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ABSTRACT
This study provides an analytical sketch of the context, culture, structures, processes, and
consequences of neoliberalism. It examines the subject from two fundamental and complementary
perspectives. The rst involves an appraisal of the history and evolution of neoliberalism as a sociopolitical phenomenon from its origins to the present. The second perspective provides a systematic
analysis of the theory and practice of neoliberalism, its circumstances and effects, with special
reference to the issue of globalization and its impact upon the weaker sectors of society. The authors
conclude that neoliberal globalizationhas contributed to the emergence of a new centre and periphery,
no longer based on distinct geographical regions, but on different political and economic strata in both
the North and South.
Introduction
Jorge Nef is the Director of the School of Government, Public Administration, and Politics at
the University of Chile in Santiago, Chile. Wilder Robles is a PhD candidate at the University
of Guelph.
JDS 16,1
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the Depression to John Keynes in 1936, the intellectual software that was later to
merge in the neoliberal synthesis, existed in an almost latent and underground state.
Monetarism and neoclassical economics were con ned to a small but in uential
group of conservative economists, business people, politicians, and thinkers. They
shared a deeply ingrained belief in the inappropriateness of Keynesianism and
their common ground centred on a scathing critique of statism, both Marxist
and social democratic. Bureaucratism, the welfare state, and the myriad of induced
development and demand-side schemes which, by the end of World War II had
become the orthodox staple of government policy, were the immediate targets of
their attack. At a deeper level, their stand also involved an assault on political
liberalism and its acceptance of equity as a guiding principle for choice.
Until the First and Second UN Development Decades (1961 to 1981), the
predominant view of development, and public sector involvement in it, was molded
by the experience of the Depression, World War II, and European reconstruction
through the Marshall Plan. This scheme was also the predominant framework
and prescription for international development (McMichael 1996). The accepted
view among theorists and practitioners was one in which universal and replicable
stages of economic growth, would transform social and political relations, bring
political stability (and democracy) and prevent communist-inspired insurgency.
President Kennedy summarized the essence of Cold War liberalism by contending
that those who made social change in the short-run impossible made violent
revolution in the long-run inevitable. Thus, the transformation of traditional
societies into modern ones was not only a means to free people from poverty,
hunger, malnutrition, and disease, but a way to protect them from tyranny and the
appeals of Communism.
By the end of the First Development Decade (1961 to 1971) it had became
evident that induced development strategies had failed. The optimistic expectation
that poor countries could catch up by merely emulating the Western experience
of industrialization, did not materialize. On the contrary, the economic gap between
rich and poor had increased. Instead of stability, revolutionary insurgency threatened the status quo, while a scal and an institutional crisis of major proportions
loomed on the political horizon of the West. For radical thinkers, the Keynesian
model had exacerbated the contradictions between accumulation and legitimisation
inherent in the liberal-democratic hybrid. For conservative critics, the scal crisis
of the Welfare State had moralistic and economic overtones. In their view, the problem was the inevitable consequence of generous social entitlements to the lower
classes and political over-participation (Huntington et al. 1975), resulting in the
undermining of the traditional moral fabric of society and de ation of authority.
In other words, it created a crisis of democracy, making society ungovernable.
The prescription was to bring about scal prudence and a more restricted form of
democracy (Hobsbawm 1994; Sklar 1980).
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pecially faculties of economics, by forcefully displacing radicals and structuralists espousing the once mainstay U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America
doctrine.4 From these positions, ideological control of the commanding heights in
the bureaucracy and academia was secured. This control over the ideological, programmatic and policy software, as well as right wing control over the media, has
made it possible for neoliberalism to establish its hegemony as an overwhelming
discourse in the transitions to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s.
To understand the historical implications of militant neoliberalism as a counterrevolutionary project it is essential to sketch the broader international circumstances which facilitated its emergence and dissemination as a global ideology.
In recent decades, a profound restructuring of the world economy has taken place.
Globalization, interdependence, skewness, dynamism, and fragility are appropriate
characterizations of the aforementioned restructuring. Central to the transnationalization of production, and the whole gamut of socio-political relations accompanying it, is the cosmocorporation (Mller 1973). The emergence and consolidation
of transnational corporations (TNCs) over the past two or three decades has created
a global network of transactions and business alliances. The spectrum of TNCs has
changed: from primarily extractive and manufacturing concerns to include services
and nance. The emerging forms have exhibited a remarkable degree of adaptability, evolving into more than a mechanism for the transfer of capital and technology
across jurisdictional boundaries. They now are a most effective vehicle for the extraction of surplus from peripheral sectors, via credit-indebtedness devices, wagedifferentials, tax advantages, franchises, transfer pricing, and the like (Collinworth
et al. 1993) to semi-peripheral sectors and from there to the various groups at the
core of corporate power. In addition, TNCs play a fundamental role in the integration of elites and their ideologies at the transnational level.
