Constitution be regarded as merely directory, but that each and everyone of its provisions should be treated as
imperative and mandatory, without reference to the rules and distinguishing between the directory and the
mandatory statutes." (II Am. Jur. 686-687; emphasis supplied.).
12 Which admittedly, has the second largest number of votes in the Senate.
13 In Angara vs. Electoral Commission (supra, 169) Senator, then Justice, Laurel, speaking for this Court,
recalled that:.
"In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the
representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members each,
so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote
of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the
commission."(emphasis supplied.).
Needless to say, what the Constitutional Convention thus precluded from being done by direct action or grant
of authority in the Charter of our Republic should not receive judicial sanction, when done by resolution of one
House of Congress, a mere creature of said charter.
14 Namely, the other two (2) Justices of the Supreme Court and Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, or a
total of six (6) members of the Tribunal.

103 Phil. 1051 Political Law Constitutional Law Political Question Defined Members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the
Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Taada who belonged to the Citizens Party.
Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members.
It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the
Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is
only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the
NP. Taada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the
SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any
chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme
Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to
choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Taada and Macapagal was
not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The
term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Taada to
decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Taada was whether or not the elections of
the 5 NP members to the SET are valid which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a separate and
independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members) must
not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed
members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority party). This is still
valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman.
Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32717

November 26, 1970

AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf.
Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent.

DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate for delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, in this special civil action for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of
respondent Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes, was not in
vain. Nor could it be considering the conceded absence of any express power granted to respondent by the
Constitutional Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such implication arising from any provision found
therein, if deference be paid to the principle that a statute is to be construed consistently with the fundamental
law, which accords the utmost priority to freedom of expression, much more so when utilized for electoral
purposes. On November 3, 1970, the very same day the case was orally argued, five days after its filing, with
the election barely a week away, we issued a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. This
opinion is intended to explain more fully our decision.
In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner, after setting forth his being a
resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to him five days previously, informed him
that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units
equipped with sound systems and loud speakers, an order which, according to him, is violative of [his]
constitutional right to freedom of speech. 1 There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according
to petitioner, he would seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. On the
very next day, this Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer
not later than November 2, 1970, at the same time setting the case for hearing for Tuesday November 3, 1970.
No preliminary injunction was issued. There was no denial in the answer filed by respondent on November 2,
1970, of the factual allegations set forth in the petition, but the justification for the prohibition was premised on

a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, 2 which made it unlawful for candidates to purchase, produce,
request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever
nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the
like, whether of domestic or foreign origin. 3 It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by
petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the
above statute subject to confiscation. It prayed that the petition be denied for lack of merit. The case was
argued, on November 3, 1970, with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmena
arguing in behalf of respondent.
This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, the election being barely a week
away, issued on the afternoon of the same day, a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition, setting forth
the absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such a ban in the light of the doctrine
ofejusdem generis as well as the principle that the construction placed on the statute by respondent
Commission on Elections would raise serious doubts about its validity, considering the infringement of the right
of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding portion was worded thus: Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent
Commission on Elections is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or
demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political jingles by candidates. This
resolution is immediately executory. 4
1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before us was one of power. Respondent
Commission on Elections was called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on petitioner. To repeat, no
such authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did contend, however, that one of its
provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being
made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
and cigarettes, and concluding with the words and the like.5For respondent Commission, the last three words
sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval
under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being
applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. 6 It is quite apparent that
what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.
The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent Commission was its failure to manifest fealty
to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance
with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription. 7 Thus, certain Administrative Code
provisions were given a construction which should be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental
law. 8 The desirability of removing in that fashion the taint of constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments
has always commended itself. The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert any
collision between what a statute provides and what the Constitution requires. The objective is to reach an
interpretation rendering it free from constitutional defects. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the
conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score. 9
2. Petitioners submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its favor obeisance to such a cardinal
precept. The view advanced by him that if the above provision of the Constitutional Convention Act were to
lend itself to the view that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited, then the challenge of
unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an
abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding that this preferred freedom calls all
the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more
meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose
censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent
Commission justify its action by the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be
free, either by himself or through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional
guarantee is not to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is

uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent
Commission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be validly
done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures.10
3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the
validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of
our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which
occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the
functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it
imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions
on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws
cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding
cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power
of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is
a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental
measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law.
To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission was aptly summed up by the
present Chief Justice thus: Lastly, as the branch of the executive department although independent of the
President to which the Constitution has given the exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration
of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely
administrative questions.' 11 It has been the constant holding of this Court, as it could not have been
otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and
there is no higher law than the Constitution.

12

Our decisions which liberally construe its powers are precisely

inspired by the thought that only thus may its responsibility under the Constitution to insure free, orderly and
honest elections be adequately fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification then for lending approval to any ruling
or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional
right as free speech. Petitioners case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on solid footing.
WHEREFORE,

as

set

forth

in

our

resolution

of

November

3,

1970,

respondent

Commission

is PERMANENTLY RESTRAINED and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance

with its aforesaid order banning the use of political taped jingles. Without pronouncement as to costs.

36 SCRA 228 Statutory Construction Ejusdem Generis

Political Law Bill of Rights Freedom of Expression
Amelito Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention (1970). His candidacy was given
due course by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) but he was prohibited from playing his campaign
jingle on his mobile units because that was an apparent violation of COMELECs ban (via a COMELEC
resolution) to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such
as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts,
hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin. It was COMELECs contention
that the jingle proposed to be used by Mutuc is a recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible
propaganda material (falling under and the likes category), and under the above COMELEC rule, the same
is subject to confiscation.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not COMELECs contention is correct.

2. Whether or not the COMELEC ban is valid.

HELD:
1. No. By virtue of Ejusdem Generis, general words following any enumeration must be of the same class as
those specifically referred to. COMELEC contended that the ban makes unlawful the distribution of electoral
propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words and the like. For
COMELEC, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. The Supreme Court did not agree. It is quite
apparent that what was contemplated in the said law violated by Mutuc was the distribution of gadgets of the
kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its
distribution. It does not include campaign jingles for they are not gadgets as contemplated by the law.
2. No. This is a curtailment of Freedom of Expression. The Constitution prohibits the abridgment of the
freedom of speech.

FACTS:
Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections violates the Constitution:
1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized national and local
elections on the second Monday of May 1992;
2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing that all incumbent
provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their
successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of
the Constitution;
3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens the term or tenure of office
of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution;
4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential, Vice-Presidential and
Senatorial elections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX under the title Commission on Elections of
the Constitution;
5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056 to synchronized
national and local elections set by the Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient,
much less, valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of November 1992, and in
the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the
parameters of the Constitution, to eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible,
resort can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or revision.
On the other hand, the SolGen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the denial of this petition arguing that the
question is political in nature and that the petitioners lack legal standing to file the petition and what they are
asking for is an advisory opinion from the court, there being no justiciable controversy to resolve. On the
merits, the SolGen contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of legislative power by Congress and
that the regular amending process prescribed by the Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE: WON the Court has competence to take cognizance of the instant petition?

HELD: Yes.
What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of RA 7056. Hence, contrary to SolGens contention, the
issue in this case is justiciable rather than political. And even if the question were political in nature, it would
still come within the Courts power considering the expanded jurisdiction conferred by Article VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Regarding the challenge to the petitioners standing, the Supreme Court held that even if the petitioners have
no legal standing, the Court has the power to brush aside technicalities considered the transcendental
importance of the issue being raised herein.
MAIN ISSUE: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional?
HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution
which provides for the synchronization of national and local elections. The said law, on the other hand,
provides for the de-synchronization of election by mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992. The
term of synchronization in the mentioned constitutional provision was used synonymously as the phrase
holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or
occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the local official first
elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these
incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have
been duly elected and qualified. The Supreme Court, quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, states that it is not
competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their
successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the
term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative
authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution which fixed the term of
office of all elective local officials, except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local election will be held
on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only two
years and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years.
The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing the campaign period. RA
7056 provides for a different campaign period, as follows:
a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days before the day of election.
b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and
c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective provincial, city and municipal
officials forty-five (45) days before the day of the elections.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 126490. March 31, 1998
ESTRELLA PALMARES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and M.B. LENDING
CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Where a party signs a promissory note as a co-maker and binds herself to be jointly and severally liable with
the principal debtor in case the latter defaults in the payment of the loan, is such undertaking of the former
deemed to be that of a surety as an insurer of the debt, or of a guarantor who warrants the solvency of the
debtor?
Pursuant to a promissory note dated March 13, 1990, private respondent M.B. Lending Corporation extended a
loan to the spouses Osmea and Merlyn Azarraga, together with petitioner Estrella Palmares, in the amount

of P30,000.00 payable on or before May 12, 1990, with compounded interest at the rate of 6% per annum to
be computed every 30 days from the date thereof.1 On four occasions after the execution of the promissory
note and even after the loan matured, petitioner and the Azarraga spouses were able to pay a total
of P16,300.00, thereby leaving a balance of P13,700.00. No payments were made after the last payment on
September 26, 1991.2crlwvirtualibrry
Consequently, on the basis of petitioners solidary liability under the promissory note, respondent corporation
filed a complaint3 against petitioner Palmares as the lone party-defendant, to the exclusion of the principal
debtors, allegedly by reason of the insolvency of the latter.
In her Amended Answer with Counterclaim,4 petitioner alleged that sometime in August 1990, immediately after
the loan matured, she offered to settle the obligation with respondent corporation but the latter informed her
that they would try to collect from the spouses Azarraga and that she need not worry about it; that there has
already been a partial payment in the amount of P17,010.00; that the interest of 6% per month compounded at
the same rate per month, as well as the penalty charges of 3% per month, are usurious and unconscionable;
and that while she agrees to be liable on the note but only upon default of the principal debtor, respondent
corporation acted in bad faith in suing her alone without including the Azarragas when they were the only ones
who benefited from the proceeds of the loan.
During the pre-trial conference, the parties submitted the following issues for the resolution of the trial court: (1)
what the rate of interest, penalty and damages should be; (2) whether the liability of the defendant (herein
petitioner) is primary or subsidiary; and (3) whether the defendant Estrella Palmares is only a guarantor with a
subsidiary liability and not a co-maker with primary liability.5crlwvirtualibrry
Thereafter, the parties agreed to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings filed and the memoranda
to be submitted by them. On November 26, 1992, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23, rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint without prejudice to the filing of a separate action for a sum of money
against the spouses Osmea and Merlyn Azarraga who are primarily liable on the instrument.6 This was based
on the findings of the court a quo that the filing of the complaint against herein petitioner Estrella Palmares, to
the exclusion of the Azarraga spouses, amounted to a discharge of a prior party; that the offer made by
petitioner to pay the obligation is considered a valid tender of payment sufficient to discharge a persons
secondary liability on the instrument; that petitioner, as co-maker, is only secondarily liable on the instrument;
and that the promissory note is a contract of adhesion.
Respondent Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the trial court, and rendered judgment
declaring herein petitioner Palmares liable to pay respondent corporation:
1. The sum of P13,700.00 representing the outstanding balance still due and owing with interest at six
percent (6%) per month computed from the date the loan was contracted until fully paid;
2. The sum equivalent to the stipulated penalty of three percent (3%) per month, of the outstanding
balance;
3. Attorneys fees at 25% of the total amount due per stipulations;
4. Plus costs of suit.7crlwvirtualibrry
Contrary to the findings of the trial court, respondent appellate court declared that petitioner Palmares is a
surety since she bound herself to be jointly and severally or solidarily liable with the principal debtors, the
Azarraga spouses, when she signed as a co-maker. As such, petitioner is primarily liable on the note and
hence may be sued by the creditor corporation for the entire obligation. It also adverted to the fact that
petitioner admitted her liability in her Answer although she claims that the Azarraga spouses should have been
impleaded. Respondent court ordered the imposition of the stipulated 6% interest and 3% penalty charges on
the ground that the Usury Law is no longer enforceable pursuant to Central Bank Circular No. 905. Finally, it
rationalized that even if the promissory note were to be considered as a contract of adhesion, the same is not
entirely prohibited because the one who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he
gives his consent.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari wherein it is asserted that:

A. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Palmares acted as surety and is therefore solidarily liable
to pay the promissory note.
1. The terms of the promissory note are vague. Its conflicting provisions do not establish Palmares
solidary liability.
2. The promissory note contains provisions which establish the co-makers liability as that of a
guarantor.
3. There is no sufficient basis for concluding that Palmares liability is solidary.
4. The promissory note is a contract of adhesion and should be construed against M.B. Lending
Corporation.
5. Palmares cannot be compelled to pay the loan at this point.
B. Assuming that Palmares liability is solidary, the Court of Appeals erred in strictly imposing the
interests and penalty charges on the outstanding balance of the promissory note.
The foregoing contentions of petitioner are denied and contradicted in their material points by respondent
corporation. They are further refuted by accepted doctrines in the American jurisdiction after which we
patterned our statutory law on suretyship and guaranty. This case then affords us the opportunity to make an
extended exposition on the ramifications of these two specialized contracts, for such guidance as may be
taken therefrom in similar local controversies in the future.
The basis of petitioner Palmares liability under the promissory note is expressed in this wise:
ATTENTION TO CO-MAKERS: PLEASE READ WELL
I, Mrs. Estrella Palmares, as the Co-maker of the above-quoted loan, have fully understood the
contents of this Promissory Note for Short-Term Loan:
That as Co-maker, I am fully aware that I shall be jointly and severally or solidarily liable with the
above principal maker of this note;
That in fact, I hereby agree that M.B. LENDING CORPORATION may demand payment of the above
loan from me in case the principal maker, Mrs. Merlyn Azarraga defaults in the payment of the note
subject to the same conditions above-contained.8crlwvirtualibrry
Petitioner contends that the provisions of the second and third paragraph are conflicting in that while the
second paragraph seems to define her liability as that of a surety which is joint and solidary with the principal
maker, on the other hand, under the third paragraph her liability is actually that of a mere guarantor because
she bound herself to fulfill the obligation only in case the principal debtor should fail to do so, which is the
essence of a contract of guaranty. More simply stated, although the second paragraph says that she is liable
as a surety, the third paragraph defines the nature of her liability as that of a guarantor. According to petitioner,
these are two conflicting provisions in the promissory note and the rule is that clauses in the contract should be
interpreted in relation to one another and not by parts. In other words, the second paragraph should not be
taken in isolation, but should be read in relation to the third paragraph.
In an attempt to reconcile the supposed conflict between the two provisions, petitioner avers that she could be
held liable only as a guarantor for several reasons. First, the words jointly and severally or solidarily liable used
in the second paragraph are technical and legal terms which are not fully appreciated by an ordinary layman
like herein petitioner, a 65-year old housewife who is likely to enter into such transactions without fully realizing
the nature and extent of her liability. On the contrary, the wordings used in the third paragraph are easier to
comprehend. Second, the law looks upon the contract of suretyship with a jealous eye and the rule is that the
obligation of the surety cannot be extended by implication beyond specified limits, taking into consideration the
peculiar nature of a surety agreement which holds the surety liable despite the absence of any direct
consideration received from either the principal obligor or the creditor. Third, the promissory note is a contract
of adhesion since it was prepared by respondent M.B. Lending Corporation. The note was brought to petitioner
partially filled up, the contents thereof were never explained to her, and her only participation was to sign

thereon. Thus, any apparent ambiguity in the contract should be strictly construed against private respondent
pursuant to Art. 1377 of the Civil Code.9crlwvirtualibrry
Petitioner accordingly concludes that her liability should be deemed restricted by the clause in the third
paragraph of the promissory note to be that of a guarantor.
Moreover, petitioner submits that she cannot as yet be compelled to pay the loan because the principal debtors
cannot be considered in default in the absence of a judicial or extrajudicial demand. It is true that the complaint
alleges the fact of demand, but the purported demand letters were never attached to the pleadings filed by
private respondent before the trial court. And, while petitioner may have admitted in her Amended Answer that
she received a demand letter from respondent corporation sometime in 1990, the same did not effectively put
her or the principal debtors in default for the simple reason that the latter subsequently made a partial payment
on the loan in September, 1991, a fact which was never controverted by herein private respondent.
Finally, it is argued that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in awarding the amount ofP2,745,483.39 in favor of
private respondent when, in truth and in fact, the outstanding balance of the loan is only P13,700.00. Where
the interest charged on the loan is exorbitant, iniquitous or unconscionable, and the obligation has been
partially complied with, the court may equitably reduce the penalty10 on grounds of substantial justice. More
importantly, respondent corporation never refuted petitioners allegation that immediately after the loan
matured, she informed said respondent of her desire to settle the obligation. The court should, therefore,
mitigate the damages to be paid since petitioner has shown a sincere desire for a
compromise.11crlwvirtualibrry
After a judicious evaluation of the arguments of the parties, we are constrained to dismiss the petition for lack
of merit, but to except therefrom the issue anent the propriety of the monetary award adjudged to herein
respondent corporation.
At the outset, let it here be stressed that even assuming arguendo that the promissory note executed between
the parties is a contract of adhesion, it has been the consistent holding of the Court that contracts of adhesion
are not invalid per se and that on numerous occasions the binding effects thereof have been upheld. The
peculiar nature of such contracts necessitate a close scrutiny of the factual milieu to which the provisions are
intended to apply. Hence, just as consistently and unhesitatingly, but without categorically invalidating such
contracts, the Court has construed obscurities and ambiguities in the restrictive provisions of contracts of
adhesion strictly albeit not unreasonably against the drafter thereof when justified in light of the operative facts
and surrounding circumstances.12 The factual scenario obtaining in the case before us warrants a liberal
application of the rule in favor of respondent corporation.
The Civil Code pertinently provides:
Art. 2047. By guaranty, a person called the guarantor binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the
obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so.
If a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the provisions of Section 4, Chapter 3,
Title I of this Book shall be observed. In such case the contract is called a suretyship.
It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt
upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control.13 In the case at
bar, petitioner expressly bound herself to be jointly and severally or solidarily liable with the principal maker of
the note. The terms of the contract are clear, explicit and unequivocal that petitioners liability is that of a surety.
Her pretension that the terms jointly and severally or solidarily liable contained in the second paragraph of her
contract are technical and legal terms which could not be easily understood by an ordinary layman like her is
diametrically opposed to her manifestation in the contract that she fully understood the contents of the
promissory note and that she is fully aware of her solidary liability with the principal maker. Petitioner admits
that she voluntarily affixed her signature thereto; ergo, she cannot now be heard to claim otherwise. Any
reference to the existence of fraud is unavailing. Fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence,
mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate. Petitioners attempt to prove fraud must, therefore,
fail as it was evidenced only by her own uncorroborated and, expectedly, self-serving
allegations.14crlwvirtualibrry

Having entered into the contract with full knowledge of its terms and conditions, petitioner is estopped to assert
that she did so under a misapprehension or in ignorance of their legal effect, or as to the legal effect of the
undertaking.15 The rule that ignorance of the contents of an instrument does not ordinarily affect the liability of
one who signs it also applies to contracts of suretyship. And the mistake of a surety as to the legal effect of her
obligation is ordinarily no reason for relieving her of liability.16crlwvirtualibrry
Petitioner would like to make capital of the fact that although she obligated herself to be jointly and severally
liable with the principal maker, her liability is deemed restricted by the provisions of the third paragraph of her
contract wherein she agreed that M.B. Lending Corporation may demand payment of the above loan from me
in case the principal maker, Mrs. Merlyn Azarraga defaults in the payment of the note, which makes her
contract one of guaranty and not suretyship. The purported discordance is more apparent than real.
A surety is an insurer of the debt, whereas a guarantor is an insurer of the solvency of the debtor.17 A
suretyship is an undertaking that the debt shall be paid; a guaranty, an undertaking that the debtor shall
pay.18 Stated differently, a surety promises to pay the principals debt if the principal will not pay, while a
guarantor agrees that the creditor, after proceeding against the principal, may proceed against the guarantor if
the principal is unable to pay.19 A surety binds himself to perform if the principal does not, without regard to his
ability to do so. A guarantor, on the other hand, does not contract that the principal will pay, but simply that he
is able to do so.20 In other words, a surety undertakes directly for the payment and is so responsible at once if
the principal debtor makes default, while a guarantor contracts to pay if, by the use of due diligence, the debt
cannot be made out of the principal debtor.21crlwvirtualibrry
Quintessentially, the undertaking to pay upon default of the principal debtor does not automatically remove it
from the ambit of a contract of suretyship. The second and third paragraphs of the aforequoted portion of the
promissory note do not contain any other condition for the enforcement of respondent corporations right
against petitioner. It has not been shown, either in the contract or the pleadings, that respondent corporation
agreed to proceed against herein petitioner only if and when the defaulting principal has become insolvent. A
contract of suretyship, to repeat, is that wherein one lends his credit by joining in the principal debtors
obligation, so as to render himself directly and primarily responsible with him, and without reference to the
solvency of the principal.22crlwvirtualibrry
In a desperate effort to exonerate herself from liability, petitioner erroneously invokes the rule on strictissimi
juris, which holds that when the meaning of a contract of indemnity or guaranty has once been judicially
determined under the rule of reasonable construction applicable to all written contracts, then the liability of the
surety, under his contract, as thus interpreted and construed, is not to be extended beyond its strict
meaning.23 The rule, however, will apply only after it has been definitely ascertained that the contract is one of
suretyship and not a contract of guaranty. It cannot be used as an aid in determining whether a partys
undertaking is that of a surety or a guarantor.
Prescinding from these jurisprudential authorities, there can be no doubt that the stipulation contained in the
third paragraph of the controverted suretyship contract merely elucidated on and made more specific the
obligation of petitioner as generally defined in the second paragraph thereof. Resultantly, the theory advanced
by petitioner, that she is merely a guarantor because her liability attaches only upon default of the principal
debtor, must necessarily fail for being incongruent with the judicial pronouncements adverted to above.
It is a well-entrenched rule that in order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous
and subsequent acts shall also be principally considered.24 Several attendant factors in that genre lend support
to our finding that petitioner is a surety. For one, when petitioner was informed about the failure of the principal
debtor to pay the loan, she immediately offered to settle the account with respondent corporation. Obviously, in
her mind, she knew that she was directly and primarily liable upon default of her principal. For another, and this
is most revealing, petitioner presented the receipts of the payments already made, from the time of initial
payment up to the last, which were all issued in her name and of the Azarraga spouses.25 This can only be
construed to mean that the payments made by the principal debtors were considered by respondent
corporation as creditable directly upon the account and inuring to the benefit of petitioner. The concomitant and
simultaneous compliance of petitioners obligation with that of her principals only goes to show that, from the
very start, petitioner considered herself equally bound by the contract of the principal makers.
In this regard, we need only to reiterate the rule that a surety is bound equally and absolutely with the
principal,26 and as such is deemed an original promisor and debtor from the beginning.27 This is because in

suretyship there is but one contract, and the surety is bound by the same agreement which binds the
principal.28 In essence, the contract of a surety starts with the agreement,29 which is precisely the situation
obtaining in this case before the Court.
It will further be observed that petitioners undertaking as co-maker immediately follows the terms and
conditions stipulated between respondent corporation, as creditor, and the principal obligors. A surety is usually
bound with his principal by the same instrument, executed at the same time and upon the same consideration;
he is an original debtor, and his liability is immediate and direct.30 Thus, it has been held that where a written
agreement on the same sheet of paper with and immediately following the principal contract between the buyer
and seller is executed simultaneously therewith, providing that the signers of the agreement agreed to the
terms of the principal contract, the signers were sureties jointly liable with the buyer.31 A surety usually enters
into the same obligation as that of his principal, and the signatures of both usually appear upon the same
instrument, and the same consideration usually supports the obligation for both the principal and the
surety.32crlwvirtualibrry
There is no merit in petitioners contention that the complaint was prematurely filed because the principal
debtors cannot as yet be considered in default, there having been no judicial or extrajudicial demand made by
respondent corporation. Petitioner has agreed that respondent corporation may demand payment of the loan
from her in case the principal maker defaults, subject to the same conditions expressed in the promissory note.
Significantly, paragraph (G) of the note states that should I fail to pay in accordance with the above schedule of
payment, I hereby waive my right to notice and demand. Hence, demand by the creditor is no longer necessary
in order that delay may exist since the contract itself already expressly so declares.33 As a surety, petitioner is
equally bound by such waiver.
Even if it were otherwise, demand on the sureties is not necessary before bringing suit against them, since the
commencement of the suit is a sufficient demand.34 On this point, it may be worth mentioning that a surety is
not even entitled, as a matter of right, to be given notice of the principals default. Inasmuch as the creditor
owes no duty of active diligence to take care of the interest of the surety, his mere failure to voluntarily give
information to the surety of the default of the principal cannot have the effect of discharging the surety. The
surety is bound to take notice of the principals default and to perform the obligation. He cannot complain that
the creditor has not notified him in the absence of a special agreement to that effect in the contract of
suretyship.35crlwvirtualibrry
The alleged failure of respondent corporation to prove the fact of demand on the principal debtors, by not
attaching copies thereof to its pleadings, is likewise immaterial. In the absence of a statutory or contractual
requirement, it is not necessary that payment or performance of his obligation be first demanded of the
principal, especially where demand would have been useless; nor is it a requisite, before proceeding against
the sureties, that the principal be called on to account.36 The underlying principle therefor is that a suretyship is
a direct contract to pay the debt of another. A surety is liable as much as his principal is liable, and absolutely
liable as soon as default is made, without any demand upon the principal whatsoever or any notice of
default.37 As an original promisor and debtor from the beginning, he is held ordinarily to know every default of
his principal.38crlwvirtualibrry
Petitioner questions the propriety of the filing of a complaint solely against her to the exclusion of the principal
debtors who allegedly were the only ones who benefited from the proceeds of the loan. What petitioner is
trying to imply is that the creditor, herein respondent corporation, should have proceeded first against the
principal before suing on her obligation as surety. We disagree.
A creditors right to proceed against the surety exists independently of his right to proceed against the
principal.39 Under Article 1216 of the Civil Code, the creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The rule, therefore, is that if the obligation is joint and several,
the creditor has the right to proceed even against the surety alone.40 Since, generally, it is not necessary for a
creditor to proceed against a principal in order to hold the surety liable, where, by the terms of the contract, the
obligation of the surety is the same as that of the principal, then as soon as the principal is in default, the surety
is likewise in default, and may be sued immediately and before any proceedings are had against the
principal.41 Perforce, in accordance with the rule that, in the absence of statute or agreement otherwise, a
surety is primarily liable, and with the rule that his proper remedy is to pay the debt and pursue the principal for
reimbursement, the surety cannot at law, unless permitted by statute and in the absence of any agreement
limiting the application of the security, require the creditor or obligee, before proceeding against the surety, to

resort to and exhaust his remedies against the principal, particularly where both principal and surety are
equally bound.42crlwvirtualibrry
We agree with respondent corporation that its mere failure to immediately sue petitioner on her obligation does
not release her from liability. Where a creditor refrains from proceeding against the principal, the surety is not
exonerated. In other words, mere want of diligence or forbearance does not affect the creditors rights vis--vis
the surety, unless the surety requires him by appropriate notice to sue on the obligation. Such gratuitous
indulgence of the principal does not discharge the surety whether given at the principals request or without it,
and whether it is yielded by the creditor through sympathy or from an inclination to favor the principal, or is only
the result of passiveness. The neglect of the creditor to sue the principal at the time the debt falls due does not
discharge the surety, even if such delay continues until the principal becomes insolvent.43 And, in the absence
of proof of resultant injury, a surety is not discharged by the creditors mere statement that the creditor will not
look to the surety,44 or that he need not trouble himself.45 The consequences of the delay, such as the
subsequent insolvency of the principal,46 or the fact that the remedies against the principal may be lost by
lapse of time, are immaterial.47crlwvirtualibrry
The raison dtre for the rule is that there is nothing to prevent the creditor from proceeding against the principal
at any time.48 At any rate, if the surety is dissatisfied with the degree of activity displayed by the creditor in the
pursuit of his principal, he may pay the debt himself and become subrogated to all the rights and remedies of
the creditor.49crlwvirtualibrry
It may not be amiss to add that leniency shown to a debtor in default, by delay permitted by the creditor without
change in the time when the debt might be demanded, does not constitute an extension of the time of
payment, which would release the surety.50 In order to constitute an extension discharging the surety, it should
appear that the extension was for a definite period, pursuant to an enforceable agreement between the
principal and the creditor, and that it was made without the consent of the surety or with a reservation of rights
with respect to him. The contract must be one which precludes the creditor from, or at least hinders him in,
enforcing the principal contract within the period during which he could otherwise have enforced it, and which
precludes the surety from paying the debt.51crlwvirtualibrry
None of these elements are present in the instant case. Verily, the mere fact that respondent corporation gave
the principal debtors an extended period of time within which to comply with their obligation did not effectively
absolve herein petitioner from the consequences of her undertaking. Besides, the burden is on the surety,
herein petitioner, to show that she has been discharged by some act of the creditor,52 herein respondent
corporation, failing in which we cannot grant the relief prayed for.
As a final issue, petitioner claims that assuming that her liability is solidary, the interests and penalty charges
on the outstanding balance of the loan cannot be imposed for being illegal and unconscionable. Petitioner
additionally theorizes that respondent corporation intentionally delayed the collection of the loan in order that
the interests and penalty charges would accumulate. The statement, likewise traversed by said respondent, is
misleading.
In an affidavit53 executed by petitioner, which was attached to her petition, she stated, among others, that:
8. During the latter part of 1990, I was surprised to learn that Merlyn Azarragas loan has been
released and that she has not paid the same upon its maturity. I received a telephone call from Mr.
Augusto Banusing of MB Lending informing me of this fact and of my liability arising from the
promissory note which I signed.
9. I requested Mr. Banusing to try to collect first from Merlyn and Osmea Azarraga. At the same time, I
offered to pay MB Lending the outstanding balance of the principal obligation should he fail to collect
from Merlyn and Osmea Azarraga. Mr. Banusing advised me not to worry because he will try to collect
first from Merlyn and Osmea Azarraga.
10. A year thereafter, I received a telephone call from the secretary of Mr. Banusing who reminded that
the loan of Merlyn and Osmea Azarraga, together with interest and penalties thereon, has not been
paid. Since I had no available funds at that time, I offered to pay MB Lending by delivering to them a
parcel of land which I own. Mr. Banusings secretary, however, refused my offer for the reason that they
are not interested in real estate.

