MicroFinance and Women's Empowerment in Africa PDF

Journal of International Development
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
QUESTIONING VIRTUOUS SPIRALS:

MICRO-FINANCE AND WOMEN'S
EMPOWERMENT IN AFRICA
LINDA MAYOUX*
Cambridge, UK
INTRODUCTION
The Micro-credit Summit in Washington in February 1997 presented an extremely

attractive vision of increasing numbers of expanding, nancially self-sustainable
micro-nance programmes1 reaching large numbers of women borrowers and making
a signicant contribution to global poverty alleviation. Funding for micro-nance
programmes targeting large numbers of women has recently been signicantly
increased under initiatives by CGAP and its member agencies.2 Those promoting
micro-nance for women see it as initiating a `virtuous upward spiral' of economic,
social and political empowerment. However parallel to this enthusiasm some
researchers based on research in South Asia, particularly Bangladesh, have questioned the degree to which micro-nance services in fact benet women.3 Some have
argued that for some women in some contexts programmes may even be
disempowering, reducing women to unpaid debt collectors for development agencies
and increasing tensions within the family (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996). Some argue
strongly that micro-nance programmes divert resources and/or the attention of
women themselves from other more eective strategies for empowerment (Ebdon,
1995). These gender considerations have added to recent questioning of the usefulness
* Correspondence to: Dr Linda Mayoux, 61 Cheney Way, Cambridge, CB4 1UE, e-mail: L.Mayoux
@dial.pipex.com
1
The term micro-nance is used as an umbrella term to refer to a range of services: credit, savings and
other nancial services like pensions and insurance which are attracting increasing attention. Most of the
research discussed here however has focused on credit.
2
Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest is an international initiative arising from the 1993 International
Conference on Actions to Reduce Global Hunger and was formally constituted in 1995. The nine founding
members are Canada, France, the Netherlands, the United States, the African Development Bank, the
Asian Development Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the United Nations
Development Programme/United Nations Capital Development Fund and the World Bank later followed
by Australia, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Inter-American Development Bank.
Approximately US$200 million (including ongoing programmes) was pledged to Micro-Finance
programmes for the poorest groups in low income countries, particularly women (World Bank, 1996).
Although there has been considerable dispute over actual amounts disbursed through CGAP under the
auspice of the World Bank, considerably more than this has been disbursed independently by member
agencies and further expansion is planned.
3
For a discussion of some of the Bangladesh literature see Kabeer (1998a). For an overview of the South
Asia literature in general see Mayoux (1998a) and particularly (1999c).
CCC 09541748/99/07095728$17.50
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958
L. Mayoux
of credit as a strategy for poverty alleviation (Hulme and Mosley (eds), 1996; Rogaly,
1996) or micro-enterprise development (Buckley, 1997).
The promotion of micro-nance programmes for women has therefore become
increasingly controversial. There has been no systematic cross-cultural or interorganizational comparison of relative impacts of dierent models or strategies. As a
preliminary to such a study this paper attempts to piece together existing and largely
unpublished evidence on 15 programmes in Africa, based on secondary source
material and the author's own exploratory research. The rst section of the paper
claries some of the assumptions about `virtuous spirals' of empowerment underlying
dierent paradigms of micro-nance provision. The following sections then examine
the degree to which the evidence supports or challenges these assumptions and the
questions which need to be asked by gender analysis. The evidence indicates that for
some women in some contexts, even very poor women, micro-nance programmes
can indeed contribute to empowerment. However, for many women impact on both
economic and social empowerment appears to be marginal and some women may be
positively disempowered. These diverse outcomes indicate extremely complex interrelationships between women's own strategies for use of micro-nance to further their
perceived interests, contextual opportunities and constraints and programme policies.
Although existing data is inadequate to reach rm conclusions about details of policy,
it does indicate the need to explicitly incorporate strategies for empowerment rather
than just increasing women's access to micro-nance.
2 VIRTUOUS SPIRALS: COMPETING PARADIGMS AND UNDERLYING
ASSUMPTIONS IN AFRICAN MICRO-FINANCE FOR WOMEN
The expansion of credit programmes for women in Africa dates back to the mid-1980s
but is set to increase dramatically in the late 1990s and into the next century. From the
1950s poverty-targeted credit became an established part of many large-scale
agricultural programmes. In Zimbabwe, Cameroon and elsewhere Savings Clubs and
Credit Unions were set up for women and men by missionaries (Mayoux, 1998c;
1999a). By the 1980s gender lobbies within some governments and aid agencies were
attempting to increase women's access to credit and savings within this wider context
of poverty-targeted micro-nance.4 The 1980s also saw a mushrooming of government and NGO-sponsored income-generation programmes for women, particularly
in the wake of the Nairobi International Women's Conference in 1985. These
frequently took the form of small revolving loan funds for group economic activities,
often based on stimulating and supporting grassroots revolving savings and credit
associations (ROSCAs).5 In the 1990s large international donor agencies like USAID,
ODA-UK and World Bank became increasingly interested in micro-enterprise
development as a central plank of a neo-liberal poverty-alleviation strategy. Evidence
4
As early as 1981 a conference held in Nairobi by ACOSCA aimed to form a network of leaders who
would work to make credit unions more representative to women's needs and to make country-specic
plans. They recommended a programme of information for women, research on women in credit unions,
nancing of labour-saving technology for women and child-care facilities and increasing women's
representation on decision-making bodies (Mbogo, 1989). For an overview of selected programmes in
Kenya, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Zambia and Zimbabwe see FAO (1988).
5
For general literature review and case studies of women and ROSCAs see Ardener and Burman (eds)
(1995).
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
Questioning Virtuous Spirals
959
of women's higher repayment rates and higher levels of expenditure on family wellbeing were used by gender lobbies within these agencies to argue for targeting women
in micro-nance programmes (Mayoux, 1995). Programmes targeting women were
also introduced by some private sector and government banks.6
There are now an increasing number of micro-nance programmes in Africa
targeting women and most of these are also expanding to reach ever large numbers
of women. Targeting women is now generally acclaimed as à good thing' by donors,
NGOs and governments of widely dierent political persuasions. However, as
discussed in detail by the author elsewhere (Mayoux, 1998a) targeting women has
been the result of a conuence of three rather distinct paradigms of micro-nance7
which come from dierent underlying development ideologies of the promoting
agencies (see Box 1). In all three paradigms it is assumed that increasing women's
access to micro-nance leads to a set of mutually-reinforcing `virtuous spirals' of
increasing economic empowerment, improved well-being and social/political/
legal empowerment for women as indicated by the arrows of Figure 1. However,
there are dierences in denitions of these terms, priorities and programme
emphases.
The nancial self-sustainability paradigm has dominated micro-nance debates
within many major donor agencies since the mid-1990s.8 This advocates large-scale,
minimalist and ultimately nancially self-sustainable and even protable micronance services for micro-enterprise and agricultural production.9 The increasing
strength of gender lobbies, coupled with accumulating evidence of women's higher
repayment rates (see below) has led many of these programmes to increasingly target
women based on eciency arguments. It is assumed that sustainable micro-nance
services alone will lead to women's individual economic empowerment through
stimulating women's micro-enterprise development, leading to increased income
under women's control. It is assumed that women's control over income will then lead
to increased well-being (health, nutrition, literacy) for women and their children. This
individual economic empowerment is also assumed to lead to wider social, political
6
In Kenya programmes include the Women Credit Programme of Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd and in
Zambia Barclays Bank. In Sudan, the Agriculture Bank has to allocate 10 per cent of its lending to
`productive families', most of which go to women.
7
The three paradigms are discussed in detail by the author elsewhere (Mayoux, 1998a). They constitute
distinct discourses arising from diering value and political premises which, despite internal inconsistencies
in practice, are internally logically consistent in relating values to aims and policies on micro-nance,
gender and empowerment and to criteria of evaluation.
8
The most detailed articulation of this approach is given in Otero and Rhyne (1994). The paradigm
underlies all current policies of CGAP and most of its member agencies (see note 2).
9
The emphasis is on programmes which oer micro-nance services alone, with minimal training or other
services. In Rhyne and Otero's formulation achieving nancial sustainability is seen in terms of four stages.
The rst level is where grants for soft loans cover operating expenses and establish a revolving loan fund.
However, when programmes are heavily subsidized and performing poorly, the value of the loan fund
erodes quickly through delinquency and ination. At the second level programmes raise funds by borrowing on terms near, but still below, market rates. Interest income covers the cost of funds and a portion of
operating expenses, but grants are still required to nance some aspects of operations. At the third level
most subsidy is eliminated. At the fourth level programmes are fully nanced from the savings of their
clients and funds are raised at commercial rates from formal nancial institutions. Fees and interest income
cover the real cost of funds, loan loss reserves, operations and ination and prots. The ultimate aim is
programmes which are protable and fully self-supporting in competition with other private sector
banking institutions and able to raise funds from international nancial markets rather than relying on
funds from development agencies. Recent guidelines for CGAP funding and best practice focus on
production of a `nancial sustainability index' which charts progress of programmes in covering costs from
incomes.
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
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L. Mayoux
and legal empowerment (RESULTS, 1997). Micro-nance groups are seen as