One of the most important developments in recent decades has been the
rapid and profound globalization of trade and nance (Hirst 1996). New trading
regimes, under the rules laid down by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
the emergence of dominant trading blocs the European Union, ASEAN and
now NAFTA and MERCOSUR have facilitated a transnational integration of
business elites into extended circuits of trade, capital, information, and power,
often by-passing national interests and regulatory structures. Today it is possible
to transfer nancial resources from one country to another at the ick of a
key, crossing national borders and affecting the national balance of payments.
In this process of transnationalization, combined with shifting economic policy,
from demand-side Keynesianism to supply-side monetarism, there have been
clear winners and losers. Finance capital, telecommunications, and in general
proprietary high-tech cosmocorporations have emerged on top.
Meanwhile, important sectors in the old post-1930 social contract such as
labour, consumers, farmers, the bulk of the white-collar, employee middle class and
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nationally-based medium-sized manufacturers have been severely hurt. The ensuing social and political restructuring has affected the nature of contemporary politics, the state, the de nition of citizenship and the very essence of governance, both
globally and within countries (Sassen 1996). Macroeconomic decision-making, as
in the case of central banks, has tended to escape national and democratic controls.
This has brought about a persistent tendency of external involvement (e.g., the
IMF, foreign creditors, transnational corporations) in seemingly internal matters
of credit, scal and monetary policy. Domestic concerns have become peripheral
and subordinate to the interests of transnational capital. While consumerism and
prosperity are peddled as popular ideology, or mesmerizing chant produced by
the business elite for popular consumption, this discourse conceals the objective
reality and operational doctrine of massive unemployment and the creation
of a low-wage economy (Standing 1989).
Alternative trading regimes to those controlled by the major trading blocs
within the Group of Seven have all but crumbled. The dismantling of the socialist trading block known as COMECON has eliminated the presence of a trade
arrangement which encompassed the Soviet Union, the Eastern European countries
and a number of centrally-planned economies in the Third World. The initiatives
for a New International Economic Order, or a Trade Union of the Third World
proposed by former President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and endorsed by successive United Nations Conferences on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) also have
failed to materialize. UNCTAD itself and the Non-Aligned Movement, the latter
resulting from the 1955 Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in 1955,
now lie in shambles, crushed between the death of the so-called socialist Second
World and the debt crisis of the former Third World. More recently, with the crises
of the Brazilian and the Argentinean economies, the future of economic union in
the Southern cone of Latin America under the aegis of MERCOSUR is very much
in question. The possiblies of South-South cooperation are not very promising.
Western elites and their clients elsewhere in the world are now in a position to
dictate the terms of global surrender, not only to the populations of the former Second and Third worlds, but to their own populations as well. Externally-imposed
structural adjustment policies severely undermine economic sovereignty, deepen
underdevelopment, and spread poverty. We now have trickle up, or recessive income distribution on an unprecedented global scale.
The Neoliberal Regime
In the post Cold War and largely unipolar world, neoliberalism has become entrenched as a global ideology (Sklar 1980). This mind-set has hegemonic strength
among the core sectors within the Group of Seven countries. Substantively, the
ideological foundation of this New Internationale is distinctively neoclassical,
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elitist, and monistic. Despite an outwardly progressive rhetoric of democratization, with support for individual freedoms, open societies, and the rule of law,
this new worldview is every bit as Manichean and dogmatic as the old Cold War,
national security discourse it has replaced (Drury 1993). In fact, this type of reactionary modernism has more than a casual continuity with its military predecessor.
Most important though, is the fact that the new orthodoxy has a strong appeal to
the af uent, globally-integrated, consumption-intensive, and modern elite sectors
in what used to be called the Third and Second Worlds. From this perspective, the
triumph of the West, the End of History, the Clash of Civilizations (Huntington 1993) and Manifest Destiny blend in a synthesis with distinct functionalist
overtones.
