The crucified and

the Crucified:
A Study in the Liberation
Christology of Jon Sobrino

Sturla J. Stlsett

Peter Lang

The crucified and the Crucified

STUDIEN ZUR INTERKULTURELLEN GESCHICHTE DES CHRISTENTUMS

ETUDES DHISTOIRE INTERCULTURELLE DU CHRISTIANISME
STUDIES IN THE INTERCULTURAL HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY
begrndet von / fond par / founded by
Walter J. Hollenweger und / et / and Hans Jochen Margull
herausgegeben von / edit par / edited by
Richard Friedli, Universit de Fribourg
Jan A. B. Jongeneel, Universiteit Utrecht
Klaus Koschorke, Universitt Mnchen
Theo Sundermeier, Universitt Heidelberg
Werner Ustorf, University of Birmingham

Volume 127

PETER LANG
Bern

Berlin

Bruxelles

Frankfurt am Main

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Wien

Sturla J. Stlsett

The crucified and the Crucified

A Study in the Liberation Christology of Jon Sobrino

PETER LANG
Bern

Berlin

Bruxelles

Frankfurt am Main

New York Oxford

Wien

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Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Introduction
Theology, Suffering and Praxis
on the Brink of the Millennium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
[1] Naming our Present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
[2] The crucified and the Crucified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
[3] Liberation Theology in Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
[4] Purpose and Plan of Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
i. Theology in a Crucified Reality
Point of Departure and Fundamental Presuppositions . . . 41
[1] Foundational Experience:
Siding with the Poor in El Salvador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
[2] Theology in a Crucified Reality:
Fundamental Presuppositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
a) To be Honest about Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
b) The Importance of the Theological Location . . . 49
c) The Poor as Theological Location . . . . . . . . . . . 57
d) Liberation of the Poor as
Theological Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
e) The Priority of Praxis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
f) Theology as Interpretation of Reality . . . . . . . . . 99
g) Theology as Intellectus Amoris . . . . . . . . . . . . .103
[3] Main Theological Heritage and Framework:
Jesuit Spirituality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105
[4] Critical Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
[5] Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .122

vii

ii. The Crucified People (1)

From Historical Reality to Theological Concept . . . . . . .125
[1] Development of the Theme;
Influences and Parallels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
[2] Ignacio Ellacura: The Crucified People
and Historical Soteriology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .134
[3] Jon Sobrino: The Crucified People
as the Body of the Crucified Christ in History . . . . . .150
[4] The crucified and the Crucified: Three Axes . . . . .163
[5] A Contrasting View: E. Jngel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
[6] Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .173
iii. Countering a Crucifying Christology
The Return to the Historical Jesus as a Way of
Liberating Latin American Images of Christ . . . . . . . . . . 179
[1] A Problematic Heritage: Christologies of
Conquest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
[2] Remedy: The Latin-American Historical Jesus
As Point of Departure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
[3] Critical Assessment: How Historical
Is Jesus Liberator? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
[4] Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .215
iv. The Crucified Liberator (1)
Interpreting Jesus Life as Salvific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[1] From Jesus Death to His Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[2] First Relation: Jesus and the Kingdom of God . . .
[3] Who is Jesus? The Mediator of the Kingdom . . . .
[4] Second Relation: Jesus and the God of
the Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[5] Jesus Faith: A God who is Father
and a Father who is God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[6] Who is Jesus? Son of God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

viii

219
219
225
237
241
246
258

[7] Sobrinos Christology and Feminist Concerns . . . 260

[8] Third Relation: Jesus and his Disciples.
The Primacy of Following . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
[9] From one son to the Son:
Is Jesus True Divinity Questioned? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
[10] Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .281
v. The Crucifying Conflict
A Struggle Between the God of Life and
the Idols of Death . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
[1] God is at Stake: Jesus Anti-Idolatrous Praxis . . . . 288
[2] Idols and Victims: The Anti-Idolatrous Character
and Victimological Orientation of Sobrinos Theology . .295
[3] A Theologal-Idolatrous Structure of Reality . . . . . 304
[4] Crucial Questions: Reality, History, Language . . . . 311
[5] From the Problem of Evil to
Hermeneutics: P. Ricoeur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
[6] A Latin American Reception and Application of
Ricoeur: J. Severino Croatto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
[7] Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .338
vi. The Crucified Liberator (2)
Interpreting Jesus Death as Salvific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
[1] Why was Jesus Killed? Historical Interpretation . . 347
[2] Who Killed Jesus: Human Beings or Gods? . . . . . 360
[3] Why Did Jesus Die? Soteriological Interpretation . . 372
[4] The Cross as Salvific Manifestation . . . . . . . . . . . 384
[5] Jesus the Liberator An Exemplary Martyr? . . . . 398
[6] The Shifting of Models: From Struggle to Sacrifice . 406
[7] Jesus The Victorious Victim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
[8] Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424

ix

vii. The Crucified God

Historical Theodicy and the Mystery of God . . . . . . . . . 429
[1] The Possibility of Gods Passibility . . . . . . . . . . . . .431
[2] How Does God Suffer? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442
[3] God Crucified in the Suffering and
Death of the Poor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463
[4] Gods Abandonment of Jesus? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473
[5] The Crucified God and The Crucified People
The Necessity of Suffering? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
[6] Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489
viii. The Crucified People (2)
The Theological Significance of Contemporary
Suffering: Towards a Critical Appraisal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493
[1] Christian Theology and Suffering:
Relevance and Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 495
[2] The Crucified People Reality and Symbol . . . . . . 511
[3] Constitutive Relatedness as Central Category . . . . .521
[4] The crucified and the Crucified:
Theological Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .537
Postscript
Hope Against Hope: The Resurrection of the C/crucified . . 571
[1] The Crucified People and the Resurrection of Jesus . .573
[2] Claiming the Victims Victory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 579
[3] End of the Millennium The End of History? . . .581
Afterword
The Reality of Continuing Crucifixion
in a Globalised Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .585
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .593
Selected index of names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 627
x

Preface

What is good about Good Friday? Does its goodness correspond

to any historical experience at all? The small wooden crosses that
have become almost a national symbol for El Salvador may point to
such a paradoxical experience. Like other Central American
nations, such as Nicaragua and Guatemala, this tiny country suffered terribly through much of the 20th century. After half a century of military dictatorship, the 1970s and 1980s became years of
increasing repression resulting in open civil war (1980-1992). El Salvador became known world-wide, not for its beautiful landscape or
its hardworking and friendly inhabitants, but for the cruelties committed within its territory.
It is against this background that the typical wooden crosses of
El Salvador cause perplexity: They are painted in such joyful, lively
colours and decorated with small drawings symbolising peaceful
community life: small country houses, people cultivating their land,
children playing in the yard. Why these joyful colours and symbols
of life on a cross a most horrible instrument of torture? Do not
Salvadorans know what crucifixion is all about? They certainly do.
During my many visits to this country since 1985, I have personally
seen enough to be able to reject the suggestion that what is
expressed in these crosses is a naive or simplistic understanding of
what such suffering entails. On the contrary, it is precisely their
own contemporary passion story that leads Salvadorans to present
the cross as a source of life. Amidst the pain, Salvadoran communities of faith bring testimonies of joy, communion, celebration,
hope against hope.
This experience of life in the valley of death, of goodness on
Good Friday, has led Jon Sobrino to reflect theologically upon
11

Gods participation in the suffering of the people. Such a reflection

is christological: In the face of a suffering human being the image of
Jesus of Nazareth can be recognised. It is also soteriological: Christian faith finds its most profound expression in the confession that
Gods presence in human history in and through Jesus is good for
humanity it brings salvation. But what, more precisely, can that
mean when seen from the contemporary experience of El Salvador,
of Latin America, of the South?
At the centre of the cross above, we see a Salvadoran woman,
surrounded by other women working for the well-being of the community. She has her arms stretched out. Is she crucified? Are there
others crucified besides Jesus? What, in that case, is their relationship to the crucified Jesus? This is where the theology of the crucified people begins. It originates in a particular experience of
suffering, with paradoxical glimpses of joy and celebration.
Impressed by this incredible capacity for celebration in the midst of
and in spite of all kinds of conflicts and hardships that are found in
El Salvador, my interest was aroused as to the theology interpreting
this experience. What did it entail? What might be its contribution
to the world wide theological debate?
The first version of this manuscript was presented for the degree
of doctor theologiae at the University of Oslo in February 1998.
There are many persons who have been of great help and support in
this work, whom I would like to thank: Jon Sobrino and his good
colleagues at the Centro Pastoral Monseor Romero at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA), San Salvador; bishop Medardo
Gmez of the Salvadoran Lutheran Church and his family; my
supervisor professor Kjetil Hafstad of the University of Oslo and
co-supervisor professor Werner Jeanrond of the University of Lund;
my opponents in the doctoral defence Dr. Jos Mguez Bonino and
Dr. Kjell Nordstokke; and all the colleagues, friends and family that
took the time and effort to read through parts or the whole of this

12

manuscript at different stages, and gave their constructive and critical comments.
Furthermore, I wish to thank the Norwegian Research Council
and the Faculty of Theology, University of Oslo for making this
work financially and practically possible; Brian McNeil, Peder Nustad and Andy Thomas for proof-reading and linguistic assistance;
Dag Tjemsland and Christian Myhre-Nielsen for computer assistance; and Roger Jensen for the laborious process of making the
manuscript ready for print in the present version.
Last but not least, I wish to thank Anne Veiteberg, my
compaera de vida, and our two children dne and Eivor, for all
their love and support.
There is no gratitude that remains silent forever (Sobrino).
Great gratitude is due to each one of these. And yet they should not
be held responsible for the end result.
As to the translations of the texts quoted in this book, I have
used already existing English translations where available, and only
altered them where I have found it necessary. Where the texts are
available only in Spanish, I have made my own translations, while
providing the original Spanish wording in the notes. I have used
The New English Bible, 1970 (NEB) for Bible quotations. Abbreviations are explained in the text.
This study is dedicated to the memory of Helge Hummelvoll, a
friend and a photographer, who was shot dead on a mission in
Southern Sudan on the 27th of September 1992; and to the memories of Dordi Eika, Kristin Fadum, John Finstad, Geir Nybraaten
and Elbjrg Aadland, who lost their lives in the aeroplane disaster at
the Chichontepec volcanoe, El Salvador on the 9th of August 1995.
Their dedication remains a costly sign of solidarity with crucified peoples.
Oslo, August 2002
Sturla J. Stlsett

13

14

Introduction
Theology, Suffering and Praxis
on the Brink of the Millennium

Despus de un mes de militarizacin, el ejrcito desaloj el pueblo de Aguilares.

Mons. Romero decidi ir cuanto antes a Aguilares para denunciar las atrocidades
cometidas y sobre todo para acompaar y dar esperanza a un pueblo aterrizado.
Muchos fuimos con l, y fue un da que, personalmente, nunca olvidar.
[] Recuerdo tambin, y es lo que ms me impact de su homila, el gran amor
que Mons. Romero mostraba hacia aquellos campesinos de Aguilares, sufrientes y
atemorizados por lo que haban vivido en el ltimo mes. Cmo mantener la
esperanza de ese pueblo? Cmo devolverles dignidad, al menos, en su sufrimiento?
Cmo decirlos que ellos son lo ms importante para Dios y para la Iglesia? Mons.
Romero lo dijo con estas palabras: ustedes son la imagen del Divino Traspasado,
del que nos habla la primera lectura. Ustedes son hoy el Cristo sufriente en la historia, vino a decirles. Y en otra homila de finales de 1979, que tambin recuerdo
bien, hablando del siervo de Jahv, deca Mons. Romero que nuestro liberador,
Jesucristo, tanto se identifica con el pueblo, hasta llegar los intrpretes de la Escritura a no saber si el Siervo de Jahve, que proclama Isaas, es el pueblo sufriente o
es Cristo que viene a redimirlos. Decir a unos campesinos atribulados que ellos
son hoy el Cristo presente en la historia, y decrselo con sinceridad, es la forma
ms radical que tiene un cristiano para devolverles, al menos, su dignidad y
mantenerlos la esperanza.
Jon Sobrino1

From a concrete experience of suffering there emerges a new theological perspective. In Aguilares, a small village in El Salvador in the
turbulent days of June 1977, a bishop consoled a terrified population by referring them to, comparing them with, even identifying
them with the crucified Christ. A theologian present, accompany1

Sobrino 1989e, 34-35. See also Sobrino 1992b, 86, Sobrino 1991d, 425 and
Cardenal, Martn-Bar, and Sobrino 1996, 207-212; 208.

15

ing the bishop and the people in their celebration of faith in those
moments of inexplicable terror, reflected on the theological content
of this consolation. It is new, and yet old: to recognise the face of
Jesus the Crucified in the faces of the humiliated and downtrodden
of today, and to signal this recognition by naming their suffering
crucifixion.
This focus coincides with a general mood of profound reorientation in contemporary Christian theology. Johann Baptist Metz,
speaking from the perspective of post-war Germany, has raised the
fundamental issue of how to do theology after Auschwitz.2 From
the perspective of Aguilares and of other war-ridden and poor communities of faith in El Salvador, Latin America, and the South, Jon
Sobrino reformulates the question: How to do theology during
Auschwitz?3 How to do theology, try to speak of, reflect upon, act
upon the reality of God in the midst of a world of innocent suffering? 4
In a similar vein to Metz, another German theologian, Jrgen
Moltmann, indicated a new departure in contemporary theology in
2
3

16

Cf. e.g. Metz 1994, 611, and Metz 1984, reprinted in Metz and Moltmann
1995: 38-48.
Sobrino 1994c, 252. Sobrino 1991d, 422: Y es que en Amrica Latina no
hacemos teologa despus de Auschwitz, sino durante Auschwitz [],
Sobrino writes, with reference to a poem by P. Casaldliga.
This question is central to Latin American liberation theology. Gustavo
Gutirrez has framed the question similarly from the perspective of Peru: It
needs to be realized, however, that for us Latin Americans the question is not
precisely how are we to do theology after Auschwitz? The reason is that in
Latin America we are still experiencing the every day violation of human
rights, murder, and the torture that we find so blameworthy in the Jewish
holocaust of World War II. [] In Peru, therefore but the question is perhaps symbolic of all Latin America we must ask: How are we to do theology while Ayacucho lasts? How are we to speak of the God of life when cruel
murder on a massive scale goes on in the corner of the dead? Gutirrez
1987, 102. Cf. Gutirrez 1990a.

a book with the programmatic title Der gekreuzigte Gott.5 Jon

Sobrinos own experiences in El Salvador particularly like the one
that day in Aguilares, but thereafter many other days as dark, and
even darker led him, from speaking with Moltmann of the crucified God, to speak also of the crucified people(s).
What meaning can it possibly have to speak of the crucified
people or of the crucified in history? And what purpose can it
serve? One main purpose has already been signalled by Sobrino: to
restore the victims dignity and to uphold their hope. Another one,
closely related, is the mobilisation of a merciful intervention for
their justice and freedom a praxis of liberation. But what about
the meaning? Theologically interpreted, a potential meaning of
this terminology must be derived from a relationship to the One
who was crucified outside the city walls of Jerusalem: Jesus of Nazareth. Hence the theme of this book: the crucified and the Crucified.

[1] Naming our Present

Living at the remote edge of the twentieth century, we encounter a
gap between the extremity of suffering and the triviality of our symbolic and conceptual worlds.6 This observation by Wendy Farley
sets us right on the track for the purpose and content of this
inquiry. The crucified people is presented by liberation theologian Jon Sobrino7 as a proper name for the sufferings of our time.
Can it bridge the gap?
5
6

Moltmann 1973. Eng. transl. Moltmann 1974.

Farley 1996, Beyond Sociology. Studies of Tragedy, Sin and Symbols of
Evil, 124-128; 124. See also Tracy 1994, where the authors opening statement
rings through the whole book: We live in an age that cannot name itself
(page 3).

17

No matter how one may wish to assess the precision and the
actual content of this name and this is what we are about to examine it can hardly be regarded as irrelevant. Towards the turn of the
millennium, world history seems to have entered into a remarkably
contradictory and confusing phase. The twentieth century, one of
the worst of human history, has witnessed absurd, radical suffering
of such a character that it seems to be beyond the scope of traditional theodicies.8 Indeed, the unworlds9 of concentration camps,
gulags, killing fields, war zones and nuclear waste dumps were not
restricted to the earlier part of the century, so that we could, with a
certain relief and satisfaction, regard them as nightmares from
which we now finally have woken up; evils of the past, now at
last overcome by progress, maturity, rationality. The silent litanies
from Rwanda, Iraq, Bosnia and Central America barely audible
after the media switched their microphones off and moved their
cameras to other sites, but not less painfully real still echo
throughout the human community. And before, during and after
such spectacular events of repugnant and incomprehensible evil
there is an even more dramatic reality of ordinary, every-day catastrophes: de-humanising poverty, ecological disintegration, and generalised discrimination on the basis of sex, race, belief or conviction.
7

8
9

18

Jon Sobrino was born in Barcelona in 1938. His parents were of Basque origin, and he grew up in Pas Vasco. He joined the Jesuit order in 1956, and one
year later he came to El Salvador for the first time. Since then, he has lived in
El Salvador, with the exception of two lengthy periods of studies abroad. He
studied Literature, Philosophy and the Science of Engineering at St. Louis
University, USA. His theological doctorate studies were carried out in
Frankfurt, between 1968 and 1974, see Sobrino 1975c. Jon Sobrino was a
close advisor to Archbishop Oscar A. Romero. He is now professor of theology and philosophy at the Universidad Centroamericana Jos Simen Caas
(UCA), in San Salvador, El Salvador.
See Deneken 1993, 53-64.
Farley 1996, ibid.

And yet there are those who willingly and even joyfully proclaim ours as a golden age. In 1989, the year of the downfall of the
Berlin wall and hence the end of the Cold War, North American
historian Francis Fukuyama announced that the end of history now
finally has dawned upon us, in the form of liberal democracy as the
end point of mankinds ideological evolution and the final form
of human government.10 Fukuyama is well aware of the reality of
the millions and millions of victims in the twentieth century, and
that they would deny that there is such a thing as historical
progress. And yet, he writes, good news has come,11 because liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration that
spans different regions and cultures around the globe, and furthermore, liberal principles in economics the free market have
spread, and have succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of
material prosperity.12
The perspective of Fukuyama and other self-congratulatory
masters of ceremony of the brave new world order13 is not only
10 Fukuyamas argument first appeared in an article in The National Interest in
the summer of 1989, entitled The End of History? It is expanded and further developed in Fukuyama 1992.
11 Fukuyama 1992, xiii.
12 Fukuyama 1992, ibid.
13 Nelson-Pallmeyer 1992. At the outbreak and as a justification of the Gulf
War in January 1991, there was much talk of a new world order. NelsonPallmeyer quotes the following statement by President George Bush: We
will succeed in the Gulf. And when we do, the world community will have
sent an enduring warning to any dictator or despot, present or future, who
contemplates outlaw aggression. The world can, therefore, seize this opportunity to fulfill the long-held promise of a new world order, where brutality
will go unrewarded and aggression will meet collective resistance [] The
cost of closing our eyes to aggression is beyond mankinds power to imagine.
This we do know: Our cause is just; our cause is moral; our cause is right.
State of Union Address, January 29, 1991, quoted from Nelson-Pallmeyer
1992, x.

19

that which emerges at the end of history. It is certainly also the perspective of historys victors. These victors fail to perceive that the
post-Cold War-world by no means meets the hopeful expectations
that people were justified in having. The termination of the conflict
between the East and the West seems only to have re-opened and
strengthened another front, the North-South.14 In this situation, an
increasing part of the worlds population has become dispensable,
insignificant, excluded. There is a whole (two-thirds) world left
over.15
Christian theology finds itself deeply challenged by this world
situation. Prompted by a marked shift towards a more polycentric,
ecumenical, cross-cultural theology as the centre of gravity of World
Christianity has moved South, the voices of these suffering others
are gradually making themselves heard.16 New theologies are
emerging, embedded in the same Christian tradition, but building
on different experiences and addressing new situations. Latin American liberation theology has been a main impetus and an important
14 The 20th century started late, in 1914, with the great confrontation between
capitalism and socialism, and ended early, in 1989, with the toppling of the
Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. The 21th century has begun with a
confrontation between North and South, between capital and labor. Xabier
Gorostiaga, rector of Jesuit university Universidad Centroamericana in Managua, Nicaragua, and also president of the Regional Coordinator of Economic and Social Research (CRIES), in a speech to the Conference of the
Latin America Sociology Association, in Havana, May 1991. See Gorostiaga
1991, 31-43; 31.
15 I have described and analysed some aspects of this world situation in the
article Stlsett 1995a and in Stlsett 1995c. Gorostiaga, op. cit.: 35, comments:
It is revealing that precisely when the end of history and the triumph of
capitalism are being announced, the World Bank published its Report on
World Development 1990: Poverty, in which it emphasized poverty as the most
pressing question of the decade. The reality of a billion people throughout
the world with less than a $370 annual income is not only shameful, it is
unsustainable.

20

forerunner to these, providing inspiration as well as methodological

and substantial guidance. But the formation and growth of these
new theologies has also implied criticism of classic liberation theology, pinpointing its deficiencies and shortcomings. As liberation
theology experiences a period of crisis and profound (self-)criticism,
these new theologies black, indigenous, feminist, etc. may now
return the favour. They can represent injection of a new life to liberation theology.17
All of these theologies, old and new, emerge from the margins in opposition to the established centres of theological and
socio-political praxis and thought. They could therefore perhaps be
labelled barbaric theologies.18 More important than the actual
designation, however, is the rise of new theological subjects in their
own right, entailed and encouraged by these theologies, and moreover, by the new theological agenda that they propose. It is on that
agenda that the reality of the crucified people is introduced.

16 At the end of his journey through two hundred years of predominantly

European theology, H. Berkhof notes that theology is becoming a more
international and pluralistic discipline: However, Western theology will
soon lose its predominance. Buenos Aires, Lagos, Bangalore, and Tokyo (let
us say) will play an equal role alongside Tbingen, Edinburgh, and Chicago.
Western theology will die in its Western-ness in order to rise again in globalness. Pluralism will then be far more extensive. But this multiplicity will be
held together through numerous dialogic relationships within a framework
of an essentially unified structure and method Berkhof 1989. Cf. Ellacura
1975b, 326 (2.4.): La existencia del pluralismo teolgico es un hecho
histrico. Es asimismo una necesidad histrica.
17 Para la teologa de la liberacin las nuevas teologas, la negra, la indgena, y
tambin la teologa feminista, han aparecido a veces como una salvacin, la
inyeccin de una nueva vida Comblin 1993, 55.
18 Dussel 1981, 20, compare, Dussel 1985, 14.

21

[2] The crucified and the Crucified

As the present study will show, the crucified people is more than
an easy catch-word, or merely pious talk. It expresses nothing less
than the theological significance of contemporary suffering, according to Jon Sobrino. In view of this suffering, the fundamental challenges are: how to do theology when faced with the reality of the
crucified peoples? And: how can theology help to bring down the
crucified from the cross(es)? Responding to these questions,
Sobrino gives paramount significance to praxis. Faced with the
immense suffering of the poor and the excluded, theology must
take the shape of a re-action in mercy, he holds. The re-action is
action in order to remove the causes of suffering. It is thus praxis,
understood as action and reflection on the world in order to transform it in a certain direction.19
Coming from one of the leading liberation theologians, the
Basque-Salvadoran Jesuit Jon Sobrinos contributions to christology,
ecclesiology, spirituality and fundamental theology have all evoked
interest and debates throughout the world-wide theological community.20 However, the main part of Sobrinos contribution so far is
in the field of christology.21 He has elaborated a christology of following and martyrdom which aims to be a contextual, Latin-American response to the fundamental christological question: Who do
you say I am? (Mk 8:29, par.), at the same time aiming to serve the
liberation of the poor and the excluded in his country and continent.22
19 I shall deal with the praxis-orientation of liberation theology in general and
Sobrino in particular in Chapter i [2] e) below.
20 Cf. the bibliography at the end of this study.
21 His main christological works are Sobrino 1976 (English translation: Sobrino
1978a); Sobrino 1982a (English translation: Sobrino 1982b); and Sobrino
1991d (English translation: Sobrino 1994c ).

22

Perhaps the most novel suggestion in the christology of Jon

Sobrino is exactly this inclusion of the crucified people, and the
importance he gives to it. This is a new theological concept a
theologoumenon 23 , and although Sobrino was not the first to suggest it24, he is the first to integrate it into a complete christological
framework. He even gives it a prominent place. The theological
content and significance of the crucified people in Sobrinos christology are derived from its relation to the crucified Jesus, a relationship which Sobrino sees as a constitutive relatedness. This emphasis
on relatedness or relationality leaves a profound mark on Sobrinos
theological reflection which has not been much highlighted in the
receptions and evaluations of it so far. It will be at the centre of our
attention in this inquiry.
The very move to give the abyss of contemporary suffering the
name of the key Christian term crucified be it in the crucified
people, the crucified reality, or the crucified in history raises a
series of questions in itself. What is actually meant here by being
crucified? What linguistic status does such a naming have? Who
are to be considered the crucified people, the crucified in his22 Perhaps the most important question that has arisen in a new way within
Christology is the question of who Jesus is, and where he stands, in relation
to the social, political, and economic issues of human history. Among the
various liberation theologies, the question of where Jesus stands in relation
to the suffering and hopes of the vast masses of oppressed and destitute peoples is central to Christology. Hellwig 1992, 87.
23 According to E. Schillebeeckx, a theologoumenon means [] an interpretation having (no more) than a theological value. But this unfamiliar word is
used only when it is meant to imply that a theological interpretation (a) is
used to be distinguished from a commonly recognized interpretation, normative for faith, and (b) is also distinguishable from a historically verifiable
affirmation. Schillebeeckx 1979, 752.
24 As we shall see, Sobrino adopts this idea from Ignacio Ellacura. Cf. Ellacura
1978a.

23

tory? Are they called so merely because they resemble Jesus in his
suffering and death, or because they in a more direct manner represent him or are identified with him? What light is shed on this reality of contemporary suffering by the life, suffering and death of
Jesus? And vice versa: what light can this reality, these suffering
human beings possibly provide in our continuous struggle with the
fundamental christological questions of the ultimate significance of
Jesus Christ and his relevance for humanity today? Does such naming imply a levelling of Jesus and other victims or martyrs in history, so that in the end he becomes little more than the exemplary
martyr? Or does it on the contrary imply that suffering people are
elevated to the status of saviours? If that should be the case, would it
be of any help to those who suffer themselves?
Sobrinos thinking on these matters has received world-wide
attention. The number of studies and dissertations in this field is
now considerable, and rapidly increasing.25 My particular emphasis
in the interpretation of Sobrino on this theme will be to see the crucified people in constitutive relatedness26 to the crucified Jesus in the
first place, and to the mystery of God in the second place. This is, in
my view, an approach that does justice to Sobrinos own intentions.
In his christology this idea of constitutive relatedness plays an
important role.27 According to this view it is not something intrinsic to an object or a person which defines what it, he or she is. Its,

25 I consider the dissertations of Martin Maier: Maier 1992, and Nancy Elizabeth Bedford (under professor Jrgen Moltmann, Tbingen): Bedford 1993
to be the most important. The colloquium in the Karl-Franzens University
in Graz, in 1992, where Jon Sobrino and theologians from Eastern and Western Europe met to discuss Sobrinos approach, is also of particular interest.
The main contributions to this seminar are published in Knig and Larcher
1992.
26 Relacionalidad constitutiva, cf. Sobrino 1976, xiii, xvi, 73; Sobrino 1978a,
50, 60, 70, 73. Compare Moltmann 1974, 11.

24

her or his ontological status is decided in and through the relations

in which the object or person is embedded.28
Consequently, Sobrino holds that in order to answer the fundamental christological question who Jesus is, it is necessary to analyse
thoroughly the relations in which Jesus finds himself, according to
the testimonies about him. And Sobrino does not remain satisfied
with solely an analysis of Jesus transcendent trinitarian relatedness
often taken into account in christologies but insists that this
must be complemented by an analysis of his historical relatedness,
which is not so commonly explored.29 Indeed Sobrino holds that it
is the latter that makes it possible to gain knowledge of the former,
not vice versa.
Sobrinos christology, accordingly, is structured around such an
analysis, in that it first explores the historical Jesus in his relation to
the Kingdom of God and then his relation to God the Father. These
two fundamental relations determine the identity, activity and ultimate historical fate of Jesus, according to Sobrino. But Jesus is also
embedded in a profound relation to his followers, which after his
death and resurrection becomes what might be defined as a transhistorical relation in the Spirit. When seen in the perspective of
Jesus death on the cross, this historical constitutive relatedness
27 Relation: An aspect or quality (as resemblance) that connects two or more
things or parts as being or belonging or working together or as being of the
same kind. Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica 1995c.
28 In this new orientation, Sobrino is not alone. It is a dominant trend in contemporary theology and in other branches of science. Cf. e.g. McFague
1987, 10: In other words, relationships and relativity, as well as process and
openness, characterize reality as it is understood at present in all branches of
science [] (I)ndividuals or entities always exist within structures of relationship; process, change, transformation, and openness replace stasis,
changelessness, and completeness as basic descriptive concepts. See below,
Chapter iv, [1] and [7]; Chapter vi, [7]; and Chapter viii, [3].
29 Sobrino 1991d, 40, et passim.

25

between Jesus and his followers becomes a relatedness between the

crucified Jesus and the crucified people, the Crucified and the crucified.
I shall demonstrate that the crucified people (and synonymous expressions) through its relatedness with the crucified Jesus
attains an epistemological-hermeneutical, historical-soteriological
and ethical-praxical role in Sobrinos theology. The crucified and
the Crucified thus expresses several of the most central tenets and
characteristic emphases presented by Latin American liberation theology30, such as the experience of the unjust suffering of the poor
and oppressed and their need for liberation, the urgency to historicise (historizar) the concept of Christian salvation, and the insistence on the hermeneutical significance of the location (lugar) and
historical context of theology. In sum, I find in this formulation an
original and thought-provoking expression of the theological sig30 Should one speak of one or many liberation theologies? One of the fiercest
critics of liberation theology, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger writes: The theology of liberation is an extraordinarily complex phenomenon. Any concept of
liberation theology has to be able to span positions ranging from the radically Marxist to those that stress necessary Christian responsibility toward
the poor and oppressed in the context of a sound ecclesiology, as did the
documents of CELAM from Medelln to Puebla. Ratzinger chooses to use
the concept of liberation theology in a more restricted sense, including
only those theologians who, according to Ratzinger, in some way have
espoused a Marxist fundamental option. Ratzinger 1990 Juan Luis Segundo, on his part, analysed what he saw as the development of two distinct
versions of Latin American liberation theology, in Segundo 1990. Christian
Duquoc prefers to speak of liberation theologies, Duquoc 1989, 7; while
Arthur McGovern (McGovern 1989) opts to treat liberation theology as one
movement, and liberation theologians as one group, p. xv. Although it is
correct that liberation theology entails different currents and perspectives,
I do not find any strong reasons for not using the singular for my purposes
here. There is a sufficient common ground and history to continue to speak
of Latin American liberation theology in general. Cf. Chapter i. below.

26

nificance of contemporary suffering. Accordingly it merits critical

analysis and further reflection.
In a more precise wording, then, this book deals with the theological significance of contemporary suffering as it is expressed in
the symbol of the crucified people and its constitutive relatedness to
the crucified Jesus in Jon Sobrinos christology.

[3] Liberation Theology in Crisis

This undertaking is all the more necessary in that Latin American
liberation theology itself seems to have entered a critical phase. This
particular strand of theological thought and praxis has been under
attack since its birth, both from within the spheres of churches and
theology, and from the outside: from other sciences and not least
damaging from political authorities and military powers. Since it
claims to be a theological praxis emerging from and among the
powerless poor living on the peripheries, the powerful centres have
reacted with considerable force against it. This holds true both for
the power centres of the Church31, i.e., in particular the Vatican32,
and of society, most notably in policy documents undergirding U.S.
31 The Church leaderships most effective strategy to counter liberation theology has been of an administrative and disciplinary nature, through the
appointing of conservative bishops, the closing down of seminaries and theological reviews sympathetic to liberation theology, the marginalisation of
the Comunidades Eclesiales de Base, etc. The case against Leonardo Boff is its
prime example. See Nordstokke 1996, 219-249 and Preface to the English
Edition, p.ix. Cf. also Sobrinos comments in Sobrino 1992d. The Latin
American edition of the magazine Cambio 16 No 1.077, 13.07. 1992, ran a
cover story on how the Vatican counters liberation theology, under the heading La nueva Inquisicin, see pp. 3 and 6-13.

27

foreign policy.33 Although these attacks have had their effects,34 it is

not primarily because of them that liberation theology is in crisis. It
is rather something intrinsic to liberation theological method itself
which now causes it to pass through a profound period of trial.
Liberation theologians insist that theology should relate to concrete historical reality in a specific social and political setting. And
they have underscored the dynamism of human history: the histori32 The Vatican, through its Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith presided by
Cardinal Ratzinger, has issued two authoritative documents on liberation
theology in general. The first and more critical one, was the Instruction on
Certain Aspects of the Theology of Liberation issued the sixth of August,
1984. Its purpose was to draw the attention of pastors, theologians, and all
the faithful to the deviations and risks of deviation, damaging to faith and to
Christian living that are brought about by certain forms of liberation theology which use, in an insufficiently critical manner, concepts borrowed from
various currents of Marxist thought. (From the introduction., p. 394 in
Congregation 1990a). The second one came close to two years later, i. e.
March 22, 1986 Congregation 1990b. It was a much more nuanced and constructive response, although not taking back the stern warnings of the first
instruction: Far from being outmoded, these warnings appear ever more
timely and relevant., paragraph 1, in op. cit., 462 For a commentary on
these statements and their reception, see i.a. Nordstokke 1996, 250-256, and
McGovern 1989, 15-19. Ignacio Ellacuras response to the first Instruction
[] is of particular interest, see Ellacura 1984b.
33 Cf. particularly the so-called Santa Fe documents, issued by the pro-Reagan
think tanks such as the Santa Fe- committee and Institute for Religion and
Democracy (IRD). Liberation theology was soon singled out as a threat to
U.S. national security. The first Santa Fe- document, from 1980, stated that
U.S. policy must begin to counter (not react against) liberation theology as
it is utilized in Latin America by the liberation theology clergy. Quoted
from Berrymann 1987, 3.
34 The following observation made by one of the veterans among the liberation
theologians, Jos Comblin, is indeed noteworthy: En los seminarios y en las
escuelas de teologa, la prohibicin de siquiera mencionar la teologa de la
liberacin es tan fuerte que las nuevas generaciones de seminaristas y estudiantes religiosos la ignoran totalmente. Comblin 1993, 50.

28

cal situation and course of events change and can be changed. Theology is an act of reflection within this process of historical
transformation.
This is exactly what has happened, then: in Latin America, as in
the world at large, the historical situation has changed, and changed
drastically. The Nicaraguan Jesuit and leading social scientist Xabier
Gorostiaga spoke in 1991 of a crucible of Copernican changes,
greater than those seen in the 1914-1917 period.35 In Latin America,
these changes come in times of cholera,36 he continues, thus referring to the depth of the economic and political crisis facing this
continent.
Economically, there is broad agreement in that the 1980s was a
lost decade for Latin America. In this period Latin America
decreased its participation in the international market from 7% to
4%, at the same time as foreign investment stock dropped from
12,3% in 1980 to 5,8% in 1989. The UN Economic Commission on
Latin America (ECLA) estimates that the number of people living
in poverty in the region increased from 112 to 184 million people in
the same period.37 Gorostiagas conclusion is that Latin Americas
financial and productive debacle in the 1980s could be compared to
the worst years of colonial pillage.38 Another leading analyst, Jorge
35 Gorostiaga 1991, 31.
36 This expression is a play of words in Spanish. Clera refers to the epidemic
disease which, after having been eradicated from the continent, re-ocurred at
the end of the 80s in the slums and poor communities of several countries in
Latin America, in the opinion of many due to the increasing poverty particularly among the urban masses as a result of the austere structural adjustment economic policies that were pursued all over the continent. At the
same time, clera means rage or extreme anger. The expression is, of course,
also a reference to Gabriel Garca Mrquez novel Love in the Times of Cholera.
37 Gorostiaga 1991, 33.
38 Ibid.

29

Castaeda, calls this the worst economic and social crisis since the
Depression.39 If it were not for illegal drug exports, emigration,
and an income-reducing but shock-absorbing informal economy,
Castaeda believes, the outcome would have been far more tragic.40
Increasing poverty is sadly not at all a new phenomenon in
Latin America. What is new, however, is the character of this poverty, and the political and ideological climate within which it
occurs. Analysing the socio-political transformations in Latin
America between 1972 and 1992, Manuel Antonio Garretn, like
many other observers, highlights a positive development too: the
profound process of democratisation that the continent has gone
through.41 Today practically all Latin American countries have
legally constituted and democratically elected governments, a fact
not many would have dared to predict just a decade ago. But this
process has not been accompanied to the same extent by a social
and economic democratisation.42
Two lessons from the last two decades are crucial for appreciating the complexity of the current situation, according to Garretn.43 Firstly, that those visions which held that growth and
development in and by themselves would secure a social change
towards more equity, democracy and social integration have failed.
In order to achieve this, some kind of conscious redistributive
action is indispensable. And secondly, that those political models
which implied redistribution by way of revolution have failed.
Where this was tried, the result was generally that those who origi39 Castaeda 1993, 5. Castaedas figures are even more negative: In 1980, 120
million Latin Americans, or 39% of the areas population, lived in poverty;
by 1985 the number had grown to 160-170 million; toward the end of the
decade it was estimated at the apalling figure of 240 million. Op. cit., 5-6.
40 Op. cit., 6.
41 Garretn 1993.
42 Op. cit., 23.
43 Op. cit., 18.

30

nally held political, military and economical power, the defenders

of the status quo, in the long run triumphed, so that the situation
got worse than at the outset. The major challenge in Latin America
in the 1990s then, according to this analysis, is to implement a
social change which implies a redistribution of power and wealth,
but to do so by way of democratic means. This means that while
seeking formulas that do not exclude conflicts, the main solutions
will have to be found within the established legal and institutional
framework, relying on some basic social consensus.44 Castaeda
comes to a similar conclusion. He too speaks of the recurrent Latin
American and almost universal aspiration for squaring the circle: how to combine change with continuity, social justice with eco-

44 Op. cit., 18. See also the interesting passage on pages 24-25: Estamos, as
lejos del ideologismo revolucionario o contrarrevolucionario que supona el
fin de las contradicciones a partir de una lucha por el poder para resolver la
contradiccin principal, la que automticamente resolva las otras. []
(E)stamos tambin lejos del ideologismo reaccionario que afirma el fin de la
historia y de las acciones colectivos por el mejoramiento de las condiciones
de la vida individual y social. No han desaparecido las viejas luchas por la
igualdad, la libertad y la independencia e identidad nacionales. Pero ahora
tales luchas se complejifican, tecnifican, autonomizan, y no se dejan identificar con sistemas ideolgicos monolticos; y adems se une a ellas la lucha
por la expansin de la subjetividad, por la felicidad y la autoafirmacin, que
dejan de ser monoplio de los sectores socio-econmicos priveligiados. La
principal conclusin es que ya no puede pensarse en un sujeto nico de la
historia porque cada uno de estos procesos y dimensiones de la vida social
reconoce sujetos y actores diferentes que a veces pueden incluso encontrarse
en bandos contrarios en algunas de estas dimensiones. Ello implica, adems,
que el repertorio de las formas de accin colectiva heredado de la matriz
clsica es insuficiente y entra en cuestin aunque no puede ni debe ser eliminado en la medida que no se resolvieron las contradicciones del pasado. Las
puras luchas antagnicas deben ser combinadas con bsquedas de consensos
bsicos.

31

nomic growth, representative democracy with effective governance.45

The principal distinguishing mark of liberation theology is an
option for the poor and for their liberation. But within the new
panorama of Latin America the character of the poverty of the poor
has changed. Perhaps this change may briefly be formulated thus:
the poor are no longer primarily oppressed and exploited, but rather
excluded, dismissed and forgotten. They are the left overs of the
neo-liberal market economies. This means that the strategies for
liberation, for the overcoming of this poverty and situation of suffering and indignity, must change too. What does liberation mean
in this new context?
Furthermore, the new situation includes a new awareness of the
pluriformity of the poor. The poor are many and they may even
have conflicting interests. The general term poor conceals a myriad of distinctions cultural, political, racial, sexual Who are the
poor, then?
Liberation theology has opted for the poor, but the poor seem
to opt for popular Protestantism. The rapid growth of Pentecostal
movements is the major religious phenomenon in Latin America
today.46 Although statistics are uncertain, it has been stated that
400 Latin American Catholics convert to a Protestant confession
every hour, i.e. 3,5 million persons a year.47 Between 1981 and 1987
the Protestant Churches doubled their membership, reaching a
total of about 50 million members.48 Given that the growth pre45 Castaeda 1993, 129.
46 I have discussed this phenomenon and the challenge it represents for liberation theology more extensively in Stlsett 1995d. The bibliography on this
phenomenon is growing rapidly. See Kirkpatrick 1988, Cook 1994, Martin
1990 Stoll 1990. See also Alvarez 1992, Boudewijnse 1991, Damen 1991, and
Sjrup 1995. An older study is Willems 1967.
47 Damen 1991, 423.
48 Keen 1992, 563.

32

dominantly takes place among the poor segments of the population,49 it represents a particular challenge to liberation theology.
What is behind this phenomenon? What may its consequences be?
In this matter, liberation theology seems to be moving from a position of neglect and superficial rejection to a more nuanced analysis.
Among the self-critical questions particularly relevant to liberation
theology in this connection is the following: Where is the true
church of the poor to be found?
These developments have put liberation theology to the test: is
it still a liberating theology for the poor of Latin America, and elsewhere? Criticisms and self-criticisms abound.50 However, as Christian theologians know well, times of crisis and trial are
simultaneously times of new possibilities. What future for liberation theology then: will it stand the test? Through our reflection on
Sobrinos expression the crucified people, or the crucified in history, and its constitutive relationship to the crucified Jesus Christ
the crucified and the Crucified as a representative and central
tenet of liberation theology, we shall join in this discussion on the
validity and relevance of this particular strand in contemporary theology at the turn of the millennium.
I hope to show that the focus chosen for this study will be particularly fruitful in view of the present situation of crisis and opportunities. For, in spite of all the changes, one thing is for certain: the
reality of suffering has not disappeared from the Latin American
continent. Neither has the need for real freedom, justice, and life
with dignity for the masses. In view of the new situation in
which everything has changed, but all is the same Jon Sobrino
proposes that liberation theology should move from being merely
a theology of liberation to becoming a theology of liberation and
martyrdom.51 It is obvious to him then, that the crucified people,
the martyr people, have not lost their primary human impor49 See i.a. Escobar 1994, 131, Sjrup 1995.

33

tance, nor their theological significance. We shall accordingly

approach the reality and theological significance of the crucified
people within this new, old situation of exclusion and oppression
prevalent not only in Latin America, but throughout the entire
globe.

50 In addition to the two Instructions issued by the Congregation for the

Doctrine of the Faith, two other documents from this influential body
should be mentioned, namely the Ten Observations on the Theology of
Gustavo Gutirrez (from March 1983), Congregation 1990d, and the notification sent to Leonardo Boff in March 1985: Congregation 1990c. Other
selected works critical of liberation theology: Sigmund 1990, Chow 1992,
Novak 1988, Gutierrez 1977, Ibnez Langlois 1989, Nash 1984 (contains a
helpful bibliography, pp. 249-255), Kloppenburg 1974. For an overview and
more nuanced assessment of the criticisms and responses, see McGovern
1989. See also Aruj 1984, Forrester 1994, Nickoloff 1992, Duquoc 1989,
Mahan and Richesin 1981, Cunningham 1994, Ogden 1989, Bigo 1992,
Libnio 1989. Noteworthy self-criticisms and -assessments are found in Assmann 1994b, Assmann 1995, Richard 1991 (English version: Richard 1994),
Comblin, Gonzlez Faus, and Sobrino 1993, Duque 1996. Garretn, op. cit.,
28, concludes that liberation theology in view of this new situation should
abandon the following four traditional views: 1) a certain economical
structuralism which tended to see all social conflicts as rooted in the economical sphere; 2) the vision of a unified historical subject: the victims of
oppression; 3) the identification of the utopia of liberation with a revolutionary methodology or model, and a relative negligence of an appropriate theory of representation and institutional mediation; and 4) a vision of civil
society, everyday life, subjectivity, modernity and modernization which was
identified except in what concerned the social struggle against oppression
with traditional Catholic thought.
51 Sobrino 1993c.

34

[4] Purpose and Plan of Study

I intend in other words to discuss Sobrinos proposal that we see the
relationship between the crucified people and the Crucified Jesus as
a key expression of the theological significance of contemporary suffering. Theological significance will here be taken in its double
aspect, meaning both significance in theology and significance to
theology.
I shall begin by examining Jon Sobrinos point of departure for
doing theology, viz. the historical and theological context, background and preconditions which mould his theological praxis
(Chapter i). Then I will be ready to take an initial closer look at the
main concept of the study, namely the crucified people(s) (Chapter ii). When the development and relative novelty of this theme in
Sobrino have been analysed and discussed, it will prove necessary to
examine its internal function in his christology. As it stands in this
constitutive relationship with the crucified Jesus, I must examine
more thoroughly Sobrinos interpretation of Jesus, and more precisely, the salvific meaning of his life and death. Before undertaking
this examination, however, one must take due account of the historical context of christological reflection in Latin America (Chapter
iii). An adequate interpretation presupposes that we set Sobrinos
christology of liberation against the background of the diverse
christologies of domination and conquest that have been common on the continent.
My exploration of Sobrinos Jesus-interpretation will then be
done in three steps. Firstly, we shall see how Sobrino interprets
Jesus life as salvific, or in historical terms, how Jesus can be legitimately claimed to be a liberator (Chapter iv). When I re-read the
history of the life of Jesus with Sobrino, considerable weight will be
given to the increasing conflict in which Jesus becomes part. This
conflict is due to the very structure of reality, Sobrino contends, a

35

structure which he furthermore holds to be the same now as it was

in the time of Jesus. We are accordingly at the very root of the
(christological and soteriological) problem when we examine the
causes for this crucifying conflict (Chapter v). Sobrino sees reality as
subject to a struggle between antagonistic and absolutely incompatible forces: the God of life and the idols of death. This chapter, at
the centre of my study, also marks something of a turning point in
it. My contention is that in Sobrinos theology, this struggle at the
foundations of reality is the ultimate explanatory ground and
framework. It is the root of the problem. However, it may also be
seen as a problem in Sobrinos thinking. Exposing the difficulties
that it raises, and how they might be overcome, will thus be an
important task.
I will then continue with the culmination in history of that
conflict, through an interpretation of Jesus salvific death, in order
to understand how the terrible reality of contemporary crucifixions
might possibly be accorded salvific significance by Sobrino (Chapter vi).
The death of Jesus sharply poses the question if and how suffering affects God-self (Chapter vii). As already indicated, the crucified people is a further development of the concept of a crucified
God, actualised by Moltmann. Understanding the relationship
between the crucified and the Crucified in Sobrino will therefore
also have to include this perspective of Gods suffering and death.
We shall see that the particular emphasis and novelty of Sobrinos
treatment of this controversial theme poses the question of Gods
relation to human suffering from the perspective of a crucified
people.
At this point, then, I will be ready to return to my point of
departure, for a final discussion and assessment of the theological
significance of contemporary suffering as it is expressed in the term
the crucified people(s) (Chapter viii). I shall do so by presenting a

36

series of thirteen theses resulting from my critical discussion with

Sobrinos proposals. The theses concern both what these proposals,
when read from my vantage-point, may signify in terms of theological content (i.e. systematic theology or dogmatics), and what they
may signify in terms of method (i.e. fundamental theology). Thus I
will apply the critical insights gained through this study in Sobrinos
writings in making some more comprehensive although tentative
and suggestive elaborations of a basic theme underlying this
study: What is an adequate strategy and method for Christian theology in our time? I shall return to the challenges to theology of suffering and praxis.
Everything concerning the relationship between the crucified
and the Crucified throughout the study is said under the presupposition of the Christian faith in the resurrection of Jesus. Yet the resurrection will not be made an explicit object of study, nor will it
play any primary role in the interpretation of this main relationship.
The reasons for this are both substantial and practical, as I shall
make clear. Before ending my study, however, I shall briefly consider what particular light faith in the resurrection sheds on the reality and symbol of the crucified peoples, and vice versa what this
contemporary suffering implies for Christian faith in the resurrection (Postscript).
Finally, some words on the spirit in which this investigation is
undertaken. Although Sobrinos theology is a consciously contextual theology, this study is written under the expectation and prior
understanding that contextual does not mean some sort of
regionalism closed in on itself, nor some sort of sectarianism,
expressing a dialogue into which only the carefully elected sect
members are permitted to join.
On the contrary, by undertaking this examination I accept
Latin American liberation theology as an invitation to an open,
cross-cultural, ecumenical conversation, built on the premises of

37

respectful interchange and mutual accountability.52 I am quite

aware of the differences between the theological and cultural traditions and real-life situations out of which Jon Sobrino reflects theologically and those of my own; although I have lived and worked in
El Salvador and elsewhere in Latin America myself, these differences
will not be wiped out. The awareness of these differences gives rise
to a certain caution and humility with regard to my own findings
and assessments, particularly when bearing in mind the atrocities of
war and repression that Jon Sobrino and his colleagues have had to
face daily for decades now, and which appear infinitely distant and
nearly unimaginable from the calmness and security of a Northern
European University.
Nevertheless, no mutually respectful conversation can endure
without an honest encounter in which all parties are permitted to
speak from their own vantage-point, with plenty of room for both
agreement and disagreement. In such a conversation, I hope and
expect that these differences when consciously admitted may
prove fruitful, at the very least by preventing our theological discourse and praxis from being just more of the same, and thus die
the death of futility and boredom.
My aim here is not primarily to detect what I may find to be
weaknesses or lay bare possible flaws in Sobrinos liberation christology. To the extent that this will be done, it will be subsumed under
what I see as the more important and fruitful undertaking: to
explore the possibilities which may be opened up through Sobrinos
reading of the tragic situation of contemporary suffering in the light
of the Christian witness of Jesus; and vice versa. I shall try to reflect

52 Cf. Bonino 1993a, and various recent ecumenical documents, such as e.g. the
Message from The Fifth World Conference of Faith and Order in Santiago
de Compostela 1993: Unity today calls for structures of mutual accountability (Paragraph 9), in Best 1994, 227. See also Stlsett 1993.

38

on and with Sobrinos proposals, even if this may lead me to reflecting against them, in part or in toto.
With a clear awareness of the contextuality of all theological
reflection, then, this study does not in any way pretend to present a
universal or neutral assessment of Sobrino, or of liberation theology in general. Rather, this study is undertaken with a determined
and ultimately quite practical purpose: to contribute to an interpretation of Christian faith which is attentive to, responsible vis--vis,
and empowering in the real lives and struggles of the many who are
excluded and victimised in our communities, and on our planet, on
the brink of the millennium. In so doing, it wishes to pay respect to
the memory and legacy of Mgr Oscar Arnulfo Romero and Ignacio
Ellacura, who were pioneers in theologically reflecting the reality of
crucified peoples, committing themselves to their cause to the point
of joining in their martyrdom.

39

40

i. Theology in a Crucified Reality

Point of Departure and Fundamental Presuppositions

Vivir en la realidad crucificada de Amrica Latina, aceptada como es y no sofocarla con nada es el primer paso para qualquier conocimiento teolgico.1

Theology today ought to relate primarily to the concrete, historical

reality in which it is embedded. This basic contention of Latin
American theology of liberation plays a fundamental role in Jon
Sobrinos theological writings, both a priori and de facto. To understand the theological significance of contemporary suffering as it
comes to expression through the centrality of the term the crucified people in Sobrinos christology, it is therefore necessary to
examine how this premise works. In other words, in this chapter i
shall consider the point of departure and fundamental presuppositions of Jon Sobrinos theological endeavour. First of all, we turn to
the more immediate and personal context of Sobrinos theology.

[1] Foundational Experience:

Siding with the Poor in El Salvador2
Why has this term, the crucified people, become so important to
Sobrino? The most obvious reason not always taken into account
in theological analyses is to be found in Sobrinos personal and
communal experience. The recent history of the church and people
of El Salvador in general, and of the Jesuit community to which
1

Sobrino 1982a, 78.