contributing to building `social capital' through developing and strengthening
women's networks.10 This building of `social capital' is then seen as potentially
leading to women's collective empowerment.11 It is further assumed that support for
female entrepreneurs will increase women's employment more generally, tapping an
underutilized resource for economic development (Downing, 1991). These mutually
reinforcing spirals of empowerment are assumed to result from access to micronance per se without explicit strategies to address other dimensions of poverty or
gender subordination.
The poverty alleviation paradigm is espoused by many NGOs and sees micronance as part of an integrated development programme where the main aim is
poverty alleviation and institutionally sustainable community development.12 Arguments in favour of targeting women stress the poverty alleviation benets, particularly
the higher levels of poverty of women and especially female-headed households and
women's higher levels of responsibility for family wellbeing. In this paradigm, the
concern is not so much with micro-enterprise and individual income but with
decreased household vulnerability to uctuations income and to crises. Micro-nance
programmes are also seen as an entry point or complement to community development programmes like literacy, health and family planning. Decreased household
vulnerability and women's role in achieving this are assumed to lead to higher status
for women in the household and greater well-being for women and their children.
Although gender subordination is recognized as an issue, the focus is on assistance to
households on the assumption that the household is a locus of mutually synergistic
interests. It is assumed that addressing women's `practical needs' is the best way of
enabling them to address gender inequality and there is considerable resistance to
attempts at direct feminist organization.
The feminist empowerment paradigm, promoted by gender lobbies within some
donor agencies and NGOs, takes inspiration from the international women's
10
For example contribution to social capital has been included in criteria for programme evaluation in
recent USAID-sponsored impact studies. Sebstad, Neill, Barnes and Chen write: Àn important aspect of
development at the community level involves the building of social capital, whereby members of the
community mutually encourage each other . . .This encouragement within groups or networks may take the
form of patronizing each other's businesses or forming market associations to discuss infrastructure
improvements. There may also be a social dimension to this encouragement as when members of the
community make contributions to a family experiencing a life event, such as a birth, a wedding or a funeral.
Social capital links individuals, enterprises and households to each other through two related channels:
information and reputation (Rochlin and Garg 1994). The transfer of information helps to establish a
common belief system and a code of behaviour upon which individual and institutional reputations are
built. Reputations then become the basis of further interaction, on an economic, social, or political basis'
(Sebstad et al., 1995, p. 16).
11
Sebstad et al. continue: `Social networks are important for the economic and social purposes mentioned
above. In some contexts, social networks are able to take on added political role as well. Where individuals
have organized themselves to address a particular problem or concern, the social network may serve as a
means of political mobilization. In addition, social networks, which in the short run serve a social function,
may in the longer term become vehicles for political action as group members become more linked
economically and socially and begin to identify their interests with that of the group (Sebstad et al., 1995,
p. 17).
12
The most persuasive account from this perspective of the role of micro-nance in poverty reduction, and
its limitations, is Johnson and Rogaly (1997). The description here of assumptions about empowerment is
based on discussions with NGOs during the research and workshops held in the pilot project on which
most of this paper is based. It is not ascribable to Johnson and Rogaly, both of whom have been
supportive of the gender critique given here and some of which is based on parallel work by Susan
Johnson.
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
961
BOX 1. WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT IN MICRO-FINANCE PROGRAMMES:

CONTRASTING PARADIGMS
Financial Self-sustainability Paradigm

Programme emphasis: increasing women's access to minimalist and nancially selfsustainable micro-nance provision.
Target group: existing micro-entrepreneurs or those with èntrepreneurial ability'.
Primary rationale for targeting women: better repayment rates contributing to
programme nancial sustainability.
Contribution of micro-nance to empowerment: individual economic empowerment.
Underlying assumption: that it is possible for women to become economically
empowered through micro-nance and for this to lead to improved well-being
and social, political and legal empowerment without explicit attention to other
dimensions of gender subordination.
Poverty Alleviation Paradigm
Programme emphasis: micro-nance as part of integrated community development
programme as an entry point for alleviating household poverty and community
collective action.
Target group: the poor and particularly the poorest men, women and children.
Rationale for targeting women: because they are seen as poorer than men and also
more likely to spend income on the wellbeing of their families.
Contribution of micro-nance to empowerment: increased household well-being and
group organization as an entry point for and/or complement to other community
development activities.
Underlying assumption: that household wellbeing and women's empowerment are
inherently synergistic.
Feminist Empowerment Paradigm
Programme emphasis: as part of sectoral strategies of women workers and/or entry
point for wider mobilization for gender equity.
Target group: mainly women but aiming also to change men.
Rationale for targeting women: in terms of equity and human rights of women.
Contribution of micro-nance to empowerment: individual economic empowerment
and group organization as an entry point for and/or complement to other
strategies for transformation of power relations throughout society.
Underlying assumption: that women are, or should be, aiming for social and
political change in ways advocated by the international women's movement.
movement and sees women's empowerment is an end in itself.13 Gender subordination is seen as a complex, multi-dimensional and all-pervasive process, aecting all
aspects of women's lives and embedded at many dierent mutually reinforcing levels:
individual consciousness, the household, work, legislation, state structures and
international economic and political systems. Empowerment is consequently seen as
requiring both a process of internal change at the individual level and organization at
13
For one of the earliest formulations see Sen and Grown (1988), later elaborated in e.g. Batliwala (1993);
(1994). For a detailed account of the empowerment approach to micro-nance see Chen et al., 1996.
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
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L. Mayoux
Figure 1.
Virtuous spirals: paradigms compared.
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
963
the macro-level. Micro-nance, together with appropriate complementary services

