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CURITIBA
2015
CURITIBA
2015
II
JULIO CESAR BATTIROLA FILHO
CURITIBA
2015
AGRADECIMENTOS
Agradeo ao meu orientador professor Dr. Eduardo de Freitas Rocha Loures
pelo apoio, conhecimento, direcionamento dos estudos, disponibilidade nos
momentos mais crticos e palavras de incentivo nas horas mais difceis, sem os
quais este trabalho no seria realizado.
Agradeo ao meu co-orientador professor Dr. Eduardo Alves Portela dos
Santos pelo apoio no incio da pesquisa e seus conselhos centrados no objetivo final
do trabalho.
Agradeo a minha namorada Gabriela Damke pelo apoio, companheirismo,
pacincia e amor durante o desenvolvimento deste trabalho.
Agradeo tambm aos professores Dr. Emerson Rigoni, Dr. Marcelo
Rodrigues e Dr. Rui Francisco Martins Maral pela sua disponibilidade e contribuio
durante as etapas do trabalho.
Agradeo aos meus pais por todos seus esforos em me fornecer sempre o
melhor, permitindo que eu alcanasse mais este objetivo.
Agradeo aos meus colegas de mestrado, por serem uma inspirao para
buscar novos conhecimentos e desafios.
Agradeo a todos os amigos e colegas que direta ou indiretamente
participaram na realizao desta pesquisa.
II
ABSTRACT
Maintenance has the objective to preserve the functional capacities of
equipments and systems in operation. Furthermore, the maintenance is not only
about optimizing equipment availability at lower cost, but also affects the whole
business perspective such as safety, environmental integrity, energy efficiency and
quality of product. Time needs to be used to investigate and determine the problem,
and to determine the maintenance plan to fix the equipment. In this regard, FMEA
has been used as best-practice expertise knowledge in the maintenance domain and
to support the decision-making process to prioritize maintenance actions so as to
enhance product/system by increasing system availability. FMEA has become a
default procedure in industry to define and document every potential failure mode.
However, according to the literature review and survey with specialist the FMEA has
some problems in its application like uncertainties in the identification of key failures
and lack of resources to be implemented. Moreover, it is noticeable the gap between
the FMEAs main role, identifying and eliminating potential failure modes, and its
applicability as a decision making tool on maintenance intervention. The objective of
this work is to develop a process aware FMEA, which integrates Delphi Methodology
to obtain consensus of specialists opinions, Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to
realize the risk assessment based on multiple criteria and a Business Process
Management System (BPMS) to instantiate its development cycle. The proposed
method, titled PAFMEA (Process-Aware FMEA), has the objective to face the main
FMEA deficiencies concerning the failure analysis in maintenance. The BPMS
environment includes functional and non-functional requirements identified in the
literature review, from analysis of FMEA software and survey with specialists from the
academy and industrial area. The PAFMEA method was subjected to the review of
maintenance specialists and practitioners in FMEA through an application study in a
multinational manufacturing company of white goods. The positive results from the
industrial application, confronts the traditional FMEA and reveals the new perception
of the PAFMEA in the assessment and prioritization of the failure modes for the
failure analysis in maintenance.
III
RESUMO
A manuteno tem o objetivo de preservar as capacidades funcionais dos
equipamentos e sistemas em funcionamento. Alm disso, a manuteno no versa
apenas sobre como otimizar a disponibilidade de equipamentos a um custo menor,
mas tambm afeta a perspectiva de todo o negcio, tais como a segurana, a
integridade ambiental, eficincia energtica e qualidade do produto. O tempo um
elemento de restrio para investigao de um problema e determinao do plano
de manuteno do equipamento. A este respeito, o FMEA tem sido utilizado como
um referencial de melhores prticas no domnio da manuteno industrial e de apoio
ao processo de tomada de deciso para priorizar aes de manuteno de modo a
melhorar o produto / sistema, aumentando a disponibilidade do mesmo. O FMEA
tornou-se um procedimento padro na indstria para identificar e documentar cada
modo de falha potencial. No entanto, de acordo com a reviso da literatura e
pesquisa com especialistas, o FMEA tem alguns problemas e desvantagens na sua
aplicao, como incertezas na identificao das principais falhas e falta de recursos
para ser implementado. Alm disso, percebe-se lacunas no atendimento do principal
papel do FMEA, identificando e eliminando possveis modos de falha, e sua
aplicabilidade como instrumento de tomada de deciso na manuteno. O objetivo
deste trabalho desenvolver um FMEA orientado por processo, que integra a
metodologia Delphi para obter consenso de opinies entre especialistas, Anlise
Hierrquica de Processos (AHP) para realizar a avaliao de risco com base em
mltiplos critrios e um Business Process Management System (BPMS) para
instanciar seu ciclo de desenvolvimento. O mtodo proposto, intitulado de PAFMEA
(Process-Aware FMEA), tem o objetivo de enfrentar as principais deficincias do
FMEA relativas anlise de falhas em manuteno. O ambiente BPMS inclui
requisitos funcionais e no-funcionais identificados na reviso da literatura, a partir
da anlise de softwares de FMEA e pesquisa com especialistas da academia e da
rea industrial. O mtodo PAFMEA foi submetido avaliao de especialistas em
manuteno e profissionais em FMEA por meio de um estudo de aplicao em uma
empresa multinacional de manufatura de produtos da linha branca. Os resultados
positivos de sua aplicao industrial, confrontam o FMEA tradicional e revelam
atravs do PAFMEA uma nova percepo na avaliao e priorizao dos modos de
falha para a anlise de falhas em manuteno.
Palavras chave - Manuteno, FMEA, AHP, Metodologia Delphi, Processo.
IV
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 Research strategy. ..................................................................................... 5
Figure 1.2 Research dimensions................................................................................. 6
Figure 1.3 Document structure. ................................................................................... 7
Figure 2.1 The FMEA team (BERTSCHE, 2008). ..................................................... 12
Figure 2.2 The FMEA team according to VDA 4.2. ................................................... 13
Figure 2.3 FMEA approach according to AIAG (2008).............................................. 13
Figure 2.4 FMEA form (AIAG, 2008; BERTSCHE, 2008). ........................................ 15
Figure 2.5. Hierarchy diagram of an AHP (RODRIGUES, 2010). ............................. 18
Figure 2.6. Example of AHP structure. ...................................................................... 19
Figure 2.7. Generic Square Matrix. ........................................................................... 20
Figure 2.8. The seven steps of the Delphi approach................................................. 33
Figure 2.9 BPM domain (Kluska, 2014). ................................................................... 34
Figure 2.10. BPM life cycle........................................................................................ 37
Figure 2.11. BPM objects. ......................................................................................... 39
Figure 2.12. Connections objects of BPMN (OMG, 2011). ....................................... 40
Figure 2.13. Swim lanes elements of BPMN (OMG, 2011). ...................................... 40
Figure 2.14. Basic artifacts of BPMN (OMG, 2011). ................................................. 41
Figure 2.15. Histogram of RPN numbers generated from all possible combinations of
severity, occurrence and detection (SANKAR & PRABHU, 2000). ........................... 47
Figure 2.16. Distribution of proposed improvements researched. (LAURENTI et al.,
2012) ......................................................................................................................... 50
Figure 2.17 Process flow of the software (BELL et al., 1992). .................................. 51
Figure 2.18 Screenshot extract from the OpenFMECA software (RIGONI, 2009). ... 56
Figure 2.19 Hierarchy of the Italian Oil refinery system (Adpated from BEVILACQUA
& BARGLIA, 2000). ................................................................................................... 60
Figure 2.20 Model to select diagnostic technics and instrumentation (CARNERO,
2005). ........................................................................................................................ 61
Figure 2.21 Hierarchy system for the combined goal programming-AHP (BERTOLINI
& BEVILACQUA, 2006). ............................................................................................ 61
Figure 2.22 Hierarchy scheme and AHP results. ...................................................... 62
Figure 2.23 Hierarchy decision model to measure health, safety and environment
performance (CHANDIMA RATNAYAKE & MARKESET, 2010)............................... 63
Figure 2.24 AHP model to select the maintenance policy (TAN et al., 2011). .......... 64
Figure 2.25 Hierarchy model of AHP and ANP for maintenance selection (ZAIM et al.,
2012). ........................................................................................................................ 64
Figure 2.26 The hierarchical tree to calculate the fault priority (CARMIGNANI, 2008).
.................................................................................................................................. 66
Figure 2.27 Hierarchy of system (SUEBSOMRAN & TALABGEAW, 2010).............. 67
Figure 2.28 Software for maintenance priority for a termal plant (SUEBSOMRAN &
TALABGEAW, 2010) ................................................................................................. 67
Figure 2.29 Hierarchy model of integrating FMECA and ANP (ZAMMORI &
GABBRIELLI, 2011). ................................................................................................. 68
Figure 2.30 Distribution of FMEA problems and drawbacks according to its classes.
.................................................................................................................................. 73
Figure 2.31 Distribution of Methods, Guidelines, Software, Frameworks and
Approaches found in the literature review. ................................................................ 75
Figure 3.1 Framework of PA-FMEA. ......................................................................... 76
Figure 3.2 Basic IDEF0 syntax. ................................................................................. 77
Figure 3.3 Information flow of phase 1 and 2 activities. ............................................ 78
Figure 3.4 Specialists survey of their current field of work. ....................................... 79
Figure 3.5 Specialists current position. ..................................................................... 80
Figure 3.6 Specialists experience in maintenance. ................................................... 80
Figure 3.7 Quantity of FMEA sessions the specialist participated before. ................ 81
Figure 3.8 Total of resource availability responses. .................................................. 82
Figure 3.9 Total of responses related to the use and calculation of the RPN. .......... 83
Figure 3.10 Total of responses related to the behavior and treatment of the
participants. ............................................................................................................... 84
Figure 3.11 Responses of sentences #13, #14 and #15. .......................................... 84
Figure 3.12 PAFMEA methodology. .......................................................................... 85
Figure 3.13 AHP structure for the Risk Analysis of the PA-FMEA. ........................... 88
Figure 4.1 Screenshot example of IQ-Software. ....................................................... 95
Figure 4.2 FMEA matrix from IQ-Software. ............................................................... 96
Figure 4.3 Tree structure and software interface of FMEA Executive. ...................... 97
Figure 4.4 Failure analysis of FMEA Executive......................................................... 97
Figure 4.5 XFMEA screenshot of the FMEA form. .................................................... 98
Figure 4.6 XFMEA customizing and generating FMEA forms. .................................. 99
VI
VII
VIII
LIST OF TABLES
IX
Table 5.24 Responses about other aspects of the PAFMEA. ................................. 135
Table 5.25 Responses about the evaluation of the software used to support the
PAFMEA. ................................................................................................................. 136
XI
INDEX
1.
INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................... 1
1.1.
RESEARCH QUESTION ...................................................................................... 3
1.2.
OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................ 3
1.3.
RESEARCH JUSTIFICATION .............................................................................. 4
1.4.
METHODOLOGY APPROACH ............................................................................ 4
1.5.
DOCUMENT STRUCTURE .................................................................................. 7
2.
LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................................... 9
2.1. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................... 9
2.1.1.
FMEA (FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS) ..................................... 10
2.1.2. AHP (ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS) .................................................. 16
2.1.3.
DELPHI METHODOLOGY ............................................................................. 30
2.1.4.
BPM (BUSINESS PROCESS MANAGEMENT) ............................................. 34
2.2.
RELATED WORKS ............................................................................................. 43
2.2.1.
FMEA PROBLEMS AND DRAWBACKS ........................................................ 44
2.2.2.
FMEA AND DECISION MAKING METHODS RELATED WORKS ................ 50
2.3.
CONSIDERETIONS AND CHAPTER SYNTHESIS ........................................... 70
3.
PAFMEA FRAMEWORK ...................................................................................... 76
3.1.
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERING AND FORMALIZATION .................................... 77
3.1.1.
SURVEY ANALYSIS ...................................................................................... 79
3.2.
PAFMEA PROPOSITION ................................................................................... 85
3.3.
PAFMEA IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS ................................................. 91
3.4.
CONSIDERATIONS AND CHAPTER SYNTESIS .............................................. 92
4.
PA-FMEA DEVELOPMENT CYCLE .................................................................... 93
4.1.
FMEA SOFTWARE REVIEW ............................................................................. 93
4.1.1.
APIS IQ-SOFTWARE ..................................................................................... 94
4.1.2.
FMEA EXECUTIVE ........................................................................................ 96
4.1.3.
RELIASOFT XFMEA ...................................................................................... 98
4.1.4.
RAM COMMANDER ....................................................................................... 99
4.1.5.
FMEA INSPECTOR ...................................................................................... 101
4.1.6.
SOFTWARE SUMMARY .............................................................................. 102
4.2.
SURVEY OF SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS .................................................. 103
4.3.
PAFMEA SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS ........................................................ 104
XII
1. INTRODUCTION
hierarchical structure, where each level of this hierarchy is part of the problem to be
solved (Saaty, 1990). This technique makes comparative judgment between multiple
criteria and places them in a ranking, thus defines the best alternative for each
criterion in question. The relation characteristic of this method allows dealing with
uncertainties inherent to the evaluation process considering the decision domain,
criteria and actors involved.
Allied to these methods and techniques it is important to understand the failure
analysis process, which allows a better identification of failures and gives a clearer
understanding of the tasks performed in the business (PINHO, 2006). Furthermore,
another vision of process can be found on the specialists tacit knowledge related to
the operational knowledge in the use of the tools cited before (FMEA, FTA and PRA)
and the perspective on the conduction of decision-making methods (AHP, ANP and
Fuzzy). These components of knowledge characterizes an intrinsically process
approach, motivating their formalization, instantiation and incorporation through
maintenance tools with features focused on processes, not on a set of functionalities
decoupled from their procedural meanings.
In this sense emerge the BPM (Business Process Management) lifecycles
and BPMS (Business Process Management System) platforms as elements of
innovation to be used in maintenance. They
characterize
Process
Aware
makes the decision-making problem of the failure analysis in a more complete and
thorough way than the regular FMEA, taking several factors into account and
characterizing a multi-criteria decision making approach.
The process approach in the concern of maintenance management systems is
innovative in the sense that existent technologies as Computerized Maintenance
Management System (CMMS) and Enterprise Asset Management (EAM) systems
which are intrinsically oriented to functions and not processes. The support of
process models with the widely accepted BPMN industrial notation (Business
Process Management Notation) in BPMS platforms allows the support of continuous
cycle improvement by reducing the response time between the need of the specialist
user (new process design and business rules) and its implementation by the
management resource (software).
