WhatReallyHappenedtoLucentTechnologies?

DougPitt
In2006,LucentTechnologies,onceaneliteAmericantechnologycompanywhosestockpricehadrisento$84,creatingamarket
valueof$258billion,barelyavoidedbankruptcybysellingouttoAlcatel,asecondtierFrenchtelecommunicationscompany.
Inashorttenyears,LucentcrashedfrombeingtheprofitablesolesourceAT&TR&Dsubsidiarytoafailingindependentcompany.
Employeeswereshedbythethousands,droppingfrom106,000tofewerthan35,000.Over70,000Americanjobsdisappearedfrom
thecompany.Largechunksweresoldoffatbargainpricesforcash.Otherswereshutdowntolessenanoverwhelmingnegativecash
flow.
Inonlysixyearsitsstockpricerosefrom$7.56persharetoahighof$84aftermultiplestocksplits,andthencrashedtoa2002lowof
56cents.Lucentsmarketvaluedroppedtolessthan$2billion,notenoughtomeettwomonthspayrollexpense.Individuals
company401Kssanktonearworthlessness(dividedbytwelve).Retireeshadtogobacktowork.Unexercisedstockoptionsbecame
wallpaper.
HowcouldalargesuccessfulAmericancompanywithsuchpowerfulfundamentalresearchandtechnologydisintegratesoquickly?
AndhowcouldWallStreetpunditsnotseeitcoming?
LucentsstoryexposesanationalafflictiondestroyingAmericasfuture.ItspeakstothecontemporaryAmericanworld,aharbinger
ofmanyothercompanyfutures.Perhapstheglobalfuture.
NoanalysistodatefullydescribestheforcesthatdroveLucenttothebrink.Someilluminatingarticlesdidprobeaspectsofthe
situation(forexample,http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2003/07/07/345538/index.htm,aswellasthebook:
OpticalIllusions).Buttheydidntrevealtheentirerealdirtystory.
RetrospectiveinterestfocusedontheLucentaccountingevents,thefinancialreportingfiascoes,andexecutiveactionsduringthelast
briefcriticalperiod,andnotthelongertermunderlyingproblemsthatguaranteedLucent'sultimatedemise.OpticalIllusionswould
haveonebelieveitwasthetransmissionproductareafailuretodelivertheneededproducts.Butthatsimplyattemptedtoshift
responsibilityawayfromWallStreetandMcGinn.
Inkeyrespects,whathappenedtoLucentandAT&Tmirrorscultural,politicalandsocialshiftsthatwereoccurringintheU.S.atthe
sametime.Iftherearelessonstobelearned,itisthatAmericaischangingfortheworse,andislosingitsabilitytocultivatetalented,
dedicatedengineersandscientists.Itislosingitsnurturing,supportivemanagers,andthecorporateculturesthatinspiretrueinvention
andinnovation.
Companiescannolongeraffordtheluxuryofbigscienceandlongtermresearchanddevelopmentprojects.Conditionsare
progressivelydeterioratedovertime.Witheverytransition,thechangesbecomemoredestructive.
Inanutshell,whathappenedtoLucentwasaresultof:
WallStreetego,greed,andmalfeasance.
Corporateexecutivegreed,incompetence,inexperienceandineffectiveness.
Meritocracybecomingmediocrity.
ButthereislotsofmoneytobemadebyWallStreetandCorporateExecutives.