like business training and training in new skills, is seen as leading to economic
empowerment dened largely in terms of women's control over income, changes in
gender roles in production and increased control of productive resources. At the same
time micro-nance groups are seen as an entry point for, or complement to, strategies
for wider social, political and legal empowerment. Here it is assumed that women will
be interested in using their economic independence and/or group membership in ways
envisaged by feminist gender lobbies in development agencies.
The discussion in this paper focuses on 15 micro-nance programmes in Cameroon
(Cameroon Gatsby Trust CGT, Mbonhweh Women's Development Association
and BERDSCO), Zimbabwe (Self Help Development Foundation SHDF and
Zambuko Trust), Zambia (CARE-PULSE), South Africa (Small Enterprise Foundation SEF), Kenya (Kenya Rural Enterprise Programme KREP, CARE-Kenya),
Uganda (Uganda Women's Finance and Credit Trust UWFCT), Niger (Maradi
Women on the Move MMD), Chad (VITA-sponsored programme), Sudan
(ACORD-sponsored programmes in Port Sudan and Kassala) and Ethiopia
(ACORD-sponsored programme in Dire Dawa). Details of these programmes and
sources used are given in the Appendix. This information is supplemented by evidence
from general impact studies and/or discussions and subsequent correspondence with
programme sta who attended three recent regional workshops in East, West and
Southern Africa co-facilitated by the author.14
The programmes have dierent origins, follow dierent models and strategies and
operate in diering social, political and legal environments. SHDF was started in the
1960s, Mbonweh, KREP, UWFCT and ACCORD-Port Sudan in the 1980s and the
others were started in the early to mid-1990s. They represent a number of dierent
micro-nance models and dier in the degree to which they are dominated by each of
the paradigms, and the ways in which they are attempting to reconcile potential
conicts between them. In most programmes all three paradigms coexist in uneasy
tension as programmes attempt to reconcile competing, and frequently conicting,
demands of donors, programme sta and programme clients. This conation of
paradigms means that, as evidenced from discussions at the regional workshops
during the pilot study, women's empowerment is frequently an assumed outcome of
nancially sustainable micro-nance programmes or female and poverty-targeting.
Denitions are constantly shifting and empowerment is rarely strategically planned.
The only programmes where there was an explicit gender policy with gender
monitoring were the programmes sponsored by Northern-based NGOs: ACORDsponsored programmes, the CARE-sponsored programmes and Zambuko which is
part of the Opportunity Trust network.
What follows does not claim to be a systematic comparative study. Assessing programme contribution to women's empowerment is inherently problematic, exacerbating methodological problems encountered in other types of impact assessment.
14
Regional workshops were hosted by Action Aid Regional Oces in Ethiopia and Ghana and by
Opportunity Trust in Zimbabwe. These were part of a pilot project entitled `Micro-nance programmes
and women's empowerment: strategies for increasing impact'. This was funded by the Small Enterprise
Development Fund, DFID UK and later by Hivos and sponsored by a steering committee of UK-based
NGOs headed by Action Aid and including ACORD, CAFOD, CARE-International, Christian Aid,
Friends of ASSEFA, Oxfam, Opportunity Trust, Save the Children, WOMANKIND and World Vision.
Details of participating programmes and discussions are given in the workshop reports: Mayoux and
Johnson (eds), 1997; Owusu-Gyam et al. (eds), 1997; and Mayoux and Duursma (eds) (1998).
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
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L. Mayoux
This is because of the contentious and complex nature of empowerment itself,

dierences and conicting interests between women and complex interrelationships
between women's own strategies, contextual constraints and programme design
(Mayoux, 1998b). Existing evidence is patchy, limited in the depth of questions asked
and/or based on very small samples. It is unlikely that either positive or negative
impacts are limited to those programmes for which they are reported. Reported
positive impacts appear in some cases to be more an indication of the limited
questions asked and unrepresentative sampling. Reported negative impacts on the
other hand may be more an indication of a programme's level of gender awareness
and accountability rather than higher prevalence of the problems described.
It is nevertheless clear that some micro-nance programmes in some contexts can
make a signicant contribution to all dimensions of empowerment for some women,
pointing to the potential of micro-nance as a development intervention for women.
At the same time the evidence does raise serious questions about any automatic
contribution of micro-nance per se to any of the links in any of the assumed
`virtuous spirals'.
3 QUESTIONING ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT: CONSTRAINTS ON
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES
The assumption underlying all three paradigms is that women's access to micronance contributes to increased incomes, generally through stimulating women's own
economic activity. The programmes discussed here are operating in very dierent
market contexts where women have diering economic roles and this aects the ways
in which women use micro-nance. Even within regions within countries, there are
signicant dierences between rural and urban areas and between women in dierent
ethnic groups. As a broad generalization of diverse reality however a distinction can
be made between Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Zambia, South Africa, Kenya and Uganda,
where women play a prominent role in agricultural production and informal sector
marketing. This contrasts with Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia and Eritrea where, as in parts
of Asia, restrictions on women's movements outside the home place greater constraints on their participation in marketing and agricultural production. It is clear
that in all these contexts women's ability to increase incomes is limited by a complex
interaction of market constraints and continuing lack of resources for entrepreneurship which also limit men's ability to use micro-nance for self-employment (Buckley,
1997). For women these problems are further compounded by gender constraints in
markets and in the household.15
Women's Access to Micro-nance: Some Very Basic Questions
The impressive achievement of micro-nance programmes in making micro-nance
services available to large numbers of women who previously had no such access
cannot be underestimated. All except three programmes (Mbonweh, ACORD-Dire
15
For detailed discussion of complex interaction of market and household level constraints and the ways
women seek to overcome them in Zimbabwe see Horn (1994).
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
965
Dawa and ACORD-Kassala) had over 3,000 clients and four (SHDF, Zambuko,
KREP and ACORD-Port Sudan) have over 10,000 and most are aiming for rapid
expansion. All programmes report high levels of demand for credit by women.16
Although as pointed out by recent critics (e.g. Buckley, 1997) `credit is also debt',
most of the women interviewed by the author in Mbonweh, CGT, SHDF and CAREPulse had reasonably clear business plans and were aware of repayment implications,
even very poor women. Women's repayment levels in most organizations discussed
here are also high. Although repayment data are notoriously problematic, ocial
estimates in the women-dominated programmes are over 95 per cent. Signicantly,
most mixed-sex programmes for which gender-disaggregated data were available
reported higher levels of repayment for women and women's groups than for men and
mixed sex groups.
Nevertheless evidence indicates rstly continuing widespread barriers to women's
access in many programmes. This is partly because of regulations in many mixed-sex
programmes e.g. collateral/guarantee requirements or targeting of services to
particular activities where men predominate or have an advantage and/or opposition
of male programme members (e.g. ACORD, 1996; Kebede, 1997; ACORD-DireDawa, 1996). Even in women-only or women-targeted programmes women were
being prevented from participating because of opposition from husbands and/or
requirements for husband's signatures in loan applications (Karamagi, 1997).
Most programmes for which data are available are not reaching the poorest
women, even when this is a stated aim. Despite emphasis on poverty-reach in promotional material and funding applications, some programmes explicitly exclude the
poorest women by focusing on existing women entrepreneurs with proven business
record. In some programmes like Port Sudan there is a marked shift towards the
better-o over time because of pressures toward nancial sustainability (Gibson,
1995). As discussed in more detail below, where groups are self-selecting they tend to
exclude or discriminate against the most disadvantaged. This discrimination is often
combined with self-exclusion from programmes by the poorest themselves when
better-o (though still poor) people are involved. For example in SEF the `better-o
poor' joined and remained members for a long time in the hope of larger future loans.
They either actively pushed out very poor people who slowed things down, or created
an environment where the very poor left.
Increases in Women's Incomes
In the programmes discussed here women generally appeared to control use of loans
in their name and male appropriation of loans does not appear to be as prevalent as
reported for Bangladesh and Pakistan. This may be because the programmes
discussed here are based on existing savings groups and/or explicitly target women
micro-entrepreneurs and track them through programme monitoring as in the case of
SHDF, MMD, Zambuko and CARE-PULSE. It may also simply be a lack of
information in most programmes. Male appropriation of loans was however reported
16
In Chad, a report describes news of VITA `spreading like wild re by word of mouth in communities,
churches, markets and other public places' (Bangui and Miankeol, 1995). Mbonweh, CGT and BERDSCO
all had far more potential borrowers wanting loans than they were able to fund. The ACORD-Sudan
programmes reported twice as many applications for credit as they were able to meet.
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
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L. Mayoux
for Port Sudan (Amin, 1993) and various forms of `loan diversion' by some extension
agents and false applicants in CGT. Male appropriation of loans is also reported in
programmes not included in this sample: three ACORD-Uganda programmes
(ACORD, 1996) and programmes in Tanzania (Locke, 1997), indicating that male
loan appropriation may be more widespread elsewhere.
Programme impact on incomes is notoriously dicult to measure. Repayment
statistics cannot be used as an indicator of contribution to incomes as women may
repay from other sources and repay in order to get access to a second loan (Marx et al.,
1997). It is dicult to trace the usage of loans and savings withdrawal with any degree
of certainty. It is also dicult to determine how far any increases in incomes are due
to micro-nance rather than other factors.17 Problems are particularly acute for
commissioned consultancies where women, like men, may be unwilling to divulge
sensitive information on incomes and use of credit because of anticipated repercussions for access to credit and/or other programme benets (Hulme, 1997). The
author's own eldwork in Cameroom and Zimbabwe indicates that loans and savings
withdrawals are often used in a complex juggling of income and expenses where
immediate use of loans for consumption is necessary for subsequent increases in
production e.g. medical care, house improvements or purchase of staple food in bulk
at low prices to free income for subsequent investment. Participants frequently also
combine nance from programmes with other sources of informal nance (Marx
et al., 1997).
There are few gender-disaggregated statistical studies but anecdotal sources indicate clear evidence of positive contributions to incomes. The promotional literature of
all programmes cite individual case studies of successful women entrepreneurs. Some
very poor women may be beneting as can be seen from the cases of Wube Cherinet
and Mrs Agnes in Box 2. In some programmes operating in favourable urban and
peri-urban contexts where there are dynamic markets and women already have
business skills, increases in incomes may be occurring for many women.18 Particularly
where loans are targeted to micro-enterprise, evidence indicates that programmes
have contributed to setting up of new economic activities for some women and
expanding existing activities for others.19 More commonly there is evidence of small
increases for larger numbers of women borrowers and decrease in vulnerability to
crises (Barnes, 1997). In some cases loans may make very poor women more able to
17
For example in CARE-PULSE an impact study of male and female participants found that 87 per cent
of respondents would have been able to operate their business without the loan (Moyo, 1997), though
changes in income levels were not measured.
18
For example in SHDF a survey of 59 borrowers found that average net additional income came to 152
per cent of loan amount adjusting for interest payments. 51 per cent had higher returns than 20 per cent
and 28 per cent were able at least to double the amount they invested (Marx et al., 1997). Preliminary
ndings of a participatory monitoring process in SEF's Tsomishano poverty-targeted programme nd that
for the majority of participants income increases of 2050 per cent occur in the rst year and for 10 per
cent increases are very large. Gender dierences are unclear but over 90 per cent of participants are women,
mostly female-headed households (Simanowitz, personal communication).
19
A participatory gender impact study of the ACORD-Sudan programmes reported that a high
proportion of enterprises assisted with ACORD credit were successful, in some cases nearly doubling
overall household income and many women had applied for successive loans to start up supplementary
initiatives. In Seraye it was noted that although women clients had fewer xed assets than men and lower
working capital, in some cases they were able to have higher income increments than men (though
presumably from a much lower initial level). A consultant's survey of 79 members in CARE-Keyna in 1995
found that while rst loans tended to be used to increase stock, later loans were used to diversify and about
half the women had more than one business (CARE-International, 1996).
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
967
BOX 2. ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT: INCREASED INCOME AND

