Dee Cruz v.

people
G.R. No. 120988 August 11, 1997

FACTS:
In September 27, 1994, Cecilia Caparos, a neighbor of Whiazel Soriano, waiting for her two children
inside the compound of the Aurora A. Quezon Elementary School when she saw Whiazel held on the
hand and being led away by Rosemarie de la Cruz. Knowing that Whiazel was enrolled in the afternoon
class, she went after them and asked de la Cruz where she was going with Whiazel. De la Cruz answred
that she was asked by Rowena Soriano, Whiazels mother, to bring Whiazel to her. Then, Caparos
asked Whiazel the same question, Whiazel said to look for De la Cruz child. During this time, Whiazel
told De la Cruz that she wanted to go. But De la Cruz refused and held her hand.The inconsistent
answer, scratches on Whiazels face and terrified look made her suspicious so she told De la Cruz to
bring Whiazel to the teacher was surprised and reasoned out but soon agreed. When they arrived,
Whiazel cried.
When Eufemia Magpantay, guidance teacher, asked De la Cruz what she was doing with Whiazel, De
la Cruz told her she was looking for the school dentist.This was also her answer when they went to the
principal. Gorgonia Nieva, De la Cruz mother-in-law: on the day prior to the incident, De la Cruz
asked her to look for Dr. Luisa Medina, a dentist because her daughter was sick. Since Nieva heard that
Dr. Luisa Medina may be found at the Aurora A. Quezon Elementary School, she accompanied De la
Cruz there at around 11:00 am. De la Cruz: she asked; guard where the clinic was. The guard gave her
directions, and told her to pass through the same gate on her way out. When she got to the clinic, no
one was there so she left. On her way out, she saw Whiazel and who walked with her. She did not hold,
look or even smile at the child. But, before she could get out she was seen by Caparos. RTC:
kidnapping and serious illegal detention of a minor
ISSUE: W/N there is a consummate crime.
HELD: NO. MODIFIED attempted kidnapping and serious illegal detention
The felony committed is kidnapping and serious illegal detention of a minor in the attempted stage
only. The attempted phase of a felony is defined as when the offender commences the commission of a
felony, directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance (Article 6,
Revised Penal Code). The overt act must be an external one which has direct connection with the
felony, it being "necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete
termination following its natural course without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
voluntary desistance of the offender, will logically and necessarily ripen to a concrete offense". already
commenced her criminal scheme by taking hold of Whiazel by the hand and leading her out of the
school premises

Recuerdo v. People
F: Petitoner was found guilty in violation of BP 22 where out of the 9 checks she issued as payment for
the jewelry she bought from Yolanda Floro, 5 were dishonored by the bank. A demand letter was sent to
her and upon failure to make payments, a complaint was filed by which she was found guilty. On
petition for certiorari, she contends that BP 22 is unconstitutional.
I: WON BP 22 is unconstitutional.
R: The court upheld the constitutionality of BP 22 citing the landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez
Where it was held that BP 22 punishes the act of making and issuing worthless checks. It is not the
non-payment of debt or obligation which the law punishes and the law does not coerce the debtor to
pay debt but the main objective of the law is the prohibition and penalizing the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Such act is against public order.

G.R. No. 185493

February 2, 2011

LtC. ROBERTO K. GUILLERGAN (Ret.), Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
On June 20, 1995 the Office of the Ombudsman indicted petitioner Roberto K. Guillergan (Guillergan)
for estafa through falsification of public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The evidence shows that
sometime in 1987, petitioner Guillergan, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), directed Master Sergeant Edna Seclon (Seclon), Chief Clerk of the Comptrollers Office, to
cause the preparation of the payrolls of their civilian intelligence agents (CIAs) with supporting time
record and book. Also on Guillergans instruction, the CIAs payrolls in Region 6 for 1987,
totaling P732,000.00, were covered by cash advances payable to Captain Roland V. Maclang, Jr.
(Maclang, Jr.), which advances were issued upon his request as disbursing officer for that purpose. On
April 14, 1989 the AFP Anti-Graft Board filed a complaint against Rio, Butcon, Maclang, Jr., Seclon,
and Guillergan for violating Articles of War 94 in relation to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). After preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas issued a resolution,
recommending the filing of charges of illegal use of public funds against Rio and the exoneration of the
other respondents. On June 20, 1995, however, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the
filing of charges against all the accused before the Sandiganbayan. Consequently, an Information was
filed against them for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a), in relation to Article 171 of the RPC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan can convict Guillergan of violation of Article 172 of the RPC
under an Information that charged him with estafa in relation to Article 171 of the code; and
2. Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public
documents.

Ruling:
What is punished in falsification of a public document is the violation of the public faith and the
destruction of the truth as solemnly proclaimed in it.Generally, the elements of Article 171 are: 1) the
offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; 2) he takes advantage of his official position;
and 3) that he falsifies a document by committing any of the ways it is done.
On the other hand, the elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 are: 1) the
offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position; 2) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171;
and 3) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.All of the
foregoing elements of Article 172 are present in this case.
The Court finds no error in the decision of the Sandiganbayan that found Guillergan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public Documents under Article 172 of the RPC.