41

Sobrino belongs in particular, conveys the immediate explanation

why Sobrino finds it necessary to speak of a crucified reality.3
This history is well known and has been widely documented.4
It has been a history of suffering; a history of structural injustice
through generations, resulting in civil war, with all its bitter consequences: persecution, disappearances, assassinations, massacres
More than 75,000 people were killed during the civil war in El Salvador between 1980 and 1992. Churches and church-members
working with the poor and committing themselves to their cause
had more than their share of these sufferings.5 The Jesuit University
in San Salvador, Universidad Centroamericana Jos Simen Caas,
under the guidance of its rector Ignacio Ellacura, made an explicit
option for the poor and marginalised in El Salvador early in the
70s. Ellacura wanted to use the resources of the university in the
2

3
4

42

Roberto Oliveros uses the expression foundational experience to describe

the original experience and intuition of liberation theology: Cul es la experiencia fundante de la teologa de la liberacin? [] Cul fue la experiencia e
intuicin originales de las que brota la teologa de la liberacin? No fue otra
que la experiencia cotidiana de la injusta pobreza en que son obligados a
vivir millones de hermanos latinoamericanos. Oliveros 1991, 18. Cf., e.g.
Hennelly 1990, xix: By far the most important background experience of
liberation theology is the widespread experience of poverty, the impoverishment of many millions of persons because of domestic and foreign socioeconomic systems.
Sobrino 1992b, 7. [] la realidad crucificada del Tercer Mundo, ante la cual
hay que reaccionar, hoy como ayer [].
See, i.a.: Anonymous 1982; Gispert Sauch de Borell 1990; Lernoux 1982;
Vigil 1994; Vigil 1987c; Danner 1994; Vigil 1987b; Vigil 1987a; Hassett and
Lacey 1991; Carranza 1992; Romero 1989; Gmez 1993; Gmez 1992; Wright
1994, Berrymann 1994, 63-106, United Nations 1993, and Stlsett 1994a.
See Anonymous 1982. Sobrino often takes this particular experience of the
Salvadoran church(es) as his point of departure, see i.a., Sobrino 1986, 171203, and 243-260; Sobrino 1987a, 109-125 and 185-188; Sobrino 1989c;
Sobrino 1989e; Sobrino 1990a; and Sobrino 1993a.

struggle for a more just and humane society. He and his staff often
took controversial and brave stands during the years of conflict.
Accordingly, UCA its leadership, staff and students alike was the
object of harsh criticisms and attacks from the authorities and sectors loyal to the regime, even to the point of violent persecution.6
Among all the difficult moments Sobrino has lived through
during these years, there are two that have left particularly profound
marks on his theological work. The first one was the assassination of
Archbishop Oscar A. Romero. The Jesuits at the UCA, and especially Ellacura and Sobrino, had become close co-workers with the
Archbishop during his years of ministry. Romeros pastoral commitment, willingness to change, spiritual strength and charismatic personality impressed Sobrino profoundly.7
The second horrifying incident was the killing of his colleagues
six Jesuit priests, amongst them Ignacio Ellacura, together with
their housekeeper and her daughter at the UCAs Pastoral Centre,
the fifteenth of November, 1989. They were all cold-bloodedly massacred by an elite battalion of the Salvadoran Armed Forces.8 Jon
Sobrino was abroad when it happened, while a colleague who had
borrowed his room in his absence, was shot dead.9 Thus Sobrino
lost his brothers and colleagues, and escaped himself by chance. In
particular, the loss of Ellacura, whom he admired and with whom
6
7

See Ellacura 1993c.

Sobrino untiringly remembers Romero in his writings. In Sobrinos opinion,
Mons. Romero representa un ejemplo preclaro y actual de cmo unificar
prxis de liberacin eficaz y espritu de las bienaventuranzas. Sobrino 1982a,
192, n.8. Cf. i.a. Sobrino 1981b; Sobrino 1989e; Sobrino 1990c; et passim.
Those who were killed, were: Ignacio Ellacura, Ignacio Martn-Bar,
Amando Lpez, Juan Ramn Moreno, Segundo Montes, Joaqun Lpez y
Lpez, Julia Elba Ramos and her daughter, Celina Mariceth Ramos. See
United Nations 1993; Doggett 1994.
Sobrinos own reflections on this tragedy can be found in Sobrino 1989b /
Sobrino 1990a; cf. Sobrino 1992b, 249-267.

43

he had a long-standing and mutually inspiring theological co-operation, has been hard on Sobrino. As will become clear in this study,
Sobrino is avowedly dependent on Ellacuras theological and philosophical works in matters both methodological and substantial.10

[2] Theology in a Crucified Reality:

Fundamental Presuppositions
These traumatic personal experiences, in which Jon Sobrinos theological reflection is profoundly rooted, are thus experiences of suffering in the midst of an active attempt to transform reality by
contributing to the removal of what is seen as the root causes of
general injustice, violence and suffering in El Salvador. In other
words, they are concrete experiences of suffering which issue in a
determined praxis. Sobrino has repeatedly reflected on these experiences and their effect on his theological labor. This has added a
strong personal and emotive tone to his theological writings, giving
them a notable existential and spiritual character. But they have also
affected the main thrust and content of his theology. Drawing on
these experiences, Sobrinos reflections on doing theology in a crucified reality contain at least seven fundamental presuppositions.
10 Ignacio Ellacura, born in Portugalete, Vizcaya (Spain) on the 9th of November 1930, came to be the most influential reference person to Jon Sobrino.
The two had much in common: They were both Jesuits of Basque origin,
nationalized Salvadorans and fully dedicated to contributing to the liberation of the poor in their capacity as theologians, scholars and priests. Ellacura was the older, and Sobrino learned to value him highly, both as a
colleague and as a friend. See Sobrino 1994a and Sobrino 1994b. Martin
Maier calls their collaboration: ein Modell theologischer Kooperation,
Maier 1992, 24.

44

In all of these, it is obvious that Sobrino is a representative of the

Latin American theology of liberation. Furthermore, the profound
influence from Ellacura on Sobrino shows through.
a) To be Honest about Reality
First of all, Sobrino stresses what he simply calls honradez con lo
real honesty about what is real.11 Doing theology today requires
an act of honesty vis--vis the concrete reality in which the theological endeavour takes place. This honesty about the truth of reality
not only refers to a mere recording of facts or an overcoming of
ignorance, but is moreover a positive act of the spirit to get to
know the truth of things against the inherent tendency to oppress
it. Gaining knowledge is a matter of triumphing against lie. Since
suppressing the truth with injustice in Pauls words is a primary expression of the sinfulness of humanity, it is necessary for the
theologian to take seriously this tendency to manipulate truth, and
be willing to change. At the root of any Christian endeavour,
including theology, lies the need for conversion. And conversion
means a change not just of mind, but also of eyes and heart.12 The
new eyes are needed to be able to see the truth of reality.13
In order to have an opinion about what the truth of reality is,
one must have at least a preliminary understanding of what is
meant by reality. Even though this philosophical topos of great
11 Sobrino 1992c, cf also Sobrino 1987a, 23-33; Sobrino 1992b, 64; et passim.
12 Cf. the Ignatian tradition of application of the senses, to which I shall
return below, see Chapter i, [3].
13 Sobrino 1992b, 16-19. By this, Sobrino introduces particular conditions into
the very act of cognisance. And he frames these conditions in Christian theological concepts; conversion, sin, etc. This immediately raises some difficult
issues regarding the status of theological knowledge vis--vis other branches
of human knowledge. I shall return to this below.

45

importance is such a fundamental concept in Sobrinos theology, he

has not yet undertaken a profound analysis of it in his writings. But
at least two things can be said of his understanding of reality.
First, he shares liberation theologys general critique of what it
sees as the prevalent idealism in the more traditional, Western theological methods. In accordance with Gustavo Gutirrez, who deems
it necessary to salvage our understanding of the faith from all
forms of idealism14, because they are nothing but forms of evading a cruel reality15, Sobrino criticises modern European theology
for attempting to solve real problems on an ideal level. In an important article on theological method, he claims that modern European
theology sees its main task and liberative potential mainly as giving
new meaning to faith, or regaining its lost meaning.16 Thus it
becomes ideological, not only because it hinders liberative solutions to the problems of reality, but because it covers up the real
problems, by presupposing that they can be solved through explanation and the giving of meaning. It covers up the real misery of
reality with a partial liberation through theological discourse, as
if Christian liberation in principle could co-exist with a reality
which is not liberated.17
Second, this critique of idealism leads Sobrino to opt for an
open or transcendental realism to which he ultimately gives a
christological foundation:
If Christ is like this, then reality too can be understood as the presence of
transcendence in history, each with the proper identity and autonomy, with14 It is in deeds, not simply in affirmations, that we salvage our understanding
of the faith from all forms of idealism. Gutirrez 1980, 22.
15 Gutirrez 1984, 69: Se evitar as caer, sea en posiciones idealistas o espiritualistas que no son sino formas de evadir una realidad cruda y exigente; sea en
anlisis carentes de profundidad y, por lo tanto, en comportamientos de eficacia a corto plazo, so pretexto de atender a las urgencias del presente.
16 Sobrino 1975a. This article was later published in Sobrino 1986, 15-47.

46

out mixture or separation, by which I mean without the reductionisms that

impoverish both. 18

This sacramental view of reality clearly goes back to Karl Rahners

creative reformulation of the thomistic legacy (transcendental
Thomism) in Catholic theology.19 But it also draws on Ellacuras
reception and application of the open realism of his philosophical
teacher, the Spanish philosopher Xabier Zubiri.20

17 Sin minimizar lo autntico del inters liberador de la teologa europea hay

que preguntarse sin embargo 1) si el carcter liberador del conocimiento
teolgico as entendido hace justicia a la liberacin cristiana, es decir, si lo
ms profundo de la liberacin consiste en liberar a la fe a travs de un significado, que pudiera coexistir en principio con una realidad no liberada; y 2) si
el carcter liberador del conocimiento teolgico descrito no slo no alcanza
su plenitud liberadora, sino que la impide al presuponer que el conocimiento libera en cuanto explica y da significado a la realidad. En este sentido el conocimiento teolgico no slo no sera totalmente liberador, sino
que se tornara ideolgico, pues tratara de encubrir la miseria real de la realidad con una parcial liberacin del ejercicio del discurso teolgico, desplazando la solucin de un problema real (la liberacin de la miseria de la
realidad) al plano ideal (la recuperacin del sentido de la fe. Sobrino 1986,
23. John Macquarrie sees this as something close to anti-intelluctualism
in Sobrinos work. No doubt the aim of Christianity is ultimately to transform history, but theology is not the whole of Christianity, but is that specifically intellectual work which aims at explanation and understanding. []
Sobrino himself cannot escape the explicative work. Macquarrie 1990, 318.
In my opinion, Macquarries criticism misses Sobrinos point. Sobrino has
never argued or procured to escape the explicative work. What he aims at, is
to ensure that the explicative work is consciously rooted in a concrete praxis,
in a specific context.
18 Sobrino 1993f, 7. Sobrino 1991d, 27: Si Cristo es as, tambin la realidad
puede comprenderse como la presencia de la transcendencia en la historia en
la historia, con la identidad y autonoma que les son propias a ambas, y sin
mezcla ni separacin, es decir, sin reduccionismos empobrecedores de lo uno
a lo otro, a lo que es tan proclive el ser humano.

47

Once reality is defined as transcendence in history and ultimately christologically founded, it makes possible the qualification of
reality as crucified. Reality is crucified because the truth about
the world is that it is a world of sin and premature death, according
to Sobrino. This is its principal fact (hecho mayor), both quantitatively and qualitatively. It is a world of sin, because sin is that which
brings death to the children of God. But this truth is usually suppressed with injustice (Rom. 1:18); it is not recognised to be the
truth. It is consciously and unconsciously being covered up by all
those who do not belong to the world of the poor, and who are at
least partly responsible for the fact that the world is crucified the
way it is. But discovering this truth about the world helps us to see
19 One important clue to the understanding of Rahners influence on Sobrino
might be found in the following passage: Con su genialidad acostumbrada,
K. Rahner deca que el ser humano es un modo deficiente de ser Cristo. El
que el modo sea deficiente es cosa de esperar, pero el que existan en verdad
seres humanos que son modos de ser Cristo es cosa de agradecer, en la vida
personal ante todo, pero tambin en la tarea terica de intentar escribir una
cristologa. Sobrino 1991d, 30. See also Sobrino 1984b. One critique against
Rahner has been that his proposal of immanent transcendentality by
which Ellacura and Sobrino are clearly influenced comes close to naturalising the supernatural. John Milbank has made this observation a central
piece in his sharp critique of liberation theology in Milbank 1993, 206-255;
207. Compare Hendrikus Berkhof s judgement, Berkhof 1989, 246: In the
end the reader is left with the impression that in Rahner the supernatural (in
contrast with traditional church doctrine) is to such a high degree a self-evident and universal existential that in ordinary usage it can really only be
described as nature. I think there is reason to hold that the strong continuity between Jesus and his followers, the Crucified and the crucified, etc. in
Sobrinos theology to some extent is made possible by this Rahnerian
approach.
20 The influence from Zubiris thought on Sobrino is mostly indirect, mediated
by Ellacura. For presentations and analyses of Zubiris thinking, see e.g.
Ellacura 1983a; Graca 1995; Gonzlez 1993b.

48

it with Gods eyes, see how God looks upon this creation which is
put on a cross.21
Accepting Sobrinos call for honesty about reality, it must be
permitted to ask: Is it adequate to describe reality as crucified?
That there is suffering immense and unjustly inflicted suffering
is a fact that needs to be recalled and restated time and time again.
But is it the truth about reality about the whole of reality? It is a
fact, but is it the principal fact of the world, as Sobrino claims? Is
the experience of suffering more real than other experiences? There
might be a danger here of universalising one particular aspect of
reality an error of which liberation theologians accuse traditional
Western theology.
Sobrinos contention may be affirmed however, to the degree
that its implication is that it is only through an active and persistent
willingness to focus on the negative aspect of reality that it is possible to approach its totality. In other words, reality in its totality is
not just suffering and conflict, not just crucifixion. It is also life and
joy, also resurrection, also the presence of Gods love in history. But
it is only possible to gain a true knowledge of the latter through an
honest confrontation with the former.
b) The Importance of the Theological Location
This is the way it must be understood, then, when Sobrino confesses that for him, this true reality did not exist before 1974,
when he returned to El Salvador from Europe.22 It was in El Salvador that he discovered what he holds to be the true reality: the
21 Sobrino 1992b, 18. En El Salvador hemos redescubierto cmo mira Dios a
esta creacin suya puesta en cruz.
22 Sobrino 1992b, 12.Pues bien, he de comenzar confesando que hasta 1974, en
que regres definitivamente a El Salvador, el mundo de los pobres, es decir, el
mundo real, no exista para m.

49

world of the poor, the marginalised, the victims. Here we may

determine the second fundamental presupposition that distinguishes Sobrinos reflections on theological labour, namely the
importance of the setting or location of theology the lugar teolgico. There is an intimate connection between the content and results
of a theological reflection and the location in which it takes place.
The context has a decisive influence on the content.
This hermeneutical and epistemological insight, firmly rooted
in the sociology of knowledge and contemporary hermeneutics, is
made theologically relevant with increasing emphasis in Sobrinos
work.23 It is not that the location from which one reads the sources
of revelation actually creates the content of the revelation, but reading the sources from a determined location can make one discover
or re-discover important realities in these sources, that have been as
if they were buried. Thus, location and sources of revelation
cannot be distinguished with precision.24 Once more, this is a point
that Sobrino has adopted from Ellacura and further developed by
applying it to christology in particular.25 I shall therefore briefly
review Ellacuras basic contentions on this matter.
(1) In order to avoid what he sees as a false universality on the part
of traditional theology, Ellacura gives priority to the context, i.e. to
the concrete social, historical and even geographical situatedness of
the theological reflection; its lugar.26 He underscores that any
human reflection is conditioned by although not totally determined by this situatedness. In a central article from 1975, in which
he investigates the possibilities for a proper Latin American theology27, Ellacura notes that history of theology shows that the his23 Drawing on Ellacuras and Sobrinos contributions in this matter, I have discussed the relevance and necessity of a contextual theology in Stlsett 1995b.
24 Sobrino 1991d, 53; 51-57.
25 Cf. Sobrino 1976, 8.

50

torical situation makes possible and at the same time puts limits to
the realisation of a dynamic theology.28 A consciousness of how
the concrete situation promotes or hinders the theological reflection
is therefore crucial. (T)he location of reception, interpretation and
appeal is fundamental to Christian praxis and theory.29
But because there are both privileged and dangerous locations for theological reflection30, a mere consciousness about the
actual context is not enough. It is furthermore necessary to actively
place oneself in the adequate historical location.31 A privileged
location for theological reflection is what Ellacura calls el lugar
teolgico.32 By that he means, firstly, a location of a special self-revelation of the God of Jesus. This manifestation is both a revealing
illumination and a call to conversion. Secondly, lugar teolgico
means the most adequate place for living out faith through the following of Jesus. And finally, el lugar teolgico is the most appropriate
location for reflection on faith, for the realisation of a Christian theology. These three aspects are intimately related, according to Ellacura: (T)he optimal location for revelation and faith is also the
26 Lat.: Ubicatio. The contextual approach of liberation theology has been
present since the beginning, and is one of its main characteristics. Cf. e.g.:
Gustavo Gutirrez 1980, 23: Theological reflection framed in the perspective of liberation starts off from the perception that this particular context
forces us to rethink completely our way of being Christians and our way of
being a Church. See also Bevans 1992, particularly pp. 63-80.
27 Ellacura 1975b.
28 Ellacura 1975b, 327 (Thesis 2.8).
29 Ellacura 1984a, 169: Hay que reconocer que es fundamental para la praxis y
la teora cristiana el lugar de recepcin, de interpretacin y de interpelacin
[]
30 Ellacura 1984a, 166.
31 Ellacura 1991c, 393: [] es menester situarse en el lugar histrico
adecuado.
32 Ellacura 1984a, 153-178; especially : 165-169.

51

optimal location for salvific-liberative praxis, and for theological

praxis.33
It is this Christian and epistemological location, as opposed to
its theme or object, which makes liberation theology special.34 Its
location, its point of departure is Latin America, which Ellacura
sees as precisely one of these adequate historical places for theological reflection because of the omnipresence of the poor on this continent, many of whom have engaged themselves in a praxis for
liberation.35 Thus the lugar teolgico in Latin America is first and
foremost the poor.
Here one might wish to question or even disapprove of this
identification of the poor as location. Does this not imply an objectification, and illegitimate reduction of the poor? Not necessarily.
In Ellacuras and Sobrinos writings, the poor is certainly a
dynamic concept, as we shall see in the next sub-chapter. Nevertheless, such an objection raises some fundamental difficulties in liberation theologians talk of the poor. Given the complexities and
diversities of the reality to which it refers, is it a fruitful concept at
all? The question is all the more important in our study, since it is
related to the validity of the concept of crucified people. At this
stage, however, my primary aim is to sort out the significance of the
location as such.
Methodologically, it is convenient to distinguish between location and source, according to Ellacura.36 Source is that which
in one form or another maintains the contents of faith, i.e. the
Word of God and the tradition of the Church. It is reasonable to
take this to mean that for Ellacura, there is a content in the source,
which in principle is independent of the context. However, this dis33 Ellacura 1984a, 67: [] el lugar ptimo de la revelacin y de la fe es tambin el lugar ptimo de la praxis salvfica liberadora y de la praxis teolgica.
34 Ellacura 1991b 325.
35 Ellacura 1991c, 394.

52

tinction is not exclusive, because in some way, the location is

source when it makes the source give certain content, in such a
way that thanks to the location and its virtues, the source actualises
and makes present certain content. What one can get from the
source, depends to a certain extent on the location from which one
approaches it. In the concrete activity of interpretation then, the
pure content of the source is not totally separable from the location. Again, the emphasis on the situated-ness of all reflection, and
all human activity including theology, comes clear. (T)he theologian and his undertaking are enormously dependent on the horizon
in which they move and the praxis towards which they are oriented.37
But this also means that Ellacura holds that the source in itself
requires from its interpreters that they place themselves in the adequate location. The different parts of revelation are directed to certain historical situations. They are not equally directed to all alike;
to any time, any place. Ellacura calls this a requirement of the
theological method as understood by the Latin American theology,
which he formulates in the following manner in the introduction to
his key article El pueblo crucificado38:
36 Ellacura 1984a, 168: Pero para evitar eqvocos es conveniente distinguir, al
menos metodolgicamente, lugar y fuente, tomando como fuente o
depsito aquello que de una u otra forma mantiene los contenidos de la fe.
La distincin no es estricta ni, menos an, excluyente, porque de algn
modo el lugar es fuente en cuanto que aqul hace que sta d de s esto o lo
otro, de modo que, gracias al lugar y en virtud de l, se actalizan y se hacen
realmente presentes unos determinados contenidos.
37 Ellacura 1984a, 167: [] el telogo y su hacer dependen enormemente del
horizonte en que se mueven y de la praxis a la que se orientan.
38 Its complete title is El pueblo crucificado. Ensayo de soteriologa histrica,
and it was published for the first time in 1978: Ellacura 1978a. This article
was republished after Ellacuras death, both in Ellacura 1989a and in Ellacura 1991a.

53

Every historical situation should be seen from its corresponding key in revelation, but revelation should be focused from the historical situation to
which it is directed, even if no historical moment is equally valid for the correctness of the focus.39

The concrete historical situation actualises and enriches the fullness

of revelation, according to Ellacura. In order that the revelation
may give of its fullness and authenticity, it is necessary for its interpreter to be situated in the right location.40 Hence, the importance
of el lugar teolgico epistemolgico.
(2) This position seems to be shared completely by Sobrino. He
applies it particularly to Christology. The ideal location for Christology is, according to Sobrino, the place from which one is best
able to understand the sources of the past about Christ, and to
grasp the reality of Christs presence in history and the actual, realised faith in him.41 It is noteworthy, however, that although there is
in Sobrino as well as in Ellacura a clear emphasis on the concrete location in its geographical, social and institutional meaning,
it is not limited to nor totally determined by that. The lugar is not
first and foremost a categorical ubi in its geographical or spatial
meaning, for instance a university, seminary, or an ecclesial base
39 Se trata, ante todo, de una exigencia del mtodo teolgico tal como lo
entiende la teologa latinoamericana: cualquier situacin histrica debe verse
desde su correspondiente clave en la revelacin, pero la revelacin debe enfocarse desde la historia a la que se dirige, aunque no cualquier momento
histrico es igualmente vlido para la rectitud del enfoque. Ellacura 1989a,
306.
40 Ellacura 1989a, 306: [] se mantiene que la situacin enriquece y actualiza
la plenitud de la revelacin y [] no cualquier situacin es la ms apta para
que la revelacin d en ella de s su plenitud y su autenticidad.
41 Sobrino 1991d, 51: [] el lugar ideal de la cristologa ser aquel donde
mejor se puedan comprender las fuentes del pasado y donde mejor se capte
la presencia de Cristo y la realidad de la fe en l.

54

community, but rather a quid, a substantial reality in which Christology can be formulated, affected, questioned and illuminated.42
What does Sobrino actually mean by this? It seems to me that
this quid could be explained as perspective or horizon. In a
more recent publication, Sobrino writes that it is possible to do
theology at a desk, but there is no reason to do it from a desk.43 In
other words, the basic perspective which theologians choose in their
work, is decisive. Likewise, Sobrino underscores thereby that this
locus theologicus is not texts like the traditional loci theologici44, but
something real, a determined, historical reality in which it is
believed that God and Christ continue to make themselves
present.45
42 Sobrino 1991d, 59. Por lugar se entiende aqu ante todo un quid, una realidad sustancial en la que la cristologa se deja dar, afectar, cuestionar e iluminar.
43 Sobrino 1995b; 125, n.19: [] a quienes critican a la universidad como lugar
de la teologa por estar alejado fsicamente de la realidad, hay que recordar
que se puede hacer teologa en un escritorio, pero que no hay por qu hacerla
necesariamente desde un escritorio.
44 In traditional Catholic teaching the following are considered loci theologici:
Scripture, tradition, the magisterium, theological sentences. This goes back
to M. Cano. Cf. Sobrino 1991d, 58, note 14. In Sobrino 1994d, Sobrino
develops this priority of reality above texts: [] ni siquiera los ms vigorosos textos sean del pasado o del presente tienen, en cuanto textos, suficiente capacidad para movilizar el espritu humano y creyente de forma
adecuada en la bsqueda de una respuesta. Esa fuerza para preguntar y para
responder slo proviene de la misma realidad. Op. cit. 51, cf. note on p.76:
Los textos pueden llevar la realidad a su plenitud, si se les considera como
smbolo real en el sentido rahneriano. Pero sin realidad, digamos lo obvio,
no hay texto. Y el texto tendr su fuerza en relacin con la realidad, no en
independencia de ella. Por ello, la teologa nunca puede basarse slo en otra
teologa, sino que en algn momento tiene que enfrentarse con y basarse en
la realidad.
45 Sobrino 1991d, 58. Accordingly, lugar teolgico has to do with the choice of
perspective and priorities for the theological work.

55

There is, then, a clear connection in Sobrinos theology

between this emphasis on contextuality and the talk of the crucified
in history. He can in an essayistic literary form, it should be noted
go so far as to say that from El Salvador he discovered that the
world is an immense cross, an unjust cross for the millions who die
at the hands of executioners, entire crucified peoples, as Ignacio
Ellacura called them.46
This last phrase is likely to be considered a rhetorical exaggeration by an outsider (non-Salvadoran, non-poor, etc.) however justified by its intention it may seem. Consequently one is forced to
ask once again about the relationship between this consciously contextual and particularistic outlook and the insistent reference to the
true reality. Is there not an inconsistency here, revealed in the tendency to present one perspective as the one and only perspective on
reality? There is a difference here between giving primacy to one
particular aspect of reality, and imposing this aspect on the totality,
thereby silencing other points of views on reality or covering up
other aspects of it. Giving primacy to one aspect is admissible
even unavoidable and necessary, taking into account generally held
hermeneutical insights. Giving primacy to the negative aspects, the
testimonies of suffering, the perspective from below, etc. is also justified, in my opinion but is something which should be grounded
philosophically and theologically. The imposition of one point of
view which may be implied in an unmodified talk of the true real-

46 Sobrino 1992b, 16-17. Pues bien, lo primero que descubrimos en El Salvador, si no reprimimos su verdad, es que este mundo es una inmensa cruz y
una injusta cruz para millones de inocentes que mueren a manos de verdugos, pueblos enteros crucificados, como los llam Ignacio Ellacura.
Sobrino continues: Y se es el hecho mayor de nuestro mundo; lo es cuantitativamente, porque abarca dos terceras partes de la humanidad; y lo es cualitativamente, porque es lo ms cruel y clamoroso.

56

ity, is not admissible, however. What Sobrino actually does in this

respect, will have to be examined further.47
c) The Poor as Theological Location
So what is, then, the privileged location for theology in a crucified
reality? In his answer, Sobrino subscribes to the fundamental maxim
of Latin American liberation theology; la opcin preferencial por los
pobres (the preferential option for the poor).48 The poor is the primary lugar teolgico in Latin America. But who are the poor?
Once again, Sobrino presupposes Ellacuras treatment of the
theme, which I shall therefore consider.49

47 Cf. below, Chapter v [4]; and Chapter viii [4], theses 1 and 13.
48 This phrase was the title of the Final Document of the Third General Conference of the Latin American Bishops Evangelization in Latin Americas
Present and Future, in Puebla de los Angeles, Mexico, January 23 February 13, 1979 (see Hennelly 1990, 253-258). It was then received as an important confirmation and consolidation of what had been the central intuition
of liberation theology since its origins. Speaking of these origins, Gustavo
Gutirrez tells that this perspective the opcin had been formed by his
own experience with poor people in Lima, Peru, see McAfee Brown 1990,
32-33. Cf. the introduction to Teologa de la Liberacin: In this book we
intend a reflection that is based in the Gospel and in the experiences of men
and women who have comitted themselves to the liberation process in this
subcontinent of oppression and despoilment which is Latin America. It is a
theological reflection that is born out of this shared experience in the effort
to abolish the actual situation of injustice and build a different, more human
society, in which there is more freedom. Gutirrez 1984, 15. Cf. also i.a.,
Gutirrez 1991b, xxv-xxviii; Gutirrez 1982; Gutirrez 1991a, Boff and Pixley
1989.
49 Ellacura treats this question especially in Ellacura 1983b and in Ellacura
1984a, 155-163.

57

(1) Firstly, according to Ellacura, the poor are the materially poor:
The materiality of poverty is its real and irreplaceable element.50
It is not only the mere lack of even indispensable goods, but also
being dialectically deprived of the fruit of ones own work, and of
work in itself, as well as of political and social power.51
By this, Ellacura underscores the socio-economic, dialectical and
political character of poor and poverty. For him, poor is initially and radically a socio-economic concept describing those who
lack material goods. This is the analogatum princeps of poverty.52 It
is a dialectical concept, because it describes the dialectical relation
between the poor and the rich: (T)here are rich because there are
poor and there are poor because there are rich. Being poor is not
just lacking, but being deprived of essential things by people who
themselves take advantage of this deprivation.53 It is a political concept, because the poor [] are in themselves a political force. In
their mere existence they are a potential political force, which
through awareness-raising, organisation and united struggle will
and should become a real political force, according to Ellacura.54
50 Ellacura 1984a, 159: La materialidad de la pobreza es el elemento real insustituible y que consiste no tanto en carecer incluso de lo indispensable, sino
en estar desposedo dialcticamente del fruto de su trabajo y del trabajo
mismo, as como del poder social y poltico, por quienes, con ese despojo, se
han enriquecido y se han tomado el poder.
51 Ibid.
52 Ellacura 1983b, 788.
53 Ibid. Ellacura notes further that it is not necessary to use Marxist categories
to support this understanding. It is more than sufficient with Jesus condemnations of the rich in the Sermon of the Mount according to Luke; the
letter of James exposure of the mechanisms of empoverishment through salaries; and the harsh accusations of the Church fathers in this matter, he
holds.
54 Ellacura 1983b, 788-789. To Ellacura, the poor are not just lugar teolgico,
but also lugar poltico, cf. Ellacura 1984a, 174-178.

58

This real, material side of poverty cannot in any way be replaced

by spirituality. It is a necessary condition for the evangelical poverty, although not a sufficient condition.55 That it is not sufficient, shows that Ellacura holds that there is an evangelical
poverty which goes beyond the pure materiality of poverty. The
evangelical poor should not be identified with just any suffering
person.56 To him the most-perfectly-poor57 are the spiritually
poor, and especially the poor with spirit.58
Ellacura sees being spiritually poor as the coronation of being
materially poor. It is impossible, from a Christian point of view, to
be spiritually poor and materially rich at the same time.59 True
Christian spirituality of poverty implies, firstly, an individual and
collective toma de conciencia about the fundamental injustice and
lack of solidarity present in the dialectics wealth poverty, which
makes impossible the historical ideal of the Kingdom of God, the
love and real confession of the consubstancial filiation of the Son,
and the brotherly love between fellow human beings.60 Secondly,
it requires that this consciousness is converted into praxis, through
organisation and effective action. This implies, thirdly, the historicised announcement of the great values of the Kingdom of God.
Ellacura believes that it is possible in some way to realise these val55 Esta materialidad real de la pobreza no puede ser sustituida con ninguna
espiritualidad; es condicin necesaria de la pobreza evanglica, aunque no es
condicin suficiente. Ellacura 1984a, 159.
56 [] sin confundir interesadamente a los pobres evanglicos con cualquier
sufriente o doliente [] Ellacura 1984a, 154.
57 (S)lo poniendo los ojos en los ms-perfectamente-pobres es como se
puede valorar todo lo que da de s la pobreza evanglica. Ellacura 1984a,
154-155.
58 This unusual translation of the phrase follows Ellacuras Spanish wording
pobres con espiritu.
59 Ellacura 1984a, 159.
60 Ellacura 1984a, 160.

59

ues, in spite of their utopian and transcendental character, through

historical processes.
The fourth element is more personal, and builds on the following two observations: To change the human person, it is not sufficient to change unjust structures. Furthermore; it is only persons
who themselves are radically changed who can promote and secure
adequate structures in society. That is why it is so important to be
poor with spirit, Ellacura holds, alluding to the Sermon on the
Mount according to Matthew 5. This is where Christian faith as
message and the grace of Jesus as operative gift have an immense
field of action.61
Here we can see how the two dimensions of historicity and
transcendence and the particular way they are intertwined, is something which characterises Ellacuras theology. He insists that the
poor are always historically poor, poor in a concrete, material way.
But they may also transcend this poverty, by giving it spirit
through having consciousness/faith and taking up a praxis of liberation/salvation. Strange as it may sound, this is what he sees as a
perfection of poverty.
Thus, the preferential option for the poor is fundamental to
any truly Christian theology, in Ellacuras opinion. This option is
for him an expression of the partiality which concretises the true
universality of the gospel.62 But it is also a partiality which is conflictual and often leads to opposition, even persecution. This follows almost by necessity from the dialectical and political aspects of
poverty.
61 Ellacura 1984a, 162: [] no basta con cambiar las estructuras para que
mecnica y reflejamente cambien las personas; [] slo hombres cambiados
radicalmente pueden propulsar y mantener cambios estructurales adecuados.
Es aqu donde la fe cristiana como mensaje y la gracia de Jess como don
operativo tienen un campo inmenso de accin.
62 Ellacura 1983b, 800.

60

There are several questions that emerge from a reading of Ellacuras explication of the poor. Is it at all helpful to operate with a
hierarchy of poor, which it seems that Ellacura does through his
mentioning of perfection and coronation of poverty? And is it
within the power and capacity of the poor themselves to become
poor with spirit i.e. to give their poverty a spiritual dimension
or quality? Or should this rather be seen as the work of God?
Through this last question it can be seen that accusations of some
sort of Pelagianism quickly come to the fore in connection with
Ellacuras positions. But then again, perhaps too quickly?
(2) Jon Sobrino makes the same fundamental option as Ellacura.
Even though he never explicitly criticises Ellacuras definition and
use of the poor, but rather presupposes it, he nevertheless seems
to modify it somewhat in his own explication. However, we shall
see that this does not solve all the difficulties I indicated above.
For Sobrino, the preferred location for a theological-epistemological process is, firstly, the poor of this world (as substantial reality)
and the world of the poor (as socio-theologal location).63 This initial
choice is justified (a priori) from the special relationship between
Jesus and the poor and his presence among them as it is attested in
the New Testament, and (a posteriori) from the experience that everything illuminates Christ better, when seen from the reality of the
poor, Sobrino contends.64
Within the world of the poor, the church of the poor plays a particular role as theological location.65 Sobrino supports I. Ellacuras
63 Sobrino makes a distinction between theological location (lugar teolgico),
as a location apt for theological reflection, and theologal location (lugar
teologal), as a location in which God is present. Cf. Sobrino 1991d, 55 and
64.
64 Sobrino 1991d, 59.
65 Sobrino 1986: 93-136.

61

definition of the term: a church in which the poor are the principal
subjects, and the principle for its internal structure,66 and he gives
three reasons why this should be considered a lugar epistemolgico:67
1) The church of the poor realises itself as a praxis of following Jesus;
it has many martyrs, who are killed in a way similar to Jesus and for
the same reasons as Jesus. 2) Its faith is celebrated in community in
a particular way. Because they are poor, Sobrino believes, they are
able to share faith, carry each other in faith, show solidarity, etc.
Because they as poor are the privileged addressees of the gospel,
their faith is able to challenge and correct the christological faith of
others. 3) Christ makes himself present in the church of the poor
and this church is his body in history, but only to the extent that it
offers Christ the hope and praxis and the suffering, that can make
him present as the Risen and the Crucified.68
Thus, the living faith in Christ in the church of the poor is a
legitimate starting point for gaining christological knowledge,
according to Jon Sobrino. There is a correlation between the fides
quae (that which is believed) and the fides qua (the act of believing),
he holds. But this correlation is not a determination in such a way
that the fides qua would create the fides quae. To avoid any such
misunderstanding it is necessary to return to the biblical witnesses
about the origin and object of christological faith, Jesus of Nazareth.
This distinction between church of the poor and world of
the poor gives Sobrino a framework within which he may tackle
the difficult issues raised in relationship with the hierarchy of
66 Ellacura 1984a, 207-208.
67 Sobrino 1991d, 62-64.
68 Sobrino 1991d, 64: En la iglesia de los pobres [] se hace presente Cristo, y
esa Iglesia es su cuerpo en la historia. Pero no lo es de cualquier forma, sino
en cuanto ofrece a Cristo aquella esperanza y praxis liberadora y aquel sufrimiento que pueden hacerlo presente como resucitado y como crucificado.

62

poor which he partly inherits from Ellacura. Nevertheless,

Sobrino does not always make this distinction clear. For instance,
when it comes to the crucified people(s) does he refer to the
church of the poor, or the world of the poor or both?69
In a more general sense, Sobrino speaks of two dimensions of
poverty; beginning from the two types of poor which in his
view appear in the gospels.70 Firstly, there are the economically
poor. These are people who suffer some sort of basic need, the hungry, the sick, the naked, prisoners, the mourning They are economically poor, because their oikos (home or house, symbolizing
that which is fundamental and primary to life) is in grave danger
[] In this manner, they are being denied even minimal conditions for life. Then there are the sociologically poor; the ones who
are despised by society, the ones held to be sinners, the publicans,
the prostitutes, the meek, the lowly, etc. In this sense, the poor are
the marginalized. They are sociologically poor because they are
being denied their socium (symbolizing the fundamental interhuman relations), and thereby even minimal dignity.
When these poor are seen as theological location, it comes
clear that the opcin preferencial por los pobres (preferential option
for the poor) understood in this two-fold sense is not just seen
as a priority commitment in a pastoral or ethical sense. It is also a
necessary condition in order to gain Christian, theological knowledge, it is a prerequisite for real cognition in the theological
endeavour.71 Sobrino gives several names to this preferential standpoint: from the standpoint of oppression72, the poor of this
world73, the crucified people74, the crucified peoples75, or just
69
70
71
72
73

See below, Chapter ii,[3]; Chapter iv, [10] and Chapter viii, [2].
Sobrino 1991d, 144-145. Cf. i.a.: Sobrino 1982a, 105 and 164-166.
Sobrino 1982b, 62 / Sobrino 1982a, 78.
Sobrino 1982a, 185.
Sobrino 1991d, 59.

63

the crucified76 . This represents, in his view, the dialectical Sitz im

Leben, a Sitz im Leben und im Tode, of a Latin American Christology.77
When Sobrino raises these fundamental epistemological issues,
one must ask what range they are intended to have. Is it necessary
according to Sobrino to place oneself in these locations in order to
gain knowledge at all? Or is it rather that without the knowledge
that can be gained from these standpoints the content of the process
of cognition is merely partial, insufficient, imprecise, or even illusory? The exact scope of these epistemological contentions is significant for the discussion of their implications for (fundamental) theology.
d) Liberation of the Poor as Theological Objective
Opting for the poor as theological locus in a crucified world should
not just be seen as a tool to gain theological insight, according to
Sobrino. The fundamental objective is to take the crucified down
from their cross. Working for the liberation of the poor is therefore
not just an epistemological precondition or suitable context for theology; it is a theological objective in its own right. This distinctive
mark of liberation theology is consciously and creatively taken up
by Sobrino. To better grasp the richness and distinctiveness of the
term liberation in Sobrinos writings, it will prove helpful to recall
some of its background. I will do so by looking briefly at Gutirrez
and Ellacuras use of this term.

74
75
76
77

64

Sobrino 1991d, 423-451, cf. Sobrino 1982a, 188.

Sobrino 1992b, 83-95.
Sobrino 1982a, 178.
Sobrino 1991d, 60.

(1) This new formulation of the theological objective goes back to

the mid-sixties, which in Latin America was a time of transition
from development to liberation, something which changed the
perception of the situation and role of the poor.78 The dependencyapproach in economics and sociology made an increasing impact on
other areas of academic and political thought.79 It gradually made
its influence felt also on theological reflection.
One of those who felt that the development-approach was
becoming inappropriate when faced with the immense poverty of
Latin America, was Gustavo Gutirrez of Peru.80 In an ecumenical
gathering in Cartigny, Switzerland 1969, though invited to speak on
the theme Theology of Development, Gutirrez chose rather to
address the seminar under the title Notes on theology of liberation81, a theme he had elaborated on for the first time one year earlier, in July 1968.82 In this contribution, he outlined what was to be
further developed in his opus magnum: Teologa de la Liberacin.83
Gutirrez sets out to show the insufficiency of the general
understanding of development, not only to economics and to the
social sciences, but also to theology.84 Observing that the develop78 The Argentinean economist Ral Prebisch had (in a report later known and
published as the CEPAL-manifesto: The Economic Development of Latin
America and its Principal Problems) as early as in 1948 suggested that the
traditional development-theories had to be abandoned. When Prebisch was
appointed the head of the UN Economic Comission on Latin America
ECLA (Spanish Comisin Econmica para Amrica Latina CEPAL) in 1950,
his analysis was further developed and made the main foundation for
ECLAs strategies for economic development in Latin America in the 1950s
and 1960s. Poverty in the peripheries, in Latin America as well as in other
Third World countries, was now seen as the negative consequence of the
increasing wealth in the centres (USA, Europe). These countries were at a
permanent disadvantage in their terms of trade with the centre. Underdevelopment is not a static situation of need, according to this view, but rather
a dynamic process; it is the form progress and modernisation takes in the
peripheries of the world economy.

65

mentalist efforts that caused such optimism in the fifties and early
79 Though pointing to the radical differences and negative interrelation
between development in the centres and in the peripheries, Prebisch and
ECLA never left the modernisation paradigm. On the contrary, their recommendations for an inward-directed development in Latin-America had
industrialisation, foreign investments and modernisation as central elements. They held the view that development in the periphery is possible
within the framework of a capitalism dominated by the centre. This was
what leading economists and sociologists in the 1960s, like A. Gunder
Frank, Th. Dos Santos, F. Cardoso and O. Sunkel criticised Prebisch for,
when it appeared that also the ECLA strategies for development failed. The
Latin American economic dependency (dependencia) became now the main
focus of interest. The negative connection between the rich and the poor
countries, the structural dependency, needs to be broken, according to the
dependency-school. Oliveros describes the nuclueus of the insight promoted
by the dependency-school in the following formula: Nuestra situacin de
explotacin no era casual, sino causal. Oliveros 1991, 30. Only the peripheries themselves, i.e. the poor groups and countries, can break this dependency. What they need is not primarily development with a little help from the
rich countries, but a process of liberation, that will enable them to become
independent economies. The poor masses of the Latin American continent
are now seen as oppressed, who are in a critical need of liberation. See e.g.
Dussel 1981, 127-136.
80 Despus del concilio la teologa del desarollo capt brevemente el inters de
los sectores modernizantes. A la valoracin del progreso humano se una
aqu una mayor preocupacin social por los pueblos pobres. Su perspectiva
optimista y dinmica no ocultar sin embargo la cortedad de sus enfoques
sobre las causas de la miseria y la injusticia, ni la parquedad de la experiencia
cristiana de donde provena. Gutirrez 1982, 255.
81 McAfee Brown 1990, 35.
82 This speech, which was delivered in the month before the Medelln Conference at a meeting of priests and laity that has been described by Pablo Richard as the explicit break, the qualitative leap, from a worldvision tied to a
developmentalist kind of practice to one tied to the practice of liberation,
has, curiously enough, not been published in English until quite recently,
Gutirrez 1990b.
83 See Gutirrez 1984, 18, n.1.

66

sixties had not succeeded, but rather led to confusion, frustration

and increased poverty, he locates the main reason for their failure to
the lack of willingness to attack what he holds to be the root causes
of underdevelopment: One was careful to avoid attacking the great
international economic interests and the interests of their natural
allies: the national dominant groups.85 Development has become
equivalent to reform-policy and modernisation, while there is in
Latin America an increasing recognition of the fact that other
means are necessary, Gutirrez continues, obviously indebted to the
dependency-school.
The poor countries are constantly gaining a clearer consciousness of the fact
that their underdevelopment is nothing else but the by-product of the development of other countries which is a result of the kind of relation that they
presently maintain with these. And therefore, that their own development
will not be possible without a struggle to break the domination that the rich
countries are exercising over them.86

In this perspective, Gutirrez considers it to be more to the point

and more humane to speak of a process of liberation, even though
this necessarily leads to a more conflictual framework of interpretation. Any liberation includes an unavoidable moment of rupture,
something that is not present in the idea of development. If one
84 La ptica desarrollista se mostr ineficaz e insuficiente para interpretar la
evolucin econmica, social y poltica del continente latinoamericano.
Gutirrez 1984, 116.
85 Se evitaba cuidadosamente, por consiguiente, atacar a los grandes intereses
econmicos internacionales y los de sus aliados naturales: los grupos nacionales dominantes. Gutirrez 1984, 51. Cf. Sobrino 1991d, 424.
86 Los pases pobres toman conciencia cada vez ms clara de que su subdesarollo no es sino el subproducto del desarrollo de otros pases debido al tipo
de relacin que mantienen acutalmente con ellos. Y, por lo tanto, que su
propio desarollo no se har sino luchando por romper la dominacin que
sobre ellos ejercen los pases ricos. Gutirrez 1984, ibid. My translation.

67

chooses to neglect this element of rupture or break, the discourse on

development and social upliftment of the poor easily becomes a
deceit.87 Liberation on the poor peripheries of the world system
must be different from liberation processes at its centres. Latin
Americans must define and be responsible for their own liberation.
However, what is at stake in any liberation process, whether on
the peripheries or in the centres, is the possibility of an authentic
human existence; a life in freedom, a freedom which is both process
and historical conquest.88 Thus Gutirrez widens the perspective.
The liberation he is speaking of is not merely poor people or countries breaking their dependence on the rich. It is further a comprehensive historical process in which human beings become agents of
their own destiny, by taking part in the formation of their own
future.89
The originality of Gutirrez contribution, which has made his
book one of the classics in contemporary theology, consists in making this analysis of the urgent need for liberation which he shares
with social scientists of his time the basis for a renewed theological
reflection: What relationship is there between the historical process
of liberation and the Christian understanding of salvation?90
Gutirrez thinks that there is an intimate relation. Liberation is
not only a political imperative, it is the will of God, for the poor
first and foremost, but through them for the whole of humanity.
This can be seen in his understanding of liberation, which has
three levels of meaning, according to Gutirrez.91 First, a historical87 Gutirrez 1984, 52.
88 Gutirrez 1984, 54.
89 Gutirrez himself traces the development of such a view on history as a process of human liberation from Descartes, via Hegel, Marx, Freud, Marcuse to
Fanon. Gutirrez 1984, 52-62.
90 Gutirrez 1984, 73.
91 Gutirrez 1984, 68-9.

68

political level: It expresses the aspirations of social classes and

oppressed peoples, and underlines the conflictual aspect of the
economical, social and political processes. Secondly, on a deeper
level which we may call historical-existential, liberation means the
historical process in which human beings become agents of their
own destiny. Thirdly, at a historical-theological level, liberation is
that which Christ brings:
Christ, the saviour, liberates the human person from sin, which is the ultimate cause of any rupture of friendship, any injustice and oppression,
bestowing authentic freedom, that is, to live in communion with Christ, the
foundation of any human fellowship.92

Gutirrez argues, then, that liberation is a socio-political necessity

for the poor and the poor nations, that it furthermore is the goal of
all human activity and of history as such, and finally that it is the
ultimate gift and will of God for humanity.
These three levels of meaning are intimately interrelated in the
Christian concept of liberation as Gutirrez sees it. They form
one single and complex process which finds its profound meaning
and its complete fulfilment in the salvific work of Christ.93 Consequently, Gutirrez insists that there is only one history94. Christ is
Lord of history, and his work embraces all dimensions of existence.
The history of salvation is the very core of human history.95

92 Gutirrez 1984, 69: Cristo salvador libera el hombre del pecado, raz ltima
de toda ruptura de amistad, de toda injusticia y opresin, y lo hace autnticamente libre, es decir, vivir en comunin con l, fundamento de toda fraternidad humana.
93 Gutirrez 1984, 69: [] estamos ante tres niveles de significacin de un
proceso nico y complejo que encuentra su sentido profundo y su plena realizacin en la obra salvadora de Cristo.
94 Gutirrez 1984, 199-226.

69

Reading this seminal work of Gutirrez twenty-five years after

its publication, one cannot help but note how several of the basic
socio-economic analyses and premises that it draws from today
seem outdated, or at least open to profound questioning.96 Gutirrez himself notes this in the introduction to the twentieth anniversary edition.97 However, he maintains, the basic theological insight
that Christian salvation must spell some sort of historical liberation for the poor still holds true. I shall return to this issue, and
discuss whether Gutirrez and his colleagues should be affirmed in
this statement.
(2) To opt for the poor is to opt for their liberation.98 Since for Ellacura, liberation is a concept which expresses the very essence of the
95 Gutirrez 1984, 199: Lo que hemos recordado en el prrafo precedente nos
lleva a afirmar que, en concreto, no hay dos historias, una profana y otra
sagrada yuxtapuestas o estrechamente ligadas, sino un solo devenir
humano asumido irreversiblemente por Cristo, Seor de la historia. Su obra
redentora abarca todas las dimensiones de la existencia y la conduce a su
pleno cumplimiento. La historia de la salvacin es la entraa misma de la
historia humana.
96 See the important analyses in Comblin, Gonzlez Faus, and Sobrino 1993.
Cf. below, Chapter viii [1].
97 Gutirrez 1991b, xxiv: It is clear, for example, that the theory of dependence, which was so extensively used in the early years of our encounter with
the Latin American world, is now an inadequate tool, because it does not
take sufficient account of the internal dynamics of each country or of the
vast dimensions of the world of the poor. In addition, Latin American social
scientists are increasingly alert to factors of which they were not conscious
earlier and which show that the world economy has evolved. For an
updated discussion on fundamental problems in development theory, see
e.g. Hettne 1990.
98 Ellacura treats this term, among other texts, in Ellacura 1993b, which
according to a footnote is [] texto indito de 1987. As far as I can see,
however, it is identical with Ellacura 1989b.

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gospel, he asks, rather rhetorically, how it can be that this central

concept has been practically forgotten by traditional theology.99 It is
thanks to liberation theology that its profound biblical and Christian roots and implications now are coming to the fore, he claims.
Liberation is for Ellacura, in the first place, an appeal to the
believer from historical reality.100 It is not something which is discovered in the Christian sources and then applied to historical reality. It comes from outside, from the urgent need for historical
transformation. This emphasis corresponds with what I earlier
called the founding experience of liberation theology.
Second, liberation is for Ellacura an historical task, and within
history, a socio-economical task.101 Poverty is primarily socio-economical. Thus, liberation of the poor is a socio-economical task. As
such, it is complex and ambiguous, Ellacura admits. The question
of how to realise an historical liberation for the popular masses is
99 Ellacura 1993b, 213: Liberacin es un concepto que representa la esencia
misma del mensaje revelado, del don salvfico de Dios a los hombres. []
No obstante esta importancia de la liberacin, la atencin magisterial y
teolgica que se le ha dado oficialmente por parte de la Iglesia ha sido hasta
hace muy poco bastante reducida, prcticamente nula. Ellacura notes that
liberty certainly has been discovered by traditional theology, but not its necessary relation to liberation. He discusses this relation on pp. 220-24, op. cit.,
where he holds that no puede hablarse de libertad personal plena ms que
como resultado de un largo proceso de liberacin (p.221). La liberacin de
las estructuras injustas y la creacin de nuevas estructuras, fomentadoras de
la dignidad y de la libertad, se constituyen por tanto en camino esencial de la
libertad, de la libertad para los individuos dentro de su contexto nacional, y
libertad para los pueblos dentro de su contexto internacional. It is not liberty that will lead to liberation (justice), the solution proposed by liberalism,
but liberation that will lead to liberty.
100 Ellacura 1993b, 215: [] una interpelacin de la realidad histrica a hombres de fe.
101 Ellacura 1993b, 215: [] una tarea histrica y, dentro de la historia, una
tarea socio-econmica.

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one that has not found an answer once and for all. This certainly
does not take away the responsibility to urgently search for such
answer(s).102
Third, and most fundamental to theology, it is liberation from
sin, death and the law. This Pauline expression must be taken not
only in its individual meaning, in Ellacuras view. He interprets and
actualises it as follows: 103
An understanding of what liberation from sin means must
take into account the totality and profundity of the essence of sin.
Sin is not primarily an offence against God, but a real deviation
from and fundamental disobedience to Gods plan and purpose for
humanity, nature and history. It is negation of faith and love. It has
three analogical not identical expressions: original (natural) sin,
personal sin and historical (social) sin. Liberation from sin in
these three different expressions happens progressively and historically, on both the social and personal levels. It is in and through
history that God, in conjunction with the human person104 intervenes to liberate from sin. This is what Ellacura calls salvation in
history, a theme to which he returns time and time again in his
writings.105
Since death is the effect of sin and the law is its cause, Ellacura
argues, an integral liberation must include liberation from these two
102 Ellacura dedicated much of his life and work, both as a Christian, philosopher, theologian and rector of the University, to the task of finding practical
and adequate answers [] which unite short-term and long-term efficacy
with respect for the Christian idiosyncrasy (Ellacura 1987b, 263) to this
question. It is an ever-returning topic in his publications. Cf. e.g. Ellacura
1987b, Ellacura 1991c, Ellacura 1993c, etc.
103 Ellacura 1993b, 216-220.
104 Ellacura 1993b, 217: La liberacin del pecado [] es tambin un proceso
en que intervienen conjuntamente Dios y el hombre []
105 See e.g. Ellacura 1976; Ellacura 1993a; Ellacura 1987a, especially 6-8; Ellacura 1991b and Ellacura 1989c.

