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UNIVERSITY OF PUNE

DEPARTMENT OF LAW

**LONGISH TERM PAPER**

SUBJECT – ANTI-DEFECTION LAW &


PARLIAMENTARI PRIVILEGES

SUBMITTED TO – NAGARALE MAM


Department of law
University of Pune, Pune-07

SUBMITTED BY- AMIT ANIL SALUNKE


LL.M. 1st year (2nd sem.)
Department of law,
University of Pune-07

Date of submission –20/04/2010

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 1


TENTATIVE CHAPTERISATION
1. INTRODUCTION:
1.1 General Introduction.

1.2 Significance of study.

1.3 Objective of study.

1.4 Hypothesis.

1.5 Scope of the study.

1.6 Research methodology.

2. ANTI-DEFECTION LAW: AN OVERVIEW:-


2.1 Anti-Defection - Meaning

2.2Constitutional Provisions

2.3Scheme of the Act.

3. PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES & ANTI-


DEFECTION LAW

4 . ANTI-DEFECTION LAW-NEED FOR REVIEW.

5. AMENDMENTS IN ANTI-DEFECTION LAW.

6. ANTI-DEFECTION LAW- INTENT & IMPACT.

7. CONCLUSION & SUGGESTIONS.

8. CRITICAL APPRAISAL.

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 2


Bibliography
Webliography

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 3


** CHAPTER 1:- GENERAL INTRODUCTION
**
1.1 INTRODUCTION:-

The judiciary can function and deliver the fruits only when it acts with free
and independent manner. But in the name of independence uncontrolled,
arbitrary actions cannot be tolerated because honesty and conviction with
justice are the principles on which the trust of whole judicial system is
erected. This requires not only judicial independence but also a supportive
control over it, so that the independence would be promoted and arbitrariness
is restricted.

1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY:-

I. We are enable to know draw back in the implementation of anti-


defection laws.

II. We can understand the reason which causes parliaments enact


this law

III. In enables us understand why this law cannot be


implementation.

IV. Enable the points or the lacunas on which we can develop this
laws

V. we can suggest for judiciary to perform more active role for the
stability Indian politics
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY:-

i. To study the relevant provisions of constitution regarding anti-


defection.

ii. To study the utility & mis-use of those provisions.

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 4


iii. To study the role of judiciary in the disputes regarding the matters of
anti-defection.

iv. To study role of anti-defection law in the stability of Indian politics

v. To study the possible improvements or modification in this law which


can inspired Indian politics to be a matured one.

1.5 HYPOTHESIS:-

1. The Inheritant parliamentary democracy would not sustain in India


because of circumstances the vastness of country ignorance of
public towards election process etc.

2. An Indian politics depends on the multi-party system & instead of


believing the separate ideals it is control of power ambition.

3. Anti-defection laws are very necessary & useful to control


degradation of “Political Behaviouralism.”

4. Unfortunately the laws other not made or implemented with honest


mind or intimation.

5. Ultimately it is the first steps towards a matured democracy.

1.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY:-

My study would be limited regarding the


original provisions of anti-defection laws and its current position.
My study looks in to some of the historical case laws which are important in
the matters of constitutional, adjudication of anti-defection laws.

1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:-

I have used doctrinal method of research for


the study of this subject. I will undergo through primarily various text books,
constituent assembly debates, various law commissions reports, international
conventions, law journals, articles, cases, etc. I will also use off-line and on-
line study material

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 5


CHAPTER 2 ANTI-DEFECTION LAW: AN
OVERVIEW:-

2.1 Anti-Defection - Meaning

To discourage the practice of defection of members from one party to


another after their election, the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act,
1985 was enacted by the Parliament. The Amendment to Article
102(regarding Members of either Houses of Parliament) and 191 (regarding
Members of state legislatures) seeks to put an end to the evil of political
defections that undermines the basic principle of democracy. Amendment
had been made in Article 191 to provide that a person shall be disqualified
for being a member of the state Legislature if he is so disqualified under the
Tenth Schedule.

The new Tenth Schedule added in the Constitution contains provisions as to


disqualification on the ground of defection. The question whether a member
has become subject to the disqualification will be decided by the presiding
officer of the House. The Speaker/Chairperson has been empowered to make
rules for giving effect to the provisions of the Schedule.

Section 16 of the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi, Act,


1991” provides for disqualification of Members of the Delhi Assembly on
grounds of defection. In pursuance of the powers conferred under the
provisions of the Tenth Schedule and the GNCT Act, the “Members of Delhi
Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules,
1996” was framed.

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 6


2.2 CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS.

TENTH SCHEDULE
[Articles 102(2) and 191(2)]
Provisions as to disqualification on ground of defection

1. Interpretation.- In this Schedule, unless the context otherwise requires,- (a)


"House" means either House of Parliament or the Legislative Assembly or,
as the case may be, either House of the Legislature of a State;

(b) legislature party", in relation to a member of a House belonging to any


political party in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 or paragraph
3 or, as the case may be, paragraph 4, means the group consisting of all the
members of that House for the time being belonging that political party in
accordance with the said provisions;

(c) "original political party", in relation to a member of a House, means the


political party to which he belongs for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) of
paragraph 2;

(d) "paragraph" means a paragraph of this Schedule.

2. Disqualification on ground of defection. - (1) Subject to the provisions of


paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, a member of a House belonging to any political party
shall be disqualified for being a member of the House-

(a) if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party; or

(b) if he votes or abstains from voting in such House contrary to any


direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person
or authority authorised by it in this behalf, without obtaining, in either case,
the prior permission of such political party, person or authority and such
voting or abstention has not been condoned by such political party, person or
authority within fifteen days from the date of such voting or abstention.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-paragraph,-

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 7


(a) an elected member of a House shall be deemed to belong to the political
party, if any, by which he was set up as a candidate for election as such
member;

(b) a nominated member of a House shall,-

(i) where he is a member of any political party on the date of his nomination
as such member, be deemed to belong to such political party;

(ii) in any other case, be deemed to belong to the political party of which he
becomes, or, as the case may be, first becomes, a member before the expiry
of six months from the date on which he takes his seat after complying with
the requirements of article 99 or, as the case may be, article 188.

