Annotation Constitutional Rights of The Accused

44
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Constitutional Rights of the Accused
ANNOTATION
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
By
JOSE AGATON R. SIBAL
________________
1. Due Process, p. 45
A Essentials of Due Process in Criminal Cases, p. 45
B Certainty and Due Process, p. 49
C Knowing Use of Perjured Testimony, p. 50
2. Right to Bail, p. 50
A Constitutional Provision, p. 50
B Importance of Right, p. 50
C Scope of Right, p. 51
D Hearing on Bail Application, p. 53
E No Excessive Bail, p. 54
3.
Specific Procedural Rights, p. 55

A
B
C
D
E
Constitutional Provision, p. 55
Presumption of Innocence, p. 55
Right to be Heard by Himself, p. 57
Right to Counsel, p. 58
Right to be Informed of Nature and Cause of
Accusation, p. 60
F Right to Speedy Trial, p. 62
G Right to Public Trial, p. 65
H Right to Confrontation, p. 66
4. Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, p. 68
A Constitutional Provision, p. 68
B History, p. 69
C Reason for the Rule, p. 69
D Prohibition Should be Liberally Construed, p. 70
E Scope of Prohibition, p. 70
45
VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990
45
F Waiver of Privilege, p. 71
5. Excessive Fines and Cruel, Degrading or
Inhuman Punishment, p. 73
6. Employment of Physical, Psychological or
Degrading Punishment, p. 74
7. Conclusion, p. 74
_______________
1. Due Process
1
The framers of our three Constitutions, following the

examples of the Jones Law, did not think it superfluous to
include in the Bill of Rights the provision that No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal
2
protection of the laws, though it seems beyond question
that whatever protection this specific provision gives can be
found also in the general due process clause. When the
Government chooses to pit its forces against him, the
individual is puny indeed and needs every protection
against the overzealousness or malice of its officers, as the
protracted
trial of Aurelia Conde from our judicial annals
3
attest. Fraenkel pointed out the first step of the tyrant is4
to use the criminal law to do away with the opposition.
and Edmund Burke added: Kings will be tyrants from
policy, when subjects are rebels from principles.

The constitutional rights of an accused are for the
protection of the guilty and the innocent alike. Only by the
assurance that even the guilty shall be given the benefit of
every constitutional guaranty can the innocent be secure in
the same rights.
A Essentials of Due Process in Criminal Cases
_______________
1
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution.
Conde vs. Court of First Instance, 45 Phil. 173 Conde vs. Rivera, 45
Phil. 650.
4
Our Civil Liberties, p. 6.

46
46

5
According to the Supreme Court in People vs. Castillo, the

requirement of due process in criminal proceedings is
satisfied if an accused person has been heard in a court
with power to try him, proceeded against under an orderly
process, and only punished after inquiry and investigation
upon notice to him and a judgment awarded within the
authority of a valid law. In a general way, due process as
applied to criminal cases requires a procedure that accords
with a scheme of ordered liberty and does not violate any
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions 6 and
conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental.
As in the case of the due process in Section 1,7 no
definition of due process in criminal cases can be
formulated to cover all situations, and its meaning must be
gradually evolved from case to case. Thus, from the Castillo
requirement of due process8 the Supreme Court went on to
hold, in Arnault vs. Pecson, that due process includes a fair
and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for
preparing a defense, which may require not only time but
adequate freedom of action. Pursuant to this principle, the
Supreme Court granted the petitioner, who was then under
indefinite confinement for contempt of the Senate, not less
than six hours within which to visit his house and his office
under proper surveillance in order to search for and get

papers which, according to him, he needed for his defense
in a pending criminal case against him. It has also been
held that the constitutional right of an accused to due
process, along with his other
constitutional rights, would be
9
violated if the Labor Code were to be construed as vesting
the National Labor Relations with criminal jurisdiction to
impose the penalties provided in the Code for unfair labor
practices, because under the Code the quasijudicial
tribunal is not bound by the Rules of Evidence
and
10
procedure prevailing in courts of law and equity
_______________
5
76 Phil. 72.
Palko vs. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319.
Article III, 1987 Constitution.
87 Phil. 418.
Article 221, Labor Code.
10
See San Miguel Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 173 SCRA 314.

47
VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990
47
may ascertain the facts without regard to technicalities of

law or procedure, and as a consequence it may11 even convict
on a12 mere preponderance of the evidence. In another
case, the Supreme Court to at least two days to prepare
for trial is a deprivation of the constitutional right by due
process.
The right to be heard, which
is guaranteed in another
13
Section of the Bill of Rights, is also essentially a part of
procedural due process. The Supreme Court so held when it
voided an order of a trial court refusing to permit an
accused to present evidence in his defense after it had
denied his motion to dismiss based on the alleged
14
insufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
Another
right also specifically guaranteed in the Bill of
15
Rights, the right to counsel, has also been considered
by
16
the Supreme Court as essential
to due process.
17
In one criminal case, upon the opening of the hearing,
the following incident occurred:
COURT:
Is this case ready for trial?
FISCAL: I am ready, your honor.

COURT:
(to the accused) Q. Do you have an attorney or

are you going to plead guilty?A. I have no
lawyer and I will plead guilty.
COURT:
Arraign the accused.
NOTE:
Interpreter read the information to the accused

in the local dialect after which he was asked this
question.
Q.
What do you plead?A. I plead guilty, but I was

instructed by one Mr. Ocampo.
Two days later the court convicted the defendant.

Commenting on the trial courts question to the accused
Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead
guilty?The Supreme Court said:
_______________
11
See Scotys Department Store vs. Micaller, 52 O.G. 5119.
12
Montilla vs. Arellano, 89 Phil. 434.
13
Section 14, clause 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution.
14
Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525.
15
Section 12, clause 1, Article III, 1987 Constituion.
16
Abriol vs. Homeres, supra.
17
People vs. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752.

48
48

Not only did such a question fail to inform the accused that it
was his right to have an attorney before arraignment, but, what is
worse, the question was so framed that it could have been
construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that he
plead guilty if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair
hearing in violation of the due process clause contained in our
Constitution.
xxx
It must be added, in the instant case, that the accused who
was unaided by counsel pleaded guilty but with the following
qualification: but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo. The trial
court failed to inquire as to the true import of this qualification.