G.R. No. 162822 August 25, 2005

JAIME GUINHAWA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new motor vehicles, including
Mitsubishi vans, under the business name of Guinrox Motor Sales.On March 17, 1995, Guinhawa
purchased a brand new Mitsubishi L-300 Versa Van from the Union Motors Corporation (UMC) in
Paco, Manila. The van bore Plate No. DLK 406. Guinhawas driver, Leopoldo Olayan, drove the van
from Manila to Naga City. However, while the van was traveling along the highway in Labo, Daet,
Camarines Norte, Olayan suffered a heart attack. The van went out of control, traversed the highway
onto the opposite lane, and was ditched into the canal parallel to the highway.The van was damaged,
and the left front tire had to be replaced. The incident was reported to the local police authorities and
was recorded in the police blotter.The van was repaired and later offered for sale in Guinhawas
showroom
Sometime in October 1995, the spouses Ralph and Josephine Silo wanted to buy a new van for their
garment business; they purchased items in Manila and sold them in Naga City. They went to
Guinhawas office, and were shown the L-300 Versa Van which was on display. Unaware that the van
had been damaged and repaired on account of the accident in Daet, the couple decided to purchase the
van.
On October 12, 1995, Josephine Silo, accompanied by Glenda Pingol, went to Manila on board the L300 Versa Van, with Glendas husband, Bayani Pingol III, as the driver. Their trip to Manila was
uneventful. However, on the return trip to Naga from Manila on October 15 or 16, 1995, Bayani Pingol
heard a squeaking sound which seemed to be coming from underneath the van. The spouses then
brought the vehicle to the Rx Auto Clinic in Naga City for examination. Jesus Rex Raquitico, Jr., the
mechanic, examined the van and discovered that it was the left front stabilizer that was producing the
annoying sound, and that it had been repaired.On February 14, 1996, Josephine Silo filed a criminal
complaint for violation of paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code against Guinhawa in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Naga City. On November 6, 2001, the MTC rendered judgment
convicting Guinhawa. he trial court declared that the accused made false pretenses or
misrepresentations that the van was a brand new one when, in fact, it had figured in an accident in
Labo, Daet, Camarines Norte, and sustained serious damages before it was sold to the private
complainant.
Guinhawa appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 19. On
August 1, 2002, the RTC affirmed the appealed judgment. he CA ruled that the private complainant had
the right to assume that the van was brand new because Guinhawa held himself out as a dealer of brand
new vans. According to the appellate court, the act of displaying the van in the showroom without
notice to any would-be buyer that it was not a brand new unit was tantamount to deceit. Thus, in
concealing the vans true condition from the buyer, Guinhawa committed deceit.
The appellate court denied Guinhawas motion for reconsideration, prompting him to file the present

petition for review on certiorari,

Issues:
(1) whether, under the Information, the petitioner was charged of other deceits under paragraph 1,
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) whether the respondent adduced proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the petitioners guilt for the crime charged.

Ruling:

The real nature of the offense charged is to be ascertained by the facts alleged in the body of the
Information and the punishment provided by law, not by the designation or title or caption given by the
Prosecutor in the Information. As can be gleaned from its averments, the Information alleged the
essential elements of the crime under paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
The false or fraudulent representation by a seller that what he offers for sale is brand new (when, in
fact, it is not) is one of those deceitful acts envisaged in paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code. The provision reads:
Art. 318. Other deceits. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the
damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall
defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.
For one to be liable for "other deceits" under the law, it is required that the prosecution must prove the
following essential elements: (a) false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in the
preceding articles;
(b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or
prejudice. It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause
or the only motive for the private complainant to part with her property.
The provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those enumerated in Articles 315 to
317 of the Revised Penal Code. It is intended as the catchall provision for that purpose with its broad
scope and intendment.
It is true that mere silence is not in itself concealment. Concealment which the law denounces as
fraudulent implies a purpose or design to hide facts which the other party sought to know.Failure to
reveal a fact which the seller is, in good faith, bound to disclose may generally be classified as a
deceptive act due to its inherent capacity to deceive. Suppression of a material fact which a party is
bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false representation.Moreover, a representation is not

confined to words or positive assertions; it may consist as well of deeds, acts or artifacts of a nature
calculated to mislead another and thus allow the fraud-feasor to obtain an undue advantage.
Fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent concealment are of the same genre. Fraudulent concealment
presupposes a duty to disclose the truth and that disclosure was not made when opportunity to speak
and inform was presented, and that the party to whom the duty of disclosure, as to a material fact was
due, was induced thereby to act to his injury.
n this case, the maximum term of imprisonment imposed on the petitioner was four months and one
day of arresto mayor. Hence, the MTC was proscribed from imposing an indeterminate penalty on the
petitioner. An indeterminate penalty may be imposed if the minimum of the penalty is
one year or less, and the maximum exceeds one year. Conformably with Article 39 in relation to
paragraph 3, Article 38 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner shall suffer subsidiary imprisonment
if he has no property with which to pay the penalty of fine.