(2) An elected member of a House who has been elected as such otherwise
than as a candidate set up by any political party shall be disqualified for
being a member of the House if he joins any political party after such
election.

(3) A nominated member of a House shall be disqualified for being a


member of the House if he joins any political party after the expiry of six
months from the date on which he takes his seat after complying with the
requirements of article 99 or, as the case may be, article 188.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this


paragraph, a person who, on the commencement of the Constitution (Fifty-
second Amendment) Act, 1985, is a member of a House (whether elected or
nominated as such) shall,-

(i) where he was a member of political party immediately before such


commencement, be deemed, for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) of this
paragraph, to have been elected as a member of such House as a candidate
set up by such political party;

(ii) in any other case, be deemed to be an elected member of the House who
has been elected as such otherwise than as a candidate set up by any political
party for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph or, as the case
may be, be deemed to be a nominated member of the House for the purposes
of sub-paragraph (3) of this paragraph.

3. Disqualification on ground of defection not to apply in case of split.-


Where a member of a House makes a claim that he and any other members
of his legislature party constitute the group representing a faction which has
AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 8
arisen as a result of a split in his original political party and such group
consists of not less than one-third of the members of such legislature party,-

(a) he shall not be disqualified under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2 on the


ground-

(i) that he has voluntarily given up his membership of his original political
party; or

(ii) that he has voted or abstained from voting in such House contrary to any
direction issued by such party or by any person or authority authorised by it
in that behalf without obtaining the prior permission of such party, person or
authority and such voting or abstention has not been condoned by such party,
person or authority within fifteen days from the date of such voting or
abstention; and

(b) from the time of such split, such faction shall be deemed to be the
political party to which he belongs for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) of
paragraph 2 and to be his original political party for the purposes of this
paragraph.

4. Disqualification on ground of defection not to apply in case of merger.- (1)


A member of a House shall not be disqualified under sub-paragraph (1) of
paragraph 2 where his original political party merges with another political
party and he claims that he and any other members of his original political
party-

(a) have become members of such other political party or, as the case may
be, of a new political party formed by such merger; or

(b) have not accepted the merger and opted to function as a separate group,

and from the time of such merger, such other political party or new political
party or group, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the political party
to which he belongs for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2 and
to be his original political party for the purposes of this sub-paragraph.

(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph, the erger of the
original political party of a member of a House shall be eemed to have taken
place if, and only if, not less than two-thirds of the members of the
legislature party concerned have agreed to such merger.

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5. Exemption.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Schedule, a
person who has been elected to the office of the Speaker or the Deputy
Speaker of the House of the People or the Deputy Chairman of the Council
of States or the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman of the Legislative Council
of a State or the Speaker or the Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly
of a State, shall not be disqualified under this Schedule,-

(a) if he, by reason of his election to such office, voluntarily gives up the
membership of the political party to which he belonged immediately before
such election and does not, so long as he continues to hold such office
thereafter, rejoin that political party or become a member of a another
political party; or

(b) if he, having given up by reason of his election to such office his
membership of the political party to which he belonged immediately before
such election, rejoins such political party after he ceases to hold such office.

6. Decision on questions as to disqualification on ground of defection.- (1) If


any question arises as to whether a member of a House has become subject to
disqualification under this Schedule, the question shall be referred for the
decision of the Chairman or, as the case may be, the Speaker of such House
and his decision shall be final:

Provided that where the question which has arisen is as to whether the
Chairman or the Speaker of a House has become subject to such
disqualification, the question shall be referred for the decision of such
member of the House as the House may elect in this behalf and his decision
shall be final.

(2) All proceedings under sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph in relation to


any question as to disqualification of a member of a House under this
Schedule shall be deemed to be proceedings in Parliament within the
meaning of article 122 or, as the case may be, proceedings in the Legislature
of a State within the meaning of article 212.

7. Bar of jurisdiction of courts.- Notwithstanding anything in this


Constitution, no court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of any matter
connected with the disqualification of a member of a House under this
Schedule.

8. Rules.-(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph,


the Chairman or the Speaker of a House may make rules for giving effect to

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 10


the provisions of this Schedule, and in particular, and without prejudice to
the generality of the foregoing, such rules may provide for-

(a) the maintenance of registers or other records as to the political parties, if


any, to which different members of the House belong;

(b) the report which the leader of a legislature party in relation to a member
of a House shall furnish with regard to any condonation of the nature referred
to in clause

(b) of sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2 in respect of such member, the time


within which and the authority to whom such report shall be furnished;

(c) the reports which a political party shall furnish with regard to admission
to such political party of any members of the House and the officer of the
House to whom such reports shall be furnished; and

(d) the procedure for deciding any question referred to in sub-paragraph (1)
of paragraph 6 including the procedure for any inquiry which may be made
for the purpose of deciding such question.

(2) The rules made by the Chairman or the Speaker of a House under sub-
paragraph (1) of this paragraph shall be laid as soon as may be after they are
made before the House for a total period of thirty days which may be
comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions and shall take
effect upon the expiry of the said period of thirty days unless they are sooner
approved with or without modifications or disapproved by the House and
where they are so approved, they shall take effect on such approval in the
form in which they were laid or in such modified form, as the case may be,
and where they are so disapproved, they shall be of no effect.

(3) The Chairman or the Speaker of a House may, without prejudice to the
provisions of article 105 or, as the case may be, article 194, and to any other
power which he may have under this Constitution direct that any wilful
contravention by any person of the rules made under this paragraph may be
dealt with in the same manner as a breach of privilege of the House.

1.3 SCHEME OF ACT:-


The Tenth Schedule — popularly known as the Anti-Defection Act — was
included in the Constitution in 1985 by the Rajiv Gandhi ministry and sets
the provisions for disqualification of elected members on the grounds of
defection to another political party.
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The law was added via the 52nd Amendment Act, 1985, soon after the Rajiv
government came to power with a thumping majority in the wake of the
assassination of prime minister Indira Gandhi. The Congress had won 401
seats in the Lok Sabha.

 GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION UNDER


THE ANTI-DEFECTION LAW'S ARTICLES 102
(2) AND 191 (2):-
a) If an elected member voluntarily gives up his membership of a political
party;
b) If he votes or abstains from voting in such House contrary to any direction
issued by his political party or anyone authorized to do so, without obtaining
prior permission.
As a pre-condition for his disqualification, his abstention from voting should
not be condoned by his party or the authorized person within 15 days of such
incident.

 Circumstances under which a split in a party is not


considered a ‘defection’:-
A split in a political party will not be considered a defection if an entire
political party merges with another; if a new political party is formed by
some of the elected members of one party; if he or she or other members of
the party have not accepted the merger between the two parties and opted to
function as a separate group from the time of such a merger.

 The powers of a party whip under the Constitution in case


of a defection:-

The whip upholds the party directives in the House as the authorised voice of
the party. On defection of elected members of his party, the whip can send a
petition on the alleged defection to the Chairman or the Speaker of a House
for their disqualification. He can also expel the members from the party. But

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 12


this does not necessarily mean that the members so expelled lose their seats
in the House. They continue to hang on to their seats as long as the Chairman
or the Speaker of a House gives a final decision on their disqualification
from the House after a proper enquiry on the basis of the petition filed by the
party whip.

 Options before a disqualified elected member:-

The members so disqualified can stand for elections from any political party
for a seat in the same House. But he, naturally cannot get a ticket from his
former party.

 The deciding authority:-

The decisions on questions as to disqualification on ground of defection are


referred to the Chairman or the Speaker of such House, and his decision is
final. All proceedings in relation to any question on disqualification of a
member of a House under this Schedule are deemed to be proceedings in
Parliament or in the Legislature of a state. No court has any jurisdiction.

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Chapter 3:Parliamentary Privileges &
Anti-Defection law

Does the anti-defection law, which was legislated to deter rampant floor-
crossing in parliament, curtail freedom of MPs who feel powerless and
"stifled" to express their views freely in parliament?

Many MPs may think so, and have expressed the need to take a relook at a
law that was enacted in 1985 to check the aya-ram-gaya-ram syndrome - so
called because of the phenomenon of MPs crossing the floor repeatedly to
switch party affiliation lured by the prospect of office or other
blandishments.

"Wholesale defection is allowed but retail is not," Shahid Siddiqui, former


MP and Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) general secretary, said at the Conference
on Effective Legislatures organised at the Taj Mahal Hotel Wednesday by
PRS Legislative Reserach.

"Political parties in India are undemocratic and have turned into feudal
parties being controlled by individuals or group of individuals. Party bosses
who are not even in parliament decide what stand an MP should take or not
(in parliament)," Siddiqui rued, as he strongly recommended a relook at the
legislation.

The legislation, which was the 52nd amendment to the constitution, made
legislators liable to for suspension if they did not always vote according to
their party whip-unless one-third of a party's bench strength defected and
formed a new party.

"Voice of legislator is stifled and if they chose to speak their conscience


against their party will, they face a whip," Siddiqui said, adding "parties
should be punished when they deflect from their poll manifesto in the name
of common minimum programme in case of a coalition government".

He made a case for lawmakers being allowed to vote according to their


conscience or the compulsions of their constituency, with the whip only
applying for no-confidence motions and money bills.

The speakers, who included Congress MP and Supreme Court advocate


E.M.S. Natchiappan, former chief justice Y.K. Sabharwal and veteran
AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 14
journalist B.G. Verghese, agreed that the law stifles parliament debate as
legislators cannot afford to dissent, without risking disqualification from the
house.

Siddiqui, also a journalist, had to quit as Samajwadi Party (SP) MP last year
after he crossed over to the BSP over the India-US civil nuclear deal. The SP
was initially opposing the pact but later supported the Manmmohan Singh
government in the confidence vote.

"We need this law but legislators should have more say given the
undemocratic functioning of political parties," he said. Verghese said most of
intra-party defections are "based on convenience and not conviction".

"Political parties also dilute their manifestos... Coalition (government) is the


marriage of convenience," said Verghese and advocated amendment to the
law. Natchiappan said an MP who gets elected after particular party fields
him owes allegiance to that party.

"He/she should abide by the laws of the party. The member has to face
disqualification if he/she decides to join some other party or votes against his
party," Natchiappan said while admitting that the "problems" in the law can
be solved through "democratic process in political parties".

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Chapter 4: ‘Anti-Defection Law – Need for
Review’
It was after painstaking endeavours spread over almost a period of two
decades that the Anti-Defection Law could find place on the statute book
with the passage of the Fifty-second Constitution Amendment Act in 1985,
which introduced the Tenth Schedule to our Constitution. The Objects and
Reasons of the related Amendment Bill clearly stated and I quote: 'The evil
of political defections has been a matter of national concern. If it is not
combated, it is likely to undermine the very foundations of our democracy
and the principles which sustain it.' Today, even twenty-three years after
coming into force of the Anti-Defection Law, the concern still remains.

Political defection among legislators is indeed a matter of great concern,


which affects the stability of the governments and is indeed destructive of the
true principles of parliamentary democracy. The Supreme Court in the case
of Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu & Ors. (AIR 1993 SC 412) has observed that
'these provisions in the Tenth Schedule give recognition to the role of
political parties in the political process. A political party goes before the
electorate with a particular programme and it sets up candidates at the
election on the basis of such programme. A person who gets elected as a
candidate set up by a political party is so elected on the basis of the
programme of that political party… that political propriety and morality
demand that if such a person, after the election, changes his affiliation and
leaves the political party which had set him up as a candidate at the election,
then he should give up his membership of the legislature and go back before
the electorate.'

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The Indian polity has had to contend with the menace of political defections
for a long time. The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a surge in political
defections causing, on several occasions, political instability both at the
Centre and in the States. The genesis of the endeavours for bringing forward
a legislation in India for curbing the malaise of defections can be traced to a
Private Member’s Resolution moved in the Fourth Lok Sabha by Shri
P.Venkatasubbaiah. The adoption of the Resolution eventually led to the
constitution of the Parliamentary Committee on Defections in the late sixties,
followed by attempts to enact the Constitution (Thirty-second Amendment)
Bill, 1973 and the Constitution (Forty-eighth Amendment) Bill, 1978. These
attempts, laudable as they were, did not yield significant results.