The record does not show whether the supposed instruction was
real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense
or to the making of the plea of guilty. No investigation was opened
by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and
there is now no way of determining whether the supposed
instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of
the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the
fiscals information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and
found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such
attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere
statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified
plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it
that the accused be assisted by counsel specially because of the
qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense
found to be capital by the court.
The filing of criminal charges in court upon which a person

accused may be convicted or acquitted is usually preceded
by some kind of preliminary investigation to enable the
prosecuting authorities to determine whether there is a
prima facie case. This is to save persons from unnecessary
harassment and expenses. Since the Bill of Rights provides
no person shall be held to answer
for a criminal offense
18
without due process of law, it seems that so long as a
preliminary investigation would amount to making 19a
person answer for a criminal offense without due process.
_______________
18
19
Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96.

49
VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990
49
B Certainty and Due Process

No principle is better settled in American constitutional
law than that a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as its application, violates the first essential requisite
of due process of law.
20
In other words, no one may be
20
of due process of law. In other words, no one may be

required at the peril of life, liberty or property
to speculate
21
as to the meaning of penal statutes. Thus, a statute
making it criminal for a person, under certain
circumstances, to be a member of a gang, was invalidated
for vagueness and uncertainty. The phrase consisting of
two or more persons was the only one used in the statute
purporting to define gang. The Supreme Court pointed
out that the meaning of that word indicated in dictionaries
and historical and sociological writings are numerous and
varied and that the
meaning is not derivable from the
22
common law either.
However, lack of precision is not itself offensive to the
requirements of due process, for the Constitution does not
require impossible standards. It is sufficient if the
language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the
prescribed conduct when 23 measured by common
understanding and practices. Accordingly, the United
States Supreme Court has held that statutes prohibiting
obscence, lewd, or filthy publications or other publications
of an indecent character are not violative of due process,
because the adjectives used, when applied according to the
proper standard and mark boundaries sufficiently distinct
for judges and juries fairly to administer the law x x x.
That there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to
determine the side of the line on which a particular past
situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language
too ambiguous to define a criminal offense.
_______________
20
Conally vs. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 389.
21
Lanzetta vs. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451.
22
For other illustrative cases see annotation: 83 L.ed. 893.
23
Roth vs. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 491, citing U.S. vs. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7,
8.
50
50

CKnowing Use of Perjured Testimony

In the United States, the rule is that due process is denied
by a conviction following a trial in which perjured

testimony on a material point was knowingly used against
the accused, at least where he suffered prejudice by virtue
of the use of such testimony even though it might affect
only his credibility, or where the prosecution knowingly
permitted false testimony to be given by a prosecution
witness in crossexamination, without correcting it. A trial
in which such perjured testimony is knowingly presented
24
or permitted by the government, is said to be unfair.
2. Right to Bail
A Constitutional Provision
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas25corpus is suspended. Excessive bails
shall not be required.
26
The word bail as used in the Constitution in the
phrase excessive bails shall not be required, is
inadequately translated by the word fianza as bail
implies a particular kind of bondthat is to say, a bond
given to secure the personal liberty of one27 held in restraint
upon a criminal or quasicriminal charge.
B Importance of Right
The evident purpose of this particular constitutional
guarantee is to prevent an innocent person from being
deprived of
_______________
24
Napue vs. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 see annotations: 3 L.ed. 2d, 1991 2
L.ed. 2d. 1575.

25
26
Taken from Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
27
Insular Government vs. Punzalan, 7 Phil. 546.

51
VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990
51
liberty and thus punished, through

the mere filing of
28
criminal charges
against him. In the case of People vs.
29
Hernandez, the government, in opposing an application
for bail pending appeal from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Manila sentencing the defendant
appellant to life imprisonment for the crime of rebellion,
urged the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, take into
consideration that the appellant was a menace to the
security of the State and that the judgment of conviction
indicated that the evidence of guilt against him was strong.
On this point the Supreme Court stressed that the
preservation of liberty is a major preoccupation of our
political system, and declared individual freedom is too
basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state,
like ours, to be denied upon mere general principles and
abstract considerations of public safety. The Court
accordingly granted 30temporary release of the appellant on
bail pending appeal.
C Scope of Right
The constitutional right to bail may be invoked by any
person arrested, detained, or otherwise deprived of his
liberty even if no complaint or information has yet been
filed against him. So, where a statute allowed the
prosecution a period of six months within which to
investigate and file the corresponding information in the
cases of persons apprehended by the American liberation
forces on suspicion of treason suspects were entitled to
obtain their liberty under bail pending their investigation
31
and the filing of criminal charges against them. The right
to bail is not limited to cases where the person accused,
upon final conviction, would be ordered confined in a penal
institution. Hence, pending appeal by a minor from
conviction for a criminal offense for which he has been
committed to the custody of a correctional or educational
institution, like the Welfareville Correctional Institution,
he is entitled, like any other accused,
_______________
28
Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 People vs. Follantes, 63 Phil. 474
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 83 Phil. 658.

29
52 O.G. 5506.
30
See Bolaos vs. Dela Cruz, 116 SCRA 78.
31
Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634.

52
52

32
to provisional release on bail.

According
to Rule 114, Section 3, of the Revised Rules of
33
Court, in noncapital cases, a defendant, before final
conviction, is entitled to bail as a matter of right, except
those charged with a capital offense or an offense which,
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time
of the application for bail, is punished by reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. Since admission
to bail is a matter of right before conviction in noncapital
offenses, the fact that the accused has previously
absconded and there is high degree of probability that he
will escape again is not a ground at all for denying bail it
gives the court no greater discretion than to increase the
bond to such an amount as will
reasonably tend to assure
34
the presence of the defendant. Hence, the bail is a matter
of right, the granting
of the same is mandatory.
35
In capital cases, when the evidence of guilt is strong,
the accused is not bailable at all,so the wording of the
constitutional provision strongly implies. It has been held,
however, that to deny bail it is not enough that the
evidence of guilt is strong it must also appear that in case
of conviction the defendants criminal
liability would
36
probably for a capital punishment. And so, strong
evidence of guilt, still the defendant pending appeal may be
granted bail where the37sentence imposed by the trial court
was life imprisonment. Moreover, on grounds of humanity
and in accordance with the modern trend
________________
32
Ching Juat vs. Ysip, 77 Phil. 848 see also Payao vs. Lesaca, 63 Phil.
218 People vs. Follantes, 63 Phil. 474 Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 83
SCRA 658.
33
As amended by Resolutions of the Supreme Court up to March 14,
1989.
34
19.
Sy Guan vs. Amparo, 79 Phil. 670 see also People vs. Alano, 81 Phil.
35
Under the Revised Penal Code capital offenses are: treason, qualified
piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, robbery with homicide,

and rape with homicide.
36
Montano vs. Ocampo, 49 O.G. 1855 Bravo, Jr. vs. Borja, 134 SCRA
466 People vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 219 People vs.
Albofera, 152 SCRA 123.
37
People vs. Hernandez, 52 O.G. 5506.