11. In March 1992, I received a copy of the summons and of the complaint filed against me by MB
Lending before the RTC-Iloilo. After learning that a complaint was filed against me, I instructed Sheila
Gatia to go to MB Lending and reiterate my first offer to pay the outstanding balance of the principal
obligation of Merlyn Azarraga in the amount of P30,000.00.
12. Ms. Gatia talked to the secretary of Mr. Banusing who referred her to Atty. Venus, counsel of MB
Lending.
13. Atty. Venus informed Ms. Gatia that he will consult Mr. Banusing if my offer to pay the outstanding
balance of the principal obligation loan (sic) of Merlyn and Osmea Azarraga is acceptable. Later, Atty.
Venus informed Ms. Gatia that my offer is not acceptable to Mr. Banusing.
The purported offer to pay made by petitioner can not be deemed sufficient and substantial in order to
effectively discharge her from liability. There are a number of circumstances which conjointly inveigh against
her aforesaid theory.
1. Respondent corporation cannot be faulted for not immediately demanding payment from petitioner. It was
petitioner who initially requested that the creditor try to collect from her principal first, and she offered to pay
only in case the creditor fails to collect. The delay, if any, was occasioned by the fact that respondent
corporation merely acquiesced to the request of petitioner. At any rate, there was here no actual offer of
payment to speak of but only a commitment to pay if the principal does not pay.
2. Petitioner made a second attempt to settle the obligation by offering a parcel of land which she owned.
Respondent corporation was acting well within its rights when it refused to accept the offer. The debtor of a
thing cannot compel the creditor to receive a different one, although the latter may be of the same value, or
more valuable than that which is due.54 The obligee is entitled to demand fulfillment of the obligation or
performance as stipulated. A change of the object of the obligation would constitute novation requiring the
express consent of the parties.55crlwvirtualibrry
3. After the complaint was filed against her, petitioner reiterated her offer to pay the outstanding balance of the
obligation in the amount of P30,000.00 but the same was likewise rejected. Again, respondent corporation
cannot be blamed for refusing the amount being offered because it fell way below the amount it had computed,
based on the stipulated interests and penalty charges, as owing and due from herein petitioner. A debt shall not
be understood to have been paid unless the thing or service in which the obligation consists has been
completely delivered or rendered, as the case may be.56 In other words, the prestation must be fulfilled
completely. A person entering into a contract has a right to insist on its performance in all
particulars.57crlwvirtualibrry
Petitioner cannot compel respondent corporation to accept the amount she is willing to pay because the
moment the latter accepts the performance, knowing its incompleteness or irregularity, and without expressing
any protest or objection, then the obligation shall be deemed fully complied with.58 Precisely, this is what
respondent corporation wanted to avoid when it continually refused to settle with petitioner at less than what
was actually due under their contract.
This notwithstanding, however, we find and so hold that the penalty charge of 3% per month and attorneys
fees equivalent to 25% of the total amount due are highly inequitable and unreasonable.
It must be remembered that from the principal loan of P30,000.00, the amount ofP16,300.00 had already been
paid even before the filing of the present case. Article 1229 of the Civil Code provides that the court shall
equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the
debtor. And, even if there has been no performance, the penalty may also be reduced if it is iniquitous or
leonine.
In a case previously decided by this Court which likewise involved private respondent M.B. Lending
Corporation, and which is substantially on all fours with the one at bar, we decided to eliminate altogether the
penalty interest for being excessive and unwarranted under the following rationalization:
Upon the matter of penalty interest, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the economic impact of
the penalty interest of three percent (3%) per month on total amount due but unpaid should be
equitably reduced. The purpose for which the penalty interest is intended - that is, to punish the obligor

- will have been sufficiently served by the effects of compounded interest. Under the exceptional
circumstances in the case at bar, e.g., the original amount loaned was onlyP15,000.00; partial
payment of P8,600.00 was made on due date; and the heavy (albeit still lawful) regular compensatory
interest, the penalty interest stipulated in the parties promissory note is iniquitous and unconscionable
and may be equitably reduced further by eliminating such penalty interest
altogether.59crlwvirtualibrry
Accordingly, the penalty interest of 3% per month being imposed on petitioner should similarly be eliminated.
Finally, with respect to the award of attorneys fees, this Court has previously ruled that even with an agreement
thereon between the parties, the court may nevertheless reduce such attorneys fees fixed in the contract when
the amount thereof appears to be unconscionable or unreasonable.60 To that end, it is not even necessary to
show, as in other contracts, that it is contrary to morals or public policy.61 The grant of attorneys fees equivalent
to 25% of the total amount due is, in our opinion, unreasonable and immoderate, considering the minimal
unpaid amount involved and the extent of the work involved in this simple action for collection of a sum of
money. We, therefore, hold that the amount of P10,000.00 as and for attorneys fee would be sufficient in this
case.62crlwvirtualibrry
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION that the
penalty interest of 3% per month is hereby deleted and the award of attorneys fees is reduced to P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78780

July 23, 1987

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of
the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or
perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the
Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers
constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased,"
even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in response to
representations that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of
members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the Chief Justice's directive
as follows:
RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. The Court REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice's
previous and standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this Court to continue
with the deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court as
well as from the salaries of all other members of the judiciary.
That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing of this petition, the Court has deemed it best
to settle the legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement. As will be shown hereinafter, the clear
intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment
of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches of
Government" in the words of Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the deliberations, it was further expressly
made clear, specially with regard to Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment

of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income
tax applied to all taxpayers.
This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as approved
and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure to
include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public officer or employee, including
constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since then has authorized the continuation of the
deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the
salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the
ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra, that declared the salaries of members of the
Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their
salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges
are properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such
income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their
salaries during their continuance in office.
A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935 Constitution provided:
... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts) shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office ... 1 (Emphasis supplied).
Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court, and of judges of
inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their continuance in
office. ... 2 (Emphasis ours).
And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973 Constitution specifically
stipulated:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers,
shall be exempt from payment of income tax. 3
The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of
lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased. 4(Emphasis supplied).
The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, for
which reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of "nondiminution "of salaries of judicial officers.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate such
contention.
The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read:
Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and of
judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not
be diminished nor subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly shall provide otherwise, the
Chief Justice shall receive an annual salary of _____________ and each Associate Justice
______________ pesos. 5 (Emphasis ours)
During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No. 18), two Commissioners presented their
objections to the provision on tax exemption, thus:
MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax of the salary of justices, does this not violate
the principle of the uniformity of taxation and the principle of equal protection of the law? After all, tax is

levied not on the salary but on the combined income, such that when the judge receives a salary and it
is comingled with the other income, we tax the income, not the salary. Why do we have to give special
privileges to the salary of justices?
MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary. We prohibit the increase or decrease of
their salary during their term. This is an indirect way of decreasing their salary and affecting the
independence of the judges.
MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a clause to respect tenure, but the special
privilege on taxation might, in effect, be a violation of the principle of uniformity in taxation and the equal
protection clause. 6
xxx

xxx

xxx

MR. OPLE. x x x
Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the sponsor, Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion, for whom we have the highest respect, to surround the Supreme Court and the judicial
system as a whole with the whole armor of defense against the executive and legislative invasion of
their independence. But in so doing, some of the citizens outside, especially the humble government
employees, might say that in trying to erect a bastion of justice, we might end up with the fortress of
privileges, an island of extra territoriality under the Republic of the Philippines, because a good number
of powers and rights accorded to the Judiciary here may not be enjoyed in the remotest degree by
other employees of the government.
An example is the exception from income tax, which is a kind of economic immunity, which is, of
course, denied to the entire executive department and the legislative. 7
And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986, Commissioner Cirilo A. Rigos
proposed that the term "diminished" be changed to "decreased" and that the words "nor subjected to income
tax" be deleted so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches in the government.
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, defended the original draft
and referred to the ruling of this Court in Perfecto vs. Meer 8 that "the independence of the judges is of far
greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries." Commissioner Rigos then
moved that the matter be put to a vote. Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas stood up "in support of an
amendment to the amendment with the request for a modification of the amendment," as follows:
FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to the amendment saying that it is not
enough to drop the phrase "shall not be subjected to income tax," because if that is all that the
Gentleman will do, then he will just fall back on the decision in Perfecto vs. Meer and in Dencia vs.
David [should be Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc., 93 Phil. 696[ which excludes them from income
tax, but rather I would propose that the statement will read: "During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be diminished BUT MAY BE SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX."IN support of this
position, I would say that the argument seems to be that the justice and judges should not be subjected
to income tax because they already gave up the income from their practice. That is true also of Cabinet
members and all other employees. And I know right now, for instance, there are many people who have
accepted employment in the government involving a reduction of income and yet are still subject to
income tax. So, they are not the only citizens whose income is reduced by accepting service in
government.
Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the amendment. Commissioner Rustico F. de los
Reyes, Jr. then moved for a suspension of the session. Upon resumption, Commissioner Bernas announced:
During the suspension, we came to an understanding with the original proponent, Commissioner Rigos,
that his amendment on page 6,. line 4 would read: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall
not be DECREASED."But this is on the understanding that there will be a provision in the Constitution
similar to Section 6 of Article XV, the General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which says:

No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional
officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax.
So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the understanding that the salary of justices is subject
to tax.
When queried about the specific Article in the General Provisions on non-exemption from tax of salaries of
public officers, Commissioner Bernas replied:
FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the General Provisions. But at any
rate, when we put a period (.) after "DECREASED," it is on the understanding that the doctrine in
Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David will not apply anymore.
The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and understood, was finally approved without objection.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The understanding, therefore, is that there will be a
provision under the Article on General Provisions. Could Commissioner Rosario Braid kindly take note
that the salaries of officials of the government including constitutional officers shall not be exempt from
income tax? The amendment proposed herein and accepted by the Committee now reads as follows:
"During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be DECREASED"; and the phrase "nor
subjected to income tax" is deleted.9
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it
was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution,
in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is
but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.10 The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution.11 it may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.121avvphi1
Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again reproduced
hereunder:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of
lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
(Emphasis supplied).
it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of
Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment,
or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction
to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional
Commission.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon
the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as affirmed
inEndencia vs. David 14 must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of
the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII,
of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations
of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the
government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 200242

July 17, 2012

CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA, Petitioner,

vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as an IMPEACHMENT COURT, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, ARLENE "KAKA" BAG-AO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, MARILYN
PRIMICIAS-AGABAS, NIEL TUPAS, RODOLFO FARINAS, SHERWIN TUGNA, RAUL DAZA, ELPIDIO
BARZAGA, REYNALDO UMALI, NERI COLMENARES (ALSO KNOWN AS THE PROSECUTORS FROM
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES), Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of temporary
restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court, Renato

C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case initiated by the respondent Members of the House of
Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by respondent Senate of the Philippines.
On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which a verified complaint
for impeachment against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the Committee on Justice. After a brief
presentation, on the same day, the complaint was voted in session and 188 Members signed and endorsed it,
way above the one-third vote required by the Constitution.
On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which convened as an impeachment
court the following day, December 14, 2011.
On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption, allegedly committed as follows:
ARTICLE I
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK RECORD MARKED BY
PARTIALITY AND SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE ARROYO ADMINISTRATION FROM THE
TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS SUPREME COURT JUSTICE AND UNTIL HIS DUBIOUS APPOINTMENT
AS A MIDNIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE TO THE PRESENT.
ARTICLE II
RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE
PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC HIS STATEMENT OFASSETS,
LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
2.1. It is provided for in Art. XI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution that "a public officer or employee
shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration
under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general
or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law."
2.2. Respondent failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as
required by the Constitution.
2.3. It is also reported that some of the properties of Respondent are not included in his declaration of
his assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act.
2.4. Respondent is likewise suspected and accused of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth, acquiring
assets of high values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits. It has been reported that
Respondent has, among others, a 300-sq. meter apartment in a posh
Mega World Property development at the Fort in Taguig. Has he reported this, as he is constitutionally-required
under Art. XI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN)? Is
this acquisition sustained and duly supported by his income as a public official? Since his assumption as
Associate and subsequently, Chief Justice, has he complied with this duty of public disclosure?
ARTICLE III
RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE
PUBLIC TRUST BY FAILING TO MEET AND OBSERVE THE STRINGENT STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII,
SECTION 7 (3) OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT PROVIDES THAT "[A] MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST
BE A PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE" IN ALLOWING
THE SUPREME COURT TO ACT ON MERE LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL WHICH CAUSED THE
ISSUANCE OF FLIP-FLOPPING DECISIONS IN FINAL AND EXECUTORY CASES; IN CREATING AN
EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS. ARROYO THROUGH HER APPOINTMENT OF HIS WIFE TO
OFFICE; AND IN DISCUSSING WITH LITIGANTS REGARDING CASES PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT.

ARTICLE IV
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION WHEN HE BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
BY ISSUING A "STATUS QUO ANTE" ORDER AGAINST THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE
CASE CONCERNING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THEN OMBUDSMAN MERCEDITAS NAVARROGUTIERREZ.
ARTICLE V
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH WANTON ARBITRARINESS AND PARTIALITY
IN CONSISTENTLY DISREGARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE CASES INVOLVING THE
16 NEWLY-CREATED CITIES, AND THE PROMOTION OF DINAGAT ISLAND INTO A PROVINCE.
ARTICLE VI
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY ARROGATING UNTO HIMSELF, AND TO A
COMMITTEE HE CREATED, THE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO IMPROPERLY INVESTIGATE A
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXCULPATING HIM. SUCH AUTHORITY
AND JURISDICTION IS PROPERLY REPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES VIA IMPEACHMENT.
ARTICLE VII
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN GRANTING A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF FORMER PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO AND HER HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO
ESCAPE PROSECUTION AND TO FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, AND IN DISTORTING THE
SUPREME COURT DECISION ON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE TRO IN VIEW OF A CLEAR FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE SUPREME COURTS OWN TRO. ARTICLE VIII RESPONDENT
BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED GRAFT AND CORRUPTION WHEN HE FAILED
AND REFUSEDTO ACCOUNT FOR THE JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND SPECIAL
ALLOWANCE FOR THE JUDICIARY (SAJ) COLLECTIONS.1
On December 26, 2011, petitioner filed his Answer2 assailing the "blitzkrieg" fashion by which the impeachment
complaint was signed by the Members of the HOR and immediately transmitted to the Senate. Citing previous
instances when President Aquino openly expressed his rejection of petitioners appointment as Chief Justice
and publicly attacked this Court under the leadership of petitioner for "derailing his administrations mandate,"
petitioner concluded that the move to impeach him was the handiwork of President Aquinos party mates and
supporters, including"hidden forces" who will be benefited by his ouster. As to the charges against him,
petitioner denied the same but admitted having once served the Offices of the President and Vice-President
during the term of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and granted the request for courtesy call only to
Mr. Dante Jimenez of the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC) while Mr. Lauro Vizconde
appeared with Mr. Jimenez without prior permission or invitation. Petitioner argued at length that the acts,
misdeeds or offenses imputed to him were either false or baseless, and otherwise not illegal nor improper. He
prayed for the outright dismissal of the complaint for failing to meet the requirements of the Constitution or that
the Impeachment Court enter a judgment of acquittal for all the articles of impeachment.
Meanwhile, the prosecution panel composed of respondent Representatives held a press conference revealing
evidence which supposedly support their accusations against petitioner. The following day, newspapers carried
front page reports of high-priced condominium units and other real properties in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig and
Quezon City allegedly owned by petitioner, as disclosed by prosecutors led by respondent Rep. Niel C. Tupas,
Jr. The prosecution told the media that it is possible that these properties were not included by petitioner in his
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) which had not been made available to the public.
Reacting to this media campaign, Senators scolded the prosecutors reminding them that under the Senate
Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials3 they are not allowed to make any public disclosure or comment
regarding the merits of a pending impeachment case.4 By this time, five petitions have already been filed with
this Court by different individuals seeking to enjoin the impeachment trial on grounds of improperly verified
complaint and lack of due process.

On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court, commenced trial
proceedings against the petitioner.Petitioners motion for a preliminary hearing was denied. On January 18,
2012, Atty. Enriqueta E. Vidal, Clerk of Court of this Court, in compliance with a subpoena issued by the
Impeachment Court, took the witness stand and submitted the SALNs of petitioner for the years 2002 to 2010.
Other prosecution witnesses also testified regarding petitioners SALNs for the previous years (Marianito
Dimaandal, Records Custodian of Malacaang Palace, Atty. Randy A. Rutaquio, Register of Deeds of Taguig
and Atty. Carlo V. Alcantara, Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City).
In compliance with the directive of the Impeachment Court, the prosecution and defense submitted their
respective memoranda on the question of whether the prosecution may present evidence to prove the
allegations in paragraphs 2.3 (failure to report some properties in SALN) and 2.4 (acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth and failure to disclose in SALN such bank accounts with huge deposits and 300-sq.m. Megaworld
property at the Fort in Taguig) under Article II (par. 2.2. refers to petitioners alleged failure to disclose to the
public his SALN as required by the Constitution).
On January 27, 2012, the Impeachment Court issued a Resolution5 which states:
IN SUM, THEREFORE, this Court resolves and accordingly rules:
1. To allow the Prosecution to introduce evidence in support of Paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of Article II of the
Articles of Impeachment;
2. To disallow the introduction of evidence in support of Par. 2.4 of the Articles of Impeachment, with respect to
which, this Court shall be guided by and shall rely upon the legal presumptions on the nature of any property or
asset which may be proven to belong to the Respondent Chief Justice as provided under Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 3019 and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379.
SO ORDERED.6
In a subsequent Resolution7 dated February 6, 2012, the Impeachment Court granted the prosecutions
request for subpoena directed to the officersof two private banks where petitioner allegedly deposited millions
in peso and dollar currencies, as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the majority votes to grant the Prosecutions Requests for
Subpoenae to the responsible officers of Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank) and Bank of the Philippine Island
(BPI), for them to testify and bring and/or produce before the Court documents on the alleged bank accounts of
Chief Justice Corona, only for the purpose of the instant impeachment proceedings, as follows:
a) The Branch Manager of the Bank of Philippine Islands, Ayala Avenue Branch, 6th Floor, SGV
Building, 6758 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, is commanded to bring before the Senate at 2:00 p.m. on
February 8, 2012, the original and certified true copies of the account opening forms/documents for
Bank Account no. 1445-8030-61 in the name of Renato C. Corona and the bank statements showing
the balances of the said account as of December 31, 2005, December 31, 2006, December 31, 2007,
December 31, 2008, December 31, 2009 and December 31, 2010.
b) The Branch Manager (and/or authorized representative) of Philippine Savings Bank, Katipunan
Branch, Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, is commanded to bring before the Senate at
2:00 p.m. on February 8, 2012, the original and certified true copies of the account opening
forms/documents for the following bank accounts allegedly in the name of Renato C. Corona, and the
documents showing the balances of the said accounts as of December 31, 2007, December 31, 2008,
December 31, 2009 and December 31, 2010:
089-19100037-3
089-13100282-6
089-121017358
089-121019593

089-121020122
089-121021681
089-141-00712-9
089-141-00746-9
089-14100814-5
089-121-01195-7
SO ORDERED.8
On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 200238) seeking to enjoin
the Impeachment Court and the HOR prosecutors from implementing the aforesaid subpoena requiring
PSBank thru its authorized representative to testify and to bring the original and certified true copies of the
opening documents for petitionersalleged foreign currency accounts, and thereafter to render judgment
nullifying the subpoenas including the bank statements showing the year-end balances for the said accounts.
On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the basis of the
complaint filed by respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for lack
of probable cause; (2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside from
being a "hodge-podge" of multiple charges, do not constitute allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being
all premised on suspicion and/or hearsay; assuming arguendo that the retention of Par. 2.3 is correct, the
ruling of the Impeachment Court to retain Par. 2.3 effectively allows the introduction of evidence under Par. 2.3,
as vehicle to prove Par. 2.4 and therefore its earlier resolution was nothing more than a hollow relief, bringing
no real protection to petitioner; (3) allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged corruption and
unexplained wealth which violates petitioners right to due process because first, Art. II does not mention "graft
and corruption" or unlawfully acquired wealth as grounds for impeachment, and second, it is clear under Sec.
2, Art. XI of the Constitution that "graft and corruption" is a separate and distinct ground from "culpable
violation of the Constitution" and "betrayal of public trust"; and (4) issued the subpoena for the production of
petitioners alleged bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same being the result of an
illegal act ("fruit of the poisonous tree") considering that those documents submitted by the prosecution violates
the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits Act)
which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof. Petitioner thus prayed for the following reliefs:
(a) Immediately upon filing of this Petition, issue a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining: (i) the proceedings before the Impeachment Court; (ii) implementation ofResolution
dated 6 February 2012; (iii) the officers or representatives of BPI and PSBank from testifying and
submitting documents on petitioners or his familys bank accounts; and (iv) the presentation, reception
and admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint;
(b) After giving due course to the Petition, render judgment:
(i) Declaring the Impeachment Complaint null and void ab initio;
(ii) Prohibiting the presentation, reception and admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4
of the Impeachment Complaint;
(iii) Annulling the Impeachment Courts Resolution dated 27 January 2012 and 6 February 2011
[sic], as well as any Subpoenae issued pursuant thereto; and
(iv) Making the TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction permanent.
Other reliefs, just or equitable, are likewise prayed for.9

Petitioner also sought the inhibition of Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno on the
ground of partiality, citing their publicly known "animosity" towards petitioner aside from the fact that they have
been openly touted as the likely replacements in the event that petitioner is removed from office.10
On February 9, 2012, this Court issued a TRO in G.R. No. 200238 enjoining the Senate from implementing the
Resolution and subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum issued by the Senate sitting as an Impeachment
Court, both dated February 6, 2012. The Court further resolved to deny petitioners motion for the inhibition of
Justices Carpio and Sereno "in the absence of any applicable compulsory ground and of any voluntary
inhibition from the Justices concerned."
On February 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition11 claiming that his right to due process is being
violated in the ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator-Judges have lost the coldneutrality
of impartial judges by acting as prosecutors. Petitioner particularly mentioned Senator-Judge Franklin S.
Drilon, whose inhibition he had sought from the Impeachment Court, to no avail. He further called attention to
the fact that despite the Impeachment Courts January 27, 2012 Resolution which disallowed the introduction
of evidence in support of paragraph 2.4 of Article II, from which no motion for reconsideration would be
entertained, "the allies of President Aquino in the Senate abused their authority and continued their
presentation of evidence for the prosecution, without fear of objection". In view of the persistent efforts of
President Aquinos Senator-allies to overturn the ruling of Presiding Officer Juan Ponce Enrile that the
prosecution could not present evidence on paragraph 2.4 of Article II -- for which President Aquino even
thanked "his senator allies in delivering what the prosecution could not"-- petitioner reiterates the reliefs prayed
for in his petition before this Court.
In the Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti12 filed on behalf of the respondents, the Solicitor General
argues that the instant petition raises matters purely political in character which may be decided or resolved
only by the Senate and HOR, with the manifestation that the comment is being filed by the respondents
"without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Honorable Supreme Court and without conceding the
constitutional and exclusive power of the House to initiate all cases of impeachment and of
the Senate to try and decide all cases of impeachment." Citing the case of
Nixon v. United States,13 respondents contend that to allow a public official being impeached to raise before
this Court any and all issues relative to the substance of the impeachment complaint would result in an
unnecessarily long and tedious process that may even go beyond the terms of the Senator-Judges hearing the
impeachment case. Such scenario is clearly not what the Constitution intended.
Traversing the allegations of the petition, respondents assert that the Impeachment Court did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion; it has, in fact, been conducting the proceedings judiciously. Respondents maintain
that subjecting the ongoing impeachment trial to judicial review defeats the very essence of impeachment.
They contend that the constitutional command of public accountability to petitioner and his obligation to fully
disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth prevail over his claim of confidentiality of deposits; hence, the
subpoena subject of this case were correctly and judiciously issued. Considering that the ongoing
impeachment proceedings, which was initiated and is being conducted in accordance with the Constitution,
simply aims to enforce the principle of public accountability and ensure that the transgressions of impeachable
public officials are corrected, the injury being claimed by petitioner allegedly resulting from the impeachment
trial has no factual and legal basis. It is thus prayed that the present petition, as well as petitioners prayer for
issuance of a TRO/preliminary injunction, be dismissed.
The core issue presented is whether the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail matters or
incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for alleged violations of right to
due process of the person being tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.
Impeachment and Judicial Review
Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy,"14 was foreseen as
creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that
"the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of
innocence or guilt."15 Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment
cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while
preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any

branch or instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments,
are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as
provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its roots in
Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence of English common law on the
Framers of the US Constitution.
Our own Constitutions provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution. Petitioner was
impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner that he claims was
accomplished with undue haste and under a complaint which is defective for lack of probable cause. Petitioner
likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the trial under the said complaint, and in the alleged partiality
exhibited by some Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during the hearings.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the issues raised in the Supplemental Petition regarding the
behavior of certain Senator-Judges in the course of the impeachment trial are issues that do not concern, or
allege any violation of, the three express and exclusive constitutional limitations on the Senates sole power to
try and decide impeachment cases. They argue that unless there is a clear transgression of these
constitutional limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of expanded judicial review over the actions of
Senator-Judges during the proceedings. By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an
Impeachment Court, Senator-Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors
and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of partiality on the part of any
Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a political question that
is not within this Courts power of expanded judicial review.
In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.16 we ruled that the power of
judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice,17 the Court
resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints against
petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the one-year bar
provision.
On the basis of these precedents, petitioner asks this Court to determine whether respondents committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives
that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.
Mootness
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than the
required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any
protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening applicants
and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the
prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional
issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.1wphi1
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a
determination thereof would be without practical use and value.18 In such cases, there is no actual substantial
relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.19
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is DISMISSED
on the ground of MOOTNESS.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 191002

April 20, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191032
JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191057
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC
IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO
THE JUDICIARY, ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191149
JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC). Respondent.
PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM; ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.; NATIONAL UNION OF
PEOPLES LAWYERS; MARLOU B. UBANO; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR
CHAPTER, represented by its Immediate Past President, ATTY. ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and the latter
in his own personal capacity as a MEMBER of the PHILIPPINE BAR; MITCHELL JOHN L. BOISER;
BAGONG ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO; BAYAN SECRETARY
GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR.; CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCE-

MENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE) CHAIRMAN FERDINAND GAITE; KALIPUNAN NG

DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY) SECRETARY GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG
NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN
KEN LEONARD RAMOS; TAYO ANG PAG-ASA CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS (LFS) CHAIRMAN JAMES MARK TERRY LACUANAN RIDON; NATIONAL UNION OF
STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP) CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN RECEDES; COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD
OF THE PHILIPPINES (CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP) CHAIRMAN MA. CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA; WALDEN F. BELLO and
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES; WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by YOLANDA QUISUMBING-JAVELLANA; BELLEZA ALOJADO DEMAISIP; TERESITA
GANDIONCO-OLEDAN; MA. VERENA KASILAG-VILLANUEVA; MARILYN STA. ROMANA; LEONILA DE
JESUS; and GUINEVERE DE LEON; AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.;Intervenors.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191342
ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP Governor-Southern Luzon), and ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING
(IBPGovernor-Eastern Visayas), Petitioners,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191420
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision, holding:
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and
the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created
by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief
Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the
Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in
accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Motions for Reconsideration

Petitioners Jaime N. Soriano (G.R. No. 191032), Amador Z. Tolentino and Roland B. Inting (G.R. No. 191342),
and Philippine Bar Association (G.R. No. 191420), as well as intervenors Integrated Bar of the PhilippinesDavao del Sur (IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.); Christian Robert S. Lim; Peter Irving Corvera; Bagong Alyansang
Bayan and others (BAYAN, et al.); Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.; the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines
(WTLOP); Marlou B. Ubano; Mitchell John L. Boiser; and Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Bello, et
al.), filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Also filing a motion for reconsideration was Senator
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., whose belated intervention was allowed.
We summarize the arguments and submissions of the various motions for reconsideration, in the aforegiven
order:
Soriano
1. The Court has not squarely ruled upon or addressed the issue of whether or not the power to
designate the Chief Justice belonged to the Supreme Court en banc.
2. The Mendoza petition should have been dismissed, because it sought a mere declaratory judgment
and did not involve a justiciable controversy.
3. All Justices of the Court should participate in the next deliberations. The mere fact that the Chief
Justice sits as ex officio head of the JBC should not prevail over the more compelling state interest for
him to participate as a Member of the Court.
Tolentino and Inting
1. A plain reading of Section 15, Article VII does not lead to an interpretation that exempts judicial
appointments from the express ban on midnight appointments.
2. In excluding the Judiciary from the ban, the Court has made distinctions and has created exemptions
when none exists.
3. The ban on midnight appointments is placed in Article VII, not in Article VIII, because it limits an
executive, not a judicial, power.
4. Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is superfluous, and is powerless to vary
the terms of the clear prohibition.
5. The Court has given too much credit to the position taken by Justice Regalado. Thereby, the Court
has raised the Constitution to the level of a venerated text whose intent can only be divined by its
framers as to be outside the realm of understanding by the sovereign people that ratified it.
6. Valenzuela should not be reversed.
7. The petitioners, as taxpayers and lawyers, have the clear legal standing to question the illegal
composition of the JBC.
Philippine Bar Association
1. The Courts strained interpretation of the Constitution violates the basic principle that the Court
should not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than what is required by the precise facts of the
case.
2. Considering that Section 15, Article VII is clear and straightforward, the only duty of the Court is to
apply it. The provision expressly and clearly provides a general limitation on the appointing power of the
President in prohibiting the appointment of any person to any position in the Government without any
qualification and distinction.
3. The Court gravely erred in unilaterally ignoring the constitutional safeguard against midnight
appointments.

4. The Constitution has installed two constitutional safeguards:- the prohibition against midnight
appointments, and the creation of the JBC. It is not within the authority of the Court to prefer one over
the other, for the Courts duty is to apply the safeguards as they are, not as the Court likes them to be.
5. The Court has erred in failing to apply the basic principles of statutory construction in interpreting the
Constitution.
6. The Court has erred in relying heavily on the title, chapter or section headings, despite precedents
on statutory construction holding that such headings carried very little weight.
7. The Constitution has provided a general rule on midnight appointments, and the only exception is
that on temporary appointments to executive positions.
8. The Court has erred in directing the JBC to resume the proceedings for the nomination of the
candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno with a
view to submitting the list of nominees for Chief Justice to President Arroyo on or before May 17, 2010.
The Constitution grants the Court only the power of supervision over the JBC; hence, the Court cannot
tell the JBC what to do, how to do it, or when to do it, especially in the absence of a real and justiciable
case assailing any specific action or inaction of the JBC.
9. The Court has engaged in rendering an advisory opinion and has indulged in speculations.
10. The constitutional ban on appointments being already in effect, the Courts directing the JBC to
comply with the decision constitutes a culpable violation of the Constitution and the commission of an
election offense.
11. The Court cannot reverse on the basis of a secondary authority a doctrine unanimously formulated
by the Court en banc.
12. The practice has been for the most senior Justice to act as Chief Justice whenever the incumbent is
indisposed. Thus, the appointment of the successor Chief Justice is not urgently necessary.
13. The principal purpose for the ban on midnight appointments is to arrest any attempt to prolong the
outgoing Presidents powers by means of proxies. The attempt of the incumbent President to appoint
the next Chief Justice is undeniably intended to perpetuate her power beyond her term of office.
IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.
1. Its language being unambiguous, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution applies to appointments
to the Judiciary. Hence, no cogent reason exists to warrant the reversal of the Valenzuela
pronouncement.
2. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides for presidential appointments to the Constitutional
Commissions and the JBC with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Its phrase "other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution" is enough proof that the limitation on
the appointing power of the President extends to appointments to the Judiciary. Thus, Section 14,
Section 15, and Section 16 of Article VII apply to all presidential appointments in the Executive and
Judicial Branches of the Government.
3. There is no evidence that the framers of the Constitution abhorred the idea of an Acting Chief Justice
in all cases.
Lim
1. There is no justiciable controversy that warrants the Courts exercise of judicial review.
2. The election ban under Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Court
and to other appointments to the Judiciary.

3. The creation of the JBC does not justify the removal of the safeguard under Section 15 of Article VII
against midnight appointments in the Judiciary.
Corvera
1. The Courts exclusion of appointments to the Judiciary from the Constitutional ban on midnight
appointments is based on an interpretation beyond the plain and unequivocal language of the
Constitution.
2. The intent of the ban on midnight appointments is to cover appointments in both the Executive and
Judicial Departments. The application of the principle of verba legis (ordinary meaning) would have
obviated dwelling on the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution. If there is
any ambiguity in Section 15, Article VII, the intent behind the provision, which is to prevent political
partisanship in all branches of the Government, should have controlled.
3. A plain reading is preferred to a contorted and strained interpretation based on compartmentalization
and physical arrangement, especially considering that the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.
4. Resort to the deliberations or to the personal interpretation of the framers of the Constitution should
yield to the plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution.
5. There is no sufficient reason for reversing Valenzuela, a ruling that is reasonable and in accord with
the Constitution.
BAYAN, et al.
1. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a
justiciable controversy. The issues it raised were not yet ripe for adjudication, considering that the office
of the Chief Justice was not yet vacant and that the JBC itself has yet to decide whether or not to
submit a list of nominees to the President.
2. The collective wisdom of Valenzuela Court is more important and compelling than the opinion of
Justice Regalado.
3. In ruling that Section 15, Article VII is in conflict with Section 4(1), Article VIII, the Court has violated
the principle of ut magis valeat quam pereat (which mandates that the Constitution should be
interpreted as a whole, such that any conflicting provisions are to be harmonized as to fully give effect
to all). There is no conflict between the provisions; they complement each other.
4. The form and structure of the Constitutions titles, chapters, sections, and draftsmanship carry little
weight in statutory construction. The clear and plain language of Section 15, Article VII precludes
interpretation.
Tan, Jr.
1. The factual antecedents do not present an actual case or controversy. The clash of legal rights and
interests in the present case are merely anticipated. Even if it is anticipated with certainty, no actual
vacancy in the position of the Chief Justice has yet occurred.
2. The ruling that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to a vacancy in the Court and the Judiciary runs
in conflict with long standing principles and doctrines of statutory construction. The provision admits
only one exception, temporary appointments in the Executive Department. Thus, the Court should not
distinguish, because the law itself makes no distinction.
3. Valenzuela was erroneously reversed. The framers of the Constitution clearly intended the ban on
midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary. Hence, giving more weight to the opinion
of Justice Regalado to reverse the en banc decision in Valenzuela was unwarranted.
4. Section 15, Article VII is not incompatible with Section 4(1), Article VIII. The 90-day mandate to fill
any vacancy lasts until August 15, 2010, or a month and a half after the end of the ban. The next

President has roughly the same time of 45 days as the incumbent President (i.e., 44 days) within which
to scrutinize and study the qualifications of the next Chief Justice. Thus, the JBC has more than enough
opportunity to examine the nominees without haste and political uncertainty.1avvphi1
5. When the constitutional ban is in place, the 90-day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII is
suspended.
6. There is no basis to direct the JBC to submit the list of nominees on or before May 17, 2010. The
directive to the JBC sanctions a culpable violation of the Constitution and constitutes an election
offense.
7. There is no pressing necessity for the appointment of a Chief Justice, because the Court sits en
banc, even when it acts as the sole judge of all contests relative to the election, returns and
qualifications of the President and Vice-President. Fourteen other Members of the Court can validly
comprise the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
WTLOP
1. The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees for Chief
Justice to the President on or before May 17, 2010, and to continue its proceedings for the nomination
of the candidates, because it granted a relief not prayed for; imposed on the JBC a deadline not
provided by law or the Constitution; exercised control instead of mere supervision over the JBC; and
lacked sufficient votes to reverse Valenzuela.
2. In interpreting Section 15, Article VII, the Court has ignored the basic principle of statutory
construction to the effect that the literal meaning of the law must be applied when it is clear and
unambiguous; and that we should not distinguish where the law does not distinguish.
3. There is no urgency to appoint the next Chief Justice, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948
already provides that the power and duties of the office devolve on the most senior Associate Justice in
case of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice.
Ubano
1. The language of Section 15, Article VII, being clear and unequivocal, needs no interpretation
2. The Constitution must be construed in its entirety, not by resort to the organization and arrangement
of its provisions.
3. The opinion of Justice Regalado is irrelevant, because Section 15, Article VII and the pertinent
records of the Constitutional Commission are clear and unambiguous.
4. The Court has erred in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the President by May 17,
2010 at the latest, because no specific law requires the JBC to submit the list of nominees even before
the vacancy has occurred.
Boiser
1. Under Section 15, Article VII, the only exemption from the ban on midnight appointments is the
temporary appointment to an executive position. The limitation is in keeping with the clear intent of the
framers of the Constitution to place a restriction on the power of the outgoing Chief Executive to make
appointments.
2. To exempt the appointment of the next Chief Justice from the ban on midnight appointments makes
the appointee beholden to the outgoing Chief Executive, and compromises the independence of the
Chief Justice by having the outgoing President be continually influential.
3. The Courts reversal of Valenzuela without stating the sufficient reason violates the principle of stare
decisis.

Bello, et al.
1. Section 15, Article VII does not distinguish as to the type of appointments an outgoing President is
prohibited from making within the prescribed period. Plain textual reading and the records of the
Constitutional Commission support the view that the ban on midnight appointments extends to judicial
appointments.
2. Supervision of the JBC by the Court involves oversight. The subordinate subject to oversight must
first act not in accord with prescribed rules before the act can be redone to conform to the prescribed
rules.
3. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a
justiciable controversy.
Pimentel
1. Any constitutional interpretative changes must be reasonable, rational, and conformable to the
general intent of the Constitution as a limitation to the powers of Government and as a bastion for the
protection of the rights of the people. Thus, in harmonizing seemingly conflicting provisions of the
Constitution, the interpretation should always be one that protects the citizenry from an ever expanding
grant of authority to its representatives.
2. The decision expands the constitutional powers of the President in a manner totally repugnant to
republican constitutional democracy, and is tantamount to a judicial amendment of the Constitution
without proper authority.
Comments
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the JBC separately represent in their respective comments,
thus:
OSG
1. The JBC may be compelled to submit to the President a short list of its nominees for the position of
Chief Justice.
2. The incumbent President has the power to appoint the next Chief Justice.
3. Section 15, Article VII does not apply to the Judiciary.
4. The principles of constitutional construction favor the exemption of the Judiciary from the ban on
midnight appointments.1awph!1
5. The Court has the duty to consider and resolve all issues raised by the parties as well as other
related matters.
JBC
1. The consolidated petitions should have been dismissed for prematurity, because the JBC has not yet
decided at the time the petitions were filed whether the incumbent President has the power to appoint
the new Chief Justice, and because the JBC, having yet to interview the candidates, has not submitted
a short list to the President.
2. The statement in the decision that there is a doubt on whether a JBC short list is necessary for the
President to appoint a Chief Justice should be struck down as bereft of constitutional and legal basis.
The statement undermines the independence of the JBC.
3. The JBC will abide by the final decision of the Court, but in accord with its constitutional mandate and
its implementing rules and regulations.

