Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
1 Introduction
2 Case Brief
1 Facts of the Case
2 Procedural History
3 Analysis
1 LEGAL QUESTIONS RAISED
2 INTERPRETATION
3 Decision by the Higher Court
4 Conclusion
5 Bibliography
SECTION:L1404
REGISTRATION NO.-11409399
TOPIC: U.P. BHOODAN YOGNA SAMITI V BRAJ KISHORE
SUBMITTED TO: MRS.
PETITIONER:
U.P.BHOODAN YAGNA SAMITI,U.P.
VS
RESPONDENT:
BRAJ KISHORE & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 9 SEPTEMBER, 1988
BENCH:
OZA, G.L
SHETTY K.J
INTRODUCTION
1 According to Salmond
2 T.N. Electricity Board V Status spg. Mills Ltd.
3 Madadev Govind Gharge V Special Land Acquisition Officer, Upper Krishna Project,
Jamkhandi, Karnataka
In State Of Jharkhand V Govind Singh4, it was held that when the words of a
statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e., they are reasonably susceptible of only
one meaning; the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of
consequences. Attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has
not been said. Court can interpret law but cannot legislate.
The various kinds of construction are:
1) Literal Construction
2) Golden Rule
3) Mischief Rule
4) Harmonious Construction
5) Strict Construction
6) Liberal Rule
In this case the Mischief Rule5 and Beneficial Construction was taken into
consideration and are defined as:
MISCHIEF RULE: PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION:HEYDONS CASE
This rule was laid down in Heydons case way back in the year 1584 and hence it it
is commonly known as Heydons Rule. This rule is also called as Mischief Rule
because it envisages adopting that construction by which the mischief is
suppressed. It is also referred to as Purposive Construction since it lays emphasis
on advancing the purpose and the object of the statute. According to this rule, if
two interpretations are possible, court will prefer that which advances the remedy
and suppresses the mischief.
In Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. V State of Bihar6, the Supreme Court explained this
rule and observed that it is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly
established in England as far back as 1584 when Heydons case was decided that
for sure and true interpretation of statutes in general, be it penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of common law, four things are to be considered:1) What was the common law before making of the Act
2) What was the mischief and defect for which common law did not provide
3) What remedy Parliament has resolved to cure the disease
4) The true reason of remedy
And then the judges shall always to make such construction as shall suppress the
mischief and advance the remedy
Normally court cannot go beyond the words of the statute unless it is absolutely
necessary. Rule of purposive construction can be applied when alternative
constructions are possible or literal meaning of the statutes leads to injustice or
absurdity.
In DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust V State of Haryana7,
the Supreme Court held that the basic rule of interpretation of statute is that the
court shall not go beyond the statute unless it is absolutely necessary so to do. Rule
of purposive construction would be resorted to only when the statute read
literally leads to manifest injustice or absurdity.
In Rishab Chand Bhandari V National Engg. Industry Ltd8., the apex Court
observed that if literal interpretation leads to absurd consequences, it should be
avoided and a purposive interpretation be given.
Thus LORD ROSKILL says that the court should identify the mischief which
existed before passing of the statute and then, if more than one construction is
possible, favour that which will eliminate the mischief so identified.
BENEFICIAL RULE: 9If the words employed in a language are ambigious and
vague, then the court has to ascertain their meaning depending upon the legislative
intent. Such meaning may be narrow meaning or wide meaning. If the wide or
extended meaning is attributed, it is called beneficial construction. Its purpose is to
benefit a specific class of people.10
CASE BRIEF
FACTS OF THE CASE
11
that they did not fall under the category of landless persons and
that the grants had not been approved by the Government.
8) After considering the objections filed by the respondents, the Additional
Collector quashed all the grants made in favour of the respondents.
9) Against the order of the Additional Collector, the respondents filed writ
petitions in the High
Court. The High Court held that the respondents were
cover by the definition landless persons as they had no land in that village and
the district, though they may be traders and paying income-tax and may have
properties in the city of Kanpur,
10) Quashed the order passed by the Additional Collector and maintained
the grants in favour of the respondents. These appeals are against the said order of
the High Court.
11) On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that the expression
landless person has to be
interpreted in the background of the law and the
philosophy behind the movement which was the basis of the enactment of the
law.