53
VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990
53
of decisions, bail may also be granted to prisoners

irrespective of the nature and merits of the charge against
them, if it is shown that their continuous confinement
during the pendency of their case would be38 injurious to
their health or would 39endanger their lives. By a good
number of precedents, it is now well established that
pending appeal a defendant convicted of a capital offense
40
but sentenced to41less than the death penalty is bailable.
In one case, the Supreme Court granted bail to a
defendant sentenced by the trial court to the capital
penalty, but that was after the government in its brief
recommended his acquittal. In no other case, however, has
the Supreme Court granted bail to an42appellant sentenced
to the death penalty by the trial court.
D Hearing on Bail Application
A person charged with a capital offense has the right to
have his application for bail be promptly
heard as
43
extension of the trial on the merits of the case.
The burden of proof to show
that evidence of guilt is
44
strong, is on the prosecution. Mere affidavits, or recitals of
their contents are
not sufficient to show the existence of
45
strong evidence,
nor is hearsay and uncorroborated
46
testimony. Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an
exception to the otherwise absolute right guaranteed by the
Constitution, the tendency has been toward a fair and
liberal appreciation of the
_______________
38
39
Dela Rama vs. Peoples Court, 77 Phil. 461.

People vs. Berg, 79 Phil. 842 and cases cited therein People vs.
Hernandez, 52 O.G. 5506.

40
People vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 219.
41
See People vs. Lacson, L8188, October 15, 1956, unreported.
42
See People vs. Fernandez, 183 SCRA 511.
43
Gerardo vs. Judge, 47 O.G. 143 see also Section 15, Rule 114,
Revised Rules of Court.

44
Marcos vs. Cruz, 67 Phil. 82 see also Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil.
55 People vs. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512 Section 5, Rule 114, Revised Rules of
Court.
45
Ocampo vs. Bernabe, supra Beltran vs. Diaz, 77 Phil. 484.
46
Enage vs. Provincial Warden, 83 Phil. 23.

54
54

evidence in determining the degree

of proof necessary to
47
warrant deprivation of that right.
Probability or improbability of flight is an important
factor to be taken into consideration in granting or denying
bail. The exception to the fundamental right to be bailed
should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of the
probability of evasion of prosecution. A defendants official
and social standing and his other personal circumstances
48
are to be considered in determining the matter.
E No Excessive Bail
49
Obviously, when the Constitution prohibits excessive bail,

it means that the bail that may be required should be
reasonable. The question of reasonableness is addressed to
the judicial discretion and to the courts sense of justice.
That bail is reasonable which, in view of the nature of the
offense, the penalty which the law attaches to it, and the
probabilities that guilt will be established on the trial,
seems no more than sufficient to secure the partys
attendance. The prisoners pecuniary circumstances is of
course an important factor in determining the
reasonableness of the trial that which is reasonable bail a
man of wealth being equivalent to a denial of the right to
bail if 50exacted of a poor man charged with a similar
offense.
The chief factor which must be determined in fixing the
amount of bail is the probability of the appearance of the
accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment. Of importance

then is the possible penalty that may be meted. Of course,
penalty 51depends to a great extent upon the gravity of the
offense.
_______________
47
Montano vs. Ocampo, 49 O.G. 1855.
48
Ibid People vs. Alano, 81 Phil. 19 Sy Guan vs. Amparo, 79 Phil. 670.
49
Last sentence of Section 13, Article III see also opening sentence of
Section 19, clause 1, Ibid.

50
See Section 6, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Court for the guidelines in
fixing amount of bail.

51
Villaseor vs. Abano, 21 SCRA 312.

55
VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990
55
3. Specific Procedural Rights

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation, against him, to
have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to
52
appear is unjustifiable.
B Presumption of Innocence
It is a cardinal and important rule of law of evidence that
the defendant in a criminal trial, however degraded or
debased he may be, and no matter what may be the
enormity of the crime charged against him, must always be
presumed innocent of the crime for which he is indicted
until his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nothing need be proved nor

is any evidence necessary as
53
basis for this presumption.
Rufus Choate said that this presumption is not a mere
phrase without meaning that it is the nature of the
evidence for the defendant that it is irresistible as the
heaven still overcome that it hovers over
the prisoner as a
54
guardian angel throughout the evidence.
In any criminal proceeding, the starting point is the
presumption of innocence. By reason of this presumption,
an accused is not called upon to offer evidence on his
behalf, for his freedom is forfeited only if the requisite
55
quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence.
_______________
52
Section 14, clause 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution see also Section 1,
Rule 115, Revised Rules of Court.

53
Underhills Criminal Evidence, 4th ed. 4951.
54
Wigmore on Evidence, Volume 9, 3rd ed., p. 408.
55
People vs. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 63.

56
56

56
The presumption of innocence, which is the logical

consequence of the rule of evidence placing the burden of
proof on the prosecution, has been 57 elevated in this
jurisdiction to a constitutional precept. Notwithstanding
the presumption, however, the state has a right to specify
what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt,
and then put upon the defendant the burden of showing
that his act is innocent and without criminal intent. This
presumption of guilt is not unusual or arbitrary, since the
act relied upon by the defendant as justification relates to
him personally or otherwise lies peculiarly within his
knowledge, and a few words from him would be
sufficient
58
to destroy the complainants prima facie case. Hence, a
statute providing that the failure of an employer to pay the
salaries of his employees at least once every two weeks or
onehalf month as required by the statute, constitutes
prima facie a fraud committed by the employer on his
employees by means of false pretenses, does
not offend the
59
constitutional presumption of innocence, for under the law
it is sufficient defense for the employer to show that such

failure was due to60 force majeure or to some other cause
beyond his control. In other words, it is not violative of the
Constitution for a law to provide that the presumption of
innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption
founded upon the experience of human conduct and to
prescribe what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence. An example of such valid law is
the Penal Code provision that the failure of a public officer
to produce public funds or property for which he is
chargeable, upon demand by another duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he61has put such
missing funds or property to his personal use.
The constitutional presumption of innocence imposes
upon
_______________
56
Yee Hem vs. U.S., 268 U.S. 178 People vs. Simbulan, 124 SCRA 927.
57
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Volume 1, p. 639.
58
U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303.
59
See Cooley, supra, pp. 639641 see also People vs. Capilitan, 182
SCRA 313.
60
People vs. Merilo, L3489, June 28, 1951, unreported.
61
People vs. Mengao, 49 O.G. 1411 People vs. Livara.