For his part, petitioner Estelito P. Mendoza (A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC) submits his comment even if the OSG and
the JBC were the only ones the Court has required to do so. He states that the motions for reconsideration
were directed at the administrative matter he initiated and which the Court resolved. His comment asserts:
1. The grounds of the motions for reconsideration were already resolved by the decision and the
separate opinion.
2. The administrative matter he brought invoked the Courts power of supervision over the JBC as
provided by Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, as distinguished from the Courts adjudicatory
power under Section 1, Article VIII. In the former, the requisites for judicial review are not required,
which was whyValenzuela was docketed as an administrative matter. Considering that the JBC itself
has yet to take a position on when to submit the short list to the proper appointing authority, it has
effectively solicited the exercise by the Court of its power of supervision over the JBC.
3. To apply Section 15, Article VII to Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII is to amend the Constitution.
4. The portions of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission quoted in the dissent of Justice
Carpio Morales, as well as in some of the motions for reconsideration do not refer to either Section 15,
Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but to Section 13, Article VII (on nepotism).
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised and argued,
not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010.
Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis.
First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and accordingly insist that
the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela.1
The contention has no basis.
Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to
precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a principle underlying the decision in
one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in
lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a
court of competent authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts,
because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably not
the best evidence of the rules of law laid down. 2
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only
of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.3 In a
hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of
co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the
innate authority to rule according to its best lights.4
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court,
especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after
re-examination, to call for a rectification.5 The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law
setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament.6 But ours is not a
common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial
pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its
reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification
to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its
wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation.
They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en

banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in
division.7
Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence that the Constitutional
Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Section
15, Article VII.
The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional
Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but only Section 13,
Article VII, a provision on nepotism. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had proposed to include judges and justices related to the President within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the President might not appoint during his or her
tenure. In the end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in
Section 13, Article VII "(t)o avoid any further complication,"8 such that the final version of the second paragraph
of Section 13, Article VII even completely omits any reference to the Judiciary, to wit:
Section 13. xxx
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not
during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments in the Judiciary. They aver that the Court either ignored or refused to apply many principles of
statutory construction.
The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves apparently contravening their avowed reliance on
the principles of statutory construction.
For one, the movants, disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII of the express extension of the
ban on appointments to the Judiciary, insist that the ban applied to the Judiciary under the principle of verba
legis. That is self-contradiction at its worst.
Another instance is the movants unhesitating willingness to read into Section 4(1) and Section 9, both of
Article VIII, the express applicability of the ban under Section 15, Article VII during the period provided therein,
despite the silence of said provisions thereon. Yet, construction cannot supply the omission, for doing so would
generally constitute an encroachment upon the field of the Constitutional Commission. Rather, Section 4(1)
and Section 9 should be left as they are, given that their meaning is clear and explicit, and no words can be
interpolated in them.9 Interpolation of words is unnecessary, because the law is more than likely to fail to
express the legislative intent with the interpolation. In other words, the addition of new words may alter the
thought intended to be conveyed. And, even where the meaning of the law is clear and sensible, either with or
without the omitted word or words, interpolation is improper, because the primary source of the legislative
intent is in the language of the law itself.10
Thus, the decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed:
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that
the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.
We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to suit the
purposes of any quarter.
Final Word

It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolving that because all
the Members of the present Court were appointed by the incumbent President, a majority of them are now
granting to her the authority to appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice.
The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair.
The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the merits of the issues. Any claim to
the contrary proceeds from malice and condescension. Neither the outgoing President nor the present
Members of the Court had arranged the current situation to happen and to evolve as it has. None of the
Members of the Court could have prevented the Members composing the Court when she assumed the
Presidency about a decade ago from retiring during her prolonged term and tenure, for their retirements were
mandatory. Yet, she is now left with an imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies created
by such inexorable retirements within 90 days from their occurrence. Her official duty she must comply with. So
must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the controversy.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality.
SO ORDERED.

DE CASTRO VS. JBC

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after
the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement
of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in
relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof
from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also
considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the position of Chief Justice the
five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate
Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their
nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition

under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section
4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the
prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and
that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to
appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its
insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the
JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there
being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy
has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process
until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires
the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice
or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court
or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division
of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that
the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that
the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the
President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion
is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.
that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section
14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their
intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and
surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

[G.R. No. L-66088. January 25, 1984.]

ALEX G. ALMARIO, ISAGANI M. JUNGCO, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., DORINTINO FLORESTA, FIDELA
Y. VARGAS, ET AL., Petitioners, v. HON. MANUEL ALBA and THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 1973 CONSTITUTION; GRANT OF
ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND URBAN LAND REFORM; PROPOSALS BASED ON
PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. The present provisions of the Constitution are adequate to
support any program of the government for the grant of public lands to qualified and deserving citizens or for
the implementation of urban land reform. Homesteads and free patents are "grants." We likewise see no
constitutional infirmity to a law passed by the Batasang Pambansa, under the present Constitution, that would
grant alienable and disposable lands of the public domain not more than twenty four (24) hectares to any
qualified tenant, farmer, and other landless citizen in areas reserved by the President, acting pursuant to such
law.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NECESSITY OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO DETERMINED SOLELY BY THE PEOPLE.
The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond the power of the courts to
adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not "grant" of public land and "urban land reform" are unwise or improvident
or whether or not the proposed amendments are unnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide.
The questions are presented for their determination.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION; REQUIREMENT FOR FAIR AND PROPER SUBMISSION ADEQUATELY MET.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 643 directs the COMELEC to publish the amendments. The respondents assure us
that publication in all provinces and cities, except a few where there are no local newspapers, has been
affected and that Barangays all over the country have been enjoined to hold community gatherings for this
purpose. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines and various civic organizations have taken a strong stand for or
against the last two proposed questions. Television and radio programs regularly broadcast the amendments.
The petitioners have failed to explain why, inspite of all the above, there is still fair and proper submission.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 1973 CONSTITUTION; GRANT OF
ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND URBAN LAND REFORM; PROPOSALS ALREADY
AUTHORIZED UNDER THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION. Resolution No. 105 deals with the grant or
distribution of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain to qualified tenants, farmers and other
landless citizens. Resolution No. 113 deals with urban land reform and social housing program. They are, then,
immediately recognizable as logical and necessary extensions of the fundamental principle of social justice
enshrined as far back as the 1935 Constitution and expanded in the present Constitution. Our adoption of such
principle antedated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by thirteen years. To my mind, therefore, no
question need arise under the standard of proper submission.
PLANA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 1973 CONSTITUTION; GRANT OF
ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND URBAN LAND REFORM; PROPOSALS ALREADY
AUTHORIZED UNDER THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION. Reflecting on Section 11, Article XIV and Section
6, Article 11 of the 1973 Constitution, it seems evident that what is sought to be adopted under Questions 3
and 4 of the forthcoming plebiscite based on Resolutions Nos. 105 and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa, is
already authorized under the existing Constitution. The proposed Constitutional amendments under Questions
3 and 4 would just be confirmatory of a legislative power already existing, it stands to reason that a protracted
discussion of the proposed Constitutional amendments under Questions 3 and 4 is neither necessary nor
constitutionally required.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT OF FAIR AND PROPER SUBMISSION COMPLIED WITH. There is
compliance with Article XVI, Section 2 of the Constitution, under which a proposed Constitutional amendment
shall be submitted to a plebiscite "which shall be held not later than 3 months after the approval of such
amendment." The proposed amendments under Questions 3 and 4, as embodied in Resolutions 105 and 113
of the Batasang Pambansa, were adopted on November 21 and December 19, 1983, respectively. From
November 21, 1983, when Resolution No. 105 was adopted, up to January 27, 1984, there would be a spread
of 67 days. On the other hand, from December 19, 1983, when Resolution No. 113 was adopted, up to January
27, 1984, there would be a spread of 39 days.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO COMPELLING REASON FOR A SEPARATE PLEBISCITE FOR THE APPROVAL OF
QUESTIONED PROPOSALS. There is no compelling reason why so much of the peoples money should be
spent for holding a separate plebiscite when the purpose, by and large, of the second is merely to confirm an
existing Constitutional power.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 1973 CONSTITUTION; REQUIREMENT
OF FAIR AND PROPER SUBMISSION. The doctrine of fair and proper submission to the people of
proposed constitutional amendments as enunciated by the Court in Tolentino v. Comelec (41 SCRA 702, 729)
mandates that "in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly
held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time, but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature
of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a
harmonious whole." There must be fair submission and intelligent consent or rejection. As the late Justice
Conrado V. Sanchez stressed in his separate opinion in the earlier case of Gonzales v. Comelec, concurred in
by the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Justice Calixto Zaldivar, (21 SCRA 774, 817), the people must
be "sufficiently informed of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon, to
express their will in a genuine manner."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GRANT OF ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND URBAN LAND REFORM;
PEOPLE HAVE NOT BEEN GIVEN AMPLE TIME TO COMPREHEND THE SIGNIFICANCE AND
CONSEQUENCES THEREOF; RATIFICATION OF THE AMENDMENTS IN A PLEBISCITE SHOULD BE
ENJOINED. There has not been ample time and dissemination of information to comprehend the
significance, implications and complications and consequences of the proposed amendments so as to comply
with the fundamental requirements of a fair and proper submission in order that the people may intelligently
approve or reject the same. It is, therefore, but proper, in accordance with due process in dealing with such a
fundamental instrument as the Constitution which basically is a charter of limitation of the powers of
government, that the precipitate submittal on January 27, 1984 of Questions Nos. 3 and 4 for the peoples
ratification or rejection be enjoined. It is far better to avail of the maximum 90-day period after the approval of
the proposed amendments for their submittal in a plebiscite so that the people may at the proper time make
their decision with the fullest possible comprehension. During this interval, the separate and completely
different second additional paragraphs proposed to be inserted in Article XIV, section 12 of the Constitution in
conflicting Resolutions Nos. 105 and 113 (103) as pointed out on pages 2 and 5 hereof should be clarified.
Otherwise, if the plebiscite is held on the 27th, the people would just have to go by the position taken by the
State at the hearing of January 24th that their remedy is to vote "No" against the proposed amendments which
they do not understand (or are "unnecessary").
ABAD SANTOS, J., separate opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 1973 CONSTITUTION; GRANT OF
ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND URBAN LAND REFORM; SUBMISSION OF
PROPOSALS IN A PLEBISCITE TO BE DEFERRED. Partial relief should be granted to petitioners as there
is manifest basis for their claim that the citizenry has not been adequately educated on the proposed
amendments on grant of public lands and urban land reform. The petitioners cite the case of Tolentino v.
Comelec and although the instant case does not fall squarely under said decision, that case can serve as a
guide in the resolution of this case. No question is raised with respect to Questions 1 and 2 which have been
thoroughly discussed in public and private fora for which reason there is no cause to delay their submission to
the people. Preparations for the plebiscite on January 27, 1984, have reached the point of no return. questions
1 and 2 can and should be submitted to the people on plebiscite day but Questions 3 and 4 should be
submitted at some other appropriate date.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., separate opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; AMENDMENTS TO THE 1973 CONSTITUTION; PROCEDURE ADOPTED
THEREFOR SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL INQUIRY. What may be noted in Article XVI is that, besides the
provision for the number of votes necessary for the Batasans proposal to amend or revise the Constitution, or
to call a convention or propose to the people the calling of a convention, the procedure for the revision or
amendment of the Constitution has not been established. Hence, the procedure shall be as the Batasan shall
adopt in the exercise of sound judgment, in the understanding that when it does so, it acts only as a constituent
assembly and not as a legislative body. If the Batasan, as a constituent assembly, should provide for the
revision or amendment of the Constitution in a manner not consonant with fundamentals of democracy and of
good government, and its action is challenged, this Court can assume jurisdiction to resolve the controversy.
2. ID.; ID.; GRANT OF ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND URBAN LAND REFORM;
BATASANG PAMBANSA RESOLUTIONS PROPOSING THE SAME SUBJECT TO THE PUBLICATION
REQUIREMENT IN THE CIVIL CODE. Publication is a fundamental requirement for Resolution 105 and
Resolution 113 and it has been sought to be done in BP 643, a statutory law setting January 27, 1984 for the

plebiscite. In the same way that the people are entitled to know what laws have been approved by the
Batasan, through their publication in the Official Gazette, the same requirement should be followed in respect
of resolutions proposing constitutional amendments. Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, a statutory law setting January
27, 1984 for the plebiscite, where the people can vote on the proposed constitutional amendments, it should be
published in the Official Gazette pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code. The Code provides that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided." The important factor in the codal provision is the publication, and the date of
effectivity of the law is of secondary importance. I do not subscribe to the proposition that, when a statute
provides for the date of its effectivity it no longer needs to be published. The provision should be interpreted
such that when a statute provides for the date of its effectivity, it shall not become effective after fifteen days of
publication but it shall be effective after publication, on the date provided in the statute itself.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF EFFECTIVE PUBLICATION OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS. A reading
of the minimum standards set in Gonzalez v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967) will readily show that principles
of good government require that, in a plebiscite for the revision of the Constitution, aside from other standards
set, the ballots should set out in full the proposed constitutional amendments so that there can be no question
that when a citizen had voted "yes" or "no", he thoroughly knew what he had voted for or against. Publication is
for the general public. Individual notice should also be given to the voter and this can be done easily through
the ballot that he will cast. Thus, in the case of non-resident defendants, summons is published in a newspaper
of general circulation but it is also required that summons be served to him individually through registered mail
sent to his last known address. In the ballots to be prepared for the January 27 plebiscite, as mentioned in BP
643, the citizen is not made aware of the exact amendments which have been proposed by the Batasan. Said
law merely makes mention of the amendments in substance. For example, anent Question No. 3, that the
"grant" is limited to 24 hectares is not stated. Question No. 4 is not even indicated. Again, to my mind, there is
failure of effective publication. It is not enough that the citizen is expected, or required, to read the newspapers
and posted copies in public places.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PLEBISCITE TO RATIFY AMENDMENTS TO BE HELD WITHIN 3 MONTHS FOLLOWING
COMPLETION OF LAST PUBLICATION. If BP 643 is published in the Official Gazette, and the ballots for
the plebiscite should contain in full the proposed amendments to the Constitution, the plebiscite can be held on
a stated date within 3 months following the completion of the last publication. The number of days after
completion of the last publication, whether it is ten days, one month, or three months, will be a question which
this Court will have no jurisdiction to resolve. It is very clear in Article XVI of the Constitution that the plebiscite
shall be held in so many number of days after approval of the amendment provided they do not exceed 3
months. The number of days is within the exclusive power of the Batasan to determine.
RELOVA, J., separate opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 1973 CONSTITUTION; GRANT OF
ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND URBAN LAND REFORM; REQUIREMENT OF PROPER
SUBMISSION NOT MET. It is safe to say that the people in the provinces are not, and by Friday (January
27) will not be sufficiently informed of the meaning, nature and effects thereof. Undersigned takes judicial
notice of the fact that they have not been afforded ample time to deliberate thereon conscientiously. As stated
by this Court in Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 41 SCRA 702, 729, "in order that a plebiscite for the
ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient
time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to
the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole." In the case at bar, it is sad to
state that proposed Amendments 3 and 4 have not been fairly laid before the people for their approval or
rejection. In fact, said proposed Amendments have only been translated into Tagalog and Cebuano. There has
been no translation thereof in the many other dialects in which case it cannot be said that our people were
afforded ample opportunity to understand and deliberate over them.
RESOLUTION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate will go to the polls on January 27, 1984 to
either approve or reject amendments to the Constitution proposed by Resolution Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112,
and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa. The proposed amendments are embodied in four (4) separate questions
to be answered by simple YES or NO answers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners herein seek to enjoin the submission on January 27, 1984 of Question Nos. 3 and 4, which cover
Resolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the people for ratification or rejection on the ground that there has been no fair
and proper submission following the doctrine laid down in Tolentino v. COMELEC (41 SCRA 707). The
petitioners do not seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only ask for more time for the people to study

the meaning and implications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature and effect of the proposals are
fairly and properly submitted to the electorate.
The questions to be presented to the electorate at the plebiscite are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
QUESTION NO. 3
Do you vote for the approval of amendments to the Constitution as proposed by the Batasang Pambansa in
Resolution Numbered 105 which, in substance, provide that grant shall be an additional mode for the
acquisition of lands belonging to the public domain and that the agrarian reform program may include the grant
or distribution of alienable lands of the public domain to qualified tenants, farmers and other landless citizens.
QUESTION NO. 4
Do you vote for the approval of an amendment to the Constitution as proposed by the Batasang Pambansa in
its Resolution Numbered 113, adding the following paragraph to Section 12 of Article XIV of the
Constitution:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The State shall moreover undertake an urban land reform and social housing program to provide deserving
landless, homeless or inadequately sheltered low income resident citizens reasonable opportunity to acquire
land and decent housing consistent with Section 2 of Article IV of this Constitution."cralaw virtua1aw library
After a careful consideration of the issues raised in the petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction, the
answer of the Solicitor General, and the arguments of the parties during the hearing on January 24, 1984, the
COURT Resolved to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
Section 2, Article XVI of the Constitution which states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x

SEC. 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment
or revision.
allows a period of not more than three months for the conduct of information campaigns. The sufficiency of the
period during which amendments are submitted to the people before they vote to either affirm or reject
depends on the complexity and intricacy of the questions presented. The petitioners have failed to show that
the addition of the one word "grant" to Section 11, Article XIV to make the provision
read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . nor may any citizen hold such (alienable) lands (of the public domain) by lease in excess of five hundred
hectares or acquire by purchase, homestead, or GRANT in excess of twenty four hectares. . ."cralaw virtua1aw
library
or that the addition of two paragraphs including one on urban land reform to Section 12 of Article XIV to make it
read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 12. The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the
tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution.
"SUCH PROGRAM MAY INCLUDE THE GRANT OR DISTRIBUTION OF ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN TO QUALIFIED TENANTS, FARMERS AND OTHER LANDLESS
CITIZENS IN AREAS WHICH THE PRESIDENT MAY BY OR PURSUANT TO LAW RESERVE FROM TIME
TO TIME, NOT EXCEEDING THE LIMITATIONS FIXED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING SECTION.
"THE STATE SHALL MOREOVER UNDERTAKE AN URBAN LAND REFORM AND SOCIAL HOUSING
PROGRAM TO PROVIDE DESERVING LANDLESS, HOMELESS OR INADEQUATELY SHELTERED LOW
INCOME RESIDENT CITIZENS REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO ACQUIRE LAND AND DECENT
HOUSING CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE IV OF THIS CONSTITUTION."cralaw virtua1aw
library
result in amendments of such nature that when the people go to the polls on January 27, 1984 they cannot
arrive at an intelligent judgment on their acceptability or non-acceptability.
The present provisions of the Constitution are adequate to support any program of the government for the
grant of pub]ic lands to qualified and deserving citizens or for the implementation of urban land reform.

Homesteads and free patents are "grants." We likewise see no constitutional infirmity to a law passed by the
Batasang Pambansa, under the present Constitution, that would grant alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain not more than twenty four (24) hectares to any qualified tenant, farmer, and other landless
citizen in areas reserved by the President, acting pursuant to such law. Nor is it correct to say that after the
agrarian land reform program now being implemented and the agitation for a similar program in urban areas,
the meaning of "urban land reform" is not yet understood. Questions No. 3 and No. 4, if ratified with an
affirmative vote, will serve at most a symbolic purpose. That much the Solicitor General conceded when he
stated that the amendments under Question No. 3 serve to confirm existing practice pursuant to long standing
legislation. Any interpretation of "grant" will, therefore, carry the weight of applicable precedents which
surround the associated words "homestead" and "purchase" in the same clause of the Constitution. Similarly,
any legislation laying down the rules on urban land reform will have to survive the constitutional tests of due
process, equal protection, police power, reasonable compensation, etc., now applied to agrarian land
reform.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
More important, however, is that the necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed amendments are
beyond the power of the courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not "grant" of public land and "urban land
reform" are unwise or improvident or whether or not the proposed amendments are unnecessary is a matter
which only the people can decide. The questions are presented for their determination. Assuming that a
member or some members of this Court may find undesirable any additional mode of disposing of public land
or an urban land reform program, the remedy is to vote "NO" in the plebiscite but not to substitute his or their
aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to the millions of voters an opportunity to express their own
likes or dislikes. The issue before us has nothing to do with the wisdom of the proposed amendments, their
desirability, or the danger of the power being abused. The issue is whether or not the voters are aware of the
wisdom, the desirability, or the dangers of abuse. The petitioners have failed to make out a case that the
average voter does not know the meaning of "grant" of public land or of "urban land reform."cralaw virtua1aw
library
As argued by the Solicitor-General:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Agrarian reform program", for example, has been in the consciousness of the Filipino people, to borrow a
phrase from the petitioners, since 1972 with the passage of P.D. No. 27 (Oct. 21, 1972), emancipating our
tenants and transferring to them ownership of the land they toil, without mentioning the fact that even prior to
this, there were several laws enacted attempting at land reform, notably Rep. Act No. 3844 (1964), ordaining
the agricultural Land Reform Code and instituting land reforms in the country. More importantly and more to the
point, grant or land grant or distribution are subject matters that have been in the consciousness of the
Filipino people since Commonwealth days, with the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, amending and
compiling the previously scattered laws relative to the conservation and disposition of lands of the public
domain.
x

"Similarly, the Filipino people have long been since familiar with the topics of urban land reform and social
housing, beginning perhaps with the countrys first zoning laws and, through all these years, with such laws as
Rep. Act No. 267 (1948), authorizing cities to purchase or expropriate home sites and landed estates and
subdivide them for resale at cost, P.D. No. 814 (1975), providing a land tenure system for the Tondo Foreshore
Dagat-Dagatan Urban Development Project, P.D. No. 933 (1976) creating the Human Settlement Commission
to bring about the optimum use of land, Rep. Act No. 1322 (1955) creating the Philippine Homesite and
Housing Authority, and P.D. No. 1517, proclaiming an urban land reform in the Philippines, to give but a few
samples. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Batas Pambansa Blg. 643 direct the COMELEC to publish the amendments. The respondents assure us that
publication in all provinces and cities, except a few where there are no local newspapers, has been affected
and that Barangays all over the country have been enjoined to hold community gatherings for this purpose.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines and various civic organizations have taken a strong stand for or against
the last two proposed questions. Television and radio programs regularly broadcast the amendments. The
petitioners have failed to explain why, inspite of all the above, there is still fair and proper submission.
On the bid for additional time, the respondents point out that Resolution No. 105 will have been submitted for
sixty seven (67) days to the people on Plebiscite Day while Resolution No. 113 will have been submitted for
forty two (42) days. The entire 1935 Constitution was submitted for ratification thirty six (36) days after approval
of Act No. 4200. The 1976 amendments which admittedly are much more complicated, difficult to understand,
and novel and far-reaching in their implications were presented to the people for only three (3) weeks. In
Sanidad v. Commission on Elections (73 SCRA 333, 375), this was how this Court answered the issue of
sufficient and proper submission:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.
and Martin are of the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the proposed amendments for

ratification by the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar expressed the hope, however, that the
period of time may be extended. Associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the
question is political and therefore beyond the competence and cognizance of this Court. Associate Justice
Fernando adheres to his concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. COMELEC (21
SCRA 774). Associate Justices Teehankee, and Muoz Palma hold that prescinding from the Presidents lack
of authority to exercise the constituent power to propose the amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no
fair and proper submission with sufficient information and time to assure intelligent consent or rejection under
the standards set by this Court in the controlling cases of Gonzales, supra and Tolentino v. COMELEC (41
SCRA 702)."cralaw virtua1aw library
The undersigned ponente would like to add his personal views to this opinion of the Court. On January 27,
1984, the average voter who goes to the polling place and reads Question No. 3 will know whether or not he or
she is in favor of distributing alienable public lands through "grants" in addition to leases, homesteads and
purchases. Upon reading Question No. 4, the voter will know whether or not he or she is in favor of an urban
land reform program. I personally find existing provisions of the Constitution more than sufficient basis for
legislation to achieve the objectives of the proposed amendments. To me, the second question on the VicePresident vis-a-vis the Executive Committee involves more complex and difficult issues involving as it does a
collegiate body as successor to the President. Yet, no one seems to question its fair and proper submission.
However, my personal feelings about the merits or demerits of the third and fourth questions are entirely
distinct and separate from the issue of their fair and proper submission to the electorate. Like any other voter,
my remedy is to vote NO on any proposal I find unwise or ill-advised and YES on those I favor. I respect the
views of those who may think differently.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, voting to dismiss for lack of a cause action; Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De
Castro, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
While recognizing the force and eloquence with which the late Justice Sanchez in Gonzales and retired Justice
Barredo in Tolentino expounded their views on the question of proper submission, still for me and from the
strict legal aspect as to the precise boundary which separates a question of wisdom, which belongs to the
political branches, and the question of power, which the court is duty bound to inquire into the opinion of
Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales, with which I concurred then, in the one that should prevail. There is, for
me, this added reinforcement to the conclusion I have reached. Resolution No. 105 deals with the grant or
distribution of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain to qualified tenants, farmers and other
landless citizens. Resolution No. 113 deals with urban land reform and social housing program. They are, then,
immediately recognizable as logical and necessary extensions of the fundamental principle of social justice
enshrined as far back as the 1935 Constitution and expanded in the present Constitution. Our adoption of such
principle antedated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by thirteen years. To my mind, therefore, no
question need arise under the standard of proper submission.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
PLANA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioners ask that the plebiscite set on January 27, 1984 on Questions 3 and 4 be deferred, leaving that on
Questions 1 and 2 to proceed as scheduled. Grant of the petition will therefore have the effect of having two
plebiscites.
Under the existing Constitution, plenary legislative power is vested in the Batasang Pambansa, including the
power to enact laws authorizing the conveyance or grant of alienable public lands to deserving citizens under
prescribed terms and conditions. Indeed there are extant so many laws providing for such disposition of public
land.
Section 11 of Article XIV of the Constitution clearly recognizes the existence of the power and, on that
assumption, merely restricts the same by providing that no citizen may "acquire by purchase or homestead
(alienable lands of the public domain) in excess of 24 hectares."cralaw virtua1aw library
With respect to social justice measures which include urban land reform and social housing program, the
present Constitution provides
"The State shall promote social justice to insure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people. Towards this
end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property,

and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." (Article II, Section 6.)
"The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from
the bondage of the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution." (Article XIV, Section 12.)
Reflecting on the foregoing Constitutional provisions, it seems evident that what is sought to be adopted under
Questions 3 and 4 of the forthcoming plebiscite based on Resolutions Nos. 105 and 113 of the Batasang
Pambansa, is already authorized under the existing Constitution.
If the foregoing be correct and the proposed Constitutional amendments under Questions 3 and 4 would just
be confirmatory of a legislative power already existing, it stands to reason that a protracted discussion of the
proposed Constitutional amendments under Questions 3 and 4 is neither necessary nor constitutionally
required.
At any rate, I find that there is compliance with Article XVI, Section 2 of the Constitution, under which a
proposed Constitutional amendment shall be submitted to a plebiscite "which shall be held not later than 3
months after the approval of such amendment." The proposed amendments under Questions 3 and 4, as
embodied in Resolutions 105 and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa, were adopted on November 21 and
December 19, 1983, respectively. From November 21, 1983, when Resolution No. 105 was adopted, up to
January 27, 1984, there would be a spread of 67 days. On the other hand, from December 19, 1983, when
Resolution No. 113 was adopted, up to January 27, 1984, there would be a spread of 39 days.
Finally, apart from legal considerations, I do not see any compelling reason why so much of the peoples
money should be spent for holding a separate plebiscite when the purpose, by and large, of the second is
merely to confirm an existing Constitutional power.
I therefore vote to deny the petition.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I vote for the partial granting of the petition and for the elimination of Questions Nos. 3 and 4 at the Plebiscite
set on January 27, 1984.
The Comelec has formulated four plebiscite questions for approval or rejection by the people of the latest
proposed amendments to the Constitution, as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Election of the members of the Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly) by provinces and cities and in the
case of Metropolitan Manila, by districts, instead of by regions;
2. Restoration of the office of Vice-President who shall succeed the President in case of the latters death or
incapacity, instead of the 15-member Executive Committee designated by him;
3. The insertion of the word "grant" in Article XIV, section 11 of the Constitution so as to provide for granting as
an additional mode (besides purchase and homestead as presently provided) for the disposition (although the
word "acquisition" is used in the question) of lands belonging to the public domain; and
4. The insertion of a second paragraph in Article XIV, section 12 of the Constitution so that the same would be
amended to read, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC.12. The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the
tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution.
"Such program may include the grant or distribution of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain to
qualified tenants, farmers and other landless citizens in areas which the President may by or pursuant to law
reserve from time to time, not exceeding the limitations fixed in accordance with the immediately preceding
Section."cralaw virtua1aw library
(The underlined paragraph constitutes the proposed amendment by insertion, under Resolution No. 105 of the
Batasang Pambansa adopted on November 21, 1983, entitled "Resolution Proposing Amendments to Sections
11 and 12 of Article XIV of the Philippine Constitution, as Amended." 1) Under Resolution No. 113 of the
Batasang Pambansa adopted on December 19, 1983, entitled "Resolution Proposing to Add a Last Paragraph
to Section 12 of Article XIV of the Philippine Constitution in order to Provide for Urban Land Reform and Social
Housing Program," the proposed additional second paragraph carries an entirely different wording, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The State shall moreover undertake an urban land reform and social housing program to provide deserving
landless, homeless or inadequately sheltered low income resident citizens reasonable opportunity to acquire
land and decent housing consistent with Section 2 of Article IV of this Constitution."cralaw virtua1aw library

