Chronology of Key Milestones and NRC Actions Taken During the

Three Mile Island Unit 2 Recovery and Decontamination

03/28/1979

Turbine Trip, Reactor Trip, H.P. Injection. At 4:00 a.m., the crew in the Three
Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) control room made the following entry in the control
room log book:
0400 Turbine trip, Reactor trip, H.P. injection ES
(H.P. injection ES refers to high-pressure injection engineered safeguards.)

03/28/1979

NRC Site Team Began Arriving. A team began to form with the arrival of
NRCs Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) and Region I inspectors shortly
after the accident, and continued to expand with the arrival of the first contingent
from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) on March 29 and additional
inspectors from all five regional offices. On March 30, the Director of NRR and
additional NRR staff arrived at the site to assist in the recovery operation. A
Public Affairs Office was also established in Middletown, PA, and staffed on a 24hour basis to manage the flow of information to the public and the media.
Initially, the NRC site team supported emergency response functions for the NRC
and the U.S. Government. Within days of the accident, the site team performed
on-site recovery activities, which can be broken down into four major areas:

NRC managers at Three Mile Island. From left to right: Roger Mattson (back to camera),
Harold Denton, Denwood Ross, Richard Vollmer, and Victor Stello (back to camera).

Review system modifications and system additions.

Review all procedures, both emergency and normal operation and
maintenance, which were necessary to post-accident activities.
Provide close and continuous monitoring for the operations.
Provide consultation, review, and analysis of the ongoing radwaste, cleanup,
and health physics activities.
04/01/1979

President Carter Toured

TMI. President and Mrs.
Carter, accompanied by
Pennsylvania Governor
Richard Thornburgh and
NRC Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation
Director Harold Denton,
toured Three Mile Island
for thirty minutes on April
1, 1979 (photo at right).

04/01/1979

NRC Bulletins Issued.

On April 1, 1979, the
NRCs Office of Inspection
and Enforcement issued a
series of bulletins
instructing all holders of
operating licenses to take
a number of immediate
actions to avoid repeating
several events that
contributed significantly to
the accidents severity (BL
79-05, 05A, 05B, 05C, 06,
06A, 06B, 06C, and 08). The bulletins and other related evaluations also
provided substantial input on other staff activities, such as those associated with
the generic study efforts and the Lessons Learned Task Force.

04/11/1979

Presidents Commission Created. On April 11, 1979, President Carter issued

Executive Order #12130, creating the Presidents Commission on the Accident at
Three Mile Island and charging its members to conduct a comprehensive study
and investigation of the recent accident involving the nuclear power facility on
Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania. A full-time staff was engaged, eventually
numbering over 60 persons; more than 30 separate staff reports were prepared,
and many of them were published alongside the report by the Commission,
which was issued on October 30, 1979. In the course of its investigation, the
Commission conducted 12 days of public hearings, and its staff compiled more
than 150 separate depositions.

04/25/1979

B&W Plants Shut Down. After a series of discussions between NRC staff and
licensees of operating Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) plants, the licensees agreed to
shut down these plants until the actions identified to the NRC could be
completed. This agreement was confirmed by a Commission Order to each
licensee. Authorizations to resume operations were issued between late May
and early July, as individual plants satisfactorily completed the short-term actions
and NRC staff completed on-site verifications of the plants readiness to resume
operations.

04/27/1979

Natural Circulation Cooling Achieved. The reactor coolant system was

intentionally placed in natural circulation cooling mode, with decay heat to the
condenser. On the afternoon of April 27, 1979, the reactor coolant pump that
had been providing the flow through the core of the TMI-2 reactor and taking
away the decay heat for removal through a steam generator was intentionally
shut down, and natural circulation cooling was achieved. The reactor was thus
brought to a stable condition, which could be sustained without dependence on
electrically activated equipment.
On May 1, 1979, the NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
Technical Review Group issued a 55-page report, TMI-2 Plant Modifications for
Cold Shutdown, that evaluated the licensee-proposed modifications to be
carried out over the following few weeks. The modifications included those
associated with transitioning to natural circulation, permitting solid plant
operations, diverse reactor coolant system pressure control capability, correcting
leaks in the decay heat removal (DHR) system, and installing a skid-mounted
DHR system. To facilitate the early completion of the design and installation of
these system modifications, system functional capability following a seismic
event was not a design requirement. However, the Seismic Category I DHR and
reactor coolant makeup system could be used to remove decay heat and control
primary pressure.
The NRR Technical Review Group report, issued on May 1, 1979, included
NUREG-0557, Evaluation of Long-Term Post-Accident Core Cooling of Three
Mile Island Unit 2. Based on their understanding of the accident scenario and
the available data, the staff evaluated the condition of the core and the core flow
resistance according to its effect on the ability to cool the core by natural
circulation. TMI-2s natural circulation cooling capability for the estimated core
flow resistance and a variety of other conditions were evaluated, and a
comparison of the base case and off-nominal plant configurations was presented.
The potential for and effects of natural convection core cooling were addressed,
and the staffs recommendations for reactor performance acceptance criteria
upon initiation of natural convection were presented.
The inadvertent shutdown of the reactor coolant pump provided the proof of
concept for natural circulation cooling mode, given the unknown integrity of the
reactor core.

05/1979

Bulletins and Orders Task Force Formed. In May 1979, NRCs Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation formed a task force responsible for reviewing and
directing the TMI-2-related staff activities regarding loss-of-feedwater transients
and small-break loss-of-coolant accidents for all operating reactors. Its findings

were documented in the report NUREG-0645, Final Report of Bulletins and

Orders Task Force of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, issued in
January 1980.
05/1979

TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Formed. In May 1979, an interdisciplinary

team of engineers from the NRCs Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,
Nuclear Regulatory Research, Inspection and Enforcement, and Standards
Development began to identify and evaluate those safety concerns originating
from the TMI-2 accident that required licensing actions.
The scope of the task force assignment covered the following general technical
areas:
Reactor operations, including operator training and licensing.
Licensee technical qualifications.
Reactor transient and accident analysis.
Licensing requirements for safety and process equipment,
instrumentation, and controls.
On-site emergency preparations and procedures.
NRR accident response role, capability, and management.
Feedback, evaluation, and utilization of reactor operating experience.
The task force proceeded in two phases:
Short-Term Recommendations. The first phase culminated in the issuance of
NUREG-0578, TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force: Status Report and ShortTerm Recommendations (July 1979). The Director of NRR ordered the
implementation of 23 short-term licensing requirements in September 1979,
based on a favorable review by NRCs independent Advisory Committee on
Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) received in August.
Final Recommendations. In the second phase of its work, the task force
considered more fundamental questions in the design and operation of nuclear
power plants, and in the licensing process. The issues were grouped into four
general categories: (1) general safety criteria, (2) system design requirements,
(3) nuclear power plant operations, and (4) nuclear power plant licensing.
NUREG-0585, TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force: Final Recommendations,
was issued in October 1979 to complete this phase.

05/10/1979

Ad Hoc Dose Assessment Group Report Issued. On May 10, 1979, NUREG0558, Population Dose and Health Impact of the Accident at the Three Mile
Island Nuclear Station: Preliminary Estimates for the Period March 28, 1979
through April 7, 1979, was issued by the Ad Hoc Dose Assessment Group,
which comprised various federal agencies. The report contained a preliminary
assessment of the radiation dose and potential health impact of the accident.
This assessment was prepared by a task group composed of technical staff from
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The report concluded that the
estimated dose that might have been received by an individual was less than 100
mrem. The collective dose received by the 2,164,000 people estimated to live

within a 50-mile radius of the reactor site was calculated to be 3,300 person-rem
(with a range of 1600 - 5300 person-rem). This corresponds to an average dose
of approximately 1.5 mrem.
05/30/1979

Feedwater Transients Studied and Report Issued. The NRC issued NUREG0560, Staff Report on the Generic Assessment of Feedwater Transients in
Pressurized Water Reactors Designed by the Babcock & Wilcox Company,
which considers the particular design features and operational history of Babcock
& Wilcox operating plants in light of the TMI-2 accident and related current
licensing requirements. As a result of this study, a number of findings and
recommendations were pursued. Similar studies were published for the
operating reactors designed by Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering.

