Case Digest

1-18
Wilson v. Girard, 354 US 524 (1957)
Facts:
Girard, a United States Army Specialist, is participating in a military exercise with his unit
in Japan when he fired an expended cartridge case to a Japanese civilian woman causing for
her death.
A security treaty between Japan and the United States authorized the making of
administrative agreements between the two governments concerning the disposition of the latter
in Japan. Such an agreement provided that the United States might waive its jurisdiction over
offenses committed in Japan by members of its armed forces. Subsequently, a Protocol
Agreement was signed by the two governments, pursuant to the NATO agreement. Agreement
authorized that in criminal cases where the right to jurisdiction is concurrent, the military
authorities of the United States would have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over the
members of their armed forces for offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the
performance of official duty.
United States maintained that he was on his official duty when the incident happened,
thus, they had the primary jurisdiction to try him. On the other hand, Japanese authorities
insisted the opposite.
After lengthy negotiations, the United States yielded to the Japanese position. Japan
then indicted him. Girard sought a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of Columbia that
was denied, but granted declaratory relief and enjoined his delivery to Japanese authorities.
Issue:
Does a sovereign nation have exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws
committed within its borders?
Held:
The Supreme Court decided that a sovereign nation always has exclusive jurisdiction to
prosecute crimes in its territory, unless it consents to prosecution by some other authority.
The Supreme Court then cited Japan's consent to U.S. jurisdiction in this case that the
U.S. could waive its jurisdiction, laid in the U.S.-Japan SOFA. The Supreme Court further stated
that it saw no constitutional problems with such a diplomatic agreement, and that therefore the
wisdom of such agreements are completely depends on the realm of the political branches of
the government. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's denial of habeas corpus, and
reversed the injunction.

Blackmer v. United States United States Supreme Court

284 U.S. 421 (1932)
Facts:
Harry Blackmer, a United States citizen residing at Paris, France, was served upon
subpoenas in France requiring him to appear as a witness on behalf of the United States at a
criminal trial in that court. However, he failed to respond to said subpoenas. Two separate
contempts were initiated against Blackmer for his failure to respond to the subpoenas and was
fined. Blackmer appealed under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, claiming the
federal statute unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not there is due process in the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in personam?
Held:
The Supreme Court decided that there is due process in the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction in personam.
Due process requires appropriate notice of the judicial action and an opportunity to be
heard. On this case, the Supreme Court said that proceeding to punish for contempt of court did
not require petitioner's presence in order to satisfy due process, since there had been suitable
notice and an opportunity to be heard on the contempt charges.
A citizen of the United States residing in a foreign country continues to owe allegiance to
the United States and is bound by its laws made applicable to his situation.
The power to require the return of absent citizens in the public interest is inherent in
sovereignty, and what in England was the sovereign prerogative in this respect pertains, under
our constitutional system, to the national authority, exercisable by Congress, to prescribe the
duties of the citizens of the United States.
One of the duties of such absent citizens to the United States is that of attending its
courts to give testimony when properly summoned, and Congress may provide for the
performance of this duty and prescribe penalties for disobedience. Hence, the court affirmed the
judgment and fine of the circuit court.

Wildenhus' Case 120 U.S. 1 (1887)

Facts:
Wildenhus a Belgian sailor aboard Belgian steamship anchored in the port of Jersey
City, New Jerse, had killed fellow crewmember Fijens on or about sixth day of October 1886.
Local police authorities learned about the incident and arrested Wildenhus. He has been taken
to the common jail of the County of Hudson on a charge under the law of New Jersey.
Belgian consul sought for a writ of habeas corpus in view of Article 11 of the Convention
Concerning the Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of Consular Officers between the United
States and Belgium. This Convention conferred Belgian consuls an exclusive jurisdiction over
the internal matters affecting that States vessels, whether the vessel is located within a foreign
States territory. However, when a matter is of such a nature as to disturb the tranquility or the
peace of the local State, its authorities may interfere over the matter without interference from
the home State.
The circuit court denied the application of the consul for the writ of habeas corpus, and
remanded Wildenhus to the custody of the local authority.
Issue:
Whether or not the local authority of New Jersey has the rightful jurisdiction cognizance
of the incident?
Held:
The Supreme Court decided that the local authority of New Jersey has the exclusive
jurisdiction of the incident.
The Supreme Court affirmed that it is not alone the publicity of the act which attends it
that fixes the nature of the crime, but the act itself. If that is of a character to awaken public
interest when it becomes known, it is a "disorder," the nature of which is to affect the community
at large, and consequently to invoke the power of the local government whose people have
been disturbed by what was done. The very nature of such an act is to disturb the quiet of a
peaceful community and to create, in the language of the treaty, a "disorder" which will "disturb
tranquility and public order on shore or in the port."
The felonious homicide was a subject for the local jurisdiction, and the consul had no
right to interfere to prevent the proper local authorities from proceeding with the case in a
regular way.
Hence, the Supreme Court upheld the verdict of the circuit court and affirms the denial of
the petition for the writ of habeas corpus.