(This additional second paragraph providing for the inclusion of an urban land reform and social housing
program appears to be the one submitted for the peoples approval or rejection in accordance with available
literature and leaflets issued by the Comelec.)
The doctrine of fair and proper submission to the people of proposed constitutional amendments as enunciated
by the Court in Tolentino v. Comelec (41 SCRA 702, 729) mandates that "in order that a plebiscite for the
ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient
time, but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to
the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole." There must be fair
submission and intelligent consent or rejection. 2
As the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez stressed in his separate opinion in the earlier case of Gonzales v.
Comelec, concurred in by the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Justice Calixto Zaldivar, (21 SCRA 774,
817), the people must be "sufficiently informed of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously
deliberate thereon, to express their will in a genuine manner."cralaw virtua1aw library
Questions Nos. 1 and 2 are not placed in issue by petitioners. As already indicated, they ask for the approval
or rejection of the proposed amendments for restoration of the old office of Vice President of the Republic and
the old system of electing the members of the National Assembly by provinces or by cities instead of by
regions. These two proposed constitutional amendments apparently bear the endorsement of the Government
and the party in power, the KBL, as well as by the opposition in general who have long clamored for such
restoration. Hence, there appears to be no question as to their being fully understood by the people in the
same manner that they readily understood and approved the first amendment to the 1935 Constitution of
giving women the right to vote.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Questions Nos. 3 and 4, however, do present a problem. They appear to be simple yet complex. Petitioners
cite the separate joint concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro and Makasiar in the
Tolentino case which stopped the scheduled plebiscite on November 8, 1971 to allow 18-year olds to vote,
wherein the pungent remark was made that while the proposed amendment "would seem to be uncomplicated
and innocuous. But it is one of lifes verities that things which appear to be simple may turn out not to be so
simple after all."cralaw virtua1aw library
To start with, several members of this very Court who have turned down the petition have expressed the view
that the amendments proposed by Questions Nos. 3 and 4 are "unnecessary," while others like Justice Abad
Santos have expressed their inability at this late date to comprehend the nature and significance of the
proposed amendments and their implications and complexities.
The Solicitor General himself at the hearing held on January 24, 1984 stated that in his personal (not official)
perception, Question No. 3 adding the single word "grant" as a mode of additional disposition of public lands
was "unnecessary", because "this has been done already. There are so many lots which had been donated by
the government granted for that building and their constitutionality has never been questioned." And as to
Question No. 4 which would insert a second additional paragraph to the present Article XIV, section 12 of the
Constitution to provide that the State shall undertake an urban land reform and social housing program, the
Solicitor General stated at the same hearing that its utility would be to "eradicate completely" any doubts about
the Governments expropriation program for the purpose.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The Solicitor General in his answer to the petition further submits that the proposed amendments are
"relatively simple and easy to comprehend", as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is to be noted also that Resolutions 105 and 103 3 are relatively simple and easy to comprehend, even as
compared to the other four amendments proposed for ratification at the same time and the submission of
which are not questioned by the petitioners. Resolution No. 105 which proposes to amend Section 11, Art. XIV
merely adds the word grant and adds additional paragraph in Section 12 of the same Article. The additional
paragraph is really nothing new for among the governments policies, it has always been the policy to make
lands of the public domain available to tenants, farmers and other landless citizens (see Sec. 13, Art XIV,
Constitution). And as to Resolution No. 103 which adopts as a State responsibility urban reform and housing
program the policy is also not new and housing is, in point of fact, already among the declared objectives of
government (Section 7, Article XI of the Constitution)." (Emphasis supplied)
Professor and former Dean Froilan M. Bacungan of the U.P. College of Law shares the same view that the
proposed amendments submitted with Questions Nos. 3 and 4 are unnecessary, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The proposed amendment to the agrarian reform program and urban land reform and social housing program
may be considered by constitutional law experts as unnecessary.
"The 1973 Constitution now has, in addition to its specific provision on agrarian reform, a very categorical

provision on social justice where the State is mandated to promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare,
and security of all the people and where it continues to say: Towards this end, the State shall regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property
ownership and profits.
"It should also be noted that the Supreme Court, interpreting constitutional law concepts such as police power
and due process of law, has given very much greater emphasis on the former and very much less emphasis
on the latter, when it comes to the interpretation of laws implementing economic, social and cultural rights.
"But as emphasized by its proponents, these proposed amendments on agrarian and urban land reform are
most useful for they reinforce the constitutional basis and mandate for government activities in these
fields."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Philippines Daily Express editorial of January 25, 1984 presents the following justifications for urging a
"Yes" vote to the questioned amendments, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As for the proposal to empower the government to grant public lands to citizens, we believe that it is a move
to enhance the development and productivity of public lands which have been idle for a long time now. Many of
our countrymen are still landless, and if they are enterprising and industrious enough to convert the great
wilderness into a productive land, they should be given all the chances to do so. The fear of some quarters that
the proposal will only spawn graft and corruption emanates from negative thinking and suspicious minds.
"On the fourth question about urban land reform, it must be noted that the proposal is nothing but a statement
of national policy in the basic charter of the land. There is already an existing law on urban land reform and it
does not authorize the grabbing of urban lands from private owners for distribution to the landless. No
government in its right senses would do that.
The premises of the newspaper would seem to be contradicted by the figures given by Minister of Agrarian
Reform Conrado Estrella in a newspaper of the same date to the effect that only 3.26 million hectares of the
Philippines total land area remain disposable, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Estrella said the country has a total land area of 30 million hectares. Of this, 13.371 million hectares are
disposable, 11.07 million are timberland, and 5.55 million unclassified.
"Of the 13.37 million hectares alienable lands, 2.75 are judicially registered, 7.35 million covered by land
applications, and 3.26 million remain disposable." 4
On the other hand, all the bar associations, including the compulsory Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
voluntary bar associations, have expressed grave doubts as to the questioned amendments. To cite a few
observations, Atty. Raul Roco, IBP President, "said the granting of such properties could be a cause of
corruption among public officials. He compared the proposed amendment to the Spanish era when vast lands
were acquired by government supporters through royal grants." 5
Philippine Bar Association President Enrique P. Syquia "said the Constitution itself embodies the policy of
conserving the patrimony of the nation for all Filipinos, including those yet unborn. But Syquia said the
amendment would allow these lands, including residential, commercial, industrial, educational, charitable, and
resettlement lands, to be given away freely to any Filipino chosen at pleasure." 6
The Philippine Lawyers Association stated that "the proposed amendment, which will allow these lands,
including residential, commercial, industrial, and other classes of land to be given away fully and freely on any
Filipino chosen at pleasure, goes against the very preamble of the Constitution. These land grants may very
well be the source of patronage, graft, and corruption, it said." 7
All these go but to show that there has not been ample time and dissemination of information to comprehend
the significance, implications and complications and consequences of the proposed amendments so as to
comply with the fundamental requirements of a fair and proper submission in order that the people may
intelligently approve or reject the same. It is, therefore, but proper, in accordance with due process in dealing
with such a fundamental instrument as the Constitution which basically is a charter of limitation of the powers
of government, that the precipitate submittal on January 27, 1984 of Questions Nos. 3 and 4 for the peoples
ratification or rejection be enjoined. It is far better to avail of the maximum 90-day period after the approval of
the proposed amendments for their submittal in a plebiscite so that the people may at the proper time make
their decision with the fullest possible comprehension. During this interval, the separate and completely
different second additional paragraphs proposed to be inserted in Article XIV, section 12 of the Constitution in
conflicting Resolutions Nos. 105 and 113 (103) as pointed out on pages 2 and 5 hereof should be clarified.
Otherwise, if the plebiscite is held on the 27th, the people would just have to go by the position taken by the
State at the hearing of January 24th that their remedy is to vote "No" against the proposed amendments which
they do not understand (or are "unnecessary").chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Once again the Filipino people are asked to approve or reject amendments to the 1973 Constitution.
The Batasan Pambansa, convened as a constituent assembly, approved six (6) resolutions,
namely:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Resolution No. 104 proposing to amend Sections Two and Four, Article VIII of the Constitution by providing
that Members of the Batasang Pambansa shall be apportioned among the provinces, cities and Metropolitan
Manila or its districts.
2. Resolution No. 105 proposing amendments to Section 11 and 12 of Article XIV of the Philippine Constitution,
as amended.
3. Resolution No. 110 proposing amendments to the Constitution to establish a different mode of presidential
succession by creating the Office of Vice-President and abolishing the Executive Committee.
4. Resolution No. 111 proposing to amend Section 1 of Article IX of the Constitution by providing that at least a
majority of the Members of the Cabinet who are heads of ministries shall come from the provincial, city or
district representatives of the Batasang Pambansa.
5. Resolution No. 112 providing for an Ordinance to be appended to the Constitution apportioning the Members
of the Batasang Pambansa to the different provinces with their component cities, highly urbanized cities, and
the districts of Metropolitan Manila.
6. Resolution No. 113 proposing to add a last paragraph to Section 12 of Article XIV of the Philippine
Constitution in order to provide for urban land reform and social housing program.
In the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 27, 1984
Question No. 1 deals with Resolutions Numbered 104, 111 and 112;
Question No. 2 deals with Resolution Numbered 110;
Question No. 3 deals with Resolution Numbered 105; and
Question No. 4 deals with Resolution Numbered 113.
The petition in this case is confined to questions numbered 3 and 4. The petition recites:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"5. Petitioners respectfully submit that of the six (6) proposed amendments, Proposal No. 5 (Resolution Nos.
105 adopted by the Batasang Pambansa on November 2, 1983), which would empower the President of the
Philippines to grant alienable lands of the public domain to individuals and landless citizens, and Proposal No.
6 (Resolution No. 113, adopted by the Batasang Pambansa on December 19, 1983), which provides for urban
land reform and social housing program, have not yet been properly and fairly submitted to the understanding
of the Filipino people.
"6. These two mentioned proposals bear far-reaching implications, and are bound to affect existing
Constitutional and statutory provisions as well as Supreme Court holdings on acquisition and/or disposition of
public lands and on property rights particularly in urban areas, that said proposals ought first to be thoroughly
explained to the people before they are made to vote for their approval or disapproval. Such is the import of the
doctrine of fair and proper submission (Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 707 [1971]).
"7. Petitioners are not aware of any campaign by the COMELEC, nor by any other governmental agency,
endeavoring to register in the consciousness of the Filipino people the rationale behind Resolution Nos. 105
and 113 and their implications.
"8. It appears to the petitioners, therefore, who stand to be adversely or favorably affected both as citizens
and as taxpayers, together with the rest of the Filipino electorates to be a deception if the Filipino people are
hurried to approve or disapprove the abovestated proposed amendments to the constitution . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The petitioners pray that this Court stop the "respondents from holding the plebiscite on 27 January 1984 until
the matters complained of in the body of this petition are properly and fairly submitted for the understanding of
the electorate."cralaw virtua1aw library

I vote to grant partial relief to the petitioners.

There is manifest basis for the claim of the petitioners that the citizenry has not been adequately educated on
the proposed amendments on grant of public lands and urban land reform. At this late date January 24,
1984 I am asked questions about the two proposals and although I try to do the best I can, I am not too sure
about my answers.
The petitioners cite the case of Tolentino v. COMELEC. In that case the following question was posed for
resolution:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat, the holding of a
plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise of
suffrage under Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution proposed in the Conventions Organic Resolution No. 1
in the manner and form provided for in said resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and resolution of
the Convention?" (At p. 721.)
This Court answered the question in the negative.
To be sure, the instant case does not fall squarely under the Tolentino decision but as the petitioners assert,
that case can serve as a guide in the resolution of this case. In the eloquent and ringing words of Mr. Justice
Antonio P. Barredo:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the
Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an
intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole." (At p. 729.)
The petitioners do not raise any question with respect to Questions 1 and 2 and indeed I can vouch that those
questions have been thoroughly discussed in public and private fora for which reason there is no cause to
delay their submission to the people. Preparations for the plebiscite on January 27, 1984, have reached the
point of no return. Questions 1 and 2 can and should be submitted to the people on plebiscite day but
Questions 3 and 4 should be submitted at some other appropriate date.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In this case, petitioners have asked that this Court promulgate a judgment "stopping . . . the plebiscite on 27
January 1984" until the constitutional amendments proposed in Batasan Resolutions Nos. 105 (Resn. 105) and
113 (Resn. 113) "are properly and fairly submitted for the understanding of the electorate." I vote for the grant
of that plea.
Article XVI of the Constitution provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the Batasang
Pambansa upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention.
(2) The Batasang Pambansa may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or,
by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an
election.
SEC. 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment
or revision."cralaw virtua1aw library
What may be noted in Article XVI is that, besides the provision for the number of votes necessary for the
Batasans proposal to amend or revise the Constitution, or to call a convention or propose to the people the
calling of a convention, the procedure for the revision or amendment of the Constitution has not been
established. Hence, the procedure shall be as the Batasan shall adopt in the exercise of sound judgment, in
the understanding that when it does so, it acts only as a constituent assembly and not as a legislative body. If
the Batasan, as a constituent assembly, should provide for the revision or amendment of the Constitution in a
manner not consonant with fundamentals of democracy and of good government, and its action is challenged,
this Court can assume jurisdiction to resolve the controversy.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
What is involved herein are Resn. No. 105 adopted on November 21, 1983, Resn. No. 113 adopted on
December 19, 1983, and BP Bilang 643, enacted on December 22, 1983.
Resn. 105 has proposed that Sections 11 and 12, Article XIV, of the Constitution be amended to read as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation, ecological, and developmental
requirements of the natural resources, shall determine by law the size of lands of the public domain which may
be developed, held or acquired by, or leased to, any qualified individual, corporation, or association, and the
conditions therefor. No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess
of five hundred hectares or acquire by purchase, homestead or grant, in excess of twenty-four hectares. No
private corporation or association may hold by lease, concession; license, or permit, timber or forest lands and
other timber of forest resources in excess of one hundred thousand hectares; however, such area may be
increased by the Batasang Pambansa upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development
Authority."cralaw virtua1aw library
"SEC. 12. The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the
tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution.
"Such program may include the grant or distribution of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain to
qualified tenants, farmers and other landless citizens in areas which the President may by or pursuant to law
reserve from time to time, not exceeding the limitations fixed in accordance with the immediately preceding
Section."cralaw virtua1aw library
Resn. 113 has proposed that the following paragraph be added to Section 12, Article XIV, of the
Constitution:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The State shall moreover undertake an urban land reform and social housing program to provide deserving
landless, homeless or inadequately sheltered low income resident citizens reasonable opportunity to acquire
land and decent housing consistent with Section 2 of Article IV of this Constitution."cralaw virtua1aw library
BP 643, a statute, provides for the holding of the plebiscite on January 27, 1984 for submission to the vote of
the citizenry the adoption or rejection of the amendments proposed in Resn. 105 and Resn. 113.
That Resn. 105 and Resn. 113 have been approved by three-fourth (3/4) vote of all Batasan members is not in
question. Publication, in my opinion, is a fundamental requirement for those two resolutions, and it has been
sought to be done in BP 643. In the same way that the people are entitled to know what laws have been
approved by the Batasan, through their publication in the Official Gazette, the same requirement should be
followed in respect of resolutions proposing constitutional amendments.
Coming now to BP 643, a statutory law setting January 27, 1984 for the plebiscite, where the people can vote
on the proposed constitutional amendments, it should be published in the Official Gazette pursuant to the
provisions of the Civil Code. The Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided." The important factor in
the codal provision is the publication, and the date of effectivity of the law is of secondary importance. I do not
subscribe to the proposition that, when a statute provides for the date of its effectivity it no longer needs to be
published. The provision should be interpreted such that when a statute provides for the date of its effectivity, it
shall not become effective after fifteen days of publication but it shall be effective after publication, on the date
provided in the statute itself. As stated in People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, 642, "the general principle and
theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation, circular
must first be published and the people officially and especially informed of said contents and its penalties."
There is no "penalty" for an individual in BP 643 but the entire statute, if not publicized, can penalize the great
majority of the people.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
A reading of the minimum standards set in Gonzalez v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967) will readily show that
principles of good government require that, in a plebiscite for the revision of the Constitution, aside from other
standards set, the ballots should set out in full the proposed constitutional amendments so that there can be no
question that when a citizen had voted "yes" or "no", he thoroughly knew what he had voted for or against.
Publication is for the general public. Individual notice should also be given to the voter and this can be done
easily through the ballot that he will cast. Thus, in the case of non-resident defendants, summons is published
in a newspaper of general circulation but it is also required that summons be served to him individually through
registered mail sent to his last known address. In the ballots to be prepared for the January 27 plebiscite, as
mentioned in BP 643, the citizen is not made aware of the exact amendments which have been proposed by
the Batasan. Said law merely makes mention of the amendments in substance. For example, anent Question
No. 3, that the "grant" is limited to 24 hectares is not stated. Question No. 4 is not even indicated. Again, to my
mind, there is failure of effective publication. It is not enough that the citizen is expected, or required, to read
the newspapers and posted copies in public places.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
If BP 643 is published in the Official Gazette, and the ballots for the plebiscite should contain in full the
proposed amendments to the Constitution, the plebiscite can be held on a stated date within 3 months
following the completion of the last publication. The number of days after completion of the last publication,
whether it is ten days, one month, or three months, will be a question which this Court will have no jurisdiction

to resolve. It is very clear in Article XVI of the Constitution that the plebiscite shall be held in so many number
of days after approval of the amendment provided they do not exceed 3 months. The number of days is within
the exclusive power of the Batasan to determine.
RELOVA, J.:
Petition for prohibition to restrain respondents Commission on Elections and Minister of the Budget from
holding the plebiscite on 27 January 1984. It is argued that the proposed amendments: Resolution No. 105
which would empower the President of the Philippines to grant alienable lands of the public domain to
individuals and landless citizens, and Resolution No. 113 which provides for urban land reform and social
housing program, have not been properly and fairly submitted to the understanding of the Filipino people.
Paragraph 6 of the petition states that
"These two mentioned proposals bear far-reaching implications, and are bound to affect existing Constitutional
and statutory provisions as well as Supreme Court holdings on acquisition and/or disposition of public lands
and on property rights particularly in urban areas, that said proposals ought first to be thoroughly explained to
the people before they are made to vote for their approval or disapproval."cralaw virtua1aw library
Respondents deny the truth of the allegations of the petition with respect to the issue of proper submission to
the electorate and claims "that Resolution No. 105 was approved on November 21, 1983 and Resolution No.
113 was approved on December 19, 1983 or 67 and 42 days, respectively, before the plebiscite scheduled on
January 27, 1984. Assuredly, these periods afford adequate and sufficient time for debate. In fact, the
amendments are now being discussed all over the country, in barangay meetings, in civic organization
discussions, as well as in radio and television. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines has been airing its views
on the amendments." (pp. 23-24, Rollo)
On the questioned proposed amendments, it is safe to say that the people in the provinces are not, and by
Friday (January 27) will not be sufficiently informed of the meaning, nature and effects thereof. Undersigned
takes judicial notice of the fact that they have not been afforded ample time to deliberate thereon
conscientiously. As stated by this Court in Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 41 SCRA 702, 729, "in order
that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the
voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se
as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole." In the
case at bar, it is sad to state that proposed Amendments 3 & 4 have not been fairly laid before the people for
their approval or rejection. In fact, said proposed Amendments have only been translated into Tagalog and
Cebuano. There has been no translation thereof in the many other dialects in which case it cannot be said that
our people were afforded ample opportunity to understand and deliberate over them. Mr. Justice Conrado V.
Sanchez, in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 21 SCRA 774, expressed his view on the minimum
requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people of a proposed
constitutional amendment. He said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be
mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the
original provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the
dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidiuous influences. We
believe the word submitted can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain
every effort to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the
meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100
citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached then there is no submission within the meaning of the word as
intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in
submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural
framework to enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we
have earlier stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission,
intelligent consent or rejection. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Undersigned is of the view that in the instant case the people have not been properly informed of proposed
Amendments 3 & 4 to the Constitution and, accordingly, its submission to them should be postponed.
Respondents are hereby enjoined from submitting them to the people on Friday, January 27, 1984. However,
the plebiscite should proceed with respect to proposed Amendments 1 & 2.chanrobles law library : re

127 SCRA 69 Political Law Amendment to the Constitution Political Question

In January 1984, a plebiscite was to be held to allow the voters to either approve or reject amendments to the
Constitution proposed by the Batasang Pambansa. The proposed amendments are embodied in four (4)
separate questions to be answered by simple YES or NO answers.
Alex Almario and some other concerned groups seek to enjoin the submission in the said plebiscite of
Questions No. 3 (grant as an additional mode of acquiring lands belonging to the public domain) and 4 (the
undertaking by the government of a land reform program and a social reform program) to the people for
ratification or rejection on the ground that there has been no fair and proper submission following the
doctrine laid down in Tolentino v. COMELEC.
However, unlike in the case of Tolentino vs COMELEC, Almario et al do not seek to prohibit the holding of the
plebiscite but only ask for more time for the people to study the meaning and implications of the said
questions/proposals until the nature and effect of the proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the
electorate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people on a later date.
HELD: No. This is a political question. The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed amendments
are beyond the power of the courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not grant of public land and urban
land reform are unwise or improvident or whether or not the proposed amendments are unnecessary is a
matter which only the people can decide. The questions are presented for their determination.
Assuming that a member or some members of the Supreme Court may find undesirable any additional mode
of disposing of public land or an urban land reform program, the remedy is to vote NO in the plebiscite but not
to substitute his or their aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to the millions of voters an
opportunity to express their own likes or dislikes.
Further, Almario et al have failed to make out a case that the average voter does not know the meaning of
grant of public land or of urban land reform.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1123

March 5, 1947

ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL., respondents.
Alejo Mabanag, Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto Serrano, J. Antonio Araneta, Antonio Barredo, and
Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Secretary of Justice Ozaeta, Solicitor General Taada, and First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes for
respondents.
TUASON, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution designated
"Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as
an ordinance thereto." The members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the
Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants, and the petitioners are eight
senators, seventeen representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the
Philippine Youth Party. The validity of the above-mentioned resolution is attacked as contrary to the
Constitution.
The case was heard on the pleadings and stipulation of facts. In our view of the case it is unnecessary to go
into the facts at length. We will mention only the facts essential for the proper understanding of the issues. For
this purpose it suffices to say that three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had
been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and
representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate
shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged
irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the
lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not
been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of
Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the present petition
was filed.
As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the
questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary threefourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress
had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
At the threshold we are met with the question of the jurisdiction of this Court. The respondents deny that this
Court has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution. There is
some merit in the petitioners' contention that this is confusing jurisdiction, which is a matter of substantive law,
with conclusiveness of an enactment or resolution, which is a matter of evidence and practice. This objection,
however, is purely academic. Whatever distinction there is in the juridical sense between the two concepts, in
practice and in their operation they boil down to the same thing. Basically the two notions are synonymous in
that both are founded on the regard which the judiciary accords a co-equal coordinate, and independent
departments of the Government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the
political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born
of that respect.
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon
the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. (16 C.J.S., 431.) This doctrine is predicated on the
principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of
authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term

is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the
scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of
the government.
But there is one case approaching this in its circumstances: Coleman vs. Miller, a relatively recent decision of
the United States Supreme Court reported and annotated in 122 A.L.R., 695. The case, by a majority decision
delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, is authority for the conclusion that the efficacy of ratification by state
legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question and hence not
justiciable. The Court further held that the decision by Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State, of the
questions of whether an amendment has been adopted within a reasonable time from the date of submission
to the state legislature, is not subject to review by the court.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political
question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be
noted that the amendatory process as provided in section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution
"consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character
to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political
function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the
Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If
on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is
less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into that of a ratification. As the Mississippi
Supreme Court has once said:
There is nothing in the nature of the submission which should cause the free exercise of it to be
obstructed, or that could render it dangerous to the stability of the government; because the measure
derives all its vital force from the action of the people at the ballot box, and there can never be danger
in submitting in an established form, to a free people, the proposition whether they will change their
fundamental law. The means provided for the exercise of their sovereign right of changing their
constitution should receive such a construction as not to trammel the exercise of the right. Difficulties
and embarrassments in its exercise are in derogation of the right of free government, which is inherent
in the people; and the best security against tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed privilege
to the people of the State to change their constitution in the mode prescribed by the instrument.
(Green vs. Weller, 32 Miss., 650; note, 10 L.R.A., N.S., 150.)
Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion joined in by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Douglas, in
Miller vs.Coleman, supra, finds no basis for discriminating between proposal and ratification. From his forceful
opinion we quote the following paragraphs:
The Constitution grant Congress exclusive power to control submission of constitutional amendments.
Final determination by Congress that ratification by three-fourths of the States has taken place "is
conclusive upon the courts." In the exercise of that power, Congress, of course, is governed by the
Constitution. However, whether submission, intervening procedure or Congressional determination of
ratification conforms to the commands of the Constitution, call for decisions by a "political department"
of questions of a type which this Court has frequently designated "political." And decision of a "political
question" by the "political department" to which the Constitution has committed it "conclusively binds
the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of . . . government." Proclamation under
authority of Congress that an amendment has been ratified will carry with it a solemn assurance by the
Congress that ratification has taken place as the Constitution commands. Upon this assurance a
proclaimed amendment must be accepted as a part of the Constitution, leaving to the judiciary its
traditional authority of interpretation. To the extent that the Court's opinion in the present case even
impliedly assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of the exclusive constitutional authority of
Congress over submission and ratification of amendments, we are unable to agree.
The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper procedure is being
followed between submission and final adoption. However, it is apparent that judicial review of or
pronouncements upon a supposed limitation of a "reasonable time" within which Congress may accept
ratification; as to whether duly authorized State officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or voting
for ratification; or whether a State may reverse its action once taken upon a proposed amendment; and
kindred questions, are all consistent only with an intimate control over the amending process in the
courts. And this must inevitably embarrass the course of amendment by subjecting to judicial
interference matters that we believe were intrusted by the Constitution solely to the political branch of
government.
The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some respects as subject to judicial
construction, in others as subject to the final authority of the Congress. There is no disapproval of the
conclusion arrived at in Dillon vs. Gloss, that the Constitution impliedly requires that a properly
submitted amendment must die unless ratified within a "reasonable time." Nor does the Court now

disapprove its prior assumption of power to make such a pronouncement. And it is not made clear that
only Congress has constitutional power to determine if there is any such implication in Article 5 of the
Constitution. On the other hand, the Court's opinion declares that Congress has the exclusive power to
decide the "political questions" of whether as State whose legislature has once acted upon a proposed
amendment may subsequently reverse its position, and whether, in the circumstances of such a case
as this, an amendment is dead because an "unreasonable" time has elapsed. No such division
between the political and judicial branches of the government is made by Article 5 which grants power
over the amending of the Constitution to Congress alone. Undivided control of that process has been
given by the Article exclusively and completely to Congress. The process itself is "political" in its
entirely, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to
judicial guidance, control or interference at any point.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in another concurring opinion to which the other three justices subscribed, arrives at
the same conclusion. Though his thesis was the petitioner's lack of standing in court a point which not
having been raised by the parties herein we will not decide his reasoning inevitably extends to a
consideration of the nature of the legislative proceeding the legality of which the petitioners in that case
assailed. From a different angle he sees the matter as political, saying:
The right of the Kansas senators to be here is rested on recognition by Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S.,
130; 66 Law. ed., 505; 42 S. Ct., 217, of a voter's right to protect his franchise. The historic source of
this doctrine and the reasons for it were explained in Nixon vs. Herndon, 273 U.S., 436, 540; 71 Law.
ed., 759, 761; 47 S. Ct., 446. That was an action for $5,000 damages against the Judges of Elections
for refusing to permit the plaintiff to vote at a primary election in Texas. In disposing of the objection that
the plaintiff had no cause of action because the subject matter of the suit was political, Mr. Justice
Homes thus spoke for the Court: "Of course the petition concerns political action, but it alleges and
seeks to recover for private damage. That private damage may be caused by such political action and
may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been doubted for over two hundred years, since
Ashby vs. White, 2 Ld. Raym., 938; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521; 3 Ld. Raym., 320; 92
Eng. Reprint, 710, and has been recognized by this Court." "Private damage" is the clue to the famous
ruling in Ashby vs. White, supra, and determines its scope as well as that of cases in this Court of which
it is the justification. The judgment of Lord Holt is permeated with the conception that a voter's franchise
is a personal right, assessable in money damages, of which the exact amount "is peculiarly appropriate
for the determination of a jury," see Wiley vs. Sinkler, 179 U.S., 58, 65; 45 Law. ed., 84, 88; 21 S. Ct.,
17, and for which there is no remedy outside the law courts. "Although this matter relates to the
parliament," said Lord Holt, "yet it is an injury precedaneous to the parliament, as my Lord Hale said in
the case of Bernardiston vs. Some, 2 Lev., 114, 116; 83 Eng. Reprint, 175. The parliament cannot judge
of this injury, nor give damage to the plaintiff for it: they cannot make him a recompense." (2 Ld. Raym.,
938, 958; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521.)
The reasoning of Ashby vs. White and the practice which has followed it leave intra-parliamentary
controversies to parliaments and outside the scrutiny of law courts. The procedures for voting in
legislative assemblies who are members, how and when they should vote, what is the requisite
number of votes for different phases of legislative activity, what votes were cast and how they were
counted surely are matters that not merely concern political action but are of the very essence of
political action, if "political" has any connotation at all. Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark, 143 U.S., 649,
670, et seq.; 36 Law. ed., 294, 302; 12 S. Ct., 495; Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130, 137; 66 Law. ed.,
505, 511; 42 S. Ct., 217. In no sense are they matters of "private damage." They pertain to legislators
not as individuals but as political representatives executing the legislative process. To open the law
courts to such controversies is to have courts sit in judgment on the manifold disputes engendered by
procedures for voting in legislative assemblies. If the doctrine of Ashby vs. White vindicating the private
rights of a voting citizen has not been doubted for over two hundred years, it is equally significant that
for over two hundred years Ashby vs. White has not been sought to be put to purposes like the present.
In seeking redress here these Kansas senators have wholly misconceived the functions of this Court.
The writ of certiorari to the Kansas Supreme Court should therefore be dismissed.
We share the foregoing views. In our judgment they accord with sound principles of political jurisprudence and
represent liberal and advanced thought on the working of constitutional and popular government as conceived
in the fundamental law. Taken as persuasive authorities, they offer enlightening understanding of the spirit of
the United States institutions after which ours are patterned.
But these concurring opinions have more than persuasive value. As will be presently shown, they are the
opinions which should operate to adjudicate the questions raised by the pleadings. To make the point clear, it is
necessary, at the risk of unduly lengthening this decision, to make a statement and an analysis of the
Coleman vs. Miller case. Fortunately, the annotation on that case in the American Law Reports, supra, comes
to out aid and lightens our labor in this phase of the controversy.

Coleman vs. Miller was an original proceeding in mandamus brought in the Supreme Court of Kansas by
twenty-one members of the Senate, including twenty senators who had voted against a resolution ratifying the
Child Labor Amendment, and by three members of the House of Representatives, to compel the Secretary of
the Senate to erase in indorsement on the resolution to the effect that it had been adopted by the Senate and
to indorse thereon the words "as not passed." They sought to restrain the offices of the Senate and House of
Representatives from signing the resolution, and the Secretary of State of Kansas from authenticating it and
delivering it to the Governor.
The background of the petition appears to have been that the Child Labor Amendment was proposed by
Congress in June, 1924; that in January, 1925, the legislature of Kansad adopted a resolution rejecting it and a
copy of the resolution was sent to the Secretary of State of the United States; that in January, 1927, a new
resolution was introduced in the Senate of Kansas ratifying the proposed amendment; that there were forty
senators, twenty of whom voted for and twenty against the resolution; and that as a result of the tie, the
Lieutenant Governor cast his vote in favor of the resolution.
The power of the Lieutenant Governor to vote was challenged, and the petition set forth prior rejection of the
proposed amendment and alleged that in the period from June 1924 to March 1927, the proposed amendment
had been rejected by both houses of the legislatures of twenty-six states and had been ratified only in five
states, and that by reason of that rejection and the failure of ratification within a reasonable time, the proposed
amendment had lost its vitality.
The Supreme Court of Kansas entertained jurisdiction of all the issues but dismissed the petition on the merits.
When the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States the questions were framed substantially in the
following manner:
First, whether the court had jurisdiction; that is, whether the petitioners had standing to seek to have the
judgment of the state court reversed; second, whether the Lieutenant Governor had the right to vote in case of
a tie, as he did, it being the contention of the petitioners that "in the light of the powers and duties of the
Lieutenant Governor and his relation to the Senate under the state Constitution, as construed by the Supreme
Court of the state, the Lieutenant Governor was not a part of the 'legislature' so that under Article 5 of the
Federal Constitution, he could be permitted to have a deciding vote on the ratification of the proposed
amendment, when the Senate was equally divided"; and third, the effect of the previous rejection of the
amendment and of the lapse of time after its submission.
The first question was decided in the affirmative. The second question, regarding the authority of the
Lieutenant Governor to vote, the court avoided, stating: "Whether this contention presents a justiciable
controversy, or a question which is political in its nature and hence not justiciable, is a question upon which the
Court is equally divided and therefore the court expresses no opinion upon that point." On the third question,
the Court reached the conclusion before referred to, namely, (1) that the efficacy of ratification by state
legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question, within the ultimate
power of Congress in the exercise of its control and of the promulgation of the adoption of amendment, and (2)
that the decision by Congress, in its control of the action of the Secretary of State, of the questions whether an
amendment to the Federal Constitution has been adopted within a reasonable time, is not subject to review by
the court.
The net result was that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas was affirmed but in the grounds stated in
the United States Supreme Court's decision. The nine justices were aligned in three groups. Justices Roberts,
Black, Frankfurter and Douglas opined that the petitioners had no personality to bring the petition and that all
the questions raised are political and non-justiciable Justices Butler and McReynolds opined that all the
questions were justiciable; that the Court had jurisdiction of all such questions, and that the petition should
have been granted and the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed on the ground that the proposal
to amend had died of old age. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed regarded some of the
issues as political and non-justiciable, passed by the question of the authority of the Lieutenant Governor to
case a deciding vote, on the ground that the Court was equally divided, and took jurisdiction of the rest of the
questions.
The sole common ground between Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice McReynolds, on the one hand and the
Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed, on the other, was on the question of jurisdiction; on the
result to be reached, these two groups were divided. The agreement between Justices Roberts, Black,
Frankfurter and Douglas, on the one hand, and the Chief Justice and Justices Stone and Reed, on the other,
was on the result and on that part of the decision which declares certain questions political and non-justiciable.
As the annotator in American Law Reports observes, therefore going four opinions "show interestingly
divergent but confusing positions of the Justices on the issues discussed. "It cites an article in 48 Yale Law
Journal, 1455, amusingly entitled "Sawing a Justice in Half," which, in the light of the divergencies in the
opinions rendered, aptly queries" whether the proper procedure for the Supreme Court would not have been to
reverse the judgment below and direct dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction." It says that these

divergencies and line-ups of the justices "leave power to dictate the result and the grounds upon which the
decision should be rested with the four justices who concurred in Mr. Justice Black's opinion." Referring to the
failure of the Court to decide the question of the right of the Lieutenant Governor to vote, the article points out
that from the opinions rendered the "equally divided" court would seem under any circumstances to bean equal
division of an odd number of justices, and asks "What really did happen? Did a justice refuse to vote on this
issue? And if he did, was it because he could not make up his mind, or is it possible to saw a justice vertically
in half during the conference and have him walk away whole?" But speaking in a more serious vein, the
commentator says that decision of the issue could not be avoided on grounds of irrelevance, since if the court
had jurisdiction of the case, decision of the issue in favor of the petitioners would have required reversal of the
judgment below regardless of the disposal of the other issues.
From this analysis the conclusion is that the concurring opinions should be considered as laying down the rule
of the case.
The respondent's other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports
absolute verity and is binding on the courts. This is the rule prevailing in England. In the United States, "In point
of numbers, the jurisdictions are divided almost equally pro and con the general principle (of these, two or
three have changed from their original position), two or three adopted a special variety of view (as in Illinois),
three or four are not clear, and one or two have not yet made their decisions." (IV Wigmore on Evidence, 3d
Edition, 685, footnote.) It is important to bear in mind, in this connection, that the United States Supreme Court
is on the side of those which favor the rule. (Harwood vs. Wentworth, 40 Law. ed., 1069; Lyon vs. Wood, 38
Law. ed., 854; Fieldvs. Clark, 36 Law. ed., 294.)
If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our law making body, we choose to follow
the rule. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official
documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any
legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those
bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or
secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of
said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."
But there is more than statutory sanction for conclusiveness.
This topic has been the subject of a great number of decisions and commentaries written with evident
vehemence. Arguments for and against the rule have been extensive and exhaustive. It would be
presumptuous on our part to pretend to add more, even if we could, to what has already been said. Which
such vast mass of cases to guide our judgment and discretion, our labor is reduced to an intelligent selection
and borrowing of materials and arguments under the criterion of adaptability to a sound public policy.
The reasons adduced in support of enrollment as contrasted with those which opposed it are, in our opinion,
almost decisive. Some of these reasons are summarized in 50 American Jurisprudence, section 150 as
follows:
SEC. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness. It has been declared that the rule against going behind the
enrolled bill is required by the respect due to a coequal and independent department of the
government, and it would be an inquisition into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very
delicate power, the frequent exercise of which must lead to endless confusion in the administration of
the law. The rule is also one of convenience, because courts could not rely on the published session
laws, but would be required to look beyond these to the journals of the legislature and often to any
printed bills and amendments which might be found after the adjournment of the legislature. Otherwise,
after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills, authenticated as exacted by the
Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained from the journals that an act theretofore enforced had
never become a law. In this respect, it has been declared that these is quite enough uncertainty as to
what the law is without saying that no one may be certain that an act of the legislature has become
such until the issue has been determined by some court whose decision might not be regarded as
conclusive in an action between the parties.
From other decisions, selected and quoted in IV Wigmore on Evidence, 696, 697, we extract these passages:
I think the rule thus adopted accords with public policy. Indeed, in my estimation, few things would be
more mischievous than the introduction of the opposite rule. . . . The rule contended for is that the Court
should look at the journals of the Legislature to ascertain whether the copy of the act attested and filed
with the Secretary of State conforms in its contents with the statements of such journals. This
proposition means, if it has any legal value whatever, that, in the event of a material discrepancy
between the journal and the enrolled copy, the former is to be taken as the standard of veracity and the
act is to be rejected. This is the test which is to be applied not only to the statutes now before the Court,

but to all statutes; not only to laws which have been recently passed, but to laws the most ancient. To
my mind, nothing can be more certain than that the acceptance of this doctrine by the Court would
unsettle the entire statute law of the State. We have before us some evidence of the little reliability of
these legislative journals. . . . Can any one deny that if the laws of the State are to be tested by a
comparison with these journals, so imperfect, so unauthenticated, the stability of all written law will be
shaken to its very foundations? . . . We are to remember the danger, under the prevalence of such a
doctrine, to be apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of this character. It is scarcely
too much to say that the legal existence of almost every legislative act would be at the mercy of all
persons having access to these journals. . . . ([1866], Beasley, C.J., in Pangborn vs. Young, 32 N.J.L.,
29, 34.)
But it is argued that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the Courts, then less than a quorum of
each House may be the aid of corrupt presiding officers imposed laws upon the State in defiance of the
inhibition of the Constitution. It must be admitted that the consequence stated would be possible. Public
authority and political power must of necessity be confided to officers, who being human may violate
the trusts reposed in them. This perhaps cannot be avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human
agencies. It is not fit that the Judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all others; nor has it been
able at all times with truth to say that its high places have not been disgraced. The framers of our
government have not constituted it with faculties to supervise coordinate departments and correct or
prevent abuses of their authority. It cannot authenticate a statute; that power does not belong to it; nor
can it keep a legislative journal. (1869, Frazer, J., in Evans vs. Brownem 30 Ind., 514, 524.)
Professor Wigmore in his work on Evidence considered a classic, and described by one who himself is a
noted jurist, author, and scholar, as "a permanent contribution to American law" and having "put the matured
nineteenth-century law in form to be used in a new era of growth" unequivocally identifies himself with those
who believe in the soundness of the rule. The distinguished professor, in answer to the argument of
Constitutional necessity, i.e., the impossibility of securing in any other way the enforcement of constitutional
restrictions on legislative action, says:
(1) In the first place, note that it is impossible of consistent application. If, as it is urged, the Judiciary
are bound to enforce the constitutional requirements of three readings, a two-thirds vote, and the like,
and if therefore an act must be declared no law which in fact was not read three times or voted upon by
two-thirds, this duty is a duty to determine according to the actual facts of the readings and the votes.
Now the journals may not represent the actual facts. That duty cannot allow us to stop with the journals,
if it can be shown beyond doubt that the facts were otherwise than therein represented. The duty to
uphold a law which in fact was constitutionally voted upon is quite as strong as the duty to repudiate an
act unconstitutionally voted upon. The Court will be going as far wrong in repudiating an act based on
proper votes falsified in the journal as it will be in upholding an act based on improper votes falsified in
the enrollment. This supposed duty, in short, is to see that the constitutional facts did exist; and it
cannot stop short with the journals. Yet, singularly enough, it is unanimously conceded that an
examination into facts as provable by the testimony of members present is not allowable. If to support
that it be said that such an inquiry would be too uncertain and impracticable, then it is answered that
this concedes the supposed constitutional duty not to be inexorable, after all; for if the duty to get at the
facts is a real and inevitable one, it must be a duty to get at them at any cost; and if it is merely a duty
that is limited by policy and practical convenience, then the argument changes into the second one
above, namely, how far it is feasible to push the inquiry with regard to policy and practical convenience;
and from this point of view there can be but one answer.
(2) In the second place, the fact that the scruple of constitutional duty is treated thus inconsistently and
pushed only up to a certain point suggests that it perhaps is based on some fallacious assumption
whose defect is exposed only by carrying it to its logical consequences. Such indeed seems to be the
case. It rests on the fallacious motion that every constitutional provision is "per se" capable of being
enforced through the Judiciary and must be safeguarded by the Judiciary because it can be in no other
way. Yet there is certainly a large field of constitutional provision which does not come before the
Judiciary for enforcement, and may remain unenforced without any possibility or judicial remedy. It is
not necessary to invoke in illustration such provisions as a clause requiring the Governor to appoint a
certain officer, or the Legislature to pass a law for a certain purpose; here the Constitution may remain
unexecuted by the failure of Governor or Legislature to act, and yet the Judiciary cannot safeguard and
enforce the constitutional duty. A clearer illustration may be had by imagining the Constitution to require
the Executive to appoint an officer or to call out the militia whenever to the best of his belief a certain
state of facts exists; suppose he appoints or calls out when in truth he has no such belief; can the
Judiciary attempt to enforce the Constitution by inquiring into his belief? Or suppose the Constitution to
enjoin on the Legislators to pass a law upon a certain subject whenever in their belief certain conditions
exist; can the Judiciary declare the law void by inquiring and ascertaining that the Legislature, or its
majority, did not have such a belief? Or suppose the Constitution commands the Judiciary to decide a
case only after consulting a soothsayer, and in a given case the Judiciary do not consult one; what is to
be done?