G.R. No. 200748

July 23, 2014

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

8:00 a.m. of 31 January 2006, the agents and special investigators of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Central Visayas Regional Office (NBI-CEVRO) or simply NBI, received a Complaint
from Corazon Absin (Corazon) and Charito Escobido (Charito). The special investigators at the NBICEVRO verified the text messages received by the complainants.1wphi1 A team was immediately
formed to implement an entrapment operation, which took place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner
of Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by
using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made part of the amount
demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon. Petitioner was later brought to the forensic laboratory
of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was done by forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan.
Petitioner was required to submit his urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence
of dangerous drugs as indicated in the confirmatory test.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
compulsory rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months at the Cebu Center for the
Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City. CA affirmed RTC
ruling.
Issue: whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.
Ruling: We declare that the drug testconducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any existing law
or jurisprudence.
A person apprehended orarrested" cannot literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for any
crime.The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15
comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law. A
charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive of the intent of the law to
rehabilitate persons apprehended or arrested for the unlawful acts enumerated above instead of
charging and convicting them of other crimes with heavier penalties. In the case at bench, the presence
of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were
found positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained
admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15,
R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been
charged under Sec. 14 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the maximum
penalty under Sec. 12(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for

Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any person who shall possess any equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. The drug test is not covered by allowable nontestimonial compulsion. Ruling of CA set aside.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision, dated 14 January 1999,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19412 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Eighth Judicial Region, Branch 21, Laoang, Northern Samar finding herein petitioner
Conchita Quinao and Salvador Cases guilty of the crime of Usurpation of Real Property. Both the
accused and private complainant are claiming ownership over the land in question. The parties
presented evidence and witnesses during the hearing of the case to buttress their claims. Complainants
witness Bienvenido Delmonte declared that on February 2, 1993 at around 9 oclock in the morning
while he was busy working in the agricultural land which he owns in common with complainant
Francisco Delmonte, accused Salvador Cases and Conchita Quinao, together with their other close
relatives suddenly appeared and while there, with the use of force, violence and intimidation, usurped
and took possession of their landholding, claiming that the same is their inheritance from their
ascendants and while there, accused immediately gathered coconuts and made them into copra.
Complainant was forcibly driven out by the accused from their landholding and was threatened that if
he will try to return to the land in question, something will happen to him. Complainant was thus forced
to seek assistance from the Lapinig Philippine National Police.
Complainants witness further declared that the actual primitive owner of the land in question was
Angel Pelison but the land was purchased by his grandfather Petre Delmonte. The land is situated at
Sitio Bagacay, Brgy. Potong, Lapinig, N. Samar with an area of 9 hectares, bounded on the East by the
properties of Roman Vernas and Marcelino Delmonte; on the North by Dimas Moscosa; on the West by
Alcantara and on the South by Bagacay group. Accused Salvador Cases and Conchita Quinao testified
for the defense. They claimed that they are the grandchildren of Lorenzo Cases; that during the lifetime
of their grandfather, he acquired the real property in question and declared the same in his namend is
devoted to rice and coconut; that they are in actual possession of the land and paid realty taxes thereon;
that the father of accused Conchita Quinao was Pedro Cases, the son of Lorenzo Cases; that the land is
located in Brgy. Potong, Lapinig, Northern Samar; and that the boundaries are as follows: on the North:
Dimas Moscosa; on the East: Petre Delmonte; on the South: Ananias Delmonte; and on the West:
Bagacay River
RTC found both accused guilty of the crime of Usurpation of Real Rights in Property, defined and
penalized under Art. 312 of the Revised Penal Code, beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences
both of them jointly and severally, to pay a fine in the amount of One Hundred Seventy Four Thousand
and Nine Hundred Sixty (P174,960.00) Pesos which amount is equivalent to the gain which said

accused have obtained in a period of almost three (3) years from the time they forcibly took possession
of this land belonging to Francisco Delmonte computed at the rate of P14,580.00 per quarter proceeds
from the produce of the land as alleged in the Information. Petitioner appealed her conviction to the
CA. The appellate court, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not there realy wqas an usurpation of real property

Ruling:The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of anothers real property or
usurped real rights in anothers property; that the possession or usurpation was committed with violence
or intimidation and that the accused had animo lucrandi. In order to sustain a conviction for
"usurpacion de derecho reales," the proof must show that the real property occupied or usurped
belongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third person, and that the possession of the usurper
was obtained by means of intimidation or violence done to the person ousted of possession of the
property. Court stated that the elements of the offense are (1) occupation of anothers real property or
usurpation of a real right belonging to another person; (2) violence or intimidation should be employed
in possessing the real property or in usurping the real right, and (3) the accused should be animated by
the intent to gain.
Thus, in order to absolve herself of any liability for the crime, petitioner insists that the elements of the
crime are not present in this case. Specifically, she maintains that she owns the property involved
herein. The matter on the ownership of the lot in question, however, had long been settled when, in
Civil Case No. 3561 (ownership of real property) involving the predecessors-in-interest of private
complainant and that of accused Cases, the Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch III, Thirteenth
Judicial Region, adjudicated said lot to private complainants predecessors-in-interest.
CA decision affirmed.