WallStreetGreedEgoMalfeasance
Everyfewyearsanew,poorlyunderstoodinvestmentproductsparksanewWallStreetfrenzywheremoneycantflowintothenew
productfastenough,untilitbecomesobviousthatitsbeenoversoldbydisingenuousWallStreethype,andcollapses.Thesebubbles
defineWallStreetepochs.
ThecommercialrealestatebubbleresultedintheResolutionTrustCorporationSavingsandLoanbailoutthatcosttaxpayers
hundredsofbillionsofdollars.TheClintoneraTelecomReformActof1996fueledthedotcombubblethatledtoLucentsdemise.
Clintoneralegislationderegulatingbankingandinvestmentfueledthesubsequentmortgagebubble.Subprimeonlycontributedtothe
problemslightly.
Whenthelatestpyramidschemeultimatelycollapsesastheyalwaysdo,itsrelativelyunimportanttoWallStreetexecutives.They
banktheirsupfrontandleavetheinvestorstotakethehit.Itsimplysignalsthetimetotakeabreaktoregroup,giveinvestorsachance
toforget,rebuildinvestortrust,andbeginlookingforthenextbigplay.
Foralltheinvestorsandtaxpayersthatsufferfinancialloss,WallStreetisfinewiththeoutcome.
WallStreetleadsthegreedgame,andcorporateexecutivesfollow.Theyknowtobanktheirmillionsandbillionsbeforethecurtain
falls.FewCEOswinbuckingWallStreetpressures.NoselfrespectingCEOwantstobeknownastheheadofastodgyold
economycompany.WarrenBuffetexcepted,anachronismthatheis.AndthatswhyhesinNebraska,notNewYork.
TheonlysustainableCEOroledrivescompaniestoMEETOREXCEEDWALLSTREETQUARTERLYEXPECTATIONS.Those
executivesthatoptoutofthegreedgameorproduceabadquarterarepunishedmightily.
Thatswherethemalfeasancecomesintoplay.WallStreetblindsitselftothetruthtokeeptheplaygoing,wheninmorerational
circumstancestheywoulddiscloselegitimateconcerns.Instead,WallStreetcontinuestoencourageunrealisticexpectations.Corporate
executivesbendthetruthaccordinglytomeetthoseexpectations.Butevenworse,executiveswilluseaccountinggamestoportray
favorablequarterlyresults,evenwhenthedeceptionisnotsustainable.Everyquarterthatthenumbersaremet,WallStreetsmileson
theirstockoptions,andtheycanbanktheirbonuses.
Onceinawhilesomeoneismadeascapegoatafterthefact.JackGrubmanhadbeenavocalhypsterforAT&Tfordecades,whenin
factsignificantnegativeinformationwasignoredbyhim.ItwasasifhewasonAT&T'spayroll.Butittookpeopledecadesto
complainenoughtomakehisconductanissue.Longafterhehadbankedhismillions.

WallStreetandtheDotcomBubble
Enteringthedotcombubble,WallStreetheraldedtheInternetExplosion.Entirelynewcorporationsandinnovationsweregoingto
knockoutconventionalbusinesses,andreplacethemwithhardcharging,eindustrygiants.Allthewhile,WallStreetwaspeddlinge
commercecompanieswithnegativebalancesheetsthathadnorealchanceofeversucceeding.Afewmadeit.Alotmoredidnot.
WallStreetlovedthenewlyspunoffLucentasthebestplaygoing.Itwasthebestofbothworlds.Anoldestablishedcompanywitha
captiveBellOperatingCompanymarket,muscle,newtechnology,andnewcontemporarynonBellHeadmanagement.
Thetimingwasright.Lucentwasnearingtheendofthetelecomdigitaltechnologycyclewhenanalogwasbeingreplacedwith
digital,andcopperwithfiber.Wirelinewasbeginningtobereplacedwithwireless,andcircuitwithpacket.Justasthetraditional
equipmentmarketwasslowing,alongcametheTelecomReformActof1996tocreateawholenewsetoftelecomequipment
customers:CompetitiveLocalExchangeCarriers(CLECs).
WallStreetwasrifewithexcitement.Moneywasflowinginfast,andthehotstockswerequicklybeingbidup.
Therewasonlyoneproblem:CLECshadnochanceofsucceeding.Evenbybuyingcustomeraccessatwholesaleprices,and
criminallyirrationalequipmentvendorfinancing,theyhadnochanceofgainingenoughwirelinemarketsharetosurvive.Besides,
wirelinegrowthwasslowing,wirelessaccess/cellularwasbeginningtoerodewirelinemarketshare,andcablewasmovingintovoice
anddataservices.

Fixedwirelesscarrierswerenotgoingtofareanybetter.
Sointoxicatedwiththeproceedsfromhelpinginvestorsdumpbillionsintothesepossibilities,WallStreetwasunwillingto
responsiblyarticulatetherationallikelyoutcomeassessments.WellbeyondthetimeitshouldhavebeenobviousthattheCLECswere
flamingout,WallStreetwasstillsingingtheirpraises.StodgyoldregulatedBellOperatingCompanieswereboring.
Therawallureofmorefinancialgainthanonecouldeverhopetoaccumulateotherwisemotivatedtheplayerstothemalfeasancethey
practicedunderthefreeenterpriselogo.

