Sei sulla pagina 1di 46

What Is Genocide?

By Gregory H. Stanton, President, Genocide Watch


The crime of genocide is defined in international law in the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide.
"Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article III: The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
The Genocide Convention was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948.
The Convention entered into force on 12 January 1951. More than 130 nations have ratified the
Genocide Convention and over 70 nations have made provisions for the punishment of genocide in
domestic criminal law. The text of Article II of the Genocide Convention was included as a crime in
Article 6 of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Punishable Acts
The following are genocidal acts when committed as part of a policy to destroy a group's existence:
Killing members of the group includes direct killing and actions causing death.
Causing serious bodily or mental harm includes inflicting trauma on members of the group through
widespread torture, rape, sexual violence, forced or coerced use of drugs, and mutilation.
Deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to destroy a group includes the deliberate
deprivation of resources needed for the group's physical survival, such as clean water, food, clothing,
shelter or medical services. Deprivation of the means to sustain life can be imposed through
confiscation of harvests, blockade of foodstuffs, detention in camps, forcible relocation or expulsion into

deserts.
Prevention of births includes involuntary sterilization, forced abortion, prohibition of marriage, and
long-term separation of men and women intended to prevent procreation.
Forcible transfer of children may be imposed by direct force or by through fear of violence, duress,
detention, psychological oppression or other methods of coercion. The Convention on the Rights of the
Child defines children as persons under the age of 14 years.
Genocidal acts need not kill or cause the death of members of a group. Causing serious bodily or
mental harm, prevention of births and transfer of children are acts of genocide when committed as part
of a policy to destroy a group's existence:
It is a crime to plan or incite genocide, even before killing starts, and to aid or abet genocide:
Criminal acts include conspiracy, direct and public incitement, attempts to commit genocide, and
complicity in genocide.
Key Terms
The crime of genocide has two elements: intent and action. "Intentional" means purposeful.
Intent can be proven directly from statements or orders. But more often, it must be inferred from a
systematic pattern of coordinated acts.
Intent is different from motive. Whatever may be the motive for the crime (land expropriation, national
security, territorial integrity, etc.,) if the perpetrators commit acts intended to destroy a group, even part
of a group, it is genocide.
The phrase "in whole or in part" is important. Perpetrators need not intend to destroy the entire
group. Destruction of only part of a group (such as its educated members, or members living in one
region) is also genocide. Most authorities require intent to destroy a substantial number of group
members -- mass murder. But an individual criminal may be guilty of genocide even if he kills only one
person, so long as he knew he was participating in a larger plan to destroy the group.
The law protects four groups - national, ethnical, racial or religious groups.
A national group means a set of individuals whose identity is defined by a common country of
nationality or national origin.
An ethnical group is a set of individuals whose identity is defined by common cultural traditions,
language or heritage.
A racial group means a set of individuals whose identity is defined by physical characteristics.
A religious group is a set of individuals whose identity is defined by common religious creeds, beliefs,
doctrines, practices, or rituals.
Copyright 2002 Genocide Watch.

Raphael Lemkin in his masterpiece "Axis Rule in Occupied Europe" (1943) invented the term
"genocide,"by combining "genos" (race, people) and "cide" (to kill).
Lemkin defined genocide as follows:

"Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except
when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of
national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would
be the disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings,
religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security,
liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups."

When Lemkin proposed a treaty against genocide to the United Nations in 1945, he defined it as
follows:

"The crime of genocide should be recognized therein as a conspiracy to exterminate national, religious
or racial groups. The overt acts of such a conspiracy may consist of attacks against life, liberty or
property of members of such groups merely because of their affiliation with such groups. The
formulation of the crime may be as follows:
"Whoever, while participating in a conspiracy to destroy a national, racial or religious group, undertakes
an attack against life, liberty or property of members of such groups is guilty of the crime of genocide."

The Genocide Convention adopted by the UN in Paris in 1948 defines genocide without the precursors
and persecution that Lemkin noted in his definitions. The Convention defines genocide as follows:

"Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article III: The following acts shall be punishable:


(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.

Genocide Watch is the Coordinator of the International Alliance to End Genocide


P.O. Box 809, Washington, D.C. 20044 USA. Phone: 1-202-643-1405
E-mail:communications@genocidewatch.org

Genocide Convention

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide


Approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly
resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948
entry into force 12 January 1951, in accordance with article XIII
status of ratifications, reservations and declarations
The Contracting Parties,
Having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution
96 (I) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit
and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world,
Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity, and
Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-

operation is required,
Hereby agree as hereinafter provided:
Article 1
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is
a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.
Article 2
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article 3
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d ) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
Article 4
Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished,
whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.
Article 5
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the
necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to
provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article

III.
Article 6
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a
competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international
penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have
accepted its jurisdiction.
Article 7
Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall not be considered as political crimes for the
purpose of extradition.
The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their
laws and treaties in force.
Article 8
Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action
under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression
of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.
Article 9
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the
present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the
other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request
of any of the parties to the dispute.
Article 10
The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally
authentic, shall bear the date of 9 December 1948.
Article 11
The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949 for signature on behalf of any Member
of the United Nations and of any nonmember State to which an invitation to sign has been addressed by
the General Assembly.
The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
After 1 January 1950, the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member of the
United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an invitation as aforesaid. Instruments
of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 12

Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, extend the application of the present Convention to all or any of the territories for the conduct
of whose foreign relations that Contracting Party is responsible.
Article 13
On the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited, the
Secretary-General shall draw up a proces-verbal and transmit a copy thereof to each Member of the
United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in article 11.
The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the
twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.
Any ratification or accession effected, subsequent to the latter date shall become effective on the
ninetieth day following the deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession.
Article 14
The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years as from the date of its coming
into force.
It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such Contracting Parties as
have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current period.
Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
Article 15
If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Parties to the present Convention should become less
than sixteen, the Convention shall cease to be in force as from the date on which the last of these
denunciations shall become effective. Article 16
A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party
by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.
The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.
Article 17
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United Nations and the nonmember States contemplated in article XI of the following:
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with article 11;
(b) Notifications received in accordance with article 12;
(c) The date upon which the present Convention comes into force in accordance with article 13;

(d) Denunciations received in accordance with article 14;


(e) The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with article 15;
(f) Notifications received in accordance with article 16.
Article 18
The original of the present Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.
A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to each Member of the United Nations and to
each of the non-member States contemplated in article XI.
Article 19
The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date
of its coming into force.
Convention text from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
The Genocide Convention in 40 Languages (from Prevent Genocide International)

Declarations and Reservations


to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
DRAFT
Link to May 28, 1951 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice
A total of thirty of the 132 nations which are party to the Genocide Convention have made
reservations, declarations and understandings.
Since 1989, eleven countries have withdrawn reservations to Article IX, concerning submission
of disputes to the International Court of Justice. As of October 3, 2000 28 counties continue to
have active reservations. Many countries have registered objections to these reservations, some
nations objecting to a reservations from a specific nation and some nations refusing to accept any
of the reservations. Click here to read objections
Summary of Reservations, Declarations and
Understadings
II

IV

VI VII VIII IX

XI

XII

Defin Respo Trib Extra Preve Submi Signat Non-

ssion
of
disput
ition
ntion es to
nsible
of
and
the
Indivi unal dition
Geno
Suppr Int'l
duals
cide
ession Court
of
Justic
e
Number
of
reservati
ons,
declarati
ons and
understa
ndings

1
(USA)

1
(Philippi
nes)

1
(Myanm
ar)

Number
withdra
wn

ure,
Ratifi
cation
and
Acces
sion

self
gover
ning
territ
ories

16

13

11

Unless otherwise indicated, the declarations and reservations were made upon ratification,
accession or succession. The symbol # indicates an "understading". Empty brackets "[ ]"
indicates that a reservation was withdrawn, see date on the left.
Reservation
Withdrawn

II

IV VI VII VIII IX

XI XII

[]

Argentina

Bahrain

Bangladesh

Albania

19 July 1999

Algeria

Belarus

28 April 1989

[]

Bulgaria

29 June 1992

[]

China

Czech Republic

26 April 1991

Finland

5 Jan 1998

Hungary

8 Dec 1989

[]

[]

India

Malaysia
Mongolia

#
19 July 1990

*
[]

*
Morocco

Myanmar

Philippines

*
*

[]

2 April 1997

[]

8 Mar 1989

[]

Poland

16 Oct 1997

Portugal

16 Sept 1999

Romania
Russian Federation

Rwanda

Singapore

Slovakia

26 April 1991

[]

Spain
Ukraine

20 April 1989

U.S.A.
Venezuela

[]

Viet Nam

Yemen

Albania
(Reservation to Article IX withdrawn July 19, 1999) As regards article IX:

The People's Republic of Albania does not consider as binding upon itself the provisions of
article IX which provides that disputes between the Contracting Parties with regard to the
interpretation, application and implementation of the Convention shall be referred for
examination to the International Court at the request of any party to the dispute. The People's
Republic of Albania declares that, as regards the International Court's jurisdiction in respect of
disputes concerning the interpretation, application and implementation of the Convention, the
People's Republic of Albania will, as hitherto, maintain the position that in each particular case
the agreement of all parties to the dispute is essential for the submission of any particular dispute
to the International Court for decision.
As regards article XII: The

People's Republic of Albania declares that it is not in


agreement with article XII of the Convention and considers that all the provisions of the
Convention should extend to Non-Self-Governing Territories, including Trust Territories.
Algeria
The Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria does not consider itself bound by article IX of
the Convention, which confers on the International Court of Justice jurisdiction in all disputes
relating to the said Convention.

The Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria declares that no provision of article VI of the
said Convention shall be interpreted as depriving its tribunals of jurisdiction in cases of genocide
or other acts enumerated in article III which have been committed in its territory or as conferring
such jurisdiction on foreign tribunals.
International tribunals may, as an exceptional measure, be recognized as having jurisdiction, in
cases in which the Algerian Government has given its express approval.
The Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria declares that it does not accept the terms of
article XII of the Convention and considers that all the provisions of the said Convention should
apply to Non-Self-Governing Territories, including Trust Territories.
Argentina
The Argentine Government reserves the right not to submit to the procedure
laid down in this article any dispute relating directly or indirectly to the territories referred to in
its reservation to article XII.
Ad article IX:

If any other Contracting Party extends the application of the Convention to


territories under the sovereignty of the Argentine Republic, this extension shall in no way affect
the rights of the Republic.
Ad article XII:

Bahrain
Reservations:
"With reference to article IX of the Convention the Government of the State of Bahrain declares
that, for the submission of any dispute in terms of this article to the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, the express consent of all the parties to the dispute is required in
each case."
"Moreover, the accession by the State of Bahrain to the said Convention shall in no way
constitute recognition of Israel or be a cause for the establishment of any relations of any kind
therewith."
Bangladesh
Declaration:
"Article IX: For the submission of any dispute in terms of this article to the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, the consent of all parties to the dispute will be required in each
case."
Belarus (Reservation to Article IX withdrawn April 28, 1989)

The Byelorussian SSR declares that it is not in agreement with article XII of the Convention and
considers that all the provisions of the Convention should extend to non-self-governing
territories, including trust territories.
Bulgaria (Reservation to Article IX withdrawn June 29, 1992)
As regards article XII: The

People's Republic of Bulgaria declares that it is not in


agreement with article XII of the Convention and considers that all the provisions of the
Convention should extend to Non-Self-Governing Territories, including Trust Territories.
China
Declaration:
1. The ratification to the said Convention by the Taiwan local authorities on 19 July 1951 in the
name of China is illegal and therefore null and void.
Reservation:
2. The People's Republic of China does not consider itself bound by article IX of the said
Convention.
Czech Republic (Reservation to Article IX withdrawn April 26, 1991)
Finland (Reservation to Article IX withdrawn January 5, 1998)
Hungary (Reservation to Article IX withdrawn December 8, 1989)
The Hungarian People's Republic reserves its rights with regard to the provisions of article XII
which do not define the obligations of countries having colonies with regard to questions of
colonial exploitation and to acts which might be described as genocide.
India
"With reference to article IX of the Convention, the Government of India declares that, for the
submission of any dispute in terms of this article to the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice, the consent of all the parties to the dispute is required in each case."
Malaysia
Reservation:
"That with reference to article IX of the Convention, before any dispute to which Malaysia is a
party may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under this article,
the specific consent of Malaysia is required in each case."

Understanding:
"That the pledge to grant extradition in accordance with a state's laws and treaties in force found
in article VII extends only to acts which are criminal under the law of both the requesting and the
requested state."
Mongolia (Reservation to Article IX withdrawn July 19, 1990)
The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic declares that it is not in a position to agree
with article XII of the Convention and considers that the provisions of the said article should be
extended to non-self-governing territories, including trust territories.
The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic deems it appropriate to draw attention to
the discriminatory character of article XI of the Convention, under the terms of which a number
of States are precluded from acceding to the Convention and declares that the Convention deals
with matters which affect the interests of all States and it should, therefore, be open for accession
by all States.
Morocco
With reference to article VI, the Government of His Majesty the King considers that Moroccan
courts and tribunals alone have jurisdiction with respect to acts of genocide committed within the
territory of the Kingdom of Morocco.
The competence of international courts may be admitted exceptionally in cases with respect to
which the Moroccan Government has given its specific agreement.
With reference to article IX, the Moroccan Government states that no dispute relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention can be brought before the
International Court of Justice, without the prior agreement of the parties to the dispute.
Myanmar
"(1) With reference to article VI, the Union of Burma makes the reservation that nothing
contained in the said Article shall be construed as depriving the Courts and Tribunals of the
Union of jurisdiction or as giving foreign Courts and tribunals jurisdiction over any cases of
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III committed within the Union territory.
"(2) With reference to article VIII, the Union of Burma makes the reservation that the said article
shall not apply to the Union."
Philippines
"l. With reference to article IV of the Convention, the Philippine Government cannot sanction
any situation which would subject its Head of State, who is not a ruler, to conditions less
favorable than those accorded other Heads of State, whether constitutionally responsible rules or

not. The Philippine Government does not consider said article, therefore, as overriding the
existing immunities from judicial processes guaranteed certain public officials by the
Constitution of the Philippines.
"2. With reference to article VII of the Convention, the Philippine Government does not
undertake to give effect to said article until the Congress of the Philippines has enacted the
necessary legislation defining and punishing the crime of genocide, which legislation, under the
Constitution of the Philippines, cannot have any retroactive effect.
"3. With reference to articles VI and IX of the Convention, the Philippine Government takes the
position that nothing contained in said articles shall be construed as depriving Philippine courts
of jurisdiction over all cases of genocide committed within Philippine territory save only in those
cases where the Philippine Government consents to have the decision of the Philippine courts
reviewed by either of the international tribunals referred to in said articles. With further reference
to article IX of the Convention, the Philippine Government does not consider said article to
extend the concept of State responsibility beyond that recognized by the generally accepted
principles of international law."
Poland (Reservation to Article IX withdrawn October 16, 1997)
Poland does not accept the provisions of this article, considering
that the Convention should apply to Non-Self-Governing Territories, including Trust Territories.
As regards article XII:

Portugal (Reservation to Article VII withdrawn Stember 16, 1999)


Declaration:
The Portuguese Republic declares that it will interpret article VII of the [said Convention] as
recognizing the obligation to grant extradition established therein in cases where such extradition
is not prohibited by the Constitution and other domestic legislation of the Portuguese Republic.
Romania(Reservation to Article IX withdrawn April 2, 1997)
The People's Republic of Romania declares that it is not in
agreement with article XII of the Convention, and considers that all the provisions of the
Convention should apply to the Non-Self-Governing Territories, including the Trust Territories.
As regards article XII:

Russian Federation(Reservation to Article IX withdrawn March 8,1989)


The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that it is not in agreement with article XII of
the Convention and considers that all the provisions of the Convention should extend to NonSelf-Governing Territories, including Trust Territories.
Rwanda
The Rwandese Republic does not consider itself as bound by article IX of the Convention.

Singapore
Reservation:
"That with reference to article IX of the Convention, before any dispute to which the Republic of
Singapore is a party may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
under this article, the specific consent of the Republic of Singapore is required in each case."
Slovakia (Reservation to Article IX withdrawn April 16, 1991)
Spain
With a reservation in respect of the whole of article IX (jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice).
Ukraine (Reservation to Article IX withdrawn April 20, 1989)
The Ukrainian SSR declares that it is not in agreement with article XII of the Convention and
considers that all the provisions of the Convention should extend to Non-Self-Governing
Territories, including Trust Territories.
United States of America
Reservations:
"(1) That with reference to article IX of the Convention, before any dispute to which the United
States is a party may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under
this article, the specific consent of the United States is required in each case.
(2) That nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation or other action by the
United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the
United States."
Understandings:
"(1) That the term `intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group as such' appearing in article II means the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in
substantial part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such by the acts specified in
article II.
(2) That the term `mental harm' in article II (b) means permanent impairment of mental faculties
through drugs, torture or similar techniques.
(3) That the pledge to grant extradition in accordance with a state's laws and treaties in force
found in article VII extends only to acts which are criminal under the laws of both the requesting

and the requested state and nothing in article VI affects the right of any state to bring to trial
before its own tribunals any of its nationals for acts committed outside a state.
(4) That acts in the course of armed conflicts committed without the specific intent required by
article II are not sufficient to constitute genocide as defined by this Convention.
(5) That with regard to the reference to an international penal tribunal in article VI of the
Convention, the United States declares that it reserves the right to effect its participation in any
such tribunal only by a treaty entered into specifically for that purpose with the advice and
consent of the Senate."
Venezuela
With reference to article VI, notice is given that any proceedings to which Venezuela may be a
party before an international penal tribunal would be invalid without Venezuela's prior express
acceptance of the jurisdiction of such international tribunal.
With reference to article VII, notice is given that the laws in force in Venezuela do not permit the
extradition of Venezuelan nationals.
With reference to article IX, the reservation is made that the submission of a dispute to the
International Court of Justice shall be regarded as valid only when it takes place with Venezuela's
approval, signified by the express conclusion of a prior agreement in each case.
Viet Nam
1. The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam does not consider itself bound by article IX of the
Convention which provides the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in solving
disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment
of the Convention at the request of any of the parties to disputes. The Socialist Republic of Viet
Nam is of the view that, regarding the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in solving
disputes referred to in article IX of the Convention, the consent of the parties to the disputes
except the criminals is diametrically necessary for the submission of a given dispute to the
International Court of Justice for decision.
2. The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam does not accept article XII of the Convention and
considers that all provisions of the Convention should also extend to Non-Self-Governing
Territories, including Trust Territories.
3. The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam considers that article XI is of a discriminatory nature,
depriving a number of States of the opportunity to become parties to the Convention, and holds
that the Convention should be open for accession by all States.
Yemen