At least ve identi able streams of thought converge in contemporary neoliberalism. The rst source is neoclassical economics, rooted in von Hayeks interpretation of Adam Smith, and the premise that economic rationality is solely the
consequence of individuals maximizing choices. The second source is monetarism
and its prescription of scal restraint, privileging anti-in ationary measures over
employment. Its major proponent has been Milton Friedman, associated with the
Chicago school, the latter closely connected to nancial speculative circles. The
third source is political neoconservatism: an offshoot of a moralistic and culturalistic reaction amalgamating on the one hand disillusioned welfare liberals, with
outright reactionaries and cold warriors on the other. The fourth source is a revamped version of nineteenth century social darwinism la Herbert Spencer, with
Malthusian and deterministic connotations. Last, but equally relevant, is the quasimystical objectivist individualism la Ayn Rand, with a poetic and highly normative avor.
The Communications Counter-Revolution
Ideologically, neoliberalism can be seen as a discourse legitimating elitist
national and international regimes. The emerging global cultural regime, more
than a de ned set of circumstances, values and structures, with its own boundaries
and dynamics, represents a massive onslaught of Western culture by means of
a revolution in communications. According to some, and paraphrasing Tof er,
we live in a world of future shock; one so dependent on computers and
telecommunications that should these gadgets cease to function, this would be
tantamount to switching off global civilization (Pelton 1981). Communications
technology, irrespective of its wide spread is neither neutral, nor freely available. It
is a highly concentrated business,5 driven by transnational capital and deregulation
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). This has meant a disappearance of both
state-owned public information systems as well as small independent, private
media operations. A highly strati ed global information order, managed by private
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goods, and services (but not labour) is to be attained. A central postulate in market
sovereignty is that an unregulated market is the best way to increase economic
growth, which will ultimately bene t everyone: supply-side economics would
produce trickle-down.
2) The second prescription is reducing taxes. Public revenues, especially direct
taxation on income and wealth are to be drastically cut down. This is geared
to increase disposable earnings among the well-to-do, resulting in a favorable
investment climate. Conversely, taxation on consumption, or indirect taxation is
boosted, especially in the form of value added or goods and services taxes (VAT
and GST). These policies are clearly set to bene t big business and are essentially
anti-labour and anti-consumer. They also reduce the scal base of government.
3) The third is reducing public expenditure. Social disbursements, including
welfare assistance, education, health care, unemployment insurance, and pensions
are considered inimical to economic ef ciency. The same goes for social safety
nets and even the maintenance of physical infrastructure such as roads, bridges,
water supply, and other services. Whenever possible these activities are to be taken
over by revenue generating private enterprises. Pro tability, not service is the
main criteria.
4) The fourth recommendation is deregulating the private sector. Government
regulation of everything that could diminish private pro ts is to be drastically reduced. In principle, deregulation is geared to enhancing competitiveness, eliminating red tape, bureaucratism, and corruption. As markets become the automatic
comptrollers, greater ef ciency is supposed to ensue.
5) The fth is the privatization of the public sector. State-owned enterprises,
as well as public-sector produced goods and services are to be sold to private investors. This includes banks, key industries, railroads, highways, energy, water and
communications utilities, schools, hospitals, and even natural resources. The assumption here is that private enterprise, driven by pro t-maximization, is inherently ef cient, risk-taking and innovative.
6) Finally is the elimination of the collectivist concept of the public good.
This is to be replaced with a view of the common good emphasizing individual
responsibility. The subsidiary state has a minimal role to play in dealing with
individual failures. Thus, those who are not able to fend for themselves are
blamed for their own problems and left largely on their own to solve them.
The Neoliberal Threat
The effort by socioeconomic elites and their institutional intellectuals to circumvent established democratic traditions and make politics governable and
markets free is a potentially antidemocratic trend. The tendency to favour limited democracies, able to respond to market forces, constitutes an attempt to
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reduce participation and depoliticize politics. The challenge presented by the 1975
report on The Crisis of Democracy (Huntington et al. 1975) to the Trilateral Commission was how to reconcile market politics with unrestricted private accumulation leading to monopoly. The neoliberal solution has been to limit the role of the
state and to facilitate private accumulation, while reducing the scope and salience
of popular participation and social policies, all this in the name of freedom. Elite
politics offers very few real options and transforms the states allegedly populist
and welfare functions into mere symbolism. Without the legitimizing trappings of
welfarism, a strong connection develops between neoliberal policies, the enhancement of law-and-order, penalization and criminalization, and the possible emergence of police states.
The implementation of this project involves essentially re-drafting the implicit
social contract among the various social actors, which regulates the pattern of
labour relations (and income-distribution) in society. It also relates to the de nition of what social actors, especially non-elite actors, are considered legitimate.