ExecutiveIncompetence/Inexperience/Ineffectiveness
Contrarytowhathasbeenwritten,Lucentwasfirstandforemostavictimofexecutiveincompetence:elitist,arrogant,outoftouch,
inexperienced.Startatthetopandworkyourwaydown.
Theendbeganwithdivestiture.AT&Twantedtoshedthestodgyregulatedoperatingcompaniesandtheequipmentandservice
restrictionsthataccompanieditsregulatedmonopolystatus.OperatingcompaniesgeneratednosizzlewithWallStreet.The
InformationAgewasuponusandAT&Thadtounleashit'stechnologytogoheadtoheadwiththelikesofIBM.
TheproblemsreallybeganwithBobAllen.FewrememberthatBobAllenbecameCEObydefaultwithJimOlson'suntimelycancer
death.FewknewthatOlsonwasworkingwithBobAllenandHalBurlingametoreinventthecompany.Allenwasthebeancounter
andBurlingamewastheHumanResourcesperson.UnderdifferentcircumstancesAllenwouldhaveneverbeenthechoicetosucceed
Olson.
ItwasalsobecomingobviousthatwithouttheoperatingcompanyexperienceAT&Twaslosingit'swayinbringingtechnologyto
market.Itwaslosingit'sabilitytomanageWesternElectric,NCRandBellLabs.ItheldnoswayoverOperatingCompany
technologychoices.Infact,LongDistanceandOperatingCompanieswerebecomingcompetitors.And,amajortechnologyshift
beyonddigitalswitchingwasunderwayandtheywereunabletochartitscourse.Muchlessleadit.
NetworkSystemswasbecominglittlemorethanunnecessarilyexpensiveoverhead.
ComputerSystemsbecametheboatanchorthatneverturnedaprofit.Itwasbecomingacorporateembarrassmenttoreporttheir
results,orlackof.Allenthoughtagoodwaytoconfusethebooks,andperhapstheonlywayoutwastoacquireNCR,another
computercompanythatwasstrugglingtosurvive.Mergethetwo,prayforsomesynergy,andbuysomefinancialreportingwriteoff
excuses.Ultimately,AT&ThadtospinNCRbackoutandgiveuponthecomputerbusiness.
Inthecourseofdoingthat,AT&TcompletelydivesteditselfofeverythingbutNetworkServices.NCRwasdumpedandLucent
pickeduptherest.
Ofnote,butcommonlyforgotten,AT&TsaddledLucentwithasmuchdebtastheycouldtogetitofftheirbooks.Theargumentcould
easilybemadethatLucentdeservedtostartit'slifewithfarlessdebt.
WithAllen'ssuddendeparture,SchachtbecametheLucentplaceholderuntilhecouldstabilizethesituationandfindasuccessor.
Nonehadbeengroomed,andtheoldAT&TmethodofmovingexecutivesuptocorporatewereoutthewindowwithnoOperating
CompaniesorLongLinestodrawexperiencedtalentfrom.

AndthencameMcGinn.
LucentwasstillwellenoughtosurviveintactuntilSchachtpickedMcGinnashissuccessor.
ItwasonlywhenMcGinnputLucentundersuchcapitalandcashflowpressurebyvirtueofirresponsible,recklessCLECfinancial
dealsthatithadnochanceforsuccess.Thesedealswerenotthoseofmarketingsubordinatesfardownthefoodchain.Thesewere
dealsthatbytheirverystructurerequiredapprovalatthetop,andacrossmultipleareas.