Chris SALE, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, et al.,

Petitioners v. HAITIAN CENTERS COUNCIL, INC., et al.
Facts:
Executive Order No. 12807 signed in 2002 required the Coast Guard to force the return
of all vessels illegally traveling by transporting passengers from Haiti to the United States
whether they may qualify as refugees.
Originally, the United States and the Haitian government made an agreement in 1981 to
stop all vessels coming to the United States and return any undocumented aliens who were not
refugees and would not be harmed upon return.
On November 18, 1991, the Coast Guard announced that the prohibition would resume
after several weeks of suspension. The following day, the Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., filed a
complaint in the United States District Court alleging that the order violated section 243(h) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees which protect individuals escaping potential prosecution from forced
repatriation. The District Court denied the councils moan, but the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not the EO violates 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and
Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees?
Held:
The Supreme Court held that neither 243(h) nor Article 33 limits the President's power to
order the Coast Guard to repatriate undocumented aliens intercepted on the high seas.
The District Court denied the application because it concluded that 243(h) is unavailable
as a source of relief for Haitian aliens in international waters, and that such a statutory provision
was necessary because the Protocol's provisions are not "self-executing." In addition, the
Supreme Court observed that Acts of Congress do not generally have application outside of
United States territory, unless explicitly noted. And, it found that both section 243(h) and Article
33 are silent regarding extraterritorial application. In fact, the language of both suggests that
only individuals who have already arrived on United States soil are protected, and their use
throughout history confirms this interpretation. Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the District
Court decision and hereby reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

DENNYS RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

Facts:
Officer Struble, a K9 officer, stopped petitioner Rodriguez for driving on a highway
shoulder, a violation of Nebraska law. After Struble issuing a warning for the traffic offense, he
asked Rodriguez for permission to walk his dog around the vehicle. Rodriguez refused but
Struble detained him until a second officer arrived. Struble then retrieved his dog, who alerted to
the presence of drugs in the vehicle. The ensuing search revealed methamphetamine. Seven or
eight minutes elapsed from the time Struble issued the written warning until the dog alerted.
Rodriguez was charged with federal drug complaint. He moved to suppress the evidence
seized from the vehicle arguing that that an officer may not extend an already completed traffic
stop to conduct a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion. The motion was denied by the
district court. He found no reasonable suspicion supporting detention once Struble issued the
written warning. He appealed in Eighth Circuit to review the denial of his motion to suppress.
The District Court then denied the motion to suppress. The Eighth Circuit upheld the district
courts judgment. Noting that the seven or eight minute delay was an acceptable de minimis and
reasonable in order to ensure officer safety.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of a K-9 unit, after the end of a traffic stop and without
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, a violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on
unreasonable search and seizures?
Held:
The Supreme Court decided in favor of the petitioner affirming that absent reasonable
suspicion, police extension of a traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff violates the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitutions shield against unreasonable searches and seizures. Moreover,
the Supreme Court affirmed that the purpose of the stop determines its allowable duration, the
authority for the stop ends when it has been accomplished. The Supreme Court held that a
seizure unrelated to the reason for the stop is lawful only so long as it does not measurably
extend the stops duration. Although the use of a K-9 unit may cause only a short extension of
the stop, it is not reasonably connected to that mission of an ordinary traffic stop and is
therefore unlawful.