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(death and law) as well as from sin itself. We note again Ellacurias
fundamental structure, the dual unity between the historical and
the transcendental: There is a definitive (transcendent) death, but
this is often anticipated in history. Because of the omnipresence of
sin, human history is full of premature death. Human beings are
deprived of their life, and thus of their possibility of being Gods
glory: gloria Dei, vivens homo.106 The total and definitive liberation
from death is eternal life in which there is no oppression, hunger,
illness, division yet this liberation should accordingly also be
anticipated in history.107
Ellacura finds room for the treatment of the category law
within the same schema. The law leads to sin, and it is therefore
something from which there is a need for liberation. This applies
not just to the Mosaic law as a way to salvation, but to every human
law. This is not to preach anarchy, Ellacura assures, but he sees
the problem as lying in the fact that in history, the law is so often
the institutional justification of a habitual practice of oppression
and repression.108
106 Adv. Haereses IV 20, 7. Archbishop Oscar A. Romero actualised these words
of Irenaeus for the Salvadoran situation thus: gloria Dei, vivens pauper,
Gods glory is the living poor. La dimensn poltica de la fe in Cardenal,
Martn-Bar, and Sobrino 1996, 193. Cf. Sobrino 1989e, 179.
107 Ellacura 1993b, 218: (L)a muerte definitiva, como consecuencia del pecado
natural (original), se adelanta de muchas formas en la historia. La sobreabundancia del pecado en la historia lleva consigo la sobreabundancia de la
muerte en la historia, donde se hace presente la lucha entre la vida y la
muerte, entendidas ambas en toda su plenitud y extensin [] La liberacin
de la muerte slo se dar de forma total y definitiva por el paso a travs de la
muerte en el disfrute precisamente de una vida eterna [], vida en la que no
habr opresin, llanto, enfermedad, divisin, sino plenitud en la comunicacin de Dios que es vida y es amor. Pero esa liberacin definitiva debe ser
anticipada.
108 Ellacura 1993b, 218-219.

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The two dimensions of sin, death and law, as well as of liberation-salvation, must be held together in mutual openness, Ellacura insists:
Not to see in sin, death and the law more than their theolog(ic)al dimension
is, best case, to present an abstract vision, and worst case, to present an ideologized, manipulating and deforming vision of them. But, at the same time, a
purely secular reading of sin, death and law deprives these fundamental realities of their own reality and their own transcendentality.109

Liberation is, for Ellacura, a process of conversion on the personal

level, and a process of transformation or revolution on the historical
level. The elements of commitment and conflict that such processes
require are thus clearly spelled out. The Christian understanding of
liberation is, unlike the bourgeois concept of liberty, always
related to the poor.110 It thereby becomes more integral, more realistic and more universal than the latter, Ellacura holds.111
The final objective of liberation is justice; justice for the poor
and justice for all. Justice is, in Ellacuras definition, that every
human being may be, may have and may receive all that is inherent
to him or her as human being.112 This is what the theological state109 Ellacura 1993b, 220, my translation. The entire paragraph reads as follows in
the original Spanish: El pecado, la muerte y la ley estn estrechamente vinculados entre s. En esas tres dimensiones fundamentales se hacen igualmente presentes las cosas de Dios y las cosas del hombre, las cosas del
individuo y las de la colectividad. No ver en el pecado, la ley y la muerte ms
que su dimensin teologal es en el mejor de los casos propiciar una visin
abstracta de los mismos y en el peor de los casos una visin ideologizada,
intersada y deformante. Pero, al mismo tiempo, una lectura puramente secular del pecado, de la muerte y de la ley, priva a esas realidades de su propia
realidad y de su propia transcendencia. It is necessary to affirm positively
[] la apertura mutua de cada uno de los dos mbitos, Ellacura concludes. For a different treatment of this issue, still within the framework of
liberation theology but with a Protestant point of departure, see Tamez 1991.

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ment of being liberated from sin in order to receive the liberty of

the children of God means in history. It is therefore what the poor
should strive for in their historical processes of liberation-salvation,
in Ignacio Ellacuras opinion.113
At least two critical comments are necessary. Firstly, it has
become increasingly clear that the socio-economic primacy that
Ellacura gives to the term liberation is insufficient in view of the
actual character of the situation of oppression in Latin America
and elsewhere. The profound and particular ethnic, racial and sexist
roots of oppression call for a more diverse and specified explication
of what liberation means and how it can be gained.
Secondly, we note at this stage even more clearly how the issue
of a cooperatio between human being and God in the process of salvation becomes a crucial issue to discuss with regard to liberation
theology. Does God save only those who help themselves? What is
the relationship between gift and task, grace and works here? Is this
110 However, the theme and concept of liberty has in its own right gained
more importance in Latin America during the last decade, given the dramatic shift to neoliberal economic policies in the region. This challenge has
been taken up particularly by the theologians and social scientist related to
the Departamento Ecumnico de Investigaciones (DEI) in San Jos, Costa
Rica. See, e.g. Mo Sung 1993; Mo Sung 1991; Hinkelammert 1996b; Hinkelammert 1996a and Assmann 1994a.
111 Ellacura 1993b, 224.
112 Op. cit., 225: El objetivo primario de la liberacin es, en cambio, la justicia,
la justicia de todos para todos, entiendo por justicia que cada uno sea, tenga
y se le d, no lo que se supone que ya es suyo porque lo posee, sino lo que le
es debido por su condicin de persona humana y por su condicin de socio
de una determinada comunidad y, en definitiva, miembro de la misma especie, a la que en su totalidad psico-orgnica corresponde regir las relaciones
correctas dentro de ella misma y en relacin con el mundo natural circundante. Puede decirse que no hay justicia sin libertad, pero la recproca es
ms cierta an: no hay libertad para todos sin justicia para todos.
113 Ibid.

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soteriology in the end only good news for the strong and committed among the poor?
Major themes are involved here. What is the relationship
between salvation and human liberation? What is the relationship
between salvation and history? What is the relationship between salvation and praxis? As can be seen, these fundamental issues are profoundly intertwined in liberation theology.
(3) Against this background, let us now return to Sobrino and see
how he views the liberation of the poor as a theological objective.114
In outlining the main differences between the way theological
knowledge is understood in Latin-American and modern European
theology115, Sobrino takes as his point of departure two basic questions: 1) Presuming that theological knowledge is a Christian theological knowledge, how does the Christian reality influence the
process of gaining knowledge itself? 2) What is the ultimate interest
behind gaining theological knowledge?
Regarding the first question, Sobrino selects three main characteristics that, in his view, need to be present in the process of gaining theological knowledge in order to make that knowledge
specifically Christian: i) The liberative aspect of the history of Jesus
leads to the question whether the theological epistemological process has a liberating function, and if so, what kind of liberation this
is. ii) The dialectical relationship between present and future in Jesus
preaching of the Kingdom of God leads to the question of the relationship between theory and praxis in a given theological epistemology. iii) The difference between religion and Christian faith, or,
christologically stated, the dialectics between cross and resurrection,
114 Lo que es especfico de la teologa de la liberacin pensamos que va ms all
de los contenidos, y consiste en un modo concreto de ejercitar la inteligencia
guiado por el principio liberacin. Sobrino 1995b, 116.
115 Sobrino 1986, 15-47.

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refers to the need for an epistemological rupture within the process

of gaining theological knowledge.
By comparing European and Latin American theology with
respect to these three points, Sobrino intends to uncover the main
differences between the two, and thereby indirectly answer the second question, about the ultimate interest behind gaining theological knowledge. It is the point about the liberative aspect of the
history of Jesus which is of particular interest here. The story about
Jesus has always been told with the expectation and claim that it
contains a liberative message. Thus a Christian theological knowledge must be liberative in some way. But how?
Theological knowledge in Latin-American theology is liberative
in a way distinct from European theology, claims Sobrino. Whereas
modern European theology is responding to the first moment of
Enlightenment, the liberation of the reason of the subject vis--vis
authoritarianism and dogmatism (Kant), Latin American liberation
theology is spontaneously inclined to give priority to the second
moment of Enlightenment, the liberation of the concrete reality
from its state of misery (Marx).116 This liberation of the reality
implies the necessity not of a new way of thinking in order to
explain or give meaning to reality (first moment), but of a new way
of acting, in order to transform the world (second moment). To
recover the threatened meaning of faith, Latin American theology
opts for the transformation of reality so that the reality may recover
meaning, and through this reaffirm the meaning of faith.
So what does Sobrino mean by liberative or liberation?
His usage of the word corresponds with Gutierrez and Ellacuras
historical-transcendental definitions. Liberation is an urgent
necessity of transforming history that emerges both from the misery
of real reality the crucified reality and from reading the gospel
of Jesus Christ. It has accordingly socio-political as well as theologi116 Cf. Karl Marx 11th thesis on Feuerbach. See also Gutirrez 1984, 57.

77

cal aspects. Liberation means the end of oppression and crucifixion, it means life and dignity for the poor and for everyone.
Sobrino adds: But this same term liberation points also to a utopia the integral liberation [] that the kingdom of God
becomes a reality and human beings come to be just that.117
Sobrino underscores the theological signification of liberation as the
coming of the kingdom to the poor in history against the present
reality of the antirreino the anti-Kingdom.118 Thus he too
stresses the conflictual and historical aspects of the term.
As with Ellacura, however, it seems that Sobrino would be well
advised to widen his concept of liberation. Introducing to this concept the struggle against other fundamental forms of oppression
racial, ethnic, sexual would not soften the radical character of it,
but rather bring out the nuances that are absolutely crucial in order
to formulate a theology which may answer to the needs of the
oppressed Latin Americans of today. In his later writings, Sobrino
does in fact seem more attentive to these nuances.119

117 [] con el termino de liberacin se describen realidades que no tienen

nada de misteriosas, sino de muy claras y necesarias; el final de la opresin y
de la crucifixin, la vida y dignidad de los pobres y de todos [] Pero con
ese mismo trmino liberacin se apunta tambin a una utopa la liberacin
integral en el lenguaje verdadero aunque poco dicente del magisterio -, el
que el reino de Dios llegue a ser realidad y los seres humanos lleguen simplemente a serlo. Sobrino 1991d, 19.
118 I shall return to this conflictual framework of Sobrinos christology the
struggle between the God of Life and the idols of death in Chapter v
below.
119 Cf. e.g., Sobrino 1995b and Sobrino 1993c, 48: [] el reto mayor o, al
menos, el ms novedoso es dirigirnos, tratar de comprender al otro, y recibir del otro, ese otro que es pobre, pero que con relacin a nosotros es ante
todo y ms primariamente otro: indgenas, afroamericanos, la gente de los
barrios []. On Sobrinos theology in a feminist perspective, see Chapter
iv [7] below.

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In any case, it can be seen that according to Sobrino, the very

process of gaining theological knowledge in order for it to be truly
liberative, and thereby truly Christian cannot be separated from
its practical and ethical implications.120 Thereby we are led to the
next fundamental feature of a theology carried out in a crucified
world: the priority of praxis.
e) The Priority of Praxis
Sobrinos theology is, as liberation theology in general, a theology of
praxis.121 Once more, I shall let Gutirrez and Ellacura spell out
the background for this emphasis in Sobrinos thinking.
(1) Theology is critical reflection on praxis in the light of the word
of God. Theology is the second act. This fundamental definition of
theology, coined by Gustavo Gutirrez, continues to play a significant role. At the origin of Latin American liberation theology is a
new encounter with the poor and a new conception of their role
and rights in society, resulting in a theological (re-)discovery of
them as other revealing God, and oppressed needing liberation.
This gives liberation theology the following methodological structure, often called its two acts, using Gutirrez terminology.122

120 Cf. Sobrino 1976, 26, where Sobrino states that Latin American christology,
emphasises [] all the christological elements that point to the paradigm
of liberation (kingdom of God, resurrection as utopia, etc.) and to the praxical disposition to realise them and thereby understand them (Jesus sociopolitical praxis, requirement to follow).
121 For the centrality and development of this self-understanding, see i.a., Segundo 1970; Assmann 1973; Gutirrez 1982, 51-95; Bonino 1975, 86-105; Boff
1991 and Boff 1980, compare discussion in McGovern 1989, 32-40 and Nordstokke 1996, 26-36.

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The first act has two aspects. The first aspect, that I prefer to
call the passive aspect of the foundational experience, is the mere
being affected by the suffering of the innocent other.123 It is the
realisation that the immense poverty of Latin America is a scandal
which cries to the heavens124; an ethical indignation (Boff )125
that leads to a refusal to accept this situation as normal.126 This is
the moment of discovery, of conscientisation and conversion, it is
a change of perspective that eventually influences the understanding
of both society and Christian faith.127
The other aspect of the discovery or the foundational experience is active. It should not be described as a second moment
122 Lo primero es el compromiso de caridad, de servicio. La teologa viene
despus, es acto segundo. Gutirrez 1984, 35.
123 The prevailing interest for the other in contemporary philosophical and
theological discourse is heavily influenced by the writings of the GermanJewish theologian F. Rosenzweig and, more recently, the Lithuanian-FrenchJewish philosopher E. Levinas. Especially the latter has had a significant indirect influence on the development of liberation theology. Most notable is the
influence on Enrique Dussel once a student of Levinas who explicitly
admits his indeptedness to both these thinkers, e.g. in Dussel 1978, 9, compare Dussel 1981, Dussel 1983. But also Gutirrez sees the thinking of Levinas
as a source of inspiration for liberation theologians.
124 Cf. the Document on Justice adopted by the Second General Conference
of the Latin American Episcopate (CELAM) in Medelln, Colombia, 1968:
There are in existence many studies of the Latin American people. The misery that besets large masses of human beings in all our countries is described
in all these studies. That misery, as a collective fact, expresses itself as injustice which cries to the heavens (quoted from Hennelly 1990, 97). Sobrino
constantly refers to the actual situation of poverty as an escndalo, see e.g.
Sobrino 1992b, 54.
125 Boff 1981b, 14. See also Boff and Boff 1987, 1-4.
126 Gutirrez very first words in Toward a Theology of Liberation confirms
this: As Christians come in contact with the acute problems that exist in
Latin America, they experience an urgent need to take part in solutions to
them. Gutirrez 1990b.

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because it is inseparable from the first. It is characterised by commitment. It is the moment for discovering that the poor are not just
suffering, they are also in the process of struggling for liberation.
This is what Gutirrez has described as the irrupcin del pobre
(irruption of the poor), which he interprets as the most important
sign of the times.128 This struggle calls for participation. Neutrality is not possible, according to liberation theology. Either one joins
the cause of the suffering and struggling other, or one supports the
prevailing situation which keeps the poor in their situation of misery. This is the moment of option for the poor, of joining in a liberative praxis, of commitment.
It is important to notice that in the discovery of the other which I
have described, there is also a crucial element of the poor discovering themselves.129 The process of liberation starts with this self-discovery of the poor, and is completely dependent on it to succeed.
The poor must be the main actors or protagonists of the process as
127 It sounds ironic but it is the truth: the churches discovered the poor, says the
Argentinian theologian Jos Mguez Bonino, describing the birth of liberation theology in The Need for a Contextual Theology in Latin America,
lecture given at the seminar Theology and Context at Trollvasshytta, Oslo
March 5-6, 1993: Bonino continues: They (the poor) had always been there
-- hidden away in indian reservations, as semi-slaves in large haciendas or
plantations, invisible as poor peasants. Now they became visible. It would be
futile to try to say whether it was the new awareness that some people in the
churches had developed that triggered the discovery or whether the now
visible poor alerted and led to look for for new answers. Certainly the two
things combined -- they are two sides of a single social and cultural process.
And this is the birth of a new theological quest in Latin America. Bonino
1993b, 4.
128 Spanish: signos de los tiempos. This is an important theme in liberation theology. Juan Luis Segundo calls it a distinguishing mark: Attention to the signs
of the time is the theological criterion which sets off a theology of liberation
from a conservative academic theology. Segundo 1976, 40. See also Gutirrez 1984, 30, and Gutirrez 1990b, 64.

81

well as of the theology of liberation, as Gutirrez repeatedly

stresses:130
We will only have an authentic liberation theology when the oppressed
themselves are able to freely raise their voices and express themselves directly
and in a creative manner both in the society and within the people of God;
when they give account of the hope which they bear, and become promotors of their own liberation. 131

These two inseparable aspects of the foundational experience of liberation theology constitute together its methodological startingpoint. It is, in Gutirrez terminology, the first act.
This first act is pre-theological. The being-affected-and-committing-oneself of this experience, resulting in liberative praxis, is
not originally motivated or legitimised in a Christian theory or
reflection, although it often is, de facto, a praxis of faith.132 It is,
rather, a spontaneous response to (experienced) reality.133 P. Frostin
129 Cf. Gutirrez 1982, 52: Los ltimos aos de Amrica latina se caracterizan
por el descubrimiento real y exigente del mundo del otro: el pobre, el oprimido, la clase explotada. En un orden social hecho econmica, poltica e ideolgicamente por unos pocos y para beneficio de ellos mismos, el otro de
esa sociedad las clases populares explotadas, las culturas oprimidas, las
razas discriminadas comienza a hacer or su propia voz. Empieza a hablar
cada vez menos por intermediarios y a decir verdad directamente su palabra,
a redescubrirse a s mismo y a hacer que el sistema perciba su presencia iquietante. Comienza a ser cada vez menos objeto de manipulacin demaggica,
o de asistencia social, ms o menos disfrazada, para convertirse poco a poco
en sujeto de su propia historia y forjar una sociedad radicalmente distinta.
130 This is where the Pedagogy of the oppressed of Paulo Freire has its important
contribution. Freire 1972. Cf. Gutirrez 1984, 132-3.
131 (N)o tendremos una autntica teologa de la liberacin sino cuando los
oprimidos mismos puedan alzar libremente su voz y expresarse directa y creadoramente en la sociedad y en el seno del pueblo de Dios. Cuando ellos
mismos den cuenta de la esperanza de que son portadores. Cuando ellos
sean los gestores de su propia liberacin. Gutirrez 1984,387.

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points to the importance of this experience, which he chooses to

call the Third World experience, and holds that it is the common
denominator of various liberation theologies. These theologies may
not be judged properly without due consideration of the centrality
of this experience.134
Thereafter comes theological reflection, as the second act,
starting from the basic and very simple intuition, in the words of
Gutirrez: The demands of the gospel are incompatible with the
social situation in which we live here in Latin America.135 In what
does that incompatibility consist? How should it be overcome? It
is in this second act that the new, spontaneous understanding and
self-understanding involved in the first act is critically reviewed
and analysed. On a more profound level, the poor can be interpreted politically in this act as potentially revolutionary, socioeconomically as dependent and oppressed, pastorally as neighbour calling for Christian love and care, philosophically as other
coming from beyond and calling for service, and theologically
as the poor of Yahweh, people of God, the other, who in their
need for liberation, reveal The Other (God)136, or, as is the particular focus of this study, the crucified.

132 Faith is understood as liberation praxis, according to Vidales 1979: Liberation theology begins with concrete experience of faith as a liberation
praxis., see also p.45: Insofar as it is liberation praxis, faith entails a discovery of the world of the other in the light of the new scientific line of
reasoning, and also an option for their cause.
133 In this sense, one could perhaps see a parallel to the so-called ethics of proximity, usually related to such thinkers as E. Lvinas and K. E. Lgstrup. Is
liberation theology a theology of proximity? Cf. thesis 12.1 in Chapter viii,
below.
134 Frostin 1992. 192-6. Compare his doctoral thesis, Frostin 1988, 4ff.
135 Gutirrez 1980, 27.

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(2) To Ellacura, the priority of praxis is closely related to his conception of reality and history. He holds that the historical character
of reality corresponds to the historical character of mind. The
human mind or intelligence (inteligencia) is affected by history, it is
always historical. Its formal structure and differentiative function
is not that of being a comprehension of being nor understanding
(captacin) of meaning, but that of apprehending reality and confronting oneself with it.137 There is a mutual (and constitutive)
interdependence between human intelligence and real things in
the world. Things are real, not just conceptualised in the human
mind. Thus intelligence is receptive to the impression that real
things make on it, it is a sensing intelligence; inteligencia sentiente
(Zubiri).138 But real things can only have this or that meaning
because of their essential respectivity to the human person.139
136 Gutirrez 1980, 15, cf. p.1. See also e.g. Gutirrez 1982, 215-276, especially La
otra historia: la historia del otro. p. 259, cf. 243. Following Levinas, Dussel
gives much weight to the concept of the other who from exteriority, from
beyond, transcendentally breaks the totality (flesh) and domination of
the ontological ego. It is the other as indicated by Schelling, but not in the
way his pupil Hegel incorporates it in his dialectical system, says Dussel.
Because the other in Hegels thinking remains within the totality, it is not
totally other, exteriority, and cannot serve to really challenge the system.
Dussel suggests, then, an analectical overcoming (superacin) of the Hegelian dialectics. It is ana-lectical because it comes from beyond, originating
in a face-to-face encounter with the other (Dussel 1981, 6.) The reality of
the other is anterior to Being (Dussel 1985, 19.) Within this framework, the
origin of liberation theology is described philosophically as a face-to-face
encounter with the poor as other.
137 Ellacura 1975a, 419: La estructura formal de la inteligencia y su funcin diferenciativa [] no es la de ser compresin del ser o captacin de sentido,
sino la de aprehender la realidad y la de enfrentarse con ella.
138 Zubiri 1984.
139 Ellacura 1975a, 419: [] en tanto que slo por su esencial respectividad
con el hombre pueden tener para ste uno u otro sentido.

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When real things appear in the human intellect through the unifying process of intellection, its primary effect is to install the
human person in reality140, i.e. in historical reality, which, in Ellacuras understanding, embraces the totality and yet remains open.
This historical openness towards something more which according to Ellacura makes it possible to speak of transcendence without
accepting the duality that traditionally is implied141 secures
human freedom, and calls for historical transforming action.
Thus, the process of inteleccin, of gaining knowledge, as a
process of installation of the human person in reality, takes on ethical and praxical dimensions. And here perhaps lies the most important contribution of Ellacura to the founding of a new theological
method. His formulation of three dimensions of inteligencia as a
hacerse cargo, cargar con and encargarse de constitutes a Spanish
play on words which is difficult to translate.142
The hacerse cargo de la realidad means gaining knowledge of
reality, the process of cognition. The Spanish expression alludes to
an understanding that goes far beyond a mere objective intellection,
and that links understanding and empathy.143 It is thus a profound
140 Domnguez Miranda 1992, 993.
141 Cf. Ellacura 1991b, 327-329.
142 Ellacura 1975a, 419: Este enfrentarse con las cosas reales en cuanto reales
tiene una triple dimensin: el hacerse cargo de la realidad, lo cual supone un
estar en la realidad de las cosas y no meramente un estar ante la idea de las
cosas o en el sentido de ellas, un estar real en la realidad de las cosas, que
en su carcter activo de estar siendo es todo lo contrario de un estar csico e
inerte e implica un estar entre ellas a travs de sus mediaciones materiales y
activas; el cargar con la realidad, expresin que seala el fundamental carcter
tico de la inteligencia, que no se le ha dado al hombre para evadirse de sus
compromisos reales sino para cargar sobre s con lo que son realmente las
cosas y con lo que realmente exigen; el encargarse de la realidad, expresin
que seala el carcter prxico de la inteligencia, que slo cumple con lo que
es, incluso en su carcter de conocedora de la realidad y comprensora de su
sentido, cuando toma a su cargo un hacer real.

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 although basic epistemological process, which implies a standing/being in the reality of things and not just before the idea of
things or their meaning.144 Ellacura holds that this epistemological process of necessity implies the other two moments. The cargar
con la realidad expresses the fundamental ethical character of intelligence, which has not been given to the human person to permit
the evasion of his real responsibilities, but to facilitate the taking
on of what things really are and what they really require.145 Here,
there is also an element of passion, of pathos.146 An authentic cognition of reality implies taking responsibility for it and bearing its
consequences. This comes clearer to the fore in the third expression,
encargarse de la realidad, which signifies taking responsibility for,
taking charge of reality. It is the praxical dimension of intelligence,
which only complies with what it is [] when it takes charge of a
real task (hacer).
The way Ellacura plays with the word cargar could perhaps
be maintained in the following explication: To gain knowledge of
143 Gonzalez Faus 1990, 256: Las mismas expresiones castellanas como !ahora
me hago cargo!, o hazte cargo, aluden a una compresin que va mucho
ms all de la mera inteleccin objetiva, y que vincula conocimiento y
empata. Cf. English translations in Ellacura and Sobrino 1993.
144 Ellacura 1975a, 419.
145 Ibid.
146 Gonzlez Faus, op. cit., 256, sees in Ellacuras definition a linking of logos,
ethos and pathos, which is different from both the modern and the postmodern mentality. The modern instrumental reason wanted to gain
knowledge (hacerse cargo) of reality without bearing with it and taking
responsibility for it. It totalised the first dimension, even to the extent of
putting it up against the two others, i.e. to get to know the reality in order to
escape the burden of it and the responsibility for it. The post-modern reason reacted correctly against this totalisation, but in order to avoid a any
totalisation, it tends to split and separate the three dimensions in a weak
thinking that results also in a weak responsibility and weak love an individualism without subjectivity, says Gonzlez Faus.

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reality implies to let the burden of real things as real make an

impression on the sensing intelligence, to accept carrying the burden of reality and its consequences, and to take responsibility for
carrying the burden of reality away , i.e. to transform it into a better reality.
Within this framework, transforming action, i.e. praxis,
becomes an integral part of the process of human cognition.147 This
process is rooted in and conditioned by a historical and social
praxis, and it has such praxis as its destination. This does not mean,
however, that human intelligence is totally conditioned by its historical setting in such a way that it does not have any relative autonomy, nor critical capacity vis--vis this historical context. On the
contrary, such criticism is one of its fundamental tasks.148
Furthermore the process of cognition is in itself praxis, according to Ellacura. Praxis is its constitutive character. It is praxis, and
at the same time one of the essential elements of any possible praxis.
Cognition is the active function of intelligence as an inteligencia sentiente confronting the dynamic historicity of reality. It is this reference to praxis that secures and conditions its scientific status.149 At
the same time it is this moment of active cognition or reflection
that makes praxis a human praxis, and not a sheer reaction.150

147 Ellacura 1975a, 418ff, cf.: Gonzlez 1990, 986-987. See also Gutirrez 1980,
19: Praxis that transforms history is not the degraded embodiment of some
pure, well conceived theory; instead it is the matrix of all authentic knowledge, and the decisive proof of that knowledges value. It is the point where
people re-create their world and forge their own reality, where they come to
know reality and discover their own selves.
148 Ellacura 1975a, 421: Lo que se necesita, entonces, para no caer en oscuras
ideologizaciones es llevar la hermenutica hasta el anlisis crtico y el desenmascaramiento, cuando sea preciso, de los orgenes sociales y de las destinaciones sociales de todo conocimiento.
149 Gonzlez 1990, 986.

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Here Ellacura clearly develops his methodology within a

Zubirian framework, although demonstrating obvious familiarity
with Marxist thought. Antonio Gonzlez sees Zubiris theory on
intelligence as incorporating and answering two great intuitions of
post-Hegelian philosophy151: First, Nietzsches fundamental critique of the separation between sensibility and intelligence, and secondly, the insistence of the young Marx that since human
sensibility is not merely passive and receptive, but constitutively
active, the human persons primary relation to the natural and social
world does not consist in contemplation, but in transforming
action. Ellacura criticises a Marxist understanding of praxis, however, for being a closed immanent praxis.152 Ellacura holds that
historical praxis must be transcendentally open.153
This last point is not surprising, given the profound theological
roots of Ignacio Ellacuras emphasis on praxis. In the article Historicidad de la salvacin cristiana Ellacura investigates the interrelation between Christian salvation and historical liberation, between
human efforts for a socio-political liberation and the coming of the
kingdom which Jesus announced.154 Through an analysis of what
he calls the historical transcendence in the Old and New Testa150 Ellacura 1975a, 421: El conocer humano tiene tambin una inmediata referencia a la praxis, aun como condicin de su propia cientificidad. Es, por lo
pronto, la misma praxis y uno de los momentos esenciales de toda posble
praxis; para que la praxis no quede en pura reaccin, es decir, para que sea
propiamente praxis humana, necesita como elemento esencial suyo un
momento activo de la inteligencia.
151 Gonzlez 1990, 985-986.
152 Ellacura 1976, 17-18.
153 Ellacura 1991b, 340: Y por eso, no es una praxis meramente poltica, ni
meramente histrica, ni meramente tica, sino que es una praxis histrica
trascendente, lo cual hace patente al Dios que se hace presente en la accin
de la historia.
154 Ellacura 1991b.

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ments, he speaks of a historical theo-praxis and praxis of salvation as the place where the work of God and the activity of human
beings come together in a dual unity of God in human being and
human being in God.155 This is expressed in the Bible in the historical praxises of Moses, of the people of Israel, and ultimately
of Jesus. Participating in such a praxis is then the core of Christian
existence. It is what makes salvation history become salvation in
history: Action in and on history, the salvation of the social
human person in history, is the real pathway whereby God will ultimately deify the human person.156
We have seen then, that according to Ellacura a theological
reflection on the incarnational, historical-revelational and christological aspects of Christian faith, as well as a philosophical reflection
on reality in itself and the very structure and function of intelligence, lead to the necessity of giving priority to praxis.
Before I proceed, it may seem relevant to ask if Ellacuras proposition is not merely an immanent activism, and thereby a reduction of Christian faith to its historical and social functions? Such
accusations of reductionism and functionalism have in fact repeatedly been raised against liberation theology.157 To fully comprehend
Ellacuras position on this point, however, one should note carefully his understanding of transcendence. History and transcend155 Op. cit., 340: [] afirma la unidad dual de Dios en el hombre y el hombre
en Dios. Este en juega una distinta funcin y tiene distinta densidad cuando
la accin es de Dios en el hombre y cuando la accin es del hombre en Dios,
pero siempre es el mismo en.
156 Ellacura 1976, 18. Regarding this deificacin, see Chapter ii [3] (2), below.
157 See, i.a. Gutierrez 1977, 96-98; Kloppenburg 1974, 15-20; Ratzinger 1990
particularly 373-374 (directed explicitly against Sobrino, whom Ellacura in
turn defends in Ellacura 1984b, 170, calling Ratzingers rendering of
Sobrinos points of view a caricature); and, most importantly Congregation 1990a, paragraph 17, pp. 411-412. Again, McGoverns overview is helpful, McGovern 1989, especially 58-59.

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ence are two dimensions, but they are intimately united, according
to Ellacura. Transcendence is not something over and above history, but something which emerges in, through and from history,
and reaches beyond it. It is something more. We can recognise the
same pattern in Ellacuras understanding of human praxis and
Gods saving activity. This structure, in which the influence of Karl
Rahners transcendental method is apparent, is fundamental to Ellacuras thinking.
Nevertheless, reading Ellacura, the impression remains that the
unification of these dimensions seems somewhat strained. One can
understand and follow the reasons why Ellacura deems it necessary
to overcome old distinctions, which furthermore have been so
manipulated as to have a negative ideological effect in society. However, it is difficult to see how Ellacura actually solves the fundamental problems that have given rise to these distinctions in the first
place. What is actually the difference between the over and
above history (which he rejects) and the beyond, the more that
emerges in and through history (which he affirms)?
(3) Moving to christology, Jon Sobrino starts from the fact that Jesus
expressed his faith in the coming of the kingdom through both
words and deeds. Therefore, the relationship between theory and
praxis is fundamental to the understanding of Christian theological
knowledge. Sobrino understands praxis as an intent to operate
on the surrounding historical reality in order to transform it in a
determined direction.158 In a Christian praxis this direction is
towards the kingdom of God. As already pointed out, Sobrino
insists that Latin American liberation theology does not start primarily from a long theoretical theological tradition, but from an
encounter with a concrete, specific reality a crucified reality in
which there is an ongoing attempt to make love and justice believable to oppressed people159; a praxis of liberation.

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This praxis, when it is a praxis of faith, is at the same time a

process of theological cognition. It is the real way to theological
knowledge, i.e., it is the main method of theology, states
Sobrino.160 In the deepest sense, then, method is understood as
content. The method is the process of gaining knowledge, it is the
way. But going this way, doing theology is also the content of theology. For christology, this means an affirmation of the biblical
statement that Jesus is the way. Following Jesus is the method to
gaining christological knowledge. But true knowledge of Jesus
implies the following of him.161
Which praxis, then, is a way to gaining theological knowledge?
Obviously not just any practice that can be defined as liberative. It
has to have a specific content, and it has a preferred social-theologal
and ecclesial location or ubication, as pointed out earlier.
The motive power behind theological knowledge in a crucified
world is not wonder (admiracin), but passion (or pain)
(dolor),162 Sobrino continues. The present state of suffering in
158 Sobrino 1982a, 166: La prctica de Jess en cuanto praxis, es decir, en
cuanto intenta operar sobre la realidad histrica circundante para tranformarla en una determinada direccin, revela, indirecta pero eficazmente, de
qu se trata el reino de Dios. In this quotation one can see how Sobrino
defines praxis as a particular form of practice. However, this distinction
between practice and praxis (Sp.: prctica and prxis) is sometimes
blurred in Sobrinos writings. Translations into English do not make the
matter easier, as they vary on this terminology. I shall point out the distinction when this seems to have a particular significance in Sobrino.
159 Sobrino 1986, 30. See also Sobrino 1992b, 47-80.
160 Sobrino 1986, 32: En este caso el mtodo ms fundamental es el mismo
camino, es la misma praxis de la fe y lo que ella da de si.
161 Sobrino 1991d, 72: [] conocer a Cristo es, en ltimo trmino, seguir a
Cristo. On this basis, one could claim that Sobrinos christology is methodology. It is reflection on the way (compare the Greek origin of the word
method: meta hodos about way) in a double sense, the way to know Jesus
and the Way that Jesus himself is.

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Latin America provokes the question of God. Theological cognition

is born out of the cries of the oppressed. In this moment of passion
or pain in theological cognition, its practical and ethical orientation
is also uncovered, according to Sobrino, since there is only one correct response to the experience of a generalised pain: to eliminate
it. What is at stake in theological reflection is not the (theoretical)
truth of its analyses, but the (practical) elimination of the real misery.
Theological cognition in Latin America has, accordingly, the
form of a historical and political theodicy 163: The only way to reconcile God and reality in its concrete state of misery and injustice,
is to transform this reality, to make it more according to the will of
God (hacer un mundo segn Dios).164
In other terms, the fundamental quandary (apora) of theological knowledge, which for Sobrino is the fact that sin has power, is
not solved through reflection alone, but only through praxis:165
Any serious process of gaining knowledge sets out to solve a fundamental apora (literally: without way, pathlessness). To Latin
American theology this apora is that the negativity of reality
injustice, suffering, sin seems to be stronger than its positive side;
the love that effectively seeks justice. Theological cognition in the
presence of this quandary, i.e. to solve the without way, is to open
a way. This should not be done primarily in thought, but in real
life. Once again, theological cognition is remitted to praxis.
The influence and fruits of Sobrinos close collaboration with
Ellacura are easy to detect here. Particularly Ellacuras definition of
cognition as a hacerse cargo, encargarse and cargar con reality, has had
great impact on Sobrinos theology.166 These three dimensions
162
163
164
165

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Sobrino 1986, 27-28.

Sobrino 1986, 38-39.
Sobrino 1986, 38.
Sobrino 1986, 42-44.

the notional, ethical and praxical which all are unified in the same
process of cognition, corresponds to what Sobrino in more recent
writings formulates as pre-socrtico, socrtico and aristotlico.167 The
pre-Socratic dimension consists in being confronted with (Ellacura: hacerse cargo de) reality as it is without the presumption of
always already having appropriate conceptual categories with which
to interpret it. The socratic dimension consists in the willingness
to bear the consequences of the knowledge gained about reality
(Ellacura: cargar con), i.e. like Socrates working for the transformation of reality (polis) through suffering its negative impact;
without fleeing even fatal confrontations with the powerful of this
world. The Aristotelian dimension is the analytical, instrumental
dimension; being able and willing to practically intervene in order
to transform reality (Ellacura: encargarse de).
Applied to christology, this conception of cognition means the
following, according to Sobrino:
It means hacerse cargo de la realidad de Cristo, which is most effectively
done through a turning to the historical reality of Jesus of Nazareth. It
means cargar con la realidad de Cristo, i.e., the readiness to listen to and
respond to his real ethical demands and to persist in this. It means encargarse de la realidad de Cristo, i.e. [letting Christ generate] a liberative praxis
which makes his cause become reality.168

It thus becomes clear that Sobrino shares the fundamental option of

liberation theology, giving priority to orthopraxis above orthodoxy:169 Time and again in his writings he affirms the irreplaceable

166 Sobrino cites this definition many times, and in a note in Jesucristo liberador,
he writes: Quisiera decir que en lo personal, esto (sic) modo de concebir el
funcionamiento de la inteligencia es de las cosas que ms me impactaron del
pensamiento de I. Ellacura. Sobrino 1991d, 71, n.40.
167 Sobrino 1993c, 35.

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and essential nature of orthopraxis, since without it we simply do

not enter into a right relationship with the God of the Bible.170
The process of gaining knowledge presupposes, includes and
is in itself a kind of praxis, Sobrino contends, in accordance with
Ellacura. With regard to gaining knowledge about Jesus Christ
(christological epistemology) such praxis is most adequately defined
as a following (seguimiento) of Jesus. This concept is fundamental
to Sobrino, as the sub-title of his first book on Christology shows:
Esbozo a partir del seguimiento del Jess histrico.
The term following has of course a wide historical and theological range of meaning and implications. Sobrino does not give a
thorough exegetical examination of it.171 He notes simply that all
the gospels report that Jesus in the beginning of his ministry calls
disciples to follow him (Mk:1,17 par. and 2,14 par.); that this call is
168 Sobrino 1991d, 71: Este modo de concebir la inteligencia significa para el
pensar cristolgico, para conocer a Cristo, lo siguiente. Significa hacerse
cargo de la realidad de Cristo, para lo cual lo ms eficaz es volver a la realidad histrica de Jess de Nazaret. Significa cargar con la realidad de Cristo,
es decir, la disponibilidad para escuchar y responder a sus exigencias ticas
reales y mantenerse en ello. Significa encargarse de la realidad de Cristo es
decir, ponerlo a producir en una praxis liberadora haciendo real su causa.
Cf. English translation in Sobrino 1994c, 35.
169 Pero con ortopraxis se quiere indicar algo ms. No se trata slo de pensar a
partir de la experiencia, sino de pensar a partir de una experiencia determinada, a partir de una praxis que no slo se siente influenciada por la miseria
del mundo [] sino a partir de la transformacin de esa miseria, que es sentida no slo como la destruccin del sentido de la realidad del sujeto, sino
como la destruccin del sentido social, de la convivencia entre hombres.
Sobrino 1986, 30-31.
170 Con esto se afirma lo insustituible y esencial de la ortopraxis, pues sin ella
simplemente no se entra en la correcta relacin con el Dios de la Biblia.
Sobrino 1991d, 351.
171 He does, however, provide an exegetical argument for the case that there is a
return to Jesus already in the New Testament : Sobrino 1991d, 104-112.

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an ultimate call, confronting the follower already from the outset

with the absoluteness of God, without explanations or conditions,
to which the only possible response is absolute obedience (Mk: 1,18
par and 2,14 par.) and radical renunciation of all competing claims
(Mt: 8,21; 19,10-12; Lk: 9,59f; 14, 25-35; Mk: 10,21); that it is a call to
follow Jesus in a mission, namely the service of the kingdom (Mk:
1,17 par; 3,13ff; 6,7 8,12f par.), which consists in a salvific and liberative practice; and that it is at the same time a call to assimilate oneself to (asemejarse a) Jesus, participating in his life and destiny (Mk:
3,14; 6,8; Lk: 2,28; 6,8f ), which includes readiness to carry the
cross (Lk: 14,27; Mt: 10,38). Finally, Sobrino uses the theological
composition of Mk: 8, 27-38 to support his argument that following is the only way to gain knowledge of the real reality of Jesus.
In addition to these biblical roots, Sobrino finds a return to the
following of Jesus in many important protagonists and movements
for renewal, particularly in situations of crisis regarding the identity
of theology and of the Church. Such was the case with Ignatius of
Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit order. In the second week of his
Spiritual Exercises, St. Ignatius calls for inner knowledge of the
Lord in order to love and follow Him more.172 There is little doubt
that the emphasis of following and obedience in the Jesuit tradition is an important background for Sobrinos preference for this
concept. In Ignatius Exercises Sobrino finds a theological intuition
which modern theology has elaborated under the formula of
hermeneutics of praxis: without a willingness to act, there is no
comprehension.173 Ignatius thus gives priority to the ptica del seguimiento, he holds, as well as emphasising the personal and conflictual aspects of this following.174

172 Sobrino 1991d, 104-105: Ignacio Loyola, en la segunda semana de sus ejercicios espirituales, slo pide conocimiento interno el Seor para que ms le
ama y le siga.

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Sobrino sees Dietrich Bonhoeffers call for Nachfolge and J.B

Metz statement that it is due time for following in the Church as
expressions of similar interventions in times of crisis as that of Ignatius Loyola.175 J. Moltmanns use of the term, especially in The Crucified God, has also had an influence on Sobrino here. In his
doctoral thesis, Sobrino qualifies Moltmanns christology as a cristologa de seguimiento.176
What about liberation theology? Although Gutirrez emphasized the encounter with and cognition of God in the work for justice in his Teologa de la Liberacin177, seguimiento was not a central
term in that book. Ignacio Ellacura on the other hand being a
Jesuit immediately gave the term central significance in his search
for a new Latin American theology: Latin American christology
understands Christian life as following.178
The following of Jesus accordingly embraces the whole Christian existence, in Sobrinos use. He calls it a short formula of Christianity and a key to the totality of Christian life.179
The following of Jesus is not only the location for the practice of faith, but it
makes it possible to know which faith we are practising. It is that which uni173 Sobrino 1976, 311: Hay aqu una intuicin que la teologa moderna ha
elaborado bajo la frmula de la hermenetica de la praxis: sin una disposicin a hacer no hay comprensin. Cf. 303-326 El Cristo de los ejercicios
de San Ignacio.
174 Op. cit., 311-316.
175 Sobrino 1983b, 937. The citation of Metz is taken from Zeit der Orden?
Freiburg 1977, 27.
176 Sobrino 1975c, 390.
177 Gutirrez 1984, 251-254; cf. 243-274.
178 Ellacura 1975b, 344, quoted by Sobrino in Sobrino 1983b, 937. Galilea 1978,
is another proof of the centrality given to this term in contemporary theological reflection in Latin America.
179 Sobrino 1983b, 936-938 and 942-943. Cf. Sobrino 1976, 297: Proponemos
el seguimiento de Jess como paradigma general de existencia cristiana.

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fies in its realisation the transcendental and the historical in Christian

life.180

This means also our particular interest here that he insists that it
is a condition for gaining knowledge about Jesus. It is the epistemological location for christology. Although at times sensible to the
importance of following for christology, European theology has
almost ignored its epistemological relevance, Sobrino holds.181
Latin American theology, however, gives it primary significance,
which makes theological method in this theology become a real
way, where method in the deepest sense becomes content: To
know Jesus is to follow Jesus.
This emphasis on following leads Sobrino to seeing christology
ultimately as a form of mystagogy. Christology can never conceptualize adequately the total truth about its object, Jesus Christ. That is
because Jesus Christ expresses for faith the real, authentic
and insuperable manifestation of the mystery of God and the mystery of human being.182 The object of christology is ultimately a
180 Sobrino 1983b, 943: El seguimiento de Jess no es slo el lugar de la prctica
de la fe, sino lo que posibilita saber qu fe es la que practicamos. Es lo que
unifica en su realizacin lo que ha de transcendente y de histrico en la
vida cristiana.
181 Sobrino 1986, 31: En la teologa europea el seguimiento de Jess se ha relegado normalmente a la teologa espiritual y apenas si ha infludo en la cristologa, y cuando lo ha hecho ha sido para mostrar la peculiar conciencia de
Jess que se muestra en la exigencia de un seguimiento incondicional. Sin
embargo, el seguimiento de Jess como lugar epistemolgico de conocer
a Jess ha sido ignorado casi siempre y est ausente en las cristologas
contemporneas sistemticas. La teologa latinoamericana sin embargo,
comprende el mtodo teolgico en el sentido de camino real. Continuando
con el ejemplo de la cristologa, es el seguimiento real de Jess, aun cuando
sta deba ser tambin esclarecida usando una pluridad de mtodos, anlisis y
hermenuticas. El mtodo en su sentido ms profundo es comprendido
como contenido.

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mystery. Therefore all formulations and conceptualisations are provisional, and fall short.
So it is absolutely necessary that christology be carried out with
great modesty, Sobrino holds.183 It should therefore become a mystagoga184 an introduction to mystery, which means that christology
can show a way, the way of Jesus, in which the human being may be confronted with mystery, may be able to call this mystery Father, as Jesus did,
and may be able to call this Jesus the Christ.185

182 Sobrino 1991d, 19.

183 Sobrino 1991d, 28 La modestia [] tiene su contrapartida en que la cristologa, puede convertirse en mystagoga, es decir, una introduccin al misterio.
184 Sobrino 1992b, 78: Mystagoga no es lo mismo que esclarecimiento terico,
sino que la iluminacin que trae consigo es originada por el contacto con la
misma realidad del misterio. Sin mystagoga siempre queda en penumbra
aquello que se quiere esclarecer, y en la actualidad recurdese la insistencia
de Rahner , una teologa que no sea mystaggica acaba por no esclarecer
nada. Mystagogy is a theological concept with deep Christian roots.
Church Fathers (e.g. Clement of Alexandria and John Chrysostom) use the
word mysterion (lat.: mysterium) referring to Christ himself. This understanding goes back to Pauline Christology, where Jesus Christ is presented as
the one who reveals Gods secret saving purpose, cf. I Cor 2; Eph. 1; Col 1-2,
7. Ignatian spirituality, as expressed in the spiritual exercises of Ignatius of
Loyola, also has clear mystagogical aspects. However, as the quotation from
Sobrino 1992b indicates, Sobrino here takes his lead from Karl Rahner. For
Rahner, mystagogy is: Hilfe zur unmittelbaren Erfahrung Gottes, in der
dem Menschen aufgeht, dass das unbegreifliche Geheimnis, das wir Gott
nennen, nahe ist, angeredet werden kann und gerade dann uns selber selig
birgt, wenn wir uns ihm bedingungslos bergeben. Rahner 1978, 10-38; 1011. Quoted from Fischer 1986, 26.
185 Sobrino 1993f, 7, see also p. 55.-/ Sobrino 1991d 28: Ms en concreto, esto
significa que la cristologa puede mostrar un camino, el de Jess, dentro del
cual el ser humano se puede encontrar con el misterio, puede nombrarlo
Padre, como lo hizo Jess, y puede nombrar a ese Jess como el Cristo.

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For Sobrino, this mystagogy consists in the following of the historical Jesus, because that is the best way to gain access to the Christ of
faith.186 It means travelling the same (logical and chronological)
way that made the first believers reach the full confession of Jesus as
the Son of God: from the mission of Jesus to the kingdom, via the
question for Jesus identity, and on to the confession of his salvific
and unique reality and significance. For Sobrino, then, christology
is the reflexive moment of this travelling. Travelling the way of the
Son and systematic reflection on Jesus Christ are inseparable and
occur simultaneously. It is at the same time reflection on the way
(methodology) and reflection on Jesus Christ (christology).
f ) Theology as Interpretation of Reality
These presuppositions, summed up in the phrases honradez con lo
real, el lugar teolgico, opcin por los pobres, liberacin, and ortopraxis
or seguimiento, lead to a reformulation of the theological task. Formally, theology consists in theologically conceptualising contemporary reality elevar a concepto teolgico la realidad actual 187
Sobrino contends. But if theology is a science, or logos, about God,
how can this be? It is possible because it is believed that this reality,
186 Cf. Rahner, according to Fischer, op. cit., 21: Nachfolge des Gekreuzigten
heisst demnach eben jene glaubend-liebende bergabe seiner selbst an die
Unbegreiflichkeit Gottes. The quotation of Rahner is from Schriften zur
Theologie XIII, Zrich, 1978, 201.
187 [] hacer teologa es formalmente elevar a concepto teolgico la realidad
actual en lo que sta tiene de manifestacin de Dios y de responder y corresponder en la fe a esa manifestacin. Sobrino 1989a, 402. Compare Sobrino
1993c, 28: Con esto queremos decir que la teologa ha actuado teniendo
ante s no slo conceptos sean stos filosficos, polticos, o teolgicos,
bblicos o sistemticos , sino realidades, o, si se quiere, teniendo ante s los
conceptos de liberacin y martirio, pero con el peso especfico que les otorga
la realidad.

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as such, contains something of God. In this concrete, historical reality there is a manifestation of God that theology must heed. The
historical situation becomes thus a source for theology, in addition
to and even prior to the traditional sources. This is a novelty of
liberation theology, in Sobrinos opinion.188
This presence of God in history finds expression in the signs of
the times189: Our theology takes absolutely seriously the present
as a location of Gods manifestation, i.e. it takes seriously the signs
of the times.190 Sobrino supports this view with two central texts
from the Second Vatican Council, in which he finds two different
dimensions of these signs. In Gaudium et Spes no. 4191, the Council
speaks of the historical-pastoral dimension of the signs of the
188 Sobrino does not develop on what is meant by concept. It seems to me
that the elevar a concepto teolgico la realidad actual parallels what is elsewhere described as concept formation: Concept formation refers to a
process by which one learns to sort his specific experiences into general rules
or classes [] Concept formation is a term used to describe how one learns
to form classes. A concept is a rule that may be applied to decide if a particular object falls into a certain class. According to the Analytic school of philosophy, concept is the subject matter of philosophy. Concepts are
according to this understanding logical, and not mental entities. Source:
Encyclopaedia Britannica 1995a and Encyclopaedia Britannica 1995b.
189 This theme has been central to liberation theology since its beginnings. Juan
Luis Segundo calls it a distinguishing mark: Attention to the signs of the
time is the theological criterion which sets off a theology of liberation from a
conservative academic theology. Segundo 1976, 40. Cf. Gutirrez 1984, 30,
and Gutirrez 1990b, 64. See also Gutirrez 1984, 30; and Segundo 1991b.
190 Sobrino 1989a, 398. Cf. Sobrino 1989d.
191 Gaudium et Spes 1966, no. 4: (T)he Church must continually examine the
signs of the times and interpret them in the light of the Gospel. Thus she
will be able to answer the questions men are always asking about the meaning of this life and the next and about the relation of one to the other, in a
way adapted to each generation. So the world in which we live, its expectations, its aspirations, its often dramatic character must be known and understood.

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times. It expresses the necessity for the Church to scrutinize that

which characterises an epoch192 in order to fulfil its pastoral task.
The second dimension, which is more important with regard to the
process and possibility of gaining theological knowledge, Sobrino
terms historical-theolog(ic)al. This is what he believes is meant in
Gaudium et Spes no. 11:
Believing that they are led by the Spirit of the Lord who fills the whole earth,
the People of God sets out to discover among the events, needs and aspirations they share with the contemporary man what are the genuine signs of
the presence and purpose of God.193

What is at stake here, Sobrino insists, is not just the relevance of the
Church or of theology vis--vis the modern world, but its very identity. He asks, rhetorically: If God is continuing to be present, to
reveal God-self in history today, how can theology then content
itself only by examining the manifestations of God in the past?
Theology must, if it does not want to end up in some sort of theological deism, take Gods actual presence seriously, and then investigate how this presence is noticable, and what it calls for.
The history of theology shows with perfect clarity that searching for the signs of the times is a risky undertaking. There may be
a short distance between locating Gods presence in history, and
arbitrarily placing God on our side. Sobrino is, of course, aware of
this danger. Yet he claims that his standpoint regarding the importance of the sign of the times does not necessarily introduce theology into the dangerous world of lofty imaginations and
manipulation of Gods revelation.194 There is a need for external
192 Sobrino 1989d, 250: Signos de los tiempos significa aqu aquello que caracteriza una poca y que ofrece una novedad con respecto a otras pocas del
pasado []
193 Gaudium et Spes 1966, no. 11.
194 Sobrino 1989d, 252-253.

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criteria against which the sign of the times may be tested. That is
why Sobrino, in line with liberation theology in general, proposes
the return to the historical Jesus Gods revelation in the past as
the main criterion (norma normans) with which to judge whether it
is God who speaks and what God says through the present
signs of the times.
In Chapter iii I shall discuss what Sobrino means by this criterion of the historical Jesus. But before that, we should note that
even this criterion is not, according to Sobrino, equally accessible
from all locations or standpoints. The (hermeneutical) circularity of
understanding affects this criterion as well.
Liberation theology [] insists on the actual presence of God and believes
that the reality and word of God that are represented in revelation, are better
rediscovered and safeguarded (when read) from the vantage point of the
actual signs of the times.195

What are these signs? As we saw earlier, in the citation from the
introduction to El principio-misericordia, Sobrino also follows Ellacura in holding that among the actual signs of the times when
seen from the true reality, the world of the poor in El Salvador
there is one which overshadows the others: The existence of the crucified people.196
This last point shows why Sobrino wants to give primacy to the
reality of the poor and oppressed: because that reality, as sign of the
times, reveals the presence of God and thereby the truth about real195 Sobrino 1989d, 253-254: La teologa de la liberacin [] insiste en la actual
presencia de Dios y cree que desde los actuales signos de los tiempos mejor se
redescubre y salvaguarda la realidad y la palabra de Dios plasmadas en la revelacin.
196 Sobrino 1992b, 7: [] quiere asentar que el signo de los tiempos por antomasia es la existencia del pueblo crucificado, y la exigencia ms primigenia
es la de bajarlo de la cruz.