07/12/1979

IE Special Review Group Formed. A Special Review Group from the NRCs
Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) was commissioned on July 12, 1979 to
develop and recommend changes in IE programs based on TMI experience.
Both preventive and responsive aspects of IE programs and operations were
studied. A total of 219 separate recommendations for change were generated in
this review. Preventive changes pervade all parts of the routine IE Inspection
Program, ranging from plant design to operation. Responsive changes focus on
the emergency preparedness of licensees and the NRC. When combined, these
changes enhance the program and organizational effectiveness of the office.
The relative priority of the recommended changes and the estimation of the
resources needed to implement them were left to IE line management.
The findings were later documented in NUREG-0616, Report of Special Review
Group, Office of Inspection and Enforcement on Lessons Learned from Three
Mile Island, in December 1979.

08/03/1979

IE Task Force on Lessons Learned Issued Report. On August 3, 1979, the

NRCs Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) task force on lessons learned
issued a report of the investigation of the TMI accident, NUREG-0600,
Investigation into the March 28, 1979 Three Mile Island Accident by Office of
Inspection and Enforcement. The scope of the investigation was limited to (1)
the licensees operational activities before the initiating event, from about 4:00
a.m. on March 28 up to about 8:00 p.m. that evening, when primary coolant flow
was reestablished by the starting of the reactor coolant pump; and (2) steps
taken by the licensee to control the release of radioactive material to off-site
environs and to implement its emergency plan, from the initiating event until
midnight on March 30.
Violations Identified. As a result of the findings in NUREG-0600, the IE
Director notified the licensee later in 1979 that their investigation had revealed
numerous items of noncompliance with NRC regulations on the part of the
licensee. Six violations, were alleged by IE, including serious weaknesses in
the licensees health physics program, control of maintenance activities,
development and review of procedures, adherence to prescribed procedures,
and audit activities. The licensee was cited for failure to operate the facility in
accordance with the Technical Specifications approved and adopted for that
particular plant, and for authorizing a surveillance procedure that placed certain
valves in a status that rendered emergency feedwater unavailable on three

separate occasions, including on March 28, when it was needed. Personnel

training were also found to be insufficient, as well as record maintenance and inhouse inspections.
ACRS Review. In a letter to Chairman Hendrie, the NRCs independent
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) registered its view of the IE
investigation later in 1979, and its conclusions based on that investigation.
Taking note of the studys limited scope, the ACRS felt that the emphasis put by
IE on the licensees departure from technical specifications prior to the accident
and from approved procedures during it resulted in too little consideration of
other relevant factors. The ACRS concluded that the limited scope of the IE
report tended to lead to a catalogue of violations, and expressed its concern that
the IE report might give the impression that failure to follow accident procedures
automatically counts as a violation. The ACRS noted that the procedures were
prepared by the licensee and were not approved by the NRC (although the
licensee was required by the NRC to follow them), and affirmed that such
procedures cannot be so detailed as to allow for every accident scenario. On the
contrary, the ACRS declared, a deviation from the conditions assumed in the
writing of the procedures may make it necessary to depart from those
procedures. There was a question as to whether an operator who, using his best
judgment, consciously takes an action that deviates from the procedures (which
in themselves may contain confusing or incorrect guidance), is guilty of a
violation. The ACRS stated that this was the wrong approach to protecting the
public health and safety in an emergency, and that an operator, guided by
written procedures, should be allowed to use his best judgment to deal with a
problem. That judgment would be subject to post-factum appraisal by
responsible parties, but it should not necessarily be deemed an error or a
violation of regulations. The ACRS found the IE report less than satisfactory for
these reasons and recommended issuance of a consolidated report on the
findings of the NRC task forces investigating the TMI accident.
08/29/1979

Personnel Overexposure Event. On August 29, 1979, six workers incurred

radiation overexposure in the TMI-2 fuel-handling building while inspecting and
tightening leaking valves in preparation for the decontamination of the area.
Reactor coolant water, highly contaminated by the March 28 accident, was
leaking from the valves. The radiation survey instrument used by the workers
showed a gamma dose rate in the room of 10 15 rems per hour in general,
and, in one small zone, of 25 rems per hour. It was decided that the time limit for
each worker to stay in the radiation area was four minutes. What the survey
instrument failed to disclose, however, was the beta radiation rates in the room,
which were running as high as 2500 rems per hour. It was later ascertained that
the workers had received doses in excess of regulatory limits from the beta
radiation. The doses were as high as 166 rems to the whole body in one
instance, and 161 rems in another. No medically significant effects were
identified by medical examination.

09/13/1979

Recommendations from the Lessons Learned Task Force Sent to

Licensees. Letters (e.g., Generic Letter 79-43, Follow-up Actions Resulting
from the NRC Staff Reviews Regarding the TMI-2 Accident) were sent to all
operating nuclear power plants, advising them that they should implement the
recommendations of the Lessons Learned Task Force and the additional items

resulting from comments by NRCs independent Advisory Committee on Reactor

Safeguards and review by the Director of NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation. A series of briefings was held to apprise reactor owners of these
requirements. Letters were also sent to applicants for construction permits and
operating licenses, instructing them to implement the short-term lessons learned.
The approach adopted by NRC staff in seeking swift implementation of the shortterm requirements allowed licensees to fulfill those requirements prior to NRC
staff review.
10/1979

Socioeconomic Impact Study Report Issued. The NRC implemented a

research program on the socioeconomic impact of the accident on the area. The
first element of this program was done as a telephone survey covering 1,500
households within 55 miles of TMI, seeking information on the activities of
household members during and after the accident, their attitudes toward TMI and
nuclear power in general, their demographic characteristics, and both the shortterm and continuing socioeconomic effects of the accident. This survey was the
broadest and most detailed of the studies undertaken in the wake of the TMI
accident, as of the end of fiscal year 1980. The survey results were published in
October 1979 in the preliminary report NUREG/CR-1093, Three Mile Island
Telephone Survey.
A second report, NUREG/CR-1215, The Social and Economic Effects of the
Accident at Three Mile Island: Findings to Date, expands upon the telephone
survey, and was prepared with the cooperation of the Governor of
Pennsylvanias Office of Policy and Planning and published in January 1980.
The report deals with the impact of the accident on the regional economy, the
business community, local government agencies, churches, schools, hospitals,
prisons, and homes for the elderly. It also appraises the accidents effect on
agriculture and tourism, both of which were adversely affected in the short run.
Finally, the report estimates the long-term effects of the accident on persons,
business firms, the value of real estate, and political institutions.

10/16/1979

Epicor-II System Approved. On August 14, 1979, the NRC issued for public
comment an environmental assessment for the use of Epicor-II in the
decontamination of the intermediate level of contaminated water (less than 100
microcuries per milliliter) in the auxiliary building. On October 3, 1979, the NRC
issued NUREG-0951, Environmental Assessment Use of Epicor-II at Three Mile
Island Unit 2. On October 16, 1979, the Commission issued a Memorandum
and Order directing the use of Epicor-II.