A serious attempt to tackle this problem, was made in 1985 with the passage
of the Anti-Defection Law as was contained in the Constitution (Fifty-
second) Amendment Act. The Act sought to curb individual defections in the
Legislatures by providing for disqualification of the defecting member while
it allowed splits, if it involved one-third of the strength of the party in the
legislature, and mergers of political parties under certain conditions, thereby
seeking not to suppress political dissent, an essential pre-requisite for a
healthy democracy. However, the fact remains that the operation of the Act,
over the years, indicated many grey areas in the law. Breaking away with the
support of one-third of the members of the party appeared easy and
defections could not be checked, specially so far as smaller parties were
concerned.

As a consequence, demands were made from various quarters for


strengthening the anti-defection law so as to achieve the desired result. The
Constitution was amended in 2003 through the Constitution (Ninety-first)
Amendment Act to rectify what seemed to be a lacunae. The amendments
AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 17
omitted the provision relating to splits from the Tenth Schedule to the
Constitution and also provided that a member, disqualified under the
provisions of the Tenth Schedule, shall also be disqualified for being be a
defence appointed as a Minister or for holding a remunerative political post
for the duration of the period commencing from the date of his
disqualification till the expiry of the term of his office or till he is elected
again. Thus, the new law provides that the 'split' would no longer.

The basis of a functional Parliamentary Democracy rests on the party system,


where parties have their policies and programmes with different priorities.
Since our independence, when India became a Republic and adopted the
system of Parliamentary Democracy, we have seen gradually the weakening
of the strength of the leading parties resulting in the formation of multiplicity
of parties, having conflicting ideologies, programmes and policies. For the
last few decades, no single party has been able to earn the people’s
confidence, resulting in the coming together of parties, whose members are
elected in the House with different programmes and ideologies and form
coalition Governments. The result has been that both in the Centre and in the
State, Governments have been formed on occasions by political parties with
disparate programmes and ideologies, who combine only with the object of
acquiring power, even by encouraging defections from one party to another
and forming unprincipled coalitions which has greatly resulted in vitiating
the political morality in the country. Politics based on certain values and
well-defined policies and priorities has become a casualty leading to vitiating
the political atmosphere and creating uncertainties in the governance
structure. Often allegations of horse trading are made of which we have seen
recently a most sordid spectacle. Parties who fight each other bitterly during
the election come together immediately after the election, only for the

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 18


purpose of sharing power and such unprincipled coalitions brought about
only to grab power have resulted in the people losing respect for our political
system as a whole. The country has witnessed instances when some members
elected as Independent candidates are persuaded to support one or other of
the big parties with the offer of Cabinet posts to enable the formation of a
Government. Unfortunately, the spectacle of aya rams and gaya rams still
remains the bane of our political system. There have been many instances of
post-poll understanding or adjustments between the different political parties,
only for the purpose of formation of Government. This has resulted in
disparate groups coming together without having any common policies and
ideologies.

The situation still continues to remain largely destructive of the principles of


parliamentary democracy as defections motivated by power and opportunism
continues to be one of the debilitating features of our political system. There
has to be a concerted effort to see that political defections are totally banned
or at least are not rewarded.

At the Conference of Presiding Officers held in 1998, there were detailed


deliberations on the need to review the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution
and a Committee of Presiding Officers was constituted under the
Chairmanship of Shri Hashim Abdul Halim, Hon’ble Speaker of the West
Bengal Legislative Assembly. The Committee, after in-depth deliberations,
identified certain problem areas in the law and recommended measures to
bring about amendments in the Tenth Schedule to further strengthen the law.
This apart, institutions like the Law Commission of India, Election
Commission and the National Commission to Review the Working of the
Constitution have also expressed their concerns and have made suggestions

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 19


for amendments to the anti-defection law. But not much headway has been
made in this direction.

Under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, the Presiding
Officers of the Houses of legislature have been given the authority to decide
questions of violation of the provisions of the Anti-Defection Law. However,
over the years the exercise of this power by Presiding Officers has caused
controversy and in many cases allegations of political considerations being
applied by the Presiding Officers in deciding the matters of defection have
been made, which considerably affects the dignity of the high office of the
Presiding Officer. It may be that in some occasions unfortunately there have
been causes to justify prima facie such allegations.

While discharging their functions under the Tenth Schedule of the


Constitution, the Presiding Officers are treated as Tribunals exercising
specific jurisdiction as conferred by the Schedule. Such exercise of power is
dehors the constitutional authority of the Presiding Officers to have exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the proceedings of the House and as such, the
Presiding Officers are not immune from their orders being challenged in
Courts of Law and in many cases not only such orders have been set-aside by
the judicial authorities but adverse comments have also been made. It has
recently appeared in the media that a Presiding Officer of one of the
Legislative Assemblies in our country has been directed by the Court to
indicate the time within which a pending matter relating to defection will be
disposed of by the Presiding Officer, as a grievance has been made before the
Court, as appears from the Media, that the concerned Presiding Officer was
deliberately delaying the disposal of the matter before him.

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The judiciary has taken up matters where the decisions of the Presiding
Officers under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution have been challenged
and this jurisdiction has been upheld by the Supreme Court of India.

It is desirable and indeed necessary, that the jurisdiction and authority to


deal with matters of defection as provided in the Tenth Schedule need not
continue to be exercised by the Presiding Officers and the power should be
conferred on some other authority like a special Tribunal comprised of
people well versed in law or on an authority like the Election Commission.

The exercise of power and jurisdiction by the Presiding Officer of any House
should not be subjected to such scrutiny, which considerably affects the
status and the position of the Presiding Officers. With all respect to the
Judiciary, whose jurisdiction cannot be denied, it will be fit and proper and
indeed, to my mind, desirable that the Presiding Officers do not continue to
be under such judicial scrutiny which in many cases has given rise to, in my
opinion, avoidable tension between the two constitutional authorities.