These are important requirements that a FMEA development cycle must fulfill,
characterizing the scientific context and scope of this work. The adoption of a
process approach and inspired in the PAIS from BPM domain, leads to a new
proposition on FMEA, titled from now in this document as PAFMEA Process Aware
FMEA.
1.1.
RESEARCH QUESTION
OBJECTIVES
1.3.
RESEARCH JUSTIFICATION
1.4.
METHODOLOGY APPROACH
The methodology is the study or science of route, with the pretense that this is
a rational path to facilitate knowledge, besides bringing implied the possibility to
serve and to be used by several people, i.e., it can be followed repeatedly and
indefinitely (MAGALHAES, 2006).
The methodology can be seen as the general knowledge and skills necessary
for the researchers to guide themselves in the investigation process, make timely
decisions, select concepts, hypotheses, techniques and appropriate data. It is also
the disciple that relates to epistemology and philosophy of science (THIOLLENT,
1996).
The Figure 1.1 illustrates the process adopted for this research (research
strategy) to explore the problem, synthesizing the organization of the research and
how it will be presented. This drawing constitutes an orientation guide that enables
Chronological*Order*
Descrip(on* Phases*
Explora(on*
Development*
Execu(on*
Conclusion*
Conclusions*and*
Final*Results*
FMEA*
Knowledge*
Domain*
Proposi(on*of*
Model*and*BPM*
Development*
Cycle*
Execu(on*of*
Case*Study*and*
Analysis*of*
Results*
Literature*
Review*Scien(c*
Database*
Proposi(on*of*
Model*
Prepara(on*of*
Case*
Discussion*of*
Results*
Literature*
Review*
Standards**
Specica(on*of*
BPM*
Implementa(on*
of*BPMS*
Final*
Conclusions*
FMEA*SoEware*
Inves(ga(on*
Process*
Modeling*
Data*Acquisi(on*
Response*to*
Research*
Ques(on*
Experts*
Consulta(on*
Development*of*
BPMS*
Compila(on*of*
Results*
Possible*Future*
Works*
main drawbacks, issues and formalize the preliminary attributes of the new
approach.
2. The development phase is responsible by the proposition of the new
approach, which integrates Delphi Methodology to obtain consensus of
specialists opinions, Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to prioritize the failure
modes based on multiple criteria, and BPM to instantiate the use of these
methods and incorporate the specialists knowledge through business process
models in a BPMS environment. Furthermore, this phase presents the
development cycle of the BPM (Business Process Management). The Figure
1.2 illustrates the research scope, integration and objective, which
characterize the new approach, the PAFMEA (Process-Aware FMEA).
1.5.
DOCUMENT STRUCTURE
This document is structured in 6 chapters and can be seen in the Figure 1.3.
Chapter 1 discusses the context of the research, the research question, justification
and objectives. It also details the methodology approach to be used in order to
achieve the research objectives and to answer the research question.
Chapter
1
-
INTRODUCTION
Research
Question
Research
Justification
Objectives
Methodology
Approach
Document
Structure
Delphi
Methodology
AHP
BPM
Related
Works
FMEA
integrated
with
other
methods
Problems
and
drawbacks
about
FMEA
PAFMEA
Implementation
and
Analysis
PAFMEA
Proposition
Considerations
and
Chapter
Synteshis
Survey
of
Software
Requirements
PAFMEA
Software
Requirements
Software
Development
Considerations
and
Chapter
Syntesis
Discussion
of
Results
Final Survey
Chapter
6
CONCLUSIONS
Final
Conclusions
Suggestions
for
Future
Works
the FMEA problems found in the literature, discussion that aims to direct the proposal
presentation in the next chapter.
Chapter 3 presents and discusses the PAFMEA framework, which is form by a
methodological basis taking into consideration the development cycle and a
technological basis based on a BPMS platform.
Chapter 4 is the development of the integrated approach into a Business
Process Management System (BPMS), which has the objective to instantiate the
PAFMEA and to facilitate its implementation. However, before the development
process, a variety of FMEA software review and a survey are performed to identify
the main requirements for the BPMS to be developed.
Chapter 5 exposes an application scenario on the implementation of the
PAFMEA instantiated in a BPMS. Furthermore, this chapter will also present a
discussion about the results obtained and a survey used to evaluate the participants
perceptions about the new method.
The last chapter presents the final conclusions of the research and possible
future works related to the present subject.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. BACKGROUND
10
periodic revision or substitutions solve the problem (Wilmeth; Usrey, 2000). However,
studies in aviation determined that only 11% of components fail due to wear and
fatigue (Lafraia, 2001). Furthermore, according to Rausand (1998), manufactures
recommendations may not be based on real factors, because many times in order to
maximize profit or decrease responsibility they orient short maintenance intervals.
In the methodological field, research in the areas of maintenance and
reliability, as well as the mechanisms and physics of equipments failures, gave rise
to techniques for analyzing failure modes (FMEA and FTA). However the qualitative
approach of these methods, the involvement of the maintenance people and the
decision-making perspective create barriers and uncertainties to implement them.
In the other hand, decision-making tools such as AHP, ANP and Fuzzy have
become to be recent tools to support in maintenance. However, the fuzzy approach
is mathematically hard to deal and testing an extensive set of rules is a complex and
time-consuming activity (BRAGLIA and BEVILACQUA, 2000). Therefore, some
authors proposed to substitute fuzzy logic with multi criteria decision methods such
as AHP and to assess the importance of the failure modes by means of pairwise
comparison (ZAMMORI and GABBRIELLI, 2012). .
The pillars of the proposal, as shown in Figure 1.2, will be discussed in the
following sections: 2.1.1 FMEA; 2.1.2 AHP; 2.1.3 Delphi; 2.1.4 BPM.
2.1.1. FMEA (FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS)
11
the author affirms that a failure can be classify into various aspects, such as origin,
extension, velocity, manifestation, criticality or age.
The FMEA 4th Edition is a reference manual to be used by suppliers to
Chrysler LLC, Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation as a guide to
assist them in the development of both Design and Process FMEAs. This manual
defines FMEA as an analytical methodology used to ensure that potential problems
have been considered and addressed throughout the product and development
process. This document also states that FMEA is a tool in risk evaluation, which is
considered to be a method to identify severity of potential effects of failure and to
provide an input to mitigating measure to reduce risk (AIAG, 2008).
Kretli (2011) also affirms that the FMEA method has the followings objectives
in maintenance:
It is also common to include, besides the basic aspects above, the failure
symptoms, script solution, the failure mechanism, failure rate and recommendations
(ROZENFELD, 2012).
The FMEA procedure according to VDA (Verband Der Automobilindustrie
German Association of the Automotive Industry) is the most extensive and commonly
used procedure, especially in the automotive industry, in Germany and in Europe as
a whole (BERTSHE, 2008).
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis is applied in a session where people are
gathered arising from areas of the company or manufacture floor, with varied
12
13
weakened, which could lead to team members, who do not feel integrated into the
discussions, which in turn leads to an inevitable upset in FMEA meetings.
The FMEA team according to VDA 4.2 is made up of four internal groups, see
Figure 2.2: department, responsible, experts and method specialist.
Define)the)Scope
Define)the)
Customer
3
Identify)Functions,)
Requirements)and)
Specifications
Identify)Potential)
Failure)Modes
Identify)Potential)
Causes
Identify)Potential)
Effects
Recommended)
Actions)and)
Results
Identifying)and)
Assessing)Risk
9
10
RISK
PRIORITY
NUMBER
Identify)Controls
8
14
The task Identify the Team (1) is responsible for selecting the FMEA team
leader, who should select team members with relevant experience and necessary
authority. Defining scope (2) establishes the boundary of the FMEA analysis. It
defines what is included and excluded, determined based on the type of the FMEA
being developed. The scope needs to be established at the start of the process to
assure consistent direction and focus. Defining the customer (3) is one of the most
important parts of any process. There are four major customers to be considered in
the FMEA process (AIAG, 2008), which are:
END USER: the person or organization that will utilize the product;
15
Process.FMEA
Members.of.Team:
Potential.
Item/Function
Failure.Mode
Project.Responsible
FMEA.Responsible
FMEA.No
Prepare.By:...........................Date:
Approved.by:........................................................Date:
Product.Name:
Code:
Current.Project.Control
Results.of.Actions
Potential.
Potential.
Recommended. Responsibility.
S
RPN
Actions.
Effects
Causes Prevention O Detection D
Actions
Target.Date
S O D New.RPN
Implemented
Record.and.assesment.of.results
Proposition.of.actions.to.reduce.the.risk
Definition/determination.of.all.current.controls
List.all.the.potential.causes.of.failure
List.all.the.potential.effects.of.failure
List.all.the.potential.failure.modes
Name.of.Component/Operation.and.Its.function
16
The decision-making is a common activity inside the companies and daily the
employees confront difficulties in making decision, because more than one objective
and criteria must be satisfy to reach the best choice between the existing alternatives
(BELTON, 1990 apud RAFATI, 2008). Multi criteria decision (MCDM) refers to the
decision-making that considers multiple criteria where they might be contradictory.
The MCDM problems are quite common in several areas and its study
development is related to the advance of the computer technology, which allows a
more detailed analysis of complex MCDM problems. According to Xu and Yang
(2001), there are two types of MCDM problems: i. problems where the decisionmaking have a finite number of solutions, ii. decision-making with infinite solutions. In
the second type, the problem is considered to be a optimization of multiple
objectives. For this research we consider the first type of MCDM.
There are several methods to solve MCDM problems, including Analytical
Hierarchy Process (AHP), which will be used in this research. The AHP method is a
technique of decision analysis and planning of multiple criteria developed by L. Saaty
in 1991 (SCHIMDT, 1995). The theory reflects the way in which the human mind
conceptualizes and structures a complex problem (SCHIMDT, 1995). When faced
with large number of elements, controllable or not, and which integrate a decision
situation, the mind adds such elements into groups according to common proprieties
(PAMPLONA, 1993).
The method is characterized by simplicity and robustness, allowing its
application to extend to numerous areas, such as strategic planning, marketing,
quality and productivity programs, analysis of projects, maintenance, among others
(ABREU, 2000).
The AHP approach developed a valuation model with weights for criteria,
integrating different metrics into a single panel points to select elements based on a
rank (CHEN, 2006). Furthermore, is the MCDM method with the highest scientific
evidence (BRAGLIA, 2006), being objective of investigation through the ontological
representation (LIAO et al, 2014). Aguiar (2007) highlights that in AHP, the decisionmaker identify a problem of evaluation in a hierarchical structure formed by a target
of evaluation, with criteria and alternatives that correspond to a hierarchical node. For
17
Wang, Chu and Wu (2007), AHP is the most popular method for multi-criteria
decision and allows the measurement of consistency of judgments of decision, highly
relevant for the relative evaluation where uncertainty is present.
Schmidt (1995) affirms that the main advantages of AHP over other multicriteria methods are the ease of use and the ability to handle inconsistent judgments.
Furthermore, Saaty (1990) lists the advantages of a hierarchy process:
The hierarchies are stable, because small changes have small effects
and additions to a well-structured hierarchy do not disturb their
performance.
In the other hand, Schmidt (1995) also lists some disadvantages and
limitations of the AHP method:
2.1.2.1.
According to Rodrigues (2010, p.36), basically the method is divided into three
distinct steps:
18
Methodology Decomposition
The first step of the method is to perform the decomposition of the problem in
a hierarchy form, which is important to define the purpose, criteria and alternatives,
see Figure 2.5 that illustrates this structure on the basis of project management
domain.
Project D
Project C
Project B
Project A
Duration
Project D
Project C
Project B
Project A
Risk
Project D
Project C
Project B
Project A
Cost
19
II.
III.
IV.
Construction.
20
!"!
like the
= !"
!!
!"
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
Considering that the matrix will always be square, the inferior triangle of the
matrix is the inverse of the superior triangle of the matrix, thus the quantity of
comparison needed are:
= ( 1)/2
Equation 2.1 Number of comparison needed.
Where n is the number of columns or lines of the matrix.
For the qualitative comparison Saaty proposes a comparative table with
values from 1 to 9, which is dominated as a fundamental scale of absolute numbers,
shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1. The fundamental scales in AHP (Saaty, 1990).
Intensity of
Importance
1
Definition
Description
Equal Importance
3
5
7
Moderate importance of
Essential or strong
importance
Extreme importance
2,4,6,8
Intermediate values
21
Pamplona (1993) interpreted the nine levels of the Saaty table in a more
simple and clearer the comparative points. This adaptive table can be seen in Table
2.2.
Table 2.2. Table proposed by Saaty according to Pamplona (1993).
Importance
Definition
Equivalent
Description
Both elements are equal in
importance
Intermediate value
Weak
Intermediate value
Moderate
Intermediate value
Strong
Intermediate Value
Absolute
Inverse
!" =
1
!"
For quantitative comparison, the table 2.1 and 2.2 are not necessary, since the
concrete values already exist for the pair comparison. This type of comparison will be
demonstrated in sequence.
To exemplify the judgment of criteria, the next calculations will be based on
the hierarchy shown in Figure 2.5, which contains three criteria: cost, risk and
duration. This example is widely used in the literature and can be found in Rodrigues
(2010) and Saaty (1990).
22
Considering that the relative importance of the criteria can vary conform the
people involved, this judgment has a qualitative nature. As an example, follow the
respective comparison of the criteria according to table 2.
Risk has importance strong (7) over NPV (Net Present Value);
It is important to notice that the modeling and reading of the table is done
relating the first column with the first line, example: the criterion cost has the
importance moderate (5) over the criterion duration, as shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3. Modeling and reading the comparison table.
Cost
Risk
Cost
NPV
5
Risk
Duration
According to the assumptions before, the comparison table can be model as
shown in Table 2.4 and as decimal values in Table 2.5:
Table 2.4. Comparison Table.
Cost
Risk
NPV
Cost
1/3
Risk
Duration
1/5
1/7
Cost
Risk
NPV
Cost
0,3333
Risk
Duration
0,2000
0,1429
23
To exemplify the alternatives judgment, the hierarchy of Figure 2.5 will also be
used and to realize the comparison the values from Table 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 will be
used.
Table 2.6. Matrix for the NPV (Net Present Value) criterion.