The "Epicor-II" system that was used to decontaminate some 380,000 gallons of intermediate-level radioactive
water held in the auxiliary building tank at the TMI-2 site is shown above. It consists of three process vessels
(steel liners) shielded by four-inch lead enclosures located in the chemical cleaning building. Each vessel
contains ion-exchange resin. The vessel at the top of the photo at the left is the system prefilter/demineralizer,
the center vessel is a cation ion-exchanger, and the third vessel is a mixed-bed polishing ion-exchanger. Each is
fitted with three quick-disconnect hoses: a liquid waste influent line, a processed waste effluent line, and a vent
line with attached overflow hose. Vented air from each vessel passes through a special filter and charcoal
absorber. "Spent" ion-exchange resin liners containing radioactive material removed from the water are
transferred by crane to cells (shown at top right) which are housed in modular concrete storage structures
(shown at bottom right). The cells are concrete-shielded, galvanized corrugated steel cylinders seven feet in
diameter and 13 feet high. The storage module shown under construction has 4-foot thick walls and is 57 feet
wide and 91 feet long. Each module holds about 60 storage cells. The modular design allowed additional
storage modules that could be built on an as-needed basis. (Source: NRC Annual Report, 1979)

10/30/1979

Presidents Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island Submits its

Final Report (also known as the Kemeny Report). The Presidents
Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island presented its final report to the
President on October 30, 1979. President Carter assigned a nine-person
interagency panel to review the report by the Kemeny Commission. Dr. Frank
Press, Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office
of the President was the Chairman. Also on the interagency panel were: Energy
Undersecretary John Deutch; Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality,
Gus Speth; Director of the Office of Management and Budget, James McIntyre;
White House Counsel, Lloyd Cutler; White House Energy Policy Coordinator,
Elliot Cutler; Domestic Policy Advisor, Stuart Eizenstat; National Security
Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Director of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, John Macy.

11/20/1979

NRC Responded to the Recommendations from the Presidents

Commission. On November 20, 1979, the NRC issued NUREG-0632, NRC
Views and Analysis of the Recommendations of the Presidents Commission on
the Accident at Three Mile Island. The NRC was requested to provide this
response by Dr. Frank Press, Director of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, Executive Office of the President.
The preliminary views of the NRC in each of the major topical areas of the
Presidents Commission recommendations were summarized. These views were
subject to refinement based on further consideration of the Report of the
President's Commission and any new insights provided by ongoing
congressional investigations, and by NRCs Special Inquiry Group.
Supplemental views from individual NRC Commissioners were included in the
NUREG report.

12/07/1979

President Carter Responded to the Recommendations from the Kemeny

Commission. Following a period of study by the interagency panel, the
President issued his response to the recommendations on December 7, 1979. A
copy of the Presidents letter is provided on page 62 of NUREG-0690, 1979
NRC Annual Report.
1980

01/1980

Special Inquiry Group Issued its Report (also known as the Rogovin
Report). Within weeks of the accident at Three Mile Island, the NRC decided to
establish a Special Inquiry Group to carry out, under independent directorship, a
thorough analysis of the causes of the accident, and an assessment of its
implications. The Commission contracted with the law firm of Rogovin, Stern,
and Huge to have the firm assume directorship of the group and responsibility for
its work. Most of the people eventually assembled to assist in the inquiry were
drawn from the NRCs professional staff, carefully screened to avoid any conflicts
of interest. A number of technical consultants in the areas of accident
investigation and safety management were also engaged to assist with the
inquiry, as were some lawyers with investigative experience. Also contributing to
the studymainly by providing specialized technical expertisewere some of
the national laboratories within the Department of Energy, the National Academy
of Public Administration (in the area of emergency response), and a private firm
experienced in human factors engineering.
The results of the special inquiry were published in January 1980 as
NUREG/CR-1250 Vols. I and II, Three Mile Island A Report to the
Commissioners and to the Public. Volume II has three parts.

01/1980

Determination of an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence Issued. Back in July

1979, the NRC formally initiated the determination as to whether or not the
accident at the TMI-2 reactor on March 28, 1979 constituted an extraordinary
nuclear occurrence. On August 17, 1979, the Commission directed that a panel
composed of members of the principal staff should be formed to assemble
information relevant to a determination of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence
(ENO), evaluate public comments, and report its findings and recommendation to

the Commission. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, defines the term
extraordinary nuclear occurrence as:
...any event causing a discharge or dispersal of source, special nuclear,
or byproduct material from its intended place of confinement in amounts
off-site, or causing radiation levels off-site, which the Commission
determines to be substantial, and which the Commission determines has
resulted or will probably result in substantial damages to persons off-site
or property off-site. The Act further states that the Commission shall
establish criteria in writing setting forth the basis upon which the
determination shall be made.
The Commission concluded that proceeding with the determination was in the
public interest for two reasons. First, the Commission noted that the events at
Three Mile Island constituted the most serious nuclear accident to date at a
licensed U.S. facility, and thus should be rigorously scrutinized from the
standpoint of its effect on the public. Second, the Commission noted the
pendency of various lawsuits concerning the accident, in which the determination
of whether or not an ENO had taken place was pertinent, and acknowledged the
informal request of the federal district court in Harrisburg to make this
determination as expeditiously as possible.
The findings were documented in NUREG-0637, Report to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission from the Staff Panel on the Commissions Determination
of an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence (ENO), in January 1980. This staff
report finds and recommends that the TMI-2 accident did not constitute an ENO.
02/11/1980

Recovery Technical Specifications Implemented. Back on June 25, 1979, the

NRC provided draft Recovery Technical Specifications to the licensee for review.
On February 11, 1980, the NRC issued NUREG-0647, Safety Evaluation and
Environmental Assessment, Metropolitan Edison Company, Jersey Central
Power and Light Company, Pennsylvania Electric Company, Docket No. 50-320,
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2. This report contained an NRC
Order for the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2, that (1) required that,
effective immediately, the facility be maintained in accordance with the
requirements of the attached proposed Technical Specifications; and (2)
proposed to formally amend the Facility Operating License to include the
proposed Technical Specifications, taking into account the present condition of
plant systems, so as to ensure that the unit would remain in a safe posture during
the Recovery Mode.

Early 1980

Underground Monitoring Wells Installed. In early 1980, NRC staff requested

that the TMI licensee install a series of monitoring wells around the auxiliary and
reactor buildings to monitor for leakage of radioactive water into the ground.

05/1980

NRC Action Plan (NUREG-0660) Issued. In May 1980, the NRC issued
NUREG-0660, NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident,
which provided a comprehensive and integrated plan for the actions now judged
necessary by the NRC to correct or improve the regulation and operation of
nuclear facilities, based on the experience from the accident at TMI-2 and the

10

official studies and investigations of the accident. NRC activities and programs
not related to the accident at TMI-2 were not described in this Action Plan.
06/28/1980

Purging of the Reactor Building Atmosphere Began.

Environmental Assessment prior to purging. Back in March 1980, NRC staff
issued for public comment a draft environmental assessment of a number of
alternative options for the decontamination of the reactor building atmosphere.
Approximately 800 responses were received from various federal, state, and
local agencies and officials, as well as from non-governmental organizations and
private individuals. Following appropriate revisions responding to the comments
received, and additional reviews and analyses by NRC staff, NUREG-0662,
Final Environmental Assessment for Decontamination of the Three Mile Island
Unit 2 Reactor Building Atmosphere, was issued in May 1980. The statement
discussed several alternative options and the potential environmental impacts
associated with each.
NRC Issued Order to Purge. Having reviewed the staff assessment and
recommendations, together with the comments from the public, the Governor of
Pennsylvania, and many others, the NRCs Commission issued a Memorandum
and Order authorizing the licensee to clean the reactor building atmosphere by
means of a controlled purge, or release of contaminated air through filter
systems. On the same day, the Commission issued a modification of the TMI
operating license setting off-site dose limits for the purge.
Purging Operations Began. The purging operation, which began on June 28,
1980, was carried out under detailed procedures approved by NRC staff. The
operation was completed 14 days later (see below).

07/1980

NRC Action Plan for Cleanup Operations Issued. The NRCs TMI Program
Office issued NUREG-0689, NRC Plan for Cleanup Operations at Three Mile
Island Unit 2, which defined the functional role of the NRC in cleanup operations
at TMI-2 to ensure that agency regulatory responsibilities and objectives would
be fulfilled. The plan outlined NRC functions in TMI-2 cleanup operations in the
following areas: (1) the functional relationship between the NRC and other
government agencies, the public, and the licensee in coordinating activities; (2)
the functional roles of these organizations in cleanup operations; (3) the NRCs
review and decision making procedure for the licensees proposed cleanup
operation; (4) the NRCs/licensees estimated schedule for major actions; and
(5) the NRCs functional role in overseeing the implementation of approved
licensee activities.
Two revisions were later issued in February, 1982, and March, 1984.

