1. Conchada vs.

director of prison
FACTS: the provincial fiscal charged Eustaquio Conchada with the crime of
murder in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas, Seventh
Judicial District, then presided over by the Honorable George R. Harvey,
judge.
During the course of the trial, defendant filed a motion praying that said
court refrain from proceeding further in the case and from sentencing him,
and that it disqualify itself in favor of the competent court, on the ground
that it was not legally constituted, because said Act No. 2347, which had
created it, was contrary to the Organic act of the Philippines and therefore
void, and said court and the judge presiding therein lacked jurisdiction to
try and decide the case and sentence him, because such jurisdiction
belonged to the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, Seventh Judicial
District, in which the complaint had been filed and which still existed in the
province. This motion was denied by the court, with exception on the part
of the defendant, and the trial was carried forward in the same court
presided over by the Honorable Isidro Paredes, who, as has already been
said, rendered the said judgment of conviction.
Later, the attorneys representing the said Conchada, prayed this Supreme
Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus to the Director of Prisons to compel
him to produce said defendant and, after due hearing, to order his release or
grant him a trial in a competent court. After mentioning the facts already set
forth, they virtually alleged that the judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, fourteenth Judicial District, on September 23, 1914,
against the defendant was illegal, null and void, because: (1) The Philippine
Legislature had no authority to abolish or deprive of jurisdiction the Court of
First of Tayabas, Seventh Judicial District, created by the constitution, nor to
substitute therefor another court of its own creation; (2) the Philippine
Legislature had no authority to dis miss or remove the judge of said Court of
First Instance, which had exclusive jurisdiction, as established by the
constitution, of the crime specified in the complaint; and (3) the judge of
first instance of Tayabas, Seventh Judicial District, established by the
Organic Act, having first acquired jurisdiction over the cause of action and
the person of the defendant, no territorial law could validly compel the
defendant-petitioner to submit to the jurisdiction of another court created by
the Legislature and presided over by a judge who held office subject to the
will of that Legislature.
After this court had directed that the respondent Director of Prisons show
cause why the writ of habeas corpus sought should not issue, and the
Solicitor General, representing ting the said Director of Prisons, had
submitted such arguments as he deemed proper, the hearing was had,
and counsel for the petitioner set forth in their brief that on the appeal
they relied upon the following legal propositions:
1. The Philippine Legislature has no authority to limit the jurisdiction of the
constitutional courts created by the Organic Act and still less to abolish,
suppress, or destroy said courts.
2. The Philippine Legislature has no authority to remove the judges
appointed under the Organic Act to preside over the court created
thereby, without abolishing the courts in which they sit.
3. The Philippine Legislature, by Act No. 2347, has decreed the final

extinction, abolition or destruction of the constitutional courts created by

the Organic Act, and has replaced or supplanted them with other courts of
its own creation.
4. The removal of the judges, along with all the officers and employees of
the old courts, and the limitation of their jurisdiction to certain causes
pending, necessarily imply the destruction or abolition of said courts.
5. The courts "organized" by Act No. 2347 are not legally constituted and
the judges appointed by virtue of said Act lack jurisdiction to try and
sentence the petitioner.
These five propositions rest upon the following hypotheses:
1. That the courts created by the Organic Act, or the law organizing the
courts of justice of the Philippine islands to wit, Act No. 136, passed on
June 11, 1901, by the United States Philippine Commission, are
constitutional courts and that said courts have been replaced or
supplanted by the Philippine Legislature through Act No. 2347 with other
courts of its own creation.
2. That the same Philippine Legislature, through Act No. 2347, without
authority therefor, has limited the jurisdiction of the courts, characterized
by petitioner's counsel as constitutional, created by the Organic Act, and
has abolished, suppressed, or destroyed said courts.
3. That the Philippine Legislature has removed, likewise without authority
therefor, the judges appointed under the Organic Act to preside over the
courts created thereby.
From these hypotheses said counsel for the petitioner, after arguing at
length in support of the propositions laid down by them, deduce that the
courts "organized" by Act No. 2347 are not legally constituted and that
Judge Paredes, appointed under said Act, lacked jurisdiction to try and
sentence Eustaquio Conchada, the petitioner.
2. Tolentino vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on
November 10, 1970, the convention held its inaugural session on June 1,
1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention
approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of
Article V of the Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On September
30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the Constitutional Convention that
it will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on
November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against
COMELEC and prayed that Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience
to the resolution be null and void.
ISSUE:
1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the
issue whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting as a
constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable one
and thus subject to judicial review. The jurisdiction is not because
the Court is superior to the Convention but they are both subject to
the Constitution.