Alternative
NPV
Project A
95
Project B
85
Project C
90
Project D
80
Cost
Project A
R$ 900,00
Project B
R$ 1200,00
Project C
R$ 850,00
Project D
R$ 1200,00
Risk
Project A
32
Project B
14
Project C
23
Project D
07
The criteria duration, cost and risk are measurable; therefore it is possible to
affirm that their values are quantitative.
ii. Normalization and weight calculation
The comparison between elements of different kind is invalid if executed
based on their absolute values. For example, is incoherent compare the criteria
duration (95) with risk (32) because they have different units. Thence, the AHP
24
method do not utilized their absolute values to form the comparison table, but uses
the relative values inside a context or criteria.
The transformation of matrix with absolute values in matrix with independent
magnitude is called normalization. It allows that elements with different magnitudes
can be compared between each other with relative importance and weights. Thus,
the comparison is established as a ranking versus other ranking.
The normalized matrix is realize trough a division of each matrix element by
the sum of its respective column, as shown in equation 2.2:
!" =
!"
!
!!! !"
= 1,2,3, ,
According to this equation, the normalization from Table 2.5 can be realized
and seen in Table 2.9.
Table 2.9. Normalization of the comparison matrix.
Cost
Risk
NPV
Cost
0,2381
0,2258
0,3846
Risk
0,7143
0,6774
0,5385
Duration
0,0476
0,0968
0,0769
Once the comparison matrix is created, then calculate the eigenvector of each
matrix. The eigenvector is a matrix unlinked from magnitudes because it contains
only the order of the relative priority (or ranking) of the elements, based on
comparing pairs (RODRIGUES, 2010, p.38).
The calculations of the eigenvector or the relative weighted matrix are used to
give weights to the elements, as shown in equation 2.3.
!!!! !"
! =
, = 1,2,3, ,
25
Considering that the eigenvector represents the relative value of the element
!" against all of them, the sum of all eigenvectors must be equal to 1, as shown in
equation 2.4.
As an example, follows the eigenvectors calculation and the ranking for all the
alternatives within the criteria duration, cost and risk. Furthermore, the calculation of
the eigenvector and the ranking for the normalized comparison matrix of criteria are
shown in tables 2.10, 2.11, 2.12 and 2.13.
Table 2.10. Eigenvector and ranking for the criterion NPV.
NPV
Wi
Ranking
Project A
95
0,2714
Project B
85
0,2429
Project C
90
0,2571
Project D
80
0,2286
Wi
Ranking
Project A
R$900,00
0,2168
Project B
R$1200,00
0,2892
Project C
R$850,00
0,2048
Project D
R$1200,00
0,2892
Wi
Ranking
Project A
32
0,4211
Project B
14
0,1842
Project C
23
0,3026
Project D
07
0,0921
26
Risk
NPV
Wi
Ranking
Cost
0,2381
0,2258
0,3846
0,2828
Risk
0,7143
0,6774
0,5385
0,6434
NPV
0,0476
0,0769
0,0738
0,0738
iii.
27
= !
Equation 2.9. The sum of the weighted values.
As an example, the calculation shown in equation 2.10 uses the comparative
matrix and its respective eigenvector.
1
0,333 5
0,2828
0,8662
= 3
1
7 0,6434 = 2,0083
0,2 0,1429 1
0,0738
0,2223
Equation 2.10. Example of the sum of the weighted values.
After the conclusion of the sum operation it is necessary to calculate the
eigenvalue of the obtained matrix (!"# ). The !"# is the arithmetic mean of the
division between the sum of the weighted value (W) and the eigenvector (! ),
represented by the equation 2.11.
Following the example from equation 2.10 the calculation of the eigenvalue
can be seen in equation 2.12.
!"#
0,8662
0,2828
2,0083 0,6434
0,2223
0,0738
=
= 3,0665
3
(!!"# !!)
(!!!)
28
(3,0665 3)
= 0,03325
(3 1)
100%
RI
0.00
0.58
0.90
1.12
1.24
1.32
1.41
1.45
0,03325
100% = 5,73%
0,58
29
matrix with all alternatives eigenvalues by the criteria eigenvector matrix (SAATY,
1994). It is important to notice that the eigenvector is a matrix where the biggest the
element, the more preferential it will be, however this approach it not always valid
(RODRIGUES, 2010). In the context of project selection presented (Figure 2.5), the
approaches are:
The biggest the NPV, the better will be the project because of its bigger
return of investment, i.e., the eigenvector ranking is directly proportional
to the criterion.
In the other hand, the smallest is the Risk and the Cost, the better the
project will be for the company, i.e., the eigenvector ranking is inversely
proportional to these criteria.
In this situation, the NPV is a factor with positive characteristics and the other
two with negative characteristics. Thus, the negative eigenvectors are compared
between them, separately from the positive eigenvectors. The result will be the
reduction to two eigenvectors, been one positive and another negative, allowing the
relationship between two rankings, dividing the positive by the negative eigenvector
(SAATY, 1994).
First of all, the equation 2.17 demonstrates intersection between the projects
alternatives with the positive criteria NPV (Table 2.10).
0,2714
0,0200
0,2429
0,0179
0,0738 =
0,2571
0,0190
0,2286
0,0169
Equation 2.17. Intersection between the alternatives and the criterion NPV.
From tables 2.11 and 2.12, the normalized value of cost and risk are used with
their respective eigenvalues from table 2.13 to calculate the intersection between the
negative criteria. This calculation can be seen in equation 2.18.
0,2168
0,2892
0,2048
0,2892
0,4211
0,3322
0,1842
0,2828
0,2003
=
0,3026
0,6434
0,2526
0,0921
0,1410
Equation 2.18. Intersection between the alternatives and the criteria Cost and Risk.
30
The final step is the division between the positive dimension by the negative
dimension, values obtained in equation 2.17 and 2.18, and shown in equation 2.19.
0,0200
0,3322
0,0602
0,0179
0,2003
0,0882
=
0,0190
0,2526
0,0752
0,0169
0,1410
0,1200
Equation 2.19. Division between the positive dimension by the negative one.
The equation 2.19 shows the final ranking for the example threated and the
results are shown in Table 2.15:
AHP Score
Project
0,1200
0,0882
0,0752
0,0602
31
and
planning
university
campus
and
curriculum
development;
According to Vichas (1982), three elements stand out in the Delphi process:
the anonymity, the control feedback and the statistical treatment of the responses
collected.
According to Enoki (2006) the anonymity means that the groups of specialists
do not know who is participating in the project or if they know any participant, they do
not communicate directly. The purpose of the anonymity is to avoid that some
people, because of their personal characteristics or position in the company,
dominate the opinions. Furthermore, when more experience specialists are
participating, the others tend to go along with their opinion, something that would
change the representative of the responses.
The control feedback means that every round of answers, the participants
need to know a little bit of the others responses. This process allows that everyone
reflects before answer the next round, changing peoples opinion going toward a
consensus. Enoki (2006) affirms that the statistical treatment of the data is the
evaluation of each set of answers, which is consider and inserted to a database
individually.
Several studies (Ament, 1970; Wissema, 1982; Helmer 1983) support and
advise the Delphi application. These studies suggest that, in general, the method is
useful to explore and unravel specific and one-dimensional questions. The
application of Delphi is suitable for situations that possess one or more of the
following characteristics (Linstone and Turoff, 1975):
1. the problem does not lend itself to be solved by analytical techniques,
but can benefit from subjective analysis on a collective basis;
32
33
Step
1
Determine
and
formulate
the
questions
Step
2
Select
the
specialists
Step
3
Formulate
a
first
q uestionnaire
t o
send
t o
the
specialists
Step
4
Analyze
t he
responses
of
the
first
q uestionnaire
Step
5
34
second questionnaire, which is responsible to inform the specialists the results of the
first round, thus they can send the responses and justify them if they differ from the
general tendency. The sixth step is the submission of the third questionnaire, which
is intended only to the specialists that had the outliners responses. This comparison
of opinions exerts a moderate influence and facilitates the convergence between on
the subject. A good degree of convergence is reached usually with the fourth
questionnaire, however, if does not happen, the cycle continue. The seventh and last
step is the analysis of the data, which should be done with statistical support to
identify convergence and divergence on the responses. This step also has the
objective to summarize the process and develop a final report, which should be
presented to the participants.
Deschamps (2013) declares that a Delphi study is usually organized in rounds,
with a set of specialists participating in each round. The author also determines that
the specialists opinions could be register through surveys, interview or panels,
among other possible techniques or tools. Results should be compiled and
distributed to all participants before each round, except for the first round.
2.1.4. BPM (BUSINESS PROCESS MANAGEMENT)
According to Kluska (2014) the BPM domain is divided into three knowledge
groups:
Business
Process
Management,
Business
Process
Modeling
Vision&of&BPM&Universe&
Business'Process'
Management'
Business'Process'
Modeling'
Management&
Governance&
Centre&of&excellence&in&
process&
Maturity&model&BPMM&
based&in&CMMI&
Guidelines&to&implement&
BPM&
Process&Drawings&
Business&Process&Modeling&
Analysis&of&business&process&
Management&of&business&
process&performance&
Process&management&
Automa4on'of'Business'
Process'
BPMS&
BPM&SoBware&
SOA&&architecture&
oriented&to&service&
and
35
Simplifies rules;
36
organization and its business processes from the perspective of the customer, from
outside to inside.
According to De Sordi (2005), the business process is a mean of integrating all
organizational assets and its management happens when these assets work in sync,
assuring them efficiency. The main resources used in BPM are described in Table
2.16.
Table 2.16. Resources used in BPM.
Resource
Definition
Knowledge
The
knowledge
captured
and
shared
with
the
Infrastructure
Human resources
Responsibility
Information
and communication
This section aims to show concepts, steps for implementation of BPM and
existing systems. It will be divided into three key points to achieve the objectives
described: phases of BPM, BPMN notation and BPM systems (BPMS).
37
2.1.4.1.
Phases of BPM
Design
and
Analysis
Monitoring
Implementa1on
Execu1on
38
The planning stage begins the BPM cycle and is the most important phase to
the success of the project, because at this moment are chosen the critical processes
of the organization and the alignment of processes with the organizations strategy
will be realized. At this stage it is essential the participation and support of senior
management with BPM, because some actions will be executed that cross various
departments, creating frictions, conflicts of interest and lack of commitment of the
proposed targets. If the support of senior management is poor or nonexistent, its
progression may be comprised (Wolff, et al, 2009).
The second step is the modeling and optimization of processes, phase
responsible for the modeling of the current state of the process and the optimization
and modeling of the desired state of the process, when applicable (Wolff, 2009).
The third step is the execution of the processes, time that the users of the
system will see the BPM project. At this stage the deployment of the new process
according to the specifications previously obtained through the planning step
performed. This step is often considered as a separate project because of its
importance. The execution of processes is crucial and a critical stage, since that time
will be perceived the implications of change management (Wolff et al, 2009).
The fourth and final step is the control and data analysis, where it is possible
to obtain information about the processes in place to use them in the development of
indicators to compare with the old processes, enabling the understanding and
evaluation of the proposed targets. Risks, cost and quality are examples of indicators
used by organizations (Wolff et al, 2009).
2.1.4.2.
BPM Notation
39
These allow for the development of diagrams that are usually quite familiar to most
business analysts, because they are very similar as flowcharts.
The four basic categories of elements in BPMN are flow objects, connecting
objects, swim lanes and artifacts, which are described below.
Flow Objects
BPMN 2.0 describes a set of three objects of flow shown in Figure 2.11:
activities, events and gateways. Activities are represented by rectangles with
rounded corners and are used to demonstrate some kind of work done in the
company. Events are represented by circles and demonstrate the course of a
process and affect the flow of a process and eventually may have a cause or impact.
Gateways are represented by a diamond and are used to control the divergence and
convergence of a control flow, determining decisions and also traditional parallel
paths or junction of paths (OMG, 2011)
Activity
Event
Gateway
40
Swim Lanes
BPMN 2.0 uses the concept of swimming lanes as a mechanism to organize
activities in different visual categories in order to illustrate different functional
capabilities or responsibilities. It uses two types of constructs, lanes and pools,
illustrated in the Figure 2.13.
41
Artifacts
The notation of BPMN 2.0 defines three basic types of artifacts, illustrated in
Figure 2.14: data objects, annotations and groups.
2.1.4.3.
42
whether they are products or services, while maintaining a high level of system
customization to your business (PUNTAR, 2009).
Most BPMS projects arise from the desire to improve corporate performance
although a good portion seeks flexibility as the main motivation. Some difficulties are
commonly encountered are reluctance in accepting the need for change and
problems when the existing culture of the organization is changed. The most
important variables for the project success are the commitment of management,
communication with users and management and user collaboration with the project
(PARKES, 2002 apud PUNTAR, 2009).
Usually a BPMS presents four main features: define the process, control the
process execution, control of interactions and management/monitor of executions
(BORGES 2001 apud PUNTAR, 2009). These features are, in general, aligned with
the steps of the BPM cycle cited in the literature, supporting the development.
a) Define the process
The definition of a process is the implementation stage in the BPMS tool. The
process model must submit all information necessary for the system to run the
process, among them we can highlight: data about
process, their starting and ending conditions, rules for its implementation, users in
charge, documents handled in each activity and applications to be used (LENDRIKE
2003 apud PUNTAR, 2009).
b) Control the process execution
Once deployed, a process can be executed through its interpretation by the
BPMS that monitors and coordinates the execution of the process. The execution of
a process corresponds to the activation of instances of this process. Multiple
instances of the same process or different processes can be running simultaneously
in a BPMS (PUNTAR, 2009).
43
c) Control of interactions
When forwarding activities for the actors responsible, the BPMS adds items to
the work lists of these actors, which contain activities of several instances from
processes that are running at that moment. The actors, in turn, access their job
listings and select the task they wish to perform. The execution of the task involves
manipulation of documents, decision making or filling data. Activities are
implemented in workplaces of the performers through specific applications or tools.
The completion of the activity replaces the process flow, and triggers new activities,
according to the results generated (LENDRIKE 2003 apud PUNTAR, 2009).
d) Management/Monitor of executions
The BPMS offers management and monitoring process execution tools. The
process model itself has the status of activities performed and running, or to be
performed. Some BPMS still have resources to measure performance and statistics
that assist in projecting improvements (PUNTAR, 2009).
Usually there is distinction between ordinary users and with administration
rights, so that the definition and instantiation of processes should be made by users
with these responsibilities. Similarly, functions of suspension and cancellation of
instances can be restricted to users with administrative privilege (BORGES 2001
apud PUNTAR, 2009).
2.2.