07/1980

Special Senate Investigation of the TMI Accident Issued its Report. The
report by the Special Senate Investigation of the TMI accidentundertaken at
the behest of the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of the Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Workswas published in July 1980. The
investigation focused on three discrete aspects of the TMI accident: events of the
first day, cleanup activities at the TMI site, and events prior to the initiation of the
TMI accident.

11

07/11/1980

Purging of the Reactor Building Atmosphere Completed. The purging

operation, which began on June 28, 1980, was completed on July 11, 1980.
Measurements showed that about 43,000 curies of krypton-85 was released
during this period. Samples from the release flow were analyzed to ascertain the
presence of radionuclides other than krypton, and the amounts were determined
to be insignificant.
During the entire operation, members of the NRC staff were on-site to monitor
the licensees activities. In addition, off-site radiation monitoring programs were
conducted by the licensee, the NRC, the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Department of Environmental Resources of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
and also by private individuals through the Community Radiation Monitoring
Program set up by the U.S. Department of Energy and the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. The maximum cumulative radiation dose and the maximum dose
rate measured at off-site locations were a fraction of the limits allowed under
NRC regulations.

07/23/1980

First Reactor Building Entry. The

first entry into the reactor building
containment was conducted by two
utility staff on July 23, 1980 (photo at
left). During the entry into
containment, 29 pictures and six
100-cm swipes were taken, and a
general area beta and gamma
survey was conducted to acquire
data at the entry level. The first
entry team spent approximately 20
minutes inside the reactor building.

08/14/1980

Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement Issued for
Public Comment. Responding to a
directive issued by the Commission
on November 21, 1979, NRC staff
prepared the draft Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement
dealing with the decontamination
and disposal of radioactive waste
resulting from the TMI accident. The statement (NUREG-0683, Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement Related to Decontamination and Disposal of
Radioactive Wastes Resulting from March 28, 1979 Accident, Three Mile Island
Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Docket No. 50-320) was released for public comment on
August 14, 1980. It discussed four fundamental activities necessary to the
cleanup: (1) treatment of radioactive liquids, (2) decontamination of the building
and equipment, (3) removal of fuel and decontamination of the coolant system,
and (4) packaging, handling, storing, and transporting nuclear waste. The
statement addressed the principal environmental impacts that can be expected to
occur as a consequence of cleanup activities, including occupational and off-site

12

radiation doses and resultant health effects, socioeconomic effects, and the
effects of psychological stress.
09/1980

NRC Issued Report on the Consequences of Bankruptcy. In a report to the

Commission by the Director of NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in
September 1980, the possibility and potential consequences of bankruptcy on
the part of the TMI licensee were explored at length. Findings were documented
in NUREG-0689, Potential Impact of Licensee Default on Cleanup of TMI-2.

09/09/1980

First GAO Report Issued. The General Accounting Office (GAO) issued its
report on the TMI-2 accident to Congress on September 9, 1980, in a document
entitled Three Mile Island: The Most Studied Nuclear Accident in History. The
GAO endorsed the directive of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works (in the draft authorizing legislation for the NRC for fiscal year 1981), which
called for the development of a safety goal for nuclear reactor regulation.

11/1980

Clarification of the TMI Action Plan Issued. In November 1980, the NRC
issued NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, which was
a letter from the NRC to licensees of operating power reactors and applicants for
operating licenses forwarding post-TMI requirements that had been approved for
implementation. Following the accident at TMI-2, NRC staff developed the
Action Plan, NUREG-0660, to provide a comprehensive and integrated plan to
improve safety at power reactors. Specific items from NUREG-0660 have been
approved by the Commission for implementation at reactors. In this report, these
specific items comprise a single document, which includes additional information
on schedules, applicability, methods of implementation review, submittal dates,
and clarification of technical positions. It should be noted that the total set of
TMI-related actions have been collected in NUREG-0660, but only those items
that the Commission had approved for implementation prior to publication were
included in NUREG-0737.

11/12/1980

Public Advisory Panel Formed by NRC. The Advisory Panel for the
Decontamination of TMI-2 met for the first time on November 12, 1980 in
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The 12-member Panel included local citizens, local
and state governmental officials, and scientists, and held 78 meetings over 13
years, meeting regularly with both the public and NRC Commissioners. In
addition to soliciting views from members of the public, the Panel interacted with
Congress and other federal agencies to ensure the safe and expeditious cleanup
of TMI-2.
NUREG/CR-6252, Lessons Learned from the Three Mile Island-Unit 2 Advisory
Panel, was issued in August 1994, and documented the analysis of the lessons
learned and preliminary conclusions on the effectiveness of the Panel.

12/1980

Public Whole Body Counting Program Report Issued. Back in April 1979, the
NRC instituted a program to determine whether any radioactivity released as a
result of the TMI-2 accident was accumulating in members of the general public
living near Unit 2. In December 1980, NUREG-0636, The Public Whole Body
Counting Program Following the Three Mile Island Accident: Technical Report,
April-September 1979, was issued. The program used a device called a whole
body counter, which measures very small quantities of radioactivity in people. A

13

total of 753 men, women, and children were successfully counted; nine of these
were counted a second time, leading to a total of 762 whole body counts. There
was no radioactivity identified in any member of the public that could have
originated from the radioactive materials released following the accident. Several
people with higher-than-average levels of naturally occurring radioactivity were
identified. The counting systems used were briefly described. Technical
problems, results, and conclusions were discussed.
1981
01/05/1981

Plant Entered Loss-to-Ambient Cooling Mode. Following tests starting in

November 1980, the reactor coolant system was placed in the loss-to-ambient
cooling mode on January 5, 1981 by heat losses to the reactor building ambient
(maintained by the reactor building fan coolers). This permitted several
previously required cooling systems to be de-energized and decommissioned.

01/1981

Investigation into Information Flow During the Accident Report Issued. In

January 1981, NUREG-0760, Investigation into Information Flow During the
Accident at Three Mile Island, was issued in response to a request from NRC
Chairman Ahearne, which directed the Office of Inspection and Enforcement to
resume its investigation of information flow during the accident at TMI-2. The
transfer of information between individuals, agencies, and personnel from
Metropolitan Edison was analyzed to ascertain what knowledge was held by
various individuals regarding the specific events, parameters, and systems
during the accident at TMI. Maximum use was made of existing records, and
additional interviews were conducted to clarify areas that had not been pursued
during earlier investigations. Although the passage of time between the accident
and post-accident interviews hampered precise recollections of events and
circumstances, the investigation revealed that information was not intentionally
withheld during the accident, and that the system for the effective transfer of
information was inadequate during the accident.

02/27/1981

Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement Issued. On February

27, 1981, the NRC issued NUREG-0683, Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement Related to Decontamination and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes
Resulting from March 28, 1979 Accident, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit
2, Docket No. 50-320. NRC staff held 31 meetings with the public, media, and
local officials. The final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS)
included the staffs responses to nearly 1,000 comments received on the draft
statement (following a 90-day comment period). The final PEIS reaffirmed the
draft statements conclusion that the decontamination of the TMI-2 facility,
including the removal of the nuclear fuel and radioactive waste from the TMI site,
was necessary for the long-term protection of public health and safety, and that
methods exist or can be suitably adapted to perform the cleanup operations with
minimal release of radioactivity to the environment. The final PEIS also
concluded that the only environmental impact that might be of significance would
be the cumulative radiation doses to the cleanup workers.

03/25/1981

NRC Approved Disposal of Epicor-II Resin Liners; Some Accepted by DOE.