In acceding to this Convention, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen does not consider
itself bound by article IX of the Convention, which provides that disputes between the
Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention
shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the
dispute. It declares that the competence of the International Court of Justice with respect to
disputes concerning the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention shall in each
case be subject to the express consent of all parties to the dispute.

Objections
(Unless otherwise indicated, the objections were made
upon ratification, accession or succession.)
Australia
15 November 1950
"The Australian Government does not accept any of the reservations contained in the instrument
of accession of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, or in the instrument of ratification of the
Republic of the Philippines.
"The Australian Government does not accept any of the reservations made at the time of
signature of the Convention by the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."
19 January 1951
"The Australian Government does not accept the reservations contained in the instruments of
accession of the Governments of Poland and Romania."
Belgium
The Government of Belgium does not accept the reservations made by Bulgaria, Byelorussian
Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Brazil23, 24
The Government of Brazil objects to the reservations made to the Convention by Bulgaria, the
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Brazilian
Government considers the said reservations as incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Convention.
The position taken by the Government of Brazil is founded on the Advisory Opinion of the
International Court of Justice of 28 May 1951 and on the resolution adopted by the sixth session
of the General Assembly on 12 January 1952, on reservations to multilateral conventions.

The Brazilian Government reserves the right to draw any such legal consequences as it may
deem fit from its formal objection to the above-mentioned reservations.
China23
15 November 1954
"The Government of China . . . objects to all the identical reservations made at the time of
signature or ratification or accession to the Convention by Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Chinese Government considers the
above-mentioned reservations as incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention
and, therefore, by virtue of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 28 May
1951, would not regard the above-mentioned States as being Parties to the Convention."
13 September 1955
[Same communication, mutatis mutandis, in respect of the reservations made by Albania.]
25 July 1956
[Same communication, mutatis mutandis, in respect of the reservations made by Myanmar.]
Cuba25
Denmark
27 December 1989
With regard to reservation (2) made by the United States of America:
"In the view of the Government of Denmark this reservation is subject to general principle of
treaty interpretation according to which a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law
as justification for failure to perform a treaty."
Ecuador
31 March 1950
The Government of Ecuador is not in agreement with the reservations made to article IX and XII
of the Convention by the Governments of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Czechoslovakia,the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and, therefore, they do not apply to Ecuador which accepted without any
modifications the integral text of the Convention.
21 August 1950

[Same communication, mutatis mutandis, in respect of the reservations made by Bulgaria.]


9 January 1951
The Government of Ecuador does not accept the reservations made by the Governments of
Poland and Romania to articles IX and XII of the Convention.
Estonia
With regard to reservation (2) made by the United States of America:
"The Estonian Government objects to this reservation on the grounds that it creates uncertainty,
as to the extent of the obligations the Government of the United States of America is prepared to
assume with regard to the Convention. According to article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, no party may invoke the provisions of its domestic law as justification for
failure to perform a treaty."
Finland
22 December 1989
With respect to reservation (2) made by the United States of America:
"In the view of the Government of Finland this reservation is subject to the general principle of
treaty interpretation according to which a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law
as justification for failure to perform a treaty."
Greece
We further declare that we have not accepted and do not accept any reservation which has
already been made or which may hereafter be made by the countries signatory to this instrument
or by countries which have acceded or may hereafter accede thereto.
26 January 1990
The Government of the Hellenic Republic cannot accept the first reservation entered by the
United States of America upon ratifying the Agreement on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, for it considers such a reservation to be incompatible with the Convention.
In respect of the second reservation formulated by the United States of America:
[Same objection mutatis mutandis, as the one made by Denmark.]
Ireland
22 December 1989

"The Government of Ireland is unable to accept the second reservation made by the United States
of America on the occasion of its ratification of the [said] Convention on the grounds that as a
generally accepted rule of international law a party to an international agreement may not, by
invoking the terms of its internal law, purport to override the provisions of the Agreement."
Italy
29 December 1989
The Government of the Republic of Italy objects to the second reservation entered by the United
States of America. It creates uncertainty as to the extent of the obligations which the Government
of the United States of America is prepared to assume with regard to the Convention."
Mexico
4 June 1990
The Government of Mexico believes that the reservation made by the United States Government
to article IX of the aforesaid Convention should be considered invalid because it is not in
keeping with the object and purpose of the Convention, nor with the principle governing the
interpretation of treaties whereby no State can invoke provisions of its domestic law as a reason
for not complying with a treaty.
If the aforementioned reservation were applied, it would give rise to a situation of uncertainty as
to the scope of the obligations which the United States Government would assume with respect
to the Convention.
Mexico's objection to the reservation in question should not be interpreted as preventing the
entry into force of the 1948 Convention between the [Mexican] Government and the United
States Government.
Netherlands
"The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands declares that it considers the reservations
made by Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, India, Morocco, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in respect of article IX of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature at Paris on 9 December 1948, to
be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. The Government of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands therefore does not deem any State which has made or which will
make such reservation a party to the Convention."
27 December 1989
With regard to the reservations made by the United States of America:

"As concerns the first reservation, the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands recalls its
declaration, made on 20 June 1966 on the occasion of the accession of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands to the Convention [...] stating that in its opinion the reservations in respect of article
IX of the Convention, made at that time by a number of states, were incompatible with the object
and purpose of the Convention, and that the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands did
not consider states making such reservations parties to the Convention. Accordingly, the
Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands does not consider the United States of America a
party to the Convention. Similarly, the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands does not
consider parties to the Convention other states which have made such reservations, i.e., in
addition to the states mentioned in the aforementioned declaration, the People's Republic of
China, Democratic Yemen, the German Democratic Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic,
the Philippines, Rwanda, Spain, Venezuela, and Viet Nam, on the other hand, the Government of
the Kingdom of the Netherlands does consider parties to the Convention those states that have
since withdrawn their reservations, i.e. the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.
As the Convention may come into force between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United
States of America as a result of the latter withdrawing its reservation in respect of article IX, the
Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands deems it useful to express the following position
on the second reservation of the United States of America:
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands objects to this reservation on the ground
that it creates uncertainty as to the extent of the obligations the Government of the United States
of America is prepared to assume with regard to the Convention. Moreover, any failure by the
United States of America to act upon the obligations contained in the Convention on the ground
that such action would be prohibited by the constitution of the United States would be contrary to
the generally accepted rule of international law, as laid down in article 27 of the Vienna
Convention on the law of treaties (Vienna, 23 May 1969)".
23 February 1996
With regard to the reservations made by Malaysia and Singapore made upon accession:
"The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands recalls its declaration made on 20 June
1966 on the occasion of the accession [to the said Convention].
[See declaration made under "Netherlands"]

Accordingly, the Government of the Netherlands declares that it considers the reservations made
by Malaysia and Singapore in respect of article IX of the Convention incompatible with the
object and purpose of the Convention. The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands does
not consider Malaysia and Singapore Parties to the Convention.
On the other hand, the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands does consider Parties to
the Convention those States that have since withdrawn their reservations in respect of article IX
of the Convention, i.e. Hungary, Bulgaria and Mongolia."

Norway
10 April 1952
"The Norwegian Government does not accept the reservations made to the Convention by the
Government of the Philippines at the time of ratification."
22 December 1989
With regard to reservation (2) made by the United States of America:
"In the view of the Government of Norway this reservation is subject to the general principle of
treaty interpretation according to which a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law
as justification for failure to perform a treaty."
Spain
29 December 1989
With regard to reservation (2) made by the United States of America:
Spain interprets the reservation entered by the United States of America to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on 9 December 1948 [...] to mean that legislation or other action by the United
States of America will continue to be in accordance with the provisions of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
Sri Lanka
6 February 1951
"The Government of Ceylon does not accept the reservations made by Romania to the
Convention."
Sweden
22 December 1989
With regard to reservation (2) made by the United States of America:
"The Government of Sweden is of the view that a State party to the Convention may not invoke
the provisions of its national legislation, including the Constitution, to justify that it does not
fulfil its obligations under the Convention and therefore objects to the reservation.
This objection does not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the Convention between
Sweden and the United States of America."