RELATED WORKS
This section is used to identify, evaluate and interpreted the main works
available in the literature relevant to the research question. This chapter is divided
into three sections:
FMEA problems and drawbacks: this section has the objective to give a
brief summary on the main works that give a productive comment or a
insight about the problems and drawbacks of the FMEA method.
44
RPN is unable to assign weight to the three factors, which may exist
during the analysis process and needed by the participants;
45
The conversion of scores are linear for the chance of failure, but
nonlinear for the chance of detection;
Different sets of the three factors can produce the exact same value
of RPN, however, the hidden implications may be totally different;
Likelihood of occurrence
Remote
Low
1/20000
1/10000
1/2000
1/1000
1/200
1/100
1/20
1/10
10
1/2
Moderate
High
Very High
46
Likelihood of occurrence
Remote
0-5
Low
6-15
16-25
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-65
66-75
76-85
10
86-100
Moderate
High
Very High
Sankar and Prabhu (2000) point out that the RPN scale itself has some
non-intuitive statistical properties. The initial and correct observation that the
scale starts at 1 and ends at 1000 often leads to incorrect assumptions about the
middle of the scale. The Table 2.19 contains some common faulty assumptions.
The 1000 RPN numbers generated from all possible combinations of severity,
occurrence and detections are shown on the histogram in Figure 2.15. It is
possible to notice that RPNs are heavily distributed at the bottom of the scale and
that nearly every RPN value is non-unique, some being recycle as many as 24
times.
Table 2.19. RPN scale statistical data (SANKAR & PRABHU, 2000)
Incorrect Assumption
roughly 500
Roughly 50% of RPN values are above
47
Figure 2.15. Histogram of RPN numbers generated from all possible combinations of
severity, occurrence and detection (SANKAR & PRABHU, 2000).
FMEA is especially efficient if applied in the analysis of elements which
cause the whole system failure. However, it can be very complicated in the case
of complex systems, which have multiple functions and are comprised of a
number of components, since a variety of information on the system has to be
considered (RAUSAND, 2004).
Despite of the popularity of the method, several problems related to its
implementation and usefulness has been reported in the literature. Some of these
problems include: lack of well-define terms (KARA-ZAITRI et al., 1991; LEE,
2001); problems in identifying key failures (BEDNARZ and MARRIOTT, 1988);
reusing knowledge about failures (AJAYI and SMART, 2008; LOUGH et al., 2008;
STONE et al., 2005). Depending on the size of the analyzed system, the number
of potential failure modes can be very large, invalidating a complete FMEA study.
According to Popovic (2012), a thorough FMEA demands time and
provision of necessary resources during the design and process development,
when design and process changes can be implemented with least difficulty and
financial means. PIPIC (2003) affirms that the main weaknesses of this method
are:
1. FMEA process is tiring and time consuming;
2. There are few overlaps, actually even a gap, between design and
process FMEA;
3. The failures are incompletely represented by FMEA method;
48
4. FMEA does not identify the current failures that occur in real time.
49
Table 2.20. Problems listed and ordered by the frequency showed in the study.
(LAURENTI et al., 2012)
Class
Problem
Frequency
Risk Definition
34,91%
precise.
Resources
31,13%
24,53%
21,70%
Risk Definition
20,75%
importance.
Risk Definition
19,81%
16,04%
Risk Definition
15,09%
Information
14,15%
Management
Organizational
Culture
members.
12,26%
50
4%
16%
1%
1%
Methods
44%
Guidelines
Systems
34%
Frameworks
Approaches
Tools
In the literature, like previous signalized, there a large quantity of works that
are based on other methods and integrated to other methods to overcome some of
the FMEA problems and drawbacks. This section has the purpose to show the main
works of this context related to the research question. Furthermore, this stage will
also present the main works related to the application of decision-making methods in
the maintenance domain. This section is divided into three sub-section: (i) FMEA
Works, (ii) Decision Making Works and (iii) FMEA Integrated to Decision Making
Methods Works.
51
engineer uses a system diagram, instead of coding a set of situations and answers
that the user would find. The main advantage of this approach is that it is not
necessary to consider and solve all situations that could be found in a period after the
analysis. The Figure 2.17 shows the process flow of the software, however the
software is not process oriented, which obligates the user to have a detailed training
before using the tool.
52
Gilchrist (1993) attacks the main FMEA drawback by modifying the traditional
risk priority number by considering the failure cost and proposed a different model
called Expected Cost (EC). The equation of this model is = . . ! . ! , where
C is the failure cost, n denotes the annual production quantity, ! is the probability of
failure and ! is the probability of detecting the failure. The main advantage of this
approach is that aggregates the failure cost of the equipment, however, due to the
difficulty of estimating the probability of failure and the probability of detecting the
failure, this model is not used frequently.
Ben-Daya and Raouf (1996) indirectly attacks the traditional risk priority
number affirming that scoring the factors using the 1-9 scale is not suitable and the
treatment of equal importance for each factor is not practical. The authors concluded
that the chance of occurrence should be more important than the chance of
detection, and proposed a new formulation for chance of occurrence by raising the 19 scale to power of 2. By changing the equal importance of the factors, the authors
minimize one of the main drawbacks cited in the literature, however not all the users
share the opinion that occurrence is more important than detection or severity, which
creates a limitation for the approach implementation.
Sankar and Prabhu (2000) developed a modified approach for prioritization of
failures in a System FMEA, which uses the rank 1-1000 called the Risk Priority
Ranks (RPR) to represent the increasing risk of the 1000 possible severityoccurrence-detection combinations.
53
geographic locations. The user uses the web browser to connect to the FMEA server
and enter the information needed to complete the FMEA. The inserted data is saved
in the database and can be accessed at any time. Therefore, the main advance of
the approach is that face-to-face meetings are not needed due to the web-based
software. However, the software does not minimize the main FMEA drawback, the
RPN calculation and analysis.
Chang (2001) proposed to use a different method that integrates Grey Theory
to calculate the risk priority number of FMEA. Grey theory, proposed by Julong Deng
in 1982, deals with decisions characterized by incomplete information, and explores
the system behavior using relational analysis and model construction (Chang, 1996).
This theory also provides measure to analyze relationship between discrete
qualitative and quantitative series. In Changs (2001) approach, the decision factors
(occurrence, detection and severity) can be assigned with different weights,
according to the process or the specialists need. The different set of weights will
result in different pattern of priority, thus, the limited resources can be effectively
allocated to the most critical items based on the process improvement strategies.
Furthermore, the problem of linear and nonlinear conversion for chance of
occurrence and detection are eliminated using the approach proposed. However,
there is no consensus method to weight the criteria, which could bring the same
problem as cited before for the FMEA approach during the RPN criteria ranking.
Puente et al. (2002) highlighted a number of FMEA drawbacks, inherent to the
traditional FMEA model, especially the calculation of the risk priority number (RPN).
Given these drawbacks, they proposed to structure expert knowledge in the form of
qualitative decision rules whereby a risk priority category (RPC), from very low VL
to very high VH, can be assigned to each cause of failure. This effectively reduces
one of the main criticisms aimed at the traditional model, since the structure of the
rule system proposed allows considerable weighting the severity index S
associated to a case of failure. Additionally to this proposal, the authors incorporated
a fuzzy decision system, which increased the continuity of the FMEA decision model
(by electing continuous values of the detection, frequency and severity), and which
optimizes risk discrimination of different causes of failure. Table 2.21 and Table 2.22
show the different from the traditional methodology and the methodology proposed
by the authors. It can be seen how the results of the ranking of the proposed
methodology is different from the traditional one. This is because the new model
54
gives a marked weighting to the severity index, whereas the RPN-based model
simply calculates the product of the three indexes with no consideration of the
importance assign to a particular index. Therefore, by changing the equal importance
of the criteria the authors minimize one of the FMEA drawbacks. However, not all the
users share the opinion that severity is more important than detection or occurrence,
which creates a limitation for the approach implementation.
Detection
Occurrence
Severity
RPN
Ranking
Failure 1
32
Failure 2
40
Failure 3
10
70
Failure 4
49
Failure 5
63
Detection
Occurrence
Severity
RPC
Ranking
Failure 1
1 - VL
4-M
8-H
Failure 2
5-M
2-L
4-M
M-H
Failure 3
1 - VL
7-H
10 - VH
VH
Failure 4
7-H
7-H
1 - VL
L-M
Failure 5
3-L
7-H
3-L
Bowles (2004) proposes that the RPN approach should be discontinued and
an entirely new prioritization technique should be used. The detection ranking should
be removed, which is also recommended by Palady et al. (1994). The detection rank
assigned for the failure mode is highly subjective, which can result in considerable
variation from one analysis to another, and a low third detections means that the
companys verification program will be able to detect that the potential problem is
real, but fixing this problem late in the design process is generally expensive.
Furthermore, the new approach proposes to segment the severity in nominal ratings
as security, functionality and cosmetics, relating it to the failure and set the maximum
value for the probability of occurrence in each class. In our research the PAFMEA will
55
also segment the severity criteria and the sub-criteria will be select by the users,
allowing a more flexible and high implementation of the approach.
There are several possible corrective actions that, theoretically, are capable of
reducing the RPN for any given failure mode. Although there are actions that aim on
reducing only severity or only occurrence, FMEA does not provide any guidelines to
help the users to choose the optimal corrective action. Therefore Blivband et al.
(2004) presented the Extended FMEA (EFMEA) method, which uses screen plot to
prioritize the associated risks with failure and evaluate the adequacy of the
improvement actions. Using graph analysis and mathematic expression the method
evaluate the feasibility of the corrective action and the expected RPN value after the
implementation, then the most adequate action is proposed to be implemented.
Yen and Chen (2005) presented a method that integrated green design with
FMEA and TRIZ (Theory of Inventive Problem Solving). The proposed method is
based on the FMEA structure and uses environment, safety and health. The FMEA is
changed to define the eco-mode of failure and to prioritize throw the eco-RPN. The
indexes severity, occurrence and detection are transformed into environmental
impact, consumer perspective and compliance with the legislation. The TRIZ method
is
used
to
propose
improvements
on
the
product/equipment
taking
into
56
index called criticality index, are used to form a prioritization table for the failure
modes.
Rigoni (2009) presented a software called OpenFMECA (Figure 2.18) and
developed by the Development Center of Products (NeDIP / EMC / UFSC). The
software main objective is to provide a collaborative and parallel environment to
develop the FMECA where people can access the software from different location
using a web server. Furthermore, the software uses Delphi methodology to reach a
consensus on the RPN criteria ranking, which a face-to-face meetings are
unnecessary for the risk assessment. However, the Delphi is conducted directly on
the S, O, D index, answering a part of the consensus issue in FMEA, but not
improving the expected extended perspective on RPN analysis.
Figure 2.18 Screenshot extract from the OpenFMECA software (RIGONI, 2009).
Chin (2009) uses FMEA integrated with Evidential Reasoning approach in the
decision analysis of multiple attributes. The method proposes to capture the diversity
of opinions from the members of the team and to prioritize the failure modes from
different types of uncertainties such as incomplete assessment, ignorance and
intervals. The method also allows the combination of the risk factors in a non-linear
measurement, which tries to overcome the most drawback cited in the literature, the
RPN calculation.
57
58
Proposal
Methods
Highlighted
Used
Points
Simulates the
Palumbo (1992)
Software for
FMEA &
process of failure
failure simulation
Simulation
occurrence and
effect propagation
Gilchrist (1993)
Software to
FMEA &
support FMEA
Casual
development
Reasoning
New RPN
integrating Cost
Ben-Daya and
Raouf (1996)
occurrence
FMEA
The tool
guarantees
standardization of
the FMEA
importance of
Sankar and
to analyze failure
cited FMEA
Prabhu (2000)
developed by
FMEA &
Kimura (2000)
support FMEA
software
Huang et al.
(2000)
Web-Based
software to
support FMEA
Virtual software to
of failure
Houten and
recovery rates
specialists
FMEA criteria
FMEA
Aggregate cost to
Changes equal
FMEA
Problems
Use sensors to
Limitation of structure
detect/avoid major
(sensors) to configure
failure
software
No face-to-face
FMEA &
meetings needed
software
RPN drawback
internet
The FMEA criteria
Chang (2001)
New RPN
approach
FMEA &
There is no consensus
Grey
weights, according
Theory
to the process or
criteria;
New RPN
FMEA &
(2002)
approach
Fuzzy
59
Proposal
Methods
Highlighted
Used
Points
New risk
Bowles (2004)
assessment
FMEA
(RPN) approach
Segment severity
into sub-criteria
Evaluate the
Problems
Eliminates detection
criteria; sub-criteria are
fixed
Blivband et al.
FMEA &
(2004)
corrective action
Screen Plot
Changes RPN
FMEA &
Considers eco-
(2005)
criteria
TRIZ
innovations aspects
Uses different
Time consuming to
areas to perform
information
New risk
assessment
(RPN) approach
FMEA &
survey
Carmignani
Modified RPN
FMEA &
(2008)
approach
AHP
Identify
Nepal (2008)
Chin (2009)
RPN approach
The economic
correlation presented is
not the same for every
company
FMEA,
between
Fuzzy &
components and
Simulation
interaction of
components
FMECA &
to-face meetings
Delphi
New RPN
approach
Technique to
Oliveira (2010)
interactions
new RPN
Rigoni (2009)
feasibility of actions
classify process
and help failure
analysis
FMEA &
Evidential
Reasoning
Uses Delphi to
reach a consensus
on the RPN
Captures diversity
No consensus method
to obtain opinion of
uncertainties to
members; Uncertainties
propose priority
Delphi &
Jury of
a consensus of
Specialists
specialists opinion
60
Goal%
Damages%
Correc8ve%
Maintenance%
Applicability%
Preven8ve%
Maintenance%
Added3Value%
Opportunis8c%
Maintenance%
Condi8on3
Based%
Maintenance%
Cost%
Predic8ve%
Maintenance%
Figure 2.19 Hierarchy of the Italian Oil refinery system (Adpated from BEVILACQUA
& BARGLIA, 2000).
Carnero (2005) proposed a model, integrating AHP and factor analysis (FA),
to select diagnostic technics and instrumentation in the predictive maintenance
program. The model was applied to screw compressors that are monitored by means
of number of predictive maintenance programs (PMPs), and can be seen in Figure
2.20. Despite the quantity of criteria used and the level of detailed of the analysis, the
reliability of the final results depends entirely on the companys maturity in the
61
predictive maintenance program, which can limit and difficult the implementation of
the model.