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ity. This is the basis for Sobrinos position on the theological significance of contemporary suffering.
g) Theology as Intellectus Amoris
In some more recent articles, Sobrino has reflected further on these
presuppositions, proposing intellectus amoris as the adequate and
ideal definition of the theological endeavour in particular of liberation theology.197 Theology understood in this manner has the following elements, then: 1) It means doing theology in the actual
moment of history. Its content is Gods actual manifestations (signs
of the times) and the active response of faith (fides qua). 2) It means
doing theology as a reaction of mercy to the reality of the crucified
peoples. 3) It means doing theology with a particular subjective preunderstanding (option for the poor) and in a particular objective
location (the world of the poor).198
The qualification of this as intellectus amoris stems particularly
from the second element. Sobrino finds that according to revelation, mercy199 is the kind of love which is the primary and ultimate
reason for Gods salvific intervention, and that this is the love which
is historicized in the practice and message of Jesus,200 that which
shapes his whole life, mission and destiny.201 It designates the
ultimate reality of God and Jesus according to revelation, and therefore also the ultimate reality of the human being.202
197 Cf. Sobrino 1989a, and Sobrino 1988c, also published in Sobrino 1992b, 4780.
198 Sobrino 1989a, 398.
199 Mercy misericordia means to Sobrino [] reaccionar ante el sufrimiento ajeno, una vez que se ha interiorizado en uno mismo, sin ms razones
para ello que su existencia. Sobrino 1992b, 66.
200 Sobrino 1992b, 34.
201 Sobrino 1992b, 37: [] configura toda su vida, su misin y su destino.

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The designation mercy-principle indicates that mercy is at the

beginning and the end of a process, as both cause and purpose, and
that it structures the process as a whole. This love, that is reaction to
the suffering of the other, is what should direct and shape any
Christian and human endeavour, Sobrino believes. Thus, theology,
being a Christian theology in the world of suffering, must be
guided by this principle.
Theology is, then, not primarily understood as an intellectus
fidei as in the tradition from Augustine and Anselm. Because mercy
is re-action, and therefore action, it is intimately related to praxis.
The only correct answer to the recognition of the suffering of the
other, is action in order to eradicate the reason for suffering. This
means faced with the concrete reality of the poor a praxis for
liberation and justice. Theology as intellectus serving this praxis
could be called intellectus iustitiae or intellectus liberationis. But in
order to express its ultimacy and totality, Sobrino prefers to speak of
it as an intellectus amoris, which for him is a universalization in biblical terminology of the intellectus misericordiae, that needs in its
turn a historical concretion as intellectus iustitiae. 203
A praxis of justice and liberation is necessary, not only in order
to remove suffering per se, but also for that which is particular to
theology as intellectus viz. an argumentative reasoning about the
contents and characteristics of Christian faith. It is therefore an
amor quaerens intellectum, Sobrino writes, twisting another classical
theological formulation.204 The ultimate theological question the
202 Sobrino 1989a, 404: (E)n la revelacin la misericordia es una forma eficaz
que aparece en pasajes fundamentales para mostrar lo ltimo de la realidad
de Dios, de Jesucristo y del ser humano.
203 Sobrino 1992b, 74: (E)s absolutamente razonable que una teologa que
surge como respuesta al sufrimiento ingente en el tercer Mundo se conciba a
s misma como intellectus amoris, lo cual es universalizacin en terminologa
bblica del intellectus misericordiae, y exige a su vez una concrecin histrica
como intellectus iustitiae.

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question of the truth of faith can in a suffering world find a more

adequate response from a praxis of justice and liberation, launched
by mercy.205

[3] Main Theological Heritage and Framework:

Jesuit Spirituality
Up until this point, I have reviewed some of the main influences
and roots of Jon Sobrinos fundamental theological approach in a
reality he describes as crucified. First and foremost, I pointed to
the importance of his concrete experience of suffering and generalised oppression in El Salvador. Second, I have briefly indicated
important influences from European theology (particularly Rahner
and Moltmann) and philosophy (Marx, Zubiri), and Latin American mentors (Gutirrez and Ellacura). I do not believe that
Sobrinos theology can be adequately analysed without a due reference to these factors.
To these two background elements must be added a third,
which is at least as important. It is the simple observation that Jon
Sobrino is a Jesuit. Although obvious, it is nevertheless not seldom
overlooked or played down in European and non-Catholic readings
of Sobrino. By reviewing some main elements of authoritative Ignatian texts like the Spiritual Exercises (Ejercicios espirituales Ej.)206
and the Autobiography of San Ignatius (Autobiografa)207, it will
come clear how embedded in the Jesuit tradition are Sobrinos presuppositions.
204
205
206
207

Sobrino 1992b, 71-75.

Sobrino 1992b, 77.
Iparraguirre, de Dalmases, and Jurado 1991, 221-305.
Iparraguirre, de Dalmases, and Jurado 1991, 100-177.

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One of Ignatius Loyolas (1491-1556) famous dictums is that it is

possible to seek God in all things.208
For Gods majesty is present in all things, through his indwelling, through
his working and through his essence, and can therefore be found in all
things, in speaking, walking, seeing, tasting, hearing, thinking, and in whatever else we may do.209

This transparental-mystical view of reality210 does not lead Ignatius

attention away from reality in order to find God some place behind
or beyond it, but on the contrary leads to a more profound appreciation of the things in the world and most especially in the small
insignificant things.211 Or, put more dialectically, just because God
is beyond the world Deus semper maior212 God may be sought in
all things in the world: Ignatius stood resolutely in the world
below because it was Gods or was destined once more to become
Gods.213
Sobrinos expression honradez con lo real, with its close connection to the thinking of Rahner and Ellacura (both Jesuits), is
clearly coined within the framework of this Ignatian view of reality
and of how to gain knowledge of God in and through it. We saw
that Sobrino emphasized that the honesty required is a triumph
over against the sinful tendency of covering up the true reality. It is
208 Ej. 39: [] porque los perfectos, por la assidua contemplacin y iluminacin del entendimiento consideran, meditan y contemplan ms ser Dios
nuestro Seor en cada criatura segn su propia essencia, presencia y potencia. Cf. also Ej. 60 and 236.
209 Monumenta Ignatiana (MI) 1, 3:510, quoted from Rahner 1968, 21-22.
210 Ignacio Iparraguirre sees transparencia as a distinctive feature of Ignatian theology. See Espritu de San Ignacio de Loyola Bilbao 1958 :177-186. Cited from
Rahner 1968, 3-4, n. 14.
211 Rahner 1968, 21.
212 See below, Chapter vii, [4].
213 Rahner 1968, 21.

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an honesty which can only come about through a conversion; a

granting of not just a new mind, but also new eyes and a new
heart.
Likewise, for Ignatius, finding God in the most insignificant
things in reality is not an easy task. This is the main theological
point behind the Ignatian Exercises. Searching for God and Gods
will is something which needs dedication, discipline and great effort
on the part of the believer.214 Ignatius underscores at least three
aspects of this dedicated effort which have left their mark on
Sobrino.
First, it involves an application of the senses,215 applicatio sensuum. Ignatius speaks very concretely of the necessity of involving all
five senses in the process of gaining knowledge of the mysteries of
God and Gods will. The exercitant is admonished to even taste,
smell and touch the divine realities. In this way, he seeks to overcome the possible onesidedness of a spiritual contemplation which
only engages the mind or the inner life of the pious. The application of the senses in Ignatius experiences promotes a synthesis of
mind and heart216, and even of hands, in the sense that what is
experienced in contemplation must be put into action: Intelligo ut
faciam.
This unity of contemplation, love and action comes clearly to
the fore in Ej. 230, where it is stated: Love should be expressed
214 Ej. 1: [] por este nombre, exercicios spirituales, se entiende todo modo de
examinar la consciencia, de meditar, de contemplar, de orar vocal y mental, y
de otras spirituales operaciones, segn que adelante se dir. Porque as como
el pasear, caminar y correr son exercicios corporales, por la mesma manera
todo modo de preparar y disponer el nima, para quitar de s todas las affeciones desordenadas, y despus de quitadas para buscar y hallar la voluntad
divina en la disposicin de su vida para la salud del nima, se llaman exercicio spirituales.
215 Cf. Ej. 2, 66-70, 122-125, 193, 252. Cf. Rahner 1968, 147.
216 Rahner 1968, 182.

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through deeds rather than words.217 It is altogether difficult to

miss the practical orientation at work in Ignatius writings. Among
the first circle of followers of Ignatius, this orientation found
expression in the formula in actione contemplativus.218
The influence on Sobrino is thus obvious: Sobrinos new eyes,
new heart and new hands as an expression of the primacy of
praxis in his theology belong to this Ignatian tradition.219
Second, Ignatius underscores the importance of a discernment of
the spirits,220 in which spirit is taken to mean any external influence on the exercitant. The discernment of spirits is a centrepiece
in the exercises.221 It is presented as a method for the exercitant to
gain insight into the will of God. There are good and bad influences, good and evil spirits, which the pious believer needs to discern, i.e. to detect and reveal the true nature of the spirits.
Sobrinos understanding of theology as conceptualising theologically the actual, contemporary reality by heeding the signs of the
times fits well into this Ignatian picture. Furthermore, this background helps explain the centrality that Sobrino gives to following,
seguimiento, in christological endeavour, as not just a consequence,
but indeed a prerequisite for that endeavour, because this process of
discernment is intimately related to the Call of the Heavenly King
217 [] el amor se debe poner ms en las obras que en las palabras. My translation, SJS. Cf. Ej. 230-237, Contemplacin para alcanzar amor.
218 See Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol III, 280-293, quoted from
McCool 1975, 316.
219 It is also reasonable to see Sobrinos main epistemological approach, in
which he adopts Ellacuras theory of cognition (see above), which in its turn
builds on Zubiris inteligencia sentiente, within this framework.
220 Cf. Autobiografa, paragraph 8, and Ej. 32, 118, 135, 313-344.
221 See Rahner 1968, 136-180. There is an abundance of literature on the meaning of this Ignatian terminology, both historically and for our present time.
For our purposes here, see particularly Gonzlez Faus 1980 and Sobrino
1980.

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(Jesus)222 and to the thought of Election in the Ignatian Exercises.

The believer needs to discern the spirits in order to be able to follow
Christ towards the goal of his kingdom; the goal of perfection, of
salvation.
This framework makes the discernment of the spirits an exceptionally difficult task, since the Heavenly King is crucified. Accepting his call, following him, leads to humiliation and suffering.223
This paradox calls for particular alertness, since the spirits may not
be what they appear to be: [] a man may be overcome not only
by what is evil, but also, very frequently, by what appears to be right
and good.224
Thus, the theme of discernment of the spirits implies a conflictual framework of interpretation: there are good and evil spirits; the
exercitant must be sure to make the right choice. This choice is
costly and painful, leading to humiliation and suffering because of
the resistance of this world to the will of God. In a world of contradiction and mutually opposing forces, human beings are called to
choose the right path. Here we have a third Ignatian theme which is
easily recognizable in the structure of Sobrinos theology. It is the
theme of conflict, of choice and partisanship.225 In his Autobiography, Ignatius gives clear testimony to how he interprets reality as
being subject to a continuous struggle between God and the Devil,
el Enemigo.226 This struggle, according to Ignatius, is a struggle of
absolutely contradictory forces. Any choice between them would be
mutually exclusive. Accordingly, Ignatius operates with a series of
dichotomies, several of which are taken over by Sobrino: God of life
222 Ej. 92-100, 167.
223 Autobiografa, 31 and 52; Ej. 48, 53, 116, 146, 203, 208, 297-8.
224 See The Official Directory of 1591 (xxii, 1), quoted from Rahner 1968, 140.
Cf. Chapter v, below.
225 See Ej. 136ff, 146, 167-174.
226 Autobiografa, 20.

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 idol(s) of death, wealth poverty, honour humiliation, etc

[]227
Thus, it is clear that Sobrinos envisioning of a practical theologia crucis228, consisting in following Jesus in the midst of a crucified
reality, does have unmistakably Jesuit characteristics. In addition to
these, several other key terms in Sobrinos writings are also directly
present in these Jesuit sources. I will mention two more central
themes of particular interest; first, the emphasis on the location,
and second, the theme of poverty.
In Ignatius Spiritual Exercises the term lugar plays a significant role. Over and over again, the exercitant is exhorted to prepare
the exercises with a composicin, viendo el lugar.229 By this is
meant an effort to place oneself in the same location as the reality
which is about to be contemplated.230 Here, the placing of oneself
in another location is primarily an act of imagination. Ellacuras
and Sobrinos use of the term lugar is somewhat different. Nevertheless, their embracing of this theological concept echoes one of
Ignatius Loyolas fundamental intuitions: that there exists a relation
227 See particularly Ej. 146: [] considerar el sermn que Cristo nuestro Seor
hace a todos sus siervos y amigos, que a tal jornada enva, encomendndoles
que a todos quieran ayudar en traerlos, primero a pobreza spiritual, y si su
majestad fuere servida y los quisiere elegir, no menos a la pobreza actual; 2.0
a deseo de opprobrios y menosprecios, porque destas cosas de sigue la humildad, de manera que sean tres escalones: el primero, pobreza contra riqueza;
el 2.0, opprobrio o menosprecio contra el honor mundano; el 3.0, humildad
contra la soberbia; y destos tres escalones induzgan a todas las otras virtudes.
228 See Chapter vii, below.
229 Ej. 47 (n.17), 91, 103, 112, 132, 151, 192, 202, 220.
230 Ej. 47: Aqu es de notar que en la contemplacin o meditacin visible, as
como contemplar a Cristo nuestro Seor, el cual es visible, la composicin
ser ver con la vista de la imaginacin el lugar corpreo donde se halla la cosa
que se quiere contemplar.

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between Gods revelation in history and the place (from) which it is

experienced, a relation which is of theological significance.
For Ellacura and Sobrino, the primary lugar teolgico is the
poor. Here too, they may find support in the writings of the
founder of the Jesuit order. In the Autobiography, Ignatius care for
and service to the poor is emphasized.231 In his pilgrimage he often
shares the lot of poor and despised people.232 He and his followers
take the vow of poverty in accordance with traditional monastic
piety.233 They dedicate themselves to diaconal work, and speak for
the rights of the poor.234 In the Spiritual Exercises, the poverty of
Christ in which the pious has to share in order to become a true follower, is given great weight.235 In fact, Ej. 167, which may be read as
something of a climax in the Spiritual Exercises, pinpoints exactly
this connection. It deals with the most perfect humility, by which
the exercitant in order to imitate and become more like Christ our
Lord opts rather for poverty with the poor Christ, than for
wealth.236 Again, Sobrino and the other liberation theologians take
the concept of the poor and poverty further than Ignatius, giving it
a more central theological significance. But they may do so with a
notable amount of support in the theological traditions of the Jesuit
order.
All in all, Sobrinos theology is profoundly marked by this Ignatian heritage. Only by paying attention to this tradition will it be
231
232
233
234
235
236

Autobiografa, paragraph 89.

Autobiografa, 87.
Autobiografa, 93.
Autobiografa, 77.
Ej. 98, 114, 142, 146, 157, 166-7, 277, 344.
Ej. 167. [] por imitar y parescer ms actualmente a Cristo nuestro Seor,
quiero y elijo ms pobreza con Cristo pobre que riqueza, opprobrios con
Cristo lleno dellos que honores, y desear ms de ser estimado por vano y loco
por Cristo, que primero fue tenido por tal, que por sabio ni prudente en este
mundo.

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possible to give a just evaluation of the interrelatedness of life, experience, praxis and theological reflection which is so characteristic to
Sobrinos approach to theological method. The Ignatian logic of
existential cognition as Karl Rahner has called it237 finds in
Sobrino a particular, actualised and contextualised expression.238

[4] Critical Questions

This rather detailed analysis of Sobrinos point of departure has
been necessary in order to establish the basis for our interpretation
of the theological significance of contemporary suffering as this
comes to expression in his novel suggestion in christology: seeing
the crucified Jesus in the light of crucified people in history and
vice versa. We have come to the point where we can unfold further
the questions and difficulties that we have encountered so far. I shall
focus on five questions, which deal with themes that are central to
this study.

237 Individual knowledge in Ignatius Loyola in The Dynamic Element in the

Church, Freiburg-London 1964, 170, quoted from Rahner, H.: op. cit., 28.
238 While it is certainly true that Sobrino, Ellacura and other Jesuits among the
leading liberation theologians (like e.g. Juan Luis Segundo and Joo
Libnio) are clearly marked by the Jesuit tradition, one may also describe
their works as attempts of reforming, criticising, and renewing the Jesuit
heritage. As Higgins and Letson comment, [] liberationist theological
and pastoral strategies have called into question the long tradition of Jesuit
commitment to structure, system and sodality. The contemporary Jesuit is
more inclined to rugged independence, grassroots networking, and conscientizing than to the maintaining of dying institutional enterprises. Higgins
and Letson 1995, 244; see also Chapter iii, Jesuit as liberationist in op. cit.,
102-134.

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(1) Do these different elements to which Sobrino in particular and

liberation theology in general give priority i.e. the poor, the epistemological location, the unity of history, and praxis of liberation
relate well to one another? Is this, in other words, a coherent methodological proposal? Since it is a response to a particular historical
situation and a reaction to what is seen as weaknesses in traditional
theological method, one could suspect that the different elements of
the alternative proposal would somehow acquire a character of ad
hoc-answers, and thereby lack the necessary coherence.
The main theological locus according to liberation theology is
the praxis of the poor for their liberation in (the one) history. In this
sentence we see how the different methodological elements are
interrelated in a mutually constitutive manner. Its fundamental
point, without which the others lose their function, is the new theological subject: the poor.
In what sense the poor are theological subject(s), is a debated
issue.239 Parting from what I have examined so far regarding the
poor and their protagonist role, at least this can be said: the poor are
the primary subjects of liberation theology insofar as their situation,
praxis and faith constitute the point of departure, the material and
the sine qua non for the theological enterprise.
However, it is not just the poor in their mere existence who
trigger the theological reflection, but the poor as they undertake
some sort of action, a struggle to overcome the forces that oppress
them, a praxis of liberation. This is the verb in the sentence. Here
lies the emphasis on the operational, dynamic view of human existence and history. Since there is only one history, this praxis of liberation is at the same time a salvific process, which is open-ended
towards transcendence. It goes through history and beyond history.
Liberation theologians stress that the poor must be the main agents
of this salvific praxis of liberation. This is so, not thanks to some
internal historical quasi-automatic law, as in Marxism, but because

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of Gods free and gracious identification with the poor and outcasts
of this world. Here liberation theologians also differ clearly from
both classical and modern European theology, who next to God, see
either the Church or the enlightened, modern human person (most
often thought of as man) as the main agents in the process of emancipation-liberation-salvation.

239 Cf. e.g.: Segundo 1990 in which Segundo claims that a notable shift within
liberation theology occurred during the seventies. At the outset, he says, liberation theology was developed in the universities among middle class intellectuals, with the purpose of de-ideologising theology and thereby turning it
into an effective tool for the liberation of the poor and oppressed. The long
term objective was to awake the poor from their passivity and fatalism and
enable them to be agents for liberation. But it was thus theology done on
behalf and in favour of the poor, not by the poor themselves. Then the
change occurred, according to Segundo. The popular movements had neither understood nor appreciated this first line with liberation theology. It
was perceived as something only relevant to Europeanised, middle-class
intellectuals. But then, many among the now frustrated liberation theologians became converted to the poor, in the sense that they now held that
it was the poor themselves that should do theology and not the theologians. The theologians should rather become organic intellectuals in
Gramscis concept. Segundo claims to detect this change in e.g. Gutirrez
theological reflection by comparing the difference between Teologa de la liberacin which he esteems highly and La fuerza de los pobres en la historia
which he thinks is of much lower quality. The problem with the second
line in liberation theology according to Segundo, is that it loses its critical
potential vis--vis the popular culture and the popular faith. This has paralysed liberation theology which has become more repetetive apology than
constructive theology, Segundo sternly states. Segundo himself wishes to
remain faithful to the first line, whereas he thinks that Gutirrez, Dussel,
Sobrino, Boff etc. all have passed from the first to the second line. Interesting as this self-criticism from one of the founders of liberation theology is, it
is hard to agree with this analysis. For a further discussion, see my article
Stlsett 1996b.

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From this, it follows that the poor according to liberation theology also are theological locus, or location, in two senses. Firstly they
are the theological location in a hermeneutical and epistemological
sense; it is necessary to adopt their standpoint in order to gain
knowledge about God, and to be able to interpret the sources of
theology correctly. Secondly, and more fundamentally, the poor
become in this outline the theological location in a more direct,
soteriological sense. The poor bring salvation. Their transformative
action has liberation as its objective, a liberation which will not only
aim at innerworldly goals, but which stretches towards the more,
the beyond, toward salvation in the full Christian sense. And
since the poor are the ones on the margins, on the reverse side of
history, the only way that history may be one history of salvation
for all, is that they break the power of division, conflict and oppression, in a word, sin, from the outside, from exteriority.240
Although there are many variations of the treatment of these
main points among liberation theologians, including those to
whom I have referred to so far, I find the structure and main line of
thought sufficiently consistent to be regarded as a coherent methodological proposal, when judged by its internal standards.241 The
theological implications and consequences of this proposal are, of
course, wider-ranging. Indirectly, this is the subject matter of my
entire study.
(2) What concept regarding the nature of human being, of the
world and of history is presupposed here? I have shown (and I shall
elaborate in greater detail on this below) that Sobrino, following
Ellacura, sees both the nature of human beings and of the world as
constitutively and radically historical. History is where human
beings and the world are intertwined in a mutually interdependent
manner. Even the working of the human mind is ultimately historical. This is why he insists that the Christian concept of salvation too

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is historical, and should be historicised.242 God is the God of history, who acts in and through history for the liberation-salvation of
human beings and the world.
This historical view of human being and world is not the same
as a purely immanent view, however. History is open-ended, Ellacura and Sobrino reiterate, time and time again. Nevertheless, this
repetitious insistence leaves one with the suspicion that they them240 The poor are the other inasmuch as they are excluded from the system, coming from beyond, challenging the totality. Others reveal themselves as others in all their acuteness of their exteriority when they burst in upon us as
something extremely distinct, as nonhabitual, nonroutine, as the extraordinary, the enormous (apart from the norm) the poor, the oppressed
(Dussel 1985, 43). The other as other is a mystery, that reason can never
embrace only faith can penetrate it, continues Enriaue Dussel (Dussel
1985, 46.) The other the poor is thus the Holy One (The Other is the
Holy One. Poor people are holy ones inasmuch as they are outside the system, Dussel 1978, 30) who reveals the totally Other, who is God. God is
the absolute Other, since he is eschatological and therefore does not give
himself entirely to us in history, but only at the end of history (Dussel 1978,
13.; compare Gutirrez 1980, 16) The Other as exteriority is definitively
God. Whenever we respect the Other as other, we live our lives as we should.
Evil enters our lives when we do not respect the Other, but use the Other as
a thing. Furthermore (Dussel 1978, 31): In the totality of the system (contrary to Wittgenstein, who thinks that God does not reveal in the world),
in the world, the self-revelation of the absolute Other takes place through the
oppressed (Dussel 1985, 189). Dussel calls this an epiphany through the
poor (ibid.). Liberating philosophy and liberating theology both stem from
this encounter with the poor and oppressed, understood as a revelation of
the other, according to Dussel.
241 This assessment does not mean that I have accepted the methodological
alternative en bloc, only that it rightly presents itself as a coherent alternative.
Even Ratzinger does not disagree on this: If one seeks to offer a global
judgement, one must say that when we try to understand the fundamental
options of liberation theology, one cannot deny that the whole theology
contains an almost irrefutable logic. Ratzinger 1990, 374.
242 Cf. Chapter ii, [2].

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selves in fact are struggling with this point. The question is whether
Ellacuras and Sobrinos open realism in fact is able to carry the
weight of the theology they formulate. Is it open enough? From
the reading of Ellacura and Sobrino on the issue of history and
transcendence, arises the suspicion that their insistence on reality
as historicity as opposed to any form of idealism and dualism, creates difficulties in the direction of monistic and synergistic tendencies.243 This suspicion and its possible consequences in soteriology
and christology will have to be examined further.
(3) Do we find here a too optimistic view of the nature of human
being, world and history, as has been objected by some?244 Some
elements do point in an optimistic direction: liberation-salvation
in history is thought to be possible. And human beings act in conjunction with God in this process of salvation. Yet at the same time
Sobrinos and liberation theologys foundational experience is an
experience of being victimised by the historical and very concrete
consequences of sin. The power of evil, sin and death is by no
means overlooked or regarded less significant in their theological
concept. For them, theology belongs to the real reality, the reality
of unjust suffering, and can never escape the presence and power of
the negative forces.
This is also why Ellacura and Sobrino point to the necessity of
being poor with spirit. Only through conversion and by the
243 This critical point is exaggerated beyond any reasonable interpretation by
Ratzinger, however. In Ratzinger 1990, 372-373, he faults Sobrino for fundamentally substituting historical fidelity for faith. Ratzinger sees this as a
result of [] a Marxist, materialist philosophy in which history has
assumed the role of God. Ellacura is included in the same criticism. Such
simplistic characteristics leave the impression of being the result of a superficial and indeed averse reading of the texts of Sobrino and Ellacura.
244 See e.g., Congregation 1990d, 349-350, paragraphs 6 and 7c; or from a conservative, evangelical perspective, Almeida 1990, 29-36, 51-52.

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strength and power of Gods spirit can the poor transform this
world in the direction of the Kingdom of God, and thus lead history towards its fulfilment. The ability of the poor to transform history in the direction of the Kingdom is, according to this view, not
rooted in some inherent quality of theirs as poor, but in their theological status as the priveleged addressees of the gospel.
Is this, nevertheless, not to expect too much from the poor? Are
not the poor also sinners?245 Is this a way of burdening the poor
with a soteriological role which they cannot and should not play?246
Ultimately, is there not too much voluntarism and activism, and
too little mystery and grace in the position of liberation theology on
this point? These questions will follow us as we proceed, in particular when examining the term the crucified people.
245 Christian Duquoc rejects such criticism of the liberation theology position:
A los telogos de la liberacin se les ha acusado de omitir el pecado. Esta
acusacin me parece infundada por un doble motivo: nunca han asimilado a
los pobres con los justos ni han negado que los pobres fueran tambin pecadores; por otra parte han subrayado que el pecado habita nuestra historia,
ya que su forma estructural, la opresin es perceptible en sus destructivos
efectos. Duquoc 1989, 92.
246 Cf. Bedford 1993, who launches this as the most serious criticism of the concept of the crucified peoples in the thinking of Ellacura and Sobrino, see p.
295. Bedford wrote her thesis under professor Jrgen Moltmann in
Tbingen, and her conclusions clearly seems to concur with his views. In a
recent review of the German edition of Mysterium Liberationis in Orientierung, Moltmann puts forward the following criticism of Ellacuras classic
essay on the crucified people: Er [i.e. Ellacura, my comment, SJS] folgert
daraus: Es ist das Opfer der Snde der Welt, und es ist dasjenige, das der
Welt Erlsung bringt []. Zu dieser khnen Aussage kommt mir die kritische Frage in den Sinn: Wenn das gekreuzigte Volk der Welt Erlsung
bringt, wer erlst dann das gekreuzigte Volk? Ist das nicht eine religise
berforderung des Volkes, und macht es seine Lasten nicht noch schwerer,
von denen das Volk doch befreit werden soll? Moltmann 1996, 205. Cf.
Maier 1992, 339.

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(4) What kind of hermeneutics is employed here? One fundamental

characteristic is that the historical, social and even geographical situatedness of any hermeneutical process is strongly underlined.
Sobrinos and Ellacuras insistence on the strong connection
between source and location leads in the direction of what we might
call a contextual or situational hermeneutics.
Furthermore, it evidently has to be labelled a hermeneutics of
praxis. The emphasis on historicisation is not just a matter of a
hermeneutical interpretation in terms of giving an actual explanation, but also involves making something effective and operational
in history.247 The interpretation of any text or event has to be verified through praxis in actual history, according to Ellacura and
Sobrino. Speaking in classical hermeneutical terms, this may be
seen as an affirmation of the statement that without some applicatio, there is no real hermeneutical intelligentia or explicatio.248 The
element of historical application through praxis is crucial to liberation theology hermeneutics.
But does this mean that liberation theology, so to speak,
solves the hermeneutical problem with its insistent reference to
praxis? Does it not rather navely seem to presuppose that praxis in
itself and automatically frees the interpreter from the complex task
of understanding? The polemical and unprecise use of the term
praxis in some works of Latin American liberation theology, especially in its early phase, may give legitimate cause to such suspicions.249
This immediately takes us to the question of how theory and
praxis relate to each other in the framework of the liberation theology method. In French theologian C. Duquocs opinion, liberation
247 See below, Chapter ii [2].
248 Tracy 1987, 101.
249 Cf. Duquoc 1989, 45-57. However, Clodovis Boff s work Boff 1980, shows
that leading liberation theologians are perfectly aware of the problem.

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theologians have not been sufficiently clear on this issue. He holds

that theory and praxis cannot be separated, but should nurture
each other mutually.250 This is not denied by liberation theologians, he admits, but their language sometimes give the impression
that it is the praxis which, almost spontaneously, engenders the theory which interprets it.251 He consequently blames them for not
taking due account of the correcting capacity of theory,252 by
almost taking for granted that the praxis of the poor generates a theory which corresponds to the transcendental meaning of the tranformation of the world.253
Is this critisicm valid in relation to Ellacuras and Sobrinos outline? It does at least seem to address a vulnerable point. Their use of
praxis is so wide that it seems to embrace every aspect of human
existence in history. And as we have seen, even the process of cognition itself is already a praxis, according to them. Theory becomes
thus only an inner moment of critical reflection on and in this historical existence. Nevertheless, as this inner moment it not only can
be critical, but should be critical. Being critical is the fundamental
task of theory, of reflection, Ellacura holds. Furthermore, we saw
that Ellacura makes the scientific status and human character of
praxis depend on this critical reflection on it. Without a critical theoretical examination and eventually correction, praxis is a mere
reaction, and not human praxis at all.
But is this sufficient to escape the serious accusations of something close to a praxis-determinism? How can theory be critical if it
250 Duquoc 1989, 50. See also e.g. Tracy 1987, 140, n. 51, where he calls for
mutually critical correlations, and Moltmann 1987, 10: Ambas magnitudes, la teora y la prctica, se corrigen recprocamente a la luz del evangelio
liberador.
251 Duquoc 1989, 50.
252 Ibid: [] capacidad correctora de la teora []
253 Duquoc 1989, 51.

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is only an inner moment of praxis? From where does it get its critical potential if it is totally dependent on praxis? The question is still
open.
(5) Earlier in this chapter i outlined what I called presuppositions for
doing theology meaningfully in a crucified reality, according to
Sobrino. But as was also pointed out, these presuppositions are
based on previous experiences of suffering and oppression experiences that make it meaningful to speak theologically of reality as
crucified. These presuppositions are then theoretically a prioris,
but de facto they emerge a posteriori. The criteria of how to do theology in a crucified reality can only be discovered when experiencing
the reality as crucified. This points to a profound circularity in
Sobrinos fundamental theological method. Theoretically, this circularity may be understood as the circularity which affects any process
of understanding. In other words, it may be (just) another version
of the hermeneutical circle.
Yet it could also be a closed circle, a circular argumentation that
in fact presupposes its own conclusions.254 If this should be the
case, such a theological method would become irrelevant for anybody who does not uncritically accept its presuppositions, or share
the basic experiences that precede it. Worse, it could then become
totally closed to outside criticism and testing or verification, thus in
fact precluding any meaningful dialogue, and in the final analysis
becoming manipulative and ideological, in the pejorative sense of
this word.255
But is this the case in Sobrinos theology, given the centrality
that it accords to the crucified people? In order to be able to give an
answer to this fundamental question, we need to have a clearer
254 Rahner speaks of the circular structure of faith knowledge, see Rahner
1993, 230-232.
255 Cf. Sobrino 1982a, 92.

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understanding of what significance Sobrino actually gives to the

crucified people. This is what I will explore in the subsequent
chapters.

[5] Conclusions
In this chapter I have shown that the reality of contemporary suffering is fundamental to the theology of Jon Sobrino. The principal
reason for this fact is to be sought in Sobrinos own experiences of
suffering in the midst of a concrete praxis for justice and peace.
These experiences make Sobrino describe reality as crucified.
Reflecting upon what it means to do theology in such a crucified reality, Sobrino emphasises seven basic points: (1) First, that it
requires an act of honesty in relation to reality. This act of honesty
implies that the theologian is willing to undergo a profound change
of mind, eyes and heart, i.e. a conversion in order to be able to see
the truth of reality. (2) Second, that there is a close relationship
between the context and content of any given theological thinking.
Theological reflection is always influenced by its situatedness, its
location. It is thus necessary to have a conscious and critical focus
on the way in which theology is being shaped and conditioned by
the concrete location from which it takes place. It is only by being
critically aware of its situatedness that theology can overcome the
limitations which follow from this situatedness, and take advantage
of the opportunities that it represents. Furthermore, Sobrino
believes together with Latin American liberation theologians in
general that there are privileged locations for theology. This privileged location is what he calls the lugar teolgico. This requires from
the side of the theologian a consciousness about the dialectical relation between the sources of theological reflection and its concrete

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location, and a willingness to move to locations from which the content of the sources can be better grasped.
(3) This privileged location for interpreting the Christian
sources, Sobrino holds to be the poor. Sobrino suggests that theological method should give priority to the conscious and committed
siding with the poor in their struggle for liberation, in order to
avoid the danger of a false neutrality inherent in any reflection and
discourse, and not least in theology. This means that, (4) in a crucified reality where the poor are considered to be a theological locus,
the liberation of the poor becomes a theological objective in its own
right.
This in turn, implies almost by necessity that (5) there be a
major emphasis in theological method on concrete history and historical praxis, in order to overcome the reductionist and escapist
consequences of an erroneous idealism in theology. Rather than
orthodoxy, the stress is laid on orthopraxis. In terms of christology, this emphasis on praxis is expressed in the centrality of the following of Jesus (seguimiento), which Sobrino sees both as a
precondition and as a consequence of gaining knowledge about the
content of faith.
This leads Sobrino to affirm that (6) theology formally consists
in conceptualizing reality theologically. The material for theological
labour is thus not just written texts of the past, but also contemporary events and phenomena, which may be interpreted theologically
as signs of Gods presence, i.e. signs of the times. Finally, Sobrino
proposes that (7) through such a reformulation of the theological
task, theology should be understood as an intellectus amoris.
In all this, we have seen that Sobrino is profoundly indebted to
other liberation theologians, in particular to his late colleague, Ignacio Ellacura. In addition, Sobrino has received important influences from modern European philosophy and theology. But

123

perhaps more significantly, we have seen that this approach to theology has deep roots in the tradition of Jesuit spirituality.
In the course of this consideration of Sobrinos point of departure and fundamental presuppositions, I have raised some questions, doubts and critical objections. These have evolved in
particular around a complex of problems related to the inter-connection and understanding of concepts such as reality, history,
the poor and Christian salvation, which will be of importance in
my further inquiry.
Concluding the present chapter, I would like to highlight one
of the major issues that in my view is at stake here, formulated as a
challenge: How can one combine the absolute, partisan commitment to the poor i.e. the excluded and oppressed other with
a balanced, nuanced view of the fragmentariness and incompleteness of our perception of reality, thus taking seriously the ambiguity
and plurality of history and reality? Applied to the world of the
poor, this challenge can be formulated as follows: How can one
take due account of the diversity of forms of oppression, of the faces
of the poor, of their strategies for survival and liberation, without
losing sight of the common denominator of their situation? How
can one appreciate both the historical potential for strength that lies
in the consciousness of this similarity on the one hand, and the necessary (and promising) theological analysis of this similarity-in-difference on the other?
With these challenges in mind, I shall now concentrate on the
term the crucified people.

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ii. The Crucified People (1)

From Historical Reality to Theological Concept

[] en esas cruces se hace presente Jess y su Dios []1

Sobrino holds that theology, formally speaking, should be a theological conceptualising of historical reality. Accordingly, in this first
approach to an analysis of the crucified people, I shall follow its
journey from historical reality to theological concept. It is this basic
understanding of theological endeavour which makes it possible for
Sobrino to include such a concept in his theological thinking in the
first place, given that it is not a concept that can be derived directly
either from the Scriptures or from the Christian tradition. By saying
this, it is not implied that the idea of crucified people is without
any precedent or parallel, or that it does not have any biblical legitimation.This remains to be shown.2 But its main source is an interpretation of a contemporary historical phenomenon. It is thus a
new theological concept, a theologoumenon.3
We have seen how crucial it is for Sobrino to make true reality
the point of departure for theological reflection. Consequently, he
emphasises that the crucified people is primarily a historical reality,
and only thereafter a theological concept. Because theological concepts are limit-statements, and accordingly not directly accessible
to human understanding, they require prior experience of historical realities, Sobrino holds.4 I have shown which personal experi1
2
3

Sobrino 1993g, 358.

See, e.g., Boff and Pixley 1989 and Gonzlez Faus 1991. Cf. treatment below,
in Chapter viii, [1].
See definition in Introduction above.

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ences, according to Sobrino himself, have led him to give such

theological weight to the crucified people.5 But a few more points
could be made regarding the crucified people as historical reality.
By defining this historical phenomenon with the word crucified, at least three central traits are indicated. First, it is thereby designated as a dialectical and conflictive reality. Where there are
crucified, there are also crucifiers. Crucifixion means conflict with
deadly consequences. Calling the world of the poor, the Third
World, or suffering people in general crucified, consequently
implies that their situation is seen in an antagonistic framework,
not merely as a result of dysfunctions, natural causes or unfortunate
circumstances. 6
This antagonistic perspective inevitably leads to the second
trait, which is the political. The determination crucified carries
political connotations. It is a fact that execution by crucifixion was a
penalty for what one now would call political crimes. But because
of the spiritualisation this symbol has undergone during the centuries, there is a need to recover this political aspect of crucifixion.
Third, and most obviously, it indicates that this historical phenomenon is not exhaustively described in purely secular terms. To
call poor and oppressed people crucified, is to give them some sort
of religious significance. Thus, we move from historical reality to
theological concept.
The aim of this chapter is to seek answers to the following questions: Where does this new concept, the crucified people, come
from? How did it develop? What role does it play in Jon Sobrinos
christology? What is meant by it?
Having made some introductory observations on the origins
and development of the term, I shall proceed to a more thorough
4
5
6

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Sobrino 1994c, 37.

See Chapter i [1].
Sobrino 1991d, 424.

study of Ignacio Ellacuras innovative and suggestive treatment of

this theme. Once again, the study of Ellacura is required in order
to grasp the particularity and meaning of Sobrinos thinking on this
matter. Having examined Sobrinos writings on the topic, then, I
move to a preliminary critical assessment. This assessment will be
only preliminary because, as I will show, it will be necessary to see
the concept in light of other main tenets of Sobrinos christology in
order to make a fair judgement. Accordingly, I return to a final consideration and evaluation in Chapter viii, on the basis of which I
shall present my own position.

[1] Development of the Theme; Influences and Parallels

(1) The theme of the crucified people and how to do theology in its
presence, has gained increasing importance in Jon Sobrinos theological writings. In his early works, the theme was only indirectly
present. In Cristologia desde America Latina7, where the framework
and structure of Sobrinos theological thought is outlined, this idea
is implicit in his discussion on the Death of Jesus and Liberation in
History8. Treating the theme of the cross of Jesus from the viewpoint of the historical suffering and processes of liberation in Latin
America, there comes an oscillation in Sobrinos use of theological
concepts as cross and crucifixion, from a reference exclusively to
the suffering of Jesus to include also a reference to the sufferings of
Latin Americans today.
First, Sobrino interprets the death of the other, i.e. the
oppressed, the Indian, the poor, etc. as the mediation in history of
7
8

Sobrino 1976.
Sobrino 1976, 135-176.

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Gods suffering and death.9 Then he goes on to determine this suffering of the other as a suffering on the cross: [] the privileged
mediation of God continues to be the real cross of the oppressed.10
There is a profound interrelation between the cross of Jesus and
the historical crosses.11
However, Sobrino does not yet develop this relationship further. One reason may be found in the fact that Sobrino wrote this
book a short time after his return to Central America from Germany, where he had finished his doctoral studies on the christologies of Wolfhart Pannenberg and Jrgen Moltmann.12 Thus, it is
clearly influenced by Jrgen Moltmanns theology, and especially
Der gekreuzigte Gott13 an influence Sobrino openly admits.14
Moltmann also speaks metaphorically of contemporary crosses;
cross of reality15, cross of the present time16, etc. He speaks of
conformitas crucis17, following the cross18, crucified Chris9 Sobrino 1976, 147.
10 Sobrino 1976, 166: [] la mediacin privilegiada de Dios sigue siendo la
cruz real del oprimido.
11 Sobrino 1976, 172: [] la cruz de Jess y las cruces histricas. He also
speaks of [] una historia que sigue siendo de cruz e injusticia, Sobrino
1976, 175.
12 Sobrino 1975c.
13 Moltmann 1973, English translation: Moltmann 1974.
14 De Moltmann he aprendido mucho. Pero, tal vez, la diferencia radica en la
diversa situacin existente en Alemania y Latinoamrica. Moltmann trata de
un modo general cosas que nosotros tratamos de un modo concreto, por
cuanto que en Europa no existen esos conflictos reales que existen entre
nosotros. Yo dira que en Latinoamrica hacemos concretamente lo que
Moltmann presenta idealmente. Sobrino according to Gibellini 1981, 465473; 472. Cf. Gutirrez on Moltmann: Gutirrez 1984, 270-271.
15 Moltmann 1974, 4; 35.
16 Moltmann 1974, 9.
17 Moltmann 1974, 45.
18 Moltmann 1974, 54ff.

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tian199, and he discusses the relationship between the cross of Jesus

and the crosses of his followers. Although Moltmann gives these
issues a nuanced treatment which would need more thorough
examination in order to make a just comparison with Sobrino, it is
fair to say in broad terms that his main point regarding Jesus cross
and other crosses in Der gekreuzigte Gott, at least is to point
out the qualitative difference between these: The qualitative difference [] should not be ignored20. (T)he cross of Jesus is prior to
the taking up of the cross by others.21 Moltmanns discussion is
also basically held within the traditional framework of taking up
the cross as a conscious, committed act of faith by the followers of
Jesus, rather than a more general description of historical victims.22
Although differences in emphasis can be noted then, Sobrino
does not go much further than Moltmann in conceptualising the
crucified people at this early stage.
Some years later, in an article Sobrino originally published in
Sal Terrae in March 1982 (later reprinted in Jess en Amrica Latina),
the concept of the crucified people comes more to the foreground.
In The Risen One is the One Who Was Crucified: Jesus Resurrection from among the Worlds Crucified, he explicitly takes his
point of departure in the crucified of history23, trusting that this
will better recapture the original meaning of the resurrection as a
19
20
21
22

Moltmann 1974, 17, cf. 24, 25, 55, 124, 149, 152.
Moltmann 1974, 64.
Ibid.
This seems to have changed in Moltmanns later works, however. See e.g.
Moltmann 1990, 198, where he too speaks of the [] martyrdom of whole
groups, people, races, and so forth.
23 Sobrino 1982b, 148 / Sobrino 1982a, 173: [] los crucificados de la historia.
Note the following error in this Spanish edition: the titles of the two final
chapters have been switched. Chapter 7 is in fact El resucitado es el Crucificado [], while Chapter 8 is La Fe en el Hijo de Dios desde un pueblo
crucificado.

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resurrection not just of any person, but of the crucified Jesus of

Nazareth. Here it becomes evident that for Sobrino, the crucified
of history are not the conscious and faithful followers of Jesus
alone. It is a wider concept: In the human race today and certainly where I am writing many women and men, indeed entire
peoples, are crucified. 24
It is significant that this first approach to the theme of crucified
people emerges in the context of a reflection on the resurrection. In
Sobrinos later writings on the theme the perspective of resurrection
is not as explicit. He also deems it important to focus particularly
on the experience of crucifixion in its harshness and darkness, i.e.,
in some sense prior to, or independent of, the light of the resurrection. This is the focus he chooses in Jesucristo liberador, which is
reflected also in the present study. Such focus and methodological
procedure do not imply a negligence or playing down of the resurrection. On the contrary, it is legitimate and necessary to choose
this approach both from the actual experience of suffering from
which Sobrinos thinking emerges, and from the theological observation that the early Christian witnesses, even having experienced
the joy of Easter, make an effort not to forget the painful experience
of the crucifixion. Yet, faith in the resurrection of the crucified one
is in Sobrinos work always seen as a fundamental premise for theological reflection on the crucified ones of our time. Seeing these crucified people as carriers of hope and even salvation appears to be
possible only on the basis of the confession that this crucified Jesus
was raised from the dead.
In another article, published the same year,25 Sobrino starts a
more explicit reflection on the reality of the crucified people. He

24 Sobrino 1982b, 148.

25 In Concilium, Vol. 153, 1982, also reprinted in a revised version in Sobrino
1982a, 185-192 / Sobrino 1982b, 159-165.

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takes his cue from Ignacio Ellacura, seeing the crucified people in
relation to the Songs of the Servant of Yahweh in Isaiah.
More recently this concept of the crucified people has moved
into the very centre of Sobrinos theology, to such an extent that it
can be used to characterise his theology as such. This is shown i.a.
through his inclusion of an entire chapter on this term in the first
volume of his reformulated and expanded christology, Jesucristo liberador26, and in the subtitle of his El Principio Misericordia. Bajar de
la cruz a los pueblos crucificados from 1991. In this book, Sobrino
wishes to set down that the sign of the times par excellence is the
existence of the crucified people, and the most urgent demand is
to take them down from the cross. 27
(2) Sobrino is not the first to introduce the crucified people as
theologoumenon. As in so many other aspects of his theological
thinking, here too he follows Ignacio Ellacura, who in 1979 wrote a
groundbreaking article on the subject. Sobrino also remembers
some of Archbishop Romeros sermons as a direct influence that
made him develop this theme, and in particular he gives significance to the pastoral visit to Aguilares in June 1979, which I referred
to at the beginning of this study.28
There are also other contemporary theologians in Latin America who have been exploring similar approaches, although with dif26 Sobrino 1991d, 423-451.
27 Sobrino 1992b, 7: [] quiere asentar que el signo de los tiempos por antonomasia es la existencia del pueblo crucificado, y la exigencia ms primigenia es la de bajarlo de la cruz. This last formulation gives cause to some
wonder already at this stage. Why is it a task to take the crucified down?
Would not the challenge for Christian faith be rather to see them resurrected? And is there any difference? The formulation to take the crucified
down has Jesuit roots, which may throw some light on this vagueness. See
Chapter viii [4], thesis 10.2.
28 See Introduction above.

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ferent emphases. The most important among these are E. Dussel,

G. Gutirrez, L. Boff, C. Mesters and F. Hinkelammert, all major
proponents of Latin American liberation theology.29
But Sobrino also finds historical roots for a theology of the
crucified people in Latin America. These are particularly to be
found in Bartolom de Las Casas (1484-1576) writings. Gutirrez,
in his seminal work on Las Casas life and theology En la busca de los
pobres de Jesucristo, sees the recognition of Jesus in the mistreated
and oppressed Indians as the central point in Las Casas spirituality
and theology.30 A central quotation from Las Casas to which
Sobrino makes repeated reference, is the following:

29 In Dussel 1969, 127-170, which is actually a reprint of a study from 1963, the
author makes an analysis of the aspects of universalism and mission in the
Servant Songs. The perspective of this early study is not as contextually
rooted and socially committed as that of Dussels later writings. He does not
(yet) relate the suffering poor people of Latin America to the mission of the
Servant. In Gustavo Gutirrez writings, the central theme is Gods particular
solidarity and identification with the poor and suffering, as already pointed
out. See e.g., Gutirrez 1982, 96-130; 112, and Gutirrez 1993a, 148-158; 153:
Desde el sufrimiento cotidiano del pueblo pobre y desde la vida entregada
en la lucha contra las causas de esa situacin se produce una nueva vigencia
del mensaje pascual. In Leonardo Boff s Boff 1987a and Boff 1987b the connection between the suffering of the people and the suffering of Jesus is
made explicit, to the point of being unified in the term crucified. The biblical scholar Carlos Mesters (Mesters 1983), also from Brazil, presents a popular re-reading of the Servant Songs which concludes that El Siervo de Dios
es el pueblo oprimido; pp. 144ff. The economist and lay theologian Franz
Hinkelammert develops a profound and peculiar criticism of capitalism in
terms of crucifixion in Hinkelammert 1981, 223-268.
30 Esta vivencia lo condujo al punto central de su espiritualidad y su teologa:
el reconocimiento de Jess de Nazaret, el Cristo, en los maltratados y
flagelados de la Indias. Gutirrez 1992, 71, cf. 71-100. English version:
Gutirrez 1993b.

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In the Indies I leave Jesus Christ, our God, being whipped and afflicted, and
buffeted and crucified, not once but thousands of times, as often as the
Spaniards assault and destroy those people. 31

Moreover, it seems that the theological reflection on contemporary

suffering in terms of crucifixion, is something which has emerged
in several areas of the so-called Third World during the last
decades.32 This trend has been taken up by the Ecumenical Institute in Strasbourg, which in 1992 organised and published a studyproject called The Scandal of a Crucified World.33 The study explores
the relationship between a traditional theologia crucis and these new
reflections on contemporary suffering, and their possible ecumenical potential.
To my knowledge, however, Sobrino is the first among these
contributors who (1) explicitly speaks of a crucified people and (2)
integrates this in a complete christological framework, and finally
(3) explicitly reflects upon the consequences of such a reality/concept for the theological endeavour as a whole. This is why I have
chosen to concentrate on his elaboration of this theme.34 This cannot be done, however, without a due consideration of Ignacio Ellacuras contributions.

31 Sobrino 1994c, 11 /Sobrino 1991d, 31: [] yo dejo en las Indias a Jesucristo,

nuestro Dios, azotndolo y afligindolo y abofetendolo y crucificndolo, no
una sino millares de veces, cuanto es de parte de los espaoles que asuelan y
destruyan auellas gentes. The quotation is from Bartolom de Las Casas
Historia de las Indias, II. 511b. Sobrino takes it from Gutirrez 1989, 169 f.
32 From an African context, see e.g., Nolan 1988, 49-67. From an Asian context: Song 1990.
33 Tesfai 1994.
34 For a discussion of the term people / pueblo, see below, Chapter viii, [2].

133

[2] Ignacio Ellacura: The Crucified People

and Historical Soteriology
Ellacura wrote El pueblo crucificado. Ensayo de soteriologa
histrica35 during the preparations for the Latin American Bishops
Conference (CELAM) in Puebla in 1979. The subtitle is significant:
Ellacura sets out to deal with this theme primarily within the field
of soteriology. That this soteriology is furthermore defined as historical, is in accordance with perhaps the key concern in his own theological and philosophical contributions; namely that which he
terms historizacin historisation.36 From his early writings37
until his last38, it remains the focal point.

35 Ellacura 1978a, see also Ellacura 1989a. An English translation of this essay
is found in Ellacura and Sobrino 1993, 580-603.
36 Jos Maria Mardones sees the emphasis on historicization of the theological
concepts in liberation theology in general and in Ellacuras writings in particular as one of these questions that characterize a whole way of thinking,
correcting a deficiency and omission of predominant theology [] una
de esas questiones que sealan todo un estilo de pensamiento teolgico, corrector de una deficiencia y olvido de la teologa predominante Mardones
1992, 84.
37 See e.g. Ellacura 1973 (English version: Ellacura 1976) which was Ellacuras
first theological book, where he straightaway outlines his position, saying
we must historicize salvation (Ellacura 1976, 5), and (S)alvation history is
a salvation in history: This statement is the theme of this whole book 15. Cf.
e.g. Ellacura 1975a, 425: [] ha de historizarse la salvacin []
38 See Ellacura 1991c, in which he proposes profetismo as method and
utopa as horizon for the historizacin del reino de Dios, 394. Ellacura
wrote this article, which was first published in Revista Latinoamericana de
Teologa (RLT) 17 (1989), pp. 141-184 (with the full title Utopia y profetismo
desde Amrica Latina), just a few months before he was assassinated.
Sobrino considers it a verdadero testamento, cf. Sobrino 1994b and Sobrino
1994a.