The licensee requested that the requirement for the solidification of spent EpicorII resins be waived, and that those spent resin liners that were similar to normal

14

reactor resin wastes be disposed of by shallow land burial at a commercial

disposal site. NRC approval to dispose of these 22 liners in this manner was
issued on March 25, 1981. The last of these liners was shipped on June 27,
1981 from the TMI site to the U.S. Ecology burial site at Richland, Washington, in
which all 22 liners were successfully disposed.
The requirement to solidify the remaining 50 Epicor-II pre-filter spent resin liners
was also waived, and a Department of Energy (DOE) program of research and
development on waste characterization examined and characterized the
condition of one of these liners and its contents at a DOE contractor facility.
Research in resin radiation degradation was reported in several NRC and DOE
reports.
04/27/1981

NRC Policy Statement that Endorsed the Programmatic Environmental

Impact Statement Issued. The Commission issued a policy statement
endorsing the final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS), and
concluded that the PEIS (NUREG-0683) satisfied the Commissions obligations
under the National Environmental Policy Act, with the exception of the disposal of
processed accident-generated water. The Commission later issued a
supplement stating that the PEIS allows staff to act on each major cleanup
activity if the activity and associated impacts fall within the scope of those
assessed in the PEIS. On June 26, 1981, NRC staff amended the Environmental
Technical Specifications of the TMI-2 license to define the criteria in Appendix R
of the final PEIS as limiting conditions of the cleanup operations.
The Commissions policy statement declared that the cleanup should be
expedited and activities carried out in accordance with the criteria in Appendix R
of the PEIS, which limited the doses to off-site individuals from radioactive
effluents resulting from cleanup activities. These effluent limits were numerically
identical to the design objectives of radioactive effluents for operating power
reactors contained in Appendix I of 10 CFR Part 50. The criteria in Appendix R
of the PEIS for TMI-2 cleanup activities were more restrictive than those for the
operating power reactors, since the Appendix R values were limits that could not
be exceeded, whereas, for operating power reactors, they were design objectives
to be met on the as low as reasonably achievable principle.
Epicor-II liners at TMI-2 are
transferred from site storage
areas in the cask shown at
top, and lowered into
shipping casks beneath to
maintain shielding of
radioactive material. During
1982, several shipments of
the casks were made to
various laboratories for
study and tests. (Source:
NRC Annual Report, 1981)

15

06/18/1981

NRC Approved the Use of the Submerged Demineralizer System. The

NRCs review of the submerged demineralizer system (SDS) formally started
when the licensee submitted the report Technical Evaluation Report,
Submerged Demineralizer System in April 1980. However, due to a number of
design changes and technical questions from the staff, formal NRC approval was
not given until June 1981.
On April 10, 1980, the licensee formally submitted its Technical Evaluation
Report (TER) and requested permission to operate an underwater
demineralization system. The SDS described in the licensees TER was
designed to provide controlled handling and treatment of the highly contaminated
wastewater generated during the accident. The SDS operated underwater, in
one of the spent fuel pools of TMI Unit 2. It consisted of a liquid waste treatment
subsystem, a gaseous waste treatment subsystem, and a solid waste handling
subsystem. The liquid waste treatment subsystem was designed to
decontaminate the high-activity wastewater by filtration and ion exchange. The
primary components of the liquid waste treatment subsystem included two filters,
and two parallel trains of four identical inorganic zeolite-filled ion exchanger
vessels. In the event that additional cleanup of the effluent from SDS was
required, it could be recycled through SDS or polished (refined) with the EpicorII system.
On June 18, 1981, the licensee was directed to promptly commence and
complete processing of the remaining intermediate-level contaminated water
(less than 100 microcuries per milliliter) in the auxiliary building tanks and the
highly contaminated water in the reactor building sump and the reactor coolant
system.
On August 9, 1981, the remaining 100,000 gallons of intermediate-level water
were completely processed. The licensee started processing the high-activity
water in September 1981. The approval to operate SDS did not include water
disposal. All processed water was stored in existing on-site tanks. Decisions
related to the disposal of processed water were made by the Commission at a
later date (see NUREG-0683, Supplement 2, issued in June 1987).

07/15/1981

NRC and DOE Signed Memorandum of Understanding. On July 15, 1981,

the NRC and Department of Energy (DOE) signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU), which formalized the working relationship between the
two agencies with respect to the removal and disposal of solid nuclear waste
generated during the cleanup of TMI-2. This was a significant step toward
ensuring that the TMI site would not become a long-term waste disposal facility.
The MOU covered only solid nuclear waste, and did not cover liquid waste
resulting from the cleanup activities. The MOU addressed three basic categories
of TMI-2 waste: (1) waste determined by DOE to be of generic value in terms of
beneficial information to be obtained from further research and development
activities (the MOU calls for DOE to perform such activities at appropriate DOE
facilities); (2) waste determined to be unsuitable for commercial land disposal
because of high levels of contamination, but which DOE may also undertake to
remove, store, and dispose of on a reimbursable basis from the licensee; and (3)
waste considered suitable for shallow land burial, to be disposed of by the
licensee in licensed, commercial low-level waste burial facilities.

16

The MOU is provided in Appendix A to NUREG-0698, Revision 1, NRC Plan for

Cleanup Operations at Three Mile Island Unit 2.
08/1981

GAO Issued Report. The General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report
entitled Greater Commitment Needed to Solve Continuing Problems at Three
Mile Island. GAO made two recommendations to the NRC:
GAO recommended that the NRC closely follow the current efforts of the
insurance and utility industries to increase insurance coverage to what it
determines to be an acceptable level.
To mitigate future regulatory constraints on nuclear accident cleanup
activities, GAO recommended that the NRC establish a set of guidelines that
would facilitate the development of recovery procedures by utility companies
in the event of other nuclear reactor accidents.
1982

03/15/1982

NRC and DOE Revised Memorandum of Understanding to Accept Fuel and

Resins. The NRC and Department of Energy (DOE) agreed to a revision of the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Instead of taking only samples of the
damaged fuel from TMI-2, DOE agreed to accept the entire core for research and
development, and for storage at a DOE facility. The terms of ultimate disposal of
the core will be negotiated between DOE and the utility operating the TMI facility.
DOE also agreed to take possession of highly radioactive resins from the
purification system, again on the basis of future reimbursement by the utility, and
planned to take possession of zeolite waste from the submerged demineralizer
system and retain it for research and testing with regard to waste immobilization.
The revised MOU is provided in Appendix A to NUREG-0698, Revision 2, NRC
Plan for Cleanup Operations at Three Mile Island Unit 2.

05/21/1982

First SDS Liner Shipped to DOE . On May 21, 1982, the first waste vessel
from the submerged demineralizer system (SDS) was shipped from TMI to DOE
facilities in Hanford, Washington for disposal. This vessel was used to process
wastewater from the reactor-coolant bleed tanks, and contained approximately
12,000 curies of radioactive material on zeolite ion-exchange media.
Subsequent shipments included liners containing more than 50,000 curies of
radioactive material removed from reactor building sump water. DOE conducted
research on glass vitrification (solidification) of this type of solid waste at Hanford.
On July 27, 1982, one of the 49 high specific activity Epicor-II liners stored onsite was sampled for gas composition at TMI, and was shipped on August 17 to
the Battelle Columbus Laboratories in West Jefferson, Ohio for radiation and
chemical characterization tests. The liner contained approximately 1,800 curies
of radioactive material, and was shipped in a special cask designed to withstand
severe transportation accidents. On August 25, a second liner was shipped from
TMI to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory for characterization tests.

17

07/21/1982

Quick Look Fuel Inspection. The first closed-circuit television inspections of

the reactor core were performed on July 21, 1982. During this Quick Look
inspection, a camera lowered into the core region revealed a rubble bed
approximately five feet below the normal location of the top of the fuel
assemblies. Results are reported in GEND-030-VOL-1, Quick Look Inspection
Report on the Insertion of a Camera into the TMI-2 Reactor Vessel.