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland


"The Government of the United Kingdom do not accept the reservations to articles IV, VII, VIII,
IX or XII of the Convention made by Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bulgaria, Burma, the
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, India, Mongolia, Morocco,
the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics or Venezuela."
21 November 1975
"The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have
consistently stated that they are unable to accept reservations in respect of article IX of the said
Convention; in their view this is not the kind of reservation which intending parties to the
Convention have the right to make.
Accordingly, the Government of the United Kingdom do not accept the reservation entered by
the Republic of Rwanda against article IX of the Convention. They also wish to place on record
that they take the same view of the similar reservation made by the German Democratic
Republic as notified by the circular letter [. . .] of 25 April 1973."
26 August 1983
With regard to statements made by Viet Nam concerning articles IX and XII and reservation
made by China concerning article IX:
"The Government of the United Kingdom have [...] consistently stated that they are unable to
accept reservations to [article IX]. Likewise, in conformity with the attitude adopted by them in
previous cases, the Government of the United Kingdom do not accept the reservation entered by
Viet Nam relating to article XII."
30 December 1987
With regard to a reservation made by Democratic Yemen concerning article IX:
"The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have
consistently stated that they are unable to accept reservations in respect of article IX of the said
Convention; in their view this is not the kind of reservation which intending parties to the
Convention have the right to make.
Accordingly the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland do
not accept the reservation entered by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen against article
IX of the Convention."
22 December 1989

"The Government of the United Kingdom have consistently stated that they are unable to accept
reservations to article IX. Accordingly, in conformity with the attitude adopted by them in
previous cases, the Government of the United Kingdom do not accept the first reservation
entered by the United States of America.
The Government of the United Kingdom object to the second reservation entered by the United
States of America. It creates uncertainty as to the extent of the obligations which the Government
of the United States of America is prepared to assume with regard to the Convention."
20 March 1996
With regard to reservations to article IX made by Malaysia and Singapore upon accession:
"The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have
consistently stated that they are unable to accept reservations to article IX. In their view, these
are not the kind of reservations which intending parties to the Convention have the right to make.
Accordingly, the Government of the United Kingdom do not accept the reservations entered by
the Government of Singapore and Malaysia to article IX of the Convention."

Territorial Application

Participant

Date of receipt
of the
Territories
notification

Australia

8 Jul 1949

All territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations


Australia is responsible

Belgium

13 Mar 1952

Belgian Congo, Trust Territory of Rwanda-Urundi

United
30 Jan 1970
Kingdom5,26

2 Jun 1970
__________________

Channel Islands, Isle of Man, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St.


Vincent, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Falkland
Islands and Dependencies, Fiji, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Pitcairn,
St. Helena and Dependencies, Seychelles, Turks and Caicos
Islands

Kingdom of Tonga

Notes:
1 For other multilateral treaties concluded in the field of human rights, see chapters V, VII, XVI,
XVII and XVIII.
2 Resolution 260 (III), Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Part
I (A/810), p. 174.
3 On 15 June 1993, the Secretary-General received form the Government of Yugoslavia the
following communication:
"Considering the fact that the replacement of sovereignty on the part of the territory of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia previously comprising the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was carried out contrary to the rules of international law, the Government of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia herewith states that it does not consider the so-called Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina a party to the [said Convention], but does consider that the so-called
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is bound by the obligation to respect the norms on
preventing and punishing the crime of genocide in accordance with general international law
irrespective of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide."
4 Ratified on behalf of the Republic of China on 19 July 1951. See note concerning signatures,
ratifications, accessions, etc. on behalf of China (note in chapter I.1).
5 On 6 June 1997, the Government of China notified the Secretary-General of the following:
In accordance with the Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the question of Hong Kong signed on
19 December 1984, the People's Republic of China will resume the exercise of sovereignty over
Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997. Hong Kong will, with effect from that date, become a
Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China and will enjoy a high degree of
autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibility of the Central
People's Government of the People's Republic of China.
The [said Convention], which the Government of the People's Republic of China ratified on [18]
April 1983, will apply to Hong Kong Special Administrative Region with effect from 1 July
1997. (The notification also contained the following declaration): The reservation
to article IX of the said Convention made by the Government of the People's Republic of China
will also apply to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
The Government of the People's Republic of China will assume responsibility for the
international rights and obligations arising from the application of the Convention to Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region.
Subsequently, on 10 June 1997, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland notified the Secretary-General of the following:

"In accordance with the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the
Question of Hong Kong signed on 19 December 1984, the Government of the United Kingdom
will restore Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China with effect from 1 July 1997. The
Government of the United Kingdom will continue to have international responsibility for Hong
Kong until that date. Therefore, from that date the Government of the United Kingdom will cease
to be responsible for the international rights and obligations arising from the application of the
[said Convention] to Hong Kong."
6 On 18 May 1998, the Government of Cyprus notified the Secretary-General of the following:
"The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has taken note of the reservations made by a
number of countries when acceding to the [said Convention] and wishes to state that in its view
these are not the kind of reservations which intending parties to the Convention have the right to
make.
Accordingly, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not accept any reservations entered
by any Government with regard to any of the Articles of the Convention."
7 Czechoslovakia had signed and ratified the Convention on 28 December 1949 and 21
December 1950, respectively, with a reservation. Subsequently, by a notification received on 26
April 1991, the Government of Czechoslovakia notified the Secretary-General of its decision to
withdraw the reservation to article IX made upon signature and confirmed upon ratification. For
the text of the reservation, see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78, p. 303. See also note in
chapter I.2.
8 The German Democratic Republic had acceded to the Convention with reservation and
declaration on 27 March 1973. For the text of the reservation and the declarations see United
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 861, p. 200. See also note under chapter I.2.
9 In a note accompanying the instrument of accession, the Government of the Federal Republic
of Germany stated that the Convention would also apply to Land Berlin.
With reference to the above-mentioned declaration, a communication from the German
Democratic Republic was received by the Secretary-General on 27 December 1973. The text of
the communication is identical, mutatis mutandis, to that published in note of chapter III.3,
paragraph 4.
In this connection, the Secretary-General received from the Governments of France, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America (17 June 1974
and 8 July 1975), the Federal Republic of Germany (15 July 1974 and 19 September 1975), the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (12 September 1974 and 8 December 1975), and the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (19 September 1974), communications identical in essence,
mutatis mutandis, to the corresponding ones reproduced in note chapter III.3. See also note 4
above.

10 Accession on behalf of the Republic of Viet-Nam on 11 August 1950. (For the text of
objections to some of the reservations made upon the said accession, see publication,
Multilateral Treaties for which the Secretary-General acts as Depositary

(ST/LEG/SER.D/13, p.91); also see note in chapter I.2.


11 The Secretary-General received on 9 November 1981 from the Government of the
Democratic Republic of Kampuchea the following objection with regard to the accession by Viet
Nam:
The Government of Democratic Kampuchea, as a party to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, considers that the signing of that Convention by the
Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam has no legal force, because it is no more than
a cynical, macabre charade intended to camouflage the foul crimes of genocide committed by the
250,000 soldiers of the Vietnamese invasion army in Kampuchea. It is an odious insult to the
memory of the more than 2,500,000 Kampucheans who have been massacred by these same
Vietnamese armed forces using conventional weapons, chemical weapons and the weapon of
famine, created deliberately by them for the purpose of eliminating all national resistance at its
source.
It is also a gross insult to hundreds of thousands of Laotians who have been massacred or
compelled to take refuge abroad since the occupation of Laos by the Socialist Republic of Viet
Nam, to the Hmong national minority in Laos, exterminated by Vietnamese conventional and
chemical weapons and, finally, to over a million Vietnamese "boat people" who died at sea or
sought refuge abroad in their flight to escape the repression carried out in Viet Nam by the
Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.
This shameless accession by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam violates and discredits the noble
principles and ideals of the United Nations and jeopardizes the prestige and moral authority of
our world Organization. It represents an arrogant challenge to the international community,
which is well aware of these crimes of genocide committed by the Vietnamese army in
Kampuchea, has constantly denounced and condemned them since 25 December 1978, the date
on which the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea began, and demands that these Vietnamese
crimes of genocide be brought to an end by the total withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces from
Kampuchea and the restoration of the inalienable right of the people of Kampuchea to decide its
own destiny without any foreign interference, as provided in United Nations resolutions 34/22,
35/6 and 36/5.
12 The Yemen Arab Republic had acceded to the Convention on 6 April 1989. See also note in
chapter I.2.
13 On on 25 June 1990, the Secretary-General received from the Government of Israel the
following objection:
"The Government of the State of Israel has noted that the instrument of accession of Bahrain to
the [said] Convention contains a declaration in respect of Israel.