57
VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990
57
the court the duty to ascertain in every case that no person

is made to answer for a 62crime without proof of his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, it being preferable to acquit a
63
guilty person rather than convict an innocent one.
However, the presumption is not conclusive and may yield
to positive proof that the crime has been committed by
accused, proof of which is strong enough
to dispel all doubts
64
and sustain defendants conviction.
C Right to be Heard by Himself
One aspect of an accused persons constitutional right to be
heard by himself is the right to be present at every stage of
65
the trial from arraignment to pronouncement of judgment.
While personal rights are generally waivable, the right of
an accused to be present at the trial may not be waived in

certain cases.
This right is jealously safeguarded. The Supreme Court
of the United States states a leading principle that
pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after
indictment
nothing shall be done in the67 absence of the
66
prisoner. And in Schwab vs. Berggren, the same court
said: The personal presence of the accused from the
beginning to the end of a trial for felony, involving life or
liberty, as well as at the time final judgment is rendered
against him, maybe, and must be assumed to be, vital to
the proper
conduct of his defense and cannot be dispensed
68
with.
The presence of accused is indispensable, except where
the accused is in custody and charged with a capital
offense, only at the following stages: (1) at the arraignment
(2) when defendant answers the complaints, if he pleads
guilty and (3) at the
________________
62
Aguirre vs. People, 155 SCRA 337 People vs. Guinto, 184 SCRA 287.
63
People vs. Solis, 182 SCRA 182.
64
People vs. Tagle, 176 SCRA 809.
65
People vs. Beechman, 23 Phil. 274 Cf. Section 1(c), Rule 115, Revised
Rules of Court.
66
Lewis vs. U.S., 146 U.S. 370.
67
143 U.S. 442.
68
See also People vs. Avancea, 32 O.G. 713.

58
58

69
pronouncement of judgment. But his presence at any

other stage of the case may be waived:
(1) the accused may waive his presence at the trial
pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail
bond, unless his presence is specifically ordered by
the court for purposes of identification
(2) the absence of the accused without any justifiable
cause at the trial on a particular date of which he
had notice and
(3) when an accused under custody had

been notified of
70
the date of the trial and escapes.
Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived
by the person entitled to 71protection, the presumption is
always against the waiver.
D Right to Counsel
Under the 1987 Constitution the right of a person under
investigation includes: the right to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice and if he
cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided
72
with one.
The right to counsel cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel. Hence, legal assistance is
needed to assist anyone before the courts of justice and in
quasijudicial bodies to avoid miscarriage of justice.
The main purpose of the presence of 73counsel during
investigation is the ascertainment of truth.
The scope of the constitutional
right to counsel as
74
implemented by the Rules of Court and its importance to
the
_________________
69
Diaz vs. U.S., 223 U.S. 442 People vs. Francisco, 46 Phil. 40.
70
Section 1(c), Rule 115, Revised Rules of Court.
71
People vs. Jara, 114 SCRA 516.
72
Section 12, clause 1, Article III see also People vs. Manlapaz, 183
SCRA 300 the leading cases that have unfailingly applied the
constitutional edict are: Morales vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 536 People vs.
Galit, 135 SCRA 465 People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 People vs. Albofera,
152 SCRA 128 People vs. Pinlac, 165 SCRA 674 Estacio vs.
Sandiganbayan, 183 SCRA 12 People vs. Aquino, 184 SCRA 205.
73
People vs. Masongsong, 174 SCRA 39.
74
Cf. Section 1(c), Rule 115.

59
VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990
59
accused are 75well stated by Chief Justice Moran in People

vs. Holgado:
In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused

be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of
law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel,
he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does
not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen
more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for
this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so
important that it has become constitutional and it is so
implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough
for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de
oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
The Court, considering the gravity of the offense and the

difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as
counsel de oficio only such members of the bar in good
standing who, by reason of their experience and ability may
adequately defend the accused. But in localities where such
members of the bar are not available, the court may
appoint any person, resident of the province and 76of good
refute for probity and ability, to defend the accused.
Denial or disregard by the trial court of the right of the
accused to be represented by counsel, and failure to inform
him of such right, or to assign to him a counsel de oficio if
he so desires, constitutes
reversible error which can be
77
remedied by appeal, however, the denial of right to
counsel must be raised immediately for he78 can not raise
such question for the first 79time on appeal, and perhaps
through habeas corpus also.
________________
75
85 Phil. 752, 756757.
76
Section 7, Rule 116, Revised Rules of Court.
77
U.S. vs. Palisoc, 4 Phil. 207 People vs. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752.
78
U.S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil. 743 People vs. Nang Kay, 88 Phil. 515.
79
Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 against the case of Velasco vs.
Superintendent, 67 Phil. 538 see also Section 20, Rule 41, Revised Rules
of Court.
60
60
The right to counsel is not violated when accused was given

opportunity to confer80with counsel before his extrajudicial
confession was taken and also when his lawyer arrived at
the closing stage of the interrogation, read the statement
81
and talked to the accused before the latter signed it.
The Court should perform this function of advising the
accused of his rights, when he appears without counsel.
How could the accused be expected to claim his right to
counsel and to make an issue of this in the trial court when
he has no one to advise him that what he should do? Most
often those who appear without counsel are those who
stand most in need of one. As stated by the United States
Supreme Court, the guarantee would be nullified by a
determination that an accuseds ignorant failure to 82claim
his rights removes the protection of the Constitution.
E Right to be Informed of Nature and Cause of Accusation
The constitutional provision referring to the right of the
accused to be informed83 of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him is satisfied by a pleading that
leaves no doubt in the mind of any person of rudimentary
intelligence as to what the charge is and does not require
one that will exclude every misinterpretation capable of
84
occurring to an intelligence fired with a desire to perfect.
The purpose of the Constitution
is to prevent surprises that
85
may lead to injustice, and so where the criminal complaint
or information suffers from ambiguous, the defendant is
entitled to a bill of86 particulars from the prosecution
specifying the charge.
________________
80
People vs. Masongsong, 174 SCRA 39.
81
Estacio vs. Sandiganbayan, 183 SCRA 12.
82
Johnson vs. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 quoted with approval in Abriol vs.
Homeres, 84 Phil. 525, 533.