First closed-circuit television inspections of the reactor core were performed on July 21, 1982.

1983
08/30/1983

Last SDS Liners Shipped to DOE. The last two of the 50 Epicor-II prefilters of
high specific activity were shipped from TMI-2 on July 12, 1983, and the last of
the 13 highly contaminated submerged demineralizer system (SDS) liners left the
TMI site on August 30, 1983.

11/18/1983

NRC Approved Use of Reactor Building Crane. The TMI-2 polar crane
suffered severe damage as a result of the accident. Besides being highly
contaminated, the cranes electrical components were damaged by hydrogen
burns and exposure to the excessive moisture in the containment building
atmosphere. Restoration of the crane was required to accomplish defueling
(removal of the reactor vessel head and internal structure, and other cleanup
activities). The staff approved the licensees safety evaluation for the
refurbishment and use of the Reactor Building Polar Crane. The initial climb to
the polar crane was made on May 14, 1981. Mechanical and electrical
inspections were made in August 1982. The crane was successfully load-tested

18

on February 29, 1984, when a test assembly weighing 214 tons was lifted and
moved along predetermined test paths. Details are documented in NUREG/CR3884, Evaluation of Nuclear Facility Decommissioning Projects: Summary
Report - Three Mile Island Unit 2 Polar Crane Recovery.

Survey in progress of the polar crane inside the reactor building. (Source: NRC Annual Report,
1981)

1984
07/1984

Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Removed. In July 1984, the reactor pressure
vessel head was removed using the reactor building polar crane and placed in
shielded storage inside the reactor building. Details of the planning, training, and
operations are documented in GEND-044, TMI-2 Reactor Vessel Head
Removal.

10/1984

NRC Issued Supplement 1 to the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact

Statement Dealing with Occupational Radiation Dose.
In October 1984, the NRCs TMI Program Office issued NUREG-0683,
Supplement 1, Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement Related to
Decontamination and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes Resulting from March 28,
1979 Accident, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Docket No. 50-320 Supplement Dealing with Occupational Radiation Dose. In accordance with the
National Environmental Policy Act, the Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement (PEIS) was supplemented to revise the staffs earlier estimates of
occupational radiation exposure resulting from the cleanup. The supplement was
required because information indicated that the cleanup may entail substantially
more occupational radiation dose to the cleanup work force than originally

19

anticipated. Cleanup was originally estimated to result in from 2000 to 8000

person-rem of occupational radiation dose. New estimates indicated that
between 13,000 and 46,000 person-rem were expected to be required.
Alternative cleanup methods considered in the supplement either did not result in
appreciable dose savings or were not known to be technically feasible. The draft
supplement to the PEIS was issued back in March 1984 for public comment.
1985
01/1985

Cleanup Funding from Industry Pledged. The Edison Electric Institute,

representing the utility industry, voluntarily pledged funds totaling $25 million per
year for six years, beginning in January 1985. A group of Japanese utility
companies pledged $18 million ($3 million for six years) to the cleanup, making
the total level of funding for cleanup activities in 1984 approximately $95 million.

02/1985

First Video Inspection of Lower Head Region. In February 1985, the first
video inspection of the reactor vessel lower head region revealed the
accumulation of a substantial quantityan estimated 10 to 20 tonsof accidentgenerated debris. The debris bed had the appearance of a gravel pile,
composed of pieces normally three to four inches long and half as wide. Similar
material was observed by sighting up through the lower diffuser plate of the core
support assembly.
Although the composition of the debris could not be determined from the video
inspections, it was evident that some molten material was generated during the
accident, and that it resolidified and collected in the lower head area. Additional
inspections conducted in July 1985, focusing on other quadrants in the lower
head, disclosed that the debris bed was shallower and the individual pieces
smaller in those areas, in contrast to the earlier determinations.
In a separate effort, Edgerton, Germeshausen, and Grier, Inc. (EG&G), under
contract to the Department of Energy, ascertained that some areas of the core
had reached temperatures of at least 5,100 F (the melting point of uranium
dioxide fuel) during the 1979 accident. This information, along with the lower
head inspection data, was used to revise certain theories of the TMI-2 accident
sequence.

05/15/1985

Reactor Vessel Plenum Assembly Removed. On May 15, 1985, the reactor
vessel plenum assembly was lifted from its jacked position in the reactor vessel
by the polar crane, using three specially designed pendant assemblies. It was
then transferred by air to the flooded deep end of the refueling canal and lowered
into its storage stand, where it remained throughout the defueling effort. The
operation was completed in just under three hours by a lift team located in a
shielded area within the reactor building. Details of the planning, training, and
operations are documented in GEND-054, TMI-2 Reactor Vessel Plenum Final
Lift.

08/1985

Licensees Waste Burial Privileges Suspended. The licensees burial

privileges at the U.S. Ecology burial site in Richland were temporarily suspended
in August 1985 when three barrels, out of a shipment of 104, were erroneously
classified, labeled, and certified by the licensee as Class A radioactive waste.

20

The privileges were restored after Washington State officials approved corrective
measures taken by the licensee to prevent future shipping and classification
violations.
10/1985

Operators Started Removing Fuel Debris from Reactor. In October 1985,

operators began to remove damaged fuel and structural debris from the reactor
vessel by pick and place defueling of the loose TMI-2 core debris. Workers
performed defueling operations from a shielded defueling work platform (DWP),
which was located nine feet above the reactor vessel flange. The platform had a
rotating 17-foot diameter surface with six-inch steel shield plates, and was
designed to provide access for defueling tools and equipment into the reactor
vessel. The DWP supported defueling operators, specially designed longhandled tools, remote viewing equipment, and two jib cranes used to manipulate
the tools. Numerous manual and hydraulically powered long-handled tools were
used to perform a variety of functions, such as pulling, grappling, cutting,
scooping, and breaking up the core debris. These tools were used to load debris
into defueling canisters positioned underwater in the reactor vessel. The
canisters were then sealed and transported using shielded canister transfer
equipment to submerged storage racks in spent fuel pool A of the auxiliary and
fuel handling building (AFHB). The canisters were designed and stored to
prevent an inadvertent criticality event. Following dewatering to control the
buildup of combustible gases, the canisters were loaded into a specially
designed shipping cask and transported to a Department of Energy facility in
Idaho for interim storage and research.
In December 1985, several defueling canisters were filled with debris consisting
of fuel assembly end fittings, control rod spiders, and small pieces of fuel
assemblies. In January 1986, the first group of defueling canisters was sealed,
dewatered, and transferred to storage racks in spent fuel pool A in the AFHB.
Dose rates to personnel during the initial phase of defueling were low and
remained low throughout the year, averaging less than 10 mrem/hr on the DWP
and less than 40 mrem/hr near the shielded canisters during transfer. The
licensee discontinued the use of respirators during defueling activities, based on
air sample data collected during the first month.

21

Workers performed defueling operations from a shielded defueling work platform (DWP), which was located nine feet
above the reactor vessel flange. The platform had a rotating 17-foot diameter surface with six-inch steel shield
plates, and was designed to provide access for defueling tools and equipment into the reactor vessel.

Numerous manual and hydraulically powered long-handled tools were used to perform a variety of functions,
such as pulling, grappling, cutting, scooping, and breaking up the core debris. These tools were used to load
debris into defueling canisters positioned underwater in the reactor vessel.

