Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL (JBC), respondent.
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the submission.
Same Same Statutory Construction Had the framers
intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they
could have explicitly done sothey could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions.As can be seen, Article VII
is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it
lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The
presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15
and 16 of the Article. Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial
Department and defines the duties and qualifications of Members
of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of
this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9
states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only
be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least
three nominees by the JBC Section 4(1) of the Article mandates
the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy. Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as
being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals
that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or
Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Same Same Same Judgments The reference to the records of
the Constitutional Commission did not advance or support the
result in In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo
A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the
Regional
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rendering the lapse of the 90day period within the period of the
ban, in which case the remaining period should resume to run at
noon of June 30. The outgoing President would be released from
nonfulfillment of the constitutional obligation, and the duty
devolves upon the new President. Considering also that Section
15 of Article VII is an express limitation on the Presidents power
of appointment, the running of the 90day period is deemed
suspended during the period of the ban which takes effect only
once every six years.
Same Same Judicial and Bar Council The ponencias
interpretation that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has until
17 May 2010, at the latest, within which to submit to the President
the list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice is absurd as it
takes the application and nomination stages in isolation from the
whole appointment processfor the ponencia, the filling of the
vacancy only involves the President, and the JBC was not
considered when the period was increased from 60 days to 90 days.
The ponencia also holds that the JBC has until May 17, 2010, at
the latest, within which to submit to the President the list of
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for the ponencia to state on the one hand that the President would
be deprived of ample time to reflect on the qualifications of the
nominees, and to show on the other hand that the President has,
in recent history, filled the vacancy in the position of Chief Justice
in one or two days. It is ironic for the ponencia to recognize that
the President may need as much as 90 days of reflection in
appointing a member of the Court, and yet abhor the idea of an
acting Chief Justice in the interregnum as provided for by law,
confirmed by tradition, and settled by jurisprudence to be an
internal matter. The express allowance of a 90day period of
vacancy rebuts any policy argument on the necessity to avoid a
vacuum of even a single day in the position of an appointed Chief
Justice.
ame Same Same As a member of the Court, I strongly take
exception to the ponencias implication that the Court cannot
function without a sitting Chief Justice.As a member of the
Court, I strongly take exception to the ponencias
implication that the Court cannot function without a
sitting Chief Justice. To begin with, judicial power is vested in
one Supreme Court and not in its individual members, much less
in the Chief Justice alone. Notably, after Chief Justice Puno
retires, the Court will have 14 members left, which is more than
sufficient to constitute a quorum. The fundamental principle in
the system of laws recognizes that there is only one Supreme
Court from whose decisions all other courts are required to take
their bearings. While most of the Courts work is performed by its
three divisions, the Court remains one courtsingle, unitary,
complete and supreme. Flowing from this is the fact that, while
individual justices may dissent or only partially concur, when the
Court states what the law is, it speaks with only one voice. The
Court, as a collegial body, operates on a one member, one vote
basis, whether it sits en banc or in divisions. The competence,
probity and independence of the Court en banc, or those of the
Courts Division to which the Chief Justice belongs, have never
depended on whether the member voting as Chief Justice is
merely an acting Chief Justice or a duly appointed one.
NACHURA, J., Separate Opinion:
Judicial Review The consolidated petitions should be
dismissed, because they do not raise an actual case or controversy
ripe for judicial determination.After careful perusal of the
pleadings and painstaking study of the applicable law and
jurisprudence, I
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BRION, J., Separate Opinion:
Judicial Review Locus Standi Jurisprudence is replete with
precedents on the liberal appreciation of the locus standi rule on
issues that are of transcendental concern to the nation, and the
petitioners very well qualify under these rulings.I completely
agree with the ponencias ruling on the parties standing, their
locus standi, to bring their petitions and interventions in their
capacities as citizens and lawyers who stand to be affected by our
ruling as lawyers or by the impact of our ruling on the nation and
the allimportant electoral exercise we shall hold in May 2010.