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 21


CHAPTER 5. AMENDMENTS IN ANTI -
DEFECTION LAWS

It is almost fifty-six years since India had awoken to freedom. And our
Constitution gives us a Sovereign, Socialist, Secular Democratic Republic.
These words are enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution. Democracy
means power to the people and power to the people means Citizens' Right to
elect representatives for the governance of the country. Democracy and
election are synonymous or in other words these two are the two sides of the
same coin. As we are living in a democratic country, we ought to cast our
vote after every five years (if there is no mid-term election). It is our
obligation to our democratic set up.

The first elected Parliament came into being in May 1952, half a century ago,
but the tragedy in our Indian democracy is that the behavior of the elected
representatives becomes more and more rude, flirts and power hungry. Split
in a party or defection of the legislators, change of sides, withdrawal of
support became common phenomena with the coming of coalition era. Our
systems of election have been wading through the dirty water of corruption
for the past few decades.

The process of choosing representatives is more and more narcissistic


process of me, my men, my constituency rather than my State or my country.
The theory, 'first to win from my constituency' have forced many MPs and
MLAs to focus their concentration only to their constituency in order to be
elected again and again. There is nothing of devoted, committed people to be
elected in election not only for five years but all the time.

But in order to win elections, in the quest for power, the Parliament or the
Legislative Assemblies should not be a den of defectors.

This is the reason behind the annexation of another schedule known as 'The
Tenth schedule' in the Constitution which is widely known as Anti-Defection
Law.

In the existing Anti Defection Act, there is a provision to allow 'bulk


defection' and it is taken as a legal split of a political party. If the violation of
the whip is by one third of the strength of the parliamentary or the
Legislature Party, there could be no disqualification - that means one third of
AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 22
the MPs or MLAs of a political party have the right to split and form a new
political party.

This is the drawback in the existing Anti-Defection Law. MPs and MLAs for
defection are not available in retail but available in whole sale. This
encourages splits in political parties. So we have seen the splits of many
political parties and birth of new political parties, majority of them having
the alphabetical suffix to their parent parties.

The Union Cabinet in a meeting on the 24th April this year, chaired by the
Prime Minister had decided to curb 'bulk defection' through legal splits by
amending the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution by deleting the Para three
of the schedule that pertains to exemption form disqualification in case of
splits.

The existing Tenth Schedule had failed to achieve the goal of checking
defections and demands have been made from many quarters from time to
time. The Dinesh Goswami committee on electoral reforms, The Law
Commission Report and the Constitution Review Commission had already
recommended the deletion of the Para that recognized splits.

The NDA Government at the Centre has hinted at strengthening the Anti-
Defection Law and determined to bring legislation in this regard in this
current session itself.

Under the new amendments, the defectors should be debarred to hold any
public office of a Minister or any other post of profit till they win the next
election that is till the defector is re-elected.

According to KN Bhatt, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court, Former


Additional Solicitor General of India, the provisions of the Tenth Schedule of
the Constitution should be amended specifically to provide that all persons
defecting - whether individually or in groups from the party or the alliances
of parties, on whose ticket they had been elected, must resign from their
parliamentary or assembly seats and must contest fresh elections. He further
holds the view that the power to decide questions as to disqualification on
ground of defection should vest in the Election Commission instead of in the
chairman or speaker of the House concerned.

There is every possibility of passing the Bill of Amendment of the Anti-


Defection Law if it is brought in the current session for discussion. The
Congress expresses its willingness to support the Bill and why not, the tenth
AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 23
schedule of the Constitution was annexed during the regime of Rajiv Gandhi
with an aim to cleanse the electoral process.

The passage of a Constitutional Amendment requires a separate vote in each


House. Further the requirement is for a two third majority which will be easy
for NDA if Congress supports the Bill.

On the other side of electoral process, the Election Commission of India is


doing its best to steer democracy in India into a right course. There are many
new Do's and Don'ts which have gripped many candidates and political
parties like a vice during the time of election. In fact we are now at a key
turning point in our history of democratic process of election.

In the coming elections, most probably in the coming Lok Sabha Elections,
many front pages of the newspapers will be occupied by the bio-datas of the
candidates, their past records, their source of income since it has becomes
mandatory of each candidate to file an affidavit showing all these things and
the copies of the affidavit should be made available to the print and
electronic medias.

Let us hope that the amendment bill pass without any hindrance in this
session so that the days of Aya Ram Gaya Ram come to an end.

‘SPF, DPA and Anti-Defection Law’

‘Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown’ – This maxim holds true for all
the time for all the heads that wear a crown and for all the hands that hold a
scepter and the head of our Chief Minister Ibobi is not an exception. Uneasy
lies more in his head than the heads of the Chief Minister of other States.

In retrospect, the year 2003 was not altogether a favorable year for Ibobi.
Many unfortunate events came hand in hand; many untoward incidents came
one after another during the last year. The controversy over the grading of
minimum qualifying marks for the SC and ST candidates for MBBS/BDS
course, the intrusion of 13 NSCN (IM) men with arms inside the territory of
Manipur, the kidnap and murder of Lungnila Elizabeth, the daughter of one
of his Cabinet colleagues, these are some of the major events which the Chief
Minister wants to forget once and for all.

The Chief Minister had spent many sleepless nights in 2003 in guarding his
fort, in trying to calm down the tremor that shook his seat and at the same
time to counter the blows inflicted upon him from the Opposition DPA to

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 24


topple his Government.

But the severest blow from the DPA came in the last week of the previous
year. All fingers were crossed, all eyes were focused on the Chief Minister’s
Bungalow and it was the exception of all from a street vendor to an erudite
scholar that the fall of SPF was eminent and there would be a new
Government in Manipur in 2004.

The scathing attack of the Opposition DPA to snatch away some Ministers
(almost all the MLAs in the SPF are Ministers) from the ruling SPF was so
great that O Ibobi had no alternative but to deport some of his Minister with
whom he had the suspicion of having divided loyalty both on the SPF and the
DPA and could be lured away by the latter to outside the State under the
careful eyes of his trusted lieutenants. During the blows of the Opposition, he
hid like a snake coiling its body around its head while exposing its whole
body to the external blows. Ibobi deliberately forgot the obligation of calling
the requisite number of Assembly session in a calendar year. His efforts
finally bore fruits.