22

1986
04/1986

Microorganisms Inside the Reactor Vessel. In April 1986, a large population

of microorganisms rapidly developed in the reactor coolant system (RCS),
clogging the defueling water cleanup system filters and hindering the operators
ability to remotely view the defueling activities in the vessel. These growths,
consisting of algae, fungi, and bacteria, as well as both aerobic and anaerobic
organisms, proved difficult to kill in several tests. In April and May, the licensee
conducted a multi-phase program to restore reactor vessel water clarity. The
program consisted of high-pressure hydrolancing to remove growths adhering to
reactor vessel surfaces, the addition of hydrogen peroxide as a biocide, and the
use of a high-pressure positive displacement pump to kill the microorganisms. A
diatomaceous earth (swimming pool-type) filter was then operated in conjunction
with the letdown and makeup of batches of reactor coolant, to remove the
organic material and improve the clarity of the RCS water. These techniques
proved successful in restoring visibility in the vessel, and were repeated as
necessary to maintain water clarity throughout defueling activities for fiscal year
1986. Pick and place defueling was resumed in May, following the completion of
the water treatment program. However, it took more than a year to completely
restore clarity and visibility.
Studies revealed that small amounts of hydraulic fluid from the defueling tools
leaked into the reactor coolant and provided the organic food source for the
microorganisms. This was aided by the correct water temperature and light from
the underwater TV camera lights.

04/1986

NRC Approved Shipping Casks for Fuel Debris. In April 1986, the NRC
issued certificates of compliance for the two NuPac 125-B Rail Casks to be used
in shipping the fuel debris by rail. Each cask was designed to hold seven
defueling canisters. The results of the tests required by Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, Part 71, Packaging and Transporting of Radioactive
Material, are summarized in GEND-055, U.S. Department of Energy Three Mile
Island Research and Development Program 1985 Annual Report.
NRC issued certificates
of compliance for the two
NuPac 125-B Rail Cask
to be used for shipment
of the fuel debris by rail.
Each cask was designed
to hold seven defueling
canisters. (DOE Photo)

23

07/1986

Licensee Submitted Proposal to Dispose Slightly Contaminated

Radioactive Water. The licensee submitted for NRC approval a proposal for
disposing of approximately 2.1 million gallons of slightly radioactive water,
contaminated during the accident and used in subsequent cleanup operations.
Out of the proposed alternatives, the licensee requested approval for a method
involving the forced evaporation of the water at the TMI site over a 2.5-year
period. The residue from this operation, containing small amounts of the
radioactive isotopes cesium-137 and strontium-90, and large volumes of boric
acid and sodium hydroxide, would require solidification and disposal as low-level
waste.

07/1986

First Fuel Debris Shipped to DOE. The first off-site shipment of the fuel and
debris removed from the damaged TMI-2 core took place in July 1986. Under a
previous agreement with the NRC, Department of Energy took possession of the
high-level waste at the TMI site boundary, and was responsible for the transport
of the material and interim storage at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.

07/1986

Extent of Core Melt Realized. The licensee conducted a core stratification

sample acquisition program. Most of the loose core debris had been removed
from the reactor vessel, and more data were needed to plan the defueling of the
material under the hard crust layer of the damaged core. A special drilling rig
was assembled on top of the Defueling Work Platform, and 10 full-length
sampling penetrations were made from the surface of the debris bed to inches
above the lower head of the reactor vessel. The samples of the reactor core
(approximately 2.5 inches in diameter and eight feet long) were analyzed at
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, along with earlier samples of the debris
collected from the lower vessel head, in order to provide data on the material
properties of the core debris.

09/1986

Drilling Operations Commenced. The heavy-duty tools were only marginally

successful, so the drilling rig that was used earlier for boring core samples was
reinstalled as the primary tool for breaking up the hard mass of core debris.

12/1986

Licensee Submitted Plans for Post-Defueling Monitored Storage. In

December 1986, the licensee proposed to place TMI-2 in an interim monitored
storage condition for an unspecified period of time, after the completion of the
current defueling effort. The licensees term for this condition was postdefueling monitored storage. The facility would remain in the storage condition
until TMI-1 was ready to be decommissioned. Both facilities would then be
decommissioned together. NRC staff began the environmental review of the
licensees proposal.
1987

06/1987

NRC Issued Supplement 2 to the Programmatic Environmental Impact

Statement for Wastewater Disposal. In June 1987, the NRC issued Final
Supplement No.2 to NUREG-0683, Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement, (PEIS) which dealt with the final disposal of 2.1 million gallons of
slightly contaminated accident-generated water. The staff concluded that the
licensees proposal to dispose of the water by forced evaporation to the
atmosphere, followed by the on-site solidification of the remaining solids and their

24

disposal at a low-level waste facility, was an acceptable plan. The staff also
concluded that no alternative method of disposing of the contaminated water was
clearly preferable to the licensees proposal. An opportunity for a prior hearing to
consider removing the prohibition on the disposal of the contaminated water was
offered, and the matter was pending before the Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board at the end of fiscal year 1987.
The NRC evaluated the licensees proposal together with eight alternative
approaches, giving consideration to the risk of radiation exposure to workers and
to the general public; the probability and consequences of potential accidents;
the necessary commitment of resources, including costs; and regulatory
constraints.
09/1987

Sludge Removal Completed. Sludge removal from the auxiliary building sump
and the reactor building was completed, and flushing of the reactor building
began in September 1987.
1988

1988

SDS Operations Completed. In 1988, the submerged demineralizer system

(SDS), which was originally used to decontaminate the water in the reactor
building basement, was removed from service. During its service life, it
processed 4,566,000 gallons of water. The defueling water cleanup system was
used to process water from the reactor coolant system and the A spent fuel
pool. The Epicor-II system processed the remainder of the contaminated water
at TMI-2.

02/1988

TMI-2 Project Directorate Dissolved. The TMI-2 Project Directorate was

dissolved in February 1988. The inspection program for TMI-2 was assumed by
the TMI resident inspection staff. Technical review and project management
functions were assumed by a NRC Headquarters project directorate.
1989

04/1989

NRC Approved Evaporation of Accident-Generated Water. Public hearings

on the licensees proposal to evaporate 2.3 million gallons of accident-generated
water were held by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB). The
hearings concluded on November 15, 1988. On February 3, 1989, the Board
issued a decision in favor of the licensee on all relevant issues. On April 13,
1989, the Commission affirmed the ASLBs decision without prejudice to any
appeals. The licensee began to construct the evaporator in August 1989.

07/1989

NRC Co-Sponsored Research of Cracks in the Lower Reactor Vessel Head.

A 1989 video inspection of the reactor vessels lower head disclosed several
cracks that appeared to be associated with in-core instrument penetration
nozzles. Higher quality color videos and a mechanical probe were used in
August 1989 to obtain better information on the cracks. The cracks appeared to
be up to approximately six inches long, 0.25 inches wide, and more than 0.19
inches deep, but not through-wall (see photo below).

25

The TMI Vessel Investigation Project (VIP) was an international program

sponsored jointly by the NRC and the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA). Participants in this
program included the U.S., Japan, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Italy,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. As described in the
formal project agreement, the objectives of the VIP were to jointly carry out a
study to evaluate the potential failure modes and the TMI-2 reactor vessels
margin for failure during the TMI-2 accident. The conditions and properties of the
materials extracted from the lower head of the TMI-2 pressure vessel were
investigated to determine the extent of the damage to the lower head by
chemical and thermal attack, the thermal input to the vessel, and the margin of
structural integrity that remained during the accident. The examinations
performed under the VIP went beyond the work that had been performed during
the previous TMI-2 examinations; specifically, the VIP obtained and examined
samples of the lower head steel, instrument penetrations, and previously molten
debris that was attached to the lower head, and used this information to estimate
the vessels margin for failure. The VIP included the development of the cutting
tools to remove lower head samples, the metallurgical laboratory work, and the
study and analyses of results. It took nearly five years to carry out the project,
during which time nearly all of the objectives were accomplished.

A 1989 video inspection of the reactor vessels lower head disclosed several cracks that appeared to
be associated with in-core instrument penetration nozzles.