In the view of the Government of the State of Israel, such declaration, which is explicitly of a
political character, is incompatible with the purpose and objectives of this Convention and
cannot in any way affect whatever obligations are binding upon Bahrain under general
International Law or under particular Conventions.
The Government of the State of Israel will, in so far as concerns the substance of the matter,
adopt towards Bahrain an attitude of complete reciprocity".
14 In communications received on 8 March, 19 and 20 April 1989, respectively, the
Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic notified the Secretary-General that they
had decided to withdraw the reservation relating to article IX. For the texts of the reservations,
see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 190, p. 381, vol.196, p. 345 and vol. 201, p. 368,
respectively.
15 On 24 June 1992, the Government of Bulgaria notified the Secretary-General its decision to
withdraw the reservation to article IX of the Convention, made upon accession. For the text of
the reservation, see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78, p. 318.
16 On 5 January 1998, the Government of Finland notified the Secretary-General that it had
decided to withdraw its reservation made upon accession to the Convention. For the text of the
reservation, see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 346, p. 324.
17 In a communication received on 8 December 1989, the Government of Hungary notified the
Secretary-General that it had decided to withdraw the reservation relating to article IX made
upon accession. For the text of the reservation, see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 118, p.
306.
18 In this regard, on 14 October 1996, the Secretary-General received from the Government of
Norway, the following communication:
"... In [the view of the Government of Norway], reservations in respect of article IX of the
Convention are incompatible with the object and purpose of the said Convention. Accordingly,
the Government of Norway does not accept the reservations entered by the Governments of
Singapore and Malaysia to article IX of the Convention."
19 In a communication received on 19 July 1990, the Government of Mongolia notified the
Secretary-General of its decision to withdraw the reservation relating to article IX made upon
accession. For the text of the reservation see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 587, p. 326.
20 On 16 October 1997, the Government of Poland notified the Secretary-General that it had
decided to withdraw its reservation with regard to article IX of the Convention made upon
accession. For the text of the reservation see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78, p. 277.

21 On 2 April 1997, the Government of Romania informed the Secretary-General that it had
decided to withdraw its reservation with regard to article IX of the Convention. For the text of
the reservation, see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78, p. 314.
22 On 11 January 1990, the Secretary-General received from the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany the following declaration:
"The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has taken note of the declarations made
under the heading "Reservations" by the Government of the United States of America upon
ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948. The Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany interprets paragraph (2) of the said declarations as a
reference to article V of the Convention and therefore as not in any way affecting the obligations
of the United States of America as a State Party to the Convention."
See also note in chapter I.2.
23 For the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 28 May 1951, see I.C.J.,
Report 1951, p. 15.
24 For the resolution adopted on 12 January 1952 by the sixth session of the General Assembly
concerning reservations to multilateral conventions, see Resolution 598 (VI); Official
Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/2119), p.
84.
25 By a notification received by the Secretary-General on 29 January 1982, the Government of
Cuba withdrew the declaration made on its behalf upon ratification of the said Convention with
respect to the reservations to articles IX and XII by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
26 On 3 October 1983, the Secretary-General received from the Government of Argentina the
following objection:
[The Government of Argentina makes a] formal objection to the declaration] of territorial
extension issued by the United Kingdom with regard to the Malvinas Islands (and dependencies),
which that country is illegally occupying and refers to as the "Falkland Islands". The Argentine
Republic rejects and considers null and void the [said declaration] of territorial extension.
With reference to the above-mentioned objection the Secretary-General received, on 28 February
1985, from the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland the
following declaration:
"The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have no doubt as
to their right, by notification to the Depositary under the relevant provisions of the above-

mentioned Convention, to extend the application of the Convention in question to the Falkland
Islands or to the Falkland Islands Dependencies, as the case may be.
For this reason alone, the Government of the United Kingdom are unable to regard the Argentine
[communication] under reference as having any legal effect."

Home | Law | Translations of the Genocide Convention | Domestic Laws

Prevent Genocide International


1804 'S' Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009 USA
Tel. 202-483-1948, Fax 202-328-0627

info@preventgenocide.org
last revised 25 October 2000

The 8 Stages of Genocide

By Gregory H. Stanton, President, Genocide Watch


Classification Symbolization Dehumanization Organization Polarization Preparation
Extermination Denial
Genocide is a process that develops in eight stages that are predictable but not inexorable. At each
stage, preventive measures can stop it. The process is not linear. Logically, later stages must be
preceded by earlier stages. But all stages continue to operate throughout the process.
1. CLASSIFICATION: All cultures have categories to distinguish people into us and them by ethnicity,
race, religion, or nationality: German and Jew, Hutu and Tutsi. Bipolar societies that lack mixed
categories, such as Rwanda and Burundi, are the most likely to have genocide. The main preventive
measure at this early stage is to develop universalistic institutions that transcend ethnic or racial
divisions, that actively promote tolerance and understanding, and that promote classifications that
transcend the divisions. The Catholic church could have played this role in Rwanda, had it not been riven
by the same ethnic cleavages as Rwandan society. Promotion of a common language in countries like
Tanzania has also promoted transcendent national identity. This search for common ground is vital to
early prevention of genocide.
2. SYMBOLIZATION: We give names or other symbols to the classifications. We name people Jews or
Gypsies, or distinguish them by colors or dress; and apply the symbols to members of groups.
Classification and symbolization are universally human and do not necessarily result in genocide unless
they lead to the next stage, dehumanization. When combined with hatred, symbols may be forced upon
unwilling members of pariah groups: the yellow star for Jews under Nazi rule, the blue scarf for people
from the Eastern Zone in Khmer Rouge Cambodia. To combat symbolization, hate symbols can be legally
forbidden (swastikas) as can hate speech. Group marking like gang clothing or tribal scarring can be
outlawed, as well. The problem is that legal limitations will fail if unsupported by popular cultural

enforcement. Though Hutu and Tutsi were forbidden words in Burundi until the 1980s, code-words
replaced them. If widely supported, however, denial of symbolization can be powerful, as it was in
Bulgaria, where the government refused to supply enough yellow badges and at least eighty percent of
Jews did not wear them, depriving the yellow star of its significance as a Nazi symbol for Jews.
3. DEHUMANIZATION: One group denies the humanity of the other group. Members of it are equated
with animals, vermin, insects or diseases. Dehumanization overcomes the normal human revulsion
against murder. At this stage, hate propaganda in print and on hate radios is used to vilify the victim
group. In combating this dehumanization, incitement to genocide should not be confused with protected
speech. Genocidal societies lack constitutional protection for countervailing speech, and should be
treated differently than democracies. Local and international leaders should condemn the use of hate
speech and make it culturally unacceptable. Leaders who incite genocide should be banned from
international travel and have their foreign finances frozen. Hate radio stations should be shut down, and
hate propaganda banned. Hate crimes and atrocities should be promptly punished.
4. ORGANIZATION: Genocide is always organized, usually by the state, often using militias to provide
deniability of state responsibility (the Janjaweed in Darfur.) Sometimes organization is informal (Hindu
mobs led by local RSS militants) or decentralized (terrorist groups.) Special army units or militias are
often trained and armed. Plans are made for genocidal killings. To combat this stage, membership in
these militias should be outlawed. Their leaders should be denied visas for foreign travel. The U.N.
should impose arms embargoes on governments and citizens of countries involved in genocidal
massacres, and create commissions to investigate violations, as was done in post-genocide Rwanda.
5. POLARIZATION: Extremists drive the groups apart. Hate groups broadcast polarizing propaganda.
Laws may forbid intermarriage or social interaction. Extremist terrorism targets moderates, intimidating
and silencing the center. Moderates from the perpetrators own group are most able to stop genocide, so
are the first to be arrested and killed. Prevention may mean security protection for moderate leaders or
assistance to human rights groups. Assets of extremists may be seized, and visas for international travel
denied to them. Coups dtat by extremists should be opposed by international sanctions.
6. PREPARATION: Victims are identified and separated out because of their ethnic or religious identity.
Death lists are drawn up. Members of victim groups are forced to wear identifying symbols. Their property
is expropriated. They are often segregated into ghettoes, deported into concentration camps, or confined
to a famine-struck region and starved. At this stage, a Genocide Emergency must be declared. If the
political will of the great powers, regional alliances, or the U.N. Security Council can be mobilized, armed
international intervention should be prepared, or heavy assistance provided to the victim group to prepare
for its self-defense. Otherwise, at least humanitarian assistance should be organized by the U.N. and
private relief groups for the inevitable tide of refugees to come.
7. EXTERMINATION begins, and quickly becomes the mass killing legally called genocide. It is
extermination to the killers because they do not believe their victims to be fully human. When it is
sponsored by the state, the armed forces often work with militias to do the killing. Sometimes the
genocide results in revenge killings by groups against each other, creating the downward whirlpool-like
cycle of bilateral genocide (as in Burundi). At this stage, only rapid and overwhelming armed intervention
can stop genocide. Real safe areas or refugee escape corridors should be established with heavily
armed international protection. (An unsafe safe area is worse than none at all.) The U.N. Standing High
Readiness Brigade, EU Rapid Response Force, or regional forces -- should be authorized to act by the
U.N. Security Council if the genocide is small. For larger interventions, a multilateral force authorized by
the U.N. should intervene. If the U.N. is paralyzed, regional alliances must act. It is time to recognize that
the international responsibility to protect transcends the narrow interests of individual nation states. If
strong nations will not provide troops to intervene directly, they should provide the airlift, equipment, and
financial means necessary for regional states to intervene.

