2.

Plant Layout Design

for
Safety & Inherent Safety

The Lady or the Tiger?

A king offered a challenge to three young men. Each would be
put in a room with two doors and could open both. If he opened
one, a hungry tiger would come outthe fiercest and most cruel
that could be obtainedthat would tear him to pieces. If he
opened the other, a young lady would come out, the most suitable
to his years and station that His Majesty could select from
amongst his fair subjects.

The Lady or the Tiger?

The first young man refused the challenge.
He lived safe and died chaste.

The Lady or the Tiger?

The second young man hired risk-assessment consultants. They collected all the available
data on lady and tiger populations. They brought in sophisticated equipment to listen for
growling and detect the faintest whiff of perfume. They completed checklists. They
developed a utility function and assessed the young mans risk aversion. Naturally this
took time (and money). The young man, now no longer quite so young, began to worry that
he would soon be no longer able to enjoy the lady. Finally, he asked the consultants to
recommend a course of action.
He opened the optimal door and was eaten by a low-probability tiger.

The Lady or the Tiger?

The third young man took a course in tiger handling..!!

The moral of the story

The young men represent us all, the tiger the hazards of industry, and the lady
the benefits industry brings to humanity. Like the first young man, society
can leave the game. We can manage without chemical plants, the benefits
they bring, and the risks they carry.
Like the second young man, we can (and do) try to assess the risks and open
the safest doors, but we can never be completely sure that our assessments are
correct and that an accident will not occur.

When possible, we should try, like the third young man, to change the work
situation and to choose designs or methods of working that minimize the hazard.

Why Inherently Safer Design?

ISD has received increased attention from the chemical industry since the 1970s as a
result of a number of major industrial accidents.
Flixborough, England (1974)

a large release of cyclohexane.

killed 28 workers,
injured 36,
destroyed the plant
53 casualties off site

Pasadena, Texas (1989) a leak of flammable vapor,

23 fatalities and
hundreds of injuries, and
destroying the plant.

Bhopal, India (1984) water entered a storage tank containing methyl isocyanate (MIC)
Exact casualty figures are disputed,
Official Indian government estimate of fatalities was 4000 in 1994.

Inherent safety

Inherent - Something which exist as a permanent and inseparable element.

Safety based on physical and chemical properties of the system, not based on added safety
devices and systems.

The major principle in Inherent Safety is to remove the hazards altogether rather than controlling.
The best method to achieve this is to reduce the inventories of hazardous substances such that a
major hazard is no longer presented.
However, this is not often readily achievable. Other possible methods to achieve an Inherently
Safer design are:
Intensification of Processes
Substitution of hazardous substances by less hazardous alternatives
Attenuation of inventories;
Reduction of hazardous process conditions i.e. temperature, pressure;
Simpler systems/processes
Fail-safe design e.g. valve position on failure.

Layers of Protection
COMMUNITY EMERGENCY REPSONSE
PLANT EMERGENCY REPSONSE
PHYSICAL PROTECTION (DIKES)
PHYSICAL PROTECTION (RELIEF DEVICES)
AUTOMATIC ACTION SIS OR ESD
CRITICAL ALARMS, OPERATOR
SUPERVISION, AND MANUAL INTERVENTION
BASIC CONTROLS, PROCESS ALARMS,
AND OPERATOR SUPERVISION

PROCESS
DESIGN

LAH
1

12

Multiple Layers of Protection

Potential Incidents

Layers of Protection

Actual Risk

13

Degraded Layers of Protection

Potential Incidents

Degraded

Higher Actual Risk

Layers of Protection

Degraded

14

Inherently Safe Process

No additional layers of protection needed

Probably not possible if you consider ALL potential hazards
But, we can be Inherently Safer

PROCESS
DESIGN

LAH
1

15

Inherently Safer Process Risk

Potential Incidents

No Layers of Protection
Needed

Actual Risk

16

Inherently Safer Design

The possibility for affecting the inherent safety of a process decreases as
the design proceeds and more and more engineering and financial
decisions have been made.
It is much easier to affect the process configuration and inherent safety in
the conceptual design phase than in the later phases of process design.
For instance the process route selection is made in the conceptual design
and it is many times difficult and expensive to change the route later.
Time and money is also saved when fewer expensive safety modifications
are needed and fewer added-on safety equipment are included to the final
process solution.

Inherently Safer Design Opportunities

Comparison with other ways of Reducing Risk

Inherent or Intrinsic eliminating the hazard by using materials and process conditions that are
nonhazardous.

Passive eliminating or minimizing the hazard by process and equipment design features that
do not eliminate the hazard, but do reduce either the frequency or consequence of the hazard
without the need for any device to function actively (e.g., the use of higher pressure-rated
equipment).
Active using controls, safety interlocks, and emergency shutdown systems to detect potentially
hazardous process deviations and take corrective action. These are commonly referred to as
engineering controls.

Procedural using operating procedures, administrative checks, emergency response, and other
management approaches to prevent incidents or to minimize the effects of an incident. These are
commonly referred to as administrative controls.

Illustrative Example
Case - Example Morton International, Paterson, NJ runaway reaction in 1998,
injured 9 people.
The process is a simple exothermic batch reaction in which two or more reactants
are added to a reactor, along with other materials such as solvents, and reacted
to produce a desired product.
The reaction is exothermic therefore there is a potential for a runaway reaction
the temperature and pressure of the reactor cannot be controlled by the
cooling system and the reactor could rupture due to high pressure an explosion
of the reactor.
Hazard of concern runaway reaction causing high temperature and pressure
and potential reactor rupture.
20

By Inherent Safety Method - Develop chemistry

which is not exothermic, or mildly exothermic
Maximum adiabatic reactor
temperature is less than the boiling
point of all ingredients and onset
temperature of any decomposition
or other reactions, and no gaseous
products are generated by the
reaction.