IndicativeofthemesswasthefactthattherewasnoinsideexecutiveleftstandingtorunthecompanyafterMcGinn.Schachthadto
stepbackinasacaretaker.Hewasalwaysanoutsider,neveraninsider.CarlyFiorina,anotherbigpartoftheproblem,hadalready
bailed.PatRussohadbailedtoKodakandfailedasaturnaroundspecialist.Andshewastheonlyexecutiveacceptableandwilling
totakethehelm.
Byfar,theworstexecutiveswerethelast:Theblindleadingtheblind,ortheincompetentnotknowinganybetterthantopickthe
incompetentassubordinates.Iftherewerecriteriaforselectingpeopleforexecutivepositionswithinthecompany,ithadnothingto
dowithcompetence.
Buttheresmoretothelastbatchofexecutivesthanincompetence.Notonlydidtheynotknowtheywereincompetent,theydidnot
realizethatwhattheyweredoingwasreckless,dangerous,andquestionablyfraudulent.Whilesomemightnotconsideritfraudulent,
itdidnotrequireanyspecialgeniustosensethattheperformancethetopexecutiveswererequiringcouldonlybeaccomplishedwith
marginal,highlyriskydealsandcookingthebookstothemax.
Ifnotguiltyoffraudandcorruptaccountingpractices,attheleast,theywentwaybeyondthetraditionalbusinesspracticesand
dealingsthathadmadeLucentwhatitwas:alongtermtechnologyleaderwithastablewellheeled,wellcapitalized,profitable
telecomcustomerbase.
Inanutshell,McGinnandtheseexecutivestriedtotakethecompanysomeplaceithadneverbeen,andtheyhadneverbeen.
Experienced,knowledgeablesubordinateexecutiveswererunoff,retiredorfired,becausetheywerestrongenoughtoholdthe
traditionallineandknewbetterthantogoalongwiththenewfolly.
RichMcGinnwasdeterminedtoscalethemountainpeakofstardomandshowtheworldwhatasuperstarhewas.AndbreakLucent
outofthefuddyduddy,lethargictelecommentality,turningthemintoafastpaced,bestinclasstechnicalleader.
ButRichMcGinnwaswidelyconsideredtobeanemptysuitbythosethatknewhimbest,andCarlyFiorinawasknownasa
demanding,slamdunkingsharkmostfocusedonselfpromotion.
ThewidelydiscussedstoryinsideLucentwasthatRichMcGinn,ambitiouspersonthathewas,rosequicklywithintheComputer
SystemsDivisionaftermarryingintotheBoardRoom.ComputerSystemswasthecorporateboatanchor,capableoflosingbillionsa
year,andneverturningprofitable.IfRichhadbeenasuperstar,hisresultstheredidnotshowit.
Thereismorethanalittleironytothefactthatsomeonefromthedogdivisionwouldbecometheheadhonchoonlylongenoughto
turnthewholecompanyintoadog.

MeritocracyBecomesMediocrity
Firstandforemost,Lucentwasoriginallyatechnologycompany,notamarketingorfinancialenterprise.Itmadenosensetohave
anyoneotherthantechnologyexpertsatitshelm.MarketingwasnotaseriousneedwhentheirmarketwasinhouseOperating
Companies.OrwhenthereweresofewcompaniescapableofdeliveringcentralofficegradesolutionstotheRBOCs.
Inthebeginning,AT&Twasawellconceivedmonolith.TheOperatingCompanieseachoperatedwithintheirregulatorydomainsas
independentsubsidiariesundertheAT&Tcorporateumbrella.LongLineswastheseparatelongdistanceoperation,keepingits
pricingandprofitsoutfromunderstateregulation.WesternElectric(WECO)wasthemanufacturingsubsidiarythatproducedthe
componentsneededtobuildandoperatetelecommunicationsnetworks.AndBellLabswastheR&Dsubsidiary,primarilytaskedwith
advancingthenetworktechnology.Inaddition,BellLabsbecameapremierecontractorforthefederalgovernment.Ithadthe
resourcesandexpertisetoperformasprimecontractoronanumberofhugeprojects:theSafeguardABMproject,theAutovon
MilitaryCommunicationsNetworkincludingtheCheyenneMountainNORADcenter,theSOSUSNavyunderwatersoundsystem
thatimplementedaglobalunderwatersoundnetworkfordetectingsurfaceshipsandsubmarines,tonameafew.
Eachsubsidiaryhaditsowncorporatestructureandculture:AT&TCorporate,LongLines,eachBellOperatingCompany,Western
Electric,andBellLabs.BellLabswasfundedjointlybyLongLinesandAT&TCorporate,asacollectiveOperatingCompanyvoice.
Someemployeeswouldoccasionallyshiftfromoneorganizationtoanother.SomeBellLabsemployeeswouldshifttomorebusiness
orientedorganizations,particularlyWesternElectric,butrarelydidemployeesshiftfromanOperatingCompany,WesternElectricor