These instances illustrate a general situation in which the judicial function of applying and enforcing the
Constitution ceases to operate. That situation exists where the Constitution enjoins duties which affect
the motives and judgment of a particular independent department of government, Legislature,
Executive, and Judiciary. Such duties are simply beyond enforcement by any other department if the
one charged fails to perform them. The Constitution may provide that no legislator shall take a bribe,
but an act would not be treated as void because the majority had been bribed. So far as the
Constitution attempts to lay injunctions in matters leading up to and motivating the action of a
department, injunctions must be left to the conscience of that department to obey or disobey. Now the
act of the Legislature as a whole is for this purpose of the same nature as the vote of a single legislator.
The Constitution may expressly enjoin each legislator not to vote until he has carefully thought over the
matter of legislation; so, too, it may expressly enjoin the whole Legislature not to act finally until it has
three times heard the proposition read aloud. It is for the Legislature alone, in the latter case as well as
in the former, to take notice of this injunction; and it is no more the function of the Judiciary in the one
case than in the other to try to keep the Legislature to its duty:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the
misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have
almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of
trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the
legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to
violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with
competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to
reflect credit upon the name of popular government. (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 699-702.)
The petitioners contend that the enrolled bill rule has not found acceptance in this jurisdiction, citing the case of
United States vs. Pons (34 Phil., 729). It is argued that this Court examined the journal in that case to find out
whether or not the contention of the appellant was right. We think the petitioners are in error.
It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210,
that, roughly, it provides two methods of proving legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and (2) in case
of acts of the Legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
The Court looked into the journals in United States vs. Pons because, in all probability, those were the
documents offered in evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or
was placed before the Court; and it has not been shown that if that had been done, this Court would not have
held the copyconclusive proof of the due enactment of the law. It is to be remembered that the Court expressly
stated that it "passed over the question" of whether the enrolled bill was conclusive as to its contents and the
mode of its passage.
Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by
the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated,
the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as
amended. This Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother
itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the
opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in
order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be
found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and
the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight
to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."
In view of the foregoing consideration, we deem it unnecessary to decide the question of whether the senators
and representatives who were ignored in the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote were members
of Congress within the meaning of section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution.
The petition is dismissed without costs.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, and Hontiveros, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BENGZON, J., with whom concurs PADILLA, J., concurring:

Although I maintain that we have jurisdiction as petitioners contend, I can't vote for them, because the enrolled
copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us.
A. The overwhelming majority of the state courts are of the opinion that the question whether an amendment to
the existing constitution has been duly proposed in the manner required by such constitution properly belongs
to the judiciary. That is the position taken by Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin. (See 12
C. J., 880 and 16C.J.S., 437.) (See also 11 Am. Jur., 639.) Only North Dakota and Oklahoma have adopted a
different view. (16 C.J.S., 437, notes 41 and 43.)
"The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional amendment has
been properly adopted according to the requirements of an existing constitution is a judicial question."
(McConaughy vs. Secretary of State, 106 Minn., 392, 409; 119 N.W., 408.) (12 C.J., 880.)
"An examination of the decisions shows that the courts have almost uniformly exercised the authority to
determine the validity of the proposal, submission, or ratification of constitutional amendments. It has
been judicially determined whether a proposed amendment received the constitutional majority of
votes. (Knightvs. Shelton, 134 Fed., 423; Rice vs. Palmer, 78 Ark., 432; 96 S. W. 396; Green vs. State
Canvassers, 5 Ida., 130; 47 P., 259; 95 Am. S.R., 169; In re Denny, 156 Ind., 104; 59 N.E., 359; 51 L.
R. A., 722; Daytonvs. St. Paul, 22 Minn., 400; Tecumseh Nat. Bank vs. Saunders, 51 Nebr., 801; 71
N.W., 779; Bott vs. Wurts, 63 N.J.L., 289; 43 A., 744, 881; 45 L.R.A., 251; State vs. Foraker, 46 Oh. St.,
677; 23 N.E., 491; 6 L.R.A., 422.)" (12 C.J., 880.)
As our constitutional system ("limitation" of powers) is more analogous to state systems than to the Federal
theory of "grant" of powers, it is proper to assume that the members of our Constitutional convention,
composed mostly of lawyers, and even the members of the American Congress that approved the TydingsMcDuffie enabling legislation, contemplated the adoption of such constitutional practice in this portion of the
world. Hence, my conclusion that in Philippine polity, courts may and should take cognizance of the subject of
this controversy.
B. The petitioners' grievance is that, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution (Article XV), the proposed
amendment was not approved "by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives." They complain that certain Senators and some members of the House of Representatives
were not allowed to participate and were not considered in determining the required three fourths vote.
The respondents, besides denying our power to revised the counting, assert that the persons mentioned, for all
practical purposed did not belong to the Congress of the Philippines on the day the amendment was debated
and approved.
Central target of attack is Republic Act No. 73 "to submit to the Filipino people, for approval or disapproval, the
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the
Congress of the Philippines in a Resolution of both Houses, etc."
Petitioners would have a declaration of invalidity of that piece of legislation. Its first section provides that "the
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the
Congress of the Philippines in a Resolution of both Houses, adopted on September eighteen, nineteen
hundred and forty-six, shall be submitted to the people, for approval or disapproval, at a general election which
shall be held on March eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, in accordance with the provisions of this
Act."
By this provision, the Legislative Department with the concurrence of the Executive, declares in the most
solemn manner that the resolution proposing the amendment was duly carried. Therefore, it would be pertinent
to inquire whether those petitioners who are members of the Congress that approved Republic Act No. 73 are
not precluded from questioning its validity or veracity, unless they assert and prove that in Congress they
opposed its enactment. In default of a contrary showing, it is not reasonable to suppose that as members of
Congress they endorsed-- or at least are bound by the declarations of Republic Act No. 73? And if a private
party is estopped from challenging the constitutional efficacy of a law whose enactment he has procured (see
16 C.J.S., 198 and 11 Am. Jur., 767) should not a member of Congress be estopped from impugning a statute
he helped (presumably) to pass? Parenthetically it should be added that the remaining petitioners, as mere
citizens, would probably have no suable claim. (Cf. 16 C.J.S., 169.)

C. But perhaps these points should be left to future study and decision, because the instant litigation may be
solved by the application of other well-established principles founded mainly on the traditional respect which
one department of the Government entertains for the actions of the others.
On account of the separation of powers, which I firmly believe, I agree to the applicability and binding effect of
section 313 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2210, which, in my opinion, has not been abrogated by the
Rules of Court. I likewise believe the soundness of the doctrine expounded by the authoritative Wigmore on a
question admittedly within the domain of the law on evidence: conclusiveness of the enrolled bill of resolution
upon the judicial authorities.
D. Withal, should that principle of conclusiveness be denied, the respondents could plausibly fall back on the
time-honored rule that the courts may not go behind the legislative journals to contradict their veracity. (United
Statesvs. Pons, 34 Phil., 729.)
According to the minutes of the joint session Exhibit 3, in the Senate sixteenth (16) senators approved the
resolution against five (5), with no absences; whereas in the house sixty-eight (68) congressmen voted "yes",
eighteen(18) voted "no", one abstained from voting and one was absent. Therefore, 16 being three-fourths of
the total membership of twenty-one of the Senate (16 plus 5), and 68 being more than three-fourths of the total
membership of eighty-eight (88) of the House of Representatives (68 plus 18 plus 1 plus 1), it is crystal clear
that the measure was upheld by the number of votes prescribed by the Constitution.
True, there are in the said exhibit statements by two Senators and one congressman to the effect that the
votes did not constitute the majority required by the Constitution. However, in the fact of the incontestable
arithmetical computation above shown, those protests must be attributed to their erroneous counting of votes;
none of them having then asserted that "there were absent Senators or Congressmen who had not been taken
into account. "Ford although we might have judicial notice of the number of proclaimed members of Congress,
still we are no better qualified than the Legislature to determine the number of its actual membership at any
given moment, what with demises or demissions, remotions or suspensions.

HILADO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result of the majority opinion as well as in the grounds supporting the same in so far as they are
not inconsistent with the applicable reasons supporting my concurring opinion in Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil.,
192). But I dissent from that part of the majority opinion (page 3, ante) wherein it is stated that if the suspended
members of the Senate and House of Representatives had been counted "the affirmative votes in favor of the
proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths of vote in either branch of
Congress."
The basic theories underlying my aforesaid concurring opinion in Vera vs. Avelino, supra, are, first, that the
questions therein raised were political in nature within the exclusive province of the legislature, and, second,
that the judiciary does not possess jurisdiction over such questions. It is to me evidence that the questions
involved in the present proceeding are no less political than those involved in that former Senate case. It is
deemed unnecessary to dwell at more length upon the grounds of my said concurring opinion.
The ground for my dissent from the above-quoted statement of the majority opinion in the instant proceeding is
that the suspension of the said members of the Senate and the House of Representatives being a political
question, the judiciary, being without jurisdiction to interfere with the determination thereof by the proper
political department of the government, has perforce to abide by said determination if it were to go any further
in the consideration of the case. In other words, any further discussion of the case in this Court will have to
start from the premise that said members have been suspended by the respective Houses of Congress and
that we, being powerless to interfere with the matter of said suspension, must consider ourselves bound by the
determination of said political branches of the government. As said by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Philipps vs.Payne (2 Otto. [U.S.], 130; 23 Law. ed., 649), "in cases involving the action of the political
departments of the government, the judiciary is bound by such action." (Williams vs. Insurance Co., 13 Pet.,
420; Garcia vs. Lee, 12 Pet., 511; Kennel vs. Chambers, 14 How., 38; Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet., 209; Nabob of
Carnatio vs. East Ind. Co., Ves., Jr., 60; Lucer vs. Barbon, 7 How., 1; R.I. vs. Mass., 12 Pet., 714.)
If, then, we are to proceed, as I think we should, upon the premise that said members have been thus
suspended, there will be to my mind, absolutely no justification, ground nor reason for counting them in the
determination of whether or not the required three-fourths vote was attained. Their case was entirely different
from that of members who, not having been suspended nor otherwise disqualified, had the right to vote upon
the resolution. In the case of the latter, they had, like all other members similarly situated, three alternatives,
namely, to vote in favor of the resolution, to vote against it, or to abstain from voting. If they voted in favor, of
course, their votes had to be counted amount those supporting the resolution. If they voted against, of course,

their votes had to be counted with those opposing. And if they abstained from voting, there would be sound
justification for counting them as not in favor of the resolution, because by their very abstention they impliedly
but necessarily would signify that they did not favor the resolution, for it is obvious that if they did, they would
have voted in favor of it. On the other hand, those suspended members who, by reason of the suspension,
whose validity or legality we are devoid of jurisdiction to inquire into, cannot be similarly treated. In their case
there would be no way of determining which way their votes would have gone or whether or not they would
have abstained from voting. In this connection, in considering the hypothesis of their voting in case they had
not been suspended, I must go upon the assumption that while those suspended members may belong to the
political party which, as a party, was opposed to the resolution, still they would have voted independently and
following their individual convictions.In this connection, it might not be amiss to mention that there were quite a
number of minority members of the legislature who voted for the resolution. Hence, we are not in a position to
say that said suspended members, if they had not been suspended, would have voted against the resolution,
nor in favor of it either, nor that they would have abstained from voting. Why then should they bed counted with
the members who voted against the resolution or those who, having the right to vote, abstained from doing so?
Why should we count them as though we knew that they would have voted against the resolution, or even that
they would have abstained from voting? Soundly construed, I submit that the Constitution does not, and could
not, include suspended members in the determination of the required three-fourths vote.
I take it, that the drafters in providing in Article XV, section 1, of the Constitution that "The Congress in joint
session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting (emphasis supplied) separately . . .", advisedly used the vital and all-important word
"voting" therein. I take it, that they meant to refer to the members voting, undoubtedly expecting that all
members not suspended or otherwise disqualified, would cast their votes one way or the other. But I am here
even making a concession in favor of the opponents when I say that those who, with the right to vote, abstain
from voting, may be counted among those not in favor of the measure. But what I cannot bring myself to
conceive is that the quoted provision should have intended to count suspended or disqualified members as
opposed to the measure, or not being in favor of it, without it being possible to know which way they would
have voted or that they would have abstained from voting that they would never have voted in favor of the
measure. If I should ask why we should not count such suspended or disqualified members among those in
favor of the measure, I am sure those who opine differently would answer, because we do not know that they
would have voted in favor of it. By the same token, if they should ask me why we should not count them among
those against the measure, I would answer that we do not know that they would have voted against it or that
they would have abstained from voting. All this inevitably leads to the conclusion the only one possible
that such suspended or disqualified members should not and cannot be counted due to that very impossibility
of knowing which way they would have voted or whether they would have abstained from voting. I stand for a
sound and rational construction of the constitutional precept.

PARAS, J.:
I fully concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Hilado.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

To surrender or not to surrender, that is the question.
The last bastion of democracy is in danger.
Those who are manning it are summoned to give up without the least resistance, and the banner of the
Constitution is silently and meekly hauled down from its pole to be offered as a booty to the haughty standard
bearers of a new brand of Farcism. In t he words of Cicero, "recedere de statu suae dignitatis."
Cardinal moral bearings have been lost in the psychological chaos suffered by those, throwing overboard all
ideals as burdensome and dangerous ballast, in desperate efforts to attain at all costs individual survival, even
in ignominy, could not stand the impact of initial defeats at the hands of invading fearsome military hordes.
The present is liable to confusion. Our minds are subjected to determinate and indeterminate ideological
pressures. Very often man walks in the darkness of a blind alley obeying the pullings and pushings of hidden
and unhidden forces, or the arcane predeterminations of the genes of human chromosomes. A rudderless ship
floating in the middle of an ocean without any visible shoreline, is bound to be wrecked at the advent of the first
typhoon. From early youth we begin to hear and learn about the true ideals. Since then we set them as the
guiding stars in our actions and decisions, but in the long travel of life, many times the clouds dim or

completely darken those stars and then we have only to rely on our faith in their existence and on habit,
becoming unerring if long enough followed, of adjusting our conduct to their guidance in calm and cloudless
nights. We are sitting in judgment to pass upon the conflicts, disputes and disagreements of our fellowmen. Let
us not forget that the day shall come that we will be judged on how are are judging. Posterity shall always have
the final say. When the time solvent has dissolved the human snag, then shall be rendered the final verdict as
to whether we have faced our task fearlessly or whether our hearts have shrunk upon the magnitude of our
duties and have chosen the most comfortable path of retreat. Then it will be conclusively known whether did
keep burning the tripod fire in the temples of old. Some of us will just return into anonymity, covered by the cold
mist of historical oblivion; others will have their names as by words repeatedly pronounced with popular hate or
general contempt; and still others will be remembered with universal gratefulness, love and veneration, the
guard on accorded to all those who remained faithful to the fundamental tenets of justice. Winnowing time will
sift the chaff from the grain.
This is one of the cases upon which future generations will decide if this tribunal has the sturdy courage to
keep its responsibility in proper high level. It will need the passing of decades and perhaps centuries before a
conclusive verdict is rendered, whether we should merit the scorn of our fellow citizens and our decision shall
be cursed as the Dred Scot decision of Chief Justice Taney, the one that plunged the United States into civil
war, or whether in the heart of each future Filipino citizen there will be a shrine in which our memory will be
remembered with gratefulness, because we have shown the far-reaching judicial statesmanship of Chief
Justice Marshall, the legal genius who fixed and held the rock bottom foundations which made of the American
Constitution the veritable supreme law of the land and established the role of the tribunals as the ultimate
keepers of the Constitution. But for sure it will be rendered, and it will be impartial and unbiased, exacting and
pitiless, with unappealable finality, and for the one condemned Dante wrote this lapidary line: "lasciate ogni
speranza."
Unless the vision of our mental eyes should be shut up by the opaque cornea of stubborn refusal to see reality
or should be impaired by the polaroid visors of prejudice, there is no question that at the time when the
resolution in question, proposing an amendment to the Constitution, was adopted, the members of the Senate
were 24 and the members of the House of Representatives were 96, and that the 16 members of the Senate
who voted in favor of the resolution, by undisputable mathematical computation, do not constituted threefourths of the 24 members thereof, and the 68 members of the House of Representatives who voted for the
resolution, by equally simple arithmetical operation, do not constitute three-fourths of the 96 members of the
said chamber. The official certifications made by the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress to the
effect that three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and three-fourths of all the members of the House of
Representatives voted for the resolution, being untrue, cannot change the facts. Nothing in existence can. The
certification, being a clear falsification of public document punished by article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
with prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000, cannot give reality to a fiction based in a narration of facts
that is in conflict with the absolute metaphysical reality of the events.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Petitioners are citizens of the Philippines, taxpayers and electors, and besides some of them are members of
the Senate, others are members of the House of Representatives, and still others are presidents of political
parties, duly registered, with considerable following in all parts of the Philippines.
The first three respondents are chairman and members, respectively, of the Commission on Elections and the
remaining three are respectively the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General and the Director of the
Bureau of Printing.
Petitioners alleged that the Senate is actually composed of 24 Senators, 8 elected in 1941 and 16 in April 23,
1946, and that the House of Representatives is composed of 98 members, elected on April 23, 1946, minus 2d
who resigned to assume other positions in the Government.
On September 18, 1946, there was presented for adoption by the Congress of the Philippines a resolution
proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto, which
reads as follows:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, of the Philippines in joint session assembled,
by a vote of not less than three-fourths of all the Members of each House voting separately. To
propose, as they do hereby propose, the following amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to
be appended as an Ordinance thereto:
ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen, of
the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the
President of the Philippines with the President of the United States on the fourth of July, nineteen

hundred and forty-six, pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered seven hundred and
thirty-three, but in no case to extend beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the
disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization, of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities,
shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business
enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same
manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations
or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines."
This amendment shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes
cast in an election at which it is submitted to the people for the ratification pursuant to Article XV of the
Constitution.
Sixteen Senators voted in favor of the resolution and 5 against it, and 68 Representatives voted in favor and 18
against.
Thereafter, Congress passed Republic Act No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on March 11, 1947, for the
purpose of submitting to the people the proposed amendment embodied in the resolution, and appropriating
P1,000,000 for said purpose.
Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 73 as unconstitutional because Congress may not, by said
act, submit to the people for approval or disapproval the proposed amendment to the Constitution embodied in
resolution Exhibit B inasmuch as, to comply with the express provisions of Article XV of the Constitution,
requiring the affirmative votes of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, three-fourths of the 24 members of the Senate is constituted by at least 18
Senators, 2 more than those who actually voted for the resolution in question, and three-fourths of the 98
members of the House of Representatives should at least be 72 Representatives, or 4 more than those who
actually voted for the resolution.
Respondents deny that the Senate is composed of 24 Senators, by excluding from them petitioners Jose O.
Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero and allege that the House of Representatives is not composed of 98
members but of only 90. They admit that at the joint session of Congress to consider the resolution Exhibit B,
in favor of the resolution 16 votes were cast in the Senate and in the House of Representatives 68 and 5 in the
Senate and 18 in the House of Representatives had voted against. They admit the approval of Republic Act
No. 73 and that necessary steps to hold the plebiscite therein provided are being taken, but deny that said act
is unconstitutional, and byway of defense, allege that the resolution Exhibit B was adopted by three-fourths of
all the qualified members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately and,
consequently, Republic Act No. 73, ordering its submission to the people for approval or disapproval, fixing a
date for a general election, and appropriating public funds for said purpose, is valid and constitutional.
At the hearing of this case both parties submitted the following stipulation:
The parties through their undersigned counsel hereby stipulate the following facts:
1. That Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero were, by the majority vote of the
Commission on Elections, proclaimed elected senators in the election of April 23, 1946;
2. That when the Senate convened on May 25, 1946, the said senators-elect took part in the election of
the President of that body; but that before the senators-elect were sworn in by the President of the
Senate, a resolution was presented, and subsequently approved, to defer the administration of oath
and the seating of Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, pending the hearing
and decision of the protest lodged against their election;
3. That on the 25th of May, 1946, the said senators individually took their alleged oath of office before
notaries public, and not on the floor, and filed said oaths with the Secretary of the Senate during the
noon recess of the said date;
4. That Messrs. Vera and Romero filed with the Auditor of the Senate other oaths of office
accomplished by them outside of the floor before a notary public and the Secretary of the Senate, on
September 5 and August 31, 1946, respectively; and that their corresponding salaries from April 23,
1946, were paid on August 31, 1946;
5. That Mr. Diokno, having left for the United States, his son Jose W. Diokno filed a copy of Mr. Diokno's
alleged oath of office dated May 25, 1946, with the Auditor of the Senate on October 15,1946, and on
said date his salary was paid corresponding to the period from April 23 to October 15, 1946;

6. That all three have subsequently received their salaries every fifteen days;
7. That since the approval of the resolution deferring their seating and oaths up to the present time, the
said Messrs. Vera, Diokno, and Romero have not been allowed to sit and take part in the deliberations
of the Senate and to vote therein, not do their names appear in the roll of the Senate;
8. That before May 25, 1946, the corresponding provincial boards of canvassers certified as having
been elected in the election held on April 23, 1946, ninety-eight representatives, among them Messrs.
Alejo Santos and Jesus B. Lava for Bulacan, Jose Cando and Constancio P. Padilla for Nueva Ecija,
Amado M. Yuson and Luis Taruc for Pampanga, Alejandro Simpauco for Tarlac, and Vicente F. Gustilo
for Negros Occidental;
9. That the aforesaid eight members-elect of the House of Representatives took part in the election of
the Speaker of the House of Representatives held on May 25, 1946;
10. That before the members-elect of the House of Representatives were sworn in by the Speaker, Mr.
Topacio Nueno, representative for Manila, submitted a resolution to defer the taking of oath and seating
of Luis Taruc and Amado Yuson for Pampanga, Constancio P. Padilla and Jose Cando for Nueva Ecija,
Alejandro Simpauco for Tarlac, Alejo Santos and Jesus Lava for Bulacan, and Vicente F. Gustilo for
Negros Occidental "pending the hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their election,"
copy of the resolution being attached to and made part of this stipulation as Exhibit 1 thereof;
11. That the resolution Exhibit 1 was, upon motion of Representative Escareal and approved by the
House, referred for study to a committee of seven, which up to the present has not reported, as shown
by the Congressional Record for the House of Representatives;
12. That the eight representatives-elect included in the resolution were not shown in on the floor and
have not been so sworn in or allowed to sit up to the present time, nor have they participated in any of
the proceedings of the House of Representatives except during the debate of the Escareal motion
referred to in paragraph 11 hereof, nor cast any vote therein since May 25, 1946, and their names do
not appear in the roll of the members of the House except as shown by the Congressional Record of
the House of Representatives, nor in the roll inserted in the official program for the inauguration of the
Republic of the Philippines hereto attached as Exhibit 2 hereof;
13. That the eight representatives-elect above mentioned took their alleged oaths of office on the date
set opposite their names, as follows:

Jose Cando
Vicente Gustilo
Constancio Padilla
Alejo Santos
Luis M. Taruc
Amado M. Yuson
Jesus B. Lava
Alejandro
Simpauco

May 25, 1946

May 25, 1946
May 22, 1946
May 23, 1946
May 25, 1946
May 25, 1946
May 25, 1946
May 25, 1946

all of which oaths were taken before notaries public, with the exception of the first four who took their
oaths before Mr. Narciso Pimentel, Secretary of the House;
14. That said oaths were filed with the Auditor through the office of the Secretary of the House of
Representatives;
15. That the persons mentioned in paragraph 13 were paid salaries for the term beginning April 23,
1946, up to the present, with the exception of Messrs. Luis Taruc and Jesus Lava, to whom payment
was suspended since August 16;
16. That Messrs. Alejo Santos and Vicente F. Gustilo took their oaths before the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and were allowed to sit on September 30, 1946, the last day of the Special
Sessions;
17. That in addition to the eight persons above mentioned, two members of the House, Representatives
Jose C. Zulueta and Narciso Ramos, had resigned before the resolution proposing an amendment to
the Constitution was discussed and passed on September 18,1946;

18. That the voting on the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution was made by the
Secretary calling the roll of each house and the votes cast were as shown in the attached certificate of
the Secretary of the House of Representatives hereto attached, marked Exhibit 3 and made a part
hereof; and
19. That the Congressional Records for the Senate and House of Representatives and the alleged
oaths of office are made a part of this Stipulation by reference thereto, respondents reserving the right
to question their materiality and admissibility.
Manila, Philippines, November 25, 1946.

For the petitioners:

For the respondents:

JOSE E. ROMERO
ANTONIO BARREDO

ROMAN OZAETA
Secretary of Justice

JOSE B.L. REYES

First Asst. Solicitor General

PETITIONER'S PERSONALITY
Whether petitioners have or have not the personality to file the petition in this case is the first question we have
to consider.
No party raised the question, but it having arisen in the course of the Court's deliberation, we should not evade
deciding it and giving what in law and justice should be the answer.
To our mind there is no doubt that petitioners have the personality to institute the present recourse of
prohibition. If petitioners should lack that personality, such legal defect would not certainly have failed to be
noticed by respondents themselves.
Respondents' failure to raise the question indicates their conviction that petitioners have the necessary legal
personality to file the petition, and we do not see any reason why such personality should be put in doubt.
Petitioners are divided into three groups: the first is composed of senators; the second, of representatives; and
the third, of presidents of four political parties.
All of the individuals composing the first two groups, with the exception of Senators Jose O. Vera, Ramon
Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, are members of either of the two houses of Congress and took part in the
consideration of Resolution Exhibit B and of Republic Act No. 73, while the above three excepted senators
were the ones who were excluded in the consideration of said resolution and act and were not counted for
purposes of determining the three-fourths constitutional rule in the adoption of the resolution.
In paragraph eight of the petition it is alleged that respondents have taken all the necessary steps for the
holding of the general election on March 11, 1947, and that the carrying out of said acts "constitute an attempt
to enforce the resolution and act aforementioned in open violation of the Constitution," is without or in excess
of respondents' jurisdiction and powers, "violative of the rights of the petitioners who are members of the
Congress, and will cause the illegal expenditure and disbursement of public funds and end in an irreparable
injury to the taxpayers and the citizens of the Philippines, among whom are the petitioners and those
represented by them in their capacities mentioned above."
There should not be any question that the petitioners who are either senators or members of the House of
Representatives have direct interest in the legal issues involved in this case as members of the Congress
which adopted the resolution, in open violation of the Constitution, and passed the act intended to make
effective such unconstitutional resolution. Being members of Congress, they are even duty bound to see that
the latter act within the bounds of the Constitution which, as representatives of the people, they should uphold,
unless they are to commit a flagrant betrayal of public trust. They are representatives of the sovereign people
and it is their sacred duty to see to it that the fundamental law embodying the will of the sovereign people is not
trampled upon.

The four political parties represented by the third group of petitioners, represent large groups of our population,
perhaps nearly one-half of the latter, and the numerous persons they represent are directly interested and will
personally be affected by the question whether the Constitution should be lightly taken and can easily be
violated without any relief and whether it can be amended by a process openly repugnant to the letter of the
Constitution itself.
As a matter of fact, the vital questions raised in this case affect directly each and every one of the citizens and
inhabitants of this country. Whether our Constitution is, as it is supposed to be, a paramount law or just a mere
scrap of paper, only good to be thrown into a waste basket, is a matter of far-reaching importance to the
security, property, personal freedom, life, honor, and interests of the citizens. That vital question will necessarily
affect the way of life of the whole people and of its most unimportant unit. Each and every one of the
individuals inhabiting this land of ours shall have to make plans for the future depending on how the question is
finally decided. No one can remain indifferent; otherwise, it will at his peril.
Our conclusion is that petitioners have full legal personality to institute the present action; and much more,
those who are members of Congress have the legal duty to institute it, lest they should betray the trust reposed
in them by the electorate.
24 SENATORS
The first question raised by respondents' answer refers to the actual number of the members of the Senate.
According to petitioners there are 24 of them while according to respondents there are only 21, excluding
Senators Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, because, according to them, "they are not duly
qualified and sworn in members of the Senate."
This allegation appears to be belied by the first seven paragraphs of the stipulation of facts submitted by both
parties.
No amount of sophism, of mental gymnastics or logo-daedaly may change the meanings and effects of the
words placed by respondents themselves in said seven paragraphs. No amount of argument may delude
anyone into believing that Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero are not senators notwithstanding their having
been proclaimed as elected senators, their having taken part in the election of the President of the Senate,
their having taken their oaths of office, and their receiving salaries as senators.
Such a paradoxical proposition could have been driven into acceptance in the undeveloped brains of the
pithecanthropus or gigantopithecus of five hundred millennia ago, but it would be unpardonably insulting o the
human mind of the twentieth century.
Our conclusion is that Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero should be counted as members of the Senate,
without taking into consideration whatever legal effects the Pendatun resolution may have produced, a
question upon which we have already elaborated in our opinion in Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192). Suspended
or not suspended, they are senators anyway, and there is no way of ignoring a fact so clear and simple as the
presence of the sun at day time. Therefore, counting said three Senators, there are 24 Senators in all in the
present Senate.
96 REPRESENTATIVES
The next question raised by respondents is their denial of petitioners' allegations to the effect that the present
House of Representatives is composed of 98 members and their own allegation to the effect that at present
"only 90 members have qualified, have been fully sworn in, and have taken their seats as such."
Again respondents' allegations are belied by paragraphs eight to seventeen of the stipulation of facts.
The disagreement between the parties is as to whether or not Representatives Cando, Gustilo, Padilla, Santos,
Taruc, Yuson, Lava and Simpauco, mentioned in paragraph 13 of the stipulation of facts, are members of the
House of Representatives.
The facts stipulated by the parties proved conclusively that said eight persons are actual members of the
House of Representatives. We may even add that the conclusiveness about said eight representatives is even
greater than in the case of Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero, because no resolution of suspension has ever
been adopted by the House of Representatives against said eight members, who are being deprived of the
exercise of some of their official functions and privileges by the unipersonal, groundless, dictatorial act of the
Speaker.
That illegal deprivation, whose counterpart can only be found in countries where the insolence of totalitarian
rulers have replaced all constitutional guarantees and all concepts of decent government, raises again a

constitutional question: whether it is permissible for the Speaker of the House of Representatives to exercise
the arbitrary power of depriving representatives duly elected by the people of their constitutional functions,
privileges, and prerogatives. To allow the existence of such an arbitrary power and to permit its exercise
unchecked is to make of democracy a mockery.
The exercise of such an arbitrary power constitutes a want on onslaught against the sovereignty itself of the
people, an onslaught which may cause the people sooner or later to take justice in their own hands. No system
of representative government may subsist if those elected by the people may so easily be silenced or
obliterated from the exercise of their constitutional functions.
From the stipulation of facts, there should not be any question that at the last national election, 98
representatives were elected and at the time the resolution Exhibit B was adopted on September 18, 1946, 96
of them were actual members of the House, as two (Representatives Zulueta and Ramos) has resigned.
Applying the three-fourth rule, if there were 24 senators at the time the resolution was adopted; three-fourths of
them should at least be 18 and not the 16 who only voted in favor of the resolution, and if there were 96
representatives, three-fourths of them should certainly be more than the 68 who voted for the resolution. The
necessary consequence is that, since not three-fourths of the senators and representatives voting separately
have voted in favor of the resolution as required by Article XV of the Constitution, there can be no question that
the resolution has not been validly adopted.
We cannot but regret that our brethren, those who have signed or are in agreement with the majority opinion,
have skipped the questions as to the actual membership of the Senate and House of Representatives,
notwithstanding the fact that they are among the first important ones squarely raised by the pleadings of both
parties. If they had taken them into consideration, it would seem clear that their sense of fairness will bring
them to the same conclusion we now arrived at, at least, with respect to the actual membership of the House of
Representatives.
Upon our conclusions as to the membership of the Senate and House of Representatives, it appears evident
that the remedy sought for in the petition should be granted.
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Without judging respondents' own estimate as to the strength of their own position concerning the questions of
the actual membership of the Senate and House of Representatives, it seems that during the oral and in the
written arguments they have retreated to the theory of conclusiveness of the certification of authenticity made
by the presiding officers and secretaries of both House of Congress as their last redoubt.
The resolution in question begins as follows: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in joint session assembled, by a vote of not less than three-fourths of all the members of each
House voting separately, . . .."
Just because the adoption of the resolution, with the above statement, appears to be certified over the
signatures of the President of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the Secretaries of both
Houses, respondents want us to accept blindly as a fact what is not. They want us to accept unconditionally as
a dogma, as absolute as a creed of faith, what, as we have shown, appears to be a brazen official falsehood.
Our reason revolts against such an unethical proposition.
An intimation or suggestion that we, in the sacred temple of justice, throwing overboard all scruples, in the
administration of justice, could accept as true what we know is not and then perform our official functions upon
that voluntary self-delusion, is too shocking and absurb to be entertained even for a moment. Anyone who
keeps the minimum sense of justice will not fail to feel aghast at the perversion or miscarriage of justice which
necessarily will result from the suggestion.
But the theory is advanced as a basis to attack the jurisdiction of this Court to inquire behind the false
certification made by the presiding officers and the secretaries of the two Houses of Congress.
Respondents rely on the theory of, in the words of the majority opinion, "the conclusiveness on the courts of an
enrolled bill or resolution."
To avoid repeating the arguments advanced by the parties, we have made part of this opinion, as Appendices
A, B, and C,1 the memoranda presented by both petitioners and respondents, where their attorneys appear to
have amply and ably discussed the question. The perusal of the memoranda will show petitioners' contentions
to be standing on stronger ground and, therefore, we generally agree with their arguments.