Now with the coming of 2004, whether it is fortune that favors the brave or
not but fortune began to smile on Ibobi. The amendment in the Anti-
Defection Law (the 97th Constitutional Amendment) comes as a last savior
for Ibobi as well as the SPF. This Amendment deletes Para (3) of the 10th
Schedule of the Constitution (Anti-Defection Law of 1985) which allows
‘bulk defection’ (one third of the total legislature of a party) as a legal split.
In the new amendment the defectors (except those expelled from the party)
will not be allowed to hold any Ministerial post on any post of profit till they
contest and win a new election.

From now onwards, if any legislator wishes to change sides, he will neither
gain the head nor the tail. The importance of a Speaker, who is often labeled
as an engineer of defection under the previous defection law has been
reduced almost to naught in the new law while the scepter of the party
president becomes longer and tougher.

Ibobi is now holding the duel post in the Congress party in the State much to
advantage, one leading the Congress Legislature Party as a Chief Minister of
the coalition SPF Government and the other, holding the rein of MPCC (I).
He can face any challenge in his leadership in the Congress Legislature Party
for the time being. The Congress High Command in Delhi will not allow any
crisis brewing in the State before the Parliament election, which will only
help to tarnish the image of the party.
AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 25
On the other hand, the Opposition DPA had fallen prostrate. The alliance is
now knocked out from the ring bleeding severely and it is unlikely to flex
muscle with SPF in the near future. The DPA had been trying its best to
topple the SPF (this is what an Opposition party in Manipur ought to be!) and
no stone was left un-turned in searching for an inroad to the fortress of the
SPF during the last two years. Even at a gentle breeze which is not enough to
move away the ringlet curl from a girl’s cheek the DPA took it as a good
omen coming in their way

They had had the chance. In June 2003, when Arvind Dave took charge from
Ved Marwah as the Governor of the State, when Home Minister ID Swamy
lashed the Chief Minister and his SPF with the remarks that the SPF
Government had no moral rights to continue, there was a bright chance of
BJP-led Government in Manipur. This misunderstanding between Imphal
and Delhi offices of the BJP was that, the BJP State unit built castle in the air
that Article 356 will be used by the Centre to install a BJP led Government in
Manipur while the Centre insisted that the State unit had to muster majority
by hook or by crook. The NDA in the Centre did not want to repeat the
failure of dismissing Rabri Government in Bihar.

So, RK Dorendra, though he cleverly managed to rope in an MSCP MP to


merge with BJP, had succeeded in becoming DPA leader backed by Federal
Party which has more sitting MLAs than the BJP, the seat of Chief Minister
still eluded him this time also. As wild goose chase ends, people of Manipur
expect a role of good and constructive opposition in ruling the State.

Now the crew of the ship under the captaincy of Ibobi has passed through the
rough weather. The foremost duty for him now is to project himself as one of
the ablest Chief Minister of the State and does something concrete in the
overall development of the State so that he can silence the storm within his
Congress party and at the same time lead the State triumphantly from the
present messes.

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 26


CHAPTER6. ANTI-DEFECTION LAW:
INTENT AND IMPACT

Mr. B.G. Verghese


� Defection first became a problem in the 1960s with floor-crossing in
state legislatures and in the Parliament becoming common. This gave
rise to the ‘Aaya Ram Gaya Ram’ phenomenon. Defection was
motivated by lure of office and money.
� In present times, elected members switch parties soon after the elections
as post-election coalitions which often happen after a fractured verdict.
In this case, it is the political party which induces defection.
� The problem starts with political parties, their structure and lack of
internal democracy. Political parties are also not accountable to
individuals.
� Political parties also ‘defect’ from their members by abdicating from the
manifestoes or election-time promises that they make. Candidates get
elected on the basis of these promises, and after the election, the party
often deviates from their manifesto. The elected member has no option
but to toe the party line.
� There is a general consensus that the law needs a review. One possible
change is that disqualification for disobeying whips be limited to Money
Bills or Confidence Motions for or against the government.
� Political parties have also become important as a basic unit of the
democratic setup. Therefore, political parties themselves are in need of
reform.
� Anti-defection law was brought in to promote stability. However, a
developing country like ours needs to change in order to develop. So
stability might in fact become an impediment to change.

Justice Y.K. Sabharwal


AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 27
� Defection is more of a political question, and most legal issues that have
come up have been examined and settled. He referred to several
important cases before the Supreme Court where the validity of the
Tenth Schedule was challenged. The validity was challenged on various
grounds such as the powers of the Speaker, curtailment of an MP/MLAs
freedom of speech and expression. (For the list of issues that have come
up before the Supreme Court, see PRS Background Note)
� A National Commission to review the working of the Constitution was
set up by the government. The Commission recommended that the power
to disqualify should be vested in the Election Commission or the
government.
� The Supreme Court has also expressed the desirability of the
government vesting this power in an authority other than the Speaker. It
may be vested in the President or the governors acting on the advice of
the Election Commission.
� This type of law is an exception to the general rule and is rarely found in
established democracies. Developed western countries do not seem to
regulate defection. (See PRS Background Note for details)
� One basic issue is whether defection is incompatible with democracy, or
whether such a law itself is undemocratic.

Mr. Shahid Siddiqui


The law is undemocratic, but it is a necessary evil given the political context.
The political atmosphere makes it necessary for us to have this law, but it
needs to be reformed.
� The law is problematic as political parties are not democratic, and there
is little or no internal discussion on issues. Party leaders who may not be
members of the legislature often take decisions regarding which way
members in the legislatures should vote. As a result, the voice of the
legislator is completely lost.
� The leaders of a political party become very important, and can change
the political stance of the party at any given point of time. This leads to
legislators not being able to represent their constituency or their
representatives well enough.

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 28


CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION &
SUGGESTIONS

Defections and splits in parties have always been a feature of Indian Politics.
Every time the National Parliament or state legislatures return a less-than-
certain outcome, out come the "suitcases" and allegations of horse trading
drown out every other public discourse. In the mad circus that follows,
parties spirit their legislators away, hide them, suborn them, and then
triumphantly parade them before the world.