83
Section 14, clause 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution see also Section
1(b), Rule 115, Revised Rules of Court People vs. Regala, 113 SCRA 613
U.S. vs. Santos, 4 Phil. 419.
84
Cf. Section 9, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Court Rosario vs. U.S., 207
U.S. 368.
85
People vs. Zulueta, 89 Phil. 907.
86
Section 10, Rule 116, Revised Rules of Court.
61
VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990
61
Also, the Constitution requires a person under

investigation to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just
the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not
be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person
under investigation the provisions of the Constitution. He
is not only dutybound to tell the person the rights to which
the latter is entitled,
he must also explain their effects in
87
practical terms. In other words, the right of a person
under interrogation to be informed implies a correlative
obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain,
and contemplates an effective communication the results in
understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a
denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the
person has been informed of his right. Now, since the
right to be informed implies comprehension, the degree of
explanation required will necessarily vary, depending upon
the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal
circumstances of the person under investigation. Suffice it
to say that a simpler and more 88lucid explanation is needed
where the subject is unlettered.
Under the Rules of Court, the right is safeguarded in
several stages of the criminal case. At the preliminary
investigation89 the accused is informed of the complaint
against him. The information must couched
in ordinary
90
and concise language without repetition (1) to enable a
person of common understanding to know the offense is
intended to be charged and
(2) to enable the court to
91
pronounce proper
judgment. The information must charge
92
but one offense. At the arraignment, the information must
be read to the accused in the language or dialect known to
_______________
87
See People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312 People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA
88
People vs. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289 cited in People vs. Duhan, 142
2.
SCRA 100 People vs. Pinlac, 165 SCRA 674 See also People vs. Olapani,
174 SCRA 495.
89
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 112, Revised Rules of Court.
90
Section 9, Rule 110, Ibid.
91
People vs. Bandojo, 63 SCRA 1053.
92
Section 6, Rule 110, supra.

62
62

him and
a copy must be furnished him by the Judge or
93
clerk.
The presumption would be, from the failure of the
accused and his counsel to seek any further information,
that he was sufficiently informed of the charge and was
satisfied with the complaint, understood what it meant,
and was willing
to go to trial on the assumption that it was
94
sufficient.
Although an accused is deaf and dumb it will be
presumed that adequate measures were taken by the trial
court to translate to him, by signs, the contents of the
information and to ascertain his manifestation,
in
95
connection with the acceptance of his plea.
The right of defendant to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation cannot be waived.
F Right to Speedy Trial
The right to speedy trial is necessarily relative, consistent
with unreasonable
delays, and depends upon the
96
circumstances. It means therefore a right to free97 trial
from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays
and
98
also justice delayed is justice denied.
Detention
prisoners, in particulars, have the right to99 have their cases
tried and decided as speedily as possible. But the right to
speedy trial
does not extend to the pronouncement of
100
judgment.
Furthermore, the Court consistently maintained that
although a speedy determination of an action implies a
speedy trial,
________________
93
Section 1, Rule 116, Ibid.
94
U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. 876.
95
People vs. Nozorio, L7628, September 29, 1955, unreported.
96
Aunabe vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993 People vs. Romulo, 40
O.G. 489 Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil. 215 People vs. Romero, 93 Phil.
128 See also Section 16, Article III, 1987 Constitution Section 1(h), Rule
115, Revised Rules of Court.
97
Conde vs. Rivera, 45 Phil. 650 Esguerra vs. Court of First Instance,
95 Phil. 609 Kalaw vs. Apostol, 64 Phil. 852 Acosta vs. People, 5 SCRA
774.
98
Conde vs. Judge of First Instance, 45 Phil. 173.
99
Manabat vs. Provincial Warden, 94 Phil. 45.
100
Acosta vs. People, 5 SCRA 774 Talaban vs. Provincial Warden of
Iloilo, 78 Phil. 599.

63
VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990
63
speedy is not the chief objective of a trial. Careful and

deliberate consideration for the administration of justice, a
genuine respect for the rights of all parties and the
requirements of procedural due process and an adherence
to the Courts standing admonition that the discretion
granted judges in the granting or denial of motions for
postponement and the setting aside denial orders
previously issued should always be predicated on the
consideration that more than the mere convenience of the
court or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and
fairness would be served
thereby are more important than
1
a race to end the trial.
The right to speedy trial obtains without respect to the
grade of the crime of which the accused may stand charged.
It is guaranteed to every person accused of a crime, not
only to one so accused for the first time, but also to the
habitual offender. Even one who is imprisoned under
sentence for the commission
of another crime is not without
2
the protection of this right.
But reasonable delays do not operate to deprive an
accused of his right to speedy trial. What is a reasonable
3
delay depends upon the particular circumstances. So,
where an information was filed in July and trial was begun
and completed in December of the same year, it could not
be said that the accused was denied his right to speedy
trial because of continuances granted on several occasions

to the prosecution either by reason of temporary inability
to locate its star witness, or of transportation difficulties
and bad weather making
streams impassable, or of transfer
4
of presiding judge. In other words, the defendants right to
speedy trial should not be carried to the extreme of
practically denying the prosecution
its day in court, for
5
causes beyond its control. It was therefore held an abuse of
discretion for a trial court to refuse the prosecutions
motion for postponement, which was the first asked by the
prosecution,
_______________
1
Yiquez vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 235 citing Amberti vs. Court
of Appeals, 89 SCRA 240.

2
14 Am. Jur. 858 see also Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil. 333.
Mercado vs. Court of First Instance, 66 Phil. 215 Gunabe vs. Director
of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993.

4
People vs. Lusanta, 47 O.G. 6161.
People vs. Alipao, 96 Phil. 20.

64
64

and to dismiss the case simply because of the non

appearance of the complainant due to a typhoon warning,
although the defendant and his witnesses managed to
make the trip to court from the same place inspite of the
bad weather, it appearing, however, that the complaining
witness was the mother of several small boys whom she
was naturally unwillingly
to leave alone at home under
6
such conditions. On the other hand, in a prosecution for
rape, it was held not an abuse of discretion for the trial
court, after granting three movements on May 27, June 1
and June 12 upon showing that the complaining witness
was ill and confined in a hospital, to dismiss the case, upon
motion of the defendant who invoked his right to speedy
trial, when the complainant7 was still not in attendance
upon resumption of the trial.
The accused must claim his right to a speedy and early
trial if he wishes its protection. 8Silence on his part cannot
be considered a demand for trial. He must see to it that his
case is tried at an early date.
case is tried at an early date.

The defendant who wants to avail of his right to speedy
trial should ask, not for dismissal of the case, but for its
trial, whereupon, if the prosecution, for lack of reasonable
ground for postponement, is ordered to proceed and fails to
do so, defendant becomes entitled to an absolute and
definite dismissal which
will bar subsequent prosecution
10
for the same offense.
The right to speedy trial is waivable, and hence, when
the delay is acquisced in by the accused, or is attributable
to him, as where the absence of material witness is due to
the fact that they were being hidden by friends of the
accused, probably with his knowledge or connivance,
he
11
cannot claim to have been denied speedy trial.
_______________
6
Ibid.
People vs. Abao, 97 Phil. 28 See also Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil.
215 and Kalaw vs. Apostol, 64 Phil. 852 for other examples of unjustified
delay.
8
State vs. Slorah, 118 Mc. 203, 4 ALR 1256.
See People vs. Jabajab, 100 Phil. 307.
10
Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54 People vs.
Jabajab, supra see also People vs. Jaramilla, 51 O.G. 5593.