Jurisprudence is replete with precedents on the liberal
appreciation of the locus standi rule on issues that are of
transcendental concern to the nation, and the petitioners very
well qualify under these rulings. In this sense, locus standi is not
a critical issue in the present case. In fact, the concern voiced out
during the Courts deliberations, is more on how participation can
be limited to those who have substantial contributions, through
their submissions, to the resolution of the grave issues before the
Court.
Same Same I disagree with the ponencias ruling on
justiciability as I believe some of the petitions before us do not
reach the required level of justiciability others, however, qualify so
that my disagreement with the lack of justiciability of some of the
petitions need not hinder the Courts consideration of the main
issue at hand.While the rule on locus standi can be relaxed, the
rule on the need for an actual justiciable case that is ripe for
adjudication addresses a different concern and cannot be similarly
treated. I disagree with the ponencias ruling on
justiciability as I believe some of the petitions before us do
not reach the required level of justiciability others,
however, qualify as discussed below so that my
disagreement with the lack of justiciability of some of the
petitions need not hinder the Courts consideration of the
main issue at hand. The basic requisite before this Court can
rule is the presence of an actual case calling for the exercise of
judicial power. This is a requirement that the Constitution itself
expressly imposes in granting the Court judicial power and in
defining the grant, the Constitution expressly states that judicial
power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Thus, the
Court does not issue advisory opinions, nor do we pass upon hypo
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sit in the Court. Thus, both by law and history, the Chief Justice
has always been a Member of the Courtalthough, as a primus
inter paresappointed by the President together with every other
Associate Justice. For this reason, we should dismiss the Soriano
petition for lack of merit.
Same Same Appointments Judiciary From their wordings,
urgency leaps up from Section 4(1) of Article VIII of the
Constitution while no such message emanates from Section 9in
the latter the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) appears free to
determine when a submission is to be made, obligating the
President to issue appointments within 90 days from the
submission of the JBC list Section 9 may offer more flexibility in
its application as the mandate for the President is to issue
appointments within 90 days from submission of the list, without
specifying when the submission should be made.Section 15 on
its face disallows any appointment in clear negative terms (shall
not make) without specifying the appointments covered by the
prohibition. From this literal reading springs the argument that
no exception is provided (except the exception found in Section 15
itself) so that even the Judiciary is covered by the ban on
appointments. On the other hand, Section 4(1) is likewise very
clear and categorical in its terms: any vacancy in the Court shall
be filled within 90 days from its occurrence. In the way of Section
15, Section 4(1) is also clear and categorical and provides no
exception the appointment refers solely to the Members of the
Supreme Court and does not mention any period that would
interrupt, hold or postpone the 90day requirement. Section 9 may
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the Court and the difference of opinion on the matter between the
Executive and the Court on the application of Section 15, Article
VII, in relation with Section 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII, of the
Constitution. What appears very clear from the decision, however,
is that the factual situation the Court ruled upon, in the exercise
of its supervision of court personnel, was the appointment by the
President of two RTC judges during the period of the ban. It is
clear from the decision, too, that no immediate appointment was
ever made to the Court for the replacement of retired Justice
Ricardo Francisco as the JBC failed to meet on the required
nominations prior to the onset of the election ban. From this
perspective, it appears clear to me that Valenzuela should be read
and appreciated for what it isa ruling made on the basis of the
Courts supervision over judicial personnel that upholds the
election ban as against the appointment of lower court judges
appointed pursuant to the period provided by Section 9 of Article
VIII. Thus, Valenzuelas application to the filling up of a vacancy
in the Supreme Court is a mere obiter dictum as the Court is
largely governed by Section 4(1) with respect to the period of
appointment. The Section 4(1) period, of course and as already
mentioned above, has an impact uniquely its own that is different
from
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that created by the period provided for the lower court under
Section 9.