AT&TtoBellLabs.Ineffecttherewasanintentionallycontrolledonewayflowofpersonnelonlyfrommoretechnicalorganizations
toless,butnotthereverse.Ineffecttechnicalprioritieswereinsulatedfrombusinesspriorities.
Overtheyears,AT&Torganizationswerestable.Timeinrankwasrequiredforpromotion.SomeBellLabspeoplewouldmigrateto
theOperatingCompaniesorcorporateAT&T.BellLabsandWesternElectric,chosetheirleadersfromwithin.
BellLabswasoriginallyastrictmeritocracy.BellLabswassubdividedintoDivisions,Labs,DepartmentandGroups,inthat
hierarchicorder.ALabwouldtypicallyconsistofthreetosixDepartments,totalingroughlyonehundredemployeesormore.
Raisesandpromotionswerebasedonanannualmeritreview.Therewasoneprimaryvalue:technicalcompetency.Thismeritreview,
performedbyallLabsupervision,wouldrankordereveryengineerwithinanentireLab.Foreverymeritreviewandsalary
administrationcycle,BellLabswouldpublishtheGreenBookthatdisplayedallemployeesalariesbyyearsofexperience,without
namingtheemployees.Eachengineercouldlookatonechartandseehowtheycomparedsalarywisewitheveryengineerintheir
experienceband.
AstimewentbyandAT&Tmanagementbecamemoreenlightened,thisstrictmeritocraticrankingsystemwaseliminated.Labwide
rankingsfellbythewayside,andDepartmentHeadsadministeredsalariesandpromotionsaccordingtocorporateguidelines.Moreof
thesalaryadministrationbecamedictatedbytheseguidelines.WhatwasonceaLabwideenforcedmeritocracybecameDepartment
Headarbitrariness.
ShareholderValuereplacedtechnicalcompetenceastheoverarchingvalue.Employeeswereaskedtoprovidebusinessoriented
quarterlygoalsandobjectives,andtoassesshowwelltheyweremeetingthem.
Originally,everyMemberofTechnicalStaff,MTS,wasexpectedtohaveatleastaMaster'sDegree.Thosethatwerehiredinwitha
Bachelor'sDegreeweresenttograduateschoolatcompanyexpensetocompletetheirstudies.Therewereafewlesserstaffpositions,
butthevastbulkofBellLabsemployeeswereMTS.
AsBellLabsgrew,andtheworkshiftedsignificantlyfromlongertermresearchtowardsdevelopment,particularlyforsoftware,it
becamedifficultandexpensivetofullystafftothoseeducationalrequirements.Consequently,thevarietyofemployeecategories
expanded,andthegraduaterequirementsdisappeared.Bachelor'sDegreegraduateswerefullycapableofperformingthesoftware
programmingdutiesbeingaskedofthem.
WhilethisenabledBellLabstorevisetheirstaffingcostsdownwardandadequatelystaffthehugeprojectundertakings,itdidnot
preservethecaliberofthepreviousemployees.Ortheirmotivationtowardtechnicalcompetence.
Ifanything,itdilutedtechnicalcompetence.

ImportingMediocrity
AnimosityalwaysexistedatsomelevelbetweenBellLabsmanagementandWesternElectric.BellLabsdesignedtheequipmentand
Westernbuiltit.
WesternElectricrespectedandresentedBellLab'sexpertpower.AndWECOhadtosharecontrolwithAT&TCorporate,which
couldleadtosomehumblingsituationswhenCorporateoverruledWestern.
Ontheothersideoftheissue,BellLabsmanagersprobablydisplayedalittletoomuchego,arroganceandsmugnessabouttheir
technicalsuperiority.
WesternElectricdealtwithcustomers,frontingforBellLabsR&D,andprobablylookeddownontheLabsashavingnobusinessor
marketingsavvy.AndtheusualconflictswouldariseabouttheLabsinabilitytodelivertherightproductattherighttime.WECOhad
frequentissueswiththeLabsfundingrequiredtoobtaintheirproducts.AndtheLabswerenotabouttorelinquishcontroloftheir
organizationsandbudgets.
TherewasonereallyinterestingWECOdevelopmentduringtheSeventiesthatwasthebeginningofthechangeincorporatethinking
aboutwhethertheLabswasinfactthebestbusinesspartnermodel.AsmalldepartmentwasformedwithinWECOofnonLabs