UNITED STATES v. PIZZARUSSO

Facts:
On June13, 1936, Turner W. Battle, Assistant to the Secretary of Labor, issued
deportation order against Paolo Silverestri violating the immigration laws.
On April 2, 1937, the alien Paolo Silverestri, and the defendant Adelaide Pizzarusso,
became surety bound to the USA amounting to $500.00 conditioned that the alien shall appear
before the District Court for the charges against him. On April 2,1937, a Writ of Habeas Corpus
was issued for the US Marshal for the District of Connecticut to bring the alien before the Court
on May 4. On December 13, 1937, a Stipulation was entered that the writ may be dismissed if
the petitioner intends to leave the United States voluntarily.
Said Writ was ordered withdrawn on December 13, 1937 and said Stipulation and Order
were entered on December 14, 1937.
On April 6, 1938 an Order to Show Cause directed the defendant to produce the alien on
April 14, 1938, and make known the reason for his failure to depart from this country; or to
furnish adequate proof that the alien had been departed already, otherwise the bond filed with
the Court declared forfeited. On May 31, 1938 court before declared breached for failure of the
defendant to prove that the alien had departed from the country as agreed. The defendant has
never paid the amount of said recognizance, or any part thereof, although demand has
frequently been made upon her. Plaintiff claims for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the the defendant is guilty of breach of recognizance, on which she was
the surety that the principal should appear in the proceedings?
Held:
The Supreme Court held that amended complaint be dismissed and the defendant is not
guilty on the above stated charge.
The Supreme Court asserted that the court may grant a writ of habeas corpus and
discharge an alien ordered deported if the Secretary of Labor exceeds his powers in depriving
the alien of his liberty. Even though there is no power in this Court to order bail pending the
hearing on the writ of habeas corpus, such bond having been given, if the terms thereof were
not complied with, there would be liability on the part of the surety. However, in this case, it
appears that there was no violation of the terms of the bond.

United States v. Alvarez-Machain

Facts:
Respondent Alvarez-Machain was abducted and brought to trial by the agents of Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) for his alleged participation in the kidnapping and murder of
a DEA agent. In the subsequent criminal proceedings, Alvarez-Machain argued that the seizure
of him violated the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. The court
dismissed the case and ordered the United States to return Alvarez-Machain to Mexico. The
Court of Appeals affirmed. In a brief per curiam opinion, the Circuit Court affirmed the lower
court's decision. Based on one of its prior decisions, the court found that, since the United
States had authorized the abduction and since the Mexican government had protested the
Treaty violation, jurisdiction was improper.
Issue:
Whether or not a criminal defendant, abducted to the United States from a nation with
which it has an extradition treaty, thereby acquires a defense to the jurisdiction of this country's
courts?
Held:
The Supreme Court held that that he does not, and that it does not preclude his criminal
charges and be tried in federal district court for violations of the criminal law of the United
States.
It has long been the rule that abduction does not invalidate a prosecution against a
foreign national. The only question, therefore, is whether the abduction violates any extradition
treaty that may be in effect between the United States and the nation in which the abductee was
to be found. The Supreme Court, citing United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, added that the
defendant may not be prosecuted in violation of the terms of an extradition treaty. However,
when a treaty has not been invoked, a court may properly exercise jurisdiction even though the
defendant's presence is procured by means of a forcible abduction (Ker v.Illinois, 119 U.S. 436).
Thus, if the Extradition Treaty does not prohibit respondent's abduction, the rule of Ker applies
and jurisdiction was proper. Moreover, the Supreme Court concluded that since the extradition
treaty does not prohibit abduction such as occurred here, it was not illegal.

Government of USA vs Purganan

G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002
Facts:
On May 18, 2001, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine DOJ, filed the appropriate Petition for Extradition with the RTC. The Petition alleged
that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant
be set for hearing.
On June 5, 2001 hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure
adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, which the court required, he submitted his
Memorandum with the alternative prayer that he be allowed to post bail in the amount of
P100,000.
The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the
required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.
Issue:
Whether or not he is entitled to bail in the extradition proceedings?
Held:
The Supreme Court decided that extradition cases are different from ordinary criminal
proceedings.
The Article III, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts
do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.It follows that
the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.