8. DENIAL is the eighth stage that always follows a genocide. It is among the surest indicators of further
genocidal massacres. The perpetrators of genocide dig up the mass graves, burn the bodies, try to cover
up the evidence and intimidate the witnesses. They deny that they committed any crimes, and often
blame what happened on the victims. They block investigations of the crimes, and continue to govern
until driven from power by force, when they flee into exile. There they remain with impunity, like Pol Pot or
Idi Amin, unless they are captured and a tribunal is established to try them. The response to denial is
punishment by an international tribunal or national courts. There the evidence can be heard, and the
perpetrators punished. Tribunals like the Yugoslav or Rwanda Tribunals, or an international tribunal to try
the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, or an International Criminal Court may not deter the worst genocidal
killers. But with the political will to arrest and prosecute them, some may be brought to justice.

1998 Gregory H. Stanton. Originally presented as a briefing paper at the US State Department in 1996.

The Eight Stages of Genocide and Preventing Genocide


Genocide Watch is the Coordinator of the International Alliance to End Genocide
P.O. Box 809, Washington, D.C. 20044 USA. Phone: 1-202-643-1405
E-mail:communications@genocidewatch.org

The 12 Ways to Deny a Genocide

Genocide Emergency: Darfur, Sudan


By Gregory H. Stanton
13 September 2004, updated 15 June 2005
The United States Secretary of State, Colin Powell, on 9 September 2004 declared that genocide has
occurred in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility, and that
genocide may still be continuing. The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, by unanimous vote
on 23 July 2004, declared that the atrocities unfolding in Darfur, Sudan, are genocide.
The State Department has not historically been forward-leaning in making findings of genocide, as was
notoriously evident during its refusal to apply the term genocide to Rwanda in 1994 until most of the
800,000 victims had been murdered. This time, however, the Ambassador for War Crimes Issues, Pierre
Richard Prosper, adopted an exemplary strategy of proof. Prosper was the Prosecutor in the Akayesu
case, which resulted in historys first conviction after trial by an International Criminal Tribunal applying
the Genocide Convention. Prospers strategy demonstrated the careful investigation and solid legal
analysis that made him so successful at the ICTR.
Prosper knew that proof of genocide needs to be based on authoritative facts. So he got the State

Departments Human Rights Bureau to commission and fund a thorough investigation by expert
investigators recruited by the Coalition for International Justice. They interviewed 1,136 eye-witnesses
in Sudanese refugee camps, a sample large enough for any social scientific study. Then he and the
State Department Legal Advisers Office applied international law to the facts, without determining in
advance what the conclusion would be. The legal conclusion was properly separated from its political
consequences.
The results of the systematic interviews were shocking. Over sixty percent of the people interviewed
had witnessed the killing of a family member. Two-thirds had witnessed the killing of a non-family
member. Over eighty percent had witnessed destruction of a village. Two-thirds had witnessed aerial
bombing of villages by the Sudanese government. And perhaps most chillingly, one third had heard
racial epithets used while they or their relatives were being murdered or raped. Assailants often
shouted, Kill the slaves and We have orders to kill all the blacks. Over 50,000 [2005 update: 250,000]
black Africans have died in Darfur, and 1.5 [2005: 2.5] million people have been displaced from their
homes. Over four [2005: eight] hundred villages have been burnt to the ground by Arab Janjaweed
militias, supported by Sudanese government bombing.
Genocide is the intentional destruction, in whole or in part, of a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group, as such. Was the killing intentional? Yes. Was it systematically organized by the al-Bashir
regime using government armed Janjaweed militias, bombers, and helicopter gunships? Yes. Were the
victims chosen because of their ethnic and racial identity? Yes. Fur, Masseleit, and Zaghawa black
African villages were destroyed. Arab villages nearby were left untouched. The State Department report
concludes, the primary cleavage is ethnic: Arabs against Africans. Is this the intentional destruction, in
part, of ethnic and racial groups? Yes. This, in short, is genocide. The genocide continues.
The Al-Bashir regime in Sudan is a serial killer, a master of genocide and ethnic cleansing, having
combined these crimes before in the Nuba mountains and in the southern Sudan, where over two
million black Africans have died. In the south, the government wants to confiscate rich oil reserves
under the lands of the Nuer, Dinka, Shilluk, Nuba, and other black African groups. In Darfur the regime
wants to Arabize the territory and drive out black Africans in order to confiscate their grazing lands,
water resources, and cattle herds.
Mass murder by starvation has been a method of genocide for centuries, perfected by the Turks in
Armenia in 1915 and by Stalin in 1933 Ukraine. It has been the strategy of choice of the Sudanese
government, both in the south and in Darfur. It is a shrewd strategy because death comes slowly and
denial is easy. All a government need do is arm and support militias, which drive a self-sufficient people
off their land through terror; herd them into displaced persons and refugee camps; then systematically
impede aid from getting to them, letting them slowly die of starvation and disease. The deaths can then
be blamed on famine, disease, ancient tribal conflicts, or civil war, or most cynically, failure of the
international community to provide needed relief.
Twelve Ways To Deny A Genocide
The Sudanese governments response to accusations of genocide has, from the beginning, been a
classic example of the strategy of denial that accompanies every genocide. The strategy employs
predictable tactics designed to obscure clear perception of criminal conspiracy with an ink-cloud of
denial. The objective of denial is to paralyze the political will of those who might take action to stop the
genocide and punish the perpetrators. [2005: All of these denial tactics are still the official Sudanese
government line.]
Israel Charny outlines the tactics of denial in Templates for Gross Denial of a Known Genocide: A
Manual, in The Encyclopedia of Genocide, volume 1, page 168. All of them are being used by the

Sudanese government.
1. Question and minimize the statistics. Sudans Foreign Minister Mustaf Osman Ismail said on 9
September 2004, that no more than 5,000 people have been killed in Darfur since February 2003.
[2005: The Sudanese government has not raised its estimate of deaths since.] In contrast, 50,000
[2005: 160,000]deaths is considered a low estimate by the U.N., World Food Program, and the ICRC.
The Sudanese Embassy in Washington said the interviews were all conducted with Darfur refugees in
Chad, not in Sudan, so were invalid. But refugee accounts are among the most reliable indicators of
crimes because witnesses testify freely, without fear. The interviews were conducted in Chad because
the Sudanese Embassy refused to grant visas to the investigation team. The U.S. has proposed a
Security Council resolution that would send investigators into Darfur to gather evidence of the crimes
where they were committed, which Sudan rejects.
2. Attack the motivations of the truth-tellers. Dismiss U.S. charges as products of election-year
politics in America, or of anti-Islamic imperialists who have demonstrated their hatred of Arabs in Iraq at
Abu-Ghraib prison. This ad-hominem moral disqualification argument was the red-herring used by the
Sudanese Ambassadors at both the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and the U.N. Security Council.
It is aimed to appeal to fellow Islamic countries like Algeria and Pakistan.
3. Claim that the deaths were inadvertent, as a result of famine, migration, or disease, not because of
willful murder. This is the usual line given to relief officials to turn the blame back upon them for not
supplying more assistance, hypocritically ignoring the systematic obstruction the Sudanese government
has placed in the way of visas for humanitarian workers and delivery of food and medicine.
4. Emphasize the strangeness of the victims. Whether they be classified as infidels, primitive
tribalists, or of another race and caste, they are unlike us. Thus, the highly influential Sudanese Arab
Gathering considers black Africans to be abd (male slaves) and kahdim (female slaves.) and
advocates their exclusion from Sudanese public life. For Americans or Europeans, such dehumanization is expressed as, Theyre Africans. They do these sorts of things to each other.
5. Rationalize the deaths as the result of tribal conflict, coming to the victims out of the inevitability
of their history of relationships. Thus, the Sudanese Ambassador to the U.N. in a BBC interview on 11
September 2004 claimed that the deaths were just the result of age-old tribal conflicts between cattle
herders (Arabs) and farmers (Africans). In fact, there were no such genocidal raids in Darfur until the
Sudanese government armed the Janjaweed in early 2003 and used the Sudanese air-force to support
them.
6. Blame out of control forces for committing the killings, distancing responsibility from the
Sudanese government. The success of this tactic was demonstrated in U.N. Security Council Resolution
1556, which blames the killings on the Janjaweed militias and actually demands that the Sudanese
government disarm the Janjaweed and bring their leaders to justice. In fact, it was the Sudanese
government that armed the Janjaweed in the first place, and continues to protect them. Not one major
Janjaweed leader has been arrested. Criminals already in jail for years have simply been renamed
Janjaweed, and sentenced for crimes they did not commit, punished by amputations under Sharia law.
7. Avoid antagonizing the genocidists, who might walk out of the peace process. This real
politik argument is used to frighten diplomats who fear upsetting the peace process in Naivasha for the
south, or in Abuja for Darfur. In 2005 the argument has become: dont upset the fragile new order in
Khartoum since signature on the agreements settling the civil war in the South. Lets now concentrate
on getting the Darfur rebels to reach a similar agreement with Khartoum in Abuja, under the African
Union. Meanwhile the ethnic cleansing of Darfur is nearly complete, and genocidal massacres and
rapes continue daily. This argument, which diplomats repeatedly and naively espouse, ignores the fact