12) To understand the common phrase used in the Bhoodan Movement as
Bhoomihin Kissan which has been translated into English to mean landless
persons there would have been no difficulty.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
12
ANALYSIS
QUESTIONS RAISED
13
13 http://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/1483657/?formInput=bhoodan%20yagna
%20act
INTERPRETATION
14
Under this case both Beneficial Rule and 15Mischief Rule was taken into
consideration as there arouse the ambiguity while interpreting the word landless.
Under the Beneficial Rule of Construction there was a specific class of people i.e.,
landless person those person who were engaged in agricultural activities but
didnt have land of their own and to save them from the landlords exploitation.
The U.P Bhoodan Yojna Act, 1953 was enacted with an object to distribute land to
such landless labors who could do agriculture but had no land for that purpose and
did not have any other means of livelihood. While interpreting the expression
landless person used in Section 14 of this Act, the Supreme Court gave regard to
the object of the Act and held that the expression landless person was limited to
landless labors and did not include a landless businessman residing in city.
Therefore, the defect in this section was the word landless person does not mean
traders who are without the land but rather the farmers who are without the land
source of livelihood was agriculture.
The remedy was to provide land to the farmers without land and their source was
agriculture.
Grant of land to landless persons--The Committee or such other authority or person
as the Committee may, with the approval of the State Government specify either
generally or in respect of any area, may in the manner prescribed, grant lands
which have vested in it to the landless persons, and the grantee of the land shall-(i) where the land is situated in any estate which has vested in the State
Government under and in accordance with Section 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Land
Abolition and Reforms Act, 1950, enquire in such land the rights and the liabilities
of a sirdar, and
(ii) where it is situate in any other area, acquire therein such rights and liabilities
and subject to such conditions, restrictions and limitations as may be prescribed
and the same shall have effect, any law to the contrary notwith-standing.
Section 15 provides that all grants shall be made so far
as may be in accordance with the scheme of the Bhoodan Yagna.
Section 14 was amended in 1975 to substitute the words
landless agricultural labourers in place of 17`landless
persons.' The objects andreasons
contained in the
Amendment Bill clearly go to show that it was because of
such errors committed that it became necessary to make this
amendment.
16
18
18 http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1483657/
Additional Collector, Kanpur dated 1.1.76 quashing the Pattas granted in favour of
the respondent.
In the month of April and May, 1968 the Petitioner before the High Court i.e.
present respondent obtained grant under Sec. l4 of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act in
respect of various plots of land situated in Village Jahangirabad Paragana
Ghatampur, District Kanpur from Bhoodan Yagna Samiti on 17.5.1972. Tehsildar
Ghatampur submitted a report to Collector. kanpur and on the basis thereof the
Additional Collector, Kanpur issued notices to these respondents under Sections of
the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act requiring them to how as to why the settlement
obtained by them be not cancelled On following grounds:
(i) As the petitioners did not reside in the village where the plots were situated they
had obtained the grant fraudulently and by misrepresenting facts.
(ii) As the petitioners did not fall in the category of land-less persons it was not
proper to make the grant in their favour.
(iii) The grants had not been approved by the Government of U.P."
Before the High Court it was contended that Sec. 14 of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna
Act which provides for allotment of land only talks of landless persons. Sec. 14 as
it stood in the year 1968 enabled the Samiti to settle the land vested in it with
landless persons. Section neither specifies that such landless persons should also be
agricultural labourers nor it provided that they have to be residents of a place in
which the concerned lands were located. It was also not provided that the persons
must be such whose source of livelihood is agriculture. The High Court on the
basis of its earlier decision felt that Section 14 as it stood in 1968 did not provide
any one of these qualifying clauses and therefore the respondents who admittedly
had no land in that village and the district, they were covered by the definition of
landless persons, in spite of the fact that they may be traders and paying incometax, may have properties in the City of Kanpur, still the learned Judges of the High
Court felt that they fell within the ambit of the definition of landless persons as it
stood in 1968 and therefore settlement made in their favour was justified. High
Court relied on Sec. 14 as it stood in 1968. It reads:
CONCLUSION
1. The Supreme Court gave the decision opposite to that of the High Court i.e.,
not in favour of respondents and held that the word landless person was
limited to landless labours and did not include a landless businessman
residing in city. . Appellant shall be entiled to costs of the appeals, counsel
fee Rs. l,500 in each of these three appeals.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
THE MATTER FOR THE CASE HAS BEEN TAKEN FROM THE
FOLLOWING SITES AND BOOKS:
1. http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1483657/
2. http://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/1483657/?formInput=bhoodan
%20yagna%20act
3. manupatra.com
4. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES- D.N. MATHUR