Same Same Same Same Stare Decisis The stability of
judgments is indeed a glue that the Judiciary and the litigating
public cannot do without if we are to have a working and stable
justice system.I find it interesting that Peralta largely justifies
his position that the JBC should now be prohibited from
proceeding with the nomination process based on Valenzuela as
the prevailing rule that should be followed under the principle of
stare decisis. Tolentino apparently misappreciates the reach and
real holding of Valenzuela, as explained and clarified above. A
ruling involving the appointment of lower court judges under
Section 9, Article VIII cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied
in toto to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court
under Section 4(1) of the same Article. Because of his
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one and all, that the terms of the Valenzuela ruling, if truly
applicable even to appointments to this Court, is not written in
stone and remains open for review by this Court.
Same Same Same Same Same Completeness has a
heightened meaning when the missing Member is the head of the
Judiciary and the Court in the person of the Chief Justice.
Valenzuela rests on the reasoning that the evil that Section 15
seeks to remedyvote buying, midnight appointments and
partisan reasons to influence the results of the electionis so
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selection process and submit its list of nominees in time for the
incumbent President or her successor to fill up the vacancy within
the period required by the Constitution. Alternatively, assuming
that an actual controversy has not yet developed as to warrant
action on the petitions filed in this case, the Court has the
authority, as an incident of its power of supervision over the JBC,
to see to it that the JBC faithfully executes its duties as the
Constitution requires of it.
Same Same Same Same Same While the President can
freely choose to appoint any person who meets the basic
qualifications for a position in the Executive Department, he does
not have such freedom of choice when it comes to appointments in
the judiciaryin the latter case, the Constitution provides in
Section 9 of Article VIII that the President can choose his
appointee only from a Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) short list of
its nominees.Citing In Re: Appointments dated March 30, 1998
of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as
Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of
Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, 298 SCRA 408 (1998), the
oppositors claim that the ban on midnight appointments applies
to the judiciary. After examining the reasons for the two
apparently conflicting provisions, the Court said that the need to
fill up vacancies in the judiciary within the period the
Constitution provides must yield to the ban on Presidential
midnight appointments. The Court explained this ruling:
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for
filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the
Presidents power of appointment, it is this Courts view
that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the
former should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of
votebuying and similar evils outweighs the need for
avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the
disposition of some cases. Temporary vacancies can abide
the period of the ban which, incidentally and as earlier
pointed out, comes to exist only once in every six years.
Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled
temporarily by designation. But prohibited appointments
are longlasting and permanent in their effects. They may,
as earlier pointed out, in fact influence the results of
elections and, for that reason, their making is considered
an election offense. But the above assumes that the outgoing
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the period of the ban to buy votes and commit similar evils like
denying the incoming President the opportunity to consider other
appointees in the light of his new policies, a point former
President Diosdado Macapagal made in Aytona v. Castillo, 4
SCRA (1962). The fact, however, is that while the President can
freely choose to appoint any person who meets the basic
qualifications for a position in the Executive Department, he does
not have such freedom of choice when it comes to appointments in
the judiciary. In the latter case, the Constitution provides in
Section 9 of Article VIII that the President can choose his
appointee only from a JBC short list of its nominees.
Same Same Same Same Same The idea that the outgoing
incumbent President can take advantage of her appointment of a
Chief Justice to buy votes in the coming elections is utterly
ridiculousshe has no control over the Judicial and Bar Councils
(JBCs) actions.In reality, a Presidents choice of Chief Justice is
in fact first a choice of the JBC before it is that of the President.
Easily there should at least be 20,000 lawyers who are 40 years of
age and have 15 years of law practice of some kind who could
qualify for Chief Justice. Yet, the President can choose only from
a list of three, four, or five lawyers that the JBC draws up for him.
Consequently, the idea that the outgoing incumbent President
can take advantage of her appointment of a Chief Justice to buy
votes in the coming elections is utterly ridiculous. She has no
control over the JBCs actions.