softwareengineerstaskedwithcontinuingsoftwarefeaturedevelopmentfortheNo1AESSSwitch.Theresultswerequitefavorable.
ThatorganizationbecamethemostprofitableoperationwithinWECOonaperemployeebasis.Ofcourse,theywereproviding
revenuegenerationbusinessfeaturesforahugeinstalledbaseof1AESSswitches.TheOperatingCompanieswouldpaywhateverit
tooktoleveragenewbusinessfeaturesacrosstheirswitches.That'swheretheirrevenuegravywas.
Duringthe80sAT&TdecidedtohybridizeBellLabs.TheboundariesbetweenWECOandtheLabswereintentionallymademuch
moreindistinct,andWECOmanagerswereputinchargeofLabsorganizations.WiththeadventoftheLucentspinoffthecorporate
wallwasremovedtotally.WhiletherewaseffectivelyaBellLabsorganization,itwasinmanycasessimplyascatteringof
heterogeneousorganizationswithinLucent.Thisfurtherreinforcedtheshiftinvaluesfromtechnicalcompetencetoshareholdervalue,
aeuphemistictermforprofit.
ProductManagementhadmuchmorecontroloverbudgetdetailsandprojectfunding.Ontheonehand,itwasfeltthattheLabsR&D
wasrunningonafirmerbusinessfoundation.Ontheother,projectsnotdirectlyassociatedwithcurrentrevenuegeneratingproducts
becameincreasinglydifficulttofund.
MixintothosepoliticsAT&TstilltryingtodriveproductchoicestosuittheirLongDistanceneeds,andthefragmentingtechnology
choicesinthemarketplace,andBellLabswasneverabletodevelopasignificantnewinhouseswitchbeyondthe5ESS.Theygot
trappedbetweentheAsynchronousTransportMode(ATM)OperatingCompanytelecommunicationsmodelandtheInternetProtocol
Internetservicesmodel.Theironeeffort,GlobeView,anATMswitch,wasamiserablefailurethatwascancelled.Splitting
developmentacrossmultipleorganizationsandlocationswasmorethanthesystemcouldmanage.Andthatwastheendofthat.
AndtheoneexceptionalproductonlyBellLabswascapableofdeveloping,thelambdarouter,wascanceled.
BellLabswasunabletoanticipatethetechnologyshiftwithintheircustomerbase,respondtoit,ordirectit.Theywerebeingout
marketed.
WhentheshiftbecameobviousLucenttriedtoacquireproductsbybuyingcompaniesatexorbitantprices.
Whileitwaswidelyknownamongtheformerseasonedexecutivesthatthetelecommunicationsequipmentmarketwashighly
cyclical,itwasnotproperlyanticipated,nordidcurrentexecutivesanticipatetheproductsthemarketshiftwouldbedemanding.
Ithadalsobecomeatimewhencorporationssloweddevelopingnewproductsinhouse.Thecoststructureswerefrequentlyhigher
thanquarterlyreportingcouldsupport.Itwascheaper,sothereasoningwenttobuyanewstartupfueledbystarvingentrepreneurs.
Anditmightreduceriskandtimetomarket.
Actually,itcreatedmoreplayfortheWallStreetmavens,anditputexecutiveswithlittletechnicalcompetencyinchargeofacquiring
technologywithouthavingtoacknowledgesubordinates.
Lucenttriedtobuytheirwayintoemergingproductsthatcouldreplacetraditionalswitching.Theypaidpremiumsformediocre
solutions.
Lucentwasimportingtechnicalcompetence,verylittleofwhichwouldresultinothernewproductlines.
Insummary,overthelastfortyyears,Lucenthadbecomeincreasinglypressuredtoshortenproductdevelopmentcycles,reduce
developmentcosts,shrinkpureresearchactivities,andbemoreresponsivetomoremarkets.Theinvestmentcommunityexpected
themtooutperformleanandmeantechnologystartupsingrowthandearnings.Thepressureforconsistentshorttermrevenueand
earningsgrowthbiasedthemawayfromlarger,longertermR&Dundertakings.Andwhenprojectswereundertaken,theywere
chosenonthebasisofstockmarketsizzlenotnecessarilysoundengineeringpractices.
R&Ddecisionsbecamedrivenbybusinessexecutivesattunedtoinvestmentcommunitymotivesandincentives,andpoorlytrainedin
theunderlyingtechnologyanddevelopmentprocesses.
Indoingsotheytradedtheirtechnicalsoulformediocrity.Andgainedtheirgreedyincompetentexecutives.
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