Government of Hongkong vs Olalia

Facts:
Respondent Muoz was charged of 3 counts of offences of accepting an advantage as
agent, and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, punishable by the common law of Hongkong.
The Hongkong Department of Justice requested DOJ for the provisional arrest of respondent
Muoz; the DOJ forward the request to the NBI then to RTC. On the same day, NBI agents
arrested him.
Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction and writ of habeas corpus questioning the
validity of the order of arrest. The CA declared the arrest void. Hence this petition by the
Hongkong Department of Justice thru DOJ.
DOJ filed a petition for certiorari in this Court and sustained the validity of the arrest.
Hongkong Administrative Region then filed in the RTC petition for extradition and arrest of
respondent. Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed by the petitioner,
initially the RTC denied the petition holding that there is no Philippine Law granting bail in
extradition cases and that private responded is a flight risk. Bail, Section 1, Rule 114, Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure - is the surety for the release of a person in custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required
under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety,
property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
Motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent, which was granted. Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not right to bail can be avail in extradition cases.
Ruling:
In Purganan case, the right to bail was not included in the extradition cases, since it is
available only in criminal proceedings. However the Supreme Court, recognised the following
trends in International Law: (1) The growing importance of the individual person in publican
international law who, in the 20th century attained global recognition, (2) The higher value now
being given in human rights in international sphere, (3) The corresponding duty of countries to
observe these human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations, (4) The of duty of this court to
balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on
extradition on the other.
In the case at bar, the record show that the respondent, Muoz has been detained for 2
years without being convicted in Hongkong. The Philippines has the obligation of ensuring the
individual his right to liberty and due process and should not therefor deprive the extraditee of
his right to bail PROVIDED that certain standards for the grant is satisfactorily met. In other
words there should be CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
However, the respondent was not able to show and clear and convincing evidence that
he be entitled to bail. Thus the case is remanded in the court for the determination and
otherwise, should order the cancellation of his bond and his immediate detention.

Secretary of Justice vs Judge Lantion

GR 139465 Jan 18 2000
Facts:
Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines
and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs of the United States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various crimes in
violation of US laws. In compliance with the related municipal law, specifically Presidential
Decree No. 1069 Prescribing the Procedure for Extradition of Persons Who Have committed
Crimes in a Foreign Country and the established Extradition Treaty Between the Government
of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America, the department
proceeded with proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical
evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and the treaty.
The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the
documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that
such information is confidential in nature and that it is premature to provide such document as
the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore, the constitutional
rights of the accused are not yet available.
Issues:
1. Whether or not private respondent, Mark B. Jimenez, be granted access to the official
extradition request and documents with an opportunity to file a comment on or opposition
thereto
2. Whether or not private respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine
Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period of time within
which to file his comment with supporting evidence. In this case, there exists a clear conflict
between the obligation of the Philippine Government to comply with the provisions of the treaty
and its equally significant role of protection of its citizens of its right of due process.
The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential decree already pose an
impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as the evaluation stage. It is not
an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. On the other hand, granting due
process to the extradition case causes delay in the process.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize
them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made

between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law
should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments.
In this case, there is no conflict between international law and municipal law. The United
States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of
crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due
process protection to their respective citizens. In fact, neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes the rights of due process from a prospective extradite.

The Lockerbie Cases before the International Court of Justice

Facts:
On 10 September 2003, after more than ten years of proceedings before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the disputes between Libya and both the United Kingdom
and the United States concerning the extradition of two Libyan citizens were removed from the
Courts List following the Parties withdrawal from the proceedings. On 3 March 1992, Libya filed
in the Registry of the ICJ two separate Applications instituting proceedings against the US and
the UK Governments, in respect of a dispute over the interpretation of the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation signed in Montreal on 23
September 1971. This filing followed the explosion of a bomb in the Pan Am Flight 103 over the
town of Lockerbie, Scotland, on 21 December 1988, which killed all 259 passengers and crew,
as well as eleven residents of the town of Lockerbie. The Lord Advocate of Scotland and a
Grand Jury of the US respectively accused two Libyan citizens, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al
Megrahi and Ali Amin Khalifa Fhimah, of this bombing. Consequently, the UK and US
Governments requested Libya to extradite the accused so that they could be prosecuted in
Scotland or in the US. The United Nations Security Council adopted three resolutions
(Resolutions 731, 748 in 1992 and Resolution 883 in 1993), ordering Libya to give a full and
efficient answer to the demands made by UK and the US in order to contribute to the
clearance of international terrorism.
Issue:
Whether the International Court of Justice has jurisdiction over the issue at hand given
the fact that Libya had not signed any extradition treaty with the UK and the US.
Ruling:
The Court stated that the parties were obliged to carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter, and that at the interim measures stage of
the proceedings, Resolution 748 was prima facie binding on the parties. In accordance with
Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations of the parties under this Resolution superseded any
obligations under other instruments, including the Montreal Convention. The Court made it clear
that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail. The Court may therefore have to ultimately
determine the legitimacy of the Resolution in terms of the Charter and could make an order
inconsistent with the Security Council's Resolution. The effect of the decision is that, in the
interim, the respondent states utilize the prima facie presumption of legitimacy in order to
pressure Libya into extraditing the alleged offenders. In insisting on extradition, the respondent
states were entitled to utilize any method consistent with international law.

