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fallacies pervading existing Marxist tradition and thus that his theoretical system was
motivated by a grand objective of overcoming them through an antiessentialist
framework, which was represented by the theory of overdetermination. In this sense,
Resnick and Wolff maintain that their antiessentialist theory is substantially informed
by Althusser. On the other hand, they point out that the old legacy of essentialist
elements are not entirely absent in Althusser, which makes his theoretical system
subject to inconsistency. On this basis, they readily admit that their antiessentialist
project is basically an extension or a completion of Althusser, bringing him further
into the areas where he failed to pursue his antiessentialism.
In order to have a more concrete picture of how Resnick and Wolff understand
Althusser, I quote in the following those passages where they comment on his alleged
inconsistency.2
[Q1] His contribution has been to show that the usual epistemological
aspects of economic determinist positions, their empiricist or rationalist
aspects, render them outside Marxian theory, as do the parallel epistemological bases of the more or less anti-economic-determinist tendencies
within the traditional debate. However, freed of these epistemological
aspects, a kind of economic determinist argument still survives, although
just barely, in Althussers formulation of Marxian theory. The clearest
statement of this argument emerges in his conception of the overdetermined social totality as a structure of instances or aspects articulated in
dominance. (93; emphasis added)
[Q2] Apparently, Althusser cannot take that last step in extricating Marxian
theory from that debate, cannot see a way finally to let go of the ontological
sort of primacy and privilege accorded the economic in and for Marxian
theory. So he both affirms that Marxian theory cannot and does not capture
any economic or other essence of the concrete-real and yet also affirms that
for Marxian theory the social totality is approached as a structure of
instances articulated by the ultimate determinance of the economic. (93;
emphasis added)
[Q3] [D]espite the rejection of all forms of essentialism required by his
overdeterminist position, apparent concessions to economic determinism
appear often in Althussers works. His essays return repeatedly to the thorny
issue of economic determinism in the last instance, which he seems to
endorse as a feature of specifically Marxian theory. Yet in his 1962 essay
Contradiction and Overdetermination, his strong position on the antiessentialism of Marxian theory leads him to the following remarkable
statement: From the first moment to the last, the lonely hour of the last
instance never comes. Here Althusser comes close to accompanying the
epistemology basis of his rejection of the economic determinism debate
with a direct dismissal of economic determinism. Yet his 1974 essay Is it
Easy to Be a Marxist in Philosophy? despite his demonstration of the
polemical purpose of Marxs statements, comes close to a reading that
2. They are numbered for later use in the last section.
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affirms substantive commitment to last instance economic determinism.
(92 3)
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For Marx
As is well known, Althussers lifelong project was to establish a Marxist philosophy
that radically departed from preexisting ones. The main question he posed concerned
the specificity of Marxist dialectics in contrast to Hegelian dialectics; his answer was,
in essence, the formers complex character. Two chapters from For Marx directly deal
with this issue. In chapter three, Contradiction and Overdetermination, Althusser
compares the Marxist concept of contradiction with the Hegelian concept and
strenuously demonstrates that the former is characterized by its complexity while the
latter is simple. On the other hand, in chapter six, On Materialist Dialectic, the
concrete meaning of the complexity of Marxist theory is elaborated in detail;
notice, moreover, that for this he relies on Maos theory of contradiction. The
concept of overdetermination emerges in this very context: Althusser throughout
these two chapters strenuously demonstrates Marxist contradiction as
overdetermined contradiction in contrast to Hegelian simple contradiction. Hence,
key to Althussers overdetermination is capturing the full meaning of complex, key
to which, in turn, is his discussion of Maos theory of contradiction. As can be seen,
Maos theory is a building block of Althussers investigation into Marxist dialectic. So
let us first examine chapter six and then chapter three.
On Materialist Dialectic
In the chapter On Materialist Dialectic, Althusser thoroughly examines Maos
theory of contradiction as a way to answer the question of the specificity of Marxs
dialectic. The crucial elements in Maos theory of contradiction, according to
Althusser, are the distinction between principal and secondary contradictions, the
distinction between principal and secondary aspects of each contradiction, and the
uneven development of contradiction. Althusser ([1965] 1969, 194) notes that,
These concepts are presented to us as if thats how it is. We are told that they are
essential to the Marxist dialectic, since they are what is specific about it, and he
continues, It is up to us to seek out the deeper theoretical reasons behind these
claims. Althussers subsequent undertaking of this task in On Materialist Dialectic
can be summed up as highlighting four essential aspects of Maos theory of
contradiction: plurality with difference, relativity (or unfixedness), mutual conditioning, and structure.6 The specificity of Marxist dialectic, as understood by
Althusser, comes into light as he elaborates on these four aspects.