that genocidists are serial killers. Policies toward them based on fear lead only to appeasement and
further genocide.
8. Justify denial in favor of current economic interests. This is a key reason why Russia opposes an
arms embargo on the Sudanese government. It has just sold twelve MIG-29s to Khartoum, and
continues to be a major supplier of other arms. Besides being another arms supplier to Khartoum, China
is a primary developer of southern Sudans oilfields and imports Sudanese oil. China has threatened to
veto U.N. sanctions.
9. Claim that the victims are receiving good treatment, while baldly denying the charges of genocide
outright. The Sudanese government claims that the internally displaced are receiving excellent
treatment in IDP camps, and will be even better off when they are moved to safe areas under
complete Sudanese government control. The Sudanese show visitors the same model IDP camp, just
as the Nazis showed the ICRC Theresienstadt. When Kofi Annan tried to visit another site, the
Sudanese quickly evacuated it, leaving him to ask, Where are the people? [2005: When Annan
interviewed rape survivors in Darfur, the Sudanese responded by arresting his interpreter the next day.
The government also arrested the director of Medcins sans Frontires, Sudan the same day for
publishing a well-documented report exposing widespread rapes by Sudanese soldiers and Janjaweed
in and around IDP camps.]
The Special Representative of the Secretary General, Jan Pronk, has recently signed a Sudanese
government proposal to create safe areas for the black Africans of Darfur, who will be guarded by the
Sudanese army. Never forget that the U.N. also agreed to a safe area plan in Bosnia. Srebenica was a
safe area where 8000 men were murdered in 1995 while Dutch soldiers stood by. Pronk was the Dutch
Development Cooperation Minister in 1995 and he resigned only after a government study of the
disaster seven years later. Now Pronk has recommended the same safe areas solution for Darfur.
What is wrong with this picture?
10. Claim that what is going on doesnt fit the definition of genocide. Definitionalist denial is most
common among lawyers and policy makers who want to avoid intervention beyond provision of
humanitarian aid. It results in analysis paralysis. It is what the State Department investigation and
report brilliantly overcame. At the time of writing (September 2004), the European Union, the Secretary
General of the United Nations and even Amnesty International still avoid calling the crimes in Darfur by
their proper name. It is a pity. There are three reasons for such reluctance:
A. Among journalists, the general public, diplomats, and lawyers who havent read the Genocide
Convention, there is a common misconception that a finding of genocide would legally require action to
suppress it. Under this misconception, having been informed that the U.S. would take no action in
Rwanda in 1994, State Department lawyers ordered avoidance of the word. They made their legal
conclusion fit the Procrustean bed of U.S. policy. They committed legal malpractice.
Unfortunately, the Genocide Convention carries no such legal compulsion to act. It legally requires only
that states-parties pass national laws against genocide and then prosecute or extradite those who
commit the crime. Article VIII of the Convention says they also may call upon the competent organs of
the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider
appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide. But they arent legally required to
do so. Article I of the Genocide Convention creates a moral obligation to prevent genocide, but it does
not dictate military intervention or any other particular measures.
B. Another misconception is the all or none concept of genocide. The all-or-none school considers
killings to be genocide only if their intent is to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group in
whole. Their model is the Holocaust. They ignore the in part in the definition in the Genocide

Convention, which they often havent read.


C. Since the 1990s, a new obstacle to calling genocide by its proper name has been the distinction
between genocide and ethnic cleansing, a term originally invented as a euphemism for genocide in the
Balkans. Genocide and ethnic cleansing are sometimes portrayed as mutually exclusive crimes, but
they are not. Prof. Schabas, for example, says that the intent of ethnic cleansing is expulsion of a
group, whereas the intent of genocide is its destruction, in whole or in part. He illustrates with a
simplistic distinction: in ethnic cleansing, borders are left open and a group is driven out; in genocide,
borders are closed and a group is killed. The fallacy of the distinction is evident in Darfur, where the
intent of the Sudanese government and their Janjaweed militias is to drive Fur, Massaleit, and Zaghawa
black African farmers off of their ancestral lands (ethnic cleansing,) using terror caused by systematic
acts of genocide, including mass murder, mass rape, mass starvation, and concentration camps run by
Janjaweed and Sudanese army guards, where murder and rape are standing orders. Both ethnic
cleansing and genocide are underway in Darfur.
D. Claim that the intent of the perpetrator is merely ethnic cleansing not genocide, which requires
the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. The U.N.
Commission of Experts report of 2005 took this way out. It confused motive with intent. (Ironically, the
U.N. Commission report even included a paragraph saying motive and intent should not be confused,
an exhortation the Commission promptly violated, itself.) Even if the motive of a perpetrator is to drive a
group off its land (ethnic cleansing), killing members of the group and other acts enumerated in the
Genocide Convention may still have the specific intent to destroy the group, in whole or in part. Thats
genocide.
11. Blame the victims. Claim that the Sudanese government is simply fighting an insurrection by a
rebel movement comprised of bandits who themselves commit war crimes. By portraying the situation
as civil war rather than genocide, the Sudanese appeal to the common misunderstanding that the two
are mutually exclusive, when in fact, as Robert Melson, Barbara Harff, Helen Fein, and others have
shown, civil war is very often a predictor and correlate of genocide. Genocide occurs especially during
civil wars because war is legalized killing, when even women and children of an adversary group may
be seen as enemies of the state.
12. Say that peace and reconciliation are more important that blaming people for genocide,
especially if the genocide happened in the past. This is the justification for amnesties for mass
murderers as part of peace agreements, and for opposition to post-conflict tribunals. But peace and
reconciliation are not alternatives to justice. Lasting peace requires justice. Without prosecution of those
who commit genocide, an expectation of impunity is created. As Fein and Harff have shown, one of the
best predictors of future genocide is previous genocide that has gone unpunished. Without trials, denial
becomes permanent.
A brutal civil war is underway in Darfur, and the ceasefire and settlement being negotiated in Abuja
might save lives. But the talks could take years. Meanwhile there will be peace in Darfur only with a
powerful African Union force, supported logistically and financially by the West, to enforce it, much as
NATO has enforced the peace in Bosnia. If the African Union force cannot stop the genocide, the U.N.,
NATO, European Union, and their member nations should send in troops under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter.

Genocide Watch is the Coordinator of the International Alliance to End Genocide


P.O. Box 809, Washington, D.C. 20044 USA. Phone: 1-202-643-1405
E-mail:communications@genocidewatch.org

Genocides, Politicides, and Other Mass Murder Since


1945
Those countries at Stage 7 are currently at the mass killing stage. They are highlighted in bold type.
They have
active genocides, recurring genocidal massacres, or ongoing politicides. They are erupting. The others
are at various
stages of dormancy (4 through 6,) but could erupt again.
Note that lower stages continue during higher stages the stages are not linear, but are simultaneous
operations, in which lower stages are logically necessary for "higher" stages, but continue during the
"higher" stages.
The table is organized by region. Within a region, countries are listed in order of their potential for mass
killing, by stages. Not all politicides since 1945 appear on this chart because some countries where
politicide has occurred have become democracies (e.g. East Germany, Poland, Romania, Mongolia)
and are not now at stage 4 or above.
Please click here to view the chart: Word.doc
2010 Genocide Watch

GENOCIDES AND POLITICIDES SINCE 1945


GENAFRICAAFRICAOCIDE

NATION

YEARS OF
EPISODES
SINCE 1945

CUMULATIVE
CIVILIAN
DEATH TOLL

GROUP AFFECTED

MAJOR KILLERS

2,000,000

Nuer, Dinka, Christians,


Nuba, southerners

Khartoum Government, NIF


Government, Militias, Rebels

250,000+

Zaghawa, Fur, Massaleit,


and Black Africans

Janjaweed Arab Militias, Sudan


Government

1956 1972
Sudan South,
Nuba Region
1983 2005

Sudan - Darfur

2001 - present

1945 1960

1,000s

Africans

Colonial Forces

1960 1965

1,000s

Civil War

Rebels, army

1,000s

Civil War

Rebels, army

80,000

Hutus, Banyamulenge,

2 million

(civil war)