Same Same Same Same Same Separation of Powers The
Supreme Court that the Chief Justice heads is not a support
agency under the President The proposition that a Chief Justice
will always be beholden to the President who appoints him is a
myth.The idea that the incoming President should have the
opportunity to choose a Chief Justice who will support his policies
does not also make sense. The Supreme Court that the Chief
Justice heads is not a support agency under the President. One of
the functions of the Supreme Court is to provide a Constitutional
check on abuses of the Executive Department. The proposition
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BERSAMIN, J.:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the
event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal
dilemmas. May the incumbent President appoint his
successor, considering that Section 15, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the
President or Acting President from making appointments
within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety? What is the relevance of Section 4
(1), Article VIII (Judicial Department) of the Constitution,
which provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court
shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof,
to the matter of the appointment of his successor? May the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) resume the process of
screening the candidates nominated or being considered to
succeed Chief Justice Puno, and submit the list of
nominees to the incumbent President even during the
period of the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII?
Does mandamus lie to compel the submission of the
shortlist of nominees by the JBC?
Precs of the Consolidated Cases
Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro and John G. Peralta
respectively commenced G.R. No. 1910021 and G.R. No.
1911492 as special civil actions for certiorari and
mandamus, praying that the JBC be compelled to submit
to the incumbent President the list of at least three
nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice.
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1Filed on February 9, 2010.
2Begun on February 23, 2010.
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10Petition in G.R. No. 191032, pp. 48.
11Petition in G.R. No. 191057, pp. 12.
12Id., at p. 11.
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27Id., at p. 14.
28Id., at p. 15.
29Id., at pp. 2024.
30Id., at pp. 2527.
31Id., at pp. 2930.
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compels
the
President
to
make
such
the fact that this is the first time that the whole country will
experience automated elections.
37Id., at pp. 3637. The OSG stresses:
The possible fallouts or serious aftermath of allowing a vacuum
in the position of the Chief Justice may be greater and riskier
than the consequences or repercussions of inaction. Needless to
state, the appointment of the Chief Justice of this Honorable
Court (sic) is the most important appointment vested by the 1987
Constitution to (sic) the President.
38Id., at p. 37.
39Id., at p. 38.
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President and that the Court must direct the JBC to follow
the rule of law, that is, to submit the list of nominees only
to the next duly elected President after the period of the
constitutional ban against midnight appointments has
expired.
Oppositor IBP Davao del Sur opines that the JBC
because it is neither a judicial nor a quasijudicial body
has no duty under the Constitution to resolve the question
of whether the incumbent President can appoint a Chief
Justice during the period of prohibition that even if the
JBC has already come up with a short list, it still has to
bow to the strict limitations under Section 15, Article VII
that should the JBC defer submission of the list, it is not
arrogating unto itself a judicial function, but simply
respecting the clear mandate of the Constitution and that
the application of the general rule in Section 15, Article VII
to the Judiciary does not violate the principle of separation
of powers, because said provision is an exception.
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whether the JBC may resume its process until the short
list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1),
Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to
appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate
Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
The ripeness of the controversy for judicial
determination may not be doubted. The challenges to the
authority of the JBC to open the process of nomination and
to continue the process until the submission of the list of
nominees the insistence of some of the petitioners to
compel the JBC through mandamus to submit the short
list to the incumbent President the counterinsistence of
the intervenors to prohibit the JBC from submitting the
short list to the incumbent President on the ground that
said list should be submitted instead to the next President
the strong position that the incumbent President is already
prohibited under Section 15, Article VII from making any
appointments, including those to the Judiciary, starting on
May 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010 and the contrary
position that the incumbent President is not so prohibited
are only some of the real issues for determination. All such
issues establish the ripeness of the controversy, considering
that for some the short list must be submitted before the
vacancy actually occurs by May 17, 2010. The outcome will
not be an abstraction, or a merely hypothetical exercise.
The resolution of the controversy will surely settlewith
finalitythe nagging questions that are preventing the
JBC from moving on with the process that it already began,
or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the
rest of the process.