In what follows we will try to analyze the positions taken in the majority opinion.
POLITICAL QUESTIONS
The majority enunciates the proposition that "political questions are not within the province of the judiciary,"
except "by express constitutional or statutory provision" to the contrary. Then argues that "a duly certified law
or resolution also binds the judges under the 'enrolled bill rule' out of respect to the political departments."
The doctrine is predicated "on the principle of the separation of powers."
This question of separation of powers is the subject of discussion in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, supra. We
deem unnecessary to repeat what we have already said in our opinion in said case, where we have elaborated
on the question.
Although the majority maintains that what they call the doctrine that political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary is "too well-established to need citation of authorities," they recognize the difficulty "in
determining what matters fall under the meaning of political questions."
This alleged doctrine should not be accepted at its face value. We do not accept it even as a good doctrine. It
is a general proposition made without a full comprehension of its scope and consequences. No judicial
discernment lies behind it.
The confession that the "difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question"
shows conclusively that the so-called doctrine has recklessly been advanced.
This allegedly "well-established" doctrine is no doctrine at all in view of the confessed difficulty in determining
what matters fall within the designation of political question. The majority itself admits that the term "is not
susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of
the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the acts of the political department of the
government."
Doctrine is that "what is taught; what is held; put forth as true, and supported by a teacher, a school, or a sect;
a principle or position, or the body of principles, in any branch of knowledge; tenet; dogma; principle of faith. "It
is a synonym of principle, position, opinion, article, maxim, rule, and axiom. in its general sense, doctrine
applies to any speculative truth or working principle, especially as taught to others or recommended to their
acceptance. Therefore, to be true, it should be expressed on simple and self-evident terms. A doctrine in which
one of the elemental or nuclear terms is the subject of an endless debate is a misnomer and paradox.
A doctrine is advanced and accepted as an established truth, as a starting point for developing new
propositions, as a guiding principle in the solution of many problems. It is a groundwork for the building of an
intellectual system. It is the basis of a more or less complex legal structure. If not the cornerstone, it should at
least be one of the main columns of an architectonic construction. If that groundwork, cornerstone or column is
supported by a thing whose existence still remains in dispute, it is liable to fall.
We irrevocably refuse to accept and sanction such a pseudo-doctrine which is based on the unsettled meaning
of political question. The general proposition that "political questions are not within the province of the judiciary"
is just one of the many numerous general pronouncements made as an excuse for apathetic, indifferent, lazy
or uncourageous tribunals to refuse to decide hard or ticklish legal issues submitted to them.
It belongs to the category of that much-vaunted principle of separation of powers, the handful of sand with
which judicial ostriches blind themselves, as if self-inflicted blindness may solve a problem or may act as a
conjuration to drive away a danger or an evil.
We agree with the majority that the proposal to amend the Constitution and the process to make it effective, as
provided in Article XV of the Constitution, are matters of political nature, but we cannot agree with their
conclusion that a litigation as to whether said article has been complied with a violated is beyond the
jurisdiction of the tribunals, because to arrive at this conclusion we must accept as a major premise the
pseudo-doctrine which we have precisely exposed as erroneous and false.
Is there anything more political in nature than the Constitution? Shall all questions relating to it, therefore,
betaken away from the courts? Then, what about the constitutional provision conferring the Supreme Court
with the power to decide "all cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty or a law?"
COLEMAN versus MILLER

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Coleman vs. Miller (122 A. L. R., 625) is invoked as the
mainstay of the majority position.
No less than eight pages of the majority opinion are occupied by the exposition and analysis of the decision of
the Supreme Court.
The case is invoked as authority for the conclusion that "the efficacy of ratification by the State legislature of a
proposed amendment to the federal Constitution" and that "the decision by Congress, in its control of the
Secretary of State of the questions of whether an amendment has been adopted within a reasonable time from
the date of submission to the State legislature," are political questions and not justiciable.
At the outset it must be noted that the two above mentioned questions have no similarity or analogy with the
constitutional questions herein discussed. The questions as to the efficacy of the ratification by the Senate of
Kansas of the Child Labor amendment proposed by the United States Congress in June, 1924, and upon the
decision of said Congress, "in its control of the Secretary of State," whether the amendment has been adopted
"within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the State legislature," either one of them does not
raise a controversy of violation of specific provisions of the Constitution as the ones raised in the present case.
No specific constitutional provision has been mentioned to have been violated because in January, 1925, the
Legislature of Kansas rejected the amendment, a copy of the rejection having been sent to the Secretary of
State of the United States, and in January, 1927, a new resolution ratifying the amendment was adopted by the
Senate of Kansas on a 21-20 division, the Lieutenant Governor casting the deciding vote. Neither was there
such mention of constitutional violation as to the effect of the previous rejection and of the lapse of time after
submission of the amendment to the State legislature.
No constitutional provision has been pointed out to have been violated because the Lieutenant Governor had
cast his vote or because by the lapse of time from June, 1924 to March, 1927, the proposed amendment had
allegedly lost its vitality.
It is only natural that, in the absence of a constitutional provision upon the efficacy of ratification by a State
legislature of a proposed amendment, it was within the ultimate power of the United States Congress to decide
the question, in its decision rendered in the exercise of its constitutional power, to control the action of the
Secretary of State, and the promulgation of the adoption of amendment could not be controlled by the courts.
Evidently, the invoked authority has no bearing at all with the matters in controversy in the present case.
We note, as observed in the majority opinion, that the four opinions in Coleman vs. Miller, according to the
American Law Reports, show "interestingly divergent but confusing positions of the justices," and are the
subject of an amusing article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455, entitled "Sawing a Justice in Half," asking how it
happened that the nine-member United States Supreme Court could not reach a decision on the question of
the right of the Lieutenant Governor of Kansas to cast his vote, because the odd number of justices was
"equally divided."
How such a "confusing" and "amusing" four-opinion decision in Coleman vs. Miller could be an authority is
beyond our comprehension.
GREEN versus WELLER
One of the authorities upon which the majority relies is the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court in
Green vs.Miller (32 Miss., 650), quoting one paragraph thereof.
Here again we have a case of inapplicable authority, unless taken in its reversed effect.
The Mississippi Supreme Court maintains that there is nothing in the nature of the submission to the people of
a proposal to amend the Constitution which should cause the free exercise of it to be obstructed or that could
render it dangerous to the stability of the government, but in making this pronouncement, it assumes that the
submission is made "in a established form," adding that the means provided for the exercise by the people of
their sovereign right of changing the fundamental law should receive such a construction as not to trample
upon the exercise of their right, and that the best security against tumult and revolution is the free and
unobstructed privilege to the people of the state to change their Constitution "in the mode prescribed by the
instrument."
So the authority, if clearly interpreted, will lead us to the conclusion that the majority position is wrong because
the Mississippi Supreme Court, in making the pronouncement, upon the assumption that the submission to the
people is made "in a established form" and "in the mode prescribed" by the Constitution, namely, in
accordance with the provisions of the instrument, the pronouncements would be the opposite if, as in the

present case, the submission of the proposal of amendment to the people is made through a process flagrantly
violative of the Constitution, aggravated by wanton falsification of public records and tyrannical trampling of the
constitutional prerogatives of duly elected representatives of the people.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black, joined in by Mr. Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr.
Justice Douglas, in the "confusing" and "amusing" decision in Coleman vs. Miller, is also invoked by the
majority, but this other authority seems equally reluctant to offer its helping hand to a helpless, desperate
position.
The major premise of the concurring opinion is as follows: "The Constitution granted Congress exclusive power
to control submission of constitutional amendments."
Everybody ought to know that no such an unlimited, unchecked, omnipotent power is granted by our
fundamental law to the Congress of the Philippines. Our Congress may propose amendments or call a
convention to make the proposal, but that is all. Nowhere in the Constitution can be found any word, any
grammatical sign, not even the faintest hint that in submitting the proposed amendments to the people,
Congress shall have "exclusive power to control the submission." That submission must be provided by law,
and no law may be enacted and come into effect by the exclusive power of Congress. It needs the concurring
action of the President of the Philippines. And if the law happens to violate the fundamental law, courts of
justice may step in to nullify its effectiveness. After the law is enacted, its execution devolves upon the
Executive Department. As a matter of fact, it is the Executive Department which actually submits to the people
the proposed amendment. Congress fixes the date of submission, but the President of the Philippines may
refuse to submit it in the day fixed by law if war, rebellion, or insurrection prevents a plebiscite from proceeding.
After showing that Mr. Justice Black started his argument from a major premise not obtainable in the
Philippines, his conclusions cannot help the majority in anyway.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the "confusing" and "amusing" case of Coleman vs. Miller
is the next authority invoked by the majority, but the opinion does not offered much help. The justice maintains
that the proceedings for voting in legislative assemblies "are matters that concern not merely political actions
but are also of the very essence of political action," and then advances the following argument: "To open the
law-courts to such controversies is to have courts sit in judgment on the manifold disputes engendered by
procedures for voting in legislative assemblies."
The argument has no weight at all. The argument merely displays an attitude, one of simple distaste for the
idea, but fails to give any sensible reason for the attitude. Ina totalitarian regime, where decisions are rendered
not in answer to the promptings of a sense of justice, but as expressions of moods, caprices and whims of
arbitrary rulers, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's attitude could be taken as the law, but then it would be necessary to
elevate him first to the category of a fuehrer.
In our jurisdiction personal attitudes are not the law. Here, justice must be founded on reason, but never on
passing unreasoned moods, judicial or otherwise.
We regret that we cannot agree with the majority's sharing Mr. Justice Frankfurter's views, which in their
judgment are in accord "with sound principles of political jurisprudence and represent liberal and advanced
thought on the workings of constitutional and popular government. "Our regret is not for ourselves alone but for
those who happen to accept as authority the unreasoned and unexplained mental attitude of a judicial officer of
a foreign country, praising it even with the much-abused label as "liberal," notwithstanding the fact that it
represents the whimsical rule of personal attitudes and not the rule of well-matured reason.
THE ENROLLED BILL THEORY
This theory is amply discussed in the memoranda of the parties attached hereto as Appendices A, B, and C.
Although we consider it unnecessary to enlarge the discussion, we deem it convenient to make a little analysis
of what is stated in the majority opinion. Respondents contend, with the full approval of the majority, that a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.
The present case is a conclusive evidence of the absurdity of the theory. How can we accept the absolute
verity of the presiding officers' certification that the resolution in question has been adopted by three-fourths of
all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, when as a matter of undisputable fact the
certification is false? How can we accept a theory which elevates a false-hood to the category of truth?

The majority alleges that the rule is the one prevailing in England. Because the English have committed the
nonsense of accepting the theory, is that reason for Filipinos to follow suit? Why, in the administration of
justice, should our tribunals not think independently? Our temple of justice is not presided by simians trained in
the art of imitation but by human beings, and human beings must act according to reason, never just to imitate
what is wrong, although such mistakes may happen to be consecrated as a judicial precedent. It would be
inconceivable for our courts to commit such a blunder.
Repeating what Wigmore has said (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 685, footnote), the majority states that in the
United States the jurisdictions are divided almost equally pro and con on the theory, although in petitioners'
memorandum Appendix A there appears more up-to-date evidence to the effect that there is a great majority
for the rejection. But to our mind, mere numbers as to pro and con seem to us immaterial in the decision as to
whether the theory is or is not correct. Numbers do not make reason nor justice.
The majority contends that the theory conforms to the express policy of our law-making body, invoking to said
effect the now obsolete section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210.
Even if we should follow the anachronistic practice of deciding issues upon the authority of laws which have
been repealed or abolished, still the evidence pointed out by the majority does not support their contention.
Section 313 alluded to enumerates the evidence that may prove the procedures of the defunct Philippine
Commission or of any legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippines, with the proviso that the
existence of a copy of acts of said commission or the Philippine Legislature, signed by the presiding officers
and secretaries of said bodies, is a conclusive proof "of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment
thereof."
This proviso has been repealed by its non-inclusion in the Rules of Court. Sections 5 and 41 of Rule 123 show
conclusively that this Supreme Court, in making the rules effective since July 1, 1940, rejected the proviso as
unreasonable and unjust. Section 5 provides that we may take judicial notice of the official acts of Congress
and section 41 provides what evidence can be used to prove said official acts, but nowhere in the rules can a
provision be found that would make conclusive a certification by the presiding officers and secretaries of both
House of Congress even if we know by conclusive evidence that the certification is false.
The allegation that the theory in question conforms to the express policy of our lawmaking body, upon the very
evidence used in support thereof, after a little analysis, has to banish as a mid-summer night's dream.
50 AMERICAN JURISDICTION, SECTION 150
In support of the theory of conclusiveness of the enrollment, the authority of 50 American Jurisprudence, 150 is
invoked as reasons for the theory.
We will analyze the reasons adduced:
1. Respect due to a coequal and independent department of the government. This must be the strongest one,
when it is first mentioned. It is so flimsy to require much discussion. Shall we sacrifice truth and justice for the
sake of a social courtesy, the mutual respect that must be shown between different departments of the
government? Has our sense of evaluation of spiritual values become so perverted that we can make such a
blunder in our choice? Since when have the social or official amenities become of paramount value to the
extent of overshadowing the principles of truth and justice?
2. Because without the theory, courts would have to make "a n inquisition into the conduct of the members of
the legislature, a very delicate power." This second reason is premised not on a democratic attitude, but rather
on a Fascistic one. It is premised on the false belief that the members of the majority are a king of emperos of
Japan, to be worshipped but never to be discussed. The ideology depicted by the second reason should be
relegated to where it belongs: the archeological museum.
3. "The rule is also one of convenience." This reason again shows a perverted evaluation of human values. Is
justice to be sacrificed for the sake of convenience?
4. "Otherwise after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills authenticated as executed by the
Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained from the journals that an act heretofore enforced had never
become a law." This last reason personifies unreasonableness to the nth degree. So we leave it as it is, as a
perpetual evidence of the extent to which legal stupidity may reach.
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
Now let us examine the arguments of the next authority invoked by the majority, Wigmore on Evidence. We will
also analyzed the arguments relied upon.

1. That to go beyond the enrolled bill "would unsettle the entire statute law of the State." This argument, as it
appears quoted in the majority decision, is premised on the unreliability of legislative journals, and it seems to
depict a mind poisoned by prejudice, as shown by the following: "We are to remember the danger, under the
prevalence of such a doctrine, to be apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of this character.
It is scarcely too much to say that the legal existence of almost every legislative action would be at the mercy
of all persons having access to these journals. . . ."
The argument should be taken into consideration in connection with American experience, which seems not to
be too flattering to our former metropolis.
Our own personal experience of more than a decade in legislative processes convinces us that Wigmore's
assumption does not obtain in the Philippines. It is true that in the pre-constitution legislative enactments we
have seen few instances in which there had been disagreement between what has actually been passed, as
shown by the journal, and the authenticated enrolled bill. But the instances were so few to justify entertaining
here the same fears entertained by Wigmore in America. Although those instances were few, we fought to
correct the evil in the Constitutional Convention, where we were able to introduce the following revolutionary
provision in the Constitution: "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall be printed and copies
thereof in their final from furnished each member at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when
the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no
amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter,
and the yeas and nays entered in the journal." (Section 21 [2], Article VI of the Constitution.)
This provision is an effective guarantee against the situation depicted by Wigmore's fears.
2. To the argument that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the courts, then less than a quorum of each
House may by the aid of presiding officers impose laws upon the State in defiance of the inhibition of the
Constitution, Wigmore answers: "This perhaps cannot be avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human
agencies. It is not fit that the judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all others; nor has it been able at
all times with truth to say that its high places have not been disgraced."
The answer is unconvincing. Because there can be and there have been blundering, disgraceful, or corrupt
judicial officers is no reason why arbitrary presiding officers and members of the legislature should be allowed
to have their way unchecked. Precisely the system of checks and balances established by the Constitution
presupposes the possibility of error and corruption in any department of government and the system is
established to put a check on them.
When the question of an unconstitutional, arbitrary or corrupt action by the legislature is placed at the bar of
justice, the judiciary must not shrink from its duty. If there is corruption in the judiciary, our laws provide the
proper remedy. Even we, the members of the highest tribunal, cannot with impunity commit "culpable violation
of the Constitution, treason, bribery, or other high crimes" without being liable to be removed from office on
impeachment, and we hope, if there is such a case, that the House of Representatives and the Senate will do
their duty in accordance with Article IX of the Constitution, and not follow the uncourageous example which is
given under the intellectual tutelage of Wigmore.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL NUMERICAL RULES
The three-fourth rule has been provided in Article XV of the Constitution as a guarantee against the adoption of
amendments to the fundamental law by mere majorities.
The Constitution must be accorded more stability than ordinary laws and if any change is to be introduced in it,
it must be in answer to a pressing public need so powerful as to sway the will of three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. Said three-fourth rule has been adopted by the
Constitutional Convention, as all the other numerical rules, with the purpose of avoiding any doubt that it must
be complied with mathematical precision, with the same certainty of all numbers and fractions expressed or
expressible in arithmetical figures.
Where the Constitution says three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, it means an exact number, not susceptible of any more or less. All the
members means that no single member should be excluded in the counting. It means not excluding three
Senators and eight Representatives as respondents want us to do in order not to cause any inconvenience to
the presiding officers and secretaries of both Houses of Congress who had the boldness of certifying that the
three-fourth rule had been complied within the adoption of the resolution in question, when such a certification
is as false as any falsehood can be.
The three-fourth rule must not be left to the caprice of arbitrary majorities, otherwise it would be the death knell
of constitutionalism in our country. If a constitutional provision can be so trifled with, as has happened in the

adoption of the resolution in question, it would mean breaking faith with the vitality of a government of laws, to
enthrone in its stead a whimsical government of men.
The Constitution contains several numerical provisions. It requires that the Senate shall be composed of 24
Senators (section 2, Article VI); that Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the
return of every enumeration, and not otherwise (section 5, Article VI); that each House may expel a member
with the concurrence of two-third of all the members (section 10 [3], Article VI); that electoral tribunals shall
each be composed of nine members, three Justices of the Supreme Court and six legislature members
(section 11, Article VI); that to overrun the veto of the President, the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
members of each House is necessary (section 20 [1], Article VI), and in certain cases the concurrence of threefourths of all the members of each House is necessary (section 20 [2], Article VI); that Congress shall, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House, have the sole power to declare war (section 25,
Article VI); that no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of all
the members of the Supreme Court (section 10, Article VIII); that the House of Representatives shall have the
sole power of impeachment by a vote of two-thirds of all its members (section 2, Article IX); and that the
Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments, but no person shall be convicted without the
concurrence of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate (section 3, Article IX).
So it can be seen that the numerical rules inserted in the Constitution affect matters not of momentary but of
momentous importance. Each and every one of them should be given effect with religious scruple, not only
because our loyalty to the sovereign people so requires, but also because by inserting them the Constitutional
Convention had abided by the wise teachings of experience.
By denying the petition and allowing those responsible for the unconstitutional adoption of the resolution in
question to have their way is to set up a precedent that eventually may lead to the supremacy of an empire of
lawlessness. It will be tantamount to opening Pandora's box of evils and disasters.
The power to declare was can only be exercised by Congress with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
members of each House. From now on, by the simple expediency of certification by the presiding officers and
secretaries of both Houses that two-thirds had voted where a bare majority had voted in fact, said majority may
plunge our people into a maelstrome of war.
The Constitution provides that the power of impeachment needs the vote of two-thirds of all the members of
the House of Representatives. From now on, a mere plurality of one will be enough to put impeachable high
officials, including the President, on the carpet.
To convict an impeached officer the fundamental law requires the concurrence of three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate. From now on, that three-fourth rule may be dispensed with or circumvented by not
counting three actual Senators, as has been done in the resolution in question, and thereby oust the President
of the Philippines if he happens not to be in the good graces of a senatorial majority.
Without entering into the merits of the proposed constitutional amendment, to submit which to the people highhanded means have been resorted to, there can be no question that it is of vital importance to the people and
it will affect future generations to unimaginable extent. The Constitutional Convention had thought it wise that
before such a momentous proposal could be submitted to the people the three-fourth rule should be adhered
to by Congress.
QUOTATION FROM THE JALANDONI CASE
Months ago we stated: "It is high time to sound the clarion call that will summon all the forces of liberalism to
wage a crusade for human freedom. They should put on the armor of righteousness and rally behind the
banner for the vindication of the principles and guarantees embodied in the Constitution and the high purposes
of the Chapter of the United Nations." This, we said in our dissenting opinion in People vs. Jalandoni, L-777.
Concerning the judgment that the future may pass upon the actuations of the Supreme Court, in that same
opinion we ventured that the historian army, under the heading of "Epoch of Great Reaction," write as follows:
At no epoch of its history has the Supreme Court shown to be most reactionary and retrogressive.
When the victims of a constitutional violation, perpetrated by a group of the highest officials of the
government, came to if for redress, it adopted a hands-off policy, showing lack of the necessary vitality
to grapple with the situation and finding refuge in a comfortable retreat, completely disappointing those
who have pinned their faith and hope in it as the first pillar of the Constitution and the inexpugnable
bulwark of human fundamental rights. The issue of human freedom was disposed of by them most
discouragingly by nullifying the right of an accused to be free on bail on appeal, in flagrant violation of a
constitutional guarantee and of one of the fundamental purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations.

Upon touching the decision of this Court in the instant case, the same historian may record that the highest
tribunal of the new Republic of the Philippines has struck the hardest blow to the Philippine constitutional
system, by refusing to do its duty in giving redress in a clear case of violation of the fundamental law, to the
great disappointment, despair and apallment of millions of souls all over the world who are pinning their hopes
on constitutionalism for the survival of humanity.
The ideal of one world oftenly enunciated by progressive leaders in the deliberations of the several organs of
the United Nations is predicated in the adoption of a single standard of laws, compulsory within all jurisdictions
of our planet. The ethology of all mankind must be shaped under the pattern of that single legal standard. But
the whole system is liable to crash if it is not founded on the rock bed of the elemental principle that the
majesty of the law must always be held supreme.
To keep inviolate this primary principle it is necessary that some of the existing social organs, moral attitudes
and habits of thinking should undergo reforms and overhauling, and many fixed traditional ideas should be
discarded to be replaced with more progressive ones and inconsonance with truth and reason. Among these
ideas are the wrong ones which are used as premises for the majority opinion in this case.
The role of innovators and reformers is hard and often thankless, but innovation and reform should
continuously be undertaken if death by stagnation is to be avoided. New truths must be discovered and new
ideas created. New formulas must be devised and invented, and those outworn discarded. Good and useful
traditions must be preserved, but those hampering the progressive evolution of cultured should be stored in the
museum of memory. The past and the present are just stepping stones for the fulfilment of the promises of the
future.
Since the last decade of the nineteenth century, physical science had progressed by leaps and bounds.
Polonium and radium were discovered by Madam Curie, Rontgen discovered the X-ray, and Rutherford the
alpha, beta and gamma particles. Atom ceased to be the smallest unit of matter to become an undermicroscopic planetarian system of neutrons, protons, and electrons.
Ion exchangers are utilized to make of electrons veritable lamps of Aladdin. Plants are grown in plain water,
without any soil, but only with anions and cations. Sawdust has ceased to be a waste matter, and from it is
produced wood sugar, weighing one-half of the sawdust processed. Inter-stellar space vacuum, almost
absolute, is being achieved to serve ends that contribute to human welfare. Bacteria and other microbes are
harnessed to serve useful human purposes. The aspergillus niger is made to manufacture the acetic to
produce vinegar for the asking. The penicillum notatum and the bacillus brevis are made to produce penicillin
and tyrothricin, two wonder drugs that are saving many lives from formerly lethal infections. DDT decimates
harmful insects, thus checking effectively malaria, an illness that used to claim more than one million victims a
year in the world. The creation of synthetics had enriched the material treasures offered to man by nature.
Means of transportation are developed to achieve supersonic speeds. Many scientific dreams are fast
becoming marvelous realities. Thus, science marches on. There is no reason why the administration of justice
should not progress onward, synchronized with the rhythm of general human advancement towards a better
future.
The fact that the majorities of the two chambers of Congress have without any qualm violated Article XV of the
Constitution and the majority of this Court, instead of granting the proper relief provided by law, preferred to
adopt the comfortable attitude of indifferent by-standers, creates a situation that seems to be ogling for more
violations of the fundamental law. The final results no one is in a position to foresee.
Our vote is for the granting of the petition.

BRIONES, M., con quien esta conforme FERIA, M., disidente:

Por segunda vez en menos de un ao nos Ilaman a decidiry arbitrar sobre una violacion de la Constitucion
elcodigo fundamental de nuestro pais. A media dos del ao pasado se trataba del recurso interpuesto ante
esta misma Corte Suprema por tres Senadores1 que se quejaban dehaber sido privados injusta y
arbitrariamente de su derecho a sentarse en el Senado de Filipinas y a particular y votar en sus
deliberaciones, con grave infraccion y detrimento de la Constitucion que ampara tal derecho. Ahora esos
mismos Senadores acuden de nuevo a esta Corte para quejarse de otra violacion de la Constitucion, pero
estavez no vienen solos: les acompaan otros cinco miembros del Senado, diecisiete miembros de la
Camarra de Representantes y tres jefes de aagrupaciones o partidos politicos Democratic Alliance, Popular
Front y Philippine Youth Party. Jose O. Vera es recurrente en su doble capacidad de miembro del Senado y
Presidente del Partido Nacionalista. De modo que los recurrentes suman veintiocho: 8Senadores, 17
Representantes y 3 particulares.2 Tienenun comun denominador, a saber: que son todos ciudadanos de
Filipinas, y, ademas, contribuyentes y electores.

Los recurridos son el Presidente y miembros de la Comision de Elecciones, el Tesorero de Filipinas, el Auditor
General y el Director del Buro de Imprenta.3
El objeto del recurso es recabar de esta Corte un mandamiento de prohibicion dirigigo a los recurridos para
que estos, sus agentes, empleados, subordinados y otras personas que actuen bajo su superintendencia o en
su nombre "se abstengan y desistan de dar los pasos tendentes haciala celebracion de un plebiscito e
eleccion general el 11 de Marzo, 1947, y de imprimir la resolucion (sobre reformade los articulos 13. y 14. de
la Constitucion), las balotas y otros papeles necesarios en relacion con dicho plebiscito,y de desembolsar o de
autorizar el expendio de fondos publicos para dicho proposito."
Para la mejor comprension del asunto estimo necesariopublicar integro a continuacion el texto de la
Resolucion conjunta que contiene la propuesta reforma a la Constitucion, resolucion que constituye la materia
u objeto de la consulta popular en el referido plebiscito de 11 de Marzo, y es la misma que en el lexico
corriente de la prensa y del publico se conoce por resolucion sobre paridad o igualdad de derecdhos
constitucionales a favor de los americanos, esdecir, que concede a estos iguales derechos que a los
filipinosen la propiedad y cultivo de terrenos publicos, en la explotacion de nuestros recursos naturales como
bosques,minas, pesca y fuerza hidraulica, y en la propiedad y operacion de utilidades publicas. He aqui su
texto:
RESOLUTION OF BOTH HOUSES PROPOSING AN AMENDMENT
TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO BE APPENDED AS AN ORDINANCE THERETO.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in joint session assembled, by
a vote of not less than three-fourths of all the Members of each House voting separately, to propose, as
they do hereby propose, the following amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended
as an Ordinance thereto;
ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION
Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen, of
the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the
President of the Philippines with the President of the United States on the Fourth of July, nineteen
hundred and forth-six, pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred and
thirty-three, but in no case to extend beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the
disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities,
shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business
enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same
manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporation
or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines.
This amendment shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes
cast in an election at which it is submitted to the people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the
Constitution.
Adopted,

(Sgd.) JOSE AVELINO

President of the Senate

(Sgd.) EUGENIO PEREZ

Speaker of the House of Representatives

We hereby certify that the foregoing Resolution was adopted by both Houses in joint session
assembled in the Hall of the House of Representatives on September 18, 1946.

(Sgd.) ANTONIO ZACARIAS

Secretary of the Senate

(Sgd.) NARCISO PIMENTEL

Secretary of the House of Representatives

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
SAMUEL C. OCCENA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE NATIONAL TREASURER, THE
DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, respondents.

G.R. No. L-56404 April 2, 1981

RAMON A. GONZALES, MANUEL B. IMBONG, JO AUREA MARCOS-IMBONG, RAY ALLAN T. DRILON,
NELSON B. MALANA and GIL M. TABIOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL TREASURER and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions1 proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged
constitutional infirmity. Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine
Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing
as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not
the fundamental law, the Javellana 2 ruling to the contrary notwithstanding. To put it at its mildest, such an
approach has the arresting charm of novelty but nothing else. It is in fact self defeating, for if such were
indeed the case, petitioners have come to the wrong forum. We sit as a Court duty-bound to uphold and apply
that Constitution. To contend otherwise as was done here would be, quite clearly, an exercise in futility. Nor are
the arguments of petitioners cast in the traditional form of constitutional litigation any more persuasive. For
reasons to be set forth, we dismiss the petitions.
The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 3 and March 12, 1981. 4 On March 10 and 13
respectively, respondents were required to answer each within ten days from notice. 5 There was a comment
on the part of the respondents. Thereafter, both cases were set for hearing and were duly argued on March 26
by petitioners and Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for respondents. With the submission of pertinent data
in amplification of the oral argument, the cases were deemed submitted for decision.
It is the ruling of the Court, as set forth at the outset, that the petitions must be dismissed.

1. It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive
portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, 6 dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare
invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six 7 to four. 8 It then concluded: "This being the
vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and
effect." 9 Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served
to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that, as of January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into
force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal
postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for
instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the
fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial
review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors
Black 10 and Murphy, 11 the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may
not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an
affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit
of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court
has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, 12 promulgated barely
two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may
be cited. 13
2. We come to the crucial issue, the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and
how it may be exercised. More specifically as to the latter, the extent of the changes that may be introduced,
the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper
submission. As was stated earlier, petitioners were unable to demonstrate that the challenged resolutions are
tainted by unconstitutionality.
(1) The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable provision in
the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang Pambansa
shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges,
and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members
thereof."14 One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon
special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the
Article on Amendments. 15 When, therefore, theInterim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and
Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue Of such impotence Its
authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the
resolutions now being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is
Concerned, the question of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not
new. In Occena v. Commission on Elections, 16 filed by the same petitioner, decided on January 28, 1980, such
a question was involved although not directly passed upon. To quote from the opinion of the Court penned by
Justice Antonio in that case: "Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the
Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from
sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935
Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as
through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed amendment." 17
(2) Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition that the amendments proposed are so extensive in
character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as
Successor of the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done was to revise and not to amend. It
suffices to quote from the opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del Rosario v. Commission on
Elections 18 to dispose of this contention. Thus: "3. And whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose
amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new
Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will
be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about
the validity of the new Constitution. 4. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with
a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total
overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised
or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people." 19 There
is here the adoption of the principle so well-known in American decisions as well as legal texts that a

constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing. 20 We are not disposed to deviate from such a
principle not only sound in theory but also advantageous in practice.
(3) That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for
proper submission. Again, petitioners have not made out a case that calls for a judgment in their favor. The
language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa,
sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It
would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative
body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be
proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement
either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose
amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such
extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for
residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and
Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1
abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the
question may be viewed not only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of the
plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention of the people
so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly informed as to the proposed changes. As to
the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the
applicable provision: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of
such amendment or revision." 21 The three resolutions were approved by the InterimBatasang Pambansa
sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of
the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution. Thus any
argument to the contrary is unavailing. As for the people being adequately informed, it cannot be denied that
this time, as in the cited 1980 Occena opinion of Justice Antonio, where the amendment restored to seventy
the retirement age of members of the judiciary, the proposed amendments have "been intensively and
extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, [ so that ] it
cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed
amendment [ s ]." 22
WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.
Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.
Abad Santos, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I vote to give due course to the petitions at bar and to grant the application for a temporary restraining order
enjoining the plebiscite scheduled for April 7, 1981.
1. Consistently with my dissenting opinion in Sanidad vs. Comelec 1 on the invalidity of the October 1976
amendments proposals to the 1973 Constitution for not having been proposed nor adopted in accordance with
the mandatory provisions thereof, as restated by me in Hidalgo vs. Marcos 2 and De la Llana vs. Comelec 3 ,
questioning the validity of the December 17, 1977 referendum exercise as to the continuance in office as
incumbent President and to be Prime Minister after the organization of the Interim Batasang Pambansa as

provided for in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments, I am constrained to dissent from the majority
decision of dismissal of the petitions.
I had held in Sanidad that the transcendental constituent power to propose and approve amendments to the
Constitution as well as to set up the machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of the
amendments proposals has been withheld by the Constitution from the President (Prime Minister) as sole
repository of executive power and that so long as the regular National Assembly provided for in Article VIII of
the Constitution had not come to existence and the proposals for constitutional amendments were now
deemed necessary to be discussed and adopted for submittal to the people, strict adherence with the
mandatory requirements of the amending process as provided in the Constitution must be complied with. This
means, under the prevailing doctrine of Tolentino vs. Comelec 4 that the proposed amendments to be valid
must come from the constitutional agency vested with the constituent power to do so, i.e. in the Interim
National Assembly provided in the Transitory Article XVII which would then have to be convened and not from
the executive power as vested in the President (Prime Minister) from whom such constituent power has been
withheld.
2. As restated by me in the 1977 case of Hidalgo, under the controlling doctrine of Tolentino, the October 1976
constitutional amendments which created the Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the Interim National
Assembly were invalid since as ruled by the Court therein, constitutional provisions on amendments "dealing
with the procedure or manner of amending the fundamental law are binding upon the Convention and the other
departments of the government (and) are no less binding upon the people" and "the very Idea of deparcing
from the fundamental law is anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and repugnant to the essence of the
rule of law." The proposed amendments at bar having been adopted by the Interim Batasang Pambansa as the
fruit of the invalid October, 1976 amendments must necessarily suffer from the same Congenital infirmity.
3. Prescinding from the foregoing and assuming the validity of the proposed amendments, I reiterate my stand
inSanidad that the doctrine of fair and proper submission firs enunciated by a simple majority of six Justices (of
an eleven member Court prior to the 1973 Constitution which increased the official composition of the Court to
fifteen) in Gonzales vs. Comelec 5 and subsequently officially adopted by the required constitutional two-thirds
majority vote of the Court (of eight votes, then) in Tolentino is fully applicable in the case at bar. The three
resolutions proposing complex, complicated and radical amendments of our very structure of government were
considered and approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February
27, 1981. It set the date of the plebiscite for thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is totally inadequate
and far short of the ninety-day period fixed by the Constitution for submittal to the people to "sufficiently inform
them of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express their will in a
genuine manner." 6
4. "The minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people
of a proposed constitutional amendment" as stated by retired Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in his separate
opinion inGonzales bears repeating as follows: "... we take the view that the words 'submitted to the people for
their ratification,' if construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution a fundamental charter that is
legislation direct from the people, an expression of their sovereign will is that it can only be amended by the
people expressing themselves according to the procedure ordained by the Constitution. Therefore,
amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere
rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original
provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their
conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We believe the word
'submitted' can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every short to
inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature
and effects thereof. ... What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an
amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to
enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier
stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent consent or
rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still approve the amendments no matter how prejudicial it is to
them, then so be it. For the people decree their own fate."
Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that "... The great men who builded the
structure of our state in this respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who
has said 'A good Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or

passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of
the people, or the thought evolved in excitement, or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone if the
government is to be safe, can be allowed efficacy ... Changes in government are to be feard unless benefit is
certain.' As Montaign says: 'All great mutation shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed
evil; another evil may succeed and a worse."'