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What is meant by historizacin? Obviously, it is more than the

mere analysis of the historical origin and development of a given
theological concept. It does not mean to tell its story, but to put
it in relation to history.39 It means giving it socio-historical
flesh,40 filling it with a concrete historical content.41 This also
goes beyond the (hermeneutical) actualisation of meaning, because
it does not only intend to explain what the concept could signify in
the historical situation today, but furthermore seeks to make the
concept historically effective, to make it operational. Put in classical
hermeneutical terms, one could say that it moves beyond the mere
explicatio, and on to applicatio.
But even more than this, the historicity that Ellacura seeks
takes at least three forms: 1) historicity as real-life authenticity, 2)
historicity as effectiveness in history, 3) historicity as hope in an
eschatological future.42 This corresponds to Ellacuras insistence
that the biblical definition of truth is not a factum, given once for
all, but a faciendum, which always seek to be verified, literally
made true, through praxis in actual history. It has, in other words,
a future-oriented and practical character carcter futuro y
prxico.43

39 Ellacura 1984a, 181: Para ello [recuperar la plenitud del sentido de trminos
como sacramento y salvacin], nada como historizarlos, lo cual no significa contar su historia, sino ponerlos en relacin con la historia.
40 Mardones 1992, 83. NB: The word utilizar in this articles first sentence is
most probably an error. I believe the correct wording should be: Una de las
insistencias que recorren los escritos de I. Ellacura es la necesidad de historizar los conceptos teolgicos (my emphasis, SJS.) Mardones continues:
Formulado libremente quiere decir que es necesario dar carne histricosocial a conceptos como pecado, gracia, salvacin, cruz, Iglesia, reindo de
Dios, etc.
41 Ibid.
42 Ellacura 1976, 93.

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We can see then, that the movement between theology and history goes both ways: Theology means both to conceptualise theologically historical reality and to historicise theological concepts.
This dual movement is clearly found in Ellacuras conceptualisation
of the crucified people, which Sobrino subsequently develops further.
Ellacura sets out from historical reality, which he sees as simply the existence of a vast portion of humankind which is literally
and historically crucified.44 What is the meaning of this from the
perspective of salvation history, which to Ellacura means salvation
in history? The question is thus posed in terms of historical soteriology,45 and the dual movement is clear: Faced with this historical
reality he asks what it might mean in theological terms (historical
soteriology). In terms of the crucified people: the people are crucified. And he asks what the main theological theme salvation
might mean when one finds oneself confronted with this historical
reality (historical soteriology). The people are crucified.
It is important at this stage to note carefully two presuppositions that Ellacuria sets forth in his understanding of historical soteriology: (1) It deals with a salvation that has to be realised within
human history, which according to him is the only history there is.
43 Ellacura 1975b, 346: El verum de la Biblia no es un factum dado, una vez
por todas, sino un faciendum. De ah que la reflexin teolgica, ejercitada
desde un logos histrico, no intenta tan slo determinar la realidad y el sentido de lo ya hecho, sino que, desde esa determinacin y en direccin a lo
por hacer, debe veri-ficar, hacer verdadero y real lo que ya en s es principio
de verdad. Por este carcter futuro y prxico no basta con la mera aceptacin
e inteleccin de la Biblia; o, si se prefiere, la intelleccin real de la Biblia
implica desde s misma el ejercicio de una determinada inteligencia, la del
logos histrico(Thesis 10.2.4.).
44 Ellacura 1989a, 305.
45 Although it involves many christological and ecclesiological themes as
Ellacura puts it (ibid.).

136

And (2) humanity participates actively in the realisation of this salvation in history. 46
(1) That there is only one history, is a basic contention of Latin
American liberation theology, which Ellacura had been advocating
since the early 70s, when he launched a fundamental critique of the
traditional Catholic division between natural and supernatural.
Like e.g. Gustavo Gutirrez47 then, Ellacura holds that there is no
separation between a secular history and history of revelation,48
although he is forced to admit that one may experience some differences between what may be a history of salvation and the real
history in which one lives empirically. The point is however that
the believer sees these two as unified or, better, united in what may
be called the great history of God.49 This is possible, in Ellacuras
view, because history is in itself transcendentally open, and because
in this openness, God is present.50
Ellacura makes a great effort to give a solid basis for the unity
of history. This is not the place for a profound analysis of his application of the philosophical-theological positions of Rahner and
Zubiri, and his own development of a philosophy of history. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the very struggle of Ellacura to reach
such an understanding of history, and his somewhat insistent and
repetitive tone when discussing it, points to some profound difficul46 Ellacura 1989a, 306.
47 Gutirrez 1984, 199-226; 200: (L)a afirmacin es clara, en concreto: Hay
una sola historia. Una historia cristofinalizada. Cf. above, Chapter i [2].
48 Ellacura 1984a, 195.
49 Ellacura 1991b, 352. Aceptando que puede darse alguna diferencia entre lo
que puede ser una historia de salvacin y la historia real que le toca vivir
empricamente, puede decirse que en el fondo el creyente ve estas dos historias unificadas o, ms bien, unidas en lo que pudiera llamarse la gran historia
de Dios.
50 Ellacura 1993a, 8 : La historia es de suyo transcendentalmente abierta y en
esa transcendentalidad est ya la presencia, al menos incoada, de Dios.

137

ties in defending his view and overviewing its consequences.51 I

have already voiced the suspicion that Ellacuras realism in the end
becomes too narrow, too closed in spite of his many assertions of
the opposite so that it is not able to carry the full weight of the
theological implications that are intended.
(2) The idea of the unity of history is so important in liberation
theology because it unites the quest for salvation with the struggle
for liberation in history. Ellacura, as we recall, speaks of a historical
theo-praxis and praxis of salvation as the place where the work
of God and the activity of human beings come together in a dual
unity of God in human being and human being in God.52 This
dual unity is expressed in the Bible in the historical praxis of Moses,
of the people of Israel, and ultimately of Jesus. Consequently,
participating in such praxis is the core of Christian existence. This is
what makes salvation history become salvation in history: Action
in and on history, the salvation of social man (sic) in history, is the
real pathway whereby God will ultimately deify man (sic!).53
This anti-dualistic view of history and salvation and Gods salvation and human participation has been and continues to be one
of the key issues in the debate or controversy on Latin American
liberation theology. Its intention is clearly to avoid, on the one
hand, religious quietism or escapism, and the vulnerability to ideological manipulation, which easily follows any theological thinking
in two rooms (cf. Bonhoeffer) or two levels (cf. Gutirrez). And, on
the other hand, to rule out the possible use of religion as a legitimi51 If there is only one history, what does it actually mean that this history is
transcendentally open? What would it be open towards?
52 See particularly Ellacura 1991b, 232-372; 340: [] afirma la unidad dual de
Dios en el hombre y el hombre en Dios. Este en juega una distinta funcin y
tiene distinta densidad cuando la accin es de Dios en el hombre y cuando la
accin es del hombre en Dios, pero siempre es el mismo en.
53 Ellacura 1976,18.

138

sation of unjust structures through a one-sided doctrine of salvation/justification which justifies the oppressor and bids the
oppressed to resign and be content with their lot. These dangers,
and the urgency of overcoming them, are something which the history of the church, not least in Latin America, clearly demonstrates.54
As they concern fundamental and classical theological loci, these
two soteriological presuppositions immediately actualise traditional
dividing lines within theology, such as the one between Catholic
and Protestant soteriology.55 And at the same time they present new
dividing lines: First World/Third World theology, European political theology/liberation theology, etc. It will become clear through
this inquiry that the conclusions regarding the legitimacy and usefulness of speaking theologically of crucified people(s) and the relevance of a theological methodology along the lines proposed by
Sobrino, depend to a considerable degree on how one views these
presuppositions.
Let us now return to Ellacuras essay on the crucified people.
Continuing in this constantly dialectical movement between contemporary history and theological interpretation, Ellacura wishes
to analyse the figure of Jesus and the oppressed humankind from
that point of view which unifies them: their passion and death. 56
Their unity or likeness in suffering makes it, in Ellacuras opinion,
hermeneutically justified to let them shed light on each other: the
crucified people sheds light on the historical significance of the
54 See Chapter iii, below.
55 These issues have been in the forefront in recent Lutheran Roman Catholic dialogue, see e.g. Lutheran-Roman Catholic 1994 and the process towards
a Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification Between the Lutheran World
Federation and the Roman Catholic Church. Although differences and unresolved problems still remain, it is fair to say that there has been considerable
rapprochement between the two churches in this field.
56 Ellacura 1989a, 306.

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death of Jesus, and the death of Jesus points to the salvific character of the crucified people.
Focusing on the historicity of Jesus death, it is clear, according
to Ellacura, that his death had historical causes just like the death
of the crucified people. The necessity of Jesus suffering of which
the evangelists speak (Gr.: edei pathein), was first and foremost historical, not theological, he believes.57 It was the necessary historical
consequence of a life which corresponded to Gods word. Through
long historical experience culminating with Jesus, the conclusion
emerges: (I)n our (historical) world it is necessary to pass through
persecution and death in order to reach the glory of God. 58
This is only so, however, because of sin. The realm of sin and
the realm of God are opposite realities.59 There is a collective sin
which governs the world and the peoples, destroys history and is
an obstacle to Gods future. We all share in this collective sin,
which is anterior to the individual sins of each.60 This historical,
collective sin puts Jesus to death. That is the true meaning of the
confession that Jesus died for our sins, Ellacura believes.61
This means that Jesus did not have to die primarily for sacrificial or expiatory purposes, according to Ellacura. Although he
admits that interpretations along these lines of such major importance in the Christian tradition do contain some valid elements,
they are insufficient in Ellacuras view, because they underscore the
historical necessity neither of the collective sin nor of the human
action to confront it by destroying injustice and constructing
love.
57
58
59
60

On the necessity of suffering, see my discussion in Chapter vii [5], below.

Ellacura 1989a, 313.
Ellacura 1989a, 314.
The collective sin grounds the individual sins and makes them possible,
Ellacura holds.
61 Ellacura 1989a, 314.

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Here we reach a main point in Ellacuras soteriological thinking: The power of sin can only be overcome through bearing its consequences: suffering under it. Salvation in history can be achieved only
through confronting sin in an active struggle against it, and bearing
the consequences of the opposition which such a struggle always
by historical necessity will meet. So it was with Jesus in his time,
and so it is with the crucified people today, according to Ellacura.
This point is indeed problematic when applied to suffering people today, as I shall show. There is a striking vagueness in Ellacuras
expressions here, and pressing questions emerge: Why is this so,
that sin is overcome by suffering under it? How is salvation actually
brought about? These questions are not answered by Ellacura. The
vagueness could be explained by the nature of the matter: In the
why and how of salvation, theology reaches its definite limit; it
is facing the unfathomable mystery. Nevertheless, theology must
always be prepared to give convincing reasons for why it holds this
(and not that) to be such a mystery, and why it chooses to express
that mystery in exactly these terms. This becomes increasingly
urgent in an attempt to historicise theological concepts, as we find
in Ellacura. Is this vagueness perhaps rather a symptom of inconsistency an inconsistency that Sobrino would inherit? We shall have
to pay close attention to this as we proceed.62
A historical interpretation of the death of Jesus is thus necessary in order to understand its salvific value, Ellacura insists. It is,
in fact, not possible to separate the historical and the soteriological
in Jesus case.63 It is his historical announcement and service of the
coming Kingdom which meets resistance to the point of persecution and execution. And it is because it was this particular man
(Jesus of Nazareth) who was crucified for these particular reasons
(the service of the Kingdom), and who suffered the consequences
62 See below, Chapter vi.
63 Ellacura 1989a, 317.

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without resignation, that he was raised from among the dead,

something which testifies to his unique salvific significance. The
point in asking about the historical aspects of the death of Jesus is to
uncover where and how the saving action of Jesus was carried out
in order to pursue it in history . 64
Recalling now the two presuppositions mentioned above, it follows that according to Ellacura, (1) the salvation that Jesus brings
must be continued, made effective in and through (the one and
only) history (it is by no means a-historical, but trans-historical65),
and (2) humankind must participate in this continued realisation of
Jesus salvific action. But interestingly, by this he does not refer to
humankind as such, in a universalistic meaning, but to a concrete
part of it. Which part, then, can be held to be the historical continuation of Jesus life and death? Ellacuras answer is clear: the
crucified people.
Then, turning from Jesus to the crucified people, Ellacura asks
about its salvific significance. Herein lies the boldest, most original
and radical novelty of his essay: to see the oppressed people as not
only the main addressee of the salvific effort, but furthermore the
principle of salvation for the whole world.66 This is obviously a
scandal, Ellacura admits.67 To expect to find salvation in the outcasts and downtrodden of this world is foolishness.68 But it is in his
view exactly the same foolishness and scandal which is linked to the
Christian interpretation of the death of Jesus.
64 Ellacura 1989a, 317: La soteriologa histrica lo que hace es buscar dnde y
cmo se realiz la accin salvfica de Jess, para proseguirla en la historia.
65 Ellacura 1989a, 318.
66 Ellacura 1989a, 319. Lo que aade la fe cristiana a la constatacin histrica
del pueblo oprimido es la sospecha de si, adems de ser el destinatario principal del esfuerzo salvfico, no ser tambn en su situacin crucificada principio de salvacin para el mundo entero.
67 Ellacura 1989a, 307-308.

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By the crucified people Ellacura understands

[] that collective body, which as the majority of humankind owes its situation of crucifixion to the way society is organized and maintained by a
minority that exercises its dominion through a series of factors, which taken
together and given their concrete impact within history, must be regarded as
sin. 69

By this definition he emphasises that it is a collective entity, and not

just suffering individuals, and that its suffering is a result of historical causes, and not primarily natural.
It is not something novel or strange to the Christian tradition to
attribute a salvific role to a collectivity. To show this, and to concre68 It is a scandal both from the point of view of those who struggle for historical liberation, and for Christians. The former (it is obvious that Ellacura
here has political forces of some sort of Marxist inspiration in mind) have
had the merit of attributing to a lower class the proletariat in Marxist
thinking a salvific-liberating role on behalf of the whole society, but at the
same time they rejected the idea that the even lower class, the Lumpenproletariat, could play any such role. In Christian thinking, which firmly holds
that there is salvation in the cross of Jesus, nevertheless there has been a tendency after the resurrection to forget the shame and scandal of the cross in
view of the victory and glory of the resurrection. Ellacura 1989a, 308-309.
69 English text taken from Ellacura and Sobrino 1993, 590. Ellacura 1989a, 318:
[] aquella colectividad que, siendo la mayora de la humanidad, debe su
situacin de crucifixin a un ordenamiento social promovido y sostenido por
una minora que ejerce su dominio en funcin de un conjunto de factores,
los cuales, como tal conjunto y dada su concreta efectividad histrica, deben
estimarse como pecado. In spite of this clear division into majority and
minority and their respective role and responsibility for the situation of
oppression, Ellacura warns against a simplistic interpretation of the historical causes of oppression: [] no caer en una divisin maniquesta del
mundo, que pondra a un lado todo lo bueno y al otro lado lo malo. In
order to avoid this, he deems it necessary to study with care the subsystems
of crucifixion which exist among the oppressed as well as among the
oppressors (p. 320).

143

tise the salvific role of the crucified people, Ellacura now turns to
an analysis of the Suffering Servant in the book of Isaiah. Faithful to
his hermeneutical principles, Ellacuras interpretation of these texts
is not a mere historical-critical exegesis, but a re-reading from a particular point of view, a particular locus theologicus.70 The choice of
reading the texts of the Suffering Servant from the point of view of
the crucified people is not arbitrary, he holds, because the crucified
people, in his opinion, must be considered the true addressees of
these texts in our historical moment. That this is so, can be confirmed only if it turns out that the texts shed new light on the reality of the crucified people, and if this reality helps clarify and
actualise the texts. This certainly does not exclude a rigorous exegetical examination, but it subordinates this, Ellacura is eager to point
out.71
So, what does the Suffering Servant tell about the crucified people, according to Ellacura? In short, (1) the Servant is chosen by
God (Is. 42,1-7) in order to (2) bring justice to all the peoples of the
world (42,4). In this election, (3) God shows preference for the
lowly, the one(s) despised by the powerful (49,4; 7). (4) The Servants task will lead to persecution and suffering (50,7; 52,14; 53), but
the Suffering Servant shall (5) endure the hardships (50,5-9; 53,7)
and gain victory through them (53,11-12), a victory which (6) means
salvation not just for the Servant but for many(53,4-5; 11-12).
The description of the Suffering Servant in Isaiah reaches its climax in chapters 52,13 -53. From this fourth song, Ellacura draws
the following eight conclusions:
(1) The Servant is someone who is crushed because of the historical intervention by human beings.

70 Ellacura 1989a, 306, 321-2. Cf. Chapter i [2] b) and c) above.

71 Ellacura 1989a, 322.

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(2) The Servant is not just someone who is not expected to be a

possible Saviour, but someone who is treated with disgust, and considered to be humiliated and punished by God.
(3) The Servant is considered to be a sinner, because he bears
the sin of others. He dies as the fruit of sin, and as filled with sins.
(4) From a perspective of faith it is discovered that the cause of
the Servants sufferings is not his own sins, but the rebellions and
crimes of the people.
(5) The Servant accepts this destiny, takes on the full weight of
the sins which put him to death, even though they are not his own.
By doing so, he takes away the sins of the people. The death of the
Servant is expiation and intercession for the sins of the world.
(6) The Servant triumphs: His death was not the failure it
seemed to be, but leads to justification of others, light and wisdom
through generations.
(7) The believer sees in the fate of the Servant the act of God.
God takes on this situation: By accepting to carry the crimes of
human beings, the Servant pleases God. This is by far the most difficult and scandalous aspect in the Servant Songs, Ellacura admits:
[] God accepts as having been wished by himself, as salutary, the sacrifice
of someone who has concretely died for reason of the sins of human beings.
Only in a difficult act of faith is the sacred writer able to discover, in the
Songs of the Servant, that which seems to the eyes of history to be the complete opposite. Precisely because he sees someone burdened with sins that he
has not committed, and crushed by their consequences, the singer of these
songs makes bold, by virtue of the very injustice of the situation, to ascribe
all this to God: God must necessarily attribute a fully salvific value to this act
of absolute concrete injustice. And the attribution can be made because the
Servant himself accepts his destiny to save, by his own suffering, those who
are actually the causes of it.72

And finally, (8) Ellacura holds that the global orientation or universal scope of these songs about the Servant makes it impossible to

145

determine once and for all who this Servant is: Suffering Servant of
Yahweh will be anyone who discharges the mission described in the
songs and par excellence the one discharging it in a more comprehensive fashion.73
Since Christian faith first and foremost identifies the Servant
with Jesus, Ellacura thinks that the link between the Servant and
the crucified people should be seen in light of the Servant christology of the New Testament. He notes that direct reference to this
title (Gr.: pais theou) is not frequent in the New Testament texts,
and that it virtually disappeared early on as a direct reference to
Jesus or a christological title, since it did not mean much to the
early-Christian Hellenistic communities.74 Nevertheless the Servant
christology is of primary importance in the New Testament when it
comes to interpreting the salvific value of the death of Jesus, Ellacura holds.
To what extent Jesus himself attributed any salvific value to his
death, is disputed. He probably did not see himself as the Servant.
The main point for Ellacura, however, is that Jesus did not seek
72 Ellacura and Sobrino 1993, 598. Spanish original: Son las frases ms fuertes,
pero que admiten la interpretacin que Dios acepta como querido por El,
como saludable, el sacrificio de quien histricamente es muerto por los pecados de los hombres. Slo en un difcil acto de fe el cantor del siervo es capaz
de descubrir lo que aparece como todo lo contrario a los ojos de la historia.
Precisamente porque ve cargado de los pecados y de las consecuencias del
pecado a quien no los cometi, se atreve, por la misma injusticia de la situacin, a atribuir a Dios lo que est sucediendo; Dios no puede menos de
atribuir un valor permanente salvfico a este acto de absoluta injusticia
histrica. Y se lo puede atribuir porque el propio siervo acepta su destino de
salvar por el sufrimiento a quienes son los causantes de l. Ellacura 1989a,
326.
73 Siervo doliente de Yahv ser todo aquel que desempee la misin descrita
en los cnticos, y lo ser por antonomasia quien la desempae de forma ms
total. Ellacura 1989a, 326.
74 Ellacura 1989a, 327.

146

death for its own (possibly salvific) sake, but accepted death as the
result of his life in struggle against the historical consequences of
sin. The death must be seen as a consequence of his life, a life
expressed in a public announcement of and active and consistent
commitment to the justice which God brings, the Kingdom.75
Thus the salvific value of the death of Jesus is seen as intimately
connected to the concrete character of that life, of which it was a
consequence.
It is this salvific life-death that needs a continuation in history 76,
according to Ellacura. The salvation that Jesus brings is trans-historical.77 But who represents this continuation? Theoretically, several possibilities are open. The crucial point is theologically
interpreted whether God accepts it as such a continuation.78 This
can only be tested against its similarity to what happened to the historical Jesus, Ellacura believes.
In the Servant, as in Jesus, the victim becomes saviour. Ellacura
finds this interpretation fundamentally confirmed and founded in
the scene of the Last Judgement in Matt. 25:31-46. Therefore it is
possible for faith in spite of all the scandal it provokes also to see
the crucified people as saviours, who will eventually bring resurrection, justice, and new life, Ellacura concludes.
This is, in my judgment, a bold new step in theology. Making
the explicit connection between the Suffering Servant, Jesus, and
suffering and oppressed humankind of today, resulting in the attri75 Ellacura 1989a, 329: [] la muerte no fue sino la culminacin de su vida, el
momento definitivo de su entrega total en el anuncio en la realizacin del
reino.
76 This question about continuation actualises again traditional dividing lines
between Catholic and Protestant soteriology. Compare my discussions on
continuity and discontinuity below.
77 Ellacura 1989a, 318.
78 Ellacura 1989a, 330.

147

bution of a salvific role to this particular portion of humankind, is a

radical thought.
It is not without difficulties, though. As I have pointed out, it
rests on two soteriological presuppositions in Ellacuras outline:
first, that salvation must be realised in human history. Second, that
salvation is realised through human participation. These presuppositions express some of the more controversial contentions of liberation theology. They have been criticised from different theological
positions.79 But if one for the moment accepts Ellacuras presuppositions, there are still problems emerging from his text that must be
addressed.
To begin with: as I have pointed out, there was also a third soteriological axiom here, namely that salvation requires suffering the
consequences of (struggle against) the power of sin. Consequently,
it must be asked: Why does the suffering of the crucified people
bring salvation? Ellacura provides no exact answer to this question.
The above-mentioned vagueness of his reference to the expiatory
significance of the Servants death points to his difficulty in coming
to terms with this. There are aspects of substitution and expiation,
and a clear element of sacrificial theology in the Servant Songs
especially in the Fourth Song which become particularly problematic when transferred to the crucified people.
In connection with this, it must be asked if carrying the sins of
others really is the same as suffering under (the consequences of )
the sins of others? Ellacura seems to mix these, the carrying and
the suffering under. But they are not identical, nor interchangeable, in my opinion. If they were, would not that imply that the sinners somehow were released from the consequences of their sins by
the simple fact that others carry (suffer) these consequences? Or to
79 Cf. the accusations of reductionism, activism and perhaps dolorism, or
idealisation of poverty and suffering, which is implicit and explicit in many
texts critical of liberation theology. See note 50 in the Introduction above.

148

remain in the terminology of crucifixion: would it not in fact admit

the view that crucifiers become liberated through the mere fact that
there are crucified ones, suffering under their evil deeds? It is indeed
hard to see, both from historical experience and theological reflection, that it actually works that way.80
Ellacura is not sufficiently careful at this point. He simply
states that sin and evil are overcome by suffering their consequences. Now, in response it may be argued that Ellacura does
underscore that it is not the passion-and-death in itself that saves,
but a life in service of the Kingdom, even when this meets resistance
to the point of persecution and death. There is an inseparable lifedeath connection at work here. But that would mean that the suffering of the people could be classified as a crucifixion only insofar as
it is a result of a reproduction of Jesus service for the Kingdom in
history. And that would in its turn make it impossible to speak of
the crucified people in terms of a vast portion of humankind, or
even to speak of it as a people if it is not taken to be Gods people
in a more general, theological sense.
This question of how the crucified people bring salvation, raises
another objection: Do the crucified people actually accept their suffering? It is said of the Servant that it is through his acceptance of
suffering that salvation is carried out. Here is another questionmark attached to Ellacuras historical soteriology. If the victim is (or
may be) in the end a saviour, is he/she then in fact an unconscious or anonymous saviour?81 If it is to be understood like this,
it must be admitted Ellacura might actually look to Matt. 25 in
support for such an interpretation. As we have just seen, he does
refer to this text, although very briefly.
80 I shall develop this observation further in Chapters vi-viii below.
81 This could, in case, be a result of the profound influence of Karl Rahner on
Ellacura. Cf. Rahners famous notion of anonymous Christians. Compare
also Chapter iv, [10], below.

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Finally, in this essay Ellacura does not explain what the salvation that the crucified people bring actually consists in. But this is a
shortcoming he is well aware of. He points therefore to the necessity
of further reflection. And that is where Sobrino takes over.

[3] Jon Sobrino: The Crucified People

as the Body of the Crucified Christ in History
Ignacio Ellacuras essay gave Sobrino an incitement and opportunity to develop further his christology on this point, going now
beyond the explicit positions he had inherited from Moltmann. In
1982, he published two articles in which the crucified people plays
the central role.82 In these he uses different terms, such as the crucified in history, the crucified people(s), or simply the crucified, which could indicate that his approach is somewhat more
flexible than Ellacuras, making use of a wider definition than his.
But it is in Jesucristo liberador that one finds Sobrinos most
detailed and developed discussion on the significance of the crucified people. He dedicates the last chapter to this theme, within the
wider framework of the christological significance of the death of
Jesus.83 In the introduction Sobrino notes that he sees the inclusion
of this theme in his christology as a novelty:
82 Sobrino 1982a, 173-192. / Sobrino 1982b, 148-165.
83 Sobrino 1991d, 423-451. / Sobrino 1994c, 254-271.- Given Sobrinos emphasis
in beginning with reality, since this reality is crucified, the chapter on the
crucified people might theoretically have been the first as well as the last
chapter of his book. In the following chapters I will reverse Sobrinos order
by starting from the crucified people, and then proceed to the crucified Jesus
and the crucified God. It is of course the circularity of understanding and
interpretation which makes both ways possible.

150

This chapter is usually not included in christologies. Some analyze what the
cross has to say about Jesus Father and speak of the crucified God, but it is
unusual to analyze what this same cross has to say about Jesus body in history.84

Jesus body in history is traditionally an ecclesiological theme.

Sobrino wishes to approach it christologically, however, asking
whether this body is crucified, what element of this body is crucified, and if its crucifixion is the presence of the crucified Christ in
history.85
References to Ellacura are explicit and frequent in this chap86
ter. Sobrino follows his approach closely. It starts out with a
straightforward claim regarding the existence of historical crosses:
From the Third World viewpoint there is no doubt that the cross
exists, not just individual crosses, but collective crosses of whole
peoples.87 Then, the concept of crucified people is approached
through a meditation on these peoples similarity with the figure of
the Suffering Servant. The crucified people resemble the Servant, in
Sobrinos view, in being familiar with illness and suffering (Is. 53,3);
in having as mission to establish justice (42,4-7), in meeting violent
opposition when procuring to carry out this mission; in an ugliness
that causes rejection and astonishment (52,14; 53,3); in being reck84 Sobrino 1994c, 254./ Sobrino 1991d, 423.
85 Sobrino 1994c, 254 / Sobrino 1991d, 423: [] si ese cuerpo est crucificado,
qu de ese cuerpo lo est y si la crucifixin de ese cuerpo es la presencia en la
historia de Cristo crucificado.
86 Sobrino 1991d, 423, n. 2: En este captulo citamos con frequencia a Ignacio
Ellacura, no slo porque su martirio lo ha introducido para siempre en el
pueblo crucificado, sino porque lo tuvo siempre radicalmente presente en
todo lo que hizo y dijo, y como telogo fue pionero, a mi entender, en teologizar a los pueblos del tercer mundo como pueblos crucificados.
87 Sobrino 1994c, 254 / Sobrino 1991d, 423: Desde el tercer mundo, no cabe
duda de que hay cruz, no slo cruces individuales, sino colectivas, las de pueblos enteros.

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oned as a sinner, punished by God (53,4; 12) and despised even in

death (53,7-9) through an unjust execution, and finally being buried
with the wicked in spite of their innocence.
In this last part, however, Sobrino also points to some differences. Not all among the crucified people are silent on the way to
their conviction (53,7); many protest loudly and even resist actively.
Sobrino remembers Archbishop Romero as one example. And not
all among the crucified peoples are even given any grave at all. Here
it is of course the thousands and thousands of disappeared (desaparecidos) in his own country and in Latin America in general that
Sobrino particularly has in mind.
Nevertheless, it is clear that they resemble the Servant, according to Sobrino: In their poverty and death they are like the Servant
and at least in this but this least is a maximum they are also like
Jesus crucified.88 The similarity between the Servant and the crucified people indicates that they are the body of Christ in actual history, then. Sobrino even holds that there can be no doubt that
these peoples are the ones who go on filling up in their own flesh
what is lacking in Christs passion (Col. 1: 24).89
Why can the crucified people be said to represent Christ?
Because they resemble the Suffering Servant, who in Christian faith
and tradition is held to refer to Jesus himself. But if this likeness
between the reality of the crucified people and the description of
the servant makes it justified to see in them the crucified body of
Christ, then it is necessary to analyse further what this may be taken
to mean theologically.
88 Sobrino 1994c, 258 / Sobrino 1991d, 429: En esa realidad de despojo y
muerte se asemejan al siervo, y en esa realidad al menos, pero ese menos es
un mximo, se asemejan tambin a Jess crucificado.
89 This particular passage from the letter to the Colossians is also referred to by
Ellacura. It seems to play a central role, but is not given a proper exegetical
analysis by either of them.

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Thus Sobrino turns from a meditation on the reality of the crucified people to a more analytical exploration of what elements of
the salvific mystery this reality may contain if the crucified people
can be compared to the Servant in this aspect as well. It is particularly in this part that Sobrino goes beyond the essay of Ellacura,
taking up the task which he left, trying to define how and what kind
of salvation is brought about by the crucified people.
(1) How do the crucified people bring salvation? First of all, the crucified people bring salvation by being killed for establishing right and
justice: The suffering Servant equals Jesus in mission and destiny.
Their common mission is to establish justice (Hebr.: mishpat)
among the peoples in the world, and their common destiny is to be
unjustly and cruelly executed for crimes they did not commit. So
also with the crucified people, according to Sobrino: This is also
true for the crucified people, although here the reason for their
death is tragically extended. 90
The crucified people participate in this mission and destiny in
an analogous manner, Sobrino holds. Analogy means that the one
takes part in the reality shares the fundamental characteristics of
the other, although not necessarily in the totality of that reality. In
other words this participation may be a participation in some
aspects of the reality of the other (not all), at the same time as it
may happen in different manners. According to this understanding
the crucified people may participate in the mission and destiny of
the Servant and of Jesus in different aspects and different ways.91
This point is essential in Sobrinos thought concerning the crucified
people, as will become clear. By such analogical method, he justifies
the use of this theologoumenon, at the same time as the method permits a certain flexibility in the application of the terminology on
historical realities.
90 Sobrino 1994c, 258/ Sobrino 1991d, 430-431.

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Sobrino distinguishes between an active and passive analogous participation. The crucified people consists of many persons
who today actively take up the challenge and mission of establishing
justice in the world, and who for that reason encounter opposition
and persecution. Sobrino calls them prophets of all kinds, who die
formally (formalmente) like the Servant/Jesus. On the other hand,
there is in the crucified people a majority of people who are put to
death, not because of what they actively do or seek to accomplish,
but simply because of what they (passively) are. These are all the
91

154

On analogy, see e.g. Soskice 1985, 65: Analogical relations all refer to the
same thing, they all have the same res significata, but they refer to it in different ways. Elizabeth Johnsons treatment in Johnson 1992, 113-117 is noteworthy. She concludes: The net result of these various recent studies is an
understanding of analogy in the Catholic mind today that once again
stresses its movement through negation towards mystery, and consequently
its nonliteral although still meaningful character of its speech about God.
Nancy Bedford (Bedford 1993) is eager to point out the limits of analogy
within Sobrinos theology, see especially Die Grenzen der Analogie
zwischen dem gekreuzigten Volk und Jesus, p.264ff. Bedford claims for
instance that the analogy between Romero and Jesus which Sobrino
underlines strongly reaches its limit in that Sobrino never says that
Romero is raised from the dead like Jesus. Doch trotz dieser Worte, und
obgleich er betont, dass Romero wie Jesus an Gott geglaubt, prophetisch
gewirkt, den Armen das Evangelium verkndet und die Gtzen angeklagt
hat, und dass er deshalb wie Jesus gettet wurde, behauptet Sobrino nirgendwo, dass Romero wie Jesus auferstanden ist. Die Auferweckung Christi
bleibt in Sobrinos Theologie ein einmaliges Ereignis und der Punkt, an dem
alle Analogien aufhren mssen op. cit., 269. But in fact, Sobrino does
claum that the analogy between Romero and Jesus also includes resurrection. In his book on Romero, Sobrino writes explicitly: Cmo vive hoy
Mons. Romero? Vive, como Jess, resucitado, Sobrino 1989e, 210. The
limit of analogy must hence be found elsewhere in Sobrinos theology. The
issue here is really the question of continuity and/ or discontinuity between
Jesus and his followers the Crucified and the crucified. See below, Chapter
iv, [9], Chapter v, [7] and Chapter viii [3-4].

innocent victims of history who die defenceless in the hands of their

executioners, such as women, children and elderly people living in
conflict zones, or victims in massacres or in situations of famine.
But how can this possibly bring about salvation? If salvation is
taken to mean the establishment of justice in a complete sense
(Hebr.: mishpat), then the implications seem to be that the active
search for its realisation in history, which does not cease nor give up
even when it encounters a resistance that entails death, is in itself
salvific. This would be in accordance with Ellacuras point, that it is
the totality of a life in service for justice, resulting in an unjustly
inflicted suffering and death, which is of salvific significance. The
difficulty attached to this, however, is that it does not explain the
salvific effect in history of an action for justice which must be
deemed a failure according to normal, historical standards. Why
or in what way is this action salvific, if it results in death?
This difficulty does not concern the actively crucified alone. It
is even more difficult to see how any salvific role can be attributed
to the passively crucified, those innocent victims who die defenceless without having undertaken any action for the establishment of
mishpat. Accordingly, there must be something more to it, than the
mere action for establishing justice and well-being salvation in a
Biblical sense. This more which is a word Sobrino often uses to
describe transcendence is related to the sin of the world.
Secondly, then, the crucified people bring salvation by bearing
the sin of the world, like the Servant, like Jesus.92 According to the
Song, the Servant bears the sins of others and, through this, saves
the sinners from their sins. This shows both what sin is, and what
has to be done with it, Sobrino holds.
Sin is, in Sobrinos view, first and foremost that which causes
premature death. Sin produces real victims in history.93 It was the
power of sin that killed the Servant. That same power crucified
92 Sobrino 1991d, 433-434.

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Jesus, and continues to crucify people today. These victims in history are the visible expression of sins invisible offence against
God.94
Like Ellacura, Sobrino holds that sin must be overcome by
bearing it. (A)s to what should be done about sin, [] the answer
is clear, eradicate it, but with one essential condition: by bearing it.
95
Bearing the sins of others does not refer primarily to the guilt of
sin, but to its direct negative consequences. Sobrino continues:
And rather than taking on the guilt of the sin, bearing the sin of others
means bearing the sins historical effects: being ground down, crushed, put
to death.96

This, he holds, is what is meant by the fundamental confession of

the New Testament, died for our sins.
Sobrinos interpretation here closely follows that of Ellacura,
thereby entailing the same difficulties that I have pointed out above.
Sobrino claims that the crucified people in fact save/liberate their
crucifiers by carrying (the real consequences of ) their sins, and
thereby, we might say, carrying their sins away. They become

93 Sobrino 1991d, 433. En el canto se dice que el siervo carga con pecados
ajenos y que con ello salva a los pecadores de su pecados. De esta forma s
dice tanto lo que es pecado como lo que hay que hacer con l. Pecado es,
ante todo, lo que da muerte, lo que produce vctimas tan reales y visbles
como lo es el siervo.
94 The historical expression of this sin is above all idolatry, according to
Sobrino. See below, particularly Chapter v, [1-3].
95 Sobrino 1994c, 260. / Sobrino 1991d, 433: Por otra parte, qu hacer con el
pecado, pregunta tambin fundamental en el NT, queda claro, erradicarlo,
pero con una condicin esencial: cargndo con l.
96 Sobrino 1994c, 260 / Sobrino 1991d, 433: Y cargar con el pecado de otros es,
antes que asumir lo que el pecado tiene de culpa, cargar con su objetivacin
histrica: ser triturado, machacado, dado muerte.

156

through a scandalous paradox, Sobrino admits bearers of historical soteriology in and through their innocent sufferings.
This is a remarkable theological statement, which might allow
for interpretations that would seem more cynically cruel than
Christian. Such interpretations would clearly miss the point that
Ellacura and Sobrino are making. But what are they actually saying
by this? And could that possibly turn out to be a justifiable Christian theological statement? As can be seen, the possible salvific role
of the crucified in history depends fundamentally on what is meant
by salvation. We must therefore ask what kind of salvation the crucified people bring, according to Sobrino. Again, it is worthwhile to
note that Sobrino explicitly refers to historical salvation: If we do
not make salvation historical in some ways, it is pointless to repeat
that the Servant and the crucified Christ bring real concrete salvation. 97
(2) What kind of salvation is brought about by the crucified people?98 The Servant is destined to be a light to the nations (42,6;
49,6). Do the crucified people bring light? Sobrino thinks so. The
crucified people contribute by their very existence to the unmasking
of the lies about this world. In their capacity to shock, they represent an important force that resists and overcomes the conscious
covering up of the real situation of this world. Such cover up is
always one of the historical consequences of sin. The crucified people offer negative light, to unmask bad solutions to our problems,
but also positive light, in that they show what utopia must be
today, Sobrino believes. They offer a humanising truth.

97 Sobrino 1994c, 262. The English translation [] make salvation historical

[] may sound more synergetical than is necessarily the case. Spanish
wording: [] sin historizarla de alguna forma [] Sobrino 1991d, 436.
98 Cf. Sobrino 1992b, 90-95; 128-132; 152-157.

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Does that light contain a salvific value? In a certain sense, yes;

to know the truth about reality, and about ourselves in that reality,
is beneficial and very necessary, in Sobrinos opinion.99 Any light
that helps uncover the truth is thus salvific.100 But the salvation
which is brought about by the crucified people is more than the revelation of truth. It is a manifold salvation.101 It cannot be reduced to
one simple characteristic, like, for instance, forgiveness of sins. The
crucified people bring salvation in offering a variety of qualities,
according to Sobrino:
In the first place, they offer an opportunity for conversion. This is
closely related to their capacity of bringing light, as we have seen.
By unmasking the lies of this world, they present the possibility of
opting for a life according to the truth.
In the second place, the crucified people offer values with a
humanising potential, according to Sobrino, values he believes are
not offered elsewhere:
[] (T)he poor have a humanizing potential because they offer community
against individualism, service against selfishness, simplicity against opulence,
creativity against an imposed copycat culture, openness to transcendence
and crass pragmatism. 102

Sobrino is perfectly aware that not all the poor offer all or any of
these values. But he holds it to be a fact that the poor as a whole do
99 In his exposition, Sobrino distinguishes between the Servant bringing light
and salvation, but this distinction is, as far as I can see, more due to the terminological drift of the Servant Songs themselves, than to a substantial distinction in Sobrinos outline. Cf. also Sobrino 1992b, 90-95.
100 This close connection between the epistemological to get to know the
truth about reality and the soteriological in Sobrinos theology is noteworthy. I shall return to this.
101 Like the salvation(s) offered by Jesus during his ministry as portrayed in the
gospels, cf. Chapter iv [2], below.

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offer them and, structurally speaking, they offer them in a way not
offered by other worlds.103
In the third place, the crucified people offer hope. They offer an
almost absurd hope in their constant struggle for survival, for
change, for liberation, for a better future. Because of the fact that
their struggle is almost always against all odds, their hope turns into
a hope against hope always endangered and under pressure.
Nevertheless, it is there, Sobrino insists: The crucified people
shows that there is a hopeful current in history available to all.
In the fourth place, they offer great love. This is shown through
their countless martyrs, Sobrino maintains. The fact that there are
people willing to lay down their lives for the rights of others, testifies more than anything else that true love is possible in this sinful
history. And this love is something that the crucified people offer to
all who wish to accept, claims Sobrino. For Sobrino, love is the
only word apt to express the ultimate salvific reality. It is love that
effects salvation; salvation consists in love; and love is the result of
salvation.104
In the fifth place and perhaps surprisingly the crucified people offer forgiveness. They do not want revenge on their oppressors.
They open up their homes and communities, and offer a new kind
of fellowship, Sobrino claims, referring particularly to the Salvadoran experience. This welcoming openness towards anybody who
approaches them to help turns out to be a de facto forgiveness,
although it is often not recognised and accepted as thus.105 Again,
102 Sobrino 1994c, 263. / Sobrino 1991d, 437: Dicho esto en lenguaje histrico,
los pobres tienen un potencial humanizador porque ofrece comunidad contra el individualismo, servicialidad contra el egosmo, sencillez contra la opulencia, creatividad contra el mimetismo cultural impuesto, apertura a la
transcendencia contra el romo positivismo y craso pragmatismo.
103 Ibid.
104 See below, Chapter vi [4].

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Sobrino is perfectly aware that this is not always the case. Nevertheless, he insists that it happens and even that it happens almost ex
opere operato, i.e. on the basis of the structure of reality and not on
the basis of pure intentionality. 106
In the sixth place they generate solidarity.107According to
Sobrino, the reality of the poor the crucified people is the historical origin of solidarity,108 which shows its absolute necessity and
its possibility. Although the solidarity that the crucified people in
fact generate may be small in quantitative terms, it is nevertheless
real and new, Sobrino reiterates.
And finally, Sobrino claims that the crucified people offer a
faith, a way of being church and a holiness that are more authentic,
more Christian and more relevant to the present-day world, and
that capture more of Jesus.109 In this rather pretentious statement,
it becomes particularly obvious that Jon Sobrino speaks out of his
105 Sobrino distinguishes between an absolution-forgiveness (perdn-absolucin) and a welcome-forgiveness (perdn-acogida). Sobrino 1991d, 170ff;
Sobrino 1992b, 142-143. The welcome-forgiveness is the prevalent kind of
forgiveness offered by Jesus in his earthly ministry according to the synoptics, Sobrino holds. It is also the kind of forgiveness offered by the crucified
people. Sobrino 1992b, 152-157.
106 [] quasi ex opere operato, es decir, en basis de la estructura de la realidad
y no a la pura intencionalidad [] Sobrino 1992b, 155.
107 Sobrino 1994c, 263-264 / Sobrino 1991d, 436ff. Cf. Sobrino 1992b, 211-248;
Sobrino and Pico 1985.
108 Sobrino 1992b, 215-221.
109 Sobrino 1994c, 264. Sobrino 1991d, 439. In this statement, in fact, one can
find the whole fundament and material of Sobrinos own theological works:
his christology sets out to present the Christ in whom the crucified believe
(Sobrino 1976, Sobrino 1982a, Sobrino 1991d, etc.), his ecclesiological writings examine the way of being church proposed and put into practice by the
crucified (Sobrino 1986), and his pneumatological writings (especially
Sobrino 1987a), develop a spirituality from the viewpoint of the crucified
and their practice of liberation.

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own Latin American experience and context, where the majority of

the population, and particularly the poor, still tend to regard themselves as more or less active church members. Furthermore, when all
of these capacities and qualities mentioned above are taken
together, one is justified to ask whether it is actually the small and
persecuted Church Base Communities (Comunidades Eclesiales de
Base CEBs) in El Salvador that Sobrino concretely has in mind
when he speaks of the crucified people.110
Now, taken as a whole, what kind of salvation is this? Time and
again Sobrino stresses the humanising potential of these values and
capacities which he calls salvific.111 It may seem that salvation
comes close to humanisation in his approach. On the other hand,
as we shall see, his concept of salvation does also have clear similarities with the traditional theological concept of deification.112
All of these wide-ranging and remarkable theological contentions regarding what kind of salvation the crucified bring, immediately evoke questions and objections. I shall address some of these
below. But before doing so, I need to return to the ultimate ques-

110 There is to a certain extent an implicit ecclesiology in the theology of the

crucified people. It will not be possible to discuss that in any detail within
the limits of this study, however. See particularly Sobrino 1986.
111 Compare Moltmann 1974, 22.
112 Cf. the maxim God became human, in order that humans might become
God. This approach, which also is expressed in terms like deiformacin,
theosis (becoming God in the patristic period this position was represented by the Alexandrian school) and homoiosis theoi (becoming like
God, i.e., participation in that which is divine cf. the Antiochene school)
underlies much soteriological reflection of the Eastern Christian tradition.
Again, we may detect the influence of Karl Rahners theology on Sobrino
here. Rahner sees the incarnation [] as the necessary and permanent
beginning of the divinization of the world as a whole Rahner 1993, 181. For
a criticism of this view, see Macquarrie 1990, 304-308.

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tion regarding the crucified and salvation, which is why it is in

Sobrinos opinion that the crucified people bring salvation.
(3) The crucified people bring salvation like the Servant simply
because they are chosen for it by God.113 This is where Sobrino draws
the limit for theological exploration into the mystery of God. Here
he refrains from giving explanations. It is paradox and mystery
and Gods unfathomable plan. But Sobrino stresses the radical
character of this salvation from below:
This is not just another example of [] Gods partiality toward defending
the poor and the victims. Here God chooses them and makes them the principal means of salvation, just as Jesus is this in his double character of proclaimer of the Kingdom and victim on the cross.114

This also means, according to Sobrino, that possible explanations

drawn from historical experience of how the poor and excluded
might possibly be of salvific significance such as, for instance, that
internalized oppression generates (or may generate) awareness and
this generates organization for liberation115, that the oppressed are
their own agents of liberation, etc. in the end are insufficient.
That the crucified people bring salvation is a statement of theologal faith which one cannot go beyond, Sobrino holds.
Still, it leaves us with a disturbing ambiguity: if the crucified
people are chosen by God to play a salvific role, does that mean that
they are chosen by God to be poor? This ambiguity threatens to
113 Sobrino 1994c, 259-260. / Sobrino 1991d, 431-433.
114 Sobrino 1994c, 259. / Sobrino 1991d, 431: Aqu no se trata ya, como en
muchos lugares del AT y del NT, de afirmar la parcialidad de Dios en
defensa de los pobres y las vctimas, sino de que los elige y hace de ellos
instrumento principal de salvacin, como lo es Jess en su doble dimensin
de anunciador del reino y de vctima en la cruz.
115 Sobrino 1994c, 259-260. / Sobrino 1991d, 432.

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subvert the very basis and intention of Jon Sobrinos liberation

christology, which clearly is to counter fatalism and theological
legitimation of poverty and repression with an interpretation of the
Christian faith that promotes resistance, hope, and active struggle
for change. A key question becomes, then, if Sobrino is bound to
(or for some reason well advised to) accept this ambiguity.

[4] The crucified and the Crucified: Three Axes

Sobrino takes Ellacuras train of thought further. He agrees with his
colleagues attempt to let the oppressed and suffering people of
today throw light on the interpretation of the Songs of the Suffering
Servant in Isaiah and of the historical life, suffering and death of
Jesus of Nazareth, and vice versa, to see these actual sufferings in the
light of the sufferings of Jesus and the Servant. The main contention of Sobrinos development of this theme is that these suffering
people of today, in their resembling Jesus the Servant, should be
seen as an actual, i.e. historical, manifestation of the crucified body
of Christ; and that anyone who looks for the manifestation of
Christ in our time should look to this particular part of humanity,
usually forgotten and disregarded. They are the Suffering Servant
and they are the crucified Christ today.116
There is accordingly a clear historical continuity between the
experience out of which the Songs of the Servant emerge, the history of Jesus, and the present destiny of the suffering and oppressed,
Sobrino holds. This continuity points to an interrelationship
between the Servant, Jesus and the suffering people of today which
116 Sobrino 1994c, 271. / Sobrino 1991d, 451: Hoy son el siervo doliente y son el
Cristo crucificado.

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goes beyond mere resemblance. It has profound theological meaning. While the Servant is seen as a prophecy and a pre-figuration of
Christ, the crucified people become the continuance of the suffering of Jesus in history.
This interrelationship is of great significance since, as we have
seen, being critical of traditional ontological essentialism, Sobrino
stresses the constitutive character of relations. Such constitutive
relatedness apparently works both ways, according to Sobrino. They
are reciprocal. Therefore, he finds it legitimate to interpret the reality of the crucified people in line with the interpretation of the life
and death of Jesus. In other words; since the death of Jesus according to Christian faith is held to be revelatory, it is legitimate to ask:
what kind of revelation do the crucified people bring? Since the
death of Jesus according to Christian faith is experienced as salvific,
what kind of salvation do the crucified people bring? Since the suffering Jesus calls his disciples to following him, what kind of reaction or response does the suffering of the crucified people call
for?
These three questions uncover what may be seen as an underlying structure in this theological relationship. I shall call this the
three axes between Jesus and the crucified people.
The first axis is epistemological-hermeneutical: In order to gain
knowledge about the suffering Jesus, we must know the suffering
people of today, and in order to interpret the texts of his suffering
adequately, it should be done from the vantage-point of these people. And vice versa: in order to gain theological knowledge and to
interpret the theological meaning of the actual sufferings of the
people, we must look to Jesus.117
The second axis is historical-soteriological: Christian faith
attributes salvific significance to the death of Jesus. This salvation is,
according to Ellacura and Sobrino, always salvation in history.
Today, the salvific effects of the death of Jesus is, in some manner

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which I shall have to examine further, transmitted or manifested

in and through the suffering of the crucified people.
The third axis might be called ethical-praxical: The suffering
and death of Jesus is a consequence of a life and a praxis in devoted
service to the God of the Kingdom and the Kingdom of God and
its primary addressees, the poor. During this service, Jesus invites
and inaugurates a praxis of following, a following in the service of
the Kingdom, a following in suffering, and in hope. The crucified
people mediate this praxis today in a double sense: they participate
in Jesus mission themselves and (hence) also in his sufferings. And
in the mere fact of their situation as suffering people, they mediate a
call from God to all human beings to participate in the mission to
overcome all suffering to take the crucified down from their
cross i.e., to act out of compassion, to establish justice and true
fellowship among human beings. This is, in other words, a praxis of
following. The relationship between the crucified and the Crucified
is realised in and through such following; it becomes ethical-praxical.
Although I find it helpful to distinguish between these three
axes in order to understand Sobrinos thinking here, it is quite clear
that they are closely connected. I have already pointed to the intimate connection between the epistemological and the soteriological
in Sobrinos theology: light comes close to salvation.118 Furthermore, I underscored the presupposition common to Ellacura and
Sobrino that salvation in history is brought about by active human
117 Sobrino 1991d, 310: Digamos tambin que la cruz de Jess remite a las
cruces existentes, pero que stas, a su vez, remiten a la de Jess, y que son,
histricamente, la grn hermentica para comprender por qu matan a
Jess, y, teolgicamente, expresan en s mismas la pregunta inacallable del
misterio de por qu muere Jess. Los pueblos crucificados en el tercer
mundo son hoy el grn lugar teolgico para comprender la cruz de Jess.
118 Cf the theology of the Gospel of John.

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participation, through a praxis of following. I shall return to these

three axes in my further assessment of the meaning of the crucified
people according to Sobrino.119
On the basis of my analysis so far, it seems that Sobrino comes
close to operating with a kind of communicatio idiomatum a
mutual interchange of properties between the suffering Jesus and
the suffering people, the Crucified and the crucified.120 What can
be said theologically of Jesus, may also be said of the people. If this
is a correct interpretation of Sobrino, it shows, again, the radical
novelty and boldness of his approach. At the same time, it draws
attention to some of the difficulties that such an interpretation
brings.
I have already indicated that some major problems arise in relation to the second axis, the historical-soteriological. These clearly
appear to be problematic when seen in relation to traditional dogmatic thinking, but also, as I have pointed out, when seen in the
perspective of the particular interest and motivating force behind
liberation theology. The salvific significance of the Servant as well as
of Christ is traditionally understood in terms of substitution, sacrifice, reconciliation and atonement. How do these theological concepts if they are to be maintained at all apply to the crucified
people?
What furthermore could be at stake here is the understanding
of the uniqueness of Jesus Christ, and the salvific significance of his
death once and for all. This concerns in other words the fundamental theme of continuity vs. discontinuity in Christian theology
between God and humanity, between Jesus and his sisters and
brothers, between creation and salvation, etc. These opposites will
119 See Chapter viii [4] below.
120 This rather unusual usage of the term communicatio idiomatum may be helpful to bring out some of the issues at stake in Sobrinos approach. See Bedford 1993, 291.