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(1),
Article
VIII
(Judicial
733
of
Proceedings
and
Debates
of
the
Constitutional
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737
of
Proceedings
and
Debates
of
the
Constitutional
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78Crawford, op. cit., supra, note 72, pp. 248249.
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of
Proceedings
and
Debates
of
the
Constitutional
Commissioner
Teofisto
Guingona
explained
that
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III
Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC
May the JBC be compelled to submit the list of nominees
to the President?
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85Comment of the OSG, p. 37.
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and within 90
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86Section 3, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
87 JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124293,
November 20, 2000, 345 SCRA 143.
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President.
The distinction between a ministerial act and a
discretionary one has been delineated in the following
manner:
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88Nery v. Gamolo, A.M. No. P011508, February 7, 2003, 397 SCRA
110, citing Musni v. Morales, 315 SCRA 85, 86 (1999).
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corresponding
decision.
SO ORDERED.
thereto
in
accordance
with
this
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structuring.
That the power of judicial appointment was lodged in
the President is a recognized measure of limitation on the
power of the judiciary, which measure, however, is
counterbalanced
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6 Id., at pp. 601603.
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people
to
these
sensitive
positions,
like
the
_______________
8 RECORD
OF THE
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TRIAL COURTS.
MR. DAVIDE: To avoid any further complication, I
would agree to delete JUDICIARY.
MR. GUINGONA: Thank you.
MR. DAVIDE: So, on line 5, the only amendment
would consist of the following: after
the word as, insert MEMBERS OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS OR THE OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee prefer to throw
this to the body?
MR. REGALADO: We prefer that we submit it to the
body.
VOTING
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THE PRESIDENT: Those in favor of this proposed
amendment of Commissioner Davide
on page 9, line 5, to include these two
offices: the constitutional
commissions and the office of the
Ombudsman, please raise their hand.
(Several Members raised their hand.)
Those against the proposed amendment will please raise their hand.
(Few Members raised their hand.)
The results show 24 votes in favor and 9 against the amendment is
approved.
MR. ROMULO: Madam President, we are almost at the end of our long
journey. I ask for continued patience on the part of everyone. We are now
on Section 20. We have consolidated all the amendments for presentation
by one person and that is, Commissioner Sarmiento. Will the Chair
recognize him please? (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied).
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talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at
the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We
think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon
its face. The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the
framers understanding thereof.13 (underscoring supplied)
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what is impossible.
In the present case, there can only arise a legal
impossibility when the JBC list is submitted or the
vacancy occurred during the appointments ban and the 90
day period would expire before the end of the appointments
ban, in which case the fresh 90day period should start to
run at noon of June 30. This was the factual antecedent
respecting the trial court judges involved in Valenzuela.
There also arises a legal impossibility when the list is
submitted or the vacancy occurred prior to the ban and no
appointment was made before the ban starts, rendering the
lapse of the 90day period within the period of the ban, in
which case the remaining period should resume to run at
noon of June 30. The outgoing President would be released
from nonfulfillment of the constitutional obligation, and
the duty devolves upon the new President.
_______________
15 Decision, p. 37.
16 Infra note 18.
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OF THE
1986, RCC No. 29 (CD Format. Commissioner Romulo stated that [t]he
sense of the Committee is that 60 days is awfully short and that the
[Judicial and Bar] Council, as well as the President, may have difficulties
with that.
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thereof.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the
appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
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http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/JBCreCJ.pdf
(visited:
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and a denial thereof, on the other that is, the case must
concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or
issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts.10 The rationale for this requirement is to prevent
the courts through avoidance of premature adjudication
from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements, and
for us to be satisfied that the case does not present a
hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event
that has not and indeed may never transpire.11
Thus, justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual
controversy between or among the parties to the dispute
(2) that the interests of the parties be adverse (3) that the
matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by
judicial power and (4) that the determination of the
controversy will result in practical relief to the
complainant.12
_______________
9 Congressman Enrique T. Garcia of the 2nd District of Bataan v. The
Executive Secretary, The Secretary of the Department of Energy, Caltex
Philippines, Inc., Petron Corporation, and Pilipinas Shell Corporation,
G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 119.
10Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 159139, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 291, 312313.
11 Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, 271 Conn. 540,
570, 858 A.2d 709 (2004).
12 Astoria Federal Mortgage Corporation v. Matschke, 111 Conn. App.
462, 959 A.2d 652 (2008).
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3 See: Guingona, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 426 292 SCRA 402
(1998) see also: Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio, 33 Phil. 494 (1970).
4 Id.
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793
6 See for example, In Re: List of Judges who failed to comply with
Administrative Circular No. 1094, dated June 29, 1994, 439 Phil. 118
390 SCRA 319 (2002).
7 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section, 6.
8 Id., Article VIII, Section 5(5).
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20 JBC009, October 18, 2000.
21 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 4(1).
22 See: allegation of grave abuse, De Castro petition, p.5.
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803
28 Soriano petition, p. 4.
29 Tolentino petition, p. 2.
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30 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896,
February 21, 1991, 194 SCRA 317, 330.
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word less for the Court. One voice can be a big difference if
the missing voice is that of the Chief Justice.
Without meaning to demean the capability of an Acting
Chief Justice, the ascendancy in the Court of a permanent
sitting Chief Justice cannot be equaled. He is the first
among equalsa primus inter pareswho sets the tone for
the Court and the Judiciary, and who is looked up to on all
matters, whether administrative or judicial. To the world
outside the Judiciary, he is the personification of the Court
and the whole Judiciary. And this is not surprising since,
as Chief Justice, he not only chairs the Court en banc, but
chairs as well the Presidential Electoral Tribunal that sits
in judgment over election disputes affecting the President
and the VicePresident. Outside of his immediate Court
duties, he sits as Chair of the Judicial and Bar Council, the
Philippine Judicial Academy and, by constitutional
command, presides over the impeachment of the
President.37 To be sure, the Acting Chief Justice may be
the ablest, but he is not the Chief Justice without the
mantle and permanent title of the Office, and even his
presence as Acting Chief Justice leaves the Court with one
member less. Sadly, this member is the Chief Justice even
with an Acting Chief Justice, the Judiciary and the Court
remain headless.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution to extend
to the Court a fixed period that will assure the nation that
the Courts membership shall immediately be filled, is
evidenced no less than by the Constitutional Commissions
own deliberations where the following exchange took place:
Mr. De Castro: I understand that our justices now in the Supreme
Court, together with the Chief Justice, are only 11.
Mr. Concepcion: Yes.
_______________
37 Constitution, Article XI, Section 2(6).
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c. Guidelines for the Judicial and Bar Council
The resolution of the present dispute can only be
complete if clear guidelines are given to the JBC on how it
shall conduct itself under the present circumstances
pursuant to this Courts ruling. The Court should therefore
direct the JBC to:
A. forthwith proceed with its normal processes for
the submission of the list of nominees for the vacancy
to be created by the retirement of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, to be submitted to the President on
or before the day before the retirement of the Chief
Justice
B. in the course of preparing its list of nominees,
determine with certainty the nominees readiness to
accept the nomination as well as the appointment
they may receive from the President, deleting from
the list the nominees who will refuse to confirm their
full readiness to accept without conditions either their
nomination or their appointment, if they will be
appointed
C. proceed with its normal processes for the
preparation of the lists for the vacancies for the lower
courts, to be submitted to the Office of the President
as soon as the election ban on appointments is lifted
and
D. in all other matters not otherwise falling
under the above, conduct itself in accordance with
this Decision.
In light of all the foregoing, I vote to:
1. Dismiss the De Castro and Peralta petitions and for
not being justiciability and for prematurity.
2. Dismiss the Soriano and the Tolentino petitions for
lack of merit.
3. Dismiss all petitions and motions for interventions
supporting or opposing the above petitions.
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Issues to be addressed
Quite ably, the majority opinion already addressed the
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