In response to this madness, the Fifty-Second Amendment to the Indian


Constitution introduced, for the first time, anti-defection measures into
Indian Law. As the preface to the Amendment Bill states:
The evil of political defections has been a matter of national concern. If it is
not combated, it is likely to undermine the very foundations of our
democracy and the principles which sustain it. With this object, an assurance
was given in the address by the President to Parliament that the Government
intended to introduce in the current session of Parliament an anti-defection
Bill. This Bill is meant for outlawing defection and fulfilling the above
assurance. (Emphasis mine)
The Amendment introduced provisions to ensure disqualification of a
member of a House belonging to a political party if:
(a) If he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party; or

(b) If he votes or abstains from voting in such House contrary to any


direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any
person or authority authorised by it in this behalf, without obtaining, in either
case, the prior permission of such political party, person or authority and
such voting or abstention has not been condoned by such political party,
person or authority within fifteen days from the date of such voting or
abstention. (Emphasis mine)

(-from the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution)

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 29


Now in theory, this would discourage party backbenchers from changing
party affiliations at the drop of a hat and thus be good for democracy. In
theory. Communism works, in theory. If you look carefully, what these laws
do is make the political party essential to the legislative process. This was not
the case prior to the Amendment. The only earlier Indian law that recognised
political parties was the Elections symbols order of 1968. Our Constitution
meant for MPs and MLAs to vote according to their consciences and the will
of their constituents, not according to party fiat.

My MP, Shivajirao Patil, belongs to the Shiv Sena. Now in a perfect world,
he would be my constituency's representative in Parliament, and that his vote
in Parliament would reflect this. However, I cannot expect him to take
decisions based on what he thinks best for the constituency or his better
judgement. He will vote according to the line his party takes. His vote in
Parliament will be decided by his party boss, Bal Thackeray. The votes of
other MPs will likewise be decided by their party bosses. And that, in these
days of crumbling inner-party democracy, means that decisions are
ultimately made by people who are accountable to no one.

In a large country like India, direct democracy is not possible. We must have
a representative democracy. But Representative Democracy demands
legislators who actually represent their constituents. Indian legislators don't,
they represent their parties. This means that a government is responsible to
its people only at election time, not all the time as one would hope.
Legislation in India cannot be overturned by popular opinion, it is decided
solely by Party "High Commands". This is why anti-defection legislation is
so popular among parties. And the best thing is, legislators now cannot vote
against such laws, because it is against the policy of most parties and would
invite anti-defection penalties.

The reality is, anti-defection law in India has seriously weakened our
Democracy. Anger against defections by MPs and MLAs has been used by
political parties to appropriate more power at the expense of the people.

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 30


CHAPTER 8. CRITICAL ANALYSIS.

When the anti-defection law was enacted by Parliament back in 1985, it was
expected to effectively curb defections that has plagued Indian political life.
Sadly, experience has shown us otherwise, in Manipur as much as elsewhere.
The anti-defection law turned out to be a classic case of the remedy being
worse than the disease. One of its most glaring loopholes, the provision
sanctifying defection if it is done by one-third of a party?s legislators, was
gleefully pounced upon by opportunistic politicians to completely subvert the
spirit of the law while keeping to its letter. The fall of the VP Singh
government heralded the era of mass defections in Indian political history,
and of course, in Manipur, our own breed of netas were quick to learn the
lesson. In smaller Assemblies such as ours, it was not difficult to find a few
MLAs willing to change over, given the right inducements, and defections
have been shamelessly used both to bolster governments as well as to topple
them, all without attracting the provisions of the 10th Schedule, The result:
constant political instability and widespread public disillusionment with
politics and politicians.

Given this sorry state of affairs, the Union government?s recent decision to
drastically amend the anti-defection law is most welcome. Indeed, a
Consitutional amendment bill has been introduced in the current session of
Parliament, and if it is carried through, it can be expected to have a most
salutory effect on our political life. For one thing, the notorious paragraph
three of the 10th Schedule providing exemption to the disqualification
penalty in the case of defection of one-third the strength of the legislature
party is to be removed altogether. For another, the proposed amendment to
the anti-defection law envisages further penalising defections by prohibiting
the defector from holding any public office or remunerative political post for
a certain period. Concurrently, it is also proposed to limit the size of the
council of ministers in a state to ten percent of the size of the Assembly.
These changes are in line with the recommendations of the National
Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, NCRWC.

One can imagine how much of a nightmare it would be to our MLAs and
netas if these provisions go through. Rather than the rich rewards reaped in
years past, defection would mean automatic disqualification, and forfeiture
of one?s seat in the Assembly. And with a limit imposed on the size of

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 31


be prepared by the Lok Sabha Secretariat, will be discussed in the winter
session ministries, there would be little to offer a potential defector. The
enactment of the Constitutional amendment bill would mean an end to such
ridiculous situations as the one we have now, where all but one of the 39
MLAs of the ruling SPF alliance are holding ministerial or Cabinet rank
posts. We may even see, at long last, a government lasting its full term in
Manipur, which is a feat no government has been able to accomplish ever
since Manipur achieved statehood.

In this context, it is rather unfortunate that the Union government has not
seen fit to include another change proposed by the NCRWC, which was to
take away the power to decide on disqualification from the hands of the
Assembly Speaker, and vest it in the Election Commission of India. As we
have seen time and again in Manipur, a partisan Speaker can wreak havoc in
a House using the anti-defection law as a weapon, and more than one
Speaker have used the post as a stepping stone for gaining the chief minister?
s chair. Empowering the Election Commission would have taken away a
weapon from the hands of the Speaker that is prone to misuse, and ensure a
quick and objective decision on the issue of disqualification in the case of
defection.

There are also those who say that the proposed amendment would severely
curtail the democratic right of dissent, and there is certainly a grain of truth
in this. But it is equally true to say that the average Indian politician has yet
to prove that he has a conscience, rather than being driven by selfish motives.
By all means, make sure that the proposed law has enough safeguards to
avoid giving unbridled dictatorial powers to party leaderships, but that
should not be used as an excuse to stall the proposed amendments, which are
solrely needed if electoral politics is to have any meaning.