Figure 2.21 Hierarchy system for the combined goal programming-AHP (BERTOLINI
& BEVILACQUA, 2006).
62
Arunraj and Maiti (2010) presented a methodology, integrating AHP and goal
programming, to select the maintenance policy based on risk of equipment failure
and cost of maintenance. The methodology was implemented in a benzene
extraction unit of a chemical plant. According to the hierarchy scheme and the results
presented in Figure 2.22, risk criteria has the highest weight, which impacts directly
on the final result that is the selection of the condition based maintenance. Despite
the ease of implementation and the high applicability of the method, the low amount
of criteria limits the analysis of the team members.
63
Figure 2.23 Hierarchy decision model to measure health, safety and environment
performance (CHANDIMA RATNAYAKE & MARKESET, 2010).
Tan et al. (2011) proposed a risk based inspection methodology to evaluate
and select the maintenance strategy in the industrial process of an oil refinery. Using
the risk definition, probability and consequence of failure the equipments were
chosen to apply the AHP method. According to the Figure 2.24, four criteria were
chosen to implement the analytic hierarchy process. Despite the applicability of the
method, it attacks only one equipment and does not deal with the different failure
modes from the process or other equipment.
64
Figure 2.24 AHP model to select the maintenance policy (TAN et al., 2011).
Zaim et al (2012) proposed to apply AHP and ANP (Analytic Network Process)
decision-making methodologies to select the most appropriate maintenance strategy.
According to the hierarchy model presented in Figure 2.25 the four criteria have their
own sub-criteria, which enhance the final analysis. The final scores show that both
method rank predictive maintenance as the most appropriate one, showing that both
of them are reliable and applicable in this specific area.
Figure 2.25 Hierarchy model of AHP and ANP for maintenance selection (ZAIM et al.,
2012).
In order to summarize these decision-making methods related works and to
facilitate further researches, the Table 2.25 brings together all the references with
their most important information related to the research question.
65
Proposal
Methods
Highlighted
Used
Points
Select
maintenance
AHP
strategy
Select diagnostic
Carnero (2005)
technics and
Select optimal
Bevilacqua
maintenance
(2006)
policy
AHP & FA
criteria which
includes Cost
AHP
Select
AHP &
Maintenance
Goal
Policy
Program
Evaluate how
factors impacts
maintenance
AHP
strategy
Select
instrumentation
Bertolini and
Maintenance
Strategy
Integration of
environmental and
analysis on a macro
economic factors
level
Integration of safety
AHP
Problems
Select
Zaim et al. (2012)
Maintenance
Strategy
AHP &
It has sub-criteria
ANP
failure modes;
maintenance strategy
selection on a macro
level
66
grades and quantitative values, which represent the FMEA application performance
of each stage. Therefore, the approach does not deal with the failure modes and
does not help directly in the maintenance decision-making process.
Carmignani (2008) proposes a new integrated method called Priority-Cost
FMECA (PC-FMECA), where the failure modes to be attacked are classify using a
modified RPN calculation. This modified RPN consider a new parameter called
profitability, which is based on cost and potential profit to reduce the losses caused
by failure occurrence. The profitability considers the advantages obtained with the
design improvements minus the cost to implement these improvements. Integrated
with this parameter, the AHP was used to obtain the weight of each criterion and the
Figure 2.26 shows the hierarchical tree of the scheme. Furthermore, the approach
proposes a mathematical expression to select the best failure modes to be attacked
based on the company budget available. To develop the approach the authors
needed to present a methodology to correlate the potential failure to its fundamental
economic aspects, which are not always the same for every company, which limits
the method implementation.
Figure 2.26 The hierarchical tree to calculate the fault priority (CARMIGNANI, 2008).
Suebsomran and Talabgeaw (2010) analyzed and developed the software for
maintenance priority and management for a thermal power plant.
The software
incorporated the FMEA and AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) approaches to find the
67
critical ranking of the systems units relating more than one criterion. The FMEA
method was utilized to find and collect the failure modes of the system and the AHP
approach was used to rank the units based on three criteria (cost, man-hour and line
priority). The systems hierarchy can be seen on Figure 2.27 and the software
interface can be seen on Figure 2.28.
Figure 2.28 Software for maintenance priority for a termal plant (SUEBSOMRAN &
TALABGEAW, 2010)
This work highlight the possibility to integrate FMEA and AHP approaches into
usable software, which was implemented in a real thermal plant and showed
satisfactory results. The main gain of this tool is that supports the managers in the
decision making process. However, despite the advantage of the approach, the
software does not give one final ranking but one for each criterion, which cannot be
chosen by the users. Furthermore, the AHP is performed based on the systems units
and not the failure modes.
68
Zammori and Gabbrielli (2011) reinforce the use of multi criteria decision
methods in the calculation of risk number (RPN) with application of Analytic Network
Process (ANP). The authors divide the severity criteria, occurrence and detection in
sub-criteria and observe the interactions between them and the alternatives in
obtaining the RPN. The Figure 2.29 presents the hierarchy model of the approach
and shows how the multi criteria will be implemented into the FMECA method, which
its mainly objective is to use a different approach for the RPN. This paper presents
one of the main inspiration bases for this research in the use of the AHP/ANP
structure. However, the relational treatment imposed by the ANP method makes
difficult to implement in the industrial scenario due to the high mathematical
complexity required to use paid software.
Figure 2.29 Hierarchy model of integrating FMECA and ANP (ZAMMORI &
GABBRIELLI, 2011).
In order to summarize the related works of FMEA integrated to decisionmaking methods and to facilitate further researches, the Table 2.26 brings together
all the references with their most important information related to the research
question.
69
Aguiar (2007)
Methods
Highlighted
Used
Points
Analyze the
FMEA &
Use specialists to
FMEA
AHP &
identify
irregularities
Fuzzy
irregularities
Proposal
Carmignani
Modified RPN
FMEA &
(2008)
approach
AHP
Suebsomran and
Maintenance
FMEA &
priority
AHP
Zammori and
Modified RPN
FMECA &
Gabbrielli (2011)
approach
ANP
Talabgeaw
(2010)
Problems
The economic
correlation presented is
not the same for every
company
Software for
maintenance
Priority
70
2.3.
The first part of this chapter presents the background concerning the mains
conceptual pillars of this research such as FMEA, AHP, Delphi methodology and
BPM. The second part was devoted firstly to investigate the FMEA problems and
drawbacks found in the literature and the integration between the FMEA and other
methods, which are an attempt to overcome some of the problems/drawbacks
showed.
In an attempt to summarize and classify the problems/drawbacks of FMEA, six
classes were defined based on Laurenti et al. (2012):
Risk Definition: all the problems related to the RPN calculation, such as
the RPN values are not precise, the indexes (severity, occurrence and
detection) are treated with the same importance, one RPN value can
represent different risk situations;
The Table 2.27 shows the relations between the problems and drawbacks
found in the literature review according to the classes cited above.
71
Reference
Ben-Daya and Raouf (1996); Bowles (2004); Blivband et
al. (2004); Carmignani (2008); Chao and Ishii (2007);
Risk Definition
Resources
Behavior
Information Management
Procedures
Rausand (2004); Goble and Brombacher (1999); KaraZaitri et al. (1991); Lee (2001); Oliveira (2010); Pipic
(2003); Vinodh (2012); Yen and Chen (2005).
Temporal
72
Procedures
24%
Risk
Deni*on
28%
Informa*on
Management
12%
Resources
20%
Behavior
8%
Temporal
8%
The Figure 2.30 shows the frequency of the FMEA problems and drawbacks
according to its specific classes. It is possible to notice that the most cited problem is
the Risk Definition, which are the problems related to the calculation of the RPN.
Furthermore, the problems related to the FMEA procedures and the resource
availability are highly frequent cited in the literature.
73
Procedures
24%
Risk
Deni*on
28%
Informa*on
Management
12%
Resources
20%
Behavior
8%
Temporal
8%
Figure 2.30 Distribution of FMEA problems and drawbacks according to its classes.
Following the second part of this chapter, the section 2.2.2 had the purpose to
show the integration of FMEA with other methods found in the literature, where the
researches have the objective to overcome some of the FMEA problems and
drawbacks cited. In order to summarize and organize, these works were classified
into five categories: Methods, Guidelines, Software, Frameworks and Approaches.
The concepts for these categories are:
74
The Table 2.28 shows the classification of these works according to the
categories cited above.
Table 2.28 Classification of FMEA integrated to other methods according to the five
categories.
Categories
Reference
Arcidiacono and Campatelli (2004); Aguiar (2007);
Bowles (2004); Blivband et al. (2004); Carmignani
Methods
Guidelines
Software
Frameworks
Nepal (2008)
Approaches
Oliveira (2010)
The Figure 2.31 shows the distribution of these works according to the
categories cited (Methods, Guidelines, Software, Frameworks and Approaches). It is
possible to notice that the most use practice is Methods, follow by Guidelines.
These practices are being developed in different types of industries such as energy,
manufacturing and product development. Furthermore, the knowledge field is
dominated by exploratory studies and investigations of a unique case, especially
because the quantity of practices in each category and the diversity of areas
published.
75
Frameworks
3%
SoEware
19%
Approaches
3%
Methods
44%
Guidelines
31%
76
3. PAFMEA FRAMEWORK
Practices
Structure
Concerns
Concerns
Literature &
Software
Reviews
Research
Goal
Interviews Questionnaries
Practices
Requirements
A1
Scientific
Database
Results Analysis
Actions
Results
Practices
FMEA Problems
& Drawbacks
A3
AHP
Delphi
Standards
BPMN
Risk
Failure Controls
Structure
PA-FMEA
Results
Guidelines
PA-FMEA
Execution
Scope
Team
Phase A3
Phases A4, A5, A6
PA-FMEA
Parameters
A5
Team
BPMS
Team
Customer
Case Study:
Planning and
Preparation
A4
Human
Resources
Information
BPMS
(Bizagi)
Function
A6
BPMS
TI Basis
PA-FMEA
Proposition
(Specification)
Barriers
Qualtrics
FMEA s
Softwares
Perfor
mance
A2
Excel
Mendeley
FMEA
Standards
Concerns
Preliminary
Consultation with
Experts
FMEA Problems
& Drawbacks
Methodology
Production &
Maintenance
Scheduling
77
Several structured methods are available and the IDEF0 model diagram
represented in Figure 3.2 is based on a simple syntax, which is the one used on the
framework proposed.
Controls'(Factors'that'
constrains'the'ac%vity)'
Inputs'(Parameters''
that'are'altered'by'
the'ac%vity)'
Func%on'or'Ac%vity'
Outputs'(Results'of'
the'ac%vity)'
Mechanisms'(Means'used'
to'performed'the'ac%vity)'
78
79
50%
41%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
12%
12%
0%
Logis1c
Manufacture
Maintenance
Engineer
Quality
80
47%
50%
40%
30%
18%
20%
10%
18%
12%
6%
6%
6%
6%
0%
Technician
Analyst
29%
24%
24%
12%
12%
0%
0 to 1
1 to 2
2 to 5
5 to 9
9 to 15
Above 15
Years
81
47%
50%
40%
30%
18%
20%
12%
12%
12%
10%
0%
0%
1
to
2
2 to 4
4 to 6
6 to 8
8 to 10
Above 10
Totally
Disagree
Indifferent
Agree
Disagree
Totally
Mean
Agree
#1
4,00
#2
14
4,18
#3
10
4,41
82
35
30
10
25
20
15
14
10
Totally Disagree
Disagree
0
Indierent
#1
#2
Agree
Totally Agree
#3
Table 3.2 Responses of the use and calculation of the RPN sentences.
Sentence
Totally
Disagree
Indifferent
Agree
Disagree
Totally
Mean
Agree
#4
3,65
#5
12
4,00
#6
10
4,41
#7
13
4,00
83
50
45
40
35
#7
30
25
#6
20
#5
15
#4
10
5
0
Totally
Disagree
Disagree
Indierent
Agree
Totally Agree
Figure 3.9 Total of responses related to the use and calculation of the RPN.
Sentences #8 until #12 are related to the behavior and treatment of the
participants during the FMEA development. The results showed in Table 3.3 confirm
the specialists opinion that the personality and the behavior of each participant can
impact negatively in the FMEA development. The bar graph in Figure 3.10 shows all
the responses related to the sentences and the five scales.
Table 3.3 Responses related to the behavior and treatment of the participants.
Sentence
Totally
Disagree
Indifferent
Agree
Disagree
Totally
Mean
Agree
#8
4,41
#9
13
3,71
#10
12
3,88
#11
10
4,25
#12
11
3,76
84
60
50
#12
40
#11
30
#10
20
#9
10
#8
0
Totally
Disagree
Disagree
Indierent
Agree
Totally Agree
Figure 3.10 Total of responses related to the behavior and treatment of the
participants.
The last three sentences are related to various aspects that could not be
classified into resources, RPN calculation and behavior of participants. The results
from sentence #13 show that the knowledge obtained from one FMEA is used as a
starting point for new ones. Thus, the reuse of knowledge is not a problem of the
method like it was identify in the literature. In the other hand, the results from
sentence #14 show the high agreement on the difficulties to monitor the improvement
actions of the FMEA. Sentence #15 represents the big indifference by the specialists
on the affirmation, which means that the standardization of the terminology used is
not important for the specialists. The graph in Figure 3.11 presents all the responses
from #13, #14 and #15.
12
10
8
#13
#14
#15
2
0
Totally
Disagree
Disagree
Indierent
Agree
Totally Agree
85
3.2.
PAFMEA PROPOSITION
Stage 1
Preparation
Stage 2
Development
Documents
List of Components
Drawings
Structure
Analysis
Documents
List of Components
Drawings
Identify Team
Optimization
Functional
Analysis
Define Scope
Define Client
DELPHI
Risk
Assessment
Failure
Analysis
ANALYTIC
HIERARCHY
PROCESS
BPM
86
End User: the person, organization field or organization that will utilize the asset,
machine or system.
Workstation
or
manufacturing
centers:
the
workstation
location
where
Parts supply chain: the supplier of stock parts managed by maintenance staff.
Stage 2- Development
The second part of the approach is responsible by the development of the
FMEA, which is form by five steps: structure analysis, function analysis, failure
analysis, risk assessment and optimization.
The structure analysis and function analysis (Figure 3.12, A/B) are
responsible of identifying the elements of the equipment and their relative functions.
From a block of diagram or flow chart of the process it creates the structure
relationship between elements of the system by a tree structure. Thus, it is possible
to present the equipment in a matter that allows the overall understanding of the
system. To fulfill this step, the team leader should assign an experienced team
member, who should use equipments documents to reach a final result.