26

Results from the VIP are documented in the following reports:

NUREG/CR-6185, TMI-2 Instrument Nozzle Examinations at Argonne
National Laboratory
NUREG/CR-6187, Results of Mechanical Tests and Supplementary
Microstructural Examinations of the TMI-2 Lower Head Samples
NUREG/CR-6194, Metallographic and Hardness Examinations of TMI-2
Lower Pressure Vessel Head Samples
NUREG/CR-6195, Examination of Relocated Fuel Debris Adjacent to the
Lower Head of the TMI-2 Reactor Vessel
NUREG/CR-6196, Calculations to Estimate the Margin to Failure in the TMI2 Vessel
NUREG/CR-6198, TMI-2 Nozzle Examinations Performed at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory
08/1989

NRC issued Supplement 3 to the Programmatic Environmental Impact

Statement for Post-Defueling Monitored Storage. In August 1989, the NRC
issued NUREG-0683 Supplement 3, Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement Related to Decontamination and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes
Resulting from March 28, 1979 Accident Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit
2, Final Supplement Dealing with Post Defueling Monitored Storage and
Subsequent Cleanup. This supplement evaluated the licensees proposal to
complete the current cleanup effort and place the facility into monitored storage
for an unspecified period of time. The licensee had indicated that the facility
would likely be decommissioned following the storage period, at the time that
Unit 1 was decommissioned. Specifically, the supplement provided an
environmental evaluation of the licensees proposal and a number of alternative
courses of action from the end of the current defueling effort to the beginning of
decommissioning. However, it did not provide an evaluation of the environmental
impacts associated with decommissioning. NRC staff had concluded that the
licensees proposal to place the facility in monitored storage would not
significantly affect the quality of the human environment. Furthermore, any
impacts associated with this action were outweighed by its benefits. The benefit
of this action was the ultimate elimination of the small but continuing risk
associated with the conditions of the facility, resulting from the March 28, 1979,
accident. The draft supplement was issued for public comment in April 1988.
1990

03/1990

Defueling Completed. The licensees defueling crews completed bulk defueling

in December 1989. In March 1990, they completed the final re-flushing and revacuuming for loose, dust-like debris. A total of 308,000 pounds of core debris
and commingled structural materials was removed from the reactor vessel and
coolant system during the five-year effort.

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04/15/1990

Final Fuel Debris Shipped. The final fuel shipment of fuel debris to the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory was made on April 15, 1990.

Last shipment of fuel debris leaving TMI to DOE in 1990. (DOE Photo)

04/26/1990

Plant Operations Transitioned. The licensee submitted documentation to justify

transition from Mode 1 (defueling) to Modes 2 through 3. In Mode 2, defueling
was completed and, thus, boration of the reactor coolant system and staffing of
the control room by licensed operators was no longer required. In Mode 3, offsite shipment of the fuel was completed and boration of the spent-fuel storage
pools was no longer required. The three criteria for changing from Mode 1 to
Mode 2 were as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)

The reactor vessel and reactor coolant system were defueled to the
extent reasonably achievable.
The possibility of a criticality in the reactor building was precluded.
There were no canisters containing core material in the reactor building.

The additional requirement for transition to Mode 3 was that no canisters

containing core material remained on the TMI site. The NRC staff and
consultants from Battelle Memorial Institute, Pacific Northwest Laboratory,
performed a detailed technical review and inspection to verify that the criteria
were met. The facility made the transition from Mode 1 to Mode 2 on April 26,
1990, and to Mode 3 the following day.

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1991
01/24/1991

Evaporator Operations Began. The evaporator system began to vaporize the

slightly contaminated accident-generated water on January 24, 1991, after a
prolonged period of system testing, modification, and repair. At the end of
September 1991, a total of 738,800 gallons had been decontaminated and
vaporized.

07/1991

Reactor Vessel Drained. The reactor vessel was drained to take final
measurements of the residual fuel remaining in the vessel. The reactor vessel
fuel measurement program was the final step in the special nuclear materials
accountability program at TMI-2. The measurement technique made use of an
array of helium-filled detectors to measure fast neutrons produced by the residual
fuel. Calibrations were made using americium-beryllium and californium sources.
1992

02/1992

NRC Issued a Safety Evaluation for Post-Defueling Monitored Storage.

Back in August 1988, the licensee submitted a Safety Analysis Report to
document and support their proposal to amend the TMI-2 license to a
possession-only license, and to allow the facility to enter post-defueling
monitored storage (PDMS). In February 1992, the NRC issued a Safety
Evaluation for post-defueling monitored storage, which addressed the license
conditions and technical specifications necessary to implement PDMS following
evaluations by NRC staff and contractor consultants from Battelle Memorial
Institutes Pacific Northwest Laboratory. As part of the evaluation, the staff
published a technical evaluation report, which appraised PDMS as an integrated
process and assessed licensee commitments that were not within the technical
specifications. These two documents and Final Supplement 3 to the
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (NUREG-0683), which was
issued in August 1989, formed the basis for the NRCs position on the PDMS.
Later, the NRC issued a possession-only license on September 14, 1993.
1993

07/1993

Residual Fuel Remaining in TMI Systems Determined. In July 1993, NRC

staff issued an analysis confirming earlier analyses by the licensee, which
indicated that the fuel remaining in the TMI-2 reactor vessel would remain
subcritical, with an adequate margin for safety, during post-defueling monitored
storage. NRC staff and consultants from Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories
performed independent evaluations and made independent measurements of
these earlier fuel measurements in the auxiliary and reactor buildings. The
licensees current best estimate of the residual fuel in the reactor vessel was
2,040 pounds (925 kilograms), based on data from recently completed fastneutron measurements. For the balance of the facility external to the reactor
vessel, earlier licensee estimates, based on measurements, sample analyses,
and visual observations, indicated that no more than 385 pounds (174.6
kilograms) of residual fuel remained.

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08/1993

Evaporation of Accident Water Completed. The decontamination and

evaporation of 2.23 million gallons of accident-generated water were completed
in August 1993.

09/14/1993

NRC Issued Possession-Only License. On September 14, 1993, the NRC

approved the post-defueling monitored storage and issued a possession-only
license.

09/23/1993

Last Meeting of the Public Advisory Panel Held. The last meeting (78th
overall) of the 10-member Advisory Panel for the Decontamination of Three Mile
Island Unit 2 was held on September 23, 1993. The Panel, composed of
citizens, scientists, and state and local officials, was formed by the NRC in 1980
to provide input to the Commission on major cleanup issues. The principal topics
discussed at these meetings included the NRC staffs safety evaluation and
technical evaluation report addressing post-defueling monitored storage, the
status and progress of cleanup at the TMI-2 facility, and the decommissioning
funding status and plans.
Lessons learned from the Public Advisory Panel were published in NUREG/CR6252, Lessons learned from the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Advisory Panel.

The Advisory Panel for the Decontamination of Three Mile Island Unit 2 held its last meeting in 1993. Panel members
attending the final meeting are pictured (names are provided in the NRC 1994 Annual Report, NUREG- 1145, Vol.
10, Page 50).

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1994
1994

TMI-2 Placed in Post-Defueling Monitored Storage. In 1994, TMI-2 was

placed in post-defueling monitored storage (PDMS), a passive, monitored state.
The licensee will maintain Unit 2 in PDMS until TMI Unit 1 permanently cease
operation. At that time, the licensee would decommission both units
simultaneously. NRC staff continues to monitor TMI-2, and requires the licensee
to submit regular PDMS reports summarizing ongoing Unit 2 activities.

References
Primary sources used in these timeline narratives include the NRC annual reports listed below
and abstracts from NRC technical (NUREG) reports mentioned in this timeline.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

USNRC, 1979 NRC Annual Report, NUREG-0690, March 1980.

USNRC, 1980 NRC Annual Report, NUREG-0774, March 1981.
USNRC, 1981 NRC Annual Report, NUREG-0920, June 1982.
USNRC, 1982 NRC Annual Report, NUREG-0998, June 1983.
USNRC, 1983 NRC Annual Report, NUREG-1090, June 1984.
USNRC, NRC Annual Report, NUREG-1145, Vols. 1-12 (1984-1995), various dates.

9/6/2012

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