The Anti-Defection Act, incorporated in the Tenth Schedule of the


Constitution, has come into sharp focus ever since the Bharatiya Janata Party
engineered a majority in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly with the help of
defectors from other parties. That the law had loopholes that needed to be
plugged was known for long, but the latest instance of its blatant abuse has
lent urgency to the matter. Prime Minister I.K. Gujral convened a meeting of
leaders of various parties for November 10. The leaders agreed on the need
for amendments to the law; a background paper on the issue, to of
Parliament.

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 32


The law, as enacted in 1985 when Rajiv Gandhi was Prime Minister,
empowers the Speaker or Chairman of the House concerned to decide on the
question of disqualification of a member who defects. The defector invites
disqualification if he or she voluntarily gives up membership of his party or
abstains from voting in violation of any direction issued by the party.
Independent members too invite disqualification if they join a political party.

The law also recognises splits in and mergers of parties. A split is recognised
if at least one-third of the total membership of the legislature party defects. If
more than two-thirds of the number of legislators of a party decide to join
another party, it is recognised as a merger; in that case, the remaining
legislators of the parent party will not be disqualified.

A note prepared by the Government recently states that the law has failed to
prevent bulk defections. On the other hand, the law has been criticised on the
grounds that it curtails the powers, privileges and immunities of members in
regard to freedom of speech and freedom of action, including freedom of
vote.

The Dinesh Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms, appointed by the


V.P. Singh Government in 1990, recommended that the disqualification
provisions should be limited to cases where a member voluntarily gives up
his membership of the party. The committee further said the disqualification
provision should apply when a member violated the party whip in respect of
a motion of vote of confidence or no-confidence or a money bill or a motion
of vote of thanks to the President's address.

The committee recommended that the power to decide on disqualification


under the Act should be given to the President or the Governor, who shall act
on the advice of the Election Commission.

Former Lok Sabha Speaker Shivraj Patil told Frontline that the stipulation in
the law on recognition of splits was introduced so as not to stifle legitimate
dissent.

At a U.F. Steering Committee meeting on November 5, Parliamentary


Affairs Minister Srikant Jena favoured an amendment which would rule out
the dissolution of the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies before the
completion of their terms. In his opinion, such a move would discourage
defections. But the Communist Party of India (Marxist) disagreed with this,
saying that, on the contrary, such a move would induce MPs and MLAs to
defect freely, as the threat of dissolution would no longer be there. The
CPI(M) and the CPI favour automatic disqualification in case of defection,
AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 33
irrespective of the number of persons breaking away or violating a party
whip.

A section of the Janata Dal is against amending the law at this point of time.
This section, led by former Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda (who is
reported to have some interest in the political developments in Karnataka
where the ruling Janata Dal is troubled by dissensions), warned against
amending the Constitution hastily to appease the Congress. Another section
favoured a Congress proposal to make it mandatory for one-half of the
legislature party to defect for a split to be recognised. This was not favoured
by the Left.

CPI(M) Rajya Sabha member and member of the party's Polit Bureau S.
Ramachandran Pillai said his party favoured an amendment to ensure that the
decision on the question of disqualification of alleged defectors was taken
within a reasonable time. He said the CPI(M) would seek an amendment to
provide for the involvement of the Election Commission in adjudicating the
cases of disqualification arising out of defection. Ramachandran Pillai said:
"The Speaker can be removed by a majority of the members of the House;
hence he cannot be impartial."

According to a senior BJP leader, the party supports the position that all
defectors, irrespective of their strength, should lose their seats, but it has
opted to be "pragmatic" as long as the law exists.

The first momentous ruling under the Act was passed in the Lok Sabha in
November 1990 when Speaker Rabi Ray declared 28 members of the Janata
Dal "unattached" after they were expelled from the party by the Janata Dal
leader in Parliament, V.P. Singh. The law does not provide for the
recognition of some members as "unattached", but neither does it provide for
disqualification of members who have been expelled from a party.

Subsequently, Ray recognised the Janata Dal(S) headed by Chandra Shekhar,


which consisted of 54 Lok Sabha members of the Janata Dal Parliamentary
Party. These 54 included the 28 "unattached" members. Ray, however,
disqualified seven members of the Janata Dal, including V.C. Shukla and
four others who were then Ministers in the Chandra Shekhar Government,
for defecting to the Janata Dal(S). Ray thus interpreted the law to establish
that a split was a one-time affair.

Shivraj Patil took quite some time to pronounce his verdict on the splits that
occurred in the Janata Dal when he was Speaker. In the case of the first split
that occurred when Ajit Singh and 20 other MPs broke away from the Janata
AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 34
Dal, he took nine months to pronounce his judgment. In the second instance,
when seven members quit the Ajit Singh faction, he took two years to
recognise the split.

The law also requires that a split in the legislature party be a consequence of
the split in the party's organisational wing. Observers, however, note that it is
difficult for Speakers to judge whether a split has taken place in the party's
organisation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:-

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 35


1. Basu, D. D., Commentary on the Constitution of India, Vol. K, ( Calcutta: Kamal Law
House, 1991).
2. Iyer, Venkat, Constitutional Perspectives, (New Delhi: ULPCL, 2001).
3. Jain, M. P., Indian Constitutional Law, (Nagpur: Wadhwa & Co., 2002).
4. Pandey, J. N., Constitutional Law of India, (Allahabad: Central Law Agency, 2003).
5. Seervai, H. M., Constitutional Law of India, Vol. 1., 286, (New Delhi: Universal Book
Traders, 2002).
6. Shukla, V. N., Constitution of India, (Lucknow: Eastern Book Co., 2001).

WEBLIOGRAPHY:-

1. http://www.uscourts.gov/supremecourt.html

2. http://www.lib.memphis.edu/govpubs//courts.htm

3. http:// www.wikipedia.com
4. http://www.legalservice.com

5. http://www.indiakanoon.com

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LL.M.1st (2nd SEM) Page 36

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