The failure analysis (Figure 3.12, C) should be carried out for each system
element and for each case it should be decided which system elements it is
reasonable to carry out a failure analysis. This step is responsible to determinate all
potential failure functions, this means that all the failure that leads to an unfulfiment
or limitation of a function is considered. At the end, the content of the failure function
87
structure is inserted into the PA-FMEA form sheet according to VDA 4.2, Table 3.4,
as potential failure effect (FE), potential failure mode (FM) and potential failure cause
(FC).
PA#eFMEA(FORM
Number:
Page:
Created:
Item-Code:
Responsible:
Type-/-Model-/Fabrication:
State:
Company:
FMEA-/-System-Element: Item-Code:
Responsible:
Created:
State:
Company:
Modified:
PotentialResponsibilityPotentialPotential-EffectsFailurePreventiveDetection/-Target-/S
CausesO
D RPN
(FE)
ModesActions
Actions
Completion(FC)
(FM)
Date
The risk assessment (Figure 3.12, D) is responsible to define the risk of each
failure mode, i.e., the RPN (Risk Priority Number), and is carried out under three
evaluation criteria:
and can be confirmed by the Figure 2.30. Therefore, to formulate a more efficient and
effective failure priority ranking, the approach propose to use the AHP technique,
which its implementation is based on the following considerations:
Different sets of the three factors can produce the exact same value of RPN,
however, the hidden implications may be totally different as pointed out by Bowles
(2004), Chang (2001), Chin (2009) and Sankar and Prabhu (2001).
The RPN based on a simple multiplication factor is not enough, as pointed out by
Ben-Daya and Raouf (1996), Chang (2001), Gilchrist (1993), Laurenti (2012),
Puente (2002) and Rausand (2004)
88
The AHP has no intent to take the RPN characterization out of the FMEA, but
has the objective to give a new and extended perspective to the user. Thus, it will be
possible to have a new analysis and a comparison between the classic RPN
calculation and the new approach. Therefore, instead of multiplication, the PAFMEA
uses a hierarchical decision structure similar to that proposed by Zammori and
Gabbrielli (2011) represented in Figure 2.29. The AHP structure for the risk analysis
of the PAFMEA can be seen in the Figure 3.13.
Obtain'a'Hierarchy'of'Failure'Modes'
Severity'
Criterion'I'
Detec;on'
Criterion'II'
Criterion'III'
Failure'
Mode'I'
Criterion'I'
Failure'
Mode'II'
Criterion'II'
Failure'
Mode'III'
Occurrence'
Criterion'III'
Criterion'I'
Failure'
Mode'IV'
Figure 3.13 AHP structure for the Risk Analysis of the PA-FMEA.
The objective of the AHP is to obtain a new hierarchy of the failure modes
using more criteria than in the classic RPN calculation. Since severity, detection and
occurrence are terms well established and understandable by the users, the proposal
is to include sub-criteria to these ones, as can be seen on Figure 3.13.
Since the AHP is a technique of decision analysis and planning of multiple
criteria, it is first necessary to decide which criteria shall be used. The sub-criteria of
severity, detection and occurrence will be presented to the users and the Delphi
method will be implemented to reach a consensus on which criteria will be used.
Deschamps (2013) declares that specialists opinions could be register through
surveys, interviews or panels, among other possible techniques or tools. The team
members will also decide the quantity of sub-criteria, which will be limited to until
three for each one.
89
The first round of the Delphi will be responsible to present the sub-criteria and
the goal to choose them is also explain with enough information so everyone is
aware of the process been applied. The criteria based on the literature review and
presented to the team members are: cost, production priority, maintenance cost,
maintenance duration, profit, man-hour, equipment damage, environmental damage
and employee safety. During the first round, the participants can add more criteria,
which will be integrated to the criteria presented before. The second round of
questionnaire is responsible to show the criteria added by the participants, however
the responses are not presented yet. The participants are asked to review their
opinions according to the compiled results so that agreement can be reached. The
number of rounds may vary according to the agreement of the participants or the
observation that agreement will not be reached.
Following with the new risk assessment approach, the AHP is implemented
with four failure modes, which should be selected by the specialists or the ones with
the highest RPN obtained by the classical FMEA. The criteria used in this step are
the ones chosen by the participants. Briefly, the step-by-step procedure in using AHP
is the following:
1. Define the decision criteria in the form of a hierarchy of objectives (Figure
3.13);
2. Weight the criteria and alternatives as a function of their importance for the
corresponding element of the higher level. For this purpose, the AHP uses
simple pairwise comparison to determine weights and ratings, so that the
analyst can concentrate on just two factors at one time. One question which
might arise when using pairwise comparison is: how important is the criteria
cost with respect to the criteria production priority in terms of the hierarchy
of the failure modes? The answer will be equally important, moderate
important, etc. The verbal responses are then quantified and translated into a
score via the use of the discrete 9-point scales from Table 3.5.
3. To maintain anonymity and reach a consensus on the comparison of the
failure modes and criteria, a Delphi technique is applied with the participation
of specialists. The number of rounds is not fixed, but at least three rounds
needs to be performed in order to reach a satisfactory result.
90
Definition
Description
Equal Importance
over another
Extreme importance
Reciprocals
4. After a judgment matrix has been developed, a priority vector to weight the
elements of the matrix is calculated. This is the normalized eigenvector of the
matrix.
The optimization actions (Figure 3.12, E), fifth step of approach, should be
taken for the failures modes with the highest ranking and according to the cost of
each action. Optimization actions are additional or new preventive and/or detection
actions introduced based on FMEA results (BERTSCHE, 2008). These actions can
be:
91
Actions that prevent the potential failure cause or reduce the occurrence of
potential failures. Such actions are only possible by altering the design or the
process.
are newly assessed through a new implementation of FMEA, forming a cycle in the
process, indicated by the feedback (bottom arrow from A6 to A4 phase) in Figure 3.1.
This assessment represents a prognosis concerning the improvement potential to be
expected. The final assessment is carried out after the new actions are implemented
and tested.
3.3.
92
3.4.
93
94
Developer
APIS GmbH
Symphony
Technologies
Macromar Software
ALD Reliability
Engineering
Reliasoft Corporation
Dyadem International
Kinetic
Elcomind
Website
http://www.apis.de/en
http://www.symphonytech.com
http://www.mapromar.com
http://www.aldservice.com
http://www.reliasoft.com.br
http://www.dyadem.com
http://www.fmeca.com
http://www.elcomind.it
Scandpower
http://www.scandpower.com
PLATO
MBFG
http://www.plato-ag.de
http://www.irmler.com/
95
i.e., possible changes in the documents can be made without the need for additional
adjustments in other documents.
This software creates various documents, such as DFMEA/PFMEA/DRBFM
forms, term plans and statistical evaluations. The format in which the documents are
presented can be modified to meet ISO/TS 169494, VDA 4.2, AIAG FMEA 4th edition,
IEC 61508 and ISO CD 26262.
The main software features are presented below:
FMEA Matrix: represents all inputs and outputs of the FMEA analysis,
following international standards such as VDA, AIAG, MIL, etc. The
software allows comments and graphics to be displayed next to the
array. Figure 4.2 shows the FMEA matrix with a Pareto graphic.
96
Follow-up actions: list the responsible, the date and any additional
information for each action. This features assists in the project
management and generates a follow-up actions report for a better
analysis.
The main software drawback is that there is no activity guide to develop the
FMEA, thus the user gets lost on which button or tool to use. Therefore a detailed
course is necessary to be able to use the tool by everyone involved.
97
FMEA form is based on AIAG FMEA 4th edition and can be exported to
MS Excel.
98
The software is based on only one standard, AIAG FMEA 4th Edition, which
does not allow the generation of the FMEA form according to any other standard.
Furthermore, there is no process-oriented guide, thus the user needs to know the
software and its features before starting to develop the FMEA.
4.1.3. RELIASOFT XFMEA
ReliaSoft Corporation specializes in developing software for the reliability
engineering. The company based in Tucson, USA, has a representative in So
Paulo, Brazil ReliaSoft.
XFMEA ReliaSoft software helps in the development of FMEA and FMECA
facilitating the study, management of information and preparation of reports for
analysis of FMEA or FMECA. The software has pre-defined settings, including major
industry standards (such as AIAG FMEA-3 or FMEA-4, SAE J1739 and MIL-STD1629A) and also provides options to extend and customize their analyzes and reports
as needed.
The reports generated by XFMEA report information about each component
analyzed with your failure mode (s). It also provides information on the effects and
causes of failure modes, and a control plan for recommended actions and a
spreadsheet for project review after the recommended actions are finalized.
The software provides many features, which allows the users to:
Register and manage the data to analyze the failure modes and failure
effects;
99
100
101
Generates the FMEA report but does not allow the possibility to choose
a standard to generate the FMEA form;
There is no process-oriented guide and none support for the users during the
FMEA development. The simplicity of the software creates a lot of limitations, such
as no guidelines during the failure analysis and no team communication during the
whole process. Furthermore, it does not provide FMEA forms according to
international standards, forcing the user to use the software FMEA report template.
102
Table 4.2 shows their features. It is possible to notice that none of the software
have all the features, thus the objective of the PA-FMEA BPMS is to integrate as
many features as possible.
Process-Oriented
Tips/Directions to Develop
FMEA
User Control
Friendly UI
Structural Tree View
RPN Auto Calculation
Generate FMEA Form
Export FMEA Form to
Word/Excel/PDF
FMEA Form Based on
Standards
Guidelines to S / O / D
Guidelines according to
standards
Rates to S / O / D already
inserted
Development of Multiple
FMEA
Columns to Add Actions to
Each FM
Statistical and Graph
Analysis
Send Email to Responsible
by each Action
Send Email Automatically
Save data in Commercial
APIS IQSoftware
FMEA
Executive
FMEA
Inspector
RAM
Commander
Reliasoft
XFMEA
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
103
Database Software
This survey is shown in Annex C and has the objective to identify the most
essential requirements to be implemented in a tool to support the FMEA
development.
Furthermore,
it
completes
the
Knowledge
Discovering
and
Desirable
Important
Indifferent Essential
Very
Mean
104
Essential
#1
2.94
#2
11
3.71
#3
3.71
#4
3.29
#5
3.65
#6
11
3.88
#7
3.12
#8
3.59
#9
3.65
#10
4.00
#11
3.18
4.3.
Desirable: It adds new values to the system and makes it more complete.
This type of requirement could be implemented in later versions of the
system, since even without its implementation the system meets their basic
features.
The requirements are also classify into Functional and Non-Functional.
105
function of a system and its components. The functional requirements of the BPMS
developed can be seen on Table 4.4.
Essential
Essential
Essential
Name
Login
Register
Users
Variety
of
Standards
Calculate
RPN
Automatically
Show
guidelines
for
S/O/D
Priority
Essential
Important
Essential
Essential
Important
Desirable
Desirable
Important
Important
Important
In the other hand, according to Sommerville and Kotonya (1998), nonfunctional requirement describes restrictions and quality aspects related to the
system and its development process. The non-functional requirements of the BPMS
can be seen on Table 4.5.
106
Non-Functional
Requirements
Name
Description
Friendly
The
user
interface
has
to
be
friendly,
without
interface
ambiguities
and
misunderstandings
The
system
should
be
easy
to
learn
for
the
user,
a
lay
Easy
to
user
should
be
able
to
perform
the
most
basic
learn
functions
The
system
should
always
be
available.
The
system
Reliability
should
not
be
unavailable
for
errors
of
users.
And
if
it
happens,
your
recovery
should
be
immediate.
Only
authorized
personal
should
be
able
to
use
and
Privacy
interfere
in
the
FMEA
process
Tips
and
Texts
are
and
technical
information
are
used
during
the
Directions
analysis
to
help
the
users
Process
A
process
oriented
software
to
guarantee
the
final
Oriented
result
of
the
analysis
The
users
personal
identification
such
as
name
should
Anonymity
remain
in
anonymity
Priority
Important
Desirable
Desirable
Essential
Important
Essential
Essential
The figure Figure 4.11 represents the architecture diagram of the BPMS,
which is divided into three layers:
Internet Layer: this layer is responsible to provide the software interface for the
final user.
BPM layer: this layer is where the BPM is located, which is integrated to Excel
file responsible to calculate the AHP.
Data Access Layer: this layer is responsible to save all the data inserted by
the user.
107
4.4.
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
The first step of the software development is to model the process of the PAFMEA to
be implemented. In fact, process modeling is essential to represent complex
systems, being the great importance to define the rules of information system
integrated with business processes. The process model of the PAFMEA can be seen
on
Figure 4.12.
108
Following the conceptual model (Figure 3.12) the process model is divided into
four steps represented by milestones in BPMN: Strategy & Planning, FMEA
Development, AHP Development and Results Presentation. These steps will be
explained in the next sections.
The
activities are responsible of defining the team, the scope and the client of the
process. The gateway is used to decide what standard the participants want to base
the next activities of the PA-FMEA development. The Figure 4.13 shows the user
interface of Define Scope & Client activity, which is also possible to see the values
inserted by the user in the previous activity through the tab Define the Team, Figure
4.14.
109
Figure 4.15 PA-FMEA process model of Strategy & Planning and FMEA
Development.
The FMEA development step is form by three activities:
Complete FMEA Header: complete the header of the FMEA form, which is
based on the VDA 4.2 (Table 2.1) and the user interface can be seen on
Figure 4.16.
Complete FMEA Form: the user should complete the FMEA form with the
information from the failure analysis, which is based on VDA 4.2 (Table 2.1)
and the user interface can be seen on Figure 4.17. Each line of the form
110
should be added individually, where after the plus button is pushed a new form
is opened (Figure 4.18), thus the user can add all the information related to
the analysis.
List/Choose Main Failure Modes: In this activity, the users should choose the
failure modes that will be analyzed with AHP in the next step of the PAFMEA.
The user interface of this activity can be seen on Figure 4.19.
111
Define AHP Criteria with Delphi: this activity is responsible by choosing the
criteria that will be applied in the AHP development. The quantity and the
112
Figure 4.21 Interface of the activity Define AHP Criteria with Delphi.
Confirm Criteria Selected: responsible of confirming the criteria selected by the
users, where it is possible to add a new one or continue the process with the
criteria already selected. One example of this activity interface is represented
on Figure 4.22.
113
114
Figure 4.24 Example of the pairwise comparison for the AHP criteria in the BPMS.