DECREASED VULNERABILITY
Ethiopia
ACORD-Dire Dawa: Wube Cherinet: 45, husband retired factory worker and
3 unemployed sons. Even before retirement the husband's wages as a factory worker
were low, leading to serious domestic conict. Wube took training from the credit
programme and used the stipend to start a catering business. Then she took a loan
and enlarged her business. She has now taken a second loan and also joined an
èqub' [ROSCA]. She plans to increase her income attending pilgrimage centres and
hopes eventually to furnish her house and make it into a snack bar. Relations with
her husband have greatly improved now she is earning an income. She no longer
asks her husband for money to cover household expenses. She is also able to
purchase luxuries for herself. As her health is not good following a miscarriage, her
husband helps serve the customers and also housework like cleaning. He gets
up every morning at 5 o'clock to clean and sweep the oor and buy food for the
business before waking her up at 8 o'clock. He then makes the bed, prepares
breakfast and coee before going to work as a stone-cutter. Her main constraint is
continuing reliance on credit from the wholesalers, but slowly she is accumulating
savings after household expenditure to become independent (ACORD-Dire Dawa,
1996).
Cameroon
Mbonweh: Mrs Agnes: has 9 children and 8 grandchildren. Her husband drinks a
lot, is violent and refuses to help her with either work or money. She took a
Mbonweh loan and bought 2 poles of land for CFA 50,000 in her own name.
Before that she had been renting land for CFA 10,000 per pole per year. The land is
34 km from her home. She paid CFA 15,000 to clear the land and takes a loan
each year for cultivation. She grows plantains, coee, cocoyam and cassava.
Mbonweh: Mrs Mari Magdelene: a very old women who buys and breaks
groundnuts to sell to school children and has a small farm which she still cultivates.
She herself has no children but neighbours and their children help her in return for
food from her farm. Other people gave her money to join Mbonweh and she
received a loan of CFA 45,000. With this money she bought bunches of green
bananas and sold these in front of her door. She is repaying the loan.
Mbonweh: Mrs Angela: is about 40, very poor and ill. She sends her 20 year old
daughter to buy yams which she sells in front of her house. Her daughter also
works her cassava farm. She got some money from the family meeting to join
Mbonweh and got a loan of CFA 90,000. She used the money for trading and to
buy medicine. She cannot estimate prots but has become used for food, medicines
and loan repayment.
Mbonweh: Mrs Martina: is a widow of about 50, partially blind and handicapped
with a swollen leg, high blood pressure and diabetes. She took a Mbonweh loan
and paid workers to work her farm and bought medicines. She is managing to
repay through buying egusi melon seeds which she cracks and sells. If she had a
larger loan she could stock more things to sell from her house at the road side.
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
968
L. Mayoux
deal with a desperate situation, even where actual incomes are not very high as in the
cases of very poor Mboweh borrowers in Box 2.
However, contribution to increased income may be marginal. All existing studies
nd that most women use loans for existing activities or further diversication within
a narrow range of low-prot activities, with which they are familiar or which are
traditionally open to women, in food processing and petty trade, handicrafts and
manufacturing (Buckley, 1996; CARE-International, 1996; ACORD-Dire-Dawa,
1996; Marx et al., 1997). It is clear that women's choices about activity and their
ability to increase incomes are seriously constrained in most cases by lack of skills and
lack of access to markets. In Sudan Fikka women were not allowed to go to the
market to sell their products. They had no idea who their customers were and sent
their children who were sometimes exploited and forced to sell the baskets at low
prices (ACORD-Kassala, 1996). In Ethiopia, Eritrea and Zimbabwe reports note the
limitations on women's ability to increase incomes because of gender discrimination
in access to education and skills which limit women's ability to diversify into more
lucrative activities and see little prospect of signicant increases in income from
women's existing activities (Kebede, 1997; Abudulahi, 1996; Phillips, 1994; Marx
et al., 1997; own eld notes). In some cases social pressures have led successful women
to give up more lucrative activities. For example in UWFCT one woman who had set
up a successful butchery business, seen as a `male' occupation, gave this up for a less
lucrative but more socially acceptable second-hand clothes business (Rugasira, 1997).
This tendency to low incomes and market crowding is frequently reinforced by
assumptions by male sta and clients within mixed sex programmes and by the lower
loan amounts given to women.20
In some cases loans may be positively disempowering and losses may be made by
signicant numbers of women. For example in SHDF 23 per cent of the 58 borrowers
interviewed made a loss (Marx et al., 1997) and many women expressed fears of not
being able to repay. There are also serious dangers of programmes contributing to
market saturation (Kebede, 1997; Abudulahi, 1996; Phillips, 1994; Marx et al., 1997).
Problems of market access are particularly acute for poor who often lack the social
skills necessary to interact with customers and to eectively market their businesses.
Negative self-perception is often mirrored by community attitudes, which view the
poor as dirty or lazy; and is reected in preference shown to buying goods from better
o people's businesses (Simanowitz, 1998). Within highly competitive markets bettero women with access to programmes will have an advantage over very poor women
without such access unless there are explicit programme strategies for diversication
out of existing female activities and poverty targeting.
4 INCREASED WELLBEING? QUESTIONING RELATIONS WITHIN
THE HOUSEHOLD
In both the poverty alleviation paradigm and the nancial self-sustainability
paradigms the household is treated as a `blackbox', a terrain where programmes
20
For example one woman interviewed in CARE-PULSE had wanted a large loan to replace hairdryers in
an existing successful small business but could only get a small loan sucient for informal trading. She
tried trading but was unsuccessful because of lack of experience and is now saddled with a debt trying to
make ends meet in tailoring.
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
969
prefer not to tread. This is despite the now extensive academic literature revealing the
household as a complex locus of negotiation over rights and responsibilities where
gender subordination is central to women's ability to benet from their own
contribution to household income and wellbeing.21 Household structures are very
variable between and within the dierent countries discussed here.22 On the one hand
there are very dierent norms regarding intra-household responsibilities and rights
over resources varying from patrilineal arrangements to matrilineal, even within a
small geographical area of the same programme (Mayoux, 1999a; Hadjipateras,
1996). There are signicant variations in adaptations of these norms in response to
religious norms regarding for example polygyny and divorce. There are also
signicant variations in the degree to which households follow or challenge these
norms in response to economic factors like land shortage, male migration and so on.
Finally there are signicant variations between women and men in their opinions
about these norms, depending on their individual preferences and the degree of
mutual understanding and respect they have for each other. This was highlighted by
numerous conversations with women during the author's eldwork. Any generalizable predictions of programme impact on wellbeing even between wives within the
same household are therefore problematic.
Increased Women's Control Over Income and Assets
The data on women's control over income in the household and impact of micronance is inadequate in many ways and needs to be substantiated by much more indepth qualitative and quantitative work. The picture is one where household
contributions and decision-making are generally a complex negotiation within
households depending on availability of income from particular sources in relation to
particular needs at the time rather than a xed allocation of rights and responsibilities. Signicantly men and women may have very dierent views of their relative
rights, responsibilities and power.23
Nevertheless, in many parts of Africa the prevalence of polygyny in many areas and
existence of separate `hearthholds' means that for many women individual control
over income is both expected and desired.24 Where women have been able to set up
economic activities this success has therefore often led to increased control over
income. Women in CGT and Mbonweh in Cameroon invariably said they controlled
their income and that this was very important to them. In some communities,
particularly where Catholicism led to disapproval of polygyny, men expected women
to keep their own income and they also contributed to the household consumption
21
For early discussions see Bruce and Dwyer (eds) (1988). For a recent overview of these debates see
Kabeer (1998b), and for detailed discussion of complexities in use of credit within the household in
Bangladesh see Kabeer (1998a).
22
For overviews of the literature on gender and the household in Africa see early discussions in Dwyer and
Bruce (eds) (1988) and for more recent research see papers in Bryceson (ed.) (1995).
23
For example in SHDF there were dierences between women and men in views about ownership of
assets and it is possibly signicant that male respondents reported a higher level of contribution to
household subsistence than female respondents ( from dierent households) (Mayoux, 1998c).
24
This is in contrast to women in Bangladesh studied by Kabeer, many of whom were attempting to
increase their inuence within a context of joint household decision-making (Kabeer, 1998a). Individual
control over income was however a priority for poorer women in CODEC, Bangladesh who had received
gender training alongside savings and loans (Mayoux, 1999c).
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
970
L. Mayoux
budget. In many households in other communities women's control was despite their
husbands' attempts to take their money. As one group of women commented wryly:
Àfrican men demand any money you have if they see it' (Mayoux, 1999a). In MMD
in rural Niger Muslim Hausa women are given their own plots of land to cultivate, to
buy and raise livestock and control all the prots. Again households are frequently
polygynous and divorce is frequent but women are allowed to take all their personal
belongings, including livestock and other assets. In this context micro-nance and the
contribution to setting up women's businesses helped many women to build up an
independent resource base. The women valued savings as well as credit in this regard,
particularly where these were a compulsory requirement of programme membership
thus giving them a means of protecting savings from being diverted to male or general
household expenditure (Kiefer, 1996).
Even in urban and peri-urban Zambia and Zimbabwe where polygyny is not very
common, the traditional acceptance or ultimate threat of polygamy and divorce or
indelity (with all its accompanying diversion of male income) also meant that
women interviewed by the author wanted control over their own income. All women
interviewed by the author in SHDF and CARE-PULSE said they controlled at least
part of the income they earned from the income nanced by the loan. Signicantly
eight of the eleven women interviewed in SHDF said that `nancial independence'
was the most important change in women's status in recent years, though it was
obvious that such independence remained seriously limited and amounted mainly to
access to limited amounts of their own cash. In some cases control over income was
mainly to increase their self-esteem and ability to make purchases independently of
their husbands and in some cases as insurance against divorce. In some cases female
control was the result of a lengthy conscious strategy for negotiating change on the
part of the woman concerned involving avoidance of overt conict and continuing to
give some control to the husband as in the case of Mrs Mapako in Box 3. In other
cases men would take the money if they could and women would resort to secrecy and
subterfuge. Again the savings programme as well as credit was important, although
women often used other savings facilities apart from those of the particular micronance programme studied.
Control over income had also increased in Sudan where women were previously
wholly economically dependent on their husbands and had not engaged in any
economic activities outside the home for fear of social disapproval. Economic income
activity generated by the programme had led to increased condence in dealing with
economic aairs. Before the programme men, as sole breadwinners, felt that they had
the right to decide how the household income should be spent. Now men were said to
treat their wives with greater respect and allow them more say in the management of
the household's nancial aairs (Hadjipateras, 1996). Positive impacts were also
noted for Ethiopia as in the case of Wube Cherinet in Box 2 above.
Increased Wellbeing for the Household
Statements about benecial impacts on households of members are frequent in NGO
funding proposals and promotional material, in some cases leading to multiplication
of numbers of programme beneciaries by a factor of as much as 7 on the assumption
that members live in large households and that membership benets all. As noted
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
971
BOX 3. NEGOTIATING CHANGE: SOME MORE PROBLEMATIC CASES