The reaction does not generate any

pressure, either from confined gas
products or from boiling of the
reactor contents

VENT
REACTANT FEEDS

PI

COOLING
TI

21

By Passive Safety Method

Maximum adiabatic pressure for

reaction determined to be 150
psig
Carryout the reaction in a vessel
with design pressure as 250 psig.
Hazard (pressure) still exists, but
passively contained by the
pressure vessel.

VENT
REACTANT FEEDS
PRV
PI

TI
COOLING

22

By Active Safety Method

Maximum adiabatic pressure for

100% reaction is 150 psig, reactor
design pressure is 50 psig.
Gradually add limiting reactant with
temperature control to limit
potential energy from reaction.
Use high temperature and pressure
interlocks to stop feed and apply
emergency cooling.
Provide emergency relief system.

VENT

RUPTURE DISK WITH DISCHARGE

TO SAFE PLACE
REACTANT FEEDS

PA
H
TA
H

SAFETY SYSTEM
LOGIC ELEMENT

COOLING

23

By Procedural Safety Method

Maximum adiabatic pressure

for 100% reaction is 150 psig,
reactor design pressure is 50
psig
Gradually add limiting
reactant with temperature
control to limit potential
energy from reaction
Train operator to observe
temperature, stop feeds and
apply cooling if temperature
exceeds critical operating
limit

VENT

RUPTURE DISK WITH DISCHARGE

TO SAFE PLACE
REACTANT FEEDS

PA
H
TA
H
COOLING

24

Which strategy should we use?

Generally, in order of robustness and reliability:

Inherent
Passive
Active
Procedural

But - there is a place and need for ALL of these strategies in a

complete safety program

25

Site Evaluation

Credible worst case scenarios Major Accident Hazards

Reasonable definition of local meteorological conditions and possible
extremes
Population density and numbers of people likely to be involved
General planning and development guidelines for the region
Ability to control movement of people in an emergency

26

General Goals of Plant Layout Design

Meet quality and capacity

requirement in the most
economical manner.

Achieve production deadlines.

Promote effective use of people,

equipment, space and energy.

Waste-disposable problems.

Minimize unit costs and optimize

quality.
Provide for employee safety and
comfort.
Control project costs.

Type of building and building code

requirements.
Guidelines related to health and
safety.
Space available and space
requirement.
Auxiliary equipment.
Roads and railroad.

Typical Safety Based

Site Layout DecisionMaking Process

Inherent Safety Concerns on Plant Layout

Minimal explosion damage, since

explosion overpressure falls off rapidly
with distance from the center of the
explosion
Minimal thermal radiation damage, as
the intensity also falls off with the
distance
Less property damage(containment of
accidents)
Easier access for emergency services such
as fire fighting
Easier access to equipment for
maintenance and inspection

Efficient and safe construction (drainage

and grade sloping)
Optimum balance among loss control,
maintenance and operation requirements
Future expansions
Impact on plant economics (more spaces
increased capital costs but also enhanced
safety need to optimize)

Methods & Techniques

Process industry has used the Dow Fire and Explosion Hazard Index
(DOW, 1987) and the Mond Index (ICI, 1985) for many years.
These indices deal with fire and explosion hazard rating of process
plants.
Dow and Mond Indices are rapid hazard-assessment methods for use
on chemical plant, during process and plant development, and in the
design of plant layout.
They are best suited to later design stages when process equipment,
chemical substances and process conditions are known.
30

Evaluation Methods & Techniques

Edwards and Lawrence (1993) have developed a Prototype Index of Inherent
Safety (PIIS) for process design.
The inherent safety index is intended for analysing the choice of process route;
i.e. the raw materials used and the sequence of the reaction steps.
This method is very reaction oriented and does not consider properly the other
parts of the process even they usually represent the majority of equipment.
The PIIS has been calculated as a total score, which is the sum of a chemical score
and a process score. The chemical score consists of inventory, flammability,
explosiveness and toxicity. The process score includes temperature, pressure and
yield.
Some of the scores are based on similar tables in the Dow and Mond Indices.
Others have been constructed by dividing the domain of values of a parameter
into ranges and assigning a score to each range.
31

Evaluation Methods & Techniques

Safety analysis
methods

Dow Fire and

Explosion
Index

Mond Index
Prototype Index of
Inherent
Safety (PIIS)

Elements of the method

Material factor: flammability and reactivity

General process hazards: exothermic chemical reactions, endothermic processes,
material handling and transfer, enclosed or indoor process units, access to the area,
drainage and spill control
Special process hazards: Such as toxic materials, sub-atmospheric pressure, operation in
or near flammable range, dust explosion, relief pressure, low temperature, quantity of
flammable and unstable materials, corrosion and erosion, leakage in the cases of joints
and packing, use of fired heaters, hot oil exchange systems, rotating equipment
Material factor / Special material hazards / General process hazards / Special process
hazards / Quantity factor / Layout hazards / Toxicity hazards
Chemical score: inventory, flammability, explosiveness and toxicity
Process score: temperature, pressure and yield
Total score: sum of the chemical and process scores

32

33

34

35

Comparison & Interpretation