3. Ocampo vs. Cabangis

FACTS: Two of the four justices who signed the decision are no longer
members of this court. The appellees now seek the cancellation and
annulment of the entry of judgment and the recall of the remittitur and the
record of the case to this court. The motion is made upon the theory that
no final judgment has ever been entered, and that by reason of the
changes in the personnel of the court the more extensive opinion which
was contemplated can not now be filed.
Section 15 of Act No. 136 provides that "in the determination of causes all
decisions of the Supreme Court shall be given in writing, signed by the
judges concurring in the decision, and the grounds of the decision shall be
stated as briefly as may be consistent with clearness."
A strict and literal compliance with this statute would often render it
impossible for the court to decide a case. The Act declares the manner in
which the Supreme Court shall perform the strictly judicial act of giving
final expression to its decision, but it does not say that the failure to
comply therewith shall render the decision ineffective. The direction is as
to a matter which is not of the essence of the thing to be done, and there
is nothing to suggest that the Legislature intended that strict compliance
therewith should be essential to the validity of a decision duly and formally
rendered in some other regular manner. It seems to be universal held that
statutes of this nature are merely directory, and that compliance therewith
is not necessary to the validity of the proceedings. A somewhat similar
questions required the supreme court to "decided every point fairly arising
upon the record, and give its reasons therefor in writing." This provision
was held not to affect the common law doctrine of res judicata.
Section 15 of Act No. 136 expresses a proper rule which should be
observed by the court unless there is some substantial reason for
departing therefrom, but if such reason exists, the judicial action can not
be controlled by legislative directions. In holding that this statute is
directory, we assume of the court against its judicial judgment.
There is, however, a broader ground upon which the decision may be
placed. The doctrine is well established in the various States of the Union
that the legislatures have no power to establish rules which operates to
deprive the courts of their constitutional authority to exercise the judicial
functions. A constitutional court when exercising its proper judicial
functions can no more be unreasonably controlled by the legislature than
can the legislature when properly exercising legislative power be

subjected to the control of the courts. Each acts independently within its
exclusive field.
But counsel asserts that the courts of the Philippine Islands are not
constitutional courts, and "that Act No. 136, the Acts of Congress and the
Commission are the Constitution as far as this Supreme Court is
concerned."
ISSUE: WON the courts of the Philippine Islands are not constitutional
courts
HELD: They are constitutional courts, because they, like the Legislature,
exist by virtue of a written Organic Law enacted by the supreme legislative
body. The validity of all legislative Acts must be determined by their
compliance with this Organic Law, and the determination of the legal
question of compliance or noncompliance therewith is a judicial question,
which must in the last analysis be determined by the judiciary. This
principle is inherent in every government organized under the American
system which distributes the powers of government among executive,
legislative and judicial departments. In the absence of a restrictive
provision in the Organic Law, a grant of the legislative power means a
grant of all the legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means
a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the
government. With the peculiar restrictions upon the power of the
Philippine Government, which lie back of the general statement already
made, we have no concern at the present time. Within the relation created
by the Acts of Congress the general principles of American constitutional
law apply whenever they can be made applicable. The motion is therefore
denied.
4. Delbros Hotel vs.
FACTS: petitioner Delbros Hotel Corporation [DELBROS, for short] filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for termination of
agreement and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against private respondents
Hilton Hotels International [now known as Hilton International Company] and
Richard Chapman, in his capacity as General Manager of Manila Hilton.
DELBROS was to receive a share in the gross operating profit [GOP] of the
hotel, as defined in Article V of the basic agreements, while HILTON was
entitled to a management fee equivalent to five percent [5%] of the gross
revenues and an incentive fee equivalent to ten percent [10%] of the GOP of
the hotel; that in violation of the terms of the agreement, HILTON a] refused,
despite repeated demands, to remit to DELBROS its share in the GOP which
as of December 31, 1984 amounted to P2,591,165.00 as well as the excess
of the normal working capital; b] transferred, without DELBROS' prior
approval, a portion of the reserve funds to its operating funds; and, c] used
said operating funds for capital expenditures without the consent of
DELBROS; that in addition, HILTON grossly mismanaged the hotel and
breached the trust and confidence reposed upon it by DELBROS; thereby
causing DELBROS to default in its amortizations to the GSIS.

In their Answer with Compulsory counterclaim, therein defendants HILTON

and Chapman specifically denied the allegations of DELBROS and set forth
the following as affirmative defenses: that DELBROS had no valid and
sufficient cause of action for failure to give a five-day notice of termination
of the Management Agreement as required under Article XI thereof;
DELBROS' cause or causes of action, if any, were barred by estoppel or
laches; DELBROS' claims or demands had been waived or abandoned; and
that the alleged violations of the Management Agreement were too trivial or
insignificant to warrant the grave penalty of termination of the Management
Agreement after it had been in force for 17 years. By way of compulsory
counterclaim, HILTON and Chapman prayed for an award of moral damages
in the amount of P1,000,000.00 each and the same amount each as
exemplary damages plus attorney's fees.
The RTC granted the injunction directed to HILTON and Chapman. From
these orders, HILTON and Chapman went to the Intermediate Appellate
Court on a petition for certiorari docketed as AC-G.R. No. SP-06474. On July
3, 1985, the Third Special Cases Division of the IAC, to which the petition
was assigned, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of the orders of Judge Dayrit. The temporary restraining
order was replaced on August 21, 1985 with a writ of preliminary injunction
ISSUE:
HELD: Since the Court of Appeals has freed us to better perform our
constitutional duties, it is imperative that we should not deny it the tools
with which to discharge its own functions faithfully I and speedily Its
members should be chosen with the same care and scrupulous attention
given to the search for Supreme Court Justices. Their compensation and
allowances should not be too different from that given to us. And instead
of being equated with municipal courts and regional trial courts, the Court
of Appeals should be regarded as a court closer to the Supreme Court than
any other court.