Armed Activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Rwanda)
Facts:
In the suit filed by the petitioner Republic of the Congo (DRC) (P) against defendant
Rwanda, the DRC tried to base the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice on nine
treaties with dispute settlement clauses that provided for such jurisdiction. Of the nine treaties,
Rwanda (D) excluded dispute settlement obligations in seven of the treaties while it was not
party to the remaining two. Based on the nature of its obligations, Rwanda (D) challenged the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
Discussions of some of the treaties were omitted by the excerpt. The treaties involved were
Convention on Privileges, Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, Genocide Convention, Article
IX, Convention on Racial Discrimination against Women, Article 29, World Health Organization
Constitution, Article 75. Unesco Convention, Article XIV, Montreal Convention, Article 14, Vienna
Convention, Article 66 and Convention Against Torture. Rwanda (D) was not party to the first
two treaties.
Issue. Whether or not the International Court of Justice lacks jurisdiction based on a treaty in
which one party to such a treaty excludes disputes settlement obligations under the treaty
before becoming a party and fails to make formal acts to bring about withdrawal of the
reservation?
Ruling:
The International Court of Justice lacks jurisdiction based on a treaty in which one party
to such a treaty excludes dispute settlement obligations under the treaty before becoming a
party and fails to take formal acts to bring about withdrawal of the reservation.
Firstly as at the time of a 1993 peace agreement to withdrawing all reservations to human rights
treaties, Rwanda may have committed itself, though this withdrawal was effectuated by the
Rwanda minister of justice, Rwanda never for once take formal acts to bring about withdrawal
of reservation. Deciding on whether to withdraw reservation with a states domestic legal order
is not the same as implementation of that decision by the national authorities within the
international legal order, which can only come to pass by notification to the other state parties to
the parties in question through the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Secondly, the existence of a dispute that implicates peremptory norms of general international
law does not imply that it is not part of the principles that jurisdiction always relies on the
consent of the parties. The treaty was however held not to form the basis of jurisdiction because
the DRC failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it initiated arbitration proceedings against
Rwanda under the Convention on Discrimination against Women.

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

Facts:
On 29 April 1999, the (former) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) instituted
proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United States of America
for violation of the obligation not to use force, resulting from the bombing of Yugoslav territory
by the United States and other Member States of NATO. Concurrent to this Application, the FRY
submitted a request for the indication of provisional measures, calling on the ICJ to order the
United States to cease immediately its acts of use of force and to refrain from any further
threat or act of force against the FRY.
In filing the Application, the FRY relied on Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Genocide, 1948 and Article 38(5) of the Rules of the Court. These articles
state, respectively, that disputes between contracting parties relating to the interpretation,
application or fulfilment of the Convention shall be submitted to the ICJ, and that applications
filed against States which have not accepted the Courts jurisdiction cannot proceed unless and
until that State accepts the Courts jurisdiction for the purposes of the case.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the ICJ can tried the case at hand without the consent of both parties.
Ruling:
On the issue of prima facie jurisdiction, the ICJ ruled that whilst it was indisputable that
both the United States and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are parties to the Genocide
Convention, a reservation made to Article IX by the United States declaring that its specific
consent is needed before any dispute is submitted to the ICJ, meant that Article IX could not
constitute a basis for jurisdiction. Regarding Article 38(5), the Court said that in the absence of
consent by the United States it lacked even prima facie jurisdiction. As a result, in rejecting the
FRYs request for provisional measures by twelve votes to three, the Court concluded that it
manifestly lacked jurisdiction to entertain Yugoslavias Application.

Salim Ahmed Hamdan vs Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al.

Facts:
Between the years of 1996 and 200, it was alleged that Hamdan was engaged in actions
in preparation of the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States. Militia forces in
Afghanistan that were fighting the Taliban captured Hamdan and turned him over to the U.S.
Military in 2002. He was transferred to Guantanamo Bay. A United States occupied Military
base. After a year of being detained without any charges being brought against him, President
Bush declared that he had committed acts triable by a military commission. He was charged
with one count of conspiracy to commit offenses triable by the commission. This commission is
created by military necessity, not by statute or constitutional power. This commission has a
presiding officer and at least three other members. The accused is afforded military counsel,
and a copy of the charges against him. This hearing may be conducted outside the presence of
the accused for the accused does not have a right to see all evidence or hear all witness
statement against him for purposes of national security. After being tried and convicted of
conspiracy, Hamdan apply for a writ of Habeas Corpus stating he deserved all the constitutional
rights afforded to him at trial, the writ was granted.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the rights protected by the Geneva Convention be enforced in federal
court through habeas corpus petitions?
2. Whether or not the military commission established to try Hamdan and others for
alleged war crimes in the War on Terror authorized by the Congress or the inherent
powers of the President?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that neither an act of Congress nor the inherent powers of the
Executive laid out in the Constitution expressly authorized the sort of military commission at
issue in this case. Absent that express authorization, the commission had to comply with the
ordinary laws of the United States and the laws of war. The Geneva Convention, as a part of the
ordinary laws of war, could therefore be enforced by the Supreme Court, along with the statutory
Uniform Code of Military Justice. Hamdan's exclusion from certain parts of his trial deemed
classified by the military commission violated both of these, and the trial was therefore illegal.
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented. Chief Justice John Roberts, who participated in
the case while serving on the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, did not take part in the decision.