ZAMBUKO-Trust: Mrs Mapako: has been operating a kiosk for the last ten years.
She is married and has two children. Her husband lost his job a couple of years ago
when he became seriously ill. He is still ill, but at times assists in the shop. He
occasionally collects and sells empty bottles to earn some income for his personal
use. Mrs Mapako owns and manages the kiosk. Her husband tries to control the
use of her earnings. He is especially inquisitive and suspicious about the use of
small discretionary funds. For some time after he lost his job there was an increase
in tension and domestic disputes. Her strategy has been to consult her husband on
most business decisions although she makes most of them. Gradually, she and her
husband have developed a common understanding of each other's new role in the
household. She has more control over the use of household income than previously
since she is the primary contributor (Barnes, 1997).
World Vision-Bostwana: Violet Makgosa: runs a poultry business. She built a
poultry house in her yard, as many of her colleagues have done, and began to travel
around the villages to sell her chickens. She deposited all the money she made from
her sales, except for her salary. Although her husband tolerated the rst few market
and bank trips, he was not happy about her going around nor depositing the money
in the bank: he wanted her to stay at home, and to use at least part of the business
savings. One day Violet went to a road camp in a nearby village to sell chickens. She
did not nish selling them, and in order to save transport money she decided to
spend a night there and sell the rest the following day. When her husband came
home and did not nd Violet he was furiously angry. The next day, having sold all
her chickens Violet returned home happy and encouraged. As soon as he saw
Violet, her husband told her she had to choose between him and her chickens. She
chose the latter and went to her parents. However, she later reported the matter to
her VWC members who negotiated with her husband on her behalf and reconciled
them. Now the husband has accepted Violet's market and bank trips and the fact
that she deposits her business revenue for future expansion (Getu, 1996).
Uganda Women's Finance and Credit Trust: Edith Kagino: married, with seven
children. Before marriage, she developed an interest in dairy helping her mother.
After marriage she worked in the workshop of her husband. From 1991 she was a
regular saver with the UWFCT and acquired a loan in 1992, for two in-calf heifers
and for the construction of a small cow shed. She planted napier grass to feed the
cows. Edith started o very well, with the rst cow calving normally. Problems
started when her husband instructed her to go back to the workshop. She could no
longer take care of the cows, and eventually she lost one of them. Despite her
protestations, her husband insisted that she remain in the workshop. Eventually
her husband chased her away from home and she had to nd shelter for herself and
the children. The husband claimed the cows as his so she was not allowed to take
them. After some months, with help of the in-laws, the husband called her back.
But he had already sold the roong sheets and construction materials of the
cowshed and all the grass was gone. She got pregnant again, then her husband
decided to live with another wife. Edith is recovering from the shock, trying to start
again. Her projects is marked as a doubtful debt (Ngajja et al., 1993, p. 20).
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
972
L. Mayoux
above, some studies conclude that there has been some reduction in household
economic vulnerability because of both expenditure of loan on consumption or
investment in economic activity. In most of the cultures where the programmes
discussed here work women are responsible for decisions related to provision of food
and children's daily needs. All studies for which data exist and all the interviews by the
author found that much of women's increased income or loans themselves is spent on
household consumption and children's welfare or repayment of old debts which would
otherwise might have had to be met from production income or loans from elsewhere.
However, rstly where women's loans are used for household consumption and/or
women are prevented by domestic responsibilities from increasing incomes impacts on
consumption are likely to be unsustainable in the longer term. Women's very eectiveness as guardians of family welfare and their responsibilities for family
provisioning and reproductive work limits their ability to invest in and expand
economic activities. Many women interviewed in Cameroon had little income left for
investment in production after providing for their families. For many this was in
contrast to their husbands who spent little on the household. The prospect here was
therefore long-term dependency on continuance of small loans to subsidise household
consumption rather than a process of upward mobility out of poverty and debt.
Secondly, there is considerable evidence that women's increased control over income
may be accompanied by a withdrawal of male contributions for their own luxury
expenditure, limiting the total increase in income going into household wellbeing.
In Zimbabwe and Niger men were quite explicit in valuing women's increased
contribution to the household because this freed them from some of their responsibility.25 In two ACORD-sponsored programmes in Uganda some women were
leaving all household expenditure to the women once they had funds. Some husbands
were even claiming a share of their wives' incomes as payment for forgone domestic
services or for the use of the lands that belong to their husbands (ACORD, 1996).
In some contexts pressures on women to earn an income were increasing to
worrying levels. In Zimbabwe women said if they did not try to nd an income their
husbands would simply look for another wife.
Thirdly women's expenditure patterns may replicate rather than counter gender
inequalities. There is some anecdotal evidence from Cameroon that women are
spending some of their loans and income on school fees for daughters as well as sons.
However there is also anecdotal evidence that women employ daughters and
daughters-in-law as unpaid family labourers increasing their workload and decreasing their ability to attend school unless this issue is directly addressed. Although
increased family income channelled through women often benets children considerably, anecdotal evidence suggests they may often still prioritize the interests of boy
children and priority is given to boy's education (Kebede, 1997). Without substitute
25
For example in SHDF one old man said Ìt is good now women have their own savings because men are
irresponsible and women are the backbone of the family'. When asked whether it would not be better to
make men responsible also both he and the women present laughed and said this was unlikely (author's
eld notes). In MMD one man said `Before the associations our wives were a large weight on us. We were
obligated to respond to all their problems, even the little ones. But since this good initiative with our wives,
they are a little more independent from us. They are able to meet all of their little needs. So now they aren't
asking us for these things anymore'; and another `Before, we really suered because all of the expenses
come back on us. For example, if my wife organized a biki or something else, I was obligated to give her
money, and if I didn't have the money, I was obliged to sell my millet or some of my livestock. Now with
the association, my wife can go and take out a loan for these problems' (Kiefer, 1996).
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
973
care for small children, the elderly and disabled, and provision of services to reduce
domestic work many programmes attending all three African workshops involved in
the pilot study reported adverse eects of women's outside work on children and the
elderly (Mayoux and Johnson, 1997); Oxusu-Gyam et al. (eds), (1997); Mayoux and
Duursma (eds), (1998).
Improvement in Women's Wellbeing
There is also evidence of positive impacts on women's wellbeing. Many studies note
that household wellbeing is of central concern to many women themselves. In most
cultures the gender division of labour and responsibility in the household, mean that
it is generally women who bear the brunt of child and male ill-health, women who are
expected to forego food if this is scarce and women who have to suer the stress, male
violence and in some cases desertion to which this can lead. Women themselves often
value the opportunity to be seen to be making a greater contribution to household
wellbeing and their condence, sense of self-worth. In Cameroon women were
particularly happy not to have to ask their husbands for cash for buying things for
themselves and in Niger they valued their ability to contribute to social obligations.26
Some poor women in Cameroon also spent loans on their own health care (see Box 2)
and also on labour-saving technology like carts or grain mills. Some were able to
move up from high labour input, low prot activities, into easier but more capitalintensive activities or to employ labourers. For some women earning an income has
also been accompanied by husbands playing an increased role in unpaid domestic
work as in the case of Wube Cherinet in Box 2 above.
Nevertheless women's increased control over income also does not translate
unproblematically into increased wellbeing for women themselves, but is strongly
inuenced by gendered rights to household expenditure and norms of female
altruism.27 Firstly, as noted above, in many cases women's ability to increase incomes
are limited. Some women face considerable hardship in order to meet loan repayments,
forgoing food and other consumption expenditure. Secondly small increases in access
to income may be at the cost of heavier work loads. In Cameroon, Zimbabwe and
Zambia women interviewed reported an increasing expectation that women will earn
an income, in addition to unpaid domestic work. In Niger women's income earning
was in addition to a wide range of time-consuming unpaid tasks including working in
her husband's elds four days a week during the growing season (Kiefer, 1996).
Participants from Uganda at the Ethiopia workshop expressed particularly strong
fears of serious adverse eects on women's health and wellbeing of heavy workloads as
they struggle to combine income-earning with unpaid domestic responsibilities.
26
In Niger a survey of 170 women in 4 associations found that although 40 per cent of members used their
loan in small business activities mostly food preparation and peanut oil extraction and 9 per cent for farm
investments, 28 per cent used them for social obligations and 23 per cent for household needs. However in
a society where women's reputation rests on their ability to participate in reciprocal gift exchanges (biki), it
was signicant that 75 per cent of women said that before the loan they would have had to stop business to
meet social obligations (Kiefer, 1996). In Chad it was found that, despite high repayment, few women
developed their enterprises and in some cases incomes were largely taken up by social obligations. (Bangui
and Miankeol, 1995).
27
The issue of women's ability to translate contributions to the household into benets has been
extensively discussed elsewhere see Note 19 above.
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
974
L. Mayoux
Thirdly, although in many cases, women's increased contribution to family income