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I vote to give due course to the petitions at bar and to grant the application for a temporary restraining order
enjoining the plebiscite scheduled for April 7, 1981.
1. Consistently with my dissenting opinion in Sanidad vs. Comelec 1 on the invalidity of the October 1976
amendments proposals to the 1973 Constitution for not having been proposed nor adopted in accordance with
the mandatory provisions thereof, as restated by me in Hidalgo vs. Marcos 2 and De la Llana vs. Comelec 3 ,
questioning the validity of the December 17, 1977 referendum exercise as to the continuance in office as
incumbent President and to be Prime Minister after the organization of the Interim Batasang Pambansa as
provided for in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments, I am constrained to dissent from the majority
decision of dismissal of the petitions.
I had held in Sanidad that the transcendental constituent power to propose and approve amendments to the
Constitution as well as to set up the machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of the
amendments proposals has been withheld by the Constitution from the President (Prime Minister) as sole
repository of executive power and that so long as the regular National Assembly provided for in Article VIII of
the Constitution had not come to existence and the proposals for constitutional amendments were now
deemed necessary to be discussed and adopted for submittal to the people, strict adherence with the
mandatory requirements of the amending process as provided in the Constitution must be complied with. This
means, under the prevailing doctrine of Tolentino vs. Comelec 4 that the proposed amendments to be valid
must come from the constitutional agency vested with the constituent power to do so, i.e. in the Interim
National Assembly provided in the Transitory Article XVII which would then have to be convened and not from
the executive power as vested in the President (Prime Minister) from whom such constituent power has been
withheld.
2. As restated by me in the 1977 case of Hidalgo, under the controlling doctrine of Tolentino, the October 1976
constitutional amendments which created the Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the Interim National
Assembly were invalid since as ruled by the Court therein, constitutional provisions on amendments "dealing
with the procedure or manner of amending the fundamental law are binding upon the Convention and the other
departments of the government (and) are no less binding upon the people" and "the very Idea of deparcing
from the fundamental law is anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and repugnant to the essence of the
rule of law." The proposed amendments at bar having been adopted by the Interim Batasang Pambansa as the
fruit of the invalid October, 1976 amendments must necessarily suffer from the same Congenital infirmity.
3. Prescinding from the foregoing and assuming the validity of the proposed amendments, I reiterate my stand
inSanidad that the doctrine of fair and proper submission firs enunciated by a simple majority of six Justices (of
an eleven member Court prior to the 1973 Constitution which increased the official composition of the Court to
fifteen) in Gonzales vs. Comelec 5 and subsequently officially adopted by the required constitutional two-thirds
majority vote of the Court (of eight votes, then) in Tolentino is fully applicable in the case at bar. The three
resolutions proposing complex, complicated and radical amendments of our very structure of government were
considered and approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February
27, 1981. It set the date of the plebiscite for thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is totally inadequate
and far short of the ninety-day period fixed by the Constitution for submittal to the people to "sufficiently inform
them of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express their will in a
genuine manner." 6

4. "The minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to the people
of a proposed constitutional amendment" as stated by retired Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in his separate
opinion inGonzales bears repeating as follows: "... we take the view that the words 'submitted to the people for
their ratification,' if construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution a fundamental charter that is
legislation direct from the people, an expression of their sovereign will is that it can only be amended by the
people expressing themselves according to the procedure ordained by the Constitution. Therefore,
amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere
rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original
provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their
conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We believe the word
'submitted' can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every short to
inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature
and effects thereof. ... What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an
amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to
enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier
stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent consent or
rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still approve the amendments no matter how prejudicial it is to
them, then so be it. For the people decree their own fate."
Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that "... The great men who builded the
structure of our state in this respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who
has said 'A good Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or
passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of
the people, or the thought evolved in excitement, or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone if the
government is to be safe, can be allowed efficacy ... Changes in government are to be feard unless benefit is
certain.' As Montaign says: 'All great mutation shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed
evil; another evil may succeed and a worse."'
Footnotes
OCCENA VS. COMELEC
SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-34150
APRIL 2, 1981
FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibiting proceedings against the
validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions (Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for
residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and
Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1
abstention.) The petitioners contends that such resolution is against the constitutions in proposing
amendments:
ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional?
HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following:
1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and how it may be exercised was
validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with
the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its
members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments similar with the interim and regular
national assembly. 15 When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and
Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue of such impotence.
2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to amount to a revision rather
than amendments. To dispose this contention, the court held that whether the Constitutional Convention will
only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an
entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment, because the
same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no
debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and
replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the
'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in

part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign
people."
3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for
proper submission. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions. The Interim
Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority
vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits
as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments
could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. Further, the
period required by the constitution was complied as follows: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three resolutions were
approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In
the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day
period provided by the Constitution.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28196

November 9, 1967

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28224

November 9, 1967

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
No. 28196:
Ramon A. Gonzales for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Juan T. David as amicus curiae
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
No. 28224:
Salvador Araneta for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
G. R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.
Petitioner therein prays for judgment:
1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913, or from performing any
act that will result in the holding of the plebiscite for the ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed
in Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of Congress of the Philippines, approved on March 16,
1967; (b) the Director of Printing from printing ballots, pursuant to said Act and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor
General from passing in audit any disbursement from the appropriation of funds made in said Republic Act No.
4913; and

2) declaring said Act unconstitutional and void.

The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the
following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum
of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several
provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province
shall have, at least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be
composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections
to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to
authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned
constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became
Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned
Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held
on November 14, 1967.
The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the hearing thereof, on October 28, 1967, the
Solicitor General appeared on behalf of respondents. Moreover, Atty. Juan T. David and counsel for the
Philippine Constitution Association hereinafter referred to as the PHILCONSA were allowed to argue
as amici curiae. Said counsel for the PHILCONSA, Dr. Salvador Araneta, likewise prayed that the decision in
this case be deferred until after a substantially identical case brought by said organization before the
Commission on Elections,1 which was expected to decide it any time, and whose decision would, in all
probability, be appealed to this Court had been submitted thereto for final determination, for a joint decision
on the identical issues raised in both cases. In fact, on October 31, 1967, the PHILCONSA filed with this Court
the petition in G. R. No. L-28224, for review bycertiorari of the resolution of the Commission on
Elections2 dismissing the petition therein. The two (2) cases were deemed submitted for decision on November
8, 1967, upon the filing of the answer of respondent, the memorandum of the petitioner and the reply
memorandum of respondent in L-28224.
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He
claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters
similarly situated. Although respondents and the Solicitor General have filed an answer denying the truth of this
allegation, upon the ground that they have no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth thereof,
such denial would appear to be a perfunctory one. In fact, at the hearing of case L-28196, the Solicitor General
expressed himself in favor of a judicial determination of the merits of the issued raised in said case.
The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan organization the objective of which is to uphold the
rule of law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions or onslaughts from whatever
source. Despite his aforementioned statement in L-28196, in his answer in L-28224 the Solicitor General
maintains that this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of L-28224, upon the ground that the same
is "merely political" as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.3 Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, who appeared before the
Commission on Elections and filed an opposition to the PHILCONSA petition therein, was allowed to appear
before this Court and objected to said petition upon the ground: a) that the Court has no jurisdiction either to
grant the relief sought in the petition, or to pass upon the legality of the composition of the House of
Representatives; b) that the petition, if granted, would, in effect, render in operational the legislative
department; and c) that "the failure of Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law . . . does not have the
legal effect of rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null
and void."
JURISDICTION
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission,4 this Court speaking through one of the leading members of
the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel declared
that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof." It is
true that in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,5 this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one,
declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a
proposed amendment to the Constitution which was being submitted to the people for ratification

satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been
weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate,6 Avelino vs. Cuenco,7 Taada vs.
Cuenco,8 and Macias vs. Commission on Elections.9 In the first, we held that the officers and employees of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed
by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary for
a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the
largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act on behalf of the party having the second largest
number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of
the, Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to
apportion the representative districts for the House of Representatives, upon the ground that the
apportionment had not been made as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of each
province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised were
political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general
grant of legislative powers to Congress.10 It is part of the inherent powers of the people as the repository of
sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours11 to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental
Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such
power.12Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives act, notas members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly.
When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people,
when performing the same function,13 for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution they are the
very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself .
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on
whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set
the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid
nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the
Supreme Court,14 the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,15 despite the eminently political character of
treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the
Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that
this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,16 the latter should be deemed
modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.
THE MERITS
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amended, reads:
The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution
or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification.
Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be proposed, either by Congress, or by a
convention called by Congress for that purpose. In either case, the vote of "three-fourths of all the members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately" is necessary. And, "such amendments shall
be valid as part of" the "Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification."
In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of three-fourths
of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately. This, notwithstanding,
it is urged that said resolutions are null and void because:
1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a
convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen;
2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose amendments or call a convention therefore
but may not avail of both that is to say, propose amendment and call a convention at the same time;
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must
be aspecial election, not a general election, in which officers of the national and local governments such as
the elections scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 will be chosen; and

4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals for amendment shall be
submitted to the people for ratification, must be held under such conditions which, allegedly, do not exist
as to give the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and implications of said
amendments.
Legality of Congress and Legal Status of the Congressmen
The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, which provides:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty Members
who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of
their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one Member. The Congress shall by
law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise.
Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same
number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the
qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise, as far
as practicable, contiguous and compact territory.
It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960; that, no apportionment having been made
within three (3) years thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its Members became
illegal; that Congress and its Members, likewise, became a de facto Congress and/or de facto congressmen,
respectively; and that, consequently, the disputed Resolutions, proposing amendments to the Constitution, as
well as Republic Act No. 4913, are null and void.
It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an apportionment within three years after the enumeration
or census made in 1960. It did actually pass a bill, which became Republic Act No. 3040,17 purporting to make
said apportionment. This Act was, however, declared unconstitutional, upon the ground that the apportionment
therein undertaken had not been made according to the number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the
Philippines.18
Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in view of the failure of Congress to make a valid
apportionment within the period stated in the Constitution, Congress became an "unconstitutional Congress"
and that, in consequence thereof, the Members of its House of Representatives are de facto officers. The
major premise of this process of reasoning is that the constitutional provision on "apportionment within three
years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise," is mandatory. The fact that Congress is under
legal obligation to make said apportionment does not justify, however, the conclusion that failure to comply with
such obligation rendered Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its Members have become de
facto officers.
It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935, Congress has not made a valid
apportionment as required in said fundamental law. The effect of this omission has been envisioned in the
Constitution, pursuant to which:
. . . Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same
number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the
qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. . . . .
The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the period to make the apportionment, a
Congress which fails to make it is dissolved or becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies necessarily that
Congress shall continue to function with the representative districts existing at the time of the expiration of said
period.
It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the elections held in 1935. This theory assumes that
an apportionment had to be made necessarily before the first elections to be held after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, or in 1938.19 The assumption, is, however, unwarranted, for there had been
no enumeration in 1935, and nobody could foretell when it would be made. Those who drafted and adopted the
Constitution in 1935 could be certain, therefore, that the three-year period, after the earliest possible
enumeration, would expire after the elections in 1938.
What is more, considering that several provisions of the Constitution, particularly those on the legislative
department, were amended in 1940, by establishing a bicameral Congress, those who drafted and adopted
said amendment, incorporating therein the provision of the original Constitution regarding the apportionment of
the districts for representatives, must have known that the three-year period therefor would expire after the
elections scheduled to be held and actually held in 1941.
Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and ratification of the original Constitution in 1935 and of
the amendment thereof in 1940 strongly indicate that the provision concerning said apportionment and the

effect of the failure to make it were expected to be applied to conditions obtaining after the elections in 1935
and 1938, and even after subsequent elections.
Then again, since the report of the Director of the Census on the last enumeration was submitted to the
President on November 30, 1960, it follows that the three-year period to make the apportionment did not expire
until 1963, or after the Presidential elections in 1961. There can be no question, therefore, that the Senate and
the House of Representatives organized or constituted on December 30, 1961, were de jure bodies, and that
the Members thereof were de jure officers. Pursuant to the theory of petitioners herein, upon expiration of said
period of three years, or late in 1963, Congress became illegal and its Members, or at least, those of the
House of Representatives, became illegal holder of their respective offices, and were de facto officers.
Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year period without a reapportionment, had the effect
of abrogating or repealing the legal provision creating Congress, or, at least, the House of Representatives,
and are not aware of any rule or principle of law that would warrant such conclusion. Neither do they allege
that the term of office of the members of said House automatically expired or that they ipso facto forfeited their
seats in Congress, upon the lapse of said period for reapportionment. In fact, neither our political law, nor our
law on public officers, in particular, supports the view that failure to discharge a mandatory duty, whatever it
may be, would automatically result in the forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to this effect.
Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our Election Law relative to the election of Members of
Congress in 1965 were not repealed in consequence of the failure of said body to make an apportionment
within three (3) years after the census of 1960. Inasmuch as the general elections in 1965 were presumably
held in conformity with said Election Law, and the legal provisions creating Congress with a House of
Representatives composed of members elected by qualified voters of representative districts as they existed at
the time of said elections remained in force, we can not see how said Members of the House of
Representatives can be regarded as de facto officers owing to the failure of their predecessors in office to
make a reapportionment within the period aforementioned.
Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the impeachment of the President, the Vice-President, the
Justices of the Supreme Court and the Auditor General for, inter alia, culpable violation of the
Constitution,20 the enforcement of which is, not only their mandatory duty, but also, their main function. This
provision indicates that, despite the violation of such mandatory duty, the title to their respective offices
remains unimpaired, until dismissal or ouster pursuant to a judgment of conviction rendered in accordance with
Article IX of the Constitution. In short, the loss of office or the extinction of title thereto is not automatic.
Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of Congress are merely de facto officers, it would not
follow that the contested resolutions and Republic Act No. 4913 are null and void. In fact, the main reasons for
the existence of the de facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under color
of title, an office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public as distinguished
from the officer in question is concerned.21 Indeed, otherwise, those dealing with officers and employees of
the Government would be entitled to demand from them satisfactory proof of their title to the positions they
hold,before dealing with them, or before recognizing their authority or obeying their commands, even if they
should act within the limits of the authority vested in their respective offices, positions or employments.22 One
can imagine this great inconvenience, hardships and evils that would result in the absence of the de
facto doctrine.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally.23 It may not be contested
except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the
ground that he is merely a de facto officer.24 And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry
into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid,
insofar as the public is concerned.
It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases at bar because the acts therein involved have not
been completed and petitioners herein are not third parties. This pretense is untenable. It is inconsistent
withTayko vs. Capistrano.25 In that case, one of the parties to a suit being heard before Judge Capistrano
objected to his continuing to hear the case, for the reason that, meanwhile, he had reached the age of
retirement. This Court held that the objection could not be entertained, because the Judge was at least, a de
facto Judge, whose title can not be assailed collaterally. It should be noted that Tayko was not a third party
insofar as the Judge was concerned. Tayko was one of the parties in the aforementioned suit. Moreover, Judge
Capistrano had not, as yet, finished hearing the case, much less rendered decision therein. No rights had
vested in favor of the parties, in consequence of the acts of said Judge. Yet, Tayko's objection was overruled.
Needless to say, insofar as Congress is concerned, its acts, as regards the Resolutions herein contested and
Republic Act No. 4913, are complete. Congress has nothing else to do in connection therewith.
The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the objection under consideration is untenable.
Available Alternatives to Congress

Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that Congress may either propose amendments to the
Constitution or call a convention for that purpose, but it can not do both, at the same time. This theory is based
upon the fact that the two (2) alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the disjunctive "or." Such basis
is, however, a weak one, in the absence of other circumstances and none has brought to our attention
supporting the conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact, the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean
"and," or vice-versa, when the spirit or context of the law warrants it.26
It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the constitutional provision on
Congress, to be submitted to the people for ratification on November 14, 1967, whereas R. B. H. No. 2 calls for
a convention in 1971, to consider proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in general. In other words, the
subject-matter of R. B. H. No. 2 is different from that of R B. H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the amendments
proposed under R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be submitted for ratification several years before those that may be
proposed by the constitutional convention called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again, although the three (3) resolutions
were passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a vote separately, or one after the other. In other
words, they were notpassed at the same time.
In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof anything that would negate the
authority of different Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the
same in, different sessions or different days of the same congressional session. And, neither has any plausible
reason been advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day.
Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional convention to propose amendments, why not
let the whole thing be submitted to said convention, instead of, likewise, proposing some specific amendments,
to be submitted for ratification before said convention is held? The force of this argument must be conceded.
but the same impugns the wisdom of the action taken by Congress, not its authority to take it. One seeming
purpose thereof to permit Members of Congress to run for election as delegates to the constitutional
convention and participate in the proceedings therein, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. Whether or not
this should be done is a political question, not subject to review by the courts of justice.
On this question there is no disagreement among the members of the Court.
May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election?
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification.
There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a "special," not a general,
election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the
people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification
in general elections.
It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the proposed amendments, that the same be
submitted to the people's approval independently of the election of public officials. And there is no denying the
fact that an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits proposed amendments is likely to be overshadowed
by the great attention usually commanded by the choice of personalities involved in general elections,
particularly when provincial and municipal officials are to be chosen. But, then, these considerations are
addressed to the wisdom of holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public officer. They do not
deny the authority of Congress to choose either alternative, as implied in the term "election" used, without
qualification, in the abovequoted provision of the Constitution. Such authority becomes even more patent when
we consider: (1) that the term "election," normally refers to the choice or selection of candidates to public office
by popular vote; and (2) that the word used in Article V of the Constitution, concerning the grant of suffrage to
women is, not "election," but "plebiscite."
Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV of the Constitution, should be
construed as meaning a special election. Some members of the Court even feel that said term ("election")
refers to a "plebiscite," without any "election," general or special, of public officers. They opine that
constitutional amendments are, in general, if not always, of such important, if not transcendental and vital
nature as to demand that the attention of the people be focused exclusively on the subject-matter thereof, so
that their votes thereon may reflect no more than their intelligent, impartial and considered view on the merits
of the proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by extraneous, if not insidious factors, let
alone the partisan political considerations that are likely to affect the selection of elective officials.

This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the attainment of which should be promoted. The ideal
conditions are, however, one thing. The question whether the Constitution forbids the submission of proposals
for amendment to the people except under such conditions, is another thing. Much as the writer and those who
concur in this opinion admire the contrary view, they find themselves unable to subscribe thereto without, in
effect, reading into the Constitution what they believe is not written thereon and can not fairly be deduced from
the letter thereof, since the spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer speculation.
The majority view although the votes in favor thereof are insufficient to declare Republic Act No. 4913
unconstitutional as ably set forth in the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is, however, otherwise.
Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the People Violate the Spirit of the Constitution?
It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved on March 16, 1967, so that, by November 14,
1967, our citizenry shall have had practically eight (8) months to be informed on the amendments in question.
Then again, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4913 provides:
(1) that "the amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette, at least twenty
days prior to the election;"
(2) that "a printed copy of the proposed amendments shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every
municipality, city and provincial office building and in every polling place not later than October 14, 1967," and
that said copy "shall remain posted therein until after the election;"
(3) that "at least five copies of said amendment shall be kept in each polling place, to be made available for
examination by the qualified electors during election day;"
(4) that "when practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Commission
on Elections, shall be kept in each polling place;"
(5) that "the Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said amendments in English, Spanish
and, whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for free distributing:" and
(6) that the contested Resolutions "shall be printed in full" on the back of the ballots which shall be used on
November 14, 1967.
We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are palpably inadequate to comply with the
constitutional requirement that proposals for amendment be "submitted to the people for their ratification," and
that said measures are manifestly insufficient, from a constitutional viewpoint, to inform the people of the
amendment sought to be made.
These were substantially the same means availed of to inform the people of the subject submitted to them for
ratification, from the original Constitution down to the Parity Amendment. Thus, referring to the original
Constitution, Section 1 of Act No. 4200, provides:
Said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be published in the Official Gazette, in
English and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election, and a
printed copy of said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial government office building and in each polling
place not later than the twenty-second day of April, nineteen hundred and thirty-five, and shall remain
posted therein continually until after the termination of the election. At least ten copies of the
Constitution with the Ordinance appended thereto, in English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each
polling place available for examination by the qualified electors during election day. Whenever
practicable, copies in the principal local dialects as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior
shall also be kept in each polling place.
The provision concerning woman's suffrage is Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 34, reading:
Said Article V of the Constitution shall be published in the Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish,
for three consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election, and the said Article V shall be
posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial office building and in each polling place
not later than the twenty-second day of April, nineteen and thirty-seven, and shall remain posted therein
continually until after the termination of the plebiscite. At least ten copies of said Article V of the
Constitution, in English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place available for examination by
the qualified electors during the plebiscite. Whenever practicable, copies in the principal native
languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall also be kept in each polling
place.

Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, referring to the 1940 amendments, is of the following tenor:
The said amendments shall be published in English and Spanish in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial government office building and in every
polling place not later than May eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty, and shall remain posted therein
until after the election. At least ten copies of said amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be
made available for examination by the qualified electors during election day. When practicable, copies
in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall also be
kept therein.
As regards the Parity Amendment, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 73 is to the effect that:
The said amendment shall be published in English and Spanish in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial government office building and in every
polling place not later than February eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and shall remain
posted therein until after the election. At least, ten copies of the said amendment shall be kept in each
polling place to be made available for examination by the qualified electors during election day. When
practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Commission on
Elections, shall also be kept in each polling place.
The main difference between the present situation and that obtaining in connection with the former proposals
does not arise from the law enacted therefor. The difference springs from the circumstance that the major
political parties had taken sides on previous amendments to the Constitution except, perhaps, the woman's
suffrage and, consequently, debated thereon at some length before the plebiscite took place. Upon the
other hand, said political parties have not seemingly made an issue on the amendments now being contested
and have, accordingly, refrained from discussing the same in the current political campaign. Such debates or
polemics as may have taken place on a rather limited scale on the latest proposals for amendment, have
been due principally to the initiative of a few civic organizations and some militant members of our citizenry
who have voiced their opinion thereon. A legislation cannot, however, be nullified by reason of the failure of
certain sectors of the community to discuss it sufficiently. Its constitutionality or unconstitutionality depends
upon no other factors than those existing at the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or
omissions of law enforcing agencies, particularly those that take place subsequently to the passage or
approval of the law.
Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency or insufficiency, from a
constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification to the people on November 14, 1967, depends
in the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this phase of the case, constitute the
minority upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fairly apprise the people of the
gist, the main idea or the substance of said proposals, which is under R. B. H. No. 1 the increase of the
maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives, from 120 to 180, and under R. B. H. No. 3
the authority given to the members of Congress to run for delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if
elected thereto, to discharge the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. We
who constitute the minority believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that said Act
is, accordingly, constitutional.
A considerable portion of the people may not know how over 160 of the proposed maximum of representative
districts are actually apportioned by R. B. H. No. 1 among the provinces in the Philippines. It is not improbable,
however, that they are not interested in the details of the apportionment, or that a careful reading thereof may
tend in their simple minds, to impair a clear vision thereof. Upon the other hand, those who are more
sophisticated, may enlighten themselves sufficiently by reading the copies of the proposed amendments
posted in public places, the copies kept in the polling places and the text of contested resolutions, as printed in
full on the back of the ballots they will use.
It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more, may fail to realize or envisage the effect of R. B. H.
No. 3 upon the work of the Constitutional Convention or upon the future of our Republic. But, then, nobody can
foretell such effect with certainty. From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are
satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as
legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.
We are impressed by the factors considered by our distinguished and esteemed brethren, who opine
otherwise, but, we feel that such factors affect the wisdom of Republic Act No. 4913 and that of R. B. H. Nos. 1
and 3, not theauthority of Congress to approve the same.
The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial power to strike down acts of the Executive or of
Congress transcending the confines set forth in the fundamental laws is not in derogation of the principle of

separation of powers, pursuant to which each department is supreme within its own sphere. The determination
of the conditions under which the proposed amendments shall be submitted to the people is concededly a
matter which falls within the legislative sphere. We do not believe it has been satisfactorily shown that
Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in enacting Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it could have done
something better to enlighten the people on the subject-matter thereof. But, then, no law is perfect. No product
of human endeavor is beyond improvement. Otherwise, no legislation would be constitutional and valid. Six (6)
Members of this Court believe, however, said Act and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 violate the spirit of the
Constitution.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and
3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the
writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs fully with the above opinion, adding a few words on the question of jurisdiction.

Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., concurring:
I concur in the foregoing opinion of the Chief Justice. I would make some additional observations in connection
with my concurrence. Sections 2 and 4 of Republic Act No. 4913 provide:
Sec. 2. The amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least
twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every
municipality, city and provincial office building and in every polling place not later than October fourteen,
nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and shall remain posted therein until after the election. At least five
copies of the said amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be made available for examination
by the qualified electors during election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native languages,
as may be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each polling place. The
Commission on Elections shall make available copies of each amendments in English, Spanish and,
whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for free distribution.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 4. The ballots which shall be used in the election for the approval of said amendments shall be
printed in English and Pilipino and shall be in the size and form prescribed by the Commission on
Elections:Provided, however, That at the back of said ballot there shall be printed in full Resolutions of
both Houses of Congress Numbered One and Three, both adopted on March sixteen, nineteen
hundred and sixty-seven, proposing the amendments: Provided, further, That the questionnaire
appearing on the face of the ballot shall be as follows:
Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to Section five of Article VI of our Constitution printed at
the back of this ballot?
Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to section sixteen of Article VI of our Constitution printed
at the back of this ballot?
To vote for the approval of the proposed amendments, the voter shall write the word "yes" or its
equivalent in Pilipino or in the local dialect in the blank space after each question; to vote for the
rejection thereof, he shall write the word "No" or its equivalent in Pilipino or in the local dialect.
I believe that intrinsically, that is, considered in itself and without reference to extraneous factors and
circumstances, the manner prescribed in the aforesaid provisions is sufficient for the purpose of having the
proposed amendments submitted to the people for their ratification, as enjoined in Section 1, Article XV of the
Constitution. I am at a loss to say what else should have been required by the Act to make it adhere more
closely to the constitutional requirement. Certainly it would have been out of place to provide, for instance, that
government officials and employees should go out and explain the amendments to the people, or that they
should be the subject of any particular means or form of public discussion.
The objection of some members of the Court to Republic Act No. 4913 seems to me predicated on the fact that
there are so many other issues at stake in the coming general election that the attention of the electorate,
cannot be entirely focused on the proposed amendments, such that there is a failure to properly submit them

for ratification within the intendment of the Constitution. If that is so, then the defect is not intrinsic in the law
but in its implementation. The same manner of submitting the proposed amendments to the people for
ratification may, in a different setting, be sufficient for the purpose. Yet I cannot conceive that the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a law may be made to depend willy-nilly on factors not inherent in its
provisions. For a law to be struck down as unconstitutional it must be so by reason of some irreconcilable
conflict between it and the Constitution. Otherwise a law may be either valid or invalid, according to
circumstances not found in its provisions, such as the zeal with which they are carried out. To such a thesis I
cannot agree. The criterion would be too broad and relative, and dependent upon individual opinions that at
best are subjective. What one may regard as sufficient compliance with the requirement of submission to the
people, within the context of the same law, may not be so to another. The question is susceptible of as many
views as there are viewers; and I do not think this Court would be justified in saying that its own view on the
matter is the correct one, to the exclusion of the opinions of others.
On the other hand, I reject the argument that the ratification must necessarily be in a special election or
plebiscite called for that purpose alone. While such procedure is highly to be preferred, the Constitution speaks
simply of "an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," and I do not
subscribe to the restrictive interpretation that the petitioners would place on this provision, namely, that it
means only a special election.

BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring:

It is the glory of our institutions that they are founded upon law, that no one can exercise any authority over the
rights and interests of others except pursuant to and in the manner authorized by law.1 Based upon this
principle, petitioners Ramon A. Gonzales and Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) come to this
Court in separate petitions.
Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and allegedly in representation thru class suit of all citizens
of this country, filed this suit for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Commission on Elections,
Director of Printing and Auditor General from implementing and/or complying with Republic Act 4913, assailing
said law as unconstitutional.
Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, non-profit and non-partisan corporation, assails the constitutionality not only
of Republic Act 4913 but also of Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 1 and 3 of March 16, 1967.
Republic Act 4913, effective June 17, 1967, is an Act submitting to the Filipino people for approval the
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in Resolutions
of Both Houses Numbered 1 and 3, adopted on March 16, 1967. Said Republic Act fixes the date and manner
of the election at which the aforesaid proposed amendments shall be voted upon by the people, and
appropriates funds for said election. Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 1 and 3 propose two amendments to the
Constitution: the first, to amend Sec. 5, Art. VI, by increasing the maximum membership of the House of
Representatives from 120 to 180, apportioning 160 of said 180 seats and eliminating the provision that
Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration; the
second, to amend Sec. 16, Art. VI, by allowing Senators and Representatives to be delegates to a
constitutional convention without forfeiting their seats.
Since both petitions relate to the proposed amendments, they are considered together herein.
Specifically and briefly, petitioner Gonzales' objections are as follows: (1) Republic Act 4913 violates Sec. 1,
Art. XV of the Constitution, in submitting the proposed amendments to the Constitution, to the people for
approval, at the general election of 1967 instead of at a special election solely for that purpose; (2) Republic
Act 4913 violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution, since it was not passed with the 3/4 vote in joint session
required when Congress proposes amendments to the Constitution, said Republic Act being a step in or part of
the process of proposing amendments to the Constitution; and (3) Republic Act 4913 violates the due process
clause of the Constitution (Sec. 1, Subsec. 1, Art. III), in not requiring that the substance of the proposed
amendments be stated on the face of the ballot or otherwise rendering clear the import of the proposed
amendments, such as by stating the provisions before and after said amendments, instead of printing at the
back of the ballot only the proposed amendments.
Since observance of Constitutional provisions on the procedure for amending the Constitution is concerned,
the issue is cognizable by this Court under its powers to review an Act of Congress to determine its conformity
to the fundamental law. For though the Constitution leaves Congress free to propose whatever Constitutional
amendment it deems fit, so that the substance or content of said proposed amendment is a matter of policy
and wisdom and thus a political question, the Constitution nevertheless imposes requisites as to
the manner orprocedure of proposing such amendments, e.g., the three-fourths vote requirement. Said

procedure or manner, therefore, from being left to the discretion of Congress, as a matter of policy and
wisdom, is fixed by the Constitution. And to that extent, all questions bearing on whether Congress in
proposing amendments followed the procedure required by the Constitution, is perforce justiciable, it not being
a matter of policy or wisdom.
Turning then to petitioner Gonzales' first objection, Sec. 1, Art. XV clearly does not bear him on the point. It
nowhere requires that the ratification be thru an election solely for that purpose. It only requires that it be at "an
election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification." To join it with an election
for candidates to public office, that is, to make it concurrent with such election, does not render it any less an
election at which the proposed amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. To prohibition
being found in the plain terms of the Constitution, none should be inferred. Had the framers of requiring
Constitution thought of requiring a special election for the purpose only of the proposed amendments, they
could have said so, by qualifying the phrase with some word such as "special" or "solely" or "exclusively". They
did not.
It is not herein decided that such concurrence of election is wise, or that it would not have been better to
provide for a separate election exclusively for the ratification of the proposed amendments. The point however
is that such separate and exclusive election, even if it may be better or wiser, which again, is not for this Court
to decide, is not included in the procedure required by the Constitution to amend the same. The function of the
Judiciary is "not to pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation".2 It is limited to
determining whether the action taken by the Legislative Department has violated the Constitution or not. On
this score, I am of the opinion that it has not.
Petitioner Gonzales' second point is that Republic Act 4913 is deficient for not having been passed by
Congress in joint session by 3/4 vote.
Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election to which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification.
Does Republic Act 4913 propose amendments to the Constitution? If by the term "propose amendment" is
meant to determine WHAT said amendment shall be, then Republic Act 4913 does not; Resolutions of Both
Houses 1 and 3 already did that. If, on the other hand, it means, or also means, to provide for how, when, and
by what means the amendments shall be submitted to the people for approval, then it does.
A careful reading of Sec. 1, Art. XV shows that the first sense. is the one intended. Said Section has two
sentences: in the first, it requires the 3/4 voting in joint session, for Congress to "propose amendments". And
then in the second sentence, it provides that "such amendments . . . shall be submitted to the people for their
ratification". This clearly indicates that by the term "propose amendments" in the first sentence is meant to
frame the substance or the content or the WHAT-element of the amendments; for it is this and this alone that is
submitted to the people for their ratification. The details of when the election shall be held for approval or
rejection of the proposed amendments, or the manner of holding it, are not submitted for ratification to form
part of the Constitution. Stated differently, the plain language of Section 1, Art. XV, shows that the act of
proposing amendments is distinct from albeit related to that of submitting the amendments to the people
for their ratification; and that the 3/4 voting requirement applies only to the first step, not to the second one.
It follows that the submission of proposed amendments can be done thru an ordinary statute passed by
Congress. The Constitution does not expressly state by whom the submission shall be undertaken; the rule is
that a power not lodged elsewhere under the Constitution is deemed to reside with the legislative body, under
the doctrine of residuary powers. Congress therefore validly enacted Republic Act 4913 to fix the details of the
date and manner of submitting the proposed amendments to the people for their ratification. Since it does not
"propose amendments" in the sense referred to by Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution, but merely provides for
how and when the amendments, already proposed, are going to be voted upon, the same does not need the
3/4 vote in joint session required in Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution. Furthermore, Republic Act 4913 is an
appropriation measure. Sec. 6 thereof appropriates P1,000,000 for carrying out its provisions. Sec. 18, Art. VI
of the Constitution states that "All appropriation . . . bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives". Republic Act 4913, therefore, could not have been validly adopted in a joint session,
reinforcing the view that Sec. 1, Art. XV does not apply to such a measure providing for the holding of the
election to ratify the proposed amendments, which must perforce appropriate funds for its purpose.
Petitioner Gonzales contends, thirdly, that Republic Act 4913 offends against substantive due process. An
examination of the provisions of the law shows no violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. The
publication in the Official Gazette at least 20 days before the election, the posting of notices in public buildings

not later than October 14, 1967, to remain posted until after the elections, the placing of copies of the proposed
amendments in the polling places, aside from printing the same at the back of the ballot, provide sufficient
opportunity to the voters to cast an intelligent vote on the proposal. Due process refers only to providing fair
opportunity; it does not guarantee that the opportunity given will in fact be availed of; that is the look-out of the
voter and the responsibility of the citizen. As long as fair and reasonable opportunity to be informed is given,
and it is, the due process clause is not infringed.
Non-printing of the provisions to be amended as they now stand, and the printing of the full proposed
amendments at the back of the ballot instead of the substance thereof at the face of the ballot, do not deprive
the voter of fair opportunity to be informed. The present wording of the Constitution is not being veiled or
suppressed from him; he is conclusively presumed to know them and they are available should he want to
check on what he is conclusively presumed to know. Should the voters choose to remain ignorant of the
present Constitution, the fault does not lie with Congress. For opportunity to familiarize oneself with the
Constitution as it stands has been available thru all these years. Perhaps it would have been more convenient
for the voters if the present wording of the provisions were also to be printed on the ballot. The same however
is a matter of policy. As long as the method adopted provides sufficiently reasonable chance to intelligently
vote on the amendments, and I think it does in this case, it is not constitutionally defective.
Petitioner Gonzales' other arguments touch on the merits or wisdom of the proposed amendments. These are
for the people in their sovereign capacity to decide, not for this Court.
Two arguments were further advanced: first, that Congress cannot both call a convention and propose
amendments; second, that the present Congress is a de facto one, since no apportionment law was adopted
within three years from the last census of 1960, so that the Representatives elected in 1961 are de
facto officers only. Not being de jure, they cannot propose amendments, it is argued.
As to the first point, Sec. 1 of Art. XV states that Congress "may propose amendments or call a convention for
that purpose". The term "or", however, is frequently used as having the same meaning as "and" particularly in
permissive, affirmative sentences so that the interpretation of the word "or" as "and" in the Constitution in such
use will not change its meaning (Vicksburg S. & P. R. Co. v. Goodenough, 32 So. 404, 411, 108 La, 442). And it
should be pointed out that the resolutions proposing amendments (R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3) are different from that
calling for a convention (R.B.H. No. 2). Surely, if Congress deems it better or wise to amend the Constitution
before a convention called for is elected, it should not be fettered from doing so. For our purposes in this case,
suffice it to note that the Constitution does not prohibit it from doing so.
As to the second argument, it is also true that Sec. 5 of Art. VI of the Constitution provides in part that "The
Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not
otherwise". It however further states in the next sentence: "Until such apportionment shall have been made,
the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National
Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present assembly districts." The failure of
Congress, therefore, to pass a valid redistricting law since the time the above provision was adopted, does not
render the present districting illegal or unconstitutional. For the Constitution itself provides for its continuance in
such case, rendering legal and de jure the status quo.
For the above reasons, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of Republic Act 4913, and fully concur with the
opinion of the Chief Justice.

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

At the outset, we are faced with a question of jurisdiction. The opinion prepared by the Chief Justice discusses
the matter with a fullness that erases doubts and misgivings and clarifies the applicable principles. A few words
may however be added.
We start from the premise that only where it can be shown that the question is to be solved by public opinion or
where the matter has been left by the Constitution to the sole discretion of any of the political branches, as was
so clearly stated by the then Justice Concepcion in Taada v. Cuenco,1 may this Court avoid passing on the
issue before it. Whatever may be said about the present question, it is hard to speak with certitude considering
Article XV, that Congress may be entrusted with the full and uncontrolled discretion on the procedure leading to
proposals for an amendment of the Constitution.
It may be said however that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,2 this Court through Justice Tuason followed Coleman v.
Miller,3 in its holding that certain aspects of the amending process may be considered political. His opinion
quoted with approval the view of Justice Black, to which three other members of the United States Supreme
Court agreed, that the process itself is political in its entirety, "from submission until an amendment becomes

part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point." In a sense
that would solve the matter neatly. The judiciary would be spared the at times arduous and in every case soulsearching process of determining whether the procedure for amendments required by the Constitution has
been followed.
At the same time, without impugning the motives of Congress, which cannot be judicially inquired into at any
rate, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that a failure to observe the requirements of Article XV would
occur. In the event that judicial intervention is sought, to rely automatically on the theory of political question to
avoid passing on such a matter of delicacy might under certain circumstances be considered, and rightly so, as
nothing less than judicial abdication or surrender.
What appears regrettable is that a major opinion of an esteemed jurist, the late Justice Tuason, would no
longer be controlling. There is comfort in the thought that the view that then prevailed was itself a product of
the times. It could very well be that considering the circumstances existing in 1947 as well as the particular
amendment sought to be incorporated in the Constitution, the parity rights ordinance, the better part of wisdom
in view of the grave economic situation then confronting the country would be to avoid the existence of any
obstacle to its being submitted for ratification. Moreover, the Republic being less than a year old, American
Supreme Court opinions on constitutional questions were-invariably accorded uncritical acceptance. Thus the
approach followed by Justice Tuason is not difficult to understand. It may be said that there is less propensity
now, which is all to the good, for this Court to accord that much deference to constitutional views coming from
the quarter.
Nor is this mode of viewing the opinion of Justice Tuason to do injustice to his memory. For as he stated in
another major opinion in Araneta v. Dinglasan,4 in ascertaining the meaning to be given the Emergency
Powers Act,5 one should not ignore what would ensue if a particular mode of construction were followed. As he
so emphatically stated, "We test a rule by its results."
The consequences of a judicial veto on the then proposed amendment on the economic survival of the country,
an erroneous appraisal it turned out later, constituted an effective argument for its submission. Why not then
consider the question political and let the people decide? That assumption could have been indulged in. It
could very well be the inarticulate major premise. For many it did bear the stamp of judicial statesmanship.
The opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion renders crystal-clear why as of this date and in the foreseeable future
judicial inquiry to assure the utmost compliance with the constitutional requirement would be a more
appropriate response.

SANCHEZ, J., in separate opinion:

Right at the outset, the writer expresses his deep appreciation to Mr. Justice Calixto O. Zaldivar and Mr. Justice
Fred Ruiz Castro for their invaluable contribution to the substance and form of the opinion which follows.
Directly under attack in this, a petition for prohibition, is the constitutionality of Republic Act 4913, approved on
June 17, 1967. This Act seeks to implement Resolutions 1 and 3 adopted by the Senate and the House of
Representatives on March 16, 1967 with the end in view of amending vital portions of the Constitution.
Since the problem here presented has its roots in the resolutions aforesaid of both houses of Congress, it may
just as well be that we recite in brief the salient features thereof. Resolution No. 1 increases the membership of
the House of Representatives from 120 to 180 members, and immediately apportions 160 seats. A companion
resolution is Resolution No. 3 which permits Senators and Congressmen without forfeiting their seats in
Congress to be members of the Constitutional Convention1 to be convened, as provided in another
resolution Resolution No. 2. Parenthetically, two of these proposed amendments to the Constitution
(Resolutions I and 3) are to be submitted to the people for their ratification next November 14, 1967.
Resolution No. 2 just adverted to calls for a constitutional convention also to propose amendments to the
Constitution. The delegates thereto are to be elected on the second Tuesday of November 1970; the
convention to sit on June 1, 1971; and the amendments proposed by the convention to be submitted to the
people thereafter for their ratification.
Of importance now are the proposed amendments increasing the number of members of the House of
representatives under Resolution No. 1, and that in Resolution No. 3 which gives Senators and Congressmen
the right to sit as members of the constitutional convention to be convened on June 1, 1971. Because, these
are the two amendments to be submitted to the people in the general elections soon to be held on November
14, 1967, upon the provisions of Section 1, Republic Act 4913, which reads:

The amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in
Resolutions of both Houses Numbered One and Three, both adopted on March sixteen, nineteen
hundred and sixty- seven, shall be submitted to the people for approval at the general election which
shall be held on November fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty- seven, in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
Republic Act 4913 projects the basic angle of the problem thrust upon us the manner in which the
amendments proposed by Congress just adverted to be brought to the people's attention.
First, to the controlling constitutional precept. In order that proposed amendments to the Constitution may
become effective, Section 1, Article XV thereof commands that such amendments must be "approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification."2The accent is on two words complementing each other, namely, "submitted" and "ratification."
1. We are forced to take a long hard look at the core of the problem facing us. And this, because the
amendments submitted are transcendental and encompassing. The ceiling of the number of Congressmen is
sought to be elevated from 120 to 180 members; and Senators and Congressmen may run in constitutional
conventions without forfeiting their seats. These certainly affect the people as a whole. The increase in the
number of Congressmen has its proportional increase in the people's tax burdens. They may not look at this
with favor, what with the constitutional provision (Section 5, Article VI) that Congress "shall by law make an
apportionment", without the necessity of disturbing the present constitutionally provided number of
Congressmen. People in Quezon City, for instance, may balk at the specific apportionment of the 160 seats set
forth in Resolution No. 1, and ask for a Congressman of their own, on the theory of equal representation. And
then, people may question the propriety of permitting the increased 180 Congressmen from taking part in the
forthcoming constitutional convention and future conventions for fear that they may dominate its proceedings.
They may entertain the belief that, if at all, increase in the number of Congressmen should be a proper topic for
deliberation in a constitutional convention which, anyway, will soon take place. They probably would ask: Why
the hurry? These ponderables require the people's close scrutiny.
2. With these as backdrop, we perforce go into the philosophy behind the constitutional directive that
constitutional amendments be submitted to the people for their ratification.
A constitutional amendment is not a temporary expedient. Unlike a statute which may suffer amendments three
or more times in the same year, it is intended to stand the test of time. It is an expression of the people's
sovereign will.
And so, our approach to the problem of the mechanics of submission for ratification of amendments is
thatreasoning on the basis of the spirit of the Constitution is just as important as reasoning by a strict
adherence to the phraseology thereof. We underscore this, because it is within the realm of possibility that a
Constitution maybe overhauled. Supposing three-fourths of the Constitution is to be amended. Or, the proposal
is to eliminate the all important; Bill of Rights in its entirety. We believe it to be beyond debate that in some
such situations the amendments ought to call for a constitutional convention rather than a legislative proposal.
And yet, nothing there is in the books or in the Constitution itself. which would require such amendments to be
adopted by a constitutional convention. And then, too, the spirit of the supreme enactment, we are sure, forbids
that proposals therefor be initiated by Congress and thereafter presented to the people for their ratification.
In the context just adverted to, we take the view that the words "submitted to the people for their ratification", if
construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution a fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the
people, an expression of their sovereign will is that it can only be amended by the people expressing
themselves according to the procedure ordained by the Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly
laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are
not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions compare them
with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free
from the incubus of extraneous or possibly in insidious influences. We believe, the word "submitted" can only
mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every effort to inform very citizen of
the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By
this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be
reached, then there is no submission within the meaning of the word as intended by the framers of the
Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment for
ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten the people,
educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one thing
is submission and another isratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent, consent or rejection. If with
all these safeguards the people still approve the amendment no matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be
it. For, the people decree their own fate.
Aptly had it been said:

. . . The great men who builded the structure of our state in this respect had the mental vision of a good
Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said "A good Constitution should beyond the reach of
temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must
yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved the excitement
or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the government is to be safe, can be allowed
efficiency. . . . Changes in government are to be feared unless the benefit is certain. As Montaign says:
"All great mutations shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil
may succeed and a worse." Am. Law Rev. 1889, p. 3113
3. Tersely put, the issue before us funnels down to this proposition: If the people are not sufficiently informed of
the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their will in a genuine
manner can it be said that in accordance with the constitutional mandate, "the amendments are submitted to
the people for their ratification?" Our answer is "No".
We examine Republic Act 4913, approved on June 17, 1967 the statute that submits to the people the
constitutional amendments proposed by Congress in Resolutions 1 and 3. Section 2 of the Act provides the
manner of propagation of the nature of the amendments throughout the country. There are five parts in said
Section 2, viz:
(1) The amendment shall be published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least
twenty days prior to the election.
(2) A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipality, city and
provincial office building and in every polling place not later than October fourteen, nineteen hundred
and sixty-seven, and shall remain posted therein until after the election.
(3) At least five copies of the said amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be made available
for examination by the qualified electors during election day.
(4) When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the
Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each polling place.
(5) The Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said amendments in English, Spanish
and, whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for free distribution.
A question that comes to mind is whether the procedure for dissemination of information regarding the
amendments effectively brings the matter to the people. A dissection of the mechanics yields disturbing
thoughts. First, the Official Gazette is not widely read. It does not reach the barrios. And even if it reaches the
barrios, is it available to all? And if it is, would all under stand English? Second, it should be conceded that
many citizens, especially those in the outlying barrios, do not go to municipal, city and/or provincial office
buildings, except on special occasions like paying taxes or responding to court summonses. And if they do, will
they notice the printed amendments posted on the bulletin board? And if they do notice, such copy again is in
English (sample submitted to this Court by the Solicitor General) for, anyway, the statute does not require that
it be in any other language or dialect. Third, it would not help any if at least five copies are kept in the polling
place for examination by qualified electors during election day. As petitioner puts it, voting time is not study
time. And then, who can enter the polling place, except those who are about to vote? Fourth, copies in the
principal native languages shall be kept in each polling place. But this is not, as Section 2 itself implies, in the
nature of a command because such copies shall be kept therein only "when practicable" and "as may be
determined by the Commission on Elections." Even if it be said that these are available before election, a
citizen may not intrude into the school building where the polling places are usually located without disturbing
the school classes being held there. Fifth, it is true that the Comelec is directed to make available copies of
such amendments in English, Spanish or whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for free
distribution. However, Comelec is not required to actively distribute them to the people. This is significant as to
people in the provinces, especially those in the far-flung barrios who are completely unmindful of the
discussions that go on now and then in the cities and centers of population on the merits and demerits of the
amendments. Rather, Comelec, in this case, is but a passive agency which may hold copies available, but
which copies may not be distributed at all. Finally, it is of common knowledge that Comelec has more than its
hands full in these pre-election days. They cannot possibly make extensive distribution.
Voters will soon go to the polls to say "yes" or "no". But even the official sample ballot submitted to this Court
would show that only the amendments are printed at the back. And this, in pursuance to Republic Act 4913
itself.
Surely enough, the voters do not have the benefit of proper notice of the proposed amendments thru
dissemination by publication in extenso. People do not have at hand the necessary data on which to base their
stand on the merits and demerits of said amendments.

We, therefore, hold that there is no proper submission of the proposed constitutional amendments within the
meaning and intendment of Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution.
4. Contemporary history is witness to the fact that during the present election campaign the focus is on the
election of candidates. The constitutional amendments are crowded out. Candidates on the homestretch, and
their leaders as well as the voters, gear their undivided efforts to the election of officials; the constitutional
amendments cut no ice with them. The truth is that even in the ballot itself, the space accorded to the casting
of "yes" or "no" vote would give one the impression that the constitutional amendments are but a bootstrap to
the electoral ballot. Worse still, the fortunes of many elective officials, on the national and local levels, are
inextricably intertwined with the results of the votes on the plebiscite. In a clash between votes for a candidate
and conscience on the merits and demerits of the constitutional amendments, we are quite certain that it is the
latter that will be dented.
5. That proper submission of amendments to the people to enable them to equally ratify them properly is the
meat of the constitutional requirement, is reflected in the sequence of uniform past practices. The Constitution
had been amended thrice in 1939, 1940 and 1947. In each case, the amendments were embodied in
resolutions adopted by the Legislature, which thereafter fixed the dates at which the proposed amendments
were to be ratified or rejected. These plebiscites have been referred to either as an "election" or "general
election". At no time, however, was the vote for the amendments of the Constitution held simultaneously with
the election officials, national or local. Even with regard to the 1947 parity amendment; the record shows that
the sole issue was the 1947 parity amendment; and the special elections simultaneously held in only three
provinces, Iloilo, Pangasinan and Bukidnon, were merely incidental thereto.
In the end we say that the people are the last ramparts that guard against indiscriminate changes in the
Constitution that is theirs. Is it too much to ask that reasonable guarantee be made that in the matter of the
alterations of the law of the land, their true voice be heard? The answer perhaps is best expressed in the
following thoughts: "It must be remembered that the Constitution is the people's enactment. No proposed
change can become effective unless they will it so through the compelling force of need of it and desire for it."4
For the reasons given, our vote is that Republic Act 4913 must be stricken down as in violation of the
Constitution.
Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Angeles, JJ., concur in the result.

REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:

I concur in the result with the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez. To approve a mere proposal to amend
the Constitution requires (Art. XV) a three-fourths (3/4) vote of all the members of each legislative chamber,
the highest majority ever demanded by the fundamental charter, one higher even than that required in order to
declare war (Sec. 24, Article VI), with all its dire consequences. If such an overwhelming majority, that was
evidently exacted in order to impress upon all and sundry the seriousness of every constitutional amendment,
is asked for a proposal to amend the Constitution, I find it impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its
framers that such amendment should be submitted and ratified by just "a majority of the votes cast at an
election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification", if the concentration of the
people's attention thereon to be diverted by other extraneous issues, such as the choice of local and national
officials. The framers of the Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof, and of the need of giving
it as much stability as is practicable, could have only meant that any amendments thereto should be debated,
considered and voted upon at an election wherein the people could devote undivided attention to the subject.
That this was the intention and the spirit of the provision is corroborated in the case of all other constitutional
amendments in the past, that were submitted to and approved in special elections exclusively devoted to the
issue whether the legislature's amendatory proposals should be ratified or not.
Dizon, Angeles, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
21 SCRA 774 Political Law Amendment to the Constitution Political Question vs Justiciable Question
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the
proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on
the same day that the general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned by
Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no

proper submission of the proposals to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the
general election rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up with their
proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other respondents
interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political
question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.
HELD:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress.
Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are inherent to the
people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when Congress makes amendments or
proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent
assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the constituent assembly is within
constitutional limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special election. SC held
that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is
a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had been
submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so
under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for
ratification in general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. Plebiscite should be scheduled on a special date
so as to facilitate Fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection. They should be able to compare the
original proposition with the amended proposition.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-34161 February 29, 1972

EUGENE A. TAN, SILVESTRE J. ACEJAS and ROGELIO V. FERNANDEZ, on their behalf and on behalf
of the People of the Philippines, petitioners,
vs.
DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL, on his behalf and on behalf of the other Delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, respondents.
RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:p
A five-page petition filed on October 6, 1971 by Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas and Rogelio V. Fernandez,
respectively, of Roxas City, Romblon and Davao City, for declaratory relief as taxpayers, but purportedly suing
on behalf of themselves and the Filipino people, in assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido
Resolution, 1 dealing with the range of the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, would have this
Court declare that it is "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to
consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a
form of government other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being] merely
empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down
therein." 2 Such a plea of the utmost seriousness was sought to be compressed in a five-page pleading. It is
understandable, therefore, why the petition could hardly be characterized as possessed of merit. Accordingly,
on October 8, 1971, this Court issued a resolution dismissing it. Then came on the last day of that month a
printed thirty-two page motion for reconsideration. It is evident that petitioners took some pains this time,
although the main reliance seems to be on a secondary authority, American Jurisprudence. 3 The show of
diligence is impressive but the persuasive quality is something else. A perusal thereof yields the conclusion
that petitioners are oblivious of the authoritative precedents in this jurisdiction. The approach is not
distinguished by its conformity with the law as it stands. In this sphere as elsewhere, new cults may be eroding
considering, however, the compulsion of the ancient faiths. Considering, however, the compulsion of the
fundamental principle of separation of powers, this Court cannot exercise the competence petitioners would

erroneously assume it possesses, even assuming that they have the requisite standing, which is the first
question to be faced.
1. What calls for prior determination is whether or not petitioners had the requisite standing to seek a
declaration of the alleged nullity of a resolution of the Constitutional Convention. 4 In the categorical and
succinct language of Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 5There has been a relaxation of this rule. So it was announced by
the present Chief Justice in Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works. 6 Thus: "Again, it is well settled that the
validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its
enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the "expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State
for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may
be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer." 7 Moreover, where a constitutional question is raised, a Senator has
usually been considered as possessed of the requisite personality to bring a suit. Thus in Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito, 8 it was a member of the Senate who was heard by this Court in a suit for prohibition to prevent the
enforcement of the congressional resolution proposing the parity rights amendment. 9 Likewise, in the latest
case in point, Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, it was a Senator who brought action challenging the
validity of Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. He was quite sucessful too.
Petitioners in the present case cannot be heard to assert that they do qualify under such a category.
Moreover, as far as a taxpayer's suit is concerned, Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it
should be entertained. It is our view that a negative answer is indicated. Nor should petitioners feel
discriminated against just because in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 10 a member of the Philippine Bar,
now Delegate Ramon Gonzales, was allowed to prosecute his action for prohibition instituted by him as a
taxpayer. Petitioners have no cause for legitimate resentment as such suit could be distinguished from the
present.
2. Petitioner Gonzales in accordance with the controlling doctrine had the good sense to wait before filing his
suit until after the enactment of the statute 11 for the submission to the electorate of certain proposed
amendments to the Constitution. 12 It was only then that the matter was ripe for adjudication. Prior to that stage,
the judiciary had to keep its hands off. The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments
being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. The judiciary as Justice Laurel emphatically asserted
"will neither direct nor restrain executive [or legislative]
action ... ." 13 The legislative and executive branches are not bound to seek its advice as to what to do or not to
do. Judicial inquiry has to be postponed in the meanwhile. It is a prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture. At such a time, it may
pass on the validity of what was done but only "when ... properly challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding." 14
Such a principle applies as well when the inquiry concerns the scope of the competence lodged in the
Constitutional Convention. The judiciary must leave it free to fulfill its responsibility according to its lights. There
is to be no interference. Its autonomy is to be respected. It cannot be otherwise if it is to perform its function
well. Such should be the case not only because it is a coordinate agency but also because its powers are
transcendent, amounting as it does to submitting for popular ratification proposals which may radically alter the
organization and functions of all three departments, including the courts. It is therefore much more imperative
that the rule of non-interference be strictly adhered to until the appropriate time comes.
More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the
interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may
the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction. That is the command of the
Constitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless and until such a doctrine loses force by being overruled or a
new precedent being announced, it is controlling. That is implicit in the rule of law. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration cannot therefor be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied. No costs.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997]

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA,
in their capacities as founding members of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization
and Action (PIRMA), respondents, SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL
ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP) and LABAN
NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special
attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few
scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the
original proponent[1] and the main sponsor[2] of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the
Constitution, characterized this system as innovative. [3] Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were
recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional
convention.[4] For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this
petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on
Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials,
by Peoples Initiative (hereafter, Delfin Petition)[5] wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for Peoples Initiative, [6] a group
of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the members of
the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be
conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of
municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the

Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated
for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the
people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on
which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the
control and supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article
VI,[7] Section 4 of Article VII,[8] and Section 8 of Article X[9] of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy
of a Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution [10] embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the
deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following
proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND
SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed
by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the
COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the
COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order [11] (a) directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition,
together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal, proposed
constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of
general circulation at his own expense not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on
12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q.
Quadra; representatives of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenoroppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers; and representatives of, or counsel for, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law
Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). [12]Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the
COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda
and/or oppositions/memoranda within five days.[13]
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein -- Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and
Maria Isabel Ongpin -- filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law
to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act
Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional Amendments by Peoples Initiative, which petitioner Senator
Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional
Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on
statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution,
unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This
deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some
future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered
before the Senate in 1994: There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the
provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This indicates
that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon
ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern the conduct of initiative on the
Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and
regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by
the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5)The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or
lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the peoples initiative.

(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other
government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the
event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the peoples initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail
expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to
mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative
itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues raised demands that this
petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling
for the admission of a taxpayers and legislators suit.[14] Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a nonextendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately
and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin
Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for peoples
initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment [15] on the petition. They
argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR GENERAL
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION
(P180,000,000.00) IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE
THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC
GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING
ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM
OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE
DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE
DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571, 200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH
BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY PURSUANT TO ITS INITIATORY
JURISDICTION UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION
IN THE CASE OFSUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE
POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY
PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT
6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN
THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE
THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY
SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL
AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS.
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION
DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS
MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT. (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290,
ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED
UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN
AMENDMENT. AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS
OF THE CONSTITUTION.REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT
TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED. (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992,
1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment [16] which starts off
with an assertion that the instant petition is a knee-jerk reaction to a draft Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution ... which is not formally filed yet. What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an Initiatory Pleading or
Initiatory Petition, which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to
put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and function.On the substantive allegations of
the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:

(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct
of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since
subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend the
Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of
the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of
the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A.
6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution because it
seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only those which lay term
limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners estimate of P180 million
as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be
simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will be a priority
government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment[17] for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the
Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement
of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which enumerates the
three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentions initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being
national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that
nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal
with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a revision
thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the
Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No.
6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC .
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the
aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private respondents
through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latters Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private respondents
Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion
for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in
Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached to
the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention
wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution because, in
the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.,[18] it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects
unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated
one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of
guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties.
[19]
A revision cannot be done byinitiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution, is limited to amendments.

(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and local
elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, to open up the political arena to as many as there
are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and
economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation in
policy and decision-making for the common good; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the
noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest
situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they are
dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium for good performance.[20]
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements the
peoples initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file the
petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d)
the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and
3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g)
the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal
from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such
peoples initiative. Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfins
petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since
the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for a peoplesinitiative under Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not
constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard for a valid
delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in Intervention. [21] He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is
the enabling law that implements the peoples right to initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a
consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even
delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was empowered under
Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the
respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its
publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an
initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the required number of
registered voters. He also submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the
authority and resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of signatures, as the
COMELECs role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the
initiative petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention
raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on the initiative to
amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number of
signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by Congress or a
constitutional convention.[22]
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the
DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the
Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and of
the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated
Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention
within a nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a
nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which
the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution;
and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the
Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding
the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of
specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain
an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist
Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the
publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the deliberations
on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and
arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin Petition
for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commissions failure or refusal to do so constituted
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record of the
House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of
stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in
Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP.[23]The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their
separate memoranda.[24]
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which appears
to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I

THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE

PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e.,
whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This
being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and under the Rules of
Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and
directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with
which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view
of the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body politic of the questioned Comelec
order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of man,
only the Supreme Court can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution.[25]

It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on
the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. [26] The COMELEC made
no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the
hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda.[27] Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due course to the
Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for
Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELECs
failure to act on Rocos motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable
the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. -- Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person,
whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin
Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of registered
voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin
Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case
may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorariunder Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure in cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Guingona, Jr.:[28]
A partys standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set
aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court
brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
II

R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM

OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under
this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than
once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book,[29] Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is
dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people
cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision
proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332).[30] That section reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:

(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article ____ Section ____ of the
Constitution.[31]
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a new formulation
of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete
Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now
covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote
Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7.[32]
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the
legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are no details in the
provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to the
legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature does not pass the
necessary implementing law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially with respect to the
budget appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We deemed it
best that this matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as envisioned, no
amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after five years from the date of the ratification of
this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be proposed through the exercise of this initiative
power would be after five years. It is reasonably expected that within that five-year period, the National
Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature - the details on how this is to be carried out - is it
possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for ratification is the work of the legislature rather
than of the people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself as a body could
propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths vote in order to
constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that proposal to the people for ratification through the
process of an initiative.
xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to vest constituent power
in the people to amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of institutionalizing popular
participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties
in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy
of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal values, the Constitution is
source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of circumspection in the drafting and in
the amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we have a separate article in
the constitution that would specifically cover the process and the modes of amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to again concede to the
legislature the process or the requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the Constitution by
people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands of the National
Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would adequately cover all the
conceivable situations.[33]
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to
AMEND -- not to REVISE -- the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. ... This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of
amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative
should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of
the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.[34]
xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate
section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of
realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate
section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is
limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul
of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b)
in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the
public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ.That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.[35]
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with the following:
xxx
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking into account the
modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama,
Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now
read as follows: "SECTION 2. -- AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS
THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE
YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE
OF THIS RIGHT.

MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective of the sense
contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed amendment.[36]
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it
was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the legislature to set forth certain
procedures to carry out the initiative...?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioners amendment does not prevent the legislature from asking another body
to set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this particular right would be
subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for submission to the
people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.[37]
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to
AMENDMENTS to -- NOT REVISION of -- the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So
insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."[38]
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing
through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:

amendments

MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is an amendment to the
Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National Assembly by a vote
of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit
the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the National Assembly is required, the import
being that the process of amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an
ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law proposed by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I
cannot agree to reducing the requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it would
require another voting by the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10
percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the Commission shall take
up the Article on the Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary sessions.[39]
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version,
which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO
THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE
UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED
VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE
PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL
BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR
OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE
OF THIS RIGHT.[40]
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9 July 1986.
[41]
Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an
amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again approved
onSecond and Third Readings on 1 August 1986.[42]
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing
percent to per centum and thereof to therein and deleting the phrase by law in the second paragraph so that
said paragraph reads: The Congress[43] shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.[44] This
amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2
of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress provided for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the
question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No.
6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through
the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the
Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:
The Congress[45] shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules
implementing the exercise of the right. The rules means the details on how [the right] is to be carried out.[46]
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No.
17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of
Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497,[47] which dealt with
the initiative and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill
No. 988,[48] which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum
under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17[49] solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or
resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17
and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the
Senate[50] and by the House of Representatives.[51] This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. -- The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions
passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed. (Underscoring supplied).
The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor
relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws,
ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out
earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the
power to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution through the system
of initiative. They can only do so with respect to laws, ordinances, or resolutions.
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of
Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and
appropriately used the phrases propose and enact, approve or reject and in whole or in part.[52]
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems ofinitiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements)

restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the
proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a
petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of
the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It
does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be
amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as
the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written
or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Underscoring supplied).
The use of the clause proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed only
strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided forinitiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous
silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and
local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of
things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under
the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II
(National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt
that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is
national initiative, if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is anational law, or a law which only Congress
can pass. It is local initiative if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or
resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative into national andlocal is actually based
on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:
SEC. 3. Definition of terms -xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Underscoring supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.[53]
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to
the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section
9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the
purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of the Commission.
(Underscoring supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local
governments; thus:
SEC. 11. Indirect Initiative. -- Any duly accredited peoples organization, as defined by law, may file a petition
for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies....
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or
insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both national and
local initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on Authority of Courts under subtitle III on Local Initiative and
Referendum is misplaced,[54] since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and
referendum. It reads:
SEC. 18. Authority of Courts. -- Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring
null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity
of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the
implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special
attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.[55]
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative bodys failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power of
initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit concerned
as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters for
their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and

(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.[56]

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twentythree sections, merely (a) mentions, the word Constitution in Section 2; (b) defines initiative on the Constitution
and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of plebiscite as the
process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people;
(d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e)
provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of
initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service.[57]
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae
on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.[58]
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas
delegata non delegari potest.[59] The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.[60]
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate
rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case
of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a)
is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;
and (b) fixes a standard -- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable -- to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. [61] A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.[62]
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably
failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is
then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS
ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power under Section
2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where
subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to
implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the
power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative
on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every
legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not
contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered
signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather
signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is
the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only
participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of
the petition;[63] (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of
registered voters in each legislative district;[64] (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment
of signature stations;[65] and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.[66]
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The latter knew that the petition does
not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution
No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was
merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper,
which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996,
and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and
resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of
the elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered
unnecessary, if not academic.

CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining
or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments on the Constitution until a sufficient law shall
have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer
be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any
longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people
under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hreby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing
rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
Political Law Revision vs Amendment to the Constitution
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term
Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and
dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in
papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in
establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition
against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues among others that the Peoples Initiative is limited to amendments
to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term limits of those in power
(particularly the President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of peoples initiative.
ISSUE: Whether the proposed Delfin petition constitutes amendment to the constitution or does it constitute a
revision.

HELD: The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution because,
in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ., it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects
unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated
one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of
guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision
cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is
limited to amendments. The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other
national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, to open up the political arena
to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of
political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for
participation in policy and decision-making for the common good; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate
and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.

Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest

Lambino Vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006
Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the
1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative
petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what
was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 17 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameralpresidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of
enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is
inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino
Groups petition.
Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a
peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the
Lambino petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by
the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of
the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended
that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the
constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2
Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735