(1) Plurality with difference: Althusser makes an insightful comment that the
principal/secondary contradiction distinction necessarily presupposes the existence
of many contradictions since no distinction whatsoever would be possible in case of
the existence of only one contradiction (194). In the sense that contradiction is
plural, not singular, it is complex.7 Hegels totality as well appears to have many
6. This categorization is mine.
7. Althusser quotes Mao ([1965] 1969, 194): A simple process contains only a single pair of
opposites, while a complex process contains more.
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which are the secondary contradictions, it necessarily follows that the secondary
contradictions also are essential to the existence of the principal contradiction, that
they really constitute [the latters] condition of existence, just as the principal
contradiction constitutes their condition of existence. Althusser ([1965] 1969, 205)
suggests that, according to Marxs principle, the relation of the forces of production
vs. relations of production and of base vs. superstructure is not that of essence
vs. its pure phenomena, but rather of mutual conditioning.
(4) Structure: The mutual conditioning along with the unfixed character of the
principal/secondary relation appears to undermine the determinate character of the
principal/secondary distinction and eventually to nullify the hierarchy. Against this
false perception Althusser warns, the domination of one contradiction over the
others cannot, in Marxism, be the result of a contingent distribution of different
contradictions in a collection that is regarded as an object. And he goes on to say,
In this complex whole containing many contradictions we cannot find one
contradiction that dominates the others as we might find the spectator a head taller
than the others in the grandstand at the stadium (201; emphasis added).10 That is, in
Maos theory, the hierarchical difference of principal/secondary contradictions
further implies that the complex whole is characterized as structured as opposed
to contingent. Now we have the meaning of complexity further extended: it is
complex in that its hierarchy is a structured hierarchy and not an arbitrary, contingent
one. This is what Althusser implies with structure in dominance.11 So to speak, the
structure in dominance operates as some sort of anchor that guarantees a unity of the
complex totality even in the midst of mutual conditioning, an ever-changing role
among many different contradictions. It is exactly in this sense Althusser uses the
notion of determination in the last instance. In a word, without the structure in
dominance or determination in the last instance, the totality would be completely
chaotic, in which case it would be no totality at all from the outset*whether
Hegelian or Marxist*since totality is an organic system.12 So, for Althusser the
structure in dominance and determination in the last instance are the absolute
precondition for the complex whole (204).13
10. For another interesting quote, right after mentioning the unfixed character of principal/
secondary roles, Althusser ([1965] 1969, 209) warns: But we must add that, while no longer
univocal, it has not for all that become equivocal the product of the first-comer among
empirical pluralities, at the mercy of circumstances and chance, their pure reflection, as the
soul of some poet is merely that passing cloud. Quite the contrary, once it has ceased to be
univocal and hence determined once and for all, standing to attention in its role and essence, it
reveals itself as determined by the structured complexity that assigns it to its role, as*if you
will forgive me the astonishing expression*complexly-structurally-unevenly determined.
11. That one contradiction dominates the others presupposes that the complexity in which it
features is a structured unity, and that this structure implies the indicated dominationsubordination relations between the contradictions (Althusser [1965] 1969, 201).
12. As opposed to Hegelian totality with the center, the glossary of Reading Capital defines
Marxist totality as decentred structure in dominance (Althusser and Balibar [1965] 1970, 322).
13. Domination is not just an indifferent fact, it is a fact essential to the complexity itself.
That is why complexity implies domination as one of its essentials: it is inscribed in its structure
(Althusser [1965] 1969, 201).
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Let us first consider Reading Capital. As for the topics related to the theory of
overdetermination, Althusser in most cases reiterates the same arguments as
presented in For Marx or adds more sophistication.17 Particularly, the same strenuous
efforts are spent on stressing the specificity of Marxian dialectics as compared to
Hegelian dialectics. In this context, two points are noteworthy. First, hierarchical
relations of various realms constituting the complex whole are much more explicitly
emphasized in Reading Capital when compared to For Marx. In elaborating the
structured nature that distinguishes Marxist totality from Hegelian totality, Althusser
insists the structure of the whole is articulated as the structure of an organic
hierarchized whole (Althusser and Balibar [1965] 1970, 98). Here it is also suggested
that the hierarchy is not a static one but that the degree of effectivity among
different spheres ever changes. However, Althusser emphasizes that what guarantees
the unity of the complex totality as intelligible is the concept of determination in
the last instance. That is, determination in the last instance makes the structure
of the whole the structure in dominance, not the structure of contingency or the
arbitrary structure, which is the same argument we have already seen in For Marx.