has considerably improved domestic relations, in other cases it intensies tensions. In
Harare women said that nowadays unless a woman could bring in an income her
husband would leave her. In some programmes there were fears that supporting
women's productive role through credit might be encouraging polygamy because of
the freeing up of male income and the economic attractions of having more than one
wife (ACORD-Kassala, 1994; ACORD, 1994). Increase in domestic violence and
abandonment was of considerable concern to many participants at the East Africa
workshop (ACORD-Kassala, 1996; ACORD, 1996; Karamagi, 1997). In some cases
women's increased autonomy has led to complete withdrawal of male support as in
the case of Edith Kagino in Box 3 above. As can be seen in the case of Violet
Makgosa, in some programmes advocacy on behalf of individual women and action
by women's groups are able to resolve these issues. However in most programmes
women receive no support and women interviewed in SHDF and CGT wanted more
support in claiming their rights against `male oppression' (their quote).
5
QUESTIONING SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND LEGAL EMPOWERMENT
All three paradigms assume that increasing women's individual economic empowerment will also contribute to wider economic, social and political empowerment. In the
nancial self-sustainability paradigm this is assumed to occur through micro-nance
provision alone and in the poverty alleviation paradigm through addressing women's
practical needs. It is only in the feminist empowerment paradigm that explicit
attention to organizing women around gender concerns is advocated. Again the
evidence indicates very diverse outcomes resulting from the complex interaction of
dierent dimensions of gender subordination and conicts as well as commonalities
of interest between women.28 It is however clear that the degree to which micronance leads to a wider questioning of gender subordination depends rstly on the
degree of exposure of the women concerned to alternative ways of thinking and
secondly the degree to which programmes seek to build on these alternative visions,
both in terms of awareness raising and explicit organization.
Changes in Gender Roles, Networks and Experience of Management and
Decision-Making
Micro-nance programmes have contributed to some changes in gender roles. Where
women who previously had no access to income set up economic activities and
particularly where they are involved in marketing this may lead to signicant changes
in women's mobility and knowledge of the world outside the household. Economic
activity may provide one of the few acceptable èxcuses' women may use to challenge
gender restrictions on interactions with men. Programmes appear to have contributed
to signicant changes in societies like Sudan where women's role has been very
circumscribed. Early in the Port-Sudan programme even to be seen discussing with an
ACORD worker had initially aroused fear and shame but now women queue outside
28
Again this is not surprising in view of the literature about the complex nature of the articulation of
`gender interests'. For overviews of debates see Molyneux, 1998; Kandiyoti, 1998.
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
975
ACORD sub-oces waiting to be served alongside the men, and are as assertive as
men in dealings with ACORD (Hadjipateras, 1996). In Mbonweh and CGT some
women noted signicant changes in acceptance of their freedom to attend meetings
and other activities, even at night. One woman interviewed in SHDF had used a loan
to purchase an ox, normally only owned by men, as a challenge to dominant gender
roles. Some women in CGT were wanting training in butchery, currently a lucrative
male preserve. However as noted above for many women there is little impact on type
or level of economic activity.
Women in many parts of Africa already have well-developed networks in the form
of work groups, informal marketing networks and ROSCAS.29 Participation in
savings and credit groups may also bring together women who did not previously
know each other and provide the basis for development of information exchange and
a forum for discussion of gender issues. In Port Sudan women have developed strong
solidarity mechanisms through their involvement in women's centres and other group
activities. Many women-only groups had decided to acquire resources which they
could manage and control. In a number of mixed-sex groups, women occupied key
positions on management committees and women had begun to demand a more
equal role in the management of group enterprises, including the appointment of both
female and male signatories for bank accounts where formerly men had handled all
the cash receipts (Hadjipateras, 1996). Some groups have used loans for group
marketing and production, strengthening bonds between women and giving them
greater status in the community (Mayoux, 1998b). In Zimbabwe SHDF Savings
Clubs have also provided a focus for collective self-help in other activities, in
particular purchase of production inputs (Marx et al., 1997). In SEF information
exchange between borrowers is facilitated to strategically build networks and in
women-dominated programmes like Zambuko and SHDF by involving women in
regional level networks.
However, the degree to which micro-nance programmes increase networks cannot
be assumed, and ways in which networks can be enhanced must be strategically
planned. Firstly contribution to networks is likely to be extremely limited where group
sizes are reduced and limited to women who already know each other in order to
maximize repayment pressures, unless there are explicit strategies to develop networking. For example in KREP primary loan groups largely replicate existing networks and
sharing of knowledge and skills mainly take place at secondary levels for group
representatives where women are underrepresented (Buckley, 1996, p. 313). In CAREPULSE these higher level meetings were also dominated by men.
Secondly, repayment pressures may not only increase stress for individual women
but also increase tensions and inequalities between women and within communities.
Evidence overwhelmingly indicates that where the group as a whole, or group leaders
29
In Cameroon most women in both rural and urban women belong to `tontines' or `njangi' groups
(Niger-Thomas, 1995; Rowlands, 1995; Mayoux, 1998). In Uganda rural women belong to dierent types
of groups including: Rotational Contribution Groups: for school fees, clothing, medical care, assets like
bicycles, payment of bride price; groups for burial expenses; trade groups, where produce is bought and
stocked then sold when prices rise; digging groups on common, hired or owned piece of land which sell the
produce and share the proceeds or convert them into group savings for on-lending to members on interest
(Ahtimbisbwe, 1993). In Kenya women formed `merry-go-rounds' (Nelson, 1995; Grace Okungu, KREP,
personal communication), in Ethiopia/Eritrea èqub' and ìddir' (ACORD-Dire-Dawa, 1996; Kebede,
1997; Negassi, 1997) in Sudan to `sanduq' savings box systems (ACORD, 1996) and in Chad to `tontine'
and other types of mutual support organizations (Bangui and Miankeol, 1995).
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
976
L. Mayoux
are responsible for ensuring loan repayment or where better-o women want access to
loans, women's groups are excluding the poorest and most disadvantaged women. In
both SHDF and CGT there is evidence that committee members might be using the
weight and inuence of their posts to get priority in loan disbursal (Marx et al.,
1997; Mayoux, 1998c; 1999a). In Uganda the group-based system also often led to the
exclusion of AIDS suerers (ACORD, 1996). In SEF and BERDSCO this sort of
discrimination led to changes in the programme to enable more eective povertytargeting.
Thirdly, there are indications not only of exclusion of poor women, but also
exploitation within groups and diversion of resources to the better-o. For example
KREP found that richer members were not repaying and making poorer members
cover their loans ( pers. com. Okungu). In VITA-Chad it was reported that revolving
credit groups were insuciently structured and group leaders did not always deliver
repayment on time or simply diverted funds which had to be repaid by other members
(Bangui and Miankeol, 1995). In Cameroon some existing tontines included `trouble
funds' (a fund for interest-free loans in times of crisis) accessible to both poor and
better-o members. However CGT loans to better-o women within these groups
appeared to be depleting these trouble funds as these better-o women diverted
money into loan repayment rather than fund contribution. This was decreasing the
access of poorer women to cash in times of crisis (Mayoux, 1999a).
Wider Political Activity and Addressing Legal Constraints
There is some evidence of women actively using groups to address wider constraints
within the community, particularly where sta are very gender aware or where micronance is in the context of a broader gender programme. For example in Zambuko a
woman giving talks on `how to manage your husband and mother-in-law' had been
invited to give talks to many group meetings on the spontaneous initiative of the
groups themselves. A group funded by CGT, supported by peasant organization
developed by a partner environmental NGO and building on existing women's
strategies, had succeeded in stopping domestic violence in the area. In Sudan exposure
to new ideas and knowledge, including awareness of the international women's
movement, has also inspired women to ght for their own rights, both individually
and collectively. For example, in some slum areas in the Sudan programmes women
had organized to demand their rights from the Town Council. Another example is
successful organization by the Association of Women Caterers against harassment
many women were experiencing at the hands of ocial authorities (Hadjipateras,
1996).
However, in the absence of specic support and organization to address gender
inequality, bringing women together for savings and credit does not necessarily
develop a sense of solidarity or joint explorations of ways in which women's problems
can be overcome. Women in Chad were reported to have rejected more empowerment-focused programmes for minimalist credit provided by VITA (Bangui and
Miankeol, 1995). The degree to which this is a result of a badly designed gender
programme, pressure from men to get access to credit while maintaining their own
power and/or women's own decision to switch allegiance because of better credit
terms is unclear from the study. There is nevertheless the possibility that in certain
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
977
contexts micro-nance may detract attention from addressing underlying gender