The neoliberal project is, for this reason, distinctively exclusionary and heavily
class-biased. The so-called leaner but meaner state resulting from structural adjustment and debt-reduction policies has built-in safeguards to prevent possible
redistributive policies resulting from irresponsible majority demands and overparticipation. The choices of citizenship are stripped of substance. Monetarist economic policies and those referred to as macroeconomic equilibrium are, as mentioned earlier, effectively taken away from public debate. They remain con ned
within acceptable limits by means of transnationalized regional trading agreements, central banking mechanisms and bureaucratic expertise. This elitist tendency to facilitate the governability of democracies reduces the governments capacity for governance, as an expression of sovereign national constituencies. It also
produces an effective loss of citizenship.
In the last analysis, the only possible outcome is the maintenance of an inequitable socioeconomic order. Attempts to resist the inevitability of this regressive
order brings out the seamy side of democracy: the manipulation of public opinion,
the induced fragmentation and trivialization of the opposition, the application of
authorized force and intimidation as insurance policies against dissent. Critics
and dissidents end up being labelled subversives and are subjected to numerous
security regulations. As John Sheahan has commented, the neoliberal policy package is inconsistent with democracy because an informed majority would reject it.
The main reason it cannot win popular support is that it neither assures employment opportunities nor provides any other way to ensure that lower income groups
can participate in economic growth (Sheahan 1987). The rationality of the economy ends up in contradiction with social and democratic rationality. In fact, the
economic policies charted under this economic doctrine have been best suited for
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authoritarian political regimes, such as Brazil under the Generals, Pinochets Chile,
or some of the Asian miracles in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.
The juxtaposition of economic freedom with political repression is the
essence of the formula known as authoritarian capitalism (Letelier 1976), which
preceded the current democratic opening in Latin America. There is a de nite
solution of continuity between the authoritarian and the electoral phase of neoliberalism. As the national security states orderly retreated into their barracks, there
emerged restricted democracies with entrenched neoliberal economic agendas. A
similar trend towards liberalization is observable in many of the former socialist
republics of Eastern Europe. These new democracies are receiver states (Nef and
Bensabat 1992) based upon restricted participation and a peculiar consociational
arrangement: a pact of elites. The key role of this state is to secure macroeconomic
equilibrium, private accumulation, privatization, and deregulation. These goals are
accomplished via debt service and the execution of the conditionalities attached to
the negotiation of such service.
However, receiver states are not circumscribed nowadays to the periphery
of the Third World and former Second World. Nor is a large foreign debt one
of their intrinsic characteristics. Western elites have been applying a similar
political agenda in their own societies. Its manifestations have been Thatcherism,
Reaganomics, and the supply-side policies applied in Canada for over a decade
and repudiated by the electorate in 1993. These socioeconomic policies have been
rationalized on grounds of keeping in ation down, reducing the tax burden, or more
recently the current internal debt-crisis. Economic restructuring and the new
social contracts are their programmatic expressions. In all cases, these policies have
led to growing income disparities. Two examples can be illustrative. In Chile during
the 17-year Pinochet dictatorship, hailed in conservative circles as a neoliberal
miracle, real income per capita grew a paltry .3 percent per annum on the average
while the proportion of people below the poverty line increased at a record 7
percent per year (Nef 1996). In Canada, for nearly a decade the top ranking country
in the UNDPs Human Development Index, a recent study indicated that between
1973 and 1996, the income differential between the top and bottom 10 percent of
the population increased from a ratio of 21 to 1 to 314 to 1.8
Effects: An Incomparable Disadvantage
The transnationalization of production and the displacement of manufacturing
to the semi-periphery, on account of alleged comparative advantages brought
about by depressed economic circumstances and the low-wage economy, results
in plant closures and the loss of jobs in the developed countries. Such globalism
replicates in the centre similarly depressed conditions to those in the periphery.
Manufacturing, in this context, evolves into a global maquiladora9 type industry
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under economies of scale and integrating its nances and distribution by means of
major transnational companies and franchises. Abundant and above all cheap
labour and pro-business biases on the part of host governments are fundamental
conditions for the new type of productive system.
Since there are many peripheral areas with easy access to inexpensive raw
materials and with unrepresentative governments willing to go out of their way
to please foreign investors, a decline of employment and wages at the centre
will not necessarily create incentives to invest, or increase productivity in the
poorer countries. Nor will wage reductions increase competitiveness, one of the
favourite neoliberal buzzwords. Since production, distribution, and accumulation
are now global, neoliberal globalization is likely to lead to a situation of permanent
unemployment, transforming the bulk of the blue collar workers the working
class into a non-working underclass. In the current global environment,
production, distribution, consumption, and accumulation are not constrained by
the tight compartments of the nation state, national legislation or responsible
governments.