Althusser argues that only this determination in the last instance makes it possible
to escape the arbitrary relativism of observable displacement by giving these
displacements the necessity of a function (99).
Second, Althusser criticizes the approach that views the relation between the
economic and the noneconomic as one of essence/phenomenon (111). This criticism
supports one of our findings in For Marx that treating the economic/noneconomic
relation as the principal/secondary relation is entirely different from treating it as an
essence/phenomenon relation. This point is reinforced in the definition of decentered structure and structure in dominance given in the glossary at the end of the
book. There it is explained that, as opposed to the Hegelian totality that
presupposes an original, primary essence that lies behind the complex appearance
that it has produced by externalization in history and which thus is a structure with
a centre, the Marxist totality has no centre, only a dominant element, and a
determination in the last instance and thus is a decentered structure (319). In
particular, this glossary strongly supports another crucial finding from For Marx about
the relation between the in the last instance phrase and the lonely hour phrase,
as follows: The phrase in the last instance does not indicate that there will be
some ultimate time or ever was some starting-point when the economy will be or was
solely determinant, the other instances preceding it or following it: the last instance
never comes (319).
Althussers elaborations in Reading Capital on the topics from For Marx show how
important the concept of determination in the last instance is in understanding his
theory of overdetermination. Another effective demonstration of its importance is
found in the chapter entitled Is It Simple to Be Marxist in Philosophy? in his Essays
in Self-Criticism. This chapter is one of Althussers later works. In it, he takes a
retrospective view of his early major works*especially For Marx and Reading
Capital*and makes comments on his achievements. He identifies three paths
17. See Althusser and Balibar (1965, 197, 58, 97, 98 9, 106, 111, etc.).
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through which to reach his early studies, and determination in the last instance is
one of them. So this chapter is a good source for us to verify whether the authors
view on the concept changed in his later years. And we observe Althusser ([1974]
1976, 177) consistently defending his original idea of determination in the last
instance against two opposite extremist misconceptions: one taking it for mechanistic materialism and the other for either idealism or relativism.
One new concept introduced in later works with relation to our concern is process
without a subject.18 It appears in the chapters Marxs Relation to Hegel in Politics
and History and Reply to Lewis in Essays in Self-Criticism. In the former, Althusser
explains that viewing history as a process without a subject is a positive heritage
Marx inherited from Hegel. Other than a thesis that the subject of process without a
subject is the process itself, not much noteworthy information is given in this text.
We rather find Althusser ([1964] 1972, 173) commenting on Reading Capital,
maintaining that one of three achievements he made in that work is A non-Hegelian
conception of the social structure (a structured whole in dominance). Obviously, this
is another support from the later Althusser for my reading of his overdetermination.
What Althusser means by process without a subject is further detailed in his
Reply to Lewis in Essays in Self-Criticism. We find the concept reflects exactly the
same idea contained in Althussers theory of overdetermination. As was the case with
his earlier works as demonstrated thus far, Althussers primary motivation with the
notion of process without a subject is to refute Hegelian simple dialectics.
Althussers own voice would most clearly convey the message:
In advancing the Thesis of a process without a Subject or Goal(s), I want
simply but clearly to say this. To be dialectical-materialist, Marxist
philosophy must break with the idealist category of the Subject as Origin,
Essence and Cause, responsible in its internality for all the determinations of
the external Object, of which it is said to be the internal Subject. For
Marxist philosophy there can be no Subject as an Absolute Centre, as a
Radical Origin, as a Unique Cause. ([1974] 1976, 96)
Collapsing determination of the economic in the last instance into unilateral
determination by the economic could lead one to interpret the above quotation as
supporting Resnick and Wolffs theory of overdetermination. However, a more
sensitive and nuanced distinction between the two determinations as suggested in
this paper would avoid such misinterpretation. We have observed several times that a
critique of Hegels search for origin, essence, or cause is perfectly compatible with
endorsing the concepts of determination in the last instance, structure in
dominance, or the primary/secondary contradiction distinction. Interestingly, a few
lines below the above-quoted passage where he explains that with the process
18. This concept particularly captures the attention since Resnick and Wolff make an argument
that it shows that Althusser in his later years changed his view from that presented in For Marx
and Reading Capital and that their overdetermination is informed by this concept. Their
argument to this effect was quoted above in Q4.