1994 present

40,000

Hema,Lendu

Ethnic militias

1997 present

1 million

(civil war)

War-lord led militias, DRC army

1994-present

500,000+

Women (mass rape)

Rwandan interhamwe militias,


Congolese militias, army

1988 present

100,000

Somalis, Isaaq clan

Warlord/clan militias

2006 - present

40,000

Islamists, govt supporters

Ethiopian army; Al-Shabaab


Terrorists

1945 1974

150,000

Oromo, Eritreans, Somali

Selassie Monarchy

1977 1979

1984
Democratic
Republic of the
Congo

1994 1997

Kabila/ Rwandan army, Ugandan,


Rwandan armies, rebels,
DRCongo, allied armies

Somalia

Ethiopia

1974 1985

750,000

Class enemies, Oromo

Derg Communists

1994 2000

125,000

Eritrea war

Army (Ethiopian Defence Forces)

2001 present

25,000+

Ethnic minorities

Army (EDF)

Oromo

Army (EDF)

1,500

Anuak in Gambella

Army (EDF)

20,000

Ogadeni (Somalis)

Army (EDF)

1958 1984

1000s

Political enemies

Toure Marxist Government

1984--2008

1000s

Political enemies

Conte Military

2000 2003

1000s

Guinean civilians

Charles Taylor Forces

2008 present

100s

Political enemies

Military

28 Sept 2009

160+

Democratic opposition

Military

50,000

Bubi, Nguema foes

Macias Nguema Regime,


Successor

1,000s

2001 - present

Guinea

1975 1979
Equatorial Guinea
2001 - present

Uganda

1972 1979

300,000

Acholi, Lango, Karamoja

Amin govt army, police

1980 1986

250,000

Baganda,, Banyarwanda

Obote govt army, police

1994 present

10,000s

LRA foes

Lords Resistance Army

1965 1996

10,000s

Southern Saras, civil war

Government Army, Libyan Army,


Rebels

2005 -- present

1000s

Zaghawas, Fur

Sudan-Backed Militias

1952 1960

1,500

Kikuyu, 100s colonials

Colonila Forces, MauMau


Kikuyu

1991 1993

1,000s

Nilotics

Ethnic Militias

2007- 2008

1300+

Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, other


ethnic groups

Ethnic Youth Gangs

1982 84

20,000

Matabele

Government Army 5th Brigade,


Milithias

1998 present

1,000+

MDC supporters, Matabele,


urban poor, white farmers

Government Police, Army,


ZANU-PF Militias

Chad

Kenya

Zimbabwe

2000 - 2007

3,000+

Dioulas,Immigrants from
Burkina Faso, Mali

Government, Bete & Other


Militias, Death Squads

2000 - 2007

1,000+

Southerners

Northern Rebels

570,000

Eritreans (independence war


with Ethiopia)

Cte dIvoire

1961 1991
Eritrea

Ethiopian Armies, Police


125,000
1998 -- 2000

Border war with Ethiopia

1959 1962

50,000

Hutus

Tutsi Government

1972

150,000

Hutus

Tutsi Army

1988

25,000

Hutus

Tutsi Army

50,000

Tutsis

Hutu Rebels

100,000

Hutus

Tutsi Army

1996 2006

100,000

Tutsi, Hutu

Rebels, Army

2004 present

1000s

Eyadema opponents

Government Police, Army

Burundi

1993 1995

Togo

Nigeria

1966 1970

1,000,000

Ibos

Nigerian Army

1972 2000
(sporadic)

1000s

Tiv, Hausa, Yoruba, Ogoni,


Others

Ethnic Mobs

2001-present

500+

Niger delta groups

Nigerian Army

1954 1963

160,000

OAS, Harkis, settlers

French Legions, OAS, Rebels

1991 -- 2005

200,000

Govt officials, Berbers

Islamic Armed Group (GIA)

1991 2003

200,000

Sierra Leone civilians

Revolutionary United Front,


Other Militias

1959 1963,
1993

10,000s

Tutsi

Hutu Government

1994

800,000

Tutsi

Hutu Power Government,


Interhamwe

1995 present

1,000s

Hutus

Rwandan Government

1959 1968

5,000

Govt foes

Government Army, Police, Rebels

Algeria

Sierra Leone

Rwanda

Congo-Brazzaville

1997 2000

1,000s

Political militias

Govt Army, Rebels, Angola

1961 -- 1962

40,000

Kongo

Colonial Army

1975 2003

500,000

Umbundu, Ovimbundu

Government, UNITA Armies,


Allies

2,000

Bokassa foes

Government Army, Police

Angola

1966 1979
Central African
Republic
2001

Liberia

1990 2003

200,000

Krahn, Gio, Mano, etc.

Doe Government Army, Taylor


Rebels, Government, Rebels

Botswana

1990 present

100s

Kng Bushmen, Caprivi


Namibians

Government Police

Senegal
Casamance

1990 2001

1,000

Diola (civil war)

Senegalese Army, Rebels

Guinea Bissau

1960s
present

1,000s

Opponents of govt

Army

Morocco- Western
Sahara

1976 present

1,000s

Sahrawis

Moroccan Army, Polisario Rebels

Mali

1990 1993

1,000

Touaregs

Malian Army, Touareg Rebels

Mozambique

1975 1994

1,000,000

MPLA, Renamo

Renamo, MPLA

Madagascar

1947 1948

50,000

Malagasy Nationalists

French Colonial Forces

1987 1996

1,000s

Zulus, Xhosa, ANC

Government Police, Ethnic


Militias

1994 present

3,000

Boer farmers

Hate Crimes

Sporadic

100s

Copts

Muslim Fundamentalists

South Africa

Egypt

Articles on Genocide and Genocide Prevention


"NC Researchers proposes health-based approach to identify groups at high risk of genocide" by NewsMedical.Net
"Genocide: It seems like a handy word," by the Economist
"Many genocides to be commemorated on Holocaust Memorial Day" by Trevor Grundy, Religion News
Service
"Justice for genocide should have no expiry date" by Prof. Colin Tatz
"Engaging religion in the prevention of genocide" by Christopher Tuckwood
"Prosecuting Aggression" by Richard Goldstone and David Kaye, The New York Times
"The Power of Lists During Genocide" by Kate Shellnutt, Houston Chronicle
"Can we prevent genocide by preventing incitement?" by Elihu D. Richter MD MPH, Yael Stein MD, Alex
Barnea MA, and Marc Sherman MLS, Genocide Prevention Now
"Rwandan Genocide: Why Early Warning Failed," by Dr. Gregory Stanton
"What does 'intent to destroy' in genocide mean?" by Kai Ambos
"Ending our age of Suffering: A Plan to Stop Genocide," by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen
"How to Prevent a Mass Atrocity" by Michael C. Pryce
"Preventing Genocide" by Politorbis
"Mass Atrocity Response Operations: An Annotated Planning Framework" by Michael C. Pryce
"Assessing country risks of genocide and politicide in 2009," by Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr
"Peoples Under Threat 2009," by Mark Lattimer, Minority Rights Group International
"Do the Right Thing," by Sarah Sewall, Boston Review
"Documenting Brutalities to Change the World," by Fatima Hassan, The New York Times
"UN debate on genocide asks: protect or intervene?," by John Heilprin
"'War on terror' used to target minorities-report," by Natasha Elkington, Reuters
"Beyond Genocide: An Ounce of Prevention," by Amy Fagin
"Never Again, For Real," by Madeleine K. Albright and William S. Cohen, The New York Times
"A Policy for Preventing Genocide," by The New York Times
"Christiane Amanpour Reveals Stories of Those Who Tried to Stop Genocide," by CNN Press Release

"After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction & Reconciliation in Rwanda and
Beyond by Phil Clark and Zachary D. Kaufman," a book review
"Redefining Genocide Education," by Ellen J. Kennedy, Ph.D., Interim Director, Center for Holocaust
and Genocide Studies, University of Minnesota
"Violations of human rights: health practitioners as witnesses," by James Orbinski, Chris Beyrer, Sonal
Singh
"What We're Facing is 'Genocidal Terror,'" by Dan Izenberg
"The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes," Speech by Gareth Evans
"Assesssing Risks of Genocide and Politicide," by Barbara Harff
"International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides," by Matthew Krain
"Bamboozling the US Public About the International Criminal Court," by Benjamin Ferencz
"The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty," by Gareth
Evans, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
"The World Was Silent," by Sara Cohan
"A Kurdish View for Peace," by Asad Gozeh
"Belfast School Mural of the Eight Stages of Genocide" by Fiona Mcllwaine Biggins
"Redefining Genocide," by Kok-Thay Eng
"Iraq, A Case Study on the Roots of Genocide," National Public Radio, USA, 18 February 2004
Genocide Watch is the Coordinator of the International Alliance to End Genocide
P.O. Box 809, Washington, D.C. 20044 USA. Phone: 1-202-643-1405
E-mail:communications@genocidewatch.org

Potrebbero piacerti anche