Figure 4.25 Example of the pairwise comparison for the failure modes in the BPMS.
Calculate AHP Final Priorities: this activity will calculate the final hierarchy list
of the failure modes. This calculation will also be performed in the Excel file
and will be shown on the BPMS interface to the user.
115
The AHP calculation will be realized through an Excel file developed especially
for this application, which will also be used to create a report for the user and can be
exported to a excel or pdf file. The excel file is divided into three steps:
1. Perform comparison between the criteria;
2. Perform comparison between the failure modes for each criteria;
3. Obtain the final priorities through a new sheet, which uses the priorities
calculated in the other two steps.
The methodology of step 1 and 2 is the same and the sequence of the
calculation is:
I.
II.
III.
Step%1:%Pairwise%comparison%for%all%criteria
Matrix'1
Criteria
Cost
Cost
1
Safety
5
Equip.'Damage
1/3
Occurrency
1/3
Safety
1/5
1
1/5
1/7
Equip.'Damage
3
5
1
1/5
Occurrency
3
7
5
1
Step%1:%Pairwise%comparison%for%"Cost"
Matrix'1
Cost
FM1
FM2
FM3
FM1
1
1/7
1/9
FM2
7
1
1/5
FM3
9
5
1
116
Figure 4.27 Example of pairwise comparison between failure modes, forming Matrix
1.
Step%2:%Calculation%of%priority%(i.e.,%normalized%eigenvector)
Matrix'2
Matrix'3
Matrix'4
FM2
Normalized%
Eigenvector
71.80000
0.78594
15.12698
0.16558
4.42857
0.04848
Eigenvector
Cost
FM1
FM2
FM3
FM1
Cost
FM1
FM2
FM3
FM1
FM2
FM3
35.58413 157.2222 496.31
7.878005 35.58413
112.3
2.495591 11.02921 35.584
689.12063
155.76372
49.10892
0.77083
0.17423
0.05493
Cost
FM1
FM2
FM3
FM1
FM2
FM3
3743.425 16663.18 52978 73384.73481
840.9226 3743.425 11902 16486.62157
264.495 1177.292 3743.4 5185.21153
0.77201
0.17344
0.05455
3
0.84127
0.250794
FM3
15.8
3
1.177778
53
11.286
3
Resistncia queimada
Problema na vlvula de refrigerao
6
2
Deteco Visual
Responsibility
Detection Actions
Ocurrence
Preventive Actions
Potential Cause
Qualidade do componente
Vlvula travada
RPN
4
4
Severity
Detection
Aquecer Cmara
Resfriar a Cmara
Potential Effects
Function_
2
2
48 Marcelo
16 Marcelo
117
Severity
[FM1]
[FM2]
[FM3]
[FM4]
Criteria'I
0.045
0.604
0.093
0.259
Criteria'II
0.596
0.101
0.243
0.059
[FM1]
[FM2]
[FM3]
[FM4]
Criteria'I
0.522
0.085
0.342
0.050
Criteria'II
0.574
0.092
0.282
0.053
[FM1]
[FM2]
[FM3]
[FM4]
Criteria'I
0.094
0.242
0.612
0.052
Criteria'II
.
.
.
.
Criteria'III
0.262
0.110
x
0.581
0.046
Severity'Criteria
0.067
0.293
0.640
Severity'Ranking
0.346
0.141
0.450
0.064
Detection
Criteria'III
Detection'Criteria
0.137
0.717
0.146
x
0.088
=
0.653
0.195
0.064
Detection'Ranking
0.451
0.098
0.398
0.053
Occurence
Criteria'III
Occurence'Criteria
Ocurrence'Ranking
.
1.000
0.094
.
x
1.000
=
0.242
.
1.000
0.612
.
0.052
Final'Ranking
Severity
Resistance'Burned
0.346
Refrigeration'Valve'with'Problem
0.141
Voltage'equipment'with'problem
0.450
Variation'of'voltage'supplier0.064
Detection Occurence
0.451
0.094
0.098
0.242
x
0.398
0.612
0.053
0.052
Sev_Det_Occu
0.280
0.094
0.626
Final'Ranking
0.198
0.200
0.547
0.055
Varia4on/of/voltage/supplier/
Voltage/equipment/with/problem/
1/
Refrigera4on/Valve/with/Problem/
Resistance/Burned/
0.000/
0.100/
0.200/
0.300/
0.400/
0.500/
0.600/
This chapter presented the BPM system of the PA-FMEA, which is an online
tool to support the development of the FMEA and to aggregate a different failure
analysis using Analytic Hierarchy Process. Before developing the BPMS, a
benchmark study was made to analyze the main commercial software solutions
available to support the FMEA development.
The integration of the AHP is to provide a different and more accurate
methodology for the decision makers, where it is possible to add as many criteria as
118
the team members decide to calculate the hierarchy list of the failure modes. Thus,
the analysis of the failure modes are not obligated to use only severity, occurrence
and detection, the users can also use other criteria such as maintenance cost,
production priority, safety, etc.
The PA-FMEA system was developed in the Bizagi Suite tool and its main
advantages are:
119
5. APPLICATION SCENARIO
identify team:
120
Stage 1
Preparation
Stage 2
Development
Documents
List of Components
Drawings
Structure
Analysis
Documents
List of Components
Drawings
Identify Team
Optimization
Functional
Analysis
Define Scope
Define Client
DELPHI
Risk
Assessment
Failure
Analysis
ANALYTIC
HIERARCHY
PROCESS
BPM
121
chiller water tube: bring the water inside the test rooms;
water Valve: allows the water from the chiller to enter in the test room;
motor fan: blow air into the test room to guarantee the desired
temperature;
The second stage of the PAFMEA is responsible by the failure mode and
effect analysis, which is form by the activities A, B, C, D and E that are represented
122
in Figure 5.1. The results of the activities A,B and C are presented in the PAFMEA
form, which was adapted to match with the companys FMEA form and can be seen
in Table 5.4. Furthermore, the form shows the risk assessment results related to the
classical FMEA approach, which is the ranking of the criteria (severity, occurrence,
detection) and the calculation of the RPN. These criteria are treated with the same
importance and the same weight to realize the RPN calculation. Even though the
software was developed based on VDA 4.2, the ranking of these criteria were based
on the standard SAE J1739/2002 because it was already used in the company, and
the index tables related to the criteria can be seen in Table 5.1, Table 5.2 and Table
5.3.
Table 5.1 Severity of the Effect of the Failure Mode Ranking (SAE J1739, 2002).
Severity of the Effect of
the Failure Mode
Hazardous - without warning
Hazardous - with warning
Very High
High
Moderate
Low
Very Low
Small
Very Small
None
Rank
Mode
Impact on safety, health or environment. The failure
will happen without warning.
Impact on safety, health or environment. The failure
will happen with warning.
Very high impact. The function is lost and a long
period is needed to restore normality.
High impact. Part of the function is lost and a long
period is needed to restore normality.
Moderate impact. Part of the function is lost and a
period is needed to restore normality.
Low impact. The function is impaired and needs to be
verified.
Moderate impact. Part of the function is impaired and
needs to be verified.
Reduced impact. Failure takes some time to be
repaired but it does not affect the function.
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
123
Detection
Failure Cause
Rank
The existing control will not detect the potential cause and
Almost Impossible
10
There is a very remote possibility that the existing control will detect
the potential cause and consequently the failure mode
There is a remote possibility that the existing control will detect the
potential cause and consequently the failure mode
There is a very low possibility that the existing control will detect the
potential cause and consequently the failure mode
There is a very low possibility that the existing control will detect the
potential cause and consequently the failure mode
There is a medium possibility that the existing control will detect the
potential cause and consequently the failure mode
There is a moderately high possibility that the existing control will
detect the potential cause and consequently the failure mode
There is a high possibility that the existing control will detect the
potential cause and consequently the failure mode
There is a very high possibility that the existing control will detect
the potential cause and consequently the failure mode
It is almost certain that the existing control will detect the potential
cause and consequently the failure mode
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Rank
1 in 90
10
1 in 900
1 in 36.000
1 in 90.000
1 in 180.000
1 in 270.000
1 in 360.000
1 in 540.000
1 in 900.000
124
PAFMEA FORM
Failure Mode
Effects
No temperature control
No temperature control
No temperature control
No temperature control
8
4
No temperature control
Resistance burned
No temperature control
Functional Failure
Cool Room
Heat Room
No temperature control
Heaters does not turn on
No temperature control
No temperature control
No temperature control
No voltage control
No voltage control
No voltage control
High variation of voltage
No data for final test
Redo test due to no data
7
7
7
5
5
5
5
Controlled
Voltage
Acquisite
Temperature
7
8
4
Actual Controls
Detection
Function
Created:
Modified:
Occurrence
Responsible:
Company:
Responsible:
Company:
Severity
Item Code:
State:
Item Code:
State:
RPN
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
5
9
5
3
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
4
7
3
3
1
2
5
2
2
1
2
Corrective Main.
Preventive Main.
Corrective Main.
Visual
Corrective Main.
Corrective Main.
Visual
Employee Instructions
Corrective Main.
Visual
Corrective Main.
Quality tests
Spare resistence
Corrective Main.
Visual
Quality tests
Panel air circulation
Visual
Employee Instructions
Corrective Main.
Visual
Corrective Main.
Visual
Supervisory
Quality tests
Corrective Main.
Visual
Supervisory
None
Supervisory
Supervisory
Supervisory
Supervisory
4
4
2
1
5
5
2
5
2
1
3
3
3
2
2
2
3
1
3
2
2
3
3
2
4
4
2
2
2
2
2
4
4
56
56
28
7
70
70
16
20
24
6
36
105
189
70
42
14
21
8
12
24
12
36
84
98
60
84
14
28
70
20
20
20
40
Responsibil
ity / Target /
Completion
Date
Dutra
Dutra
Dutra
Dutra
Marcelo
Marcelo
Battirola
Dutra
Marcelo
Marcelo
Marcelo
Marcelo
Marcelo
Marcelo
Marcelo
Marcelo
Marcelo
Battirola
Dutra
Marcelo
Marcelo
Marcelo
Marcio
Marcio
Marcio
Marcio
Battirola
Battirola
Battirola
Battirola
Battirola
Battirola
Function
Functional
Failure
Failure Mode
RPN
189
Heat Room
Resistance burned
Controlled
It does not
Varivolt with
voltage
controlled voltage
problem
Cool room
Controlled
It does not
Variation of
Voltage
controlled voltage
voltage supplier
Refrigeration valve
with problem
98
70
70
125
The next step of the risk assessment is the selection of the sub-criteria related
to severity, detection and occurrence. This selection was realized using Delphi
methodology and a consensus was reached with two rounds of questionnaire, which
was performed using the BPMS showed in chapter 4. The final AHP hierarchy
structure is represented in Figure 5.3. According to the team members, there is no
other criterion that is interesting to analyze occurrence, so this criterion will not be
divided.
Level'0'
Goal'
Obtain'a'Hierarchy'of'Failure'Modes'
Level'1'
Criteria'
Level'2'
SubKCriteria'
Severity'
Equipment'
Damage'
Level'3'
Alterna?ve'
Produc?on'
Priority'
Resistance'Burned'
Detec?on'
Maintenance'
Dura?on'
Visual'
Inspec?on'
Varivolt'with'problem'
Occurrence'
Detailed'
Inspec?on'
Supervisory'
Inspec?on'
Refrigera?on'Valve'
with'problem'
Failure'
Occurrence'
Varia?on'of'voltage'
supplier'
Severity
Detection
1
0.250
3
Consistency
Ratio:
0.082
4
1
5
Occurrence
0.333
0.20
1
Sum:
Priority
Weight
0.280
0.094
0.626
1.000
126
Equipment
Damage
Production
Priority
Maintenance
Duration
Maintenance
Duration
Priority
Weight
0.167
0.143
0.067
0.333
0.293
7
Consistency
Ratio:
0.091
Sum:
0.640
1.000
Visual Inspection
Detailed
Inspection
Supervisory
Inspection
Priority
Weight
Visual Inspection
0.717
Detailed
Inspection
0.166
0.333
0.088
Supervisory
Inspection
0.2
0.195
Sum:
1.000
127
FM2
FM3
FM4
Priority
Weight
FM1
1.00
0.13
0.33
0.14
0.045
FM2
8.00
3.00
1.00
0.17
6.00
1.00
4.00
0.25
0.604
0.093
7.00
0.25
Consistency
Ratio: 0.079
4.00
1.00
0.259
1.000
FM3
FM4
Sum:
FM2
7.00
1.00
4.00
FM3
3.00
0.25
1.00
FM4
8.00
3.00
3.00
Priority
Weight
0.596
0.101
0.243
0.13
0.33
Consistency
Ratio: 0.078
0.33
1.00
0.059
1.000
Sum:
FM3
0.33
0.14
1.00
0.14
FM4
7.00
4.00
7.00
1.00
Priority
Weight
0.262
0.110
0.581
0.046
Sum:
1.000
128
The pairwise comparison for the detection sub-criteria are presented in Table
5.12, Table 5.13 and Table 5.14. Moreover, the tables show that the consistency of
the data is inside the required value (<0,1). However, these consistencies were not
reached in the first pairwise, forcing the team members to analyze the weights and
redo the pairwise comparison.
Table 5.12 Pairwise comparison for visual inspection.
Visual
Inspection
FM1
FM2
FM1
1.00
7.00
FM2
0.14
1.00
FM3
0.50
7.00
FM4
0.13
0.33
Consistency
Ratio: 0.087
FM3
2.00
0.14
1.00
0.20
FM4
8.00
3.00
5.00
1.00
Priority
Weight
0.522
0.085
0.342
0.050
Sum:
1.000
FM3
3.00
0.20
1.00
0.20
FM4
7.00
3.00
5.00
1.00
Priority
Weight
0.574
0.092
0.282
0.053
Sum:
1.000
FM3
0.14
0.20
1.00
0.17
FM4
3.00
3.00
6.00
1.00
Priority
Weight
0.137
0.146
0.653
0.064
Sum:
1.000
129
FM1
1.00
4.00
7.00
FM2
0.25
1.00
4.00
FM3
0.14
0.25
1.00
FM4
3.00
5.00
7.00
Priority
Weight
0.094
0.242
0.612
0.33
0.20
Consistency
Ratio: 0.089
0.14
1.00
0.052
1.000
Sum:
After the pairwise comparison of level 1, level 2 and level 3, the next step is
the calculation of the ranking of the failure modes for each criterion (severity,
detection and occurrence). The calculation of the severity ranking is presented in
Table 5.16. The left matrix is obtained by using the priority weight value of equipment
damage (criterion I), production priority (criterion II) and maintenance duration
(criterion III). These values are presented in Table 5.9, Table 5.10 and Table 5.11,
respectively. The severity sub-criteria column is obtained by using the priority weight
from Table 5.7.