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without a subject he is refuting Hegelian dialectic, Althusser claims that the Marxist
alternative lies in the determination in the last instance (96).19
Conclusion
Let us list three major findings from the reading of Althussers works on his theory of
overdetermination:
F1: Althussers first demonstration of overdetermination is found already in
its most systematic and complete form in two chapters in For Marx. He was
fairly consistent on the theory in his major subsequent works, which
supplement and reinforce what had been said in For Marx. A new concept
introduced in his later works, process without a subject, also clearly reflects
Althussers original concept of overdetermination.
F2: Distinction between principal and secondary contradiction, structure in
dominance, and determination in the last instance*all of which are
informed by Maos theory of contradiction but are criticized by Resnick
and Wolff as essentialist and as thus what should be cast out of truly
antiessentialist Althusser*are in fact central elements of Althussers theory
of overdetermination.
F3: Determination by the economic in the last instance and the lonely
hour of the last instance never comes are two different ways to express the
same idea. The former is in contrast to unilateral determination by the
economic, not to the latter. This careful distinction between determination in the last instance and unilateral determination is crucial in
understanding Althussers critique of Hegelian essentialism.
Now we are ready to assess Resnick and Wolffs theory of overdetermination and their
comments from Q1 through Q5 on Althussers overdetermination in light of the
findings from F1 through F3. First, Resnick and Wolff attempt to reformulate
Althussers overdetermination to reject as essentialist any social theory that
privileges one sphere over the others to whatever degree is undermined by F2.
Second, based on their antiessentialist understanding of Althusser, they criticize his
inconsistency as in Q1 and Q2. These misdirected charges result from the fact that
Resnick and Wolff fail to distinguish between determination by the economic in the
last instance and unilateral determination by the economic as found in F3. For
them, the former is as essentialist as is the latter. Their understanding of Althussers
overdetermination is problematic in that it does not see his more nuanced critique of
Hegelian essentialism, which reduces everything into one essence. To Althussers
critique of Hegel, a particular type of causality of the determination in the last
19. In reality Marxist philosophy thinks in and according to quite different categories:
determination in the last instance*which is quite different from the Origin, Essence or Cause
(Althusser [1974] 1976, 96).
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instance is central. Third, as in Q3, Resnick and Wolff charge Althusser with
inconsistency between the last instance and the lonely hour phrases. This
charge contradicts F3. Fourth, Resnick and Wolff in Q4 argue that Althussers concept
of process without a subject is similar to their antiessentialist overdetermination.
However, my investigation shows that the concept faithfully reflects Althussers
overdetermination as noted in F1. Fifth, Q5 reveals Resnick and Wolffs flat rejection
of Maos theory of principal/secondary contradiction as contradicting their antiessentialist overdetermination. F2 effectively shows that the latter fundamentally
departs from Althussers overdetermination, which is based on Maos distinction
between principal and secondary.
Overall, Q1 through Q5 indicate that Resnick and Wolff treat Althussers
essentialist moments as unfortunate problems caused by inconsistency and an
inability to free himself from the remnants of the old legacy. This is an unfair
treatment that does not grasp Althussers theory in its own right. I am not claiming
that in Althusser there is no element of inconsistency or that everything is perfectly
clear throughout his whole works. What I intend to show through an examination of
the development of Althussers theory of overdetermination is that he was too serious
and consistent with the notion of principal/secondary distinction, determination in
the last instance, and structure in dominance to be charged with being inconsistent
and to be reformulated in line with Resnick and Wolffs interpretation of overdetermination.
These observations finally point us toward the ultimate question posed in the
beginning of the paper: i.e., how to understand the relation between Althussers
original theory of overdetermination and Resnick and Wolffs reformulation of it. My
comparative demonstration indicates that Resnick and Wolffs theory of overdetermination is more of a departure from, rather than a completion of, Althussers
concept. What they call antiessentialist moments in Althusser which need to be
extended into those unfortunately essentialist ones actually do not exist in the first
place. These findings raise the question in what sense Resnick and Wolffs theory of
overdetermination is Althusserian when it is different from Althussers original
theory in fundamental aspects.
References
Althusser, L. (1964) 1972. Politics and history: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hegel and
Marx. 2d ed. Trans. B. Brewster. London: New Left Books.
***. (1965) 1969. For Marx. Trans. B. Brewster. Harmondsworth: The Penguin Press.
***. (1974) 1976. Essays in self-criticism. Trans. G. Lock. London: New Left Books.
. Balibar. (1965) 1970. Reading Capital. Trans. B. Brewster.
Althusser, L., and E
London: New Left Books.
Mao, T. 1967. On contradiction. In Selected works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1. Peking:
Foreign Language Press.
Resnick, S., and R. Wolff. 1987. Knowledge and class: A Marxian critique of political
economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.