inequalities, as discussed by others for Bangladesh (Ebdon, 1995).
6 `VIRTUOUS SPIRALS AND VICIOUS CONSTRAINTS': IMPLICATIONS

FOR GENDER ANALYSIS AND POLICY
The evidence indicates extremely complex interrelationships between women's own
strategies for use of micro-nance to further their perceived interests and contextual
opportunities and constraints and programme policies. As a broad generalization
there are a number of points of contrast between the African context and that in
Bangladesh and many parts of India noted in previous studies. Firstly the fact that
women are more widely involved in production and market activities make it more
likely that they will use savings and credit for their own individual activities. Secondly
these roles, coupled with kinship and marriage patterns which frequently lead to
separate `heartholds' mean that women are more likely to seek to retain their own
income, and more likely to be successful in this. The existence of separate hearthholds
does however also raise the problem of men increasingly withdrawing their own
incomes and further decreasing their responsibility for household wellbeing. Thirdly
the existence of already well-developed networks between women mean that micronance does not necessarily make the considerable contribution to women's social
empowerment noted for some South Asian programmes.
In the absence of systematic research on inherently complex interactions between
programme contexts and policy, any conclusions about the relative impacts of
dierent models and strategies are inevitably tentative. We know very little about how
many women are beneting or losing and it is clear that there is considerable variation
in impact between women within the same communities and within the same
programme.
Nevertheless, the questions raised by existing evidence about any automatic
contribution of micro-nance per se to empowerment point to need for a much more
strategic approach if the full potential of micro-nance is to be realized. A full
discussion of what this entails is outside the scope of this paper. As argued in detail by
the author elsewhere (Mayoux, 1998a) and indicated in Box 4 this requires not only
strategies targeting women, but strategies targeting men, institutionalized gender
guidelines in `malestream policy' and greater attention to linkages with other
organizations working for change in gender relations.
There has however been far less questioning of the dominant nancial selfsustainability paradigm in Africa than in South Asia. What is most disturbing in
current debates is the frequent lack of concern about programme impact on
empowerment. The requirements for funding from the enormous CGAP budget, the
main driving force behind micro-nance development in Africa, are solely concerned
with nancial sustainability indicators and contain no reference to gender strategies.
Failure to explicitly incorporate empowerment strategies into programme design will
at best miss an important contribution to development. At worst it may lead to
disempowerment of signicant numbers of women through burdening them with debt
and diverting resources from more eective empowerment strategies.
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
978
L. Mayoux
BOX 4. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A GENDER POLICY