11
Esguerra vs. Court of First Instance, 95 Phil. 609 Gunabe vs.

65
VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990
65
G Right to Public Trial

The right to a public trial is manifestly intended to protect
the rights of a person accused of a crime, so that the public
may see that he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly
condemned and that the presence of spectators may keep
his triers keenly alive to a sense of 12
their responsibility and
to the importance of their functions.
A public trial means one which is not limited or
restricted to any particular class 13of the community but is
open to the free observation of all.
There is no general agreement as to what is meant by
public trial or as to the limitation on the attendance at a

criminal trial that a court14 may put consistently with the
constitutional
provision.
The
obvious
minimum
compliance with the requirement of public trial is to have
the trial open to the general public, without discrimination,
and conducted in a court room sufficient in size to
accomodate a reasonable proportion of the general public in
addition 15
to the court officers, lawyers, parties and
witnesses.
16
The Rules of Court provide that where the evidence to
be presented offensive to decency and public morals, the
court may order the public to be excluded from the court.
This exception is considered by some American authorities
as valid and17 by others as violative of an accuseds right to
public trial.
The right
to a public trial may be waived by the
18
defendant.
_______________
Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993 People vs. Jabajab, supra.
12
14 Am. Jur. 865.
13
People vs. Greeson, 230 Mich. 124 State vs. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205
LRA 1916 E 472.

14
Annotation: Ann. Cases, 1917, 625 156 A.L.R. 265 48 A.L.R. 2d.
1438 Section 14, clause 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution.

15
See People vs. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 50 N.W. 422, 1091 People vs.
Greeson, 230 Mich. 124 203 N.W. 141 State vs. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255
79 N.E. 462, 9 LRANS 277 Annotation: 9 Ann. Cases III 27 LRANS 487
Ann. Cases 1917 E. 625.
16
Section 2, Rule 135.
17
See 14 Am. Jur. 866868 and footnotes.
18
See Gunabe vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993.

66
66

Thus, where for the convenience of witnesses a case was

tried in Bilibid prison, without any objection on the part of
the defendant as to the place of trial or that it was not
public at the time, it was held that the defendant
had
19
waived by his acquiescence his right to public trial.
Also for waiver to exist, the following elements must
concur: existence of a right knowledge of the existence

thereof and intention to relinquish such right. Such waiver
must be made in an unequivocal manner. The acts or
omissions relied upon as waiver should be so manifestly
consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily
relinquish the particular right or advantage
that no other
20
explanation of his conduct is possible.
H Right to Confrontation
The right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him
face to face is not to enable them to gaze idly upon each
other, but has for its main and essential purpose to ensure
to the accused opportunity to crossexamine such
witnesses, and thus prevent his conviction 21upon
depositions or exparte affidavits given in his absence.
Thus, the right of crossexamination is a substantial
right, the preservation of which is essential to a proper
administration of justice, and extends to all matters within
the knowledge of the witness,
the disclosure of which is
22
material to the controversy.
The constitutional right of confrontation, which
guarantees to the accused the right to crossexamine the
witnesses for the prosecution is one of the most basic rights
of the accused person under our system of justice. It is a
fundamental right which is
_______________
19
U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304.
20
See Fernandez vs. Subido, 70 Phil. 151.
21
U.S. vs. Javier, 37 Phil. 449 State vs. Shaughnessy, 212 Wis. 322,
249 N.W. 522, 90 A.L.R. 368 Maltox vs. U.S., 156 U.S. 237 Kirby vs. U.S.,
174 U.S. 42 2 Wigmore on Evidence, Sections 13961397 Dowdell vs.
U.S., 227 U.S. 326.
22
Crossby vs. State, 82 S.E. 2d. 38 citing News Publishing Co. vs.
Butler, 22 S.E. 282 Richards vs. Harpe, 155 S.E. 85 See also People vs.
Bagano, 181 SCRA 747.
67
VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990
67
part of due process not only in criminal proceedings but

also in civil proceedings as well as in proceedings in
23
administrative tribunals with quasijudicial powers.
23
administrative tribunals with quasijudicial powers.

In almost exactly the same language our three
Constitutions secured it, thus: In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused x x x shall 24enjoy the right x x x to
meet the witnesses face to face. Echoing the same
guarantee, Section 1 (f) of Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be entitled to confront and crossexamine the
witnesses against him at the trial. Constitutional
confrontation requirements apply specifically to criminal
proceedings and have been held to have two purposes: first
and primarily, to secure the opportunity of cross
examination, and secondarily, to obtain the benefit of the
moral impact of the25courtroom atmosphere as it affects the
witness demeanor. Stated otherwise, it insures that the
witness will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring
lying by the threat of perjury charge it forces the witness
to submit to crossexamination, a valuable instrument in
exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth and it
enables the court to observe
the demeanor of the witness
26
and assess his credibility.
In Savory
Luncheonette vs. Lakas ng Manggagawang
27
Pilipino and the cases cited thereunder, the Court
speaking through Justice Palma, has provided us with a
concise overview of the right to crossexamination as a vital
element of due process. Thus:
The right of a party to confront and crossexamine opposing
witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature
or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi
judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due
process. However, the
_______________
23
People vs. Seneris, 99 SCRA 92 citing Savory Luncheonette vs. Lakas ng
Manggagawang Pilipino, 62 SCRA 258.

24
Section 14, clause 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution Section 19, Article IV,
1973 Constitution and Section 17, Article III, 1935 Constitution.