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be in tension in any given christology, since they stem from the central point and mystery of Christian faith in Jesus: that he is both
true God and true human being.121 Nonetheless, the particular
character of this tension is by no means insignificant.
Furthermore, Sobrinos position may be accused of trying to
give a religious explanation of the meaning of the suffering of others. Such explanation runs the risk of coming close to justification
or legitimation, which in its turn, may lead to passivity and resignation on behalf of those suffering. This is exactly what liberation theology claims to be opposing. If the theology of the crucified people
is not to be in direct contradiction with the main drift of liberation
theology, and hence in self-contradiction, Sobrino needs to explain
how victims of today may be accorded a salvific role without
thereby being de facto functionalised, instrumentalised or objectified in a pejorative sense, and without making God in the end
responsible for their suffering.
The emphasis on the historical-soteriological significance of the
crucified people is, in other words, a crucial point. Interestingly, this
is also a point on which Ellacura and Sobrino are more explicit
than other liberation theologians. Gustavo Gutirrez, for instance,
refers to Ellacura-Sobrino when applying their term crucified people in his book on Job.122 However, Gutirrez himself never
addresses the issue of a possible salvific meaning of the suffering of
the innocent. He prefers to speak of the pedagogical value of suffering.123 Of course, the very heart of Gutirrez theology is the
121 Cf. the Confession of Chalkedon 451, which states that Jesus Christ is a
divine person in whom are perfectly conjoined, without either mixture or
separation, a complete divine nature and a complete human nature. See e.g.
Macquarrie 1990, 24 and 147-174.
122 Gutirrez 1987, xvi, n.16. The resemblance of the crucified Jesus and the
Amerindian servant reminds us that the poor of Latin America (and elsewhere in the world) is a crucified people.
123 Gutirrez 1987, 46.

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particular relationship of God and the poor. Gods predilection for

and presence among the poor would in many aspects parallel the
emphasis of Ellacura and Sobrino. Nevertheless, there might be
some important nuances here, which Gutirrez attempts to safeguard by not speaking directly of such a salvific or soteriological
value.124
It is important to recall here that Sobrino sees an analogy
between the crucified people and Jesus, which is not the same as
identity. The crucified people participate in some (partial) aspects
and in different manners in the reality of the crucified Christ. But
in what aspects, and in which manners? This is what I shall have to
examine further.
When setting out to do so, it becomes clear that our movement
from historical reality to theological concept in this chapter has left
us with another question of great significance: what is in fact the
status of a theological concept? How can reality be elevated to theological concept? And what kind of concept is the crucified people?
It builds on analogy, obviously. It is also a typology: as the suffering
servant, so Jesus. As Jesus, so the crucified people. Is it not also a
metaphor? I shall later suggest that in addition to what is already
mentioned it is most fruitfully to be regarded a symbol. In that
case, what status do metaphors and symbols have in theological discourse? We are thus brought to the larger issue of the status and
character of religious language. It is an issue to which Sobrino pays
little attention. Nevertheless it seems to me to be fundamental for
an adequate understanding of his thinking. In my view, if we are to
speak positively of Gods identification with victims, even of the
soteriological implications of this identification, through a term like
the crucified people, we need a deepened understanding of the

124 A personal interview with Gutirrez at Boston College, July 12 1995,

strengthened this assumption. See the discussion in Chapter vii [5] below.

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metaphorical and symbolic character of theological as indeed, all

language.
All of these difficulties must be dealt with in order to make a
fair evaluation of the viability of seeing the interrelationship
between the crucified and the Crucified as an expression of the theological significance of contemporary suffering.

[5] A Contrasting View: E. Jngel

In order to spell out more clearly some of the controversial aspects
of Sobrinos description of the relationship between the suffering
Jesus and suffering people as a theologically significant, analogical
relationship based on a profound historical continuity, it may prove
helpful to listen to a dissenting voice.
One of the leading German theologians of our time, Eberhard
Jngel, addresses in his article The Sacrifice of Jesus as Sacrament
and Example125 the question of a contemporary understanding of
the salvific significance of Jesus death. He notes a surprising recent
return to sacrifice terminology126, which however, with its moral
or ethical orientation is of little help for understanding the early
Christian interpretation of the death of Jesus as sacrificial. The
ancient cultic idea of sacrifice, which Jngel considers central in
order to understand the death of Jesus, has lost its persuasive power.
It has gradually been replaced by an ethical and hence metaphorical
use of the concept.

125 In Jngel 1995, 163-190. German original: Jngel 1982, reprinted in Jngel
1990.
126 Jngel 1995, 163.

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Paradoxically, this shift from a cultic to an ethical use of sacrifice is due to the central event of Christian faith itself the death of
Jesus. In earliest Christianity the crucifixion of Jesus Christ was
understood and proclaimed not only as a sacrificial death, but
rather as the one sacrifice which has been offered and carried out
once for all (compare Heb 10.12 with 10.10).127 After the perfect
sacrifice of Jesus Christ, no other sacrifices will ever be necessary or
valid, according to this interpretation. Therefore the concept itself
gradually takes on new meaning. It now becomes a metaphor,
according to Jngel.128
This ethical, metaphorical use of the concept of sacrifice is in
itself not necessarily harmful, in Jngels opinion, not even theologically.129 But it is certainly damaging if and when it becomes the
one and only meaning of the concept, so that when applied to the
death of Jesus, this is seen merely in its character of exemplum, and
not in its more fundamental character of sacramentum. This is the
crucial issue. Jngel finds it decisive for the self-understanding of
Christian theology, whether the story of Jesus Christ is conceived
only ethically, as an example of right human behaviour, only as exemplum, or beyond and behind that, as a history which effectively
changes the being of humanity, as sacrament.130
Jngel traces this distinction exemplum sacramentum back to
Augustine, and deems it central to the understanding of Luthers
christology and soteriology. Luther according to Jngel even
holds as false teaching an exclusively ethical exemplum christology
which is oriented to the following of Jesus, because it thus bypasses
the true significance of Jesus Christ. This true significance is
grasped only when the death of Jesus is seen as an unmerited gift
127
128
129
130

170

Op. cit., 166.

Op. cit., 181.
Op. cit., 168.
Op. cit., 169.

which effectively changes all humanity, because it changes humanitys relationship to God. By making substitutionary atonement for
the sins of all people by his death, Jesus restores the God-world relationship, and thus the lost wholeness for undivided being, or in
biblical terms, shalom.131 This was only possible because, as Christian faith confesses, the man Jesus is the Son of God, therefore all
of humanity is integrated into his human existence.132
Now, having received with thankfulness and joy the gift of
Jesus death as a sacrament, then it may and should also be seen
as an example, Jngel continues.133 The Protestant emphasis here is
obvious: first we are justified by grace alone, then we are called to
serve our neighbour in the likeness of Jesus. A legitimate following
of Christ can and should take place, a following that sometimes also
takes the character of suffering. This may be described metaphorically as a sacrifice which also the NT does. However one should
exercise singular linguistic restraint in using this category in this
context in particular, Jngel warns.134 And he continues:
In no way can it refer to a soteriologically relevant sacrifice, or to a prolongation of the atoning sacrifice of Jesus Christ. Christianity must narrate or proclaim the death of its Lord, his passion story, not its own passion story. A
soteriologically freighted ethica crucis [ethics of the cross] would be the worst
form of theologiae gloriae [theology of glory].135

By this, Jngel has driven his point home: sacrifice when applied to
Jesus death should primarily be seen as sacramental, being a unique
and effective atonement once and for all, and only secondarily as an
131
132
133
134
135

Op. cit., 178.

Op. cit., 179.
Op. cit., 181.
Op. cit., 187.
Op. cit., 188. Cf. Moltmann 1974, 55: The cross of Christ cannot be reduced
to an example for the cross of those who follow him.

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example which we are called to follow. But when applied to human

action, it should be taken in its metaphorical meaning, as following
the ethical example of Jesus, without any traces whatsoever of sacramental, soteriological meaning:
It is important to be reminded, especially with regard to the suffering of
Christians, that post Christum mortum, the terminology of sacrifice has only
metaphorical significance. Human activity and human suffering have no sacramental function whatsoever.136

This position seems to be in contradiction with Sobrinos in several

aspects.137 Jngel would probably deem Sobrinos christology in
this respect an exclusively ethical exemplum christology.138 And
as we have just seen, Jngel would shun all talk of a salvific meaning
or effect in the suffering of people today. One main difference
between the two, is that while Sobrino underscores and develops
the continuity between Jesus and human history, the fundamental
assertion of Jngels article is the absolute discontinuity: Jesus is
unique, his death is once and for all.
Following Jngel, Nancy Bedford concludes her study on this
aspect of Sobrinos christology by stating:
Even if striking similarities may be discovered between the fate of Christ and
that of the crucified people, a kind of communicatio idiomatum between
Jesus Christ as the Servant of God and the crucified people as the historical
continuation of the Servant of God, in the sense that the fate of the people
would have an expiatory effect like that of Christ, is thus neither biblically
based nor appropriate in terms of systematic theology.139

136 Jngel 1995, 188.

137 See Sobrino 1976, xvii.
138 L. Laberge is of a different opinion: Sobrino veuille privilgir le caractre
plus quexemplaire de Jess de Nazaret pour nos vies. Laberge 1988, 269.

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The question is, however, whether it would be fair to interpret

Sobrino as stating that the salvific significance of the crucified people lies in an expiatory effect like that of Christ? One might also
ask whether the alternatives exemplum and sacramentum are as distinguishable, exclusive and absolute as they may seem in Jngels
approach. Furthermore, one wonders how it is possible for a concept (sacrifice) to become metaphorical and only so after a
particular historical event?
In any case, the critical objections to a chistology like Sobrinos
that seem to follow from a reading of Jngels article makes it necessary to undertake a further inquiry into Sobrinos interpretation of
the salvific meaning of Jesus life and death.

[6] Conclusions
In this chapter we have seen how Ellacura and Sobrino, on the
basis of a pastoral intuition of Archbishop Oscar Romero, have
developed theologically the idea of the crucified people. This concept arises out of combining the concrete reality of suffering and
oppression in the world of the poor for them in concreto, El Salvador and the testimonies to the suffering Servant in Isaiah, and the
suffering Jesus in the New Testament. It is thus an application of
what we have found to be a fundamental feature of the theological
139 Original German wording: Auch wenn frappierende hnlichkeiten
zwischen dem Geschick Christi und des gekreuzigten Volkes zu entdecken
sind, ist also eine Art communicatio idiomatum zwischen Jesus Christus als
Gottesknecht und dem gekreuzigten Volk als historischer Fortsetzung des
Gottesknechtes, wonach das Schicksal des Volkes eine shnende Wirkung
im Sinne Christi htte, weder biblisch noch systematisch angemessen. Bedford 1993, 290-291.

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method of Ellacura and Sobrino, which is a dual movement

between historical reality and theological concept. Reality (the people) is interpreted theologically (crucified) and theological concepts
(crucifixion, salvation) are historised (suffering, liberation).
In the historical soteriology that thus emerges, the crucified
people plays a major role. Following then the crucified people
from reality to theological concept, we found that Ellacura puts
the crucified people on the systematic-theological agenda through
his suggestive and innovative essay written in 1979; that he does so
within the framework of what he calls historical soteriology,
which relies on two basic presuppositions: a) that salvation always is
historical and b) that humanity actively participates in the realisation of salvation in history; that he maintains that the death of Jesus
should be primarily interpreted historically, in order to thereby see
its salvific significance; that he suggests that the salvific significance
of the death of Jesus, which is prefigured in the Songs of the Suffering servant, is at present being realised through the suffering of the
poor and oppressed, whom he calls the crucified people. God has
made these people a principle of salvation for the whole world140,
Ellacura maintains. This can be seen when one puts oneself in the
place of these people today and there reads and interprets the testimonies to the Servant and of Jesus.
Evaluating this approach critically, I noted that Ellacuras
thinking causes difficulties exactly in its most bold and novel statement: the salvific character and mission of the crucified people. The
question of how their sufferings are a principle of salvation is not
precisely or sufficiently treated, particularly in view of traditionally
central soteriological concepts such as expiation, substitution and
sacrifice.
This rather detailed analysis of Ellacura was necessary in order
to understand Sobrinos thinking in these matters, since Sobrino
140 Ellacura 1989a, 319.

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builds on Ellacura to such a large extent. We saw that Sobrino further develops the theological reflection on the crucified people by
seeing it as Jesus (crucified) body in history; that he sees the relationship between the crucified people and the crucified Christ as an
analogical relationship, i.e. the people participate in the reality of
Jesus not totally, but in certain aspects and in certain ways, that he
furthermore attempts a description of how the crucified people
bring salvation (by being killed for establishing right and justice
and by bearing the sin of the world), and what kind of salvation
they bring (light, humanising values, hope, great love, forgiveness, solidarity and faith), while the question of why it is
so, rests with Gods unfathomable plan.
Moving to a preliminary critical evaluation, I noted that the
relationship between the crucified and the Crucified in Sobrinos
framework may be described as having three axes: (i) an epistemological-hermeneutical axis, (ii) an historical-soteriological axis, and
(iii) an ethical-praxical axis; that this relationship is constitutive and
reciprocal, i.e. that both the identity of the crucified people and the
identity of the crucified Jesus are defined through this relation with
the other; and that Sobrino thereby seems to suggest a kind of communicatio idiomatum between Jesus and the suffering people of
today.
Holding this to be a questionable suggestion, especially with
regard to the second axis (the historical-soteriological), I brought in
a dissenting voice, that of Eberhard Jngel, in order to shed light on
some of the issues at stake. Jngel distinguishes between an exemplary and a sacramental understanding of the death of Jesus, holding the latter to be an absolute and irreplaceable foundation and
presupposition for the former, so that Jesus death must be primarily understood as an effective atoning sacrifice for all, which means
that after the sacrament of Jesus sacrifice there is no need for further sacrifices, so that sacrifice from then on acquires a merely

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metaphorical meaning. Thus any prolongation of the sacrifice of

Jesus Christ, in a sacramental, salvific meaning, is excluded,
according to Jngel.
As this position, with its strong emphasis on discontinuity
where Sobrino finds continuity, throws critical light on the statements of Ellacura and Sobrino, it helps sharpen our questions in
order to bring out the meaning and implications of the term the
crucified people as an expression of the theological significance of
contemporary suffering.
Furthermore, in following the crucified people from historical
reality to theological concept, we have also detected a need for a
more thorough examination of the role and status of (religious/theological) language. How can reality be elevated to theological concept? Behind this question lies, as we shall see, the burning issues of
reality, reference and rhetoric.
Who then, are the crucified people? In Ellacura we found a relatively precise definition, underscoring that it is a collective entity
whose suffering is a result of historical (i.e. socio-political) causes.
Sobrino gives a somewhat wider definition, yet one which at the
same time allows more nuances, by suggesting a distinction
between an active meaning and a passive meaning. On the one
hand, the crucified people consists of many persons who actively
take up the challenge and mission of establishing justice in the
world, and who for that reason encounter opposition and persecution. On the other hand, there is in the crucified people a majority
of human beings who are put to death, not because of what they
actively do or seek to accomplish, but simply because of what they
(passively) are. These are all the innocent victims of history,141
according to Sobrino.

141 I shall later propose that Sobrinos theology may be seen as a kind of victimology. See Chapter v [2], below.

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Attributing to these people a primary role in the history of salvation and in the Christian theological endeavour is the main contention of Sobrino. Can his approach be said to be acceptable, or even
fruitful, and if so, on what terms? While appreciating the originality and relevance of the suggestion, I have raised some doubts. To
see whether these are justified, I shall now turn to a more profound
analysis of the other pole of the relationship between the crucified
and the Crucified: the Crucified Liberator. Following Ellacuras and
Sobrinos advice, however, our interpretation needs to be rooted in
history.

177

178

iii. Countering a Crucifying Christology

The Return to the Historical Jesus as a Way of Liberating
Latin American Images of Christ

Tal parece que los espaoles trajeron a Cristo a Amrica para crucificar al indio.1

Defining suffering people as crucified within the context of Christian theology implies establishing a relationship between them and
the crucified Jesus of Nazareth. This is what Jon Sobrino does. For
this reason he finds it justified to give this theme a thorough treatment within the framework of his christology. The crucified people
is for him the (crucified) body of Christ present in the world today.
From this follows that whatever theological status may be given to
the crucified people, it must be derived from an interpretation of
Jesus. In order to know who the crucified in history are, one needs
to provide an answer to the foundational christologial question,
which according to the gospels was posed by Jesus himself: Who
do you say I am? (Mark 8:29, par.)
Answering this question from a Latin American point of view
implies having to deal with the history of christology on that continent.2 It is certainly a dark history, in many aspects. The tight interconnection of christology and conquest has been more than a
chronological coincidence. From Corts to Pinochet, christological
1
2

Words by Abad y Queipo, Bishop of Michoacn, quoted from Bricker 1989,

7.
Since systematic christologies in the strict and modern meaning are a recent
phenomenon in Latin America, I shall in this chapter use christology in a
wide meaning involving the explicit and implicit convictions and beliefs
regarding the person and role of Jesus Christ, among Latin American elites
as well as in the population in general.

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conceptions and elements have been used to legitimate oppression

and injustice to such an extent, that one might from the standpoint of liberation theology, that is be tempted to speak of a crucified or even a crucifying christology.
Hoping to provide a better understanding of this characteristic
of Sobrinos interpretation of Jesus Christ, I shall in this chapter first
briefly sketch this specific Latin American background. As a remedy
against oppressive manipulation of christology, Sobrino recommends taking the historical Jesus as a starting point. Since this is a
basic, albeit controversial and somewhat unclear tenet in Sobrinos
writings, I shall have to consider this point of departure which I
shall call the Latin American historical Jesus with some care. In
so doing, I shall also give a hearing to some of those who have raised
critical voices against Sobrinos position.

[1] A Problematic Heritage: Christologies of Conquest

Christology came to Latin America3 with the conquista. Christopher Columbus had come to see himself as Christ-bearer (the etymological significance of his first name). He was convinced that
3

180

What to call the region is a matter of contemporary debate. One proposal is

Abya-Yala, a CUNA term (Panama) that describes the totality and integrity
of the eco-geography which after the conquest and invasion beginning in
1492 is known as Latin America and the Caribbean. Abya-yala means
Mature land. In a consultation on Theological Education in Contexts of
Survival held in Managua July 14-18 1991, the seminaries represented there
agreed to recover this term as part of their own identity and heritage, to designate Latin America and the Caribbean in the future. The term is not in
common use, however. Cf. Community of Latin American Ecumenical Theological 1991, 1, note 1.

his name symbolised a mission of carrying Christ to the New

World in fulfilment of the Old Testament prophecies.4 The Christ
that he carried with him was, in many ways, a Spanish Messiah. The
end of the fifteenth century was an epoch of nationalistic triumphalism in Spain. Having conquered the Muslims and expelled
them from the Spanish peninsula in 1492, the Spaniards would now
bring this spirit of religious warfare to the so-called New World.
Furthermore, the Spanish domination of the New World takes
place at the beginning of the schism of Western Christianity. Its
character is accordingly profoundly marked by a Hispanic Catholic
Christianity furiously antagonistic to infidels, apostates, and heretics and restrictive in regard to alternative possibilities for interpreting the religious experience.5 Colonisation and evangelisation
became, for all practical purposes, two sides of the same coin. It
should be seen as no coincidence that the infamous conqueror
4

Trinidad 1984, 56. The evangelistic motivation behind the Spanish venture
to the West, a motivation which Columbus personally shared, can be seen
from this excerpt from his journal from 1492. The words are directed to King
Ferdinand and Queen Isabella: Your Highnesses, as good Christian and
Catholic princes, devout and propagators of the Christian faith, as well as
enemies of the sect of Mahomet and of all idolatries and heresies, conceived
the plan of sending me, Christopher Columbus, to this country of the
Indies, there to see the princes, the peoples, the territory, their disposition
and all things else, and the way in which one might proceed to convert these
regions to our holy faith. Cited from McKennie Goodpasture 1989, 7. At
the beginning of his second journey, Columbus received the following
instruction from King Fernando and Queen Isabel (los reyes catlicos):
Por ende, sus altezas, deseando que nuestra santa fe catlica sea aumentada
ey acrescentada, mandan y encargan a dicho almirante [] {i.e. Columbus,
my comment, SJS} que por todas las vas y maneras que pudiere, procure e
trabaje atraer a los moradores de dichas islas e tierra firme a que se conviertan a nuestra santa fe catlica. Cited Rivera Pagn 1992a, 73. English
translation: Rivera Pagn 1992b.
Rivera Pagn 1992b, 50.

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Hernn Corts had a cross in his banner accompanied by the following Latin inscription: Amici, sequamur crucem; si nos fidem
habuerimus, in hoc signo vincemus. 6
The Spanish image of Christ that Columbus and his companions brought with them was complex and ambiguous. According to
an analysis made by Sal Trinidad, at least five main traits may distinguished.7 Firstly, there was the suffering and conquered Christ,
the Christ of the via crucis, the dead Jesus in the tomb. Correspondingly, there was a heavy emphasis on the child Jesus in his
mothers lap. Both these images of Jesus underscore his weakness.
He was the humiliated and defeated victim and the helpless and
harmless child. The image of the helpless child in Marys lap would
also allow the Spanish conquerors to regard themselves as the true
guardians of the child Jesus, who was in need of their protection.
Then there was also the Christ of the mysteries, particularly
present in the Eucharist. The holy communion was regarded almost
as a magic recipe prescribed by the church for eternal life, in order
to live forever.8 This was, of course, seen as an excellent nourishment for conquerors and warriors (although they normally received
the Sacrament only once a year).
A fourth feature in this Spanish image of Christ was the Risen
One as the Almighty Heavenly Monarch. The risen Jesus was thus
made the guarantor of the power of the Spaniards. They were confident that their project of colonisation was legitimate since the Pope
Alexander VI in a papal bull of 1493 had given the Spanish both the
6
7

182

Friends, let us follow the cross, and if we have faith, in this sign we shall
win the victory. Cited from Rivera Pagn 1992b, 48.
Following Sal Trinidad, op. cit. The original Spanish version of this article,
Cristologa Conquista Colonizacin, appeared first in Cristianismo y
Sociedad 43-44/13 (August 1975): 12-25, and is also published in the collection
Equipo 1984, 204-220.
Trinidad 1984, 52.

permission and responsibility to spread the Gospel in the newly

discovered areas,9 and the Pope as was still undisputed had his
power from the Risen Christ. The hierarchical line of command
was, then, from the victorious Risen Christ to the Holy See, from
the Holy See to the Spanish king, and from him to the conquerors
and later encomenderos.10
Finally, there was another, divergent image of Jesus, gradually
being set up in opposition to these power-legitimating images. That
was the pacific Christ, preached by people like Antonio Montesinos
and Bartolom de las Casas.11 It is well worth noting that Las Casas
prophetic voice had one of its roots in a diverging christology. In
the profound intuition, expressed in the words (frequently quoted
by Sobrino12) about leaving behind Jesus in the Indies being
whipped and afflicted, and buffeted and crucified, not once but
thousands of times, as often as the Spaniards assault and destroy
those people13, one can even find an incipient theology of the crucified people.

10

11
12
13

The Pope comissioned the crown to bring to the worship of our Redeemer
and the profession of the Catholic faith their residents and inhabitants,
[]. McKennie Goodpasture 1989, 5.
The encomienda system was designed to force the Indian population to
work for the Spaniards, who were in great need of labour force in the mines
and on the plantations. It was based on an instruction issued by Queen Isabella on December 20, 1503, according to which she commands the Governor of Hispaniola to [] compel and force the said Indians to associate
with the Christians of the island and to work on their buildings, and to
gather and mine the gold and other metals, and to till the fields and produce
food for the Christian inhabitants and dwellers of the said island [].
McKennie Goodpasture 1989, 7-8.
Cf., e.g. Gutirrez 1992 (English translation: Gutirrez 1993b); Hanke 1949;
Mires 1989.
Sobrino 1991d, 31; Sobrino 1992b, 90, et passim.
See above, Chapter ii [1].

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What happened when this christology from above in a sociological, not theological sense14 was received by and gradually integrated into the culture below, the culture of the conquered and
oppressed indigenous people? Still following Trinidads analysis, we
can detect at least three coinciding and complementary christologies, all with a common ideological effect.
The first one is a christology of resignation. In this, the powerless
and defeated Jesus corresponds to the powerless and defeated people. The main expressions of this christology, which is still prominent in Latin American piety, are church paintings and statues of a
sad and weak Jesus on his way to Golgotha, and above all the
popular Holy Week processions. In Latin America, Sobrino notes,
the most holy religious celebration is Sacred Triduum, the most
holy day is Good Friday, and the most holy moment on Good Friday is the moment of Jesus burial.15 Trinidad is not alone then, in
asking what these Holy Week rites mean today: Are they symbols
of the liberation of Latin America, or are they continuing to play
the role of baptizing and confirming the establishment?16
This ambiguity inherent in a christology which underscores the
interconnection between the suffering of Jesus and the suffering of
14 In other words, I use above and below here in another sense than the
common one in christological debate. See e.g. Pannenberg 1968, 33-35.
15 Hasta el da de hoy, el Cristo de las mayoras pobres de Amrica Latina es el
Cristo sufriente, de modo que la semana santa es el momento religioso ms
importante del ao; de ella, el viernes santo, y de ste, el santo entierro.
Sobrino 1991d, 32.
16 Trinidad 1984. 59. Trinidad continues: What, then, has been the function
of christology in Latin America? The first thing that stands out is its role in
baptizing, sacralizing, the conquista and the resulting oppression, as well as
making a virtue out of suffering. Suffering was supposed to lead to glory and
express communion with the crucified Christ [] Even the beatitudes were
pressed into service: Blessed are the poor [] those who weep [] those
who suffer.

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the people is of great importance to this present study. One must

critically ask: might a theology of the crucified people perhaps
contrary to the expressed intentions of its advocates in the end
play the role of a christology of resignation? I have already raised
this concern in the previous chapter. The risk needs to be considered seriously.
Secondly, a christology of domination emerges as the other side of
the coin with the powerful heavenly Christ corresponding to the
powerful earthly elites, in society and in the Church. It seems that
the Amerindians traditional perception of great confrontations as
struggles among the gods, helped underpin such a christology from
the very beginning. Christ, the God of the conquerors, had won the
battle. The indigenous peoples had to accept their defeat as the
defeat of their gods, and accept the rule of the intruders and their
Lord. Hence it is evident why the powerful, the mighty, take such
an interest in evangelisation and in the propagation of these rare
glorious Christs, these paternal Christs, Trinidad writes. They are
symbols of power and domination.17
Once again, there is a noteworthy ambiguity at work here. As I
shall demonstrate, the perspective of the struggle of the gods is perhaps the ultimate structuring principle of Sobrinos christology.18
Here we are reminded that this vision was at work on both sides of
the conquest, among the indigenous peoples as well as among the
Spanish conquerors.19 And in both cases its principal function was
clearly in favour of the victors, preparing and theologically endorsing their victory. The idolatry of the natives justified the Spaniards
violent conquest in the conquerors own opinion.

17 Trinidad 1984, 60.

18 See Chapter v.
19 Rivera Pagn 1992b, 154-168.

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The confrontation between the Europeans and the natives of the Americas was
perceived by the Europeans as a divine, transcendental, and cosmic battle in
which the victor was God and the loser, Satan. No matter how hard the devil
tried, Jesus Christ vanquished him from the Kingdom that he had here.20

Again, Bartolom de Las Casas was the exception. He prophetically

denounced the Spaniards as the real worshippers of idols, adoring
gold and riches as the true god, to whom they sacrifice the blood of
the Amerindians.21 Las Casas also exposed and condemned the way
in which this idolatry of mammon was hidden behind rhetorical
allegiance to the crucified Christ.22
Thus we see how the reference to a battle of gods can be used
equally to justify and denounce the use of oppressive power. In
addition, we recognise in the passage just cited that other principal
traits of a contemporary christology of liberation, such as Jesus as
Messiah and as the mediator of the Kingdom, were also fundamental in this colonial christology of domination. One important
observation may be drawn from this, namely that the material content of a given christology alone seems to be unable to safeguard it
against manipulation. It is therefore all the more necessary to take
into account its actual social and even political function, as we shall
see.
Thirdly, one can observe a christology of marginalisation growing
from this process of colonisation-evangelisation. In Latin American
20 Rivera Pagn 1992b, 162. The citation is from Gernimo de Mendietas Historia eclesistica indiana from 1596 (third facsimile, ed. Editorial Porra,
Mxico 1980: 18: 224)
21 The issue is acutely posited by Las Casas in the rhetorical question, Who is
the true god of the conquerors: God or gold? The conquistadors, Las Casas
asserts, make war against the Indians and enslave them to reach the goal that
is their god: gold []; to take out of their blood the riches they take as their
god [] To this god-gold, he continues, they sacrificed the Indians, killing
them in the mines [] Rivera Pagn 1992b, 259.
22 Ibid. Cf. Gutirrez 1989, and Gutirrez 1992.

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piety, even today, there is a tendency to draw attention away from

Jesus, in favour of the Saints, and above all in favour of Virgin
Mary. In a way, Jesus is marginalised. This corresponds with the
great mass of marginalized adults and children, the great mass of
those who are not taken into account, Trinidad points out.23 But
then, the child Jesus is adopted, is taken care of, by the wealthy
and powerful, as an act of benevolence. Trinidad is here referring to
an overwhelmingly paternalistic form of charity which is undertaken in the name of the child Jesus all over Latin America, especially at Christmas time. A chosen few among the marginalised thus
receive some help, but remain marginalised. And Jesus is again
made the guarantor of the status quo; the benevolence of the wealthy
is supposed to bring secure spiritual blessings for themselves and
thereby also theological legitimation of their status and role in society.
Although the descriptions presented by Trinidad are dense,
rather polemical descriptions which would need some further elaboration from a strictly historical point of view,24 I think his main
assertion of an inherited christology of oppression25 being effective
all over the continent for centuries, is basically valid. One could ask,
however, whether there was not also a subversive and provocative
underside when oppressed indigenous and later also poor, mestizo
people adopted the image of the suffering Jesus. It is in my opinion
reasonable also to suppose that they did to some extent recognise a
potential for resistance and survival in the fact that the portrait of
the Risen Christ in the Gospels underscores that he is none other
than the suffering and humiliated Jesus.26 This other story of chris23 Trinidad 1984, 60.
24 Trinidads strong wording in the introduction, for instance, where he speaks
of a Spanish redemptive masochism, makes one suspect that the so-called
leyenda negra has left too notable a mark on his historical version.
25 Trinidad 1984, 60.

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tology and conquista is less visible and less developed. It has come to
the fore in glimpses, as in the prophetic testimonies of Las Casas
and the Peruvian chronicler Guamn Poma de Ayala. But it might
have been expressed primarily at the level of popular irony.27
It is against the backdrop of these ambiguous christologies, captive and dependent, but with a liberating current underneath, that
the quest for a new Latin American christology emerges. It is a
search for liberating christology in a double sense. Jon Sobrino is
among the first to contribute to such a liberation christology.28
26 This is a main point in Sobrinos treatment of the resurrection, see Postscript, below. Hugo Assmann deems the separation of cross and resurrection
fatal: The dolorous Christs of Latin America, whose central image is ever
the cross, are Christs of impotence an impotence interiorized by the
oppressed. Defeat, sacrifice, pain, cross. Impotence, powerlessness is
accepted undigested, recognised in advance and submitted to. Defeat is not
perceived as a temporary reversal to be overcome in struggle. It appears an
inevitable necessity, as a condition for the privilege of living. [] On the
other hand, the rare glorious Christs of Latin America seated on thrones
and wearing royal crowns like kings of Spain are not other Christs, they are
the same Christs, the same sorrowful Christs, their necessary counterparts.
They are their other face the one the dominator sees. Thus there is no way
to separate cross and resurrection without falling among Christs that alienate, Christs that estrange. Christs of established power (who have no need to
struggle, because they already dominate), and Christs of established impotence (who are too dominated to be able to struggle) are the two faces of
oppressor christologies. Assmann 1984; 135-136.
27 See the suggestive and original article by Pedro Negre Rigol: Negre Rigol
1984.
28 Besides Sobrino, the main proponents of a Latin American liberation christology have been Leonardo Boff, (see his groundbreaking Boff 1972, and the
collection Boff 1981a) and Juan Luis Segundo, who wrote extensively on
these matters; from Segundo 1984-1989 to Segundo 1991a. See also Bonino
1984 and Equipo 1984. For an overview, discussions and appraisals, see e.g.,
Lois 1991; Bussmann 1980; Batstone 1991; Waltermire 1994; Macquarrie
1990, 316-320.

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Because of this particular history and actual situation, in which

there is a sabotage of christology in the name of christology in
Hugo Assmanns words,29 the new Latin American christology
insists that it is not sufficient merely to repeat and explain the dogmas of Christ for the believers of today. It is first of all necessary to
employ a hermeneutics of suspicion in order to expose how the prevailing christologies function in society. Against oppressive christologies, one must formulate a christology which critically asks about
the continuing presence and liberating activity of Jesus Christ in the
reality of today. This is what Hugo Assmann has labelled the actuation of the power of Christ in history.30
The main challenge, according to Assmann, is [] to determine, even though not in exclusive terms, just where this power of
Christ is acting in conflictive human history.31 The direct answer
to this question is the distinctive mark of Latin American liberation
christology: the power of Christ in history is present in the praxis of
the poor.32 Christ is on the side of the oppressed, against the
oppressors. Christ is therefore to be confessed as Jesus Christ Liberator, as the programmatic title of the first christology to emerge
from Latin America, that of Leonardo Boff, clearly proclaims.33

29
30
31
32

Assmann 1984, 125.

Ibid.
Assmann 1984, 132.
Recently, in a self-critical article on the crisis of liberation theology, Assmann comments on what he now deems an over-estimation of the power of
the poor during the early phase of this theological current: [] no h
dvida de que se cometeram ingenuidades a respeito do suposto surgimento
de uma igreja dos pobres ou quanto irrupco dos pobres na igreja (e seu
potencial evangelizador). [] A Teologia da Libertaco equivocou-se ao
pensar que a opco pelos pobres fosse a nica sada para a Igreja e a Sociedade. Assmann 1994b, 7.
33 Boff 1972.

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Sobrino explicitly locates his own christological efforts in this

framework. He looks to Guamn Poma and Las Casas for its
roots.34 Sobrino believes that in the preference shown by the poor
and oppressed in Latin America for the image of the suffering Jesus,
there is a recognition which, paradoxically, has given them strength
to endure: In this suffering Christ they recognised themselves, and
from him they learned patience and resignation to enable them to
survive with a minimum of meaning on the cross that was laid on
them.35
Like Trinidad and Assmann, Sobrino points to the need to tear
down oppressive images of Christ, and replace them with liberating
ones. Among the christological distortions that he wishes to overcome with his own christology, he mentions three in particular.36
First, there is the frequent tendency, as Sobrino sees it, of presenting Christ as a sublime abstraction. The abstract Christ comes
through in conceptions of Christ as Love and in conceptions of
Christ as Power. The former has been used to neutralise the partiality Jesus himself displayed in favour of the oppressed, whereas the
latter has justified the sacralization of power in the political and
economical realms, Sobrino claims.
Second, there is the affirmation that Christ is the embodiment
of universal reconciliation. This statement, which Sobrino deems
true in itself, but [] not given its dialectical thrust, is often used
34 As, Guamn Poma deca: ha de saberse claramente con la fe que donde
est el pobre est el mismo Jesucristo, y Bartolom de Las Casas: yo dejo en
las Indias a Jesucristo, nuestro Dios, azotndolo y afligindolo y
abofetendolo y crucificndolo, no una sino millares de veces, cuanto es de
parte de los espaoles que asuelan y destruyen aquellas gentes. Sobrino
1991d, 31.
35 En ese Cristo sufriente se reconocieron y de l aprendieron paciencia y resignacin para poder sobrevivir con un mnimo de sentido en la cruz que les
fue impuesta. Sobrino 1991d, 32.
36 Sobrino 1978a, xvi-xix / Sobrino 1976, xii-xiii, cf. Sobrino 1991d, 36-42.

190

to harmonise historical conflicts and immunise against Jesus prophetic denunciations and curses. The traditional kind of soteriology
works in this direction, too, Sobrino believes, in making sin a universal, almost a-historical concept, from which Jesus by his death
has saved all people, once and for all.
Third, Sobrino sees a danger in the tendency to absolutise
Christ, as if he were the ultimate or the divine pure and simple,
not seeing him in his essential relationality with the Kingdom of
God and the God of the Kingdom. This last point concerns a core
tenet in Sobrinos christology which I will deal with in more detail
in Chapter iv, namely that Jesus is the revelation not of God in
directo, but of the Son, i.e. the way to God in history.37
Like Boff, then, Sobrino sets out to explore the image of Jesus as
Liberator. This image of the liberator Christ is new and unexpected38, he claims. It is something that has emerged in the last
decades praxis(/es) for liberation in Latin America.39 The suffering
Christ has now become a symbol for protest and liberation for the
many poor and afflicted throughout the region. Sobrino holds this
new image to be a sign of the times. In it, he sees a historical coincidence of identity and relevance, since it is the image of Christ
which is most relevant to the majority of the Latin American population living in poverty, and at the same time the image which
renders the historical figure of Jesus in the most faithful manner.
In short, the Latin American population is longing for a liberator, and Jesus of Nazareth is a liberator, a Messiah, Sobrino believes.
The image of Christ the liberator restores the essence of the title
Messiah, which though maintained down the centuries, has by now
lost any sense of historical or popular messianism.40 Thus, the title
37 Sobrino 1978a, 105. I shall return to this in Chapter iv [8-10].
38 Sobrino 1991d, 33.
39 Cf. the shift from development to liberation, described in Chapter
i[2]d), above.

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Christ the liberator picks up a story that was more or less broken
off after the first generations of Christians.41 Inspired by this image
of a Liberator-Messiah, Sobrino sets out to show its validity. 42

[2] Remedy: The Latin-American Historical Jesus

As Point of Departure
How is one to resist the ideologised versions of Christ, the manifold
and widespread christologies of domination so useful for the protectors of the status quo in Latin America? Basically, by siding with the
poor, and returning to the historical Jesus as starting point and criterion for christological reflection, Sobrino responds.
(1) The issue of where to begin is no small issue in theological work.
It may bring a significant influence to bear on the results. Therefore, Sobrino gives it due consideration.43 In his elaboration of
methodological starting points for gaining knowledge about Jesus
Christ we see again a circular structure in Sobrinos methodology. It
is a circle between Gods revelation in the present and in the past.
40 Cf. Sobrino 1993h: Con el liberador se recoge hoy lo central del sentido
mas originario del mesas: en la historia aparecer alguien que traer salvacin a los pobres y oprimidos, aparecer un rey justo que liberar de
esclavitudes a las mayoras populares.
41 Sobrino 1994c, 276, n. 12. / Sobrino 1991d, 36, n. 12. Con la imagen del
Cristo liberador se recobra lo fundamental del ttulo mesas mantenido
ciertamente a lo largo de la historia, pero privado ya de cualquier contenido
histrico-popular. Con el Cristo liberador se retoma una historia que qued
interrumpida prcticamente con las primeras generaciones de cristianos.
42 Cf. Sobrino 1982a, 91: Ciertamente Cristo es el liberador para la cristologa;
pero la tarea de sta consiste ms en mostrarle cmo liberador.
43 Sobrino 1976, 1-30; 265-270; Sobrino 1991d, 17-114.

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Liberation theology [] insists on the actual presence of God and believes that
the reality and word of God that are represented in the revelation, are better
rediscovered and safeguarded (when read) from the actual signs of the times.44

The actual sign of the times from which Sobrino starts his christology is the new image of Christ as liberator having emerged among
poor and oppressed Christians struggling for liberation in Latin
America. This image is informed from, and should be tested
against, the historical Jesus, Sobrino believes. The historical Jesus is
what he calls his methodological point of departure. One could
say, then, that Sobrino sets out from the Latin American historical
Jesus.
Before explaining what this apparently contradictory expression
might mean, I must once more45 add a note on the significance of
the resurrection in Sobrinos christological enterprise. Why does
Sobrino not begin with the resurrection of Christ?46 After all, this
may be said to be the starting point of the New Testament. Admitting that all christology and Christian faith actually emerge after
and as a result of the resurrection of Christ, Sobrino nevertheless
deems the resurrection inadequate as starting point, because, in
order to interpret the resurrection correctly, we must know who it
was that was raised from the dead, why he was raised, and how we
gain access to the risen One.47 Therefore, it is better to begin with
the historical Jesus of Nazareth, Sobrino contends.
This should not be understood as preferring jesuology to
christology, however. As should have become clear, the perspective of the resurrection is present already from the beginning in
44 Sobrino 1989d, 253-254: La teologa de la liberacin [] insiste en la actual
presencia de Dios y cree que desde los actuales signos de los tiempos mejor se
redescubre y salvaguarda la realidad y la palabra de Dios plasmadas en la revelacin.
45 See Introduction above, and Postscript below.
46 Cf. e.g., Pannenberg 1968, 53ff.

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Sobrinos christology as a basic presupposition. The present faith in

Christ in the poor communities of Latin America is faith in the living Christ, active in and through history precisely because he was
raised from the dead. But having this overall perspective, it is still
more fruitful to take the historical Jesus as a methodological point of
departure, Sobrino argues. Because in that way, the manipulation of
the risen Christ in all kinds of oppressive conquest christologies
may more easily be unmasked and dismantled.
Sobrino argues that our best remedy in order to free christology
from its possible perversions is a return to the historical Jesus. The
strength of this argument is disputable, however. Is it possible to
know anything about the historical Jesus? Is it fruitful to separate
the Jesus of history from the Christ of faith? And is not even the
historical Jesus just as ambiguous, just as open to diverse and opposite interpretations as the dogma of a Risen Christ?
Hugo Assmann points out that there is something too ingenuous in the intention of those who think they can fill in the Latin
American christological lacuna with a powerful biblical portrait of
Christ []48 A simple recourse to a better exegesis will not lead
to an objective purification of christological doctrine. Is it not so
47 La resurreccin de Cristo fue necesaria para que surgiese la fe en Cristo, y es
por ello la condicin de posibilidad de toda cristologa. Pero no es un punto
de partida til, pues hasta que no se esclarece quin ha sido resucitado (Jess
de Nazaret), por qu ha sido resucitado (para que se manifieste la justicia de
Dios contra un mundo de injusticia), cmo se accede al resucitado (en el
seguimiento de Jess en ltimo trmino), la resurreccin no conduce necesariamente al verdadero Cristo. Sobrino 1991d, 85 / Sobrino 1994c, 44. See
also Sobrino 1983a, 480-484. Earlier in his career, however, Sobrino seems to
have been of a different opinion: Pero tanto histrica como sistemticamente el punto de partida de la cristologa es la resurreccin de Cristo, que
es por definicin un acontecimiento del pasado que apunta al futuro.
Sobrino 1974, 181.
48 Assmann 1984, 126.

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also with the historical Jesus? Will a recourse to better history

solve the problem? We shall have to consider this starting point in
Sobrino more carefully.
(2) The expression a Latin American historical Jesus, certainly seems
a contradiction. The historical Jesus was, of course, not a Latin
American campesino. Nevertheless I regard this paradoxical expression as helpful in order to bring out what Sobrino has in mind
when he speaks of the historical Jesus. For him, historical is not
primarily the history of wie es eigentlich gewesen (Leopold von
Ranke49) in Galilee. It is rather this history as seen from and continued in the today of Latin America. History is that which links the
oppressed communities of El Salvador to Jesus of Nazareth. A Latin
American quest for the historical Jesus is therefore conscious of both
poles in this historical connection.
However, the historical Jesus is given priority over the contemporary images of Christ, in Sobrinos approach. The main criterion
for discerning correctly the signs of the times, in this case the
image of Jesus as liberator, is the historical Jesus. His life and service, his historical praxis, is the norma normans for the content of
any christology as well as for a liberating praxis today.50 This
makes Jesus at the same time object of theological epistemology and
norm for the epistemological method, i.e. for how knowledge about
him is to be gained. Once again, there seems to be an inescapable
circularity in Sobrinos framework, a circularity which leads to a certain vagueness.
49 Leopold von Ranke: Gesammelte Werke 33/34, VII.
50 Cf. Sobrino 1982a, 23: Cristo va siendo presentado no slo como quien
mueve a la liberacin, sino como norma de la prctica liberadora y prototipo
del hombre nuevo que se pretende con la liberacin. Jess aparece como la
norma normans, y no la norma normata de la liberacin. Likewise Sobrino
1991d, 100-101 and Sobrino 1983b, 939.

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What does Jon Sobrino actually mean by the term the historical Jesus? It has become common terminology within New Testament studies to speak of three quests of the historical Jesus,
referring to Albert Schweitzers (1875-1965) influential study The
Quest of the Historical Jesus from 1906. The first quest actually
started long before Schweitzer though, with Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768), whose writings were posthumously published
by Gottfried Ephraim Lessing in 1774. The presupposition of this
original quest was that there was a radical abyss between the historical figure of Jesus, and the way the Christian church interpreted and
presented him. This criticism paved the way for the liberal life of
Jesus movement, which highlighted the religious personality of
the historical Jesus in a manner that made him look suspiciously
like an ideal figure by the progressive standards of the nineteenth
century.
It was this development that Schweitzer together with Johannes Weiss (1863-1914), William Wrede (1859-1096) and Martin Khler (1835-1912), although on different grounds firmly rejected.
Schweitzer set out to find the historical Jesus, but encountered a
complete stranger, belonging to a totally apocalyptic world view
which seemed to Schweitzer to have no contact with that of modern
human beings of the twentieth century. The quest had failed, in
other words. This failure made Rudolf Bultmann take the position
that the historicity of Jesus was of close to no importance to christology; the only necessary affirmation was that Jesus had lived.
Questioning whether this really is all there is to say, one of Bultmanns students Ernst Ksemann, and the Norwegian scholar Nils
Alstrup Dahl (independently of each other, around 1953) re-open
the issue, thus initiating a new or second quest. In the foreground of this quest was the aspiration to explore the continuity
between the preaching of Jesus and the preaching about Jesus. The
new quest built on the presupposition that it was possible to gain

196

some historically affirmed knowledge about Jesus of Nazareth,

although its primary concern was theological. Central scholars
related to this movement were, among others, Gnther Bornkamm,
Joachim Jeremias and Edward Schillebeeckx.
Finally, in the course of the last fifteen years there has been what
Marcus J. Borg calls a renaissance of the academic discipline of Jesus
scholarship, especially in North America. Building on new archaeological findings and recent developments in the use of anthropological (and other interdisciplinary) methods in New Testament
studies, the leading proponents of the third quest (Marcus Borg,
E.P. Sanders, Richard Horsley, Burton Mack, John Dominic Crossan, John P. Meier and many others) have presented a whole series
of Jesus-portraits that have evoked wide public interest, far beyond
the confines of Biblical scholarship. Particularly controversial have
been the procedures and findings of the Jesus Seminar, a colloquium of North American New Testament scholars. Whereas the
second quest emphasised the uniqueness of Jesus in almost every
sense, the third quest tends to see him much more in continuity
with his contemporaries.51
Does Sobrino belong to the first, second or third quest or
none of these? In the opening pages of his first book on christology,
we find this definition:
Let me say right here that my starting point is the historical Jesus. It is the person,
teaching, attitudes, and deeds of Jesus of Nazareth insofar as they are accessible,
in a more or less general way, to historical and exegetical investigation.52

This programmatic statement does not mean that Sobrino is unaware of the profound difficulties revealed in the various quests for
51 See i.a., McGrath 1994, 316-327; Dahl 1991; Borg 1994b; Borg 1994a; Meier
1991; Crossan 1991; etc.
52 Sobrino 1978a, 3. Sobrino 1976, 2-3.

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the historical Jesus within New Testament studies since H. S. Reimarus.53 The historical Jesus who comes to the fore in Latin American Christology not only in that of Sobrino54 is not the same as
the European, liberal Jesus. The historical Jesus implies here the
whole history of Jesus, his development and destiny, which ends
in crucifixion and is culminated and confirmed in the faith in his
resurrection.55 It is not a term used in opposition to the Christ of
faith; its intention is not liberation from dogma.56 Sobrino clearly
does not belong to the first quest, in other words.
On the contrary, the historical Jesus is used in his approach to
give the correct direction to the understanding of the christological
dogma.57 The historical Jesus is both the way to the Christ of faith,
and its safeguard.58 The historical Jesus becomes then, for
Sobrino, a criterion to discern and correctly interpret on the one
hand the historical situation and praxis, the signs of the times, and
on the other hand the fides qua, the actual explication and application of the christological dogma. A historical praxis without the historical Jesus as norm is in danger of becoming reductionist. A
Christian transcendental faith without the historical Jesus as norm,
is in danger of becoming alienating and ideologised. In the historical Jesus the two come together, are corrected and complemented,
Sobrino is convinced.

53 Sobrino is, of course, fully aware of the exegetical difficulties involved in

trying to go back to that Jesus [] Sobrino 1978a, xxii/ Sobrino 1976, xvi.
See also Sobrino 1976, 209/ Sobrino 1978a, 273.
54 Hilgert 1989.
55 Sobrino 1976, 270. Cf. Sobrino 1991d, 96: Por el Jess histrico entendemos la vida de Jess de Nazaret, sus palabras y hechos, su actividad y su
praxis, sus actitudes y su espritu, su destino de cruz (y de resurreccin).
56 Sobrino 1982a, 80.
57 Sobrino 1982a, 71ff.
58 Sobrino 1991d, 74-79.

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But is it possible to know anything about the historical Jesus,

when it is generally accepted that the gospels do not provide us with
the biography of Jesus, but with testimonies to belief in him?
Sobrino thinks so, to a certain extent, and he suggests three main
criteria for determining this, following E. Schillebeeckx: (1) the
appearance of one and the same theme on various levels of tradition; (2) what is specific to and distinctive of a theme by contrast
with and even in opposition to theologies and practices that came
after Jesus; and (3) the consistency of Jesus death with what is narrated of his life.59
Sobrino shares with both the second and the third quest this
relative optimism with regard to the possibility of knowing something important about the historical Jesus in spite of the failure of
the first quest. However, the criteria he uses are clearly derived from
the second quest.60 But again, historical knowledge per se is not, for
him, the main purpose in emphasising the historical Jesus as the
methodological point of departure:
It is necessary to determine theoretically what is meant by historical when we
speak of the historical Jesus. By historical here is not meant directly and primarily the factual, that which is geographically and temporally datable with exactitude, or that which has been called ipsissisima verba or facta Jesu. It is
59 Sobrino 1982b, 74. / Sobrino 1982a, 89: 1) la aparicin de un mismo tema en
varios estratos de la tradicin, 2) lo especfico y distintivo de un tema a diferencia y aun oposicin a teologas y prcticas posteriores a Jess 3) la congruencia que su propia muerte otorga a lo que se narra de su vida.
60 Sobrino is obviously dependent on leading German exegetes of this period,
such as J. Jeremias and E. Ksemann, especially in his first books on christology In his later writings, some Spanish and Latin American exegetes come
more to the fore. Yet, one still misses in Sobrinos writings an even more
explicit reception and creative systematic development of the movement of
popular re-reading of the Bible that has grown in strength across the continent even as liberation theology entered its present crisis. See i.a. Mesters
1989 and Vaage 1997.

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presupposed that some of this is possible, and when accepted by historical criticism, it is certainly welcome. By historical is meant here formally the praxis of
Jesus as the place where the maximum metaphysical density of his person is
expressed. This praxis is every activity, in words and deeds, with which he transforms the surrounding reality in the direction of the Kingdom of God and
through which his own person is gradually formed and expressed. But moreover,
it [i.e. Jesus praxis, my comment, SJS] has unleashed a history which has come to
us in order to be continued. Thus, the actual praxis is a demand made by Jesus,
but also the hermeneutical location for the comprehension of Jesus.61

In this lengthy quotation we can trace the influence of the

Zubirian-Ellacuran concepts of history and praxis on Sobrinos
thinking.62 For Sobrino, the most historical element about Jesus is
his praxis,63 and the spirit with which he realized this.64 Accordingly, he holds that all knowledge about Jesus should be structured
from this. Furthermore, for Sobrino the stories about Jesus in the
New Testament are not primarily doctrine, but stories about a prac61 My translation. Sobrino 1983a, 483-4: Hay que determinar tericamente lo
que se entiende por histrica al hablar del Jess histrico. Por histrico no
se entiende aqu en directo y primariamente lo fctico, aquello que es
geogrfica o temporalmente datable con exactitud o lo que se ha dado en
llamar ipsissisima verba o facta Jesu. Se presupone que algo de esto es posble
y en cuanto lo acepte la crtica histrica, bienvenido. Por histrico se
entiende aqu formalmente la prctica de Jess como aquel lugar de mayor
densidad metafsica de su persona. Esa prctica es toda actividad, en hechos
y palabras, por la que transforma la realidad circundante en la direccin del
reino de Dios y a travs de la cual se va haciendo y expresando su propia persona. Pero adems ha desencadenado una historia que ha llegado hasta
nosotros para ser continuada. Con ello la prctica actual es una exigencia de
Jess, pero es tambin el lugar hermenutico de comprensin de Jess. Cf.
Sobrino 1982a, 89; Sobrino 1976, 210.
62 Cf. Chapter i [2] e) above. For example, Sobrino cites with approval Ellacuras statement: (T)he historical life of Jesus is the fullest revelation of the
Christian God, Ellacura 1976, 27.
63 Sobrino 1982a, 81, cf. Sobrino 1991d, 96-100.