Criterion
I
0.045
0.604
0.093
FM4
0.259
0.046
Severity
Sub-Criteria
0.067
0.293
0.640
Severity
Ranking
0.346
0.141
0.450
0.064
The calculation of the detection ranking is presented in Table 5.17. The left
matrix is obtained by using the priority weight value of visual inspection (criterion I),
detailed inspection (criterion II) and supervisory inspection (criterion III). These
values are presented in Table 5.12, Table 5.13 and Table 5.14, respectively. The
detection sub-criteria column is obtained by using the priority weight from Table 5.8.
130
Criterion
I
0.522
0.085
0.342
0.050
Detection
Sub-Criteria
0.717
0.088
0.195
Detection
Ranking
0.451
0.098
0.398
0.053
The last action of the risk assessment approach is the calculation of the final
ranking, which is presented in Table 5.17. The left matrix is form by the final ranking
of severity, detection and occurrence. These values are presented in Table 5.16,
Table 5.17 and Table 5.15, respectively. The Sev_Det_Occu column is form by the
priority weight from Table 5.6. Moreover, the Figure 5.4 represents in a bar graph the
ranking of the failure modes.
Final
Ranking
FM1
FM2
FM3
FM4
Severity
0.346
0.141
0.450
0.064
Detection Occurrence
0.451
0.094
0.098
0.242
x
0.398
0.612
0.053
0.052
Sev_Det_Occu
0.280
0.094
0.626
0.055
FM4
0.547
0.000
0.100
Final
Ranking
0.198
0.200
0.547
0.055
FM3
0.200
FM2
0.198
FM1
0.200
0.300
0.400
0.500
0.600
131
Function
Controlled
voltage
Functional
Failure
It does not
PAFMEA
Failure Mode
AHP Weight
Varivolt with
controlled
0.547
problem
voltage
Refrigeration
2
Cool room
valve with
0.200
problem
3
4
Resistance
Heat Room
0.198
Controlled
Voltage is not
Variation of
Voltage
controlled
voltage supplier
burned
0.055
After finalizing the risk assessment, the final activity of the PAFMEA is the
optimization of the system according to the most critical failure modes, which can
also be treated as the recommended maintenance activities. However, this activity
was not possible to complete due to the lack of time to have the feedback of the
proposed actions considering the period of this research and its presentation.
5.2.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
One of the PAFMEA proposals is the new risk assessment approach, which uses
AHP to calculate a new ranking of the failure modes. Therefore, the Table 5.20
compares the ranking of the classical RPN approach with the ranking of the PAFMEA
approach. The results show that the ranking of both approaches are different, which
puts in question the classical approach and corroborate with the literature.
Table 5.20 Comparison ranking of classical approach and PAFMEA.
Failure Mode
PAFMEA Rank
Resistance burned
132
According to the team members the PAFMEA approach adds new promising
perspectives to the analysis, which can be summarize in the addition of more criteria
and the different weights assign by the AHP for these criteria.
The PAFMEA ranking caused a deeper discussion between the participants
about their priorities in the maintenance area. At the end, they conclude that the new
ranking is more suitable to their reality (based on classical FMEA) and the reasons
are:
If a resistance burns, the solution is well known by the team members and the
action is fast, which does not have a big impact in the process.
If the equipment varivolt has a problem, which happens less frequent than the
resistance burned, the solution is not known and the repair action could take
two hours or two days.
If the refrigeration valve has a problem, the solution is also not known, which
could take hours to repair or even days to change the equipment for a new
one.
Another perspective of the final results is the different weight for the criteria
and sub-criteria, which can be seen in Figure 5.5. According to the results showed,
occurrence is the most important criteria for the team members, follow by severity
and detection. The inversion of importance seen here, occurrence over severity, is
explicable because the system under analysis does not impact the users safety, thus
occurrence is more important because impact directly the production rate. It is also
possible to conclude that detection has a low impact on the final ranking, mainly
because its weight is much smaller than the other criteria.
The structure also shows that maintenance duration is the most important subcriteria related to severity, which is because the maintenance duration affects directly
production priority, overall equipment effectiveness and the production target. Also in
the severity criteria, the level of equipment damage is the less important one.
In the detection sub-criteria, visual inspection is the most important, because
according to the team members this kind of inspection is the easiest and the first one
to perform by the employees. Detailed inspection is the less important one, because
its the longest one and not always gives the expected results.
133
Obtain'a'Hierarchy'of'Failure'Modes'
Severity'
Detec?on'
0.280'
Equipment'
Damage'
0.094'
Produc?on'
Priority'
0.067'
Occurrence'
Maintenance'
Dura?on'
0.293'
Visual'
Inspec?on'
0.640'
Resistance'Burned'
0.717'
Refrigera?on'Valve'
with'problem'
0.198'
Detailed'
Inspec?on'
0.626'
Supervisory'
Inspec?on'
0.088'
Varivolt'with'problem'
0.200'
Failure'
Occurrence'
0.195'
1.000'
Varia?on'of'voltage'
supplier'
0.547'
0.055'
In order to analyze the implementation of the PAFMEA and the benefits of the
BPMS a survey was performed with the team members. The sentences of the survey
can be seen in Annex D.
The survey of Annex A was also implemented to identify the profile of the
specialists, which is form by four people. According to this survey, all the specialists
work in the maintenance department and the group is form by one supervisor, one
engineer and two analysts. Moreover the graph presented in Figure 5.6 and Figure
5.7 show the time of experience in maintenance and the quantity of FMEA section
the participants responded. By that, it is possible to conclude that the team members
have good experience in the maintenance domain and has participated in average
Quan*ty of People
3
2
1
0
0
to
1
1 to 2
2 to 5
5 to 9
9 to 15
Years
Above 15
Quan*ty of People
134
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1
to
2
2 to 4
4 to 6
6 to 8
8 to 10
Above 10
Table 5.21 Responses related to the resources sentences of the final survey.
Sentence
Totally
Disagree
Indifferent
Agree
Disagree
Totally
Mean
Agree
#1
4.00
#2
4.25
The next set of sentences is related to the new risk assessment approach, which
is the biggest problem according to the literature review. The Table 5.22 shows that
the addition of more criteria and the different weight for the criteria were 100%
accepted and approved by the participants. The team members also agreed that the
directly comparison gives a better evaluation to rank the failure modes.
135
Table 5.22 Responses about the new risk assesment approach of the final survey.
Sentence
Totally
Disagree
Indifferent
Agree
Disagree
Totally
Mean
Agree
#3
5.00
#4
5.00
#5
4.25
Table 5.23 Responses about the behavior and treatment of the team members.
Sentence
Totally
Disagree
Indifferent
Agree
Disagree
Totally
Mean
Agree
#6
4.50
#7
3.75
#8
4.50
Sentences #9 and #10 are related to other aspects that could not be classified
into the last three set of sentences. The Table 5.24 confirms that the guidelines used
to support the users in the ranking of the criteria is very helpful and that the language
used throughout the method is clear for the users.
Totally
Disagree
Indifferent
Agree
Disagree
Totally
Mean
Agree
#9
4.00
#10
4.00
136
The last sentences were used to evaluate the benefits of the software used to
support the PAFMEA development. The results of Table 5.25 show that the
participants agree with all the sentences. The main sentences that could be
highlighted here are:
#13: The software optimizes the time available of the team members by
given the possibility to perform the analysis at any time and from
different places.
Therefore, these sentences also show that other problems like the lack of
standardization during different failure analysis, the availability of time and the
facilitation to reuse information are solved by the PAFMEA system.
Table 5.25 Responses about the evaluation of the software used to support the
PAFMEA.
Sentence
Totally
Disagree
Indifferent
Agree
Disagree
Totally
Mean
Agree
#11
4.00
#12
4.25
#13
4.75
#14
4.25
#15
4.50
#16
4.50
#17
4.75
137
6. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter presents the conclusions of this work (item 6.1) and suggestions
for future work (item 6.2). The conclusions compare the research questions and
objectives set forward to the results obtained, also highlighting the contributions of
the research. The suggestions for future work describe possible research that could
be carried out both from the results obtained as to complement them.
6.1.
FINAL CONCLUSIONS
The related works of the FMEA that are integrated to other methods
were presented in section 2.2.2. The results showed that 44% of the
attempts are related to the proposition of a new method, leaving
software (19%), framework (3%) and approach (3%) proposals as the
least used ones. However, despite the high amount of works trying to
overcome some of the FMEA drawbacks, especially the RPN approach,
none of them is flawless and easily implemented, which leaves a gap
on the field for new proposals;
138
139
6.2.
The PAFMEA uses AHP for the risk assessment stage of the failure mode
analysis by adding more criteria and assigning different weight for these criteria.
However, the software implemented in the BPMS platform limited the number of subcriteria for severity and detection. Moreover, the software also limited the alternatives
of the AHP for a maximum of four failure modes. Therefore, one possible future work
would be increasing the quantity of sub-criteria and alternatives to enrich the failure
analysis.
In order to enhance the multi-criteria analysis, the ANP (Analytic Network
Process) could be as an extension of the AHP structure. While the AHP decomposes
a decision problem in the form of a hierarchy of independent elements, the ANP
replaces the hierarchies with networks and makes it possible to structure the
decisions that involve functional dependencies. The structure difference between a
hierarchy and a network is illustrated in Figure 6.1
140
concordance rates, used to evaluate the benefits of an alternative over the others,
and disagreement rates that measure the disadvantages of an alternative over the
other.
141
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142
143
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149
( ) Quality
( ) Manufacture
( ) Maintenance
( ) Engineer
( ) Finance
( ) Marketing
3. What field do you current work?
( ) Logistic
( ) Quality
( ) Manufacture
( ) Maintenance
( ) Engineer
( ) Finance
( ) Marketing
4. What is your current position?
( ) Operator
( ) Technician
( ) Analyst
( ) Engineer
( ) Supervisor
( ) Manager
( ) 3 to 5 years
( ) 6 to 9 years
( ) 10 to 15 years
( ) Above 16 years
6. Time of experience in Maintenance.
( )0
( ) 1 to 2 years
( ) 3 to 5 years
( ) 6 to 9 years
( ) 10 to 15 years
( ) Above 16 years
150
( ) Use software
( ) Coordinate FMEA
( ) Others
( ) 2 to 4
( ) 4 to 6
( ) 6 to 8
( ) 8 to 10
( ) Above 10
151
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
The sentences below are related to the use and calculation of the RPN (Risk Priority
Number).
4. The RPN criteria (severity, occurrence and detection) form a limited approach for the
decision-making process.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
5. One of the main drawbacks of the FMEA is that it does not assigned weights to the
three criteria (severity, occurrence and detection) to calculate the RPN.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
7. One RPN value can represent different risk situations because of the combination of
the criteria (severity, occurrence and detection), which is often a problem in the
decision making process.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
The sentences below are related to the behavior and treatment of the FMEA
participants.
8. Disagreements or doubts happen between the team member during the ranking of
152
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
9. People involved in the FMEA development are not treated equally during the
meetings.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
10. The attitudes, behaviors and relationship between the team members often a cause
for the long FMEA meetings.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
12. Reach a consensus between the participants to rank occurrence, detection and
severity is a hard and time-consuming task.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
The sentences below are related to the others aspects of the FMEA.
13. The knowledge obtain from one FMEA is usually used as a starting point for new
FMEAs.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
14. The monitoring process of the improvements actions is often a problem for the
responsible.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
15. The terminology used to describe an item and structure of the FMEA form (failure
mode, failure effects, cause of failure, etc.) is standardized.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
153
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
2. Help structure in each phase to support the user during the FMEA development.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
3. A process oriented approach, which ensures that the user follows the right steps
for the FMEA development.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
5. Export the FMEA form/report for various types of files (MS Excel, PDF, etc).
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
6. Show guidelines to help the user to rate the RPN criteria (severity, occurrence
and detection).
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
7. The rating for the RPN criteria (severity, occurrence and detection) should be
already inserted in the software to avoid misunderstanding by the users.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
8. Addition of external files (pictures, CAD, documents, etc.) to help the users during
the FMEA development.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
10. Save data from the FMEA in a commercial database software (SQL Server).
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
11. Collaborative work through an online tool, without the need of face-to-face
meetings.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
12. Please add other requirements that were not listed above.
154
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
2. The online software allows the user to better manage their time and availability for
future analysis.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
The sentences below are related to the use and calculation of the RPN (Risk Priority
Number).
3. Since the regular FMEA uses three criteria (severity, occurrence and detection) the
application of the PAFMEA gives more flexibility to the method by adding more
criteria to evaluate and rank the failure modes.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
4. One of the main problem of the FMEA is that it does not assigned weights to the
three criteria (severity, occurrence and detection) to calculate the RPN, however
since the PAFMEA uses a different approach to rank the failure modes, this problem
is solved.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
5. The comparison performed between the criteria gives a more accurate perception
and evaluation to better rank the failure modes.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
The sentences below are related to the behavior and treatment of the FMEA
participants.
6. The online software eliminates the discussions that could happen during face-to-face
meetings.
155
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
7. The PAFMEA ensures the anonymity of the team members and guarantee that their
opinions are treated equally.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
8. Reach a consensus between the participants to rank the criteria is easier with the
new approach and the software.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
The sentences below are related to the others aspects of the PAFMEA.
9. The guidelines showed to rate severity, occurrence and detection are very helpful.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
10. The language used is clear and specific, in other words, vague and imprecise
expressions are not used.
( )1
( )2
( )3
( )4
( )5
The sentences below are related to the software used to support the PAFMEA
implementation.
11. The software facilitates the integration and participation of the team members.
( )1
( )2
( )3
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12. The software facilitates the standardization of the terminology used to nominee the
functions, function failure, failure modes, failure effects and failure causes.
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13. The software optimizes the time available of the team members by given the
possibility to perform the analysis at any time and from different places.
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14. The software facilitates the management of input and output data of the analysis.
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15. The software facilitates the management of the improvement actions recommended.
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16. The use of the software facilitates to find and reuse important information of previous
FMEAs, decreasing the efforts needed to develop new analysis.
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17. The software facilitates the development of reports to support the decision-making
process.
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