25
21 Am. Jur. 2d. 360 see also U.S. vs. Javier, 37 Phil. 449.
26
People vs. Seneris, 99 SCRA 92 citing California vs. Green, 339 U.S. 157.
27
62 SCRA 258, 263267.
68
68
right is a personal to a renunciation of the right of cross

examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to
crossexamine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he
necessarily forfeits the right to crossexamine and the testimony
given on direct examination of the witness will be received or
allowed to remain in the record. The conduct of a party which may
be construed as an implied waiver of the right to crossexamine
may take various forms. But the common basic principle
underlying the application of the rule on implied waiver is that
the party was given the opportunity to confront and cross
examine an opposing witness but failed
to take advantage of it for
28
reasons attributable to himself alone.
29
The provision of the Constitution authorizing trial de

absentia of the accused in case of his nonappearance after
arraignment despite due notice means that he waives his
right to meet the witnesses face to face among others. An
express waiver 30of the appearance after arraignment has
the same effect.
4. Privilege Against SelfIncrimination
A witness will not be compelled to answer any question
which incriminates him or the reply to which will supply
evidence by which he could be convicted of a criminal
offense, under the provision of our Constitution to the effect
that no 31person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. Based on this constitutional guaranty, the
Revised Rules of Court provides that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to be exempt
32
from being compelled to be a witness against himself.
_______________
28
Fulgado vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 81 see also People vs.
Seneris, 99 SCRA 92.

29
Section 14, clause 2, Article III.
30
Carredo vs. People, 183 SCRA 273.
31
32
Section 1(e), Rule 115.

69
VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990
69
B History
The provision that no one is bound to incriminate himself is
older than the Government of the United States. At an
early day it became a part of the common law of England.
It was established on the grounds of public policy and
humanityof policy, because if the party were required to
testify, it would place the witness under the strongest
temptation to commit the crime of perjury, and of
humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of
confessions by duress.
It had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial
methods of interrogating the accused 33person, which had
long obtained in the continental system.
In otherwords, the very object of adopting this provision
of law was to wipe such practices as formerly prevailed in
those Islands of requiring accused persons to submit to
judicial examinations, and to give testimony regarding the
offenses with which34they were charged.
In Emerys case, it was said that the principle applies
equally to any compulsory disclosure of the guilt of the
offender himself, whether sought directy as the object of
the inquiry, or indirectly and incidentally for the purpose of
establishing facts involved in an issue between the parties.
If the disclosure thus made would be capable of being
used against him as a confession of crime, or an admission
of facts tending to prove the commission of an offense,
such
34a
disclosure would be an accusation against himself.
C Reason for the Rule
In the language of Mr. Justice Bradley, in the Boyd case,
any compulsory discovery by extorting the partys oath x x
x to convict him of a crime x x x is contrary to the principles
of free government it is abhorent to the instincts of an
Englishman it is abhorent to the instinct of an American.
It may suit the
______________
33
Jones Law of Evidence, Section 887 Blacks Constitutional Law, p.
575.
34
107 Mass. 172.
34a
U.S. vs. Navarro, 3 Phil. 143.

70
70

purposes of despotic power but it cannot abide the

pure
35
atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom.
D Prohibition Should be Liberally Construed
The constitutional guaranty must be liberally construed in
favor of the witness, and when a proper question arises the
constitutional provision should be applied in a broad and
liberal spirit to secure to the citizen that immunity
from
36
every species of selfaccusation 37
implied in his, also for the
security of person and property.
E Scope of the Prohibition
As to the kinds of facts covered by the privilege, Wigmore
says:
(1) The privilege applies to any fact to which a penalty
is attached by way of retribution or deterrence,
whether that penalty be a money fine or an
imprisonment or a deprivation of a right or
privilege. But it does not apply where a deprivation
or forfeiture or other loss is merely a measure to
prevent further improper exercise of a privilege,
e.g., a disbarment or the cancellation of a liquor
license. And of course it applies when in a civil
proceeding a penal fact is incidentally relevant.
(2) The privilege applies not merely when the fact is in
itself a penal fact, but also when the fact would
tend to criminate the witness. Where the penalty
has once been imposed and suffered, the act is no
longer penal hence a prior conviction can always be
asked about.
(3) The privilege applies only to a fact penalized by the
law of the forum, and not by the law of any foreign
State or other jurisdiction. The theoretical reason
for this that courts cannot and do not attempt to
enforce any law but that of their own State. The

practical reason is that to recognize a privilege
founded on the law of a foreign State
_____________
35
U.S. vs. Navarro, 3 Phil. 143 see also Galman vs. Pamaran, 138
SCRA 294 People vs. Gardner, 144 N.Y. 119 U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil.
145.
36
Ward vs. State, 27 Okla, Crim. Rep. 362, 228 P. 498 People vs.
Spain, 307 Ill. 282, 138 N.E. 614.

37
Boyd vs. U.S., 116 U.S. 616.

71
VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990
71
would require an encyclopedic analysis of any laws

in the world which is impractical.
(4) The privilege applies only to a penal act of the
witness himself, not of a third person. Otherwise,
no criminal trial could proceed. Moreover, the third
person would be protected, if he should be called as
a witness.
(5) The privilege applies only to a natural person, not
to a corporation. On principle, the privilege is
concerned chief with the extractions of testimonial
responses, and the artificial person is of course
incapable of being questioned.
(6) The privilege does not apply to a record required to
be kept, of acts not in themselves criminal, which
become so only because of the persons own choice
e.g., to a pharmacists record of narcotics sold, for
the sale in itself is lawful if made on conditions
prescribed by law, such as physicians prescription
or to a clergymans record of marriages, for the act
of performing a marriage is lawful, unless the
celebrant omits to obey some prescribed conditions.
This limitation of the privilege is sometimes judicially explained
on the ground that such records are public books or official
books, and that the official has impliedly undertaken to waive the
privilege.
On the same principle as in paragraph 6, the privilege does

not apply to an oral report, required by law, of acts not in
themselves criminal e.g. an automobile drivers report
of a
38
collision, or an arrested persons disclosure of his name.
F Waiver of Privilege
There can be no implied waiver of a citizens right against
selfincrimination.
Any such renunciation cannot be predicated on such a
slender or tenuous reed as a dubious implication.
Otherwise, it would be easier to lose the human rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights than to protect or preserve
them it would be easier to enslave the citizen than for him
to remain free. Such a result was never intended by the
Founding Fathers.
Section 17 of the Bill of Rights stating that no person
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, applies
to both the ordinary witness and the suspect under
custodial investigation.
In support of the rule that there can be no implied
waiver of
______________
38
Wigmore on Evidence (Student Text), pp. 371372.