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tice stories that have been collected and edited in order that this
practice may be followed.65 Historical is [] that which unleashes
history.66
One main difference in emphasis here from the protagonists of
the second quest might perhaps be formulated thus: while the principal point in the second quest was the fundamental continuity
between the preaching of Jesus and the preaching about him,
Sobrino stresses the continuity between the praxis of Jesus and the
praxis of his followers today.67 For Sobrino, historicity is the past as
continued in the present, heading for the future: Jesus past can be
recovered in the present only if it pushes us toward the future.68
What about the third quest? Is Sobrinos historical Jesus compatible with the main insights of these recent developments within
New Testament scholarship? First of all, Sobrino does not demonstrate familiarity with this contemporary current. He does not
explicitely refer to any of its main proponents (Crossan, Meier,
Borg, et al.).69 Besides this, it should be noted that Sobrinos point
of departure and main interest in the historical Jesus is different
64 This latter, is an addition which Sobrino calls una relativa novedad que ha
sido exigida por la experiencia latinoamericana. Relating practice and
spirit in this manner reduces the danger of falling into pure activism, on
the on hand, and pure spiritualism, on the other, Sobrino believes. Sobrino
1991d, 98-99
65 Sobrino 1982a, 82.
66 Sobrino 1991d, 97.: Histrico es [] lo que desencadena historia. This
definition is borrowed from Moltmann, see his Moltmann 1967.
67 This does not imply that the second quest was not preoccupied with praxis.
Nonetheless, at least it seems that the issue of praxis takes a more central
position and has other characteristics in Sobrino.
68 Sobrino 1978a, xxiii. / Sobrino 1976, xvi: Dicho de otra forma, el pasado de
Jess slo se recobra en el presente si impulsa hacia un futuro.
69 See i.e. Borg 1994b; Meier 1991; Crossan 1994; and Theology Today Vol. 52,
no 1, April 1994 (the whole issue is dedicated to the third quest for the historical Jesus).

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from the one prevalent in the third quest. Sobrinos approach is

admittedly historical-theological. It is impossible to historicise Jesus
without at the same time theologising him, he acknowledges. But
the opposite is also true: It is impossible to theologise him without
historising him. This is what the gospels in the mere fact of their
having been written show, in Sobrinos opinion.70
When it comes to the main findings of the third quest (to the
degree that it is at all possible to speak of any consensus among its
proponents) the picture is manifold. In the third quest there is a
pointedly strong emphasis on the continuity of Jesus with his contemporary time, its religion, culture, society, whereas the second
quest, relying heavily upon the criterion of dissimilarity, stressed
Jesus uniqueness and his discontinuity with the past as well as with
the present and future. Sobrino, it seems to me, does both. His historical-theological reading of Jesus portrays a man in profound continuity and solidarity with his people and the best in its
traditions71, at the same time as his words and actions bring him
into conflict with its religious and political authorities, a conflict
with deadly consequences. This conflict points to the uniqueness of
Jesus his faith, mission and consciousness in Sobrinos rendering.
All in all, although not explicitly in rapport with the third
quest, Sobrinos core tenets on the historical Jesus do not seem
incompatible with fundamental traits of this current. I shall give
70 Sobrino 1991d, 117: De los evangelios, la cristologa aprende, pues, dos lecciones importantes. La primera es que no se puede teologizar la figura de
Jess sin historizarla, narrando su vida y su destino. Sin ello, la fe no tiene
historia. La segunda es que no se puede historizar a Jess sin teologizarlo
como buena noticia, y as, en referencia esencial a las comunidades. Sin ello,
la historia no tiene fe.
71 Sobrino 1976, 32: A Jess hay que comprenderle en primer lugar como un
reformador religioso que predicaba las mejores tradiciones de Israel. Cf.
Sobrino 1991d, 135ff; and Sobrino 1993h.

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some examples of this. Sobrino is more explicitly dependent on the

second quest, though. Yet, the approach of Sobrino is better characterised as a proper Latin American quest, in which the following of
the praxis of Jesus today is the distinctive characteristic.72

[3] Critical Assessment: How Historical Is Jesus Liberator?

The return to the historical Jesus is fundamental to Sobrinos christology, as it is to the other recent christological sketches from Latin
America. It has been criticised and discussed: Is it really the historical Jesus that is meant here or should it rather be labelled the
synoptic, or earthly Jesus?73 Does not Sobrino, in fact, confuse
history and theology? Is he not projecting the ideal of a Latin American liberator back into history? Let us hear some of the critics.
(1) In his critical book on liberation theology, Napoleon Chow74
dedicates the main part of his section on Christology to the work of
Sobrino, [] the most outstanding exponent of christology
among the liberation theologians.75 Chow faults Sobrino for failing to comply with generally accepted academic standards:
72 Jacques Depuis has succinctly described what distinguishes the Latin American quest from the European: Por el contrario, la vuelta al Jess histrico de
la Cristologa de la liberacin est marcada por una intuicin y significado
muy diferente. No se intenta recuperar crticamente los datos histricos para
dotar a la fe cristolgica de un fundamento histrico vlido. Se dirige, ms
bien, a redescubrir en la praxis del Jess histrico el principio hermenutico
de la praxis liberadora de la Iglesia cristiana. La praxis de Jess tiene un valor
paradigmtico especialmente para el obrar cristiano. Tiene su aplicacin
especial en un contexto en que grandes masas populares estn sometidas a
una pobreza deshumanizadora. Depuis 1994, 47-48.

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The christological program that Sobrino proposes selects those aspects of Jesus life
that will help in formulating a strategy for liberation. These aspects include the
resurrection and the Kingdom of God, the socio-political activity of Jesus and the
obligation of the Christian to follow his example. This is a paradigm which is
more directed at a struggle for the truth than at an academic search for the
truth.76

Chow portrays the christology of Sobrino almost as a baptised revolutionary polemic or ideology, and he even introduces a direct
comparison with the Communist Manifesto. And, if liberation theology needs the figure of a revolutionary Christ in order to attract
revolutionary disciples, it is obvious that Sobrino has done a good

73 Cf. the discussion in Bedford 1993, 134-138; with reference to, i. a., Ogden
1978; and Segovia 1980, as well as Bussmann 1980,.9f, 56f and 158. Nancy
Bedford holds that Sobrino lacks clear methodological criteria for how to
recover the historical Jesus. What he is really concerned with, in her opinion,
is the synoptic image of Jesus, rather than the later, dogmatic portrait of
Jesus. Bedford supports her argument with a reference to Myre 1980, 109f:
La christologie de lauteur est donc moins fonde sur le Jsus de lhistoire,
comme il le prtend, que sur la christologie des vangiles synoptiques.
Why does Sobrino insist on the designation historical, according to Bedford? Der tiefere Grund ist wohl, dass ohne dieses Wort ein Aspekt vielleicht verlorenginge, auf den er um jeden Preis aufmerksam machen will,
nmlich, dass Jesus Christus historisch ist, weil er whrend seines irdischen
Lebens Geschichte entfesselt hat (desencaden) und sie kraft seines Geistes
immer noch entfesselt. Op. cit [], 138
74 Chow 1992.
75 [] el expositor ms destacado de la cristologa entre los telogos de la Liberacin. Chow 1992, 57-79; 60.
76 El programa cristolgico que propone Sobrino, escoge aquellos aspectos de
la vida de Jess que ayudarn a disear una estrategia de liberacin, y ellos
incluyen la Resurreccin y el Reino de Dios, la actividad sociopoltica de
Jess y la obligacin del cristiano de seguir su ejemplo. Ese es un paradigma
creado ms para luchar por la verdad que para una bsqueda de la verdad acadmica. Op. cit., 65

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job.77 The whole book is clearly written within this anti-Marxist

framework.
Besides this exaggerated ideological critique, Chows major criticism regards Sobrinos emphasis on an historical approach as
tendentious and filled with omissions.78 Chow particularly
mentions the case of the Pharisees. While Sobrino accepts the version of Jesus death which blames the Pharisees, Chow holds that
Jesus and the Pharisees were not adversaries.79
Furthermore, Chow maintains that Sobrino does not distinguish adequately between a historical and a theological approach
when he intends to substitute the classical christologies ontological
approach to Jesus divinity with a relational. For Sobrino, Jesus
divinity is expressed in his historical relations with his Father and
with the Kingdom of God. This may be possible, according to
Chow, but cannot be presented as the results of a historical investigation.
Sobrino wishes to live in an ideal world. He affirms that he searches for the historical Christ at the same time as he puts forward declarations of faith, which,
precisely because of the intrinsic character of faith, it is impossible to criticize
from any historical point of view.80

Historical investigation and affirmations of faith should not be

mixed, Chow holds. If one intends to reach conclusions that are
77 Y, si la teologa de la liberacin necesita la figura de un Cristo revolucionario para fines de lograr discpulos revolucionarios, es evidente que Sobrino
ha hecho un buen trabajo. Op. cit.,70
78 Aunque Sobrino pretende adoptar una aproximacin histrica para moldear
su cristologa, su tratamiento de la historia a veces es tendenciosa, e incurre
en omisiones cruciales y acepta y enfatiza datos e interpretaciones que estn
abiertamente destinados a perfilar al Cristo de la teologa de la liberacin.
Ibid.
79 Chow supports this claim with references to J.T.Pawlikowski, R.Radford
Ruether and E.P. Sanders, cf. n.81-82.

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clearly predetermined by ones faith, one does not write good history, nor good theology. 81
Sobrinos historical Jesus is thus predetermined by his faith, or
rather, by his socio-political programme the liberation of the poor
in Latin America, according to Chow. Wanting to demonstrate
what he holds to be a more correct historical interpretation of Jesus,
Chow moves on to a rendering of the main tenets of E.P. Sanders
Jesus and Judaism from 1985.
It should be noted that, even though his book is from 1992,
Chow bases his harsh criticism solely on Cristologa desde Amrica
Latina. After all, Sobrinos approach to this issue is further developed in Jess en Amrica Latina and Jesucristo liberador, as a consequence of the questions and criticisms he had received. But
moreover, Chow oversimplifies the distinctions between faith and
science, and between theological and historical. His position with
regard to historical science draws close to a positivistic historicism.
Chow does not discuss Sobrinos explicit statements on the interrelationship between these aspects, nor does he himself discuss the
meaning of historical. Finally, the stark ideological (anti-Marxist)
framework of Chows analysis makes him unable to meet his own
standards of neutrality: his discourse seems to be at least as much
struggle (on a rhetorical level, that is) as an academic search for
truth.
Although Chows critique for these reasons is generally inadequate, I do think that there is a core in it that should be taken seri80 My translation. Sobrino quiere tener el mejor de los mundos, afirma que
busca el Cristo histrico al mismo tiempo que plantea declaraciones de fe
que, precisamente debido a su carcter intrnsico, son inatacables desde
cualquir perspectiva histrica. Op. cit., 71.
81 My translation. Si intenta llegar a conclusiones que estn claramente predeterminadas por su fe, no escribe buena historia ni buena teologa. Op. cit.,
72.

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ously: Chow has spotted indications of an unclarity or even an

inconsistency in Sobrinos argument regarding the relationship
between history and theology. I shall pursue this further below.
(2) Arthur McGovern cites a rather scathing critique made by the
well-known New Testament scholar John P. Meier in June 1988, of
Sobrinos (and J.L.Segundos) use of the historical Jesus.82
Sobrino, says Meier, cites very few important exegetes at any length, and he has
no extended, critical discussion of the meaning of the historical Jesus nor of criteria dealing with this topic. Meier asserts that the historical Jesus means that
which the methods of historical criticism enable us to retrieve about Jesus of Nazareth. These historical reconstructions cannot be identified, however, with the
real Jesus. Sobrino glosses over this and sometimes equates the historical Jesus
with the humanity of Jesus and other times with Jesus earthly career.83

Meier too faults Sobrino for his oversimplified view of Judaism in

Jesus time. The Pharisees had probably little to do with Jesus
death, according to recent exegetical studies, he maintains.
McGovern then answers this critique on Sobrinos behalf. He
admits that Meier may be correct in judging that Sobrinos scholarship falls short of the standards set by Schillebeeckx and others
when it comes to biblical interpretation. However, Sobrino is a
hermeneutical theologian who is trying to draw attention to
dimensions of Jesus neglected in traditional theologies []84
Moreover, Meier assumes his own definition of the historical Jesus
as definitive, which is not exactly a fruitful basis for discussion, in
McGoverns view.85

82
83
84
85

McGovern 1989, 80-82.

Op. cit: 80.
McGovern 1989, 81.
Ibid.

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When it comes to the issue of the Pharisees, however, McGovern agrees with Meier:
[] Meiers point about oversimplifying the role of the Pharisees in Jesus death
appear quite valid in the light of recent scholarship. But even on this point, the
particular work he cites (Sanders: Jesus and Judaism) was published after
Sobrino and Segundo had completed their works.86

(3) This issue of Sobrinos (mis-)interpretation of Judaism in Jesus

day comes most critically through in an article by Clark M. Williamson.87 Williamson launches harsh attacks against Sobrinos
Christology at the Crossroads, concluding that
[] Sobrinos whole project of a Christology for liberation theology is jeopardized critically by his way of approaching the historical Jesus. A liberation theology that cuts itself off from the liberating event of the Bible, the Exodus of a
people from oppression, from real slavery to real freedom, is self-defeating.88

This remark, claiming that Sobrinos christology cuts itself off

from the exodus-event, shows how exaggerated and strained Williamsons criticism is. It is totally incomprehensible how Williamson
can read Sobrinos texts without recognising the profound and decisive traces of the liberating motive of the Exodus in them.89 Nevertheless, the gravity of the issues at stake in Williamsons main
critique regarding Sobrinos treatment of the Jewishness of Jesus is
such that it merits attention.
Williamson intends to show no less than how Sobrinos christology is basically anti-Jewish. This is partly due to Sobrinos dependence on German exegesis, particularly Jeremias, he assumes. But
86
87
88
89

208

Ibid.
Williamson 1983.
Op. cit., 153.
Sobrino 1976, 31ff; Sobrino 1991d, 127ff.

the critique goes even further, alleging i.a. that Sobrino consciously
leaves out the Lords prayer in his treatment of the prayer of Jesus,
because [] it doesnt fit Sobrinos anti-Jewish model.90 AntiJewishness has been a fundamental structure in Christian theology
all the way at least since Tertullian, in Williamsons view. In main
themes of his christology, such as God, Jesus, law, church, Jewish
exegesis, prayer, late Judaism, legalistic piety, the Pharisees, and
not least Jewish responsibility for the death of Jesus, Williamson
finds Sobrino guilty of accepting and applying uncritically this antiJewish schema.
In the same manner, Williamson faults Sobrino for failing to see
that Judaism was and is a behavioural system, having no creed. It
was and is orthopraxy the very thing Jesus is said to have
demanded. 91
His most fundamental criticism with regard to Sobrinos historical Jesus is that it is
[] historically uncritical or uncritically historical, simply taking a parable as
an actual instance of a generalized attitude or simply taking a parable as an
event or, in any case, taking the parable out of context of its situation in the
Redaktionsgeschichte of the gospels. The latter comment, however, is applicable to
Sobrinos entire approach to the historical Jesus and is a basic structural flaw,
methodologically, in everything he says about Jesus.92

How should one assess these critics? One main observation is that,
Williamson, like some of the other critics, fails to recognise the distinctiveness of the Latin American quest, whose main intention is
not to secure the christological interpretation against criticisms of
modern (secular) historical science. As I have shown, historical
90 Op. cit.,152. Sobrino, of course, has no reason to leave out the Lords
prayer; see Sobrino 1991d, 253, et passim.
91 Op. cit., 150
92 Op. cit., 151.

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takes on a particular meaning in Sobrinos use. Accordingly, his use

of historical in the historical Jesus should be understood in line
with the practical-hermeneutical understanding of history which
Sobrino (like Ellacura) promotes elsewhere.93
Nonetheless, these critics do point to a weakness in Sobrinos
methodology. Even though he insists on the significance of the
hermeneutical standpoint (praxis in the world of the poor) for the
interpretation of the historical Jesus, he does admit the need for criteria in order to identify the historical Jesus. But the relationship
between the criteria and the hermeneutical standpoint remains
unclear in his outline. Are the criteria applicable only from the particular hermeneutical standpoint? The difficulty here is particularly
obvious, since Sobrino calls the historical Jesus norma normans.
Once again, the circularity is confusing. Furthermore, it is difficult
to see how Sobrino himself applies these criteria, or rather, he does
not seem to apply them too rigorously. I shall try to throw light on
this problem as I proceed, and subsequently propose how it may be
overcome.94
Other critical objections to Sobrinos interpretation regard his
lack of sensitivity to some main issues raised by the third quest.
Sobrinos dependency on Jeremias and Ksemann makes him vulnerable to this critique, particularly on the issue of the Pharisees
and Judaism at the time of Jesus. Sobrino needs to pay more attention to this matter. Although he has in fact modified his position in
his later writings, an even more refined vision of Jesus contemporary Judaism may bring more influence to bear on his interpretation
of Jesus death. But this is of course not to say, as Williamson does,
that Sobrinos christology is anti-Jewish, and even consciously so.
Such a statement is in my opinion much out of place.

93 See Chapters I [2] e) and II [2-3], above.

94 See Chapters IV, V and VI below.

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Is the historical Jesus as point of departure a misleading concept in

Sobrinos christology, then? At the very least, it is ambiguous.
Sobrinos use of the concept is different from the way it is customarily understood in European and North American Biblical scholarship related to the three quests. But what could be a suitable
alternative?
Bedford proposes that Sobrino actually refers to the synoptic
Jesus.95 This is not accurate in my opinion, for at least two reasons.
First, the synoptic Jesus is too text-oriented to cover adequately
Sobrinos concept, which deals with Jesus practice and the remembrance of the practice in actu. Secondly, it fails to take into account
Sobrinos frequent references to the christology of the Letter to the
Hebrews.
What about the earthly Jesus? Would that be better? No,
because the opposition earthly heavenly would also be misleading. Sobrino, following Gutirrez and Ellacura, strives to overcome
the theological thinking on two levels, whether heaven and earth
or secular history and history of salvation. There is only one history according to liberation theology.
The pre-paschal Jesus could be another alternative. Although
better than those just mentioned, its weakness is that it would
somehow conceal the fact that the Latin American historical Jesus
includes even the Easter experience.96
95 Bedford 1993, 137: Es wre zweifelsohne eindeutiger, wenn er etwa von dem
synoptischen Jesus anstatt von dem historischen Jesus sprechen wrde.
96 Ramn Hilgert 1989, 164-178; 164: Fiel a su pregunta cristolgica especfica,
{la cristologa de la liberacin} busca comprender para vivir mejor el misterio de la resurreccin a partir del Jess histrico: es decir, la fe vivida frente
a los desafos a que se siente lanzada en su seguimiento a Jess, en medio de
las vicisitudes de la actual concretez histrica; qu significa creer en la resurreccin de Jess que fue eliminado por los poderes del mundo, en nuestro
mundo donde a tantos es negado el derecho de vivir dignamente, aunque
para eso se tenga que asesinar a los que luchan por la vida?

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What then? My suggestion is that Sobrino should move from

the historical Jesus to the (hi)story of Jesus. Let us recall the
principal reasoning of the Latin American quest: In order to get
know Jesus, it is necessary to begin with the historical Jesus. In
order to know the historical Jesus it is necessary to begin with his
praxis and the spirit with which he realised this praxis. In order to
know this praxis, it is necessary to continue, carry on with it (proseguirlo)97 in present times.
Latin American Christology understands by the historical Jesus the totality of the
history of Jesus, and the purpose of beginning with the historical Jesus is so that
his history be continued today.98

But how can you engage in a praxis of following if you cannot know
beforehand at least something of what this praxis consists in? The
point is that you cannot, without having heard the story of Jesus.
What Sobrino wants to give priority to is not the historical Jesus,
the factual, real Jesus in directo99 but the direction, impetus, main
tendencies in what is told and remembered about him, about his
real life especially his practice and relationships. This story, or narration, of Jesus life is what links the historical Jesus and his followers of our day. And this is the link that Sobrino more than anything
is concerned to secure. For this, he needs the story of Jesus as correction as guiding principle, as criterion. In fact Sobrino does use

97 Sobrino uses pro-seguir (continue, carry on) to underscore that the following (seguimiento) of Jesus is not a mere imitation of him, but a continuation of his practice. Thus mediations are absolutely necessary. Cf. Sobrino
1991d, 100.
98 La cristologa latinoamericana entiende por Jess histrico la totalidad de la
historia de Jess, y la finalidad de comenzar con el Jess histrico es la de que
se prosiga su historia en la actualidad. Sobrino 1982a, 81.
99 Cf. [] lo histrico-factual de Jess. Sobrino 1991d, 113.

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the term the history of Jesus as synonym to the historical

Jesus.100
I hold Sobrinos christology to be above all a narrative christology a narrative and practical christology. It is more narrative than
he admits,101 perhaps because he fears that the term narrative may
hold connotations in a merely literary and even fictional direction,
so that the historical reality as such loses importance and falls out of
sight. Though such connotations may be present, a narrative christology need not be so conceived. Narration is in fact an adequate
category in order to interconnect remembrance, reality, history and
human action. Later, I shall show how Paul Ricoeurs contributions
are particularly enlightening in this aspect. Another leading contemporary philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre, says that we live out of
narratives and because we understand our own lives in terms of the
narratives we live out [] the form of a narrative is appropriate for
understanding the action of others.102 And Johann Baptist Metz
was among the first to call for a narrative theology a narrative and
practical theology precisely out of concern for the victims of
human history. He began to speak of the dangerous memory of
Jesus, a phrase that has had many positive repercussions in recent
theology.103
Sobrinos christology clearly demonstrates, in my opinion, that
there are several advantages to stressing the historicity of Jesus own
life. As we shall see, this makes it possible to combine different and
diverging testimonies to his life. It also makes it possible to be open

100 Sobrino 1991d, 96.[] dicho sistemticamente: la historia de Jess.

Sobrino 1994c, 50. He does also speak of the historical dimension of Jesus.
101 Although the narrative perspective is gradually becoming more explicit in
Sobrinos texts, see e.g. Sobrino 1991b, 583. Sobrino 1995b,124.
102 See his influential MacIntyre 1985.
103 Metz 1980.

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to the supposition that Jesus, like any other human being, in fact
passed through important changes during his life.
The telling of a (hi-)story is almost always done with a particular objective: one wants to convince someone, to make something
happen. Every story-telling is rhetoric.104 What critics like Chow
fail to recognise, is that this applies equally to all academic work.
Even the scientific historian tells his story with a purpose open or
concealed. This purpose, or the wider intentional project within
which the telling of the story occurs, may be called a governing
master-narrative.105

104 In the classical sense rhetoric is the art and/or technique of persuasive discourse. It is, says Paul Ricoeur, without doubt as old as philosophy; it is said
that Empedocles invented it. But it was Aristotle who first conceptualised
the field of rhetoric, and the question that set his project in motion was:
what does it mean to persuade? Ricoeur 1978, 9-12. The centrality of rhetoric in theology is underlined in Jones 1995, where the following definition is
found: Rhetoric in theology functions as the dangerous science of the possible, for the sake of the inexpressible, in the hands of the hopeful (p. 109).
See also: Tracy 1987, particularly 47-65; and Booth 1991.
105 When I speak of master-narrative (which might also have been called
meta-narrative) I am not thereby defending what post-modernists criticise
as the (authoritarian) meta-narratives of modernity; rather, I wish to point
out that every interpretation of history takes on a narrative structure, and
that the particular interpretation of a historical event is dependent on this
narrative structure and the greater narrative framework into which it is
imbedded, without thereby implying that the issue of the relationship
between the narrative and historical reality is beyond reach or irrelevant.
Along these lines then, I would recommend a search for an understanding of
the historical which on the one hand takes into account the conditioned
and engaged position of any interpreter of history, without on the other
hand necessarily giving way to complete historical relativism and subjectivism. See, e.g. White 1973, Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob 1994; cf. Moxnes 1995. I
shall deal with this in greater detail in Chapter v below, where the work of
Paul Ricoeur in this field will play an important role.

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Sobrinos christology clearly has such a guiding, governing master-narrative; namely the liberation of the poor.106 Jesus is Liberator, and Sobrinos portrait of the historical Jesus is intended to
support this image of Jesus as liberator. Only by placing his interpretation within the confines of this master-narrative can Sobrino
actually achieve his goal in returning to the historical Jesus, namely
to hinder manipulative, oppressive images of Christ. Any attempt at
verifying the historicity of Sobrinos interpretation (or any other
interpretation that claims to build on history), must include an
evaluation of the adequacy of this wider pattern and purpose, what
I choose to call its master-narrative. The validity of this master-narrative must be checked against both identity (i.e. against what we
may, however fragmentarily, know about Jesus) and relevance (i.e.
against the contemporary situation and needs of the communities).
Only by taking this wider context of our historical quest into
account, may the return to the history of Jesus function as a remedy against oppressive christologies. In this sense, Assmanns
observation applies here too: neither a more biblical nor a more
historical christology can by itself safeguard christology against
sabotage.

[4] Conclusions
In order to be better able to appreciate the characteristics of
Sobrinos theological reflection, we have in this chapter recalled the
history of christology in Abya-Yala, or Latin America as it came to
be called. The disastrous interconnection of evangelisation and vio106 This master-narrative concurs with what I shall propose to term the victimological orientation of Sobrinos christology. See below, Chapter v [2].

215

lent conquest was legitimated by and resulted in profoundly distorted images of Christ implicit and explicit christologies on
that continent for centuries. It is against this backdrop of oppressive
christologies that the contemporary christology of liberation of
which Sobrino is among the leading protagonists develops. This
christology aims to be critical and liberating, by overcoming the
old, alienating interpretations of Christ, and replacing these with an
interpretation which corresponds to the poor populations aspiration towards liberation and justice. Believing that such an image
actually is a truthful rendering of the historical figure of Jesus of
Nazareth, Sobrino recommends a return to the historical Jesus as
the methodological starting point for a liberating christology.
This return to the historical Jesus has evoked criticisms and
questions, however. Comparing Sobrinos approach with the socalled three quests for the historical Jesus, I concluded that
although he is more directly influenced by the second quest, the
bulk of Sobrinos tenets does not seem to be seriously questioned by
the third quest. However, Sobrino belongs more properly to a specifically Latin-American quest. Evaluating the historicity of the
Latin American historical Jesus, I am led to the following conclusions:
1) The conscious interconnection of both historical poles the
present and the past, Jesus and his followers, the Crucified and the
crucified in the search for the historical Jesus is a trait which
makes the Latin American quest in which Sobrino clearly shares,
compare favourably with the three quests.
2) Nonetheless, Sobrino is not consistent enough in making
explicit this aspect when he applies the term the historical Jesus. In
this, the critics cited above have in fact laid bare a weakness in
Sobrinos work. At times, as I shall show, he seems to use historical as an argument for the objectivity of his portrait of Jesus. It
should be noted, however, that this is a point with which Sobrino

216

deals in a more refined manner in his later writings than in his earlier. But the main difficulty which Sobrino still needs to clarify is
what it actually means to use the historical Jesus as norm.
3) Sobrino cannot do anything more than draw a portrait of
Jesus. The validity of Sobrinos portrait of the historical Jesus cannot
be evaluated without taking into account the master-narrative
encompassing it, which is that of the liberation of the poor. The
validity of this master-narrative must be checked against both identity (against what we may, however fragmentarily, know about
Jesus) and relevance (against the contemporary situation and needs
of the communities).
4) The narrative and rhetorical character of Sobrinos christology should be stronger underlined, and further developed.
I shall return to these points for further treatment below. But now I
am ready to leave the methodological considerations and proceed to
an analysis of the content of Sobrinos historical-theological reading of Jesus of Nazareth.107 In the previous chapter, I concluded
that in order to interpret the theological significance of the crucified
people, it is necessary to interpret the story of Jesus, especially his
suffering and death. The potential salvific meaning of the existence
of a crucified people would have to reflect the salvific meaning of
Jesus death on the cross. A central feature in Sobrinos interpretation of Jesus death is to see it as the historical consequence of his
life. I shall now examine those incidents and permanent traits in
Jesus life which Sobrino finds leading to his death on the cross.

107 This is the English subtitle of Jesucristo liberador.

217

218

iv. The Crucified Liberator (1)

Interpreting Jesus Life as Salvific

[] se puede hacer cristologa tambin a partir de narraciones historico-teolgicas

[]1

In the following three chapters I shall examine Sobrinos interpretation of Jesus life and death. On the basis of his historical soteriology on the one hand (which requires salvation to be realised within
the one and only history) and the concrete situation of suffering
and oppression in Latin America on the other (which makes the
soteriological interest take shape as a longing for a Liberator of the
poor), the question arises whether it can be assured that Jesus, being
immersed in this history, can be rightfully seen as such a liberator.
And if so, it will be crucial to find out in what way Jesus is liberator.
Hence, I begin with investigating in what sense Jesus life is salvific,
according to Jon Sobrino.

[1] From Jesus Death to His Life

It is widely recognised that when it comes to historical attestation,
the most assured fact about Jesus of Nazareth is his death. Jesus
death by execution under Pontius Pilate is as sure as anything historical can ever be.2 Sobrino is accordingly on safe ground when he
adopts as one of the criteria for deciding the historicity of the Jesustraditions the consistency of Jesus death with what is narrated of
1

Sobrino 1991b, 583.

219

his life.3 This criteria is not original; it was suggested by New Testament scholar Nils Alstrup Dahl already in 1953, at the beginning
of the second quest.4 But Sobrino gives a particularly Latin American reason for highlighting this criterion. It acquires special evidence in the concrete situation of Latin America.
There the deaths of hundreds and thousands of persons is analogous to Jesus
death, and the causes of their death are historically similar to the causes of
Jesus death. That Jesus must have lived and acted in the way he is reported
to have lived and acted is not only plausible, it goes without saying.5

We see here once again the crucial significance to Sobrino of the

theological location. Although goes without saying is a rhetorical
exaggeration, Sobrinos point here is that there is an affinity
between what is narrated of Jesus out of the early Christian experience and the present experience of the poor Christian communities
in Latin America.6 He calls it an isomorfismo estructural de situaciones entre el tiempo de Jesus y el nuestro, citing Leonardo Boff. That
2

220

Crossan 1995, 5. Crossan cites two well-known non-Christian sources to the

death of Jesus: Flavius Josephus: Jewish Antiquities, 18-63 and Cornelius Tacitus: Annals, 15-44.
Sobrino 1982b, 74. / Sobrino 1982a, 89: 1) la aparicin de un mismo tema en
varios estratos de la tradicin, 2) lo especfico y distintivo de un tema a diferencia y aun oposicin a teologas y prcticas posteriores a Jess 3) la congruencia que su propia muerte otorga a lo que se narra de su vida.
One point in the life of Jesus is unconditionally established: his death. A
historically tenable description of the life of Jesus would be possible only in
the form of a description of his death, its historical presuppositions, and the
events preceding and following it. Dahl 1991, 98.
Sobrino 1982b, 74. / Sobrino 1982a, 90: Hay centenares y miles de personas
cuya muerte es anloga a la de Jess, y las causas de cuyas muertes som
histricamente semejantes a las de Jess. Que Jess haya tenido que vivir y
actuar as, si su muerte es histricamente como la describen los evangelios, es
algo no solo verosmil sino que se impone por s mismo.
Sobrino 1991d, 99.

this affinity gives an hermeneutical advantage, is a fundamental

premise in Sobrinos whole theological production. He writes from
Latin America, although not exclusively to / for Latin Americans.
This particular Latin American reason is also a reminder of
how the fundamental thrust of Sobrinos christology, its primary
interest and intention (the liberation of the poor), directs and
shapes it all the way through. As I have just pointed out, the primary opcin por los pobres indicates the master-narrative according
to which Sobrino interprets the (hi-)story of Jesus.7
In investigating if and how Jesus brings salvation in history, i.e.,
if and how Jesus can be rightly called Liberator, Sobrino may well
start with Jesus death on the cross. But given the historical presupposition that his death was not just an absurd coincidence,8 but had
something to do with the way he lived his life; and the theological
presupposition that the salvific aspect of Jesus is not just related to
his death but also to the totality of his history as life-death (and resurrection), examining his death in isolation will not suffice.9
What are the basic features of a human life? Sobrino holds that
they are relations and praxis.10 In his option for the constitutive
character of relations as a way of overcoming a more static, ontological essentialism, Sobrino is well in tune with a major trend within
science in general, and theology in particular. In her book Models of
God, Sallie McFague notes that relationships and relativity, as well
as process and openness, characterise reality as it is understood at
present in all branches of science.11 Because it is recognised that
7
8

Cf. e.g. Sobrino 1991d, 127, n.15.

Cf. Sobrino 1991d, 334: La muerte de Jess no fue un error. Fue consecuencia de su vida, y sta, a su vez, consecuencia de su concreta encarnacin, en
un antirreino que da muerte, para defender a sus vctimas.
9 Sobrino 1976, 137.
10 Cf. i.a., Sobrino 1976, xvi.
11 McFague 1987, 10.

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individuals and entities always exist within structures of relationship; process, change, transformation, and openness replace stasis,
changelessness, and completeness as basic descriptive concepts.
Accordingly, preference is given to an organic model: the qualities
of life openness, relationship, interdependence, change, novelty
and even mystery become the basic ones for interpreting all reality.12
All of these qualities of life mentioned by McFague play a significant role in Sobrinos reading of the life of Jesus. But he gives a
particular and major importance to Jesus relationships to the Kingdom of God and the God of the Kingdom, whom Jesus calls abba,
(intimate) Father. In both, Sobrino is confident that he is on secure
historical ground13, at the same time as he deems these relations to
be the most significant for spelling out adequately the theological
meaning of the life-and-death of Jesus. Accordingly, Sobrino structures his rendering of the life of Jesus around these two relations.14
Because he deems the former relation (Jesus-Kingdom) external
and the latter (Jesus-Father) internal, he suggests that an examination should begin with the former. 15
As we already know, these are not the only important relationships of Jesus, according to Sobrino. The relationships between
Jesus and his followers, Jesus and the poor and outcasts, the popular
masses, etc. that is, from our perspective, the relation between the
Crucified and the crucified play a fundamental role in his christology. But it is necessary to see the importance of these other relationships as a consequence of Jesus constitutive relations to the
Kingdom of God and the God of the Kingdom, and not vice versa.
In other words, the importance of the relationship between the
12
13
14
15

222

Ibid.
Sobrino 1982a, 89.
Compare Moltmann 1974, 127.
Cf. Sobrino 1991b, 578ff.

Crucified and the crucified gains strength from Jesus the Crucifieds
particular and unique relations to the Kingdom and to the
Father. First, then, I shall consider these relations, before proceeding to a study of Jesus relationship with his followers.
But first, one more word on praxis. Sobrino claims that the
maximum metaphysical density of a person is expressed in his or
her praxis.16 Behind this somewhat awkward expression with its
Zubirian-Ellacuran fingerprints, lies an anthropology/ontology
which is ultimately rooted in the Old Testament conception of
God. Just as God in the Old Testament is never presented as a God
quoad se, but always in relations as a God-of-a-people:17 thus, God
is insofar as God acts, or reigns.18 According to this conception, then, a human person expresses her or his own being through
action. This is why Sobrino gives priority to Jesus praxis in giving
answers to the christological question about who he is.19 Sobrino
makes it clear even from the very beginning of Cristologa desde
Amrica latina that he intends to give preference to the praxis of
Jesus over his own teaching and over the teaching that the New Testament theologians elaborated concerning his praxis.20 This is at
the same time a way of safeguarding the historicity of the interpretation of Jesus, Sobrino believes, holding that
16
17
18
19

Sobrino 1983a, 483f. Compare Gonzlez 1993a, 156-157.

Sobrino 1991d, 124.
Sobrino 1978a, 357.
Although this is an adequate approach in my view, it is at the same time
appropriate to point out that a persons inner being and identity is never
totally expressed and determined in this persons acts. The distinction
between a human persons identity before God (coram Deo) and his or her
achievements or actions is a crucial and valid point in traditional Protestant
anthropology (see, for instance, Martin Luthers De homine from 1536),
which I think it is important to maintain particularly in a theology with a
victimological orientation. See thesis 9.1 in Chapter viii [4] below.
20 Sobrino 1978a, xxii. / Sobrino 1976, xvi.

223

[] (t)he most historical element in the historical Jesus is his practice, that
is, his activity brought to bear upon the reality around him in order to transform it in a determinate, selected direction, the direction of the Kingdom of
God.21

In Jesucristo liberador Sobrino develops this tenet further, by adding

that the most historical element is the practice of Jesus, and the
spirit with which he realised it.22 By spirit Sobrino here seems to
refer to the human attitude or disposition which generates and
accompanies the practice.23 He exemplifies this by saying that the
practice of Jesus is realised in a spirit of honesty about reality, partiality in favour of the small and insignificant, a fundamental attitude of mercy, faithfulness towards the mystery of God []24 By
21 Sobrino 1982b, 66. / Sobrino 1982a, 81: Lo ms histrico del Jess histrico
es su prctica, su actividad para operar activamente sobre su realidad circundante y transformarla en una direccin determinada y buscada, en la
direccin del reino de Dios.
22 My trans. and italics. SJS. Sobrino 1991d, 98: Decamos que lo ms
histrico de Jess es su prctica, y hemos aadido el espritu con qu la llevo
a cabo y del cual la imbuy: honradez con la realidad, parcialidad hacia lo
pequeo, misericordia fundante, fidelidad al misterio de Dios [] I have
maintained the more literal translation spirit with which instead of the
more common (and correct) English spirit in which, in order to draw
attention to the originality (following Ellacura, see above) in Sobrinos use
of this notion.
23 Cf. Sobrino 1987a. The translations of this title into English (Spirituality of
Liberation) and German (Geist, der befreit, Lateinamerikanische Spiritualitt
{Freiburg i Br., 1989}) lay bare the ambiguity of Sobrinos application of the
word S/spirit. Again, the theology of Rahner seems to be an important influence. Commenting on Rahners book Geist in Welt or Spirit in the World
from 1957, Macquarrie writes: Here the traditional word spirit is applied to
the human being, and it is the analysis of spirit that serves as the clue to
understanding what it is to be human, including the mysterious but undeniable sense of the infinite that belongs to the essence of humanity. Macquarrie 1990, 395.

224

combining practice and spirit, Sobrino intends to avoid both pure

activism and pure spiritualism. It is in this sense, it is worth noticing, that Sobrino wishes to propose a spiritual theology.25
The salvific meaning of Jesus life-death can, accordingly, be
better explored through a study of the relations he finds himself in,
and the actions that he undertakes. That there is an intimate connection between them, should also be noted: the importance Jesus
himself gives to the relations, is expressed through his praxis. I now
turn to Sobrinos reading of these fundamental traits of the life of
Jesus.

[2] First Relation: Jesus and the Kingdom of God

What is the central concern of Jesus? What is the ultimate goal and
motivation for his life and activity? At the centre of his message as
this is expressed through words and deeds is not himself as Messiah
or Son of God. Neither is it God quoad se.26 The ultimate to Jesus is
the Kingdom of God which is approaching.27 This is the primary
content of his preaching and practice, and that which ultimately
determines his life, service and destiny.28 It is expressed clearly and
programmatically in Mark 1,15: The time has come; the Kingdom
of God is upon you; repent and believe in the Gospel.
24 My translation, SJS. Sobrino 1991d, 98: [] honradez con la realidad, parcialidad hacia lo pequeo, misericordia fundante, fidelidad al misterio de
Dios [].
25 See Sobrino 1991d, 28: La cristologa necesita y debe desencadenar la fuerza
de la inteligencia, pero tambin otras fuerzas del ser humano. Su quehacer
deber ser incluso doctrinal, pero su esencia ms honda est en ser algo
espiritual.
26 Sobrino 1982a, 97-101.

225

Jesus life is thus de-centered; he lives and understands himself

from and for something distinct from himself.29 This fact underscores his humanity, his creatureliness (creaturidad), Sobrino
believes.
That which appears to be the ultimate, the most central reality
to Jesus, then, is correspondingly the core of the Christian gospel.
This means that the other features, themes and nuances of the
Christian message should be structured around and interpreted in
the light of this core. The Kingdom of God is the most adequate
structuring principle of a Christian theology, Sobrino holds. Since
this is the option of Latin American liberation theology in general
(thus showing its originality), Sobrino proposes that it may be characterised as a theology of the Kingdom of God.30 If it is true that
all renewal of theology comes through a reflection on its fundamen27 Sobrino 1991d, 121-232; Sobrino 1982a, 97-108 Is the Greek basileia best
translated as kingdom or reign? Sobrino prefers to speak of reino de
Dios, which would correspond to the English kingdom, since reign
would be reinado in Spanish. Those who translate Sobrinos texts into
English, differ at this point. I shall predominantly use Kingdom of God,
although it will become quite clear that Sobrinos interpretation is not limited to an area in which God reigns, but rather describes the act and reality
of God reigning in history.
28 Sobrino 1991b, 576: En los sinpticos es central histrica y sistemticamente la relacin de Jess con el reino de Dios, que definimos aqu formalmente como la ltima voluntad de Dios para este mundo. Ese reino y su
cercana es presentado por Jess como lo realmente ltimo; es lo que configura su persona en la exterioridad de su misin (hacer historia) y en la interioridad de su subjetividad (su propia historicidad), y es tambin lo que
desencadena su destino histrico de cruz. [] En otras palabras, para
conocer lo especficamente cristiano del reino de Dios hay que volver a Jess;
pero tambin, a la inversa, para conocer a Jess hay que volver al reino de
Dios.
29 Sobrino 1991d, 121.
30 See Sobrino 1991a especially pp. 473f.

226

tal kernel and basic thrust, then the renewal presented by liberation
theology is related to the importance it gives to the Kingdom. Ellacura held that the Kingdom of God is the main object of theology, and that which all authentic followers of Jesus should strive to
realize.31 Sobrino argues that the Kingdom should be taken as
structuring principle because it corresponds to the requirements of
both identity and of relevance: identity, since it is the central content of the gospel, and relevance, since it is what the Latin American
people and particularly the poor need, long and strive for.32
According to Sobrino, it is certain that the Kingdom of God
was central to the historical Jesus. Applying the three criteria mentioned earlier33, he finds that the notion of the Kingdom (1) appears
in all levels of the synoptic tradition; (2) reappears in the gospels
even though it is not central to other New Testament writings and
(3) is congruent with Jesus historical destiny.34
There seems to be no major opposition to such a stance within
New Testament scholarship of today.35 We may then accept the historical basis, but what does it mean? Jesus, though he makes the
Kingdom the centre of his activity, never explains directly what this
Kingdom is. He only proclaims that it has come near. Sobrino
therefore suggests three complementary methods in order to find
out what Jesus understood by this term.

31
32
33
34

Ellacura 1987a.
Compare Moltmann 1974, 7-31.
Sobrino 1982b, 74.
Sobrino 1991d, 113-114: Por ejemplificarlo en el anlisis del reino de Dios,
es criterio de historicidad (a) que aparece en todos los estratos de las tradiciones sinpticas, (b) que reaparece en los evangelios aun cuando no aparezca centralmente en los otros escritos neotestementarios y (c) la
congruencia al destino histrica de Jess.
35 According to Stephen J. Patterson, basileia is [] a concept most scholars
still agree in placing at the center of Jesus preaching. Patterson 1995, 43.

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First, he mentions the common historico-critical exegeses of the

notion, its origins and development in the biblical texts. This is
what he calls the va nocional. The second method is more original,
and follows Sobrinos predilection for relations as a constitutive
ontological category. It is what he calls va del destinatorio, the way
of the addressee. This method consists in investigating primarily to
whom Jesus seems to direct the message of the Kingdom. To
whom does this message actually appear as good news? The presupposition is that it is possible to deduce from a knowledge of these
addressees something of importance about the content and characteristics of the Kingdom itself. The third method is called the va de
la prctica de Jess: What can be known of the Kingdom from an
analysis of Jesus activities related to its nearness? Sobrino takes over
this method from Schillebeeckx, who says of the specific content of
the Kingdom that [] it stems from the whole of Jesus activity.36
Applying these methods then, and subsequently interpreting
Jesus relationship to the Kingdom of God from the standpoint of
the crucified reality in Latin America, Sobrino arrives at the following conclusions about the Kingdom:
(1) In the Old Testament, the concept of the Kingdom or rather
reign of God (Hebr.: malkuta Jahweh, Gr.: basileia tou theou) has an
utopian character. It refers to a situation in which God shall reign,
transforming the socio-historical situation of crisis into a situation
of justice and well-being for all Gods people (Psalm 96,13f ).37 Israel
expects this intervention from God to take place in history, that it
will signify the transformation of the whole society, and that it will
emerge as a new and good reality good news against the background of a situation of suffering and defeat. It therefore generates
36 Sobrino 1994c, 70 / Sobrino 1991d, 126.
37 Sobrino 1991d, 128.

228

and nurtures an active, popular and historical hope among them.

The failures and national catastrophes that Israel experiences never
manage to extinguish this hope. They do, however, lead to a process
of apocalyptisation and eschatologisation and ultimately universalisation of the concept.
This new reality, which comes to being through Gods transforming intervention (reign), is characterised by the reinstatement
of the rights of the poor and destitute. Accordingly, the reign of God
is not understood as merely an internal change in the hearts of
human persons, but as a restructuring of the visible and concrete
relations between human beings which implies an authentic liberation of human being on all levels.38
Proclaiming the Kingdom is consequently nothing new or original to Jesus. He picks it up from the reservoir of his peoples traditions, and then onesidedly concentrates upon this theme. The
particularity of his employment of the theme is above all his assertion that this longed-for reign now has come near. It should no
longer only be an object of hope, but of certainty (Mark 9:1; Matt
9:37 par., John 4:35, etc). It has come near not as Gods judgement,
but as grace. The Kingdom is pure gift and should be received with
gratitude and joy. Therefore, the message of the Kingdom is euangelion, gospel, good news (Mark 8:35; 10:29; Matt 4:23; Acts 15:7). It
must be proclaimed with joy, just as it creates joy.39
However, if the Kingdom is Gods pure grace and merciful initiative, this does not mean that it stands in absolute contradiction to
human activity. All people are exhorted to correspond in a particular
manner to the message of the Kingdom, just as Jesus himself acts
and lives in correspondence to the Kingdom which has drawn near.
This correspondence can be summarised as conversion and a new
life.
38 Sobrino 1976, 33-34.
39 Sobrino 1993d, cf. Stlsett 1996a.

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(2) The message of the Kingdom has some particular addressees: the
poor. The Kingdom of God is for the poor (Luke 4:18; 6:20; 7:22;
Matt 11:5). But who are the poor?40 As we saw earlier, Sobrino finds
two dimensions of poverty, two types of poor appearing in the
gospels:41 the economically poor and the sociologically poor.
The economically poor are people who suffer some sort of basic
need, while the sociologically poor are those who are despised by
society, the ones held to be sinners, the publicans, the prostitutes,
the meek, the lowly, etc. The poor are, to repeat, those for whom
life is a heavy burden on the basic level of survival and living with a
minimum of dignity.42 Furthermore, Sobrino underscores the collective (the poor as a people)43 and dialectical (the poor as empobrecidos impoverished in opposition to and oppressed by the rich)
aspects of the poor, as they appear in the gospels.
Jesus shows an obvious partiality t owards these poor, and grants
them the Kingdom. The Kingdom is only for the poor, Sobrino
contains, once again giving exegetical support to his argument with
a reference to Jeremias.44 The Kingdom is essentially partisan, and
this partisanship is scandalous and accordingly difficult to
accept. It is true that the Kingdom, as an eschatological reality, is
universal, but this universality is reached only through its scandalous
partiality with the poor.
40 In Chapter i I presented Sobrinos understanding and definition of the
poor. In this, he is exegetically dependent on Jeremias and Soares-Prabhu,
and systematically on Gutirrez and Ellacura.
41 Sobrino 1991d, 143-148. Cf. i. a.: Sobrino 1982b, 105 and 164-166.
42 Sobrino 1994c, 84. / Sobrino 1991d, 151: Hemos dicho que pobres son aquellos para quienes la vida es una pesada carga en sus niveles primarios de sobrevivir y de vivir con un mnimo de dignidad..
43 Cf. the crucified people, below, Chapter viii [2].
44 Cf. Jeremias 1987, 116: [] the reign of God belongs to the poor alone []
the first beatitude means that salvation is destined only for beggars and sinners.

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(3) This partiality of the Kingdom is clearly expressed also in Jesus

actions. These actions indirectly reveal the content of the Kingdom:
the miracles of Jesus are liberating signs of the nearness of the Kingdom, and plural salvations45 of the poor. His casting out of devils
shows the victory of the Kingdom over against the anti-Kingdom46,
Gods victory over against evil. Jesus welcoming of sinners (acogida)
is liberation from self-deceit, fear and shame, as well as restitution
of social dignity. Jesus parables are polemical and challenging stories
about the Kingdom, that above all are defending the scandalous fact
of its partiality towards the poor.
What then about the non-poor? Is it possible for them to enter
in the Kingdom? Yes, but their entrance goes by way of the poor.
Through analogy, it is possible to participate in various manners in
the reality of the poor. Sobrino develops this analogy in accordance
with Ellacuras treatment of the theme, which I presented in Chapter i. But the analogatum princeps is the materially poor.
The Kingdom is for the poor because they are materially poor; the Kingdom
is for the non-poor to the extent that they lower themselves to the poor,
defend them and allow themselves to be imbued with the spirit of the
poor.47

Given that the Kingdom is for the poor, and the greatest threat to
the poor is premature death, the Kingdom is a Kingdom of basic
life. Poverty means being close to death. The basic distinction
between poor and non-poor relates to the grantedness of life:
Those who can take life and survival for granted, and those who
45 Sobrino 1991d, 160-161. / Sobrino 1994c, 89-90.
46 See below, Chapter v.
47 Sobrino 1994c, 128. / Sobrino 1991d, 221-222: Para los pobres es el reino,
porque son materialmente pobres, y el reino es para los no-pobres, en la
medida en que se abajan a los pobres, los defienden y se dejan imbuir del
espritu de los pobres.

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cannot take precisely this for granted.48 Borrowing Gutirrez

expression, Sobrino says that the poor are those who die before
their time.49 This makes Sobrino relate the Kingdom to Jesus
defence of basic life (Mark 2:23-28 par; 7:10; 10:19 par; Matt 5:21-28;
15, 4; Luke 10:30), and to the centrality Jesus gives to the primary
symbol of life, which is food and bread (Mark 2:15-17; 6:30-44 par;
7:2-5; 8:1-10; Matt 15:2; 15:32-39; 25:35, 40; Luke 11:3). The Kingdom
as eschatological fulfilment reaches beyond this minimum of basic
life, but this minimum is for the poor who are the primary addressees of the Kingdom, a maximum, and thus already a salvific reality. We no doubt need to speak of the eschatological fulfilment,
but without forgetting the protology of creation; we need to speak
of life in its fulness, but not forgetting life in its bare essentials.50
The Kingdom of God is thus seen as the utopia of life for the
poor. The fact that basic life is considered to be utopian points to
the reality of sin in history. Sobrino lays great stress on the Kingdom as a reality which is actively opposed by the forces of the antiKingdom. The coming of the Kingdom stands in combative relation (relacin dulica) to the anti-Kingdom.51 Announcing the
good news of the victory of the Kingdom of life over against the
forces of the anti-Kingdom of death must accordingly be expressed
in and through a committed praxis, a continuous attempt to make
these good news become good realities in history. This is what
Jesus does and this is what he calls his followers to do. In this sense,
the poor are not only addressees of the Kingdom, but simultaneously its main protagonists, constructores del Reino.
48 Sobrino 1994c, 85. / Sobrino 1991d, 153.
49 Sobrino 1994c, 84. / Sobrino 1991d, 151.
50 Sobrino 1994c, 86. / Sobrino 1991d, 154: Habr que hablar, sin duda, de la
escatologa plenificante, pero sin olvidar la protologa de la creacin, habr
que hablar de la vida en plenitud, pero sin olvidar la vida mnima.
51 Sobrino 1994c, 126. / Sobrino 1991d, 218.