The new correlation of forces is one where blue-collar workers have lost, and
lost big. In contrast to the fragmented and increasingly marginalized condition of
both the blue and white collar sectors of the workforce, the present structure of the
global economic order is transnational, centralized, concentric, and institutionalized at the top. Its fundamental components are trade, nance, and the protection
of the proprietary rights of international business. Rules, actors, and instrumentalities constitute a de-facto and de jure system of global governance in which elite
interests in the centre and the periphery are increasingly intertwined.
Conclusion
The historical and structural circumstances of this new economic order are
de ned by three fundamental structural parameters, the common denominator of
which is global macroeconomic restructuring. The rst is the end of the Cold War
and the collapse of the socialist Second World. This circumstance is construed as
the victory of capitalism. The second contextual parameter of this new order is the
disintegration and further marginalization of the Third World. The third parameter
is economic globalization on a scale and depth unprecedented in human history.
The most crucial ideological trait that underpins the present global regime is
the pervasiveness of neoliberalism as a hegemonic and homogenizing discourse.
This discourse contains in its core a distinctive ethics of possessive and predatory individualism with very few moral constraints. Whether under the spell of
monetarism or the so-called Trilateral doctrine (Sklar 1980), conventional economic thinking has displaced not only socialism but practically all manifestations
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But harmony and predictability at the transnational summit does not necessarily
translate into order and security at the base. As production, nance and distribution
in a rapidly globalizing economy become transnationalized, so does economic vulnerability. After the years of world-wide prosperity during the 1960s and the 1970s,
economic instability and vulnerability to external economic forces have become
endemic. The effects of economic insecurity, manifested in poverty, unemployment
and sheer uncertainty are felt by the bulk of the population in the periphery. Economic globalization under the neoliberal formula has disenfranchised people from
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ful lling their basic human needs, namely, access to food, housing, and employment. It has caused social polarization within and across national boundaries. It has
contributed to the emergence of a new centre and periphery no longer based on geographical regions, but on political and economic groupings in both the North and
South. On the one hand, there stands the highly transnationalized, af uent, mobile,
and in uential elites in the First World, former Second World, and Third World.
On the other, there is the heterogeneous and fragmented majority of the inhabitants
of the planet living in all the worlds of development who are increasingly
marginalized and disenfranchised in the global village. As the process of globalization under the banners of neoliberalism advances, the proportion of those in the
other world increases. So does the probability of human insecurity and mutual
vulnerability.
There is a great deal of optimistic triumphalism among those who espouse
neoliberalism. From the perspective of its supporters, the inherent superiority of
this global project has been demonstrated by the collapse of socialism in Eastern
Europe, the disintegration of African societies and Latin Americas lost decade.
Yet, the sharp schism between these two worlds and the con ict between an
expanding Western civilization and an increasingly fragile, unstable and besieged
global and domestic periphery, offers a scenario of violent confrontation: a new
World War III. The growing squalor of the many, which makes the prosperity
of the few possible, has intrinsically destabilizing effects. It is a direct threat to
everybodys security. The extreme vulnerability of the South and the East, far from
enhancing the security of the North and the West, is a symptom of a profound
malaise in the entire global system. With hindsight neoliberalism may well be
perceived as one of the greatest and most elaborate deceptions in modern history.
But today its consequences are real and go beyond a clever global con game. This
dysfunctional system is already eroding post-industrial civilizations vitality, not
only in what is contemptuously referred to as down there but essentially up
there too.
NOTES
See Carl Friedrich, The Political Thought of Neoliberalism, American Political Science
Review, XLIX: 2, 1955, 509ff.
2 According to the Portuguese Times (June 12, 1997), Norman Bailey, an academic and a former
Senior Director of International Academic Affairs for the National Security Council during the
Reagan Administration, has had longstanding connections to the US intelligence community.
3 Norman Bailey, Organization and Operation of Neoliberalism in Latin America, in Bailey
(ed.), Politics, Economic and Hemispheric Security, New York, Praeger 1965, 193. The entire
volume is a collection of pieces by right-wing thinkers, resulting from a conference organized
by the Center for Strategic Studies at Yorktown University in July 1964.
4 The ECLA Doctrine refers to the keynesian approaches to economic recovery and importsubstitution industrialization followed by the relatively more advanced Latin American coun-
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