Prosecutor v. Tadic
Facts:
For committing war crimes at a Serb-run concentration camp in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Tadic was prosecuted in Court. The jurisdiction of the tribunal was however challenged by Tadic
on the ground that it exceeded the authority of the U.N. Security Council. This argument of Tadic
was dismissed by the trial court but Tadic appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not a plea against the International Tribunal jurisdiction be examined by the
International Tribunal based on the invalidity of its establishment by the Security Council.
Ruling:
The court held that plea against the International Tribunal jurisdiction can be examined
by the International Tribunal based on the invalidity of its establishment by the Security Council.
The criteria for establishing an International Tribunal includes the establishment in accordance
with the proper international standards, the provision of guarantees of fairness, justice, and
evenhandedness, in full conformity with internationally recognized human rights instruments.
Hence, a tribunal like the one created in this case must be endowed with primacy over national
courts.

Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v. France)

Facts:
A civilian vessel which was docked in New Zealand was destroyed by a team of French
agents. The agents, Mafart and Prieur, were extradited and New Zealand sought reparation
from the incident. The agents were transferred to a French military facility and subsequently
transported to Paris on the basis that they needed medical attention. This dispute was brought
before an arbitral tribunal in which New Zealand demanded a declaration that France had
breached its obligation and ordered that it return the agents to the facility for the remainder of
their sentences.
Issue:
Whether or not the wrongfulness of an act of a state not in consonance with an
international obligation precluded by the distress of the author state if there exists a situation of
extreme peril in which the organ of the state has, at that particular moment, no means of saving
himself or persons entrusted to his care other than to act in a manner inconsistent with the
requirements of the obligation at issue.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the wrongfulness of an act of a state not in consonance with an
international obligation is precluded by the distress of the author state if there exists a situation
of extreme peril in which the organ of the state has, at that particular moment, no means of
saving himself or persons entrusted to his care other than to act in a manner inconsistent with
the requirements of the obligation.
In order to justify France conduct, three conditions are required: (1) very exceptional
circumstances of extreme urgency involving medical or other considerations, provided by New
Zealand; (2) the reestablishment of the original situation of compliance; and (3) a good faith
effort to try to obtain the consent of New Zealand. While the removal of Mafart was justified, the
removal of Prieur without the knowledge of New Zealand was unjustifiable; and this was a
material breach on the part of France.

Techt v. Hughes
Facts:
Techts dad who was an American citizen, died intestate in New York. His daughter,
Techt had tied the knot with an Austro-Hungarian citizen and under federal law at the time; she
had lost her United States citizenship as a result. The New York law allowed Techt to take
property as inheritance if she were to be an alien friend. When the court established this fact
and that she could claim half the inheritance, her sister appealed on the ground that she was
entitled to the whole property because Techt was an alien enemy. The appeals court found
Techt to be an alien enemy at this time because the U.S. was at war with Austria-Hungary in
1919. Techt however based her argument on the terms of the Treaty of 1848 between the U.S.
and Austria nationals of either state could take real property by descent.
Issue:
Whether or not the provision involved in a controversy is inconsistent with national policy
or safety in a situation whereby a treaty between belligerents at war has not been denounced.
Ruling:
The court decided that if a treaty is in force, it implies that it is the supreme law of the
land. There is nothing incompatible with the policy of the government, safety of the nation, or the
maintenance of the war in the enforcement of this treaty, so as to sustain Techts title. Affirmed.

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC. vs. ANTI-TERRORISM

COUNCIL
Facts:
Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA
9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as respondents in the various
petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions,
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice
Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and
National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo
Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the
IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
Issue: Whether or not the petition should prosper.
Ruling:
The court ruled against the petition. Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against
respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is clear:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how
respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.