72
72

the right against selfincrimination and all other

constitutional rights by the witness or by the accused, is
the fact that the right against double jeopardy can only be
renounced by the accused if the criminal case against him
is dismissed or otherwise terminated with his express
consent. Without such express consent to the dismissal or
termination of the case, the accused can always
invoke his
39
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
The privilege may also be deemed waived by a witness
voluntarily taking the stand. The moment he testifies on a
matter which is part of a whole fact forming a single
relevant topic, he can be compelled
to testify as to the
40
remaining parts of the whole. The accused, by testifying
when he could have 41remained silent, is also considered

waiving his
privilege, although there is authority to the
42
contrary. Of several views concerning the extent of the
waiver when
the accused takes the witness chair,
43
Wigmore, favors the one that holds that his testimony
upon any fact is a waiver on all other facts relevant to the
issue, and thereby excluding collateral matters such as
those affecting
credibility.
44
Wharton added: Since it is a personal right to be
exercised by him alone, the privilege against self
incrimination may be waived by a witness and, when
waived by the voluntary offer of the witness to testify fully,
if he has been fully informed of his rights and acts under
advice of counsel, or by answering questions without
objection or without claiming the privilege. Hence, a
witness who voluntarily answers an incriminating question
on direct examination without claiming his privilege cannot
refuse to answer on crossexamination question germane to
his direct examination upon the ground that his answer
might incriminate him.
_______________
39
Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294, concurring opinion of the then
Chief Justice Makasiar.

40
VIII Wigmore, 3rd ed., Section 2276.
41
Ibid.
42
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 3rd ed., p. 317 see also Wigmore,
Op. Cit., p. 449.

43
Op. Cit., pp. 441445.
44
Criminal Evidence, 11th ed., p. 1144.

73
VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990
73
5. Excessive Fines and Cruel, Degrading or

Inhuman Punishment
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death

penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
45
perpetua.
According to the Supreme Court, it takes more than
merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportions, or severe
for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitutions. To come
under the ban, the punishment must be flagrantly and
plainly oppressive, wholly disproportionate to the nature
of the offense
as to shock the moral sense of the
46
community.
By this test, the Court adjudged the penalty of
imprisonment for five (5) to ten (10) years imposed by law
for illegal possession of firearms, not to be cruel and
unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the extent of being
shocking to public conscience, taking into considerations
the public interest at stake and the necessity
for a radical
47
measure to meet rampant criminality.
In certain
exceptional circumstances obtaining in a particular case
the penalty may be out of proportion, but is not necessarily
offensive to the Constitution just for this reason. In any
case constitutionality of a statute
is not to be judged in the
48
light of exceptional cases. Fortunately, the law in this
jurisdiction authorizes the court in such cases to
recommend executive
clemency.
49
The Court has also held that a fine of up to P5,000 for
profiteering is not cruel and unusual or shocking to the
conscience, considering the necessity to prevent dealers
taking advantage of the countrys critical conditions to
make unusual profits. It may be thought that in a single
sale, as for example, in a sale of one can of milk, the profit
may be small, and in a prosecution for this one sale the
corresponding penalty may seem out of propor
_______________
45
46
People vs. Estoista, 49 O.G. 3330 resolution, 50 O.G. 153.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid see also People vs. Melgar, 52 O.G. 7238.
49
People vs. Tiu, 51 O.G. 1863.

74
74

tion, but similar transactions add up to a great number,

and cause great hardship, particularly on poor people.
A contempt order committing the party in contempt to
imprisonment until he complies with previous orders of the
court is remedial in purpose and coercive in character,
intended for the benefit of the other party, and the
indefinite confinement that may result from continued non
compliance is neither cruel nor excessive, particularly so
when the imprisoned
man carries the keys to his prison in
50
his own pocket.
The abolition of capital punishment of death is not
absolute. The Congress may impose by enacting a law on
capital punishment on offenses involving heinous crimes.
6. Employment of Physical, Psychological or
Degrading Punishment
51
Under the New Constitution, the use of physical,

psychological, or degrading punishment against any
prisoner or detainee are now against the law which
Congress may enact and much more a direct smack on our
fundamental law.
The use of substantial or inadequate penal facilities
under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Also, secret detention places, solitary, in communicado,
52
or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
7. Conclusion
The Bill of Rights constitutes the reservation of the
sovereign people against, as well as the limitation on, the
delegated powers of government. These rights need no
express assertion. On the contrary, the police and
prosecution officers of the country should respect these
constitutional liberties as 53
directed by the decision in the
Hildawa vs. Ponce
Enrile, and Valmonte vs. Integrated
54
National Police cases. The established jurispru
_______________
50
Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741.
51
52
53
138 SCRA 146.
54
138 SCRA 146.

75
VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990
75
dence is that waiver by the citizen of his constitutional

rights should
be clear, categorical, knowing, and
55
intelligent.
And any evidence, confession or admission, in violation
of the Bill of Rights shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding and/or in evidence against the accused.
o0o
_____________
55
Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294 Johnson vs. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 cited Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 and in Chavez vs. Court of
Appeals, 24 SCRA 663.
76
Copyright2016CentralBookSupply,Inc.Allrightsreserved.

Annotation Constitutional Rights of The Accused

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Annotation Constitutional Rights of The Accused

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

44

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Specific Procedural Rights, p. 55

VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990

Constitutional Rights of the Accused

The framers of our three Constitutions, following the

policy, when subjects are rebels from principles.

The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution.

Our Civil Liberties, p. 6.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

According to the Supreme Court in People vs. Castillo, the

under proper surveillance in order to search for and get

Palko vs. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319.

Article III, 1987 Constitution.

Article 221, Labor Code.

See San Miguel Corporation vs. National Labor Relations

Commission, 173 SCRA 314.

VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990

Constitutional Rights of the Accused

may ascertain the facts without regard to technicalities of

Is this case ready for trial?

FISCAL: I am ready, your honor.

(to the accused) Q. Do you have an attorney or

Arraign the accused.

Interpreter read the information to the accused

What do you plead?A. I plead guilty, but I was

Two days later the court convicted the defendant.

See Scotys Department Store vs. Micaller, 52 O.G. 5119.

Montilla vs. Arellano, 89 Phil. 434.

Section 14, clause 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution.

Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525.

Section 12, clause 1, Article III, 1987 Constituion.

Abriol vs. Homeres, supra.

People vs. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

court failed to inquire as to the true import of this qualification.

The filing of criminal charges in court upon which a person

Section 14, clause 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution.

Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96.

VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990

Constitutional Rights of the Accused

B Certainty and Due Process

In other words, no one may be

of due process of law. In other words, no one may be

Conally vs. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 389.

Lanzetta vs. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451.

For other illustrative cases see annotation: 83 L.ed. 893.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

CKnowing Use of Perjured Testimony

by a conviction following a trial in which perjured

L.ed. 2d. 1575.

Section 13, Article III, 1987 Constitution.

Taken from Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.

Insular Government vs. Punzalan, 7 Phil. 546.

VOL. 186, JUNE 4, 1990

Constitutional Rights of the Accused

liberty and thus punished, through

Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 83 Phil. 658.

See Bolaos vs. Dela Cruz, 116 SCRA 78.

Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

to provisional release on bail.