Strategies Targeting Women
. conditions of micro-nance delivery: to be exible to women's aspirations, needs
and existing strategies.
. complementary services: to include explicit attention to gender rather than only
support for economic activity.
. structures for participation: by women clients in decision-making and strategies
to increase the contribution of groups to empowerment rather than merely using
groups as a mechanism for ensuring repayment.
. mechanisms for the representation of very poor women, women in dicult
relationships, younger women in decision-making and/or for ensuring that they
are not disadvantaged by the programme.
. inter-organizational linkages with other organizations oering support services
and challenging gender subordination.
Strategies Targeting Men: explicit strategies for redistribution of power and
resources including:
. gender awareness for men throughout the programme with concrete incentives
for `good practice'.
. incentives to register property and assets in women's names or in joint names.
. strategies for reinforcing and strengthening male responsibilities for household
wellbeing including that of their wives and daughters.
. organizing male support for change in gender relations.
Institutionalized Gender Guidelines in `Malestream' Policy: to increase access,
enabling articulation of women's aspirations and needs and ensuring gender equity
in overall programme policy
. examination of all policies from a gender perspective in particular concepts of
`household' and `community' and implicit assumptions about gender dierences
in rights, responsibilities and roles and consequent gender dierences in
opportunities and constraints.
. commitment to gender equity in sta recruitment and promotion including
necessary changes in ìnstitutional culture' to assist female sta.
. concrete incentives for gender equity in programme implementation by both male
and female sta to ensure that women benet from programmes.
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APPENDIX: SUMMARY DETAILS OF MAIN CASE STUDIES

Country
Date
Size and target group
Programme type
Gender policy
Sources used
ACORD-Dire-Dawa
Ethiopia
1994
1,994 clients of whom 45%

Credit and savings programme
were women. Targets poorest in through community-based
urban area.
organizations.
Detailed gender policy at Programme annual

all levels monitored by
reports.
ACORD.
ACORD-Kassala: Kassala SmallScale Enterprise Programme
Sudan
1991
1,966 clients assisted of whom

54% were women.

through community-based
organizations.

reports; Hadjipateras
ACORD.
(1996).
ACORD-Port Sudan: Sudan SmallScale Enterprise Programme
Port Sudan
1984
15,077 clients assisted up till

1995 of whom 49% were
women. Targets the poorest
refugees in urban areas.

through community-based
organizations.

reports; Amin (1993);
Hadjipateras (1996);
ACORD.
Gibson (1995); Stallard
(1996); Gasim et al.
(1995).
BERDSCO: Benevolent Community

Education and Rural Development
Society
Cameroon
1990
5,000 members of whom 90%

are women.

No formal gender policy. 3 weeks eldwork,
recently adopting a Grameen model.
internal reports
documented in detail
in Mayoux (1999a).
CARE-WED: CARE-International
Women's Enterprise Development
Programme
Kenya
1992
8,000 members of whom 80%

were women in 1995. Targets
poor rural entrepreneurs.
Group credit and savings programme. No formal gender policy. CARE-International

(1996); Dichter (1996).
CARE-PULSE
Zambia
1995
4,987 members 68% female.

Micro-entrepreneurs in periurban Lusaka.
Group credit and savings programme. General statement on

gender principles.
CGT: Cameroon Gatsby Trust
Cameroon
1994
reg
1996
About 4,000 women in rural

and semi-rural areas.
Credit programme operating through No formal gender policy. 3 weeks eldwork,

tontine groups.
internal reports
in Mayoux (1999a).
KREP: Kenya Rural Enterprise

Programme
Kenya
1984
12,885 clients of whom 23%

were women in 1996. Targets
existing micro-entrepreneurs.
Grameen model and nancial systems No formal gender policy. Buckley (1998); Okungu
approach.
(1998).
Five days eldwork,

discussions with sta;
Moyo (1997).
983
Continued . . .
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
Name
984
Country
J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)
Date
Size and target group
Programme type
Gender Policy
Sources used
MMD: Maradi Women on the Move Niger
1991
Goal of 3,750 women in rural

areas.
Credit programme delivered through No formal gender policy. Kiefer (1996).

ROSCA-based Savings Associations.
Mbonweh Women's Development

Association
Cameroon
1988
About 300 women.
Credit programme operating through Women-only programme

family meeting groups.
with commitment to
empowerment but no
formal gender policy
SEF: Small Enterprise Foundation
South Africa
1992
5,000 clients of whom 97% are Grameen model but focus on poverty Gender policy being
women.
targetting.
developed.
SHDF Self-Help Development

Foundation
Zimbabwe
1960s
credit
1996
Over 200,000 members of SCs, Savings club with credit programme

loans 1,200 98% female. Rural added.
and urban poor.
UWFCT Uganda Women's Finance

and Credit Trust
Uganda
1984
9,408 women savers and 1,050 Savings and credit programme as

Women-only programme Ngajja et al. (1993);
loans in 1996.
aliate of Women's World Banking. but no formal gender
Mensink (1995);
policy.
Rugasira (1997).
VITA-Chad: sponsored by US
Volunteers in Technical Assistance
Chad
1990
Size NA. Mainly women.
Minimalist group credit programme.
NA.
Zambuko Trust
Zimbabwe
1992
17,000 clients, 80% Women.

Targeting women microentrepreneurs in urban areas.
Savings and Credit on Trust Bank

model of Opportunity International.
sta.
Formal gender policy for Three days eldwork,

sta.
discussions with sta;
Barnes (1997).
3 weeks eldwork,
internal reports
in Mayoux (1999a).
Simanowitz (1997) and
personal
communications.
No formal gender policy Three days eldwork,

discussions with sta and
secondary sources, in
particular Marx et al.
(1997).
Bangui and Miankeol

(1995).
L. Mayoux
Name

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Journal of International Development

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

QUESTIONING VIRTUOUS SPIRALS:

The Micro-credit Summit in Washington in February 1997 presented an extremely

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

Questioning Virtuous Spirals

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

and legal empowerment (RESULTS, 1997). Micro-nance groups are seen as

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

Questioning Virtuous Spirals

BOX 1. WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT IN MICRO-FINANCE PROGRAMMES:

Financial Self-sustainability Paradigm

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

Virtuous spirals: paradigms compared.

Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

Questioning Virtuous Spirals

the macro-level. Micro-nance, together with appropriate complementary services

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

This is because of the contentious and complex nature of empowerment itself,

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

Questioning Virtuous Spirals

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

Questioning Virtuous Spirals

BOX 2. ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT: INCREASED INCOME AND

Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

Questioning Virtuous Spirals

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Questioning Virtuous Spirals

BOX 3. NEGOTIATING CHANGE: SOME MORE PROBLEMATIC CASES

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Questioning Virtuous Spirals

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Thirdly, although in many cases, women's increased contribution to family income

QUESTIONING SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND LEGAL EMPOWERMENT

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

Questioning Virtuous Spirals

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Questioning Virtuous Spirals

contexts micro-nance may detract attention from addressing underlying gender

6 `VIRTUOUS SPIRALS AND VICIOUS CONSTRAINTS': IMPLICATIONS

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

BOX 4. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A GENDER POLICY

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

Questioning Virtuous Spirals

Ardener, S. and Burman, S. (1995). Money-Go-Rounds: The Importance of Rotating Savings

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

Questioning Virtuous Spirals

Southern Africa. Milton Keynes: The Open University (Report of Workshop

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

J. Int. Dev. 11, 957984 (1999)

Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

APPENDIX: SUMMARY DETAILS OF MAIN CASE STUDIES

Size and target group