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(4) This stress upon the Kingdom as a Kingdom of basic life allows
its concrete materiality to come into focus. The coming of the Kingdom will take shape in history as the granting of life to the poor. It
has to do with the living conditions of those marginalised economically and socially in society. But will an improvement of their living
conditions be all that the Kingdom promises? No, Sobrino admits
that such an interpretation would put limits to Gods transcendent
reality, and thus reduce not only the mystery of God, but the mystery of life in itself. There is something more to it.
Bearing in mind Sobrinos fundamental option for what he
(with Ellacura) calls historical transcendence, we arrive at Sobrinos
conclusive definition of the systematic concept of the Kingdom of
God: The Kingdom of God is the just life of the poor, always open
to a more.52 That the Kingdom is life of the poor is as we have
seen understood as life as a basic, material reality. That it is the
just life points to the fact that the poor are denied this life, which
is their right, by the forces of the anti-Kingdom. Waiting and working for the coming of the Kingdom means struggling for justice in
history.
The historical transcendence is expressed in the addition
always open to a more. Sobrino explains: Life is a reality that is
by its very nature always open to a more; it is something dynamic
that points to a development of itself to fulfil itself on various levels,
with new possibilities and new demands.53 Illustrating this point,
Sobrino presents the phenomenology of bread, in which he tries
to show how bread is always more than bread: It has a praxic
dimension (how to obtain bread), an ethical dimension (how to
share it), a community dimension (the bread as shared) and a primary celebratory dimension (eating together at table). It also has a
social and political dimension (the question of bread for others, for
52 Sobrino 1994c, 131ff / Sobrino 1991d, 226ff.
53 Sobrino 1994c, 132. / Sobrino 1991d, 227.

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communities, for a whole people) and thus relates to the need for
liberation, and the questions of political strategies and ideologies,
and pastoral strategies and ecclesiologies, etc. Furthermore, the reality of bread evokes the need for spirit:
[] mercy to stir our hearts at the sight of those without bread, courage to
struggle for bread, fortitude to stand firm in the face of conflicts and persecutions, truth to analyse the reasons why there is no bread and find ways of
overcoming these.54

This, in turn, points to the sacramental dimension of bread, which

[] moves us to thank God who made it or it can make us ask why God
allows there not to be bread and it not to be shared. It can make us ask if
there is something more than bread, if there is a bread of the word, necessary
and good news, even when there is no material bread, if it is true that at the
end of history there will be bread for all and whether it is worth working for
it in history, even though at times darkness seems to cover everything,
whether the hope that there will be bread is wiser than resignation to the
lack of it []55

54 Sobrino 1994c, 132. / Sobrino 1991d, 228: [] misericordia para que se remuevan las entraas ante los sin-pan, valenta para luchar por l, fortaleza para
mantenerse en los conflictos y persecuciones, verdad para analizar las causas
de que no haya pan y para analizar los mejores caminos para superarlas.
55 Sobrino 1994c, 132. / Sobrino 1991d, 228-229: La buena noticia del pan
mueve a agradecer al Dios que lo ha hecho o puede llevar a la pregunta por
qu permite que no haya pan y que no sea compartido. Mueve a seguir al
Jess que multiplic panes para saciar el hambre o puede llevar a la pregunta
de por qu la historia da muerte a hombres como l. Puede llevar a la pregunta de si hay algo ms que pan, si hay un pan de la palabra, necesario y
buena noticia, incluso cuando no hay pan material, si es verdad que al final
de la historia habr pan para todos y si merece la pena trabajar por ello,
aunque muchas veces la oscuridad lo permee todo, si la esperanza de que
haya pan es ms sabia que la resignacin []

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By this fine example, Sobrino aims to show how life always develops into a more, and this, in his view, demonstrates how transcendence begins with and develops from within history.
This means that Sobrino also reframes the issue of the Kingdoms status as present or future reality, the already but not-yet.56
In and through the proclamation and activity of Jesus and, subsequently, of his followers the Kingdom has already come. It has
appeared in signs; although these are concrete salvific events, they do
not equal the totality of the reality of the Kingdom. As total reality,
the Kingdom is still not yet present, it is eschatological. In this
sense, the eschatological reservation is valid.
This concept, der eschatologische Vorbehalt, originally coined by
E. Ksemann, has played a central part in the debate regarding
European political theology. Sobrino agrees that the concept does
have its rationale, although not as a total levelling of all historical
reality in comparison with the utopia of the Kingdom, but as a criterion which makes it possible to judge to what extent the Kingdom
may be said to be historically present at a given moment. The historical reality is not just not the Kingdom, but it is certainly not
the Kingdom, and thereby the critical and utopian character of the
Kingdom comes to the fore, without it losing its historical relevance.57 A different way of expressing this, is to say that the Kingdom has come on the level of its definite Mediator (Jesus), but not
on the level of mediation: the Kingdom as a total reality.
What kind of salvation is brought about by the coming of the
Kingdom, then? Sobrinos answer to this question is of particular
importance to this study:

56 Sobrino 1991d, 191ff.

57 I have developed this further in the article Stlsett 1994d. This approach was
then harshly criticised by Peter Widmann, see Widmann 1994. My response
to that criticism is found in Stlsett 1994b.

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The salvation brought by the Kingdom though this is not all the Kingdom
brings will, then be being saved in history from the evils of history. What
the benefits of the Kingdom might be is determined above all by the actual
situation of oppressed human beings and not by an a priori decision about
what salvation might mean. Salvation is always salvation of someone, and in
that someone, from something. The salvation brought by the Kingdom
comes, therefore, in history. So with Jesus, the content of salvation was dictated by the reality of his listeners, and his actions (miracles, casting out of
devils, welcoming sinners) were beneficial because they brought good where
there had been specific ills.58

This understanding of salvation(s) as beneficial actions and or

events is central to Sobrinos soteriology. This is therefore a crucial
point in interpreting what he sees as the salvific aspect of the crucified people(s).59
Summing it all up, we find that the particularity of Sobrinos interpretation of the Kingdom of God lies in his emphasis on its conflictual, evangelical, partisan, historical and popular traits. The
Kingdom is a conflictual reality, since its coming is victory over
against the forces of the anti-Kingdom. Therefore, the proclamation
of its coming is particularly good news to the victims living in a
58 Sobrino 1994c, 125-126./ Sobrino 1991d, 218: La salvacin que trae el reino,
aunque no se agote en ello, ser, entonces, salvacin histrica de los males
histricos. En qu consistan los bienes del reino viene determinado, ante
todo, por la situacin concreta de los seres humanos oprimidos y no por una
decisin a priori de lo que sea la salvacin. La salvacin es siempre salvacin
de alguien, y en ese alguien, de algo. La salvacin que trae el reino es, por
lo tanto, histrica. Como en Jess, el contenido de la salvacin viene dictado
por la realidad de sus oyentes, y su prctica (los milagros, la expulsin de los
demonios, la acogida a los pecadores) es benfica porque trae bienes ante
esos males concretos.
59 If we connect this observation to the difficulties encountered in Chapter ii,
we may pose the following critical question: Is it a beneficial action to bear
(the consequences of ) the sins of others?

236

situation of suffering and despair because of these evil forces of sin

and oppression. The Kingdom of God is theirs, it belongs to the
poor. These are the evangelical and partisan dimensions of the Kingdom. The Kingdom is a historical reality, which, although it cannot
ever be fully realised in history, seeks some realisation in history
through historical mediations.60 Finally, emphazising the poor as
addressees and agents of the Kingdom, not as individuals but as a
collective, Sobrino holds the Kingdom of God to be esentially popular in character, both in the qualitative sense (the people as the
poor majorities) and the quantitative (the majorities being the
poor).61 The Kingdom of God belongs to a people, a people of the
poor, of victims a crucified people.

[3] Who is Jesus? The Mediator of the Kingdom

If the Kingdom is so conceived, what does that make of Jesus? As
we have shown, Sobrino sees the Kingdom of God as Jesus ultimate
concern, and should therefore also be the ultimate, structuring
principle in Christian theology, and in christology in particular. The
Kingdom of God is not God, but the mediation of the reality of
God in history, it is the ultimate will of God for this world.62 As
the final mediation, the Kingdom has not yet arrived, but only
appeared in signs. But its ultimate mediator has come, once and for
all. This mediator is Jesus, Sobrino holds.
In this sense we can and must say, according to faith, that the definitive, ultimate and eschatological mediator of the Kingdom of God has already
60 Sobrino 1994c, 129. / Sobrino 1991d, 223-224.
61 Sobrino 1994c, 130. / Sobrino 1991d, 224-226.
62 Sobrino 1991b, 576. The English translation here follows Sobrino 1993i, 441.

237

appeared: Jesus. We need not wait for another even though before and
after Jesus other mediators exist, related to him and authorized by him
which is no more than repeating, in Kingdom terminology, the basic christological confession: Christ is the mediator.63

Jesus, as mediator of the Kingdom, is both its proclaimer and initiator. The relationship between Jesus and the Kingdom the mediator and the mediation is essential and constitutive, Sobrino says,
once again showing his predilection for relationality as fundamental
category in theology. Given the main characteristics of the Kingdom as portrayed by Sobrino, then, we get a clearer picture of who
this Jesus is.
First, as mediator of the Kingdom Jesus stands in a particular
relation to a particular people. Since the Kingdom of God is popular, i.e. belonging to a people, Jesus is profoundly related to the
same people, the same collectivity of excluded and downtrodden
human beings. Jesus appears as a popular leader in the same tradition as Moses, Joshua, etc. In this sense, he appears as and is conceived to be an anointed, a messiah. At the same time, his role vis-vis the people when seen from the standpoint of his suffering and
crucifixion, is similar to that of the Suffering Servant. His messianism is not as expected; he becomes a crucified Messiah.64 Jesus relationship with the multitude, with his own people, and with his
flock of followers are given due consideration in Sobrino. Particular
weight is given to Jesus misereor super turbas, his compassion with
the multitudes (Mark 8:2; 6:34).65 And the issue of the peoples role
63 Sobrino 1994c, 108. Note particularly the important insertion [] before
and after Jesus other mediators exist, related to him and authorized by him
[], to which I shall return below.
64 Cf. Dahl 1974.
65 Cf. Sobrino 1992b, 34: El misereor super turbas no es slo una actitud
regional de Jess, sino lo que configura su vida y su misin y le acarrea su
destino. Y es tambin lo que configura su visin de Dios y del ser humano.

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in the historical trial of Jesus is given a careful treatment and a novel

interpretation.66
Second, Jesus as mediator of the Kingdom brings salvation in
history. Through his life leading to death on the cross Jesus initiates and proclaims the coming of the Kingdom of God. Since the
Kingdom seeks historical realisation, the activity of Jesus is interpreted as an adequate way of corresponding to the nearness of the
Kingdom of God in history. Whether his activity is realised because
the Kingdom has come near, or in order to make the Kingdom
come, is not absolutely clear according to Sobrino. This tension a
tension between the Kingdom of God as Gods pure gift and grace,
on the one hand, and as a human mission, on the other is not
resolved in the biblical witness, he holds. Accordingly, the tension
should be preserved in contemporary theological reflection and
practice.
Third, when Jesus is seen as the mediator of the Kingdom it
becomes clear that he does not present himself in directo as a neutral, universal reconciler. The Kingdom of God is partial. It belongs
(only) to the poor. Accordingly, Jesus takes sides. He shows himself
in solidarity with these socially and economically marginalised people, defends their right to basic life and life in abundance. His activity confirms this: He prophetically denounces the oppressive forces,
he defends in words and deeds the scandalous fact that the Kingdom of God is Gods gracious gift to the poor of this world, and
not least he makes present through his miracles, his welcoming of
sinners and his fellowship with the outcasts, the manifold blessings
or salvations of the Kingdom.
Fourth, since the coming of the Kingdom is euangelion, good
news, the reality of the mediators having appeared in human history is good news, too. Jesus himself is good news to the poor. On
66 Cf. Sobrino 1991d, 316: El pueblo, las mayoras a las que se diriga Jess, no
aparece entre los responsables de la persecucin.

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this issue, Sobrino has made some original contributions, focusing

on the question of how, in general, a human person can be good
news, and, in particular, in what sense Jesus is Gospel.67 The evangelical character of Sobrinos christology thus comes clearly
through.68 And it relates to the interpretation of the Kingdom of
God as the core of the gospel.
And, finally, Jesus appears as a man in conflict (C. Bravo69),
because of the committed and dialectical partisan character of the
Kingdom.70 The Kingdom of God as mediation is opposed by
another mediation, the anti-Kingdom. The mediator of the Kingdom (Jesus) struggles against the mediators of the anti-Kingdom
(the devils, Satan, principalities and powers). That the coming of
the Kingdom of God is seen as a victory over against these oppressive anti-Kingdom-forces, points to its liberating character. The
Kingdom of God means the liberation of the poor and the
oppressed in history, according to Sobrino. Accordingly, Jesus the
mediator of the Kingdom is seen as liberator: Jesucristo liberador.

67 See particularly Sobrino 1990b and Sobrino 1993e.

68 Sobrino 1991d, 274 Segn esto, la cristologa podr y tendr que asentar la
verdad de Jesucristo, pero tendr que expresar su ser buena noticia. Y ella
misma, como cristologa, podr y tendr que estar transida del talante
evanglico de buena noticia y resumar gozo. De otra forma, no correspondera al mediador. Cf. Sobrino 1991d, 114-117.
69 Bravo 1986.
70 Sobrino 1991d, 311: Jess fue esencialmente hombre en conflicto, y por ello
fue perseguido.

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[4] Second Relation: Jesus and the God of the Kingdom

The obvious fact that Jesus was a profoundly religious human
being, has received renewed attention and interest in recent biblical
and theological scholarship.71 Jon Sobrino also makes this aspect a
cornerstone in his historical-theological reading of Jesus of Nazareth. According to all the testimonies that we have about him, there
can be no doubt that Jesus understood himself as a person before
God. But in what God does Jesus trust? And how does his relationship with God affect his life and destiny?
As I have already noted, Sobrino sets out to understand who
Jesus is historically and theologically through an analysis of the
relations in which Jesus finds himself embedded. These relations
are, according to Sobrino, constitutive of the identity of Jesus. Having considered the principal external relationship of Jesus according to Sobrino, namely his relationship to the Kingdom of God, we
shall now turn to the internal relationship: his relationship with
God. This is a subject even more difficult than the former, Sobrino
admits, because it seeks to a certain extent to penetrate Jesus own
personality, his consciousness and existential self-understanding.
Nevertheless, he deems it both possible and necessary to recover
some main traits of this constitutive relationship between Jesus and
God.
In Cristologa desde Amrica Latina Sobrino dealt with this relationship primarily from the perspective of the faith of Jesus. In
Jesucristo liberador, he changes the structuring perspective to Jesus
and God-Father, without leaving the controversial theme of Jesus
faith. The complementary juxtaposition of Kingdom and God as
abba is thus more clearly spelt out.72

71 See, e.g., Verms 1993.

241

Who, then, is God to Jesus? One can approach the question of

Jesus vision of God from several paths. Firstly, one may undertake
an analysis of the notions and traditions about God that Jesus
employs. In doing so, Sobrino points out the diversity of traditions
on the content of the reality of God73 that one may find in Jesus
expressions and attitudes.74 There is clearly the prophetic tradition:
God is seen as the defender and protector of the poor, the weak and
excluded. God opposes oppressors and evildoers, and requires conversion and justice both individually and collectively. There is also
the apocalyptic tradition, according to which God is seen as the God
who will come in power as absolute King and Judge at the very end
of history a coming that will transform all reality. There is the wisdom tradition, which underscores the dimension of Gods providence and continued works in creation. According to this tradition,
Sobrino notes, God acts with the same goodness to all creatures,
good or bad, believers or non-believers. It thus diverges from the
eschatological visions of God as Judge. And, finally, Sobrino finds
in Jesus, especially at the end of his life, what he calls existential traditions concerning God. These are the dark and ambivalent visions
of God present in all theodicies75, in which the silence of God is
the most prominent trait. This is the tradition of God in Job, Lamentations and Ecclesiastes, which Sobrino finds to be different
from and even contrary to the God of the Kingdom.76
In all of these traditions present in the testimonies to Jesus relationship to God, Sobrino finds that the formality of the reality of
72 By doing so, Sobrino seems to have taken due notice of an early constructive
criticism of his Cristologa desde Amrica latina made by Jos Ignacio
Gonzlez Faus. See Gonzlez Faus 1978, 34.
73 Sobrino 1994c, 136. / Sobrino 1991d, 234.
74 Sobrino 1994c, 136-138. / Sobrino 1991d, 234-239.
75 Sobrino 1994c, 137. / Sobrino 1991d, 236.
76 Sobrino 1994c, 137. See particularly the issue of the silence of God and the
derelictio Jesu, Chapter vii [4] below.

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God is transcendence. But this transcendence is brought out in different ways, according to the different traditions, for instance, as
creator, as absolute sovereignty, incomprehensibility, and so on. The
novelty and particular character of Jesus interpretation of this transcendence is, however, that he sees it essentially as grace. Gods
transcendence, his infinite distance, ultimacy and otherness, has
come radically close in an unexpected and unmerited way, without thereby ceasing to be transcendence. The very notion of what
Gods transcendence is, is thus transformed. So is the understanding
of transcendent power, which from now on not only will be a power
from above a power to judge the unjust as Sobrino sees it, but
furthermore a power from below a power to raise up both victims
and victors, and restore justice.77
This analysis of the traditions of the content and formality of
the reality of God present in the testimonies of Jesus, may then be
further scrutinised and complemented by a closer examination of
the prayers and words of Jesus. Since he was a pious Jew, it is obvious
that Jesus was a praying man, Sobrino notes. But more than this,
the gospels portray him as someone who seeks fulfilment and guidance through prayer in all important moments of his life. According
to Luke (3:21), his public life begins with a prayer; in all of the gospels it ends with a prayer. Accordingly, Sobrino accords great significance to the prayers of Jesus.78 Through them, he sees a possibility
of grasping something of the interiority of Jesus own person.
Jesus prayer is not ingenuous, nor mere routine. On the contrary, he shows himself critical of the possible misuse of prayer, in
77 Compare my discussions in Chapters VI and VII below.
78 In addition to the detailed treatment in Sobrino 1976, 109-134; and Sobrino
1991d, 239-243, Sobrino has written a book solely dedicated to the theme:
Sobrino 1981a. See also his numerous writings on spirituality and Christian
life: Sobrino 1978b; Sobrino 1983c; Sobrino 1984a; Sobrino 1987a; Sobrino
1988a; Sobrino 1988b; Sobrino 1991c; Sobrino 1992e; etc.

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several forms. He condemns clearly what Sobrino labels mechanical prayers (Matt 6:7f ), hypocritical prayers (Matt 6:5f ), cynical prayers (Luke 18:11), alienating ( Matt 7:21) and oppressive
prayers (Mark 12:38,40).
All these passages show Jesus or, more accurately, the first communities
reflecting on prayer on the basis of their memories of Jesus as conscious of
the numberless ways in which prayer can be spoiled: spiritual narcissism,
vanity and hypocrisy, verbosity, alienating and oppressive manipulation
[]79

This quotation is noteworthy, not only for what it tells us about

Jesus prayers, but also because of the important insertion regarding
method. Here, Sobrino corrects himself (more accurately) in a
way that makes us confirm that in his view, the historical Jesus
should more accurately be defined as the history of Jesus as remembered (and followed) by the communities. But what does
Sobrinos analysis of Jesus prayer tell him of Jesus relationship with
God?
Sobrino chooses two prayers of Jesus according to the gospels as
paradigmatic to the Jesus-God relationship. First, there is the prayer
in Matt 11:25 (Luke 10;21): I thank you, Father, Lord of heaven and
earth, because you have hidden these things from the wise and the
intelligent and have revealed them to infants. This prayer, which
Sobrino holds to be historically situated, though we cannot be sure
of the actual words or when Jesus said them,80 is a prayer of joy
and thankfulness for Gods benevolence, which is shown through
79 Sobrino 1994c, 140. / Sobrino 1991d, 240-241: Todas estas citas muestran
cmo Jess, o, ms exactamente, las primeras comunidades que reflexionaban sobre la oracin, en base a los recuerdos de Jess, son conscientes de las
innumerables formas de viciar la oracin: narcicismo espiritual, vanidad e
hipocresa, palabrera, instrumentalizacin alienante y opresora, etc.
80 Sobrino 1994c, 140, cf. Sobrino 1981a, 28-30.

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Gods unexpected and gracious partiality on behalf of infants

that which is small and insignificant according to human standards.
Jesus rejoices and praises God because of Gods goodness and love,
which in a sinful history comes to expression through a predilection
for the little ones the downtrodden and excluded. God is for
Jesus, thus, [] that which produces joy because it is good, someone in whom one can truly trust and whom one can call Father.81
The second prayer is the one in Gethsemane: Abba, Father, for
you all things are possible; remove this cup from me; yet not what I
want, but what you want (Mark 14:35-36; Matt 26, 39; Luke 22:4142.). Sobrino also finds a historical certain nucleus to this prayer,
given the christological scandal it implies. Here, we see an almost
contrary side of Jesus vision of God. God is remote, distant, incomprehensible, silent in the face of suffering. Yet, Jesus remains faithful
to this God: [] not what I want. In this way he surrenders himself to God; Jesus lets God be God.82
These two prayers, taken together, express the dialectic totality
of the Jesus-God relationship, Sobrino believes. On the one hand
God is for Jesus the benevolent Father in whom he trusts unconditionally and rejoices. On the other hand, God is a Father who is
God, still unfathomable mystery, to whom Jesus totally surrenders
even when he experiences total darkness. I shall now consider these
two fundamental aspects of Jesus faith, according to Sobrino, in
greater detail.

81 Sobrino 1994c, 141. / Sobrino 1991d 242: Y a la inversa, de ese gozo se puede
colegir lo que Dios es para Jess, aquello que produce gozo porque es bueno,
alguien en quien se puede verdaderamente confiar y llamar Padre.
82 Sobrino 1994c, 141. / Sobrino 1991d, 243: Dios permanece como el misterio
insondable para Jess y Jess lo deja ser Dios.

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[5] Jesus Faith: A God who is Father

and a Father who is God
(1) To Jesus, God is (Aram.:) abba, a benevolent, good Father, with
whom Jesus enjoys an intimate relationship, a relationship into
which he invites all fellow human beings. This understanding of
Jesus vision of and relationship with God is a fundamental tenet in
the christology of Sobrino. Jesus becomes the one he is historically
and theologically through his life vis--vis the Kingdom of God
and the God of the Kingdom who is abba, the benevolent, intimate Father. In a similar manner, all persons, as followers of Jesus,
are called to become who they are in the image of God, through
seeing themselves in the light of the same two relations.
Since his christology intends to be historically founded, it is an
important point to Sobrino that abba as a key term to Jesus Godrelationship is as historically assured as the sayings of the Kingdom.
[] Jesus used the Palestinian Aramaic term Abba, the historicity
of which is not open to doubt.83 But while there seems to be no
doubt whatsoever in contemporary New Testament scholarhip with
regard to the historicity of the centrality of the (Gr.:) basileia tou
theou to Jesus, this is not in spite of Sobrinos confident assurance
the case with abba.
By choosing this term as a key to Jesus God-relationship,
Sobrino once again shows his exegetical dependence on J. Jeremias.
83

246

Sobrino 1994c, 146. / Sobrino 1991d, 251: [] Jess usa el trmino arameo
palestinense abba, de cuya historicidad no se puede dudar. Cf., Sobrino
1994c, 67: In the Gospels this something central in Jesus life is expressed by
two terms: Kingdom of God and Father. Of both, the first thing to say is
that they are authentic word of Jesus. Sobrino 1991d, 121: En los evangelios
eso que es central en la vida de Jess aparece expresado con dos trminos:
reino de Dios y Padre. De ambas cosas hay que decir, en primer lugar, que
son palabras autnticas de Jess.

It was Jeremias who first focused on this word, and built it into a
cornerstone in his theological position84, as it is in Sobrinos. Abba
is a form of the Aramaic word for father. In the New Testament it
is found in Gal 4:6, Rom 8:15 and Mark 14:36 alongside the Greek
ho pater as an address to God.85 According to Jeremias, this way of
addressing God had a very familiar and intimate tone. He saw it as
an absolute novelty and something unique to Jesus, and argued that
it could not be found elsewhere in contemporary Judaism.86 It
reflected, according to Jeremias, the address of a child to its father.
Applying such an intimate address to God, was something unheard
of and even shocking to Jesus contemporaries.87 To them, it would
most probably sound disrespectful of Gods majesty. Trusting in the
criterion on dissimilarity (widely accepted as adequate during the
second quest) Jeremias concluded that the term originated with
Jesus, and furthermore (now depending on linguistic analyses) that
it was used by Jesus every time he addressed God as Father.88
This theological point rapidly won a widespread hearing, also
beyond the confines of theological scholarship. The idea of the particular intimacy of childrens address made it a short step to translate abba with daddy, although Jeremias was hesitant to make that
step explicitly himself.89
84 Barr 1988, 28. The argument is fundamental in Jeremias writings. See references in Barrs article, and Jeremias 1987, 36-37.
85 Cf. Ashton 1992.
86 Jeremias 1987, 66: All this confronts us with a fact of fundamental importance. We do not have a single example of God being addressed as Abba in
Judaism, but Jesus always addressed God in this way in his prayers.
87 Op. cit., 67: abba was a childrens word, used in everyday talk, an expression of courtesy. It would have been disrespectful, indeed unthinkable, to
the sensibilities of Jesus contemporaries to address God with this familiar
word.
88 Ibid: Jesus dared to use Abba as a form of address to God. This Abba is the
ipsissima vox Jesu.

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Sobrino relies totally on Jeremias interpretation of abba: The

Jews did not use it,90 since it was the term used by children to
address their father and therefore implied great familiarity and
trust.91 It was absolutely unique to Jesus. From this historically
assured nucleus, then, Sobrino goes on to a more comprehensive
interpretation of Jesus relationship with God.
Now, as already indicated, the certainty of Jeremias interpretation of abba on which Sobrino relies, is today contested both with
regards to its meaning and to its historicity. Leading scholars as
Geza Verms92 and James Barr93 are among those who have raised
serious doubts and criticisms regarding Jeremias position. In a careful analysis of the semantic and linguistic arguments used by Jeremias, Barr argues that (a) abba was not a childish expression
comparable to daddy, but was used by children and adults alike. It
was however, more familiar than formal and ceremonious, and
can according to Barr be defined as a solemn, responsible, adult
address to a Father.94 (b) It is impossible to prove that all the cases
in which Jesus addresses God as Father derive from an original
abba. (c) Abba might have been Hebrew as well as Aramaic, but in
either case, it is noteworthy that the expression does not specify
whose father, as e.g. my father, but rather should be rendered, as

89 Note however, the translation in Jeremias 1987, 65-66. According to Barr,

Jeremias even came to see such an interpretation as a piece of inadmissible
navity, but without taking the logical consequences of this statement in his
own theological reasoning; Barr 1988, 34.
90 Sobrino 1994c, 146.
91 Ibid.
92 Cf. Verms 1983, 41 f.
93 Barr 1988.
94 Barr 1988, 46. The three words for father in Norwegian perhaps provide
a parallell to the distinction Barr makes: abba is neither pappa nor
Fader, but far.

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the Greek translations do, as determinative (the father) and/or

vocative (Father!).
Barrs final conclusion is the most significant one for our discussion (d):
Although the use of abba in address to God may have been first originated by
Jesus, it remains difficult to prove how constant and pervasive this element
was in the expression of himself; and it is therefore difficult to prove that it is
a quite central keystone in our understanding of him.95

What consequences could be drawn from this with regards to

Sobrino? Does one of his two pillars rely on shaky foundations? If
Barr is right and his arguments are convincing96 then Sobrino
should be criticised for making too much out of the use and significance of abba to the Jesus-God relationship, especially in claiming
its authentic historicity. His reliance on Jeremias may misdirect his
christological project at this point. As William C. Placher warns:
The debate about Abba demonstrates the dangers of putting too
much theological weight on particular historical claims about
details of Jesus life and ministry.97
On the other hand, Barrs arguments do not lead to a necessary
denial of the historicity of the term, nor do they necessarily repudiate the wider theological argumentation in Jeremias (and Sobrino).
As Barr himself underscores:
These conclusions in themselves do not appear to upset Jeremias wider
argumentation. It may be fully probable that Jesus addressing of God as
father is connected with his requirement that his followers should be like

95 Ibid.
96 After all, the word appears only three times in the New Testament, and the
one occurrence in the Gospels refers to a prayer of Jesus to which there
reportedly were no human witnesses.
97 Placher 1994, 59.

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children, even if this is not related to the specific term abba in the way that
has been suggested. It may also be quite true that the use of abba was original with Jesus and historically genuine []98

What Barr intends, is to question the assurance about the degree to

which this can be proved.
The principal theological point for Sobrino is that Jesus fundamental experience with God was that God is good; someone in
whom he can trust and rest. For Jesus, God is good, and it is good
for him and all human beings that God is such. In this sense, God is
a Father; the confidence and love that should exist between God
and human beings is similar to the closest relationships among
human beings: family-relationships. Jesus responds to the reality of
God with trust, confidence and joy. He dares to approach God in
absolute intimacy.
This theological interpretation cannot be secured or proved by
historically assured facts. In fact, to the degree that it would
depend on the historicity of Jesus use of abba, it would seem doubtful. But the lack of certain historical evidence regarding this term
does not falsify this interpretation either, for at least two reasons.
First, because there is a much broader attestation in the New
Testament that Jesus does address God as Father (Gr.: ho pater), in
fact on twenty-six occasions, as Sobrino himself points out.99 The
content of the theological interpretation does not necessarily
depend on the aramaic abba. But the point that Sobrino is making,
when he argues that: [] the relative ambiguity of the term
father is clarified by noting that Jesus used the Palestinian Aramaic
term Abba 100, seems to be vulnerable, at least on the background
of this recent scholarly development.
98 Op. cit., 39.
99 With the exception of Mark 15:34 par. Sobrino 1994c, 146.
100 Ibid.

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Second; in any historical description of Jesus, there is always a

theological interpretation at work as well. There is no such thing as
a naked historical fact. The significance or meaning of a historical
fact depends on the perspective from which its interpreter
approaches it. 101 When this is taken into account, however, then a
theological interpretation can and should argue for its plausibility by referring to historical indications or traces. Although Sobrino
at several places shows explicit awareness of this, his legitimation of
theological interpretations with recourse to history and historical is, as I have pointed out in Chapter iii, confusing. His reliance
on the historicity of the abba is an example of this.
Having taken this into consideration, however, I conclude that
although it seems well advised not to depend on Jeremias abbainterpretation as much as Sobrino does, the main contention that
one important aspect of Jesus relationship to God was that it was
characterised by trust and confidence in a God who is a good
Father, still seems tenable.
(2) The God-Father of Jesus does not only appear as a God who is
near and approachable, whom Jesus recognises and to whom he
may respond in joyful trust. In the image of God that appears in
and through the life of Jesus there is not just affinity, but also absolute alterity; complete otherness.102 God remains mystery to Jesus.
God is a Father who is God.
It is in this perspective that Sobrino proposes to see Jesus ignorance, temptations, errors and lack of knowledge about the time of
the coming of the Kingdom. These features have at times appeared
101 Cf. my earlier claim that it is rather a historical reconstruction of Jesus based
on some particular, contemporary interests (exposed in the master-narrative) that Sobrino proposes, than more strictly the historical Jesus as
norm, Chapter iii [4], above.
102 Compare Chapter vii [5], below.

251

too shocking to Christian piety and therefore been toned down.

But they are clearly described in the New Testament. And exactly
because of the difficulties they might cause for the post-Easter confession of Jesus as God, it is probable that they have a historical
grounding. Sobrino suggests that they be seen as showing how Jesus
in his own life travels vis--vis a God whom he does not manipulate or control. [] Jesus respects the transcendence of God absolutely []103 His openness and total trust-availability towards this
God is at the same time united with a respect for the distance
between himself and the ultimate mystery of God. Jesus lets God be
God.
This shows the creatureliness of Jesus, Sobrino believes. But
even more so, his not knowing the day of the coming of the Kingdom which, Sobrino notes, is not a peripheral theological point,
but a very central one becomes a noetic precondition for unconditional openness to God.104 The complete trust in and surrender
to the God who remains mystery, would not have been possible if
Jesus did not share also this fundamental human trait: uncertainty
and vulnerability in facing the future and the ultimacy of reality.
The image of God emerging in and through the life of Jesus is
then dialectical. While it is true that Jesus can rest in God, God is
also a God who does not let him rest, in Sobrinos elegant wording.105
(3) How do these different and even contrary traditions and visions
of God come together in (the testimonies about) Jesus? How is the

103 Sobrino 1994c, 154, Sobrino 1991d, 264.

104 Ibid. Lo positivo para este apartado es que el no-saber del da de la venida
del reino es el presupuesto notico de la apertura incondicional a Dios.
105 En ese Padre descansa Jess, pero a su vez, el Padre no lo deja descansar.
Sobrino 1991d, 271.

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discontinuity between them bridged if at all? Responding to this,

Sobrino makes two important points.
The first is that Jesus relationship with God is expressed not
only through ideas, words or particular moments of prayer. Jesus
understanding of God can be grasped only through an interpretation of the totality of Jesus life: his ideas, words, priorities and
actions. This is because, for Jesus, God is not only someone of
whom he speaks or to whom he prays; to Jesus, God is the reality to
whom he devotes his whole life. In the words of Gustavo Gutirrez,
Jess practica a Dios Jesus puts God into practice.106 And only
in this totality of Jesus life is it possible to hold together the diversities and even divergences in the images of God.
This leads to the second point, which to Sobrino is crucial,
namely the historicity of Jesus understanding of God. By this he
denotes the progressive development of Jesus, his growth in this
particular case, the internal development in his understanding and
attitudes with regard to God. The vision of God that Jesus has in
the first part of his ministry is not the same as in the last part of his
ministry, Sobrino believes. Something seems to have changed.
There has even been crisis and conversion in Jesus relationship to
God.
The contention that Jesus has undergone a conversion, may
seem quite provocative. But Sobrino emphasises that to use this
term of Jesus does not necessarily refer to a change from an evil or
sinful attitude to a good and just one; it rather describes the fact of
a significant change of place and perspective, going from one view
of God to another, according to Gods own self-disclosure. It means
seeking God where God wants to be found. This change of place
and perspective is present in the Gospel renderings of Jesus life, and
finds a particular expression in the so-called Galilean crisis.
106 Sobrino 1994c, 136. / Sobrino 1991d, 235.

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Basically, Sobrino divides the history of Jesus, or of his public

ministry, into two parts. The fundamental turning point is that crucial happening in Galilee, when Peter confesses that Jesus is the
Messiah, but immediately afterwards is abruptly rejected by Jesus.
The fact that all the evangelists report this event (Mark 8:27ff; Matt
16:13ff, Luke 9:18ff and John 6:66ff ) points to its theological centrality. Until this point, Jesus has announced the imminent coming
of the Kingdom, a coming in grace which evokes joy, forgiveness
and celebration particularly among the poor. But after this episode
in Galilee, the tone and framework of Jesus mission suddenly
changes. He starts to predict his suffering and death. Geographically, the change can be seen in his turning towards Jerusalem. Now
his faith and mission lead him into suffering and darkness; he faces
incomprehensible resistance to the coming of the Kingdom, and
finally experiences the mysterious and painful absence of the God of
the Kingdom.107
Jesus has undergone a change in his conception of God, and
simultaneously a change in his conception of himself and his mission, and of the how and when of the coming of the Kingdom,
Sobrino postulates. In this, Jesus shows himself to be truly human,
allowing God to be God.
Again we have reached an important, more specific determination of Sobrinos use of the term historical Jesus. It does not simply, perhaps not even primarily, mean that Jesus belongs to history,
but rather that Jesus has a history.
We want to see Jesus in the historical process of change and development.
[] What we want to recover is the totality of the historical Jesus. That is
not simply the sum total of his historical actions and attitudes but the latter

107 Sobrino 1976, 276 . To the question of whether God is absent or not, see
below, Chapter vii [4].

254

organized in his life story. Thus the historical Jesus is nothing else but the
history of Jesus.108

For this theological interpretation on the basis of a reconstructed

chronology of Jesus life and ministry, in which the Galilean crisis
is given a primary importance, Sobrino has received sharp criticism.
David Batstone admits that Sobrinos approach unquestionably
contributes to a historical method of interpretation.109 However,
Batstone argues that this approach also leads Sobrino into some of
the same traps sprung by earlier quests for the life of Jesus. This
happens when Sobrino is reconstructing the chronology of Jesus
history where he is not justified, according to Batstone, for the
same reasons that liberal European scholars were wrong in their
(first) reconstructions of the life of Jesus. William Wredes demonstration that the gospels had been arranged theologically and not
chronologically, is still a fatal blow this time to (Ellacuras and)
Sobrinos description of Jesus history, Batstone forcefully claims.
Sobrino has obviously considered this and similar criticisms
between Cristologa desde Amrica latina and Jesucristo liberador. He
is more cautious in the latter book. The historicity of the Galilean
crisis is contested among New Testament scholars, he admits.110
Nevertheless, Sobrino chooses to stand by his reconstruction of this
history of/in Jesus and the theological interpretation he attaches to
this. It is understandable why he does so, because this fundamental
108 Sobrino 1978a, 84-85. / Sobrino 1976, 63: El problema [] consiste [] en
ver a Jess en su proceso histrico de desarollo y cambio. [] Lo que hay
que recobrar es la totalidad del Jess histrico, que no es la suma de sus
acciones y actitudes histricas, sino esas acciones y actitudes en cuanto
aparecen organizadas en su historia. El Jess histrico entonces no es otra
cosa que la historia de Jess.
109 Batstone 1991, 55-56.
110 Sobrino 1991d, 259: La historicidad de esta crisis es hoy discutida o, al
menos, matizada.

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perspective of growth or development and dynamism together with

the relational approach is absolutely fundamental to his whole
christology. But it does once again draw attention to his peculiar use
of the category historical.
(4) The history of Jesus is of great theological significance according
to Sobrino. This can be seen very clearly in the central place that he
gives to the terms filiation, filiacin, and following, to which I
shall return. The history of Jesus is for Sobrino, first and foremost,
Jesus walking with God in history. In a fundamental way, then, it
is the history of Jesus faith.
By giving the theme of Jesus faith a central place, Sobrino
enters into a controversial field. He is aware of the strong tradition
stemming from Thomas Aquinas, according to which Jesus could
not have had faith, because being divine, he had full vision of God
in his essence. Sobrino, however, refers to the recent recovery of
this theme within both Catholic and Protestant christologies, while
at the same time stating that these christologies still ignore the history of his faith.111
Sobrino sees Jesus faith expressed in the totality of his life,
words and deeds in relationship to the two constituent limit-realities that he is facing; the Kingdom of God and the God-Father of
the Kingdom.Absolute trust and complete openness to God, taken
as a whole, can be understood as what the scriptures mean by
faith.112 It is a faith in process of development, which experiences
change, resistance and darkness. Through this dynamic historical
development, then, Jesus faith is shaped by history in the same
time as it shapes history. It endures even in the darkness of conflict
111 Sobrino 1978a, 86. / Sobrino 1976, 65.
112 Sobrino 1994c, 154. / Sobrino 1991d, 265. La absoluta confianza y la radical
disponibilidad con respecto a Dios, si se las toma unificadamente, pueden
ser tomadas como lo equivalente a lo que la Escritura llama fe.

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and suffering, and thus becomes a a victorious and liberating faith,

Sobrino holds.113
The focus on Jesus faith became soon a much discussed and
criticised aspect of Sobrinos christology even in sympathetic theological circles in Latin America. 114 The issue is debated on exegetical as well as systematic grounds. As I have already mentioned, the
current research on the historical Jesus accentuates the religious
faith and practice of Jesus, and sees him much more in religious
continuity with his contemporaries than was common some
decades ago. At the same time, the exegetical and biblical interpretation of NT references to Jesus faith especially the ambiguous
genitive (Gr.:) pistis Iesou Xristou continues to be a crux interpretum, about which no clear agreement exists.115 In the field of systematics, there is also disagreement on the significance of this issue.
In Latin America, however, there have been several approaches
along Sobrinos lines of thought, making the faith of Jesus a basic
theological point.116
To Sobrino, the question of Jesus faith is nothing less than a
test of whether one actually is prepared to accept Jesus true humanity or not: it would be paradoxical for theology to state that faith
was not essential in defining what is authentically human.117

113 Sobrino 1978a, 87 / Sobrino 1976, 65.

114 This can be seen from Jos Ignacio Gonzalez Faus comments in a seminar in
Mexico on Cristologa desde Amrica Latina, published in Christus. Gonzalez
Faus basically defends Sobrinos approach, and sees in the negative reception
of this theme in Sobrino a particular scepticism towards the liberation
approach in general, rather than to the theological issue of Jesus faith in
itself. Gonzlez Faus 1978, 30-38.
115 See for instance Dodd 1995.
116 Cf. e.g. Tamez 1991, 126-136, n. 72; and Gonzlez F. 1993.
117 Sobrino 1991d, 266. Cf., e.g., Tracys critical note in Tracy 1991, 295; and also
n.8, 243.

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[6] Who is Jesus? Son of God

When analysing Jesus relationship with God, Sobrino thus highlights particularly the New Testament description of this relationship as comparable to a parent-child relationship. Faced with the
mystery of God that to Jesus appears as the profoundly good (lo
sumamente bueno), Jesus relates to this mystery in the manner of a
son approaching a father: with joy, love, faith, trust although
at the same time also with respect, readiness, disponibilidad, willingness to obey.
In the same way as Sobrino has presented Jesus mission as a
making history according to the will of God by responding to the
approaching Kingdom of God which makes Jesus a mediator,
messiah, liberator he also presents Jesus personality and personal development as a making himself a human being in the presence of a God-Father.118
In these descriptions we see clearly the dynamic and transformative emphases in Sobrinos interpretation. There is development,
transformation, and active history-making related to Jesus, at
both the exterior and interior levels. This development is seen not
as a harmonious gradual development, but as something which is
struggled through in the presence of opposition, incomprehensibility and suffering. At this point one can find reflections in the christology of Sobrino of the very point of departure of Latin American
liberation theology, namely the transition from a mainly development-related approach to liberation.119
I shall soon return to Sobrinos treatment of the cause and content of this opposition, the struggle between the God of life and the
118 Hemos presentado la misin de Jess, como un hacer historia segn Dios, y
la propia historicidad personal de Jess, como un hacerse l mismo un ser
humano en presencia de Dios-Padre. Sobrino 1991d, 271.
119 See above, Chapter i [2] d).

258

idols of death. It is worth noting here, though, that this transformation or liberating process in Sobrino consists in both divinisation
and humanisation. Jesus becomes son of God through the relationship with the God Father. This is a process of filiation, according to Sobrino, which is theologically ultimately confirmed by God
in the act of the resurrection. At the same time, this walking
towards God which makes Jesus son of God, and thereby participating in the very reality of God (divinisation), is equally a process
through which Jesus becomes a human being (hacerse l mismo un
ser humano [] ).120 It is a process of authentic humanisation.
This critical point in Sobrinos christology is somewhat diffuse.
I shall therefore give it a more detailed treatment below. 121 At this
stage, it may suffice to suggest the following interpretation of this
relationship in Sobrino: being a true human being means living
before the true God in faith and trust, letting God be God. At the
same time the true God as attested by the Bible is a God who precisely being divine lets human being be human being. Divinity
and humanity thus enters into a mutually constitutive relationship.
Such a conclusion does not come from an abstract analysis of the
concepts divinity and humanity, but from a concrete re-reading
of that human life in which according to the Christian faith true
humanity and true divinity coincide: the life of Jesus of Nazareth.
As we shall see, this simultaneous movement in the supposedly
opposite directions of humanity and divinity closely relates to the
concept of salvation in Sobrino as well.122

120 Sobrino 1991d, 271.

121 See my discussion below, Chapter viii [3].
122 See Chapter vi.

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[7] Sobrinos Christology and Feminist Concerns

God is Father, Jesus is Son. This is a proper place then, to address
what may be seen as a shortcoming in Sobrinos theological work;
one which does in fact threaten to undermine its liberative intention and character. I refer to a notable lack of explicit sensitivity to
feminist concerns. The critical questions that must be raised and
that have been raised since the birth of feminist theology are
these: are a God-Father and a Saviour-Son good news to
oppressed women? Can a male saviour save women?123 In spite of
this strong emphasis on Jesus relationship to God as Father,
Sobrino shows no explicit, critical awareness of the possible patriarchal and hence oppressive consequences of such an interpretation.
For this he has received criticisms from feminist theologians, as
would be expected.124
The fact that Sobrino does not refer to gender issues at all
reveals a more general problem in his outline, which may be seen as
a lack of nuances in his treatment of oppressive structures and
oppressed groups. The poor-rich dichotomy seems to govern the
whole of his thinking to such an extent that other, equally important oppressive structures (sexist, racist, cultural etc.) disappear
from sight.125
Although he has argued that this primacy be given to the socioeconomic oppression, Sobrino seems to be increasingly aware of the
123 This question is the heading of a chapter in Rosemary Radford Ruethers
classic Sexism and God-talk, Radford Ruether 1983.
124 See e.g., the criticism made by Primavesi 1995.
125 In contrast to malestream liberation theologies, a feminist liberation theology does not privilege a Marxist class analysis but seeks to comprehend the
multiplicative structures of womens oppression racism, class exploitation,
heterosexism, and colonialism that determine and diminish all of our
lives. Schssler Fiorenza 1994, 12-13.

260

difficulties raised by this one-sidedness. In the introduction to a

recent article, he summarises with approval some major criticisms
and self-critisicms of liberation theology.126 Among these, he refers
to the need to take more seriously the reality of women, which he
admits has been absent in the beginning and neglected to the
present in liberation theology.127
But is Sobrinos basic approach helpful, from a feminist perspective? Can feminist concerns be integrated into it without a fundamental change in its structure? At least three reasons point in the
direction of a positive answer. Firstly, because of the centrality that
it gives to the constitutive character of relationships. Secondly,
because of the emphasis on the continuity between Jesus and his
followers, a following which importantly is never seen as
restricted to men. And thirdly, because of the liberating character of
Sobrinos christology: its committed stance on the side of victims.
A basic insight of feminist studies is that women often describe
their experience using the terms relatedness and interconnection.128 Hence these terms have become central in feminist theology. This metaphysics of connection, Mary Grey notes, sees the
interdependence and interconnection of all things on the widest
possible scale: It is not simply that all people interconnect but that
all living things are organically interconnected.129 The similarity
with Sobrinos thinking becomes more visible however, when we
hear that this perspective enables one to see the self as a self-in-relation, which means that I become in relation to you,130 and furthermore when Grey points out that connection is an energizing
126 Sobrino 1995b, 116.
127 Ibid.: [] hay que tomar en serio la realidad de la mujer ausente en los
comienzos y descuidada hasta el presente.
128 Grey 1991, 7.
129 Grey 1991, 11.
130 Ibid.

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way of living and experiencing, and a historical process.131 A

leading scholar in feminist social ethics, Beverly Wildung Harrison,
makes the centrality of relationship one of her fundamental basepoints for a feminist moral theology.132 Starting from the contention that relationality is at the heart of all things,133 Wildung
Harrison sketches a reinterpretation of Jesus ministry and death
which sees it in terms of Jesus power of mutuality.
Jesus death on the cross, his sacrifice, was no abstract exercise in moral virtue. His death was the price he paid for refusing to abandon the radical
activity of love of expressing solidarity and reciprocity with the excluded
ones in his community.134

This interpretation concurs much with Sobrinos, as we shall see.

And like Sobrino, Wildung Harrison sees this radical activity of
love, this way of being in the world that deepens relation, as
something to which every follower of Jesus is summoned.135
This leads to my second argument that Sobrinos christology is
131 Op. cit., 15.
132 Harrison 1985, 15-20. One of the two other basepoints shows clearly a further correspondence with Sobrinos thinking, namely Activity as the Mode
of Love (8-12). Whether the third one, emphasising embodiment (Our
Bodies, Ourselves as the Agents of Love) is compatible with Sobrino, is less
clear. See below, Chapter vii, [1].
133 Op. cit., 15.
134 Op. cit., 18. Harrison continues: Sacrifice, I submit, is not a central moral
goal or virtue in Christian life. Radical acts of love expressing human solidarity and bringing mutual relationship to life are the central virtues of
Christian life. That we have turned sacrifice into a moral virtue has deeply
confused the Christian moral tradition [] To be sure, Jesus was faithful to
death. He stayed with his cause and he died for it. He accepted sacrifice. But
his sacrifice was for the cause of radical love, it was in order to make relationship and to sustain it, and, above all, to right wrong relationship, which we
call doing justice.
135 Ibid.

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compatible with fundamental tenets of feminist theology, the

emphasis on the continuity between Jesus and other human beings,
i.e., his followers. I shall soon return to this relation as Sobrino
depicts it. But an important point to be made here is that the
emphasis on constitutive relationality in which we grow, become,
change in relation to each-/an-other applied to the continuity and
connection between Jesus and other human beings, makes it possible to overcome the static soteriological essentialism that has had
and continues to have such oppressive consequences for women, as
feminist theologians have rightly pointed out. This requires, of
course, that such relations not be seen as exclusive in the sense that
some persons or groups of persons are systematically barred from
participating in them, and, furthermore, that they not be seen as
hierachical, or to use Schssler Fiorenzas neologism kyriarchal.136 In other words, if Jesus becomes saviour in and through
the relations in which he is embedded, if his status as the true
human being depends on these relations, then we may conclude
as Radford Ruether does137 that the maleness of Jesus has no ultimate significance.
136 Schssler Fiorenza 1994, 14. [] I have argued for a redefinition of the concept of patriarchy to mean not simply the rule of men over women but
rather a complex social pyramid of graduated dominations and subordinations. Because feminist discourses continue to use the term patriarchy in
the sense of gender dualism, I introduced in But She Said the neologism
kyriarchy, meaning the rule of the emperor/master/lord/father/husband
over his subordinates.
137 Radford Ruether 1983. Interestingly, though, Radford Ruether sees the maleness of Jesus as having social, symbolic significance in the framework of
societies of patriarchal privilege. In this sense Jesus, as the Christ, the representative of liberated humanity and the liberating Word of God manifests
the kenosis of patriarchy, the announcement of the new humanity through a
lifestyle that discards hierarchical caste privilege and speaks on behalf of the
lowly. Ibid.

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We need to think in terms of a dynamic, rather than a static, relationship

between redeemer and redeemed. The redeemer is one who has been
redeemed, just as Jesus himself accepted the baptism of John. Those who
have been liberated can, in turn, become paradigmatic, liberating persons for
others.138

Sobrino does think in terms of such a dynamic relationship

between Jesus and his followers the Crucified and the crucified.
But is he in fact willing and able to give women full and equal
admittance to this relationship? Sobrino himself clearly belongs to a
tradition that of the Jesuit order which explicitly and systematically expresses male supremacy in discipleship by not inviting
women to enter the Society of Jesus. Does his christology have the
potential to supersede this kyriarchal tradition?
To Sobrino, the ultimate albeit contradictory sign of the salvific
presence of Jesus in history is the continuing occurrence of martyrdom. Martyrdom shows that there has been a true following of
Jesus taking place. The crucial test case will then be whether women
are recognised and counted among those true followers, those mar138 Radford Ruether 1983, 144. Radford Ruethers outline of a feminist christology coincides with Sobrinos liberation christology in other aspects as well,
e.g., in the choice of a starting point: A starting point for this inquiry must
be a reencounter with the Jesus of the Synoptic Gospels, not the accumulated doctrine about him but his message and praxis. What will then occur,
Radford Ruether believes, is a figure remarkably compatible with feminism. (142). At the same time Radford Ruether points to the danger of
over-emphasizing past history, without being critically aware of the the
present from which we approach it. Christ, as redemptive person and Word
of God, is not to be encapsulated once-for-all in the historical Jesus. The
Christian community continues Christs identity, 144. Although this
expresses perhaps the fundamental trait of Sobrinos christology and the
rationale for introducing the reality and symbol of the crucified people in it,
it is exactly this point that is somewhat obscured in Sobrinos usage of the
historical Jesus, I submit.

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tyrs. Is Sobrino able to encounter Christ in the form of our sister,

to use Ruthers words?139 In her moving reflection on the martyrdom of women in El Salvador, Jane M. Grovijahn critically
observes:
Renewed interest in the efficacy of martyrdom is forced on the church
because of the brutal destruction of life in El Salvador. Yet within these martyrologies, women are practically nonexistent. [] Why is an attack on a
priest viewed as as an attack on the entire church, but a brutal rape and murder of a female catechist not even remembered?140

Sobrino, however, stands the test. As Grovijahn recognises, he

explicitly and forcefully acknowledges Christs presence through
women: In a reflection upon the brutal murder of the four American women in 1980, Jon Sobrino celebrates salvation coming to El
Salvador through women.141 Another feminist theologian, Elizabeth A. Johnson, also strongly endorses Sobrino in this, commenting that he got it exactly right when he wrote of the North
American women:
I have stood by the bodies of Maura Clarke, Ita Ford, Dorothy Kazel, and
Jean Donovan [] The murdered Christ is here in the person of four women
[] Christ lies dead here among us. He is Maura, Ita, Dorothy and Jean.
But he is risen, too, in these same four women, and he keeps hope in liberation alive.142

139 Ibid.
140 Grovijahn 1991, 20. Grovijahn calls for a redefinition of the traditional
understanding of martyrdom, which she finds not only deceptive, but idolatrous. (21). Sobrino has launched proposals in the same direction, cf.
Sobrino 1991d, 440-451.
141 Grovijahn 1991, 27.
142 Johnson 1992, 74. The quotation is from Sobrino 1988b, 153-156. Original
Spanish wording in Sobrino 1987a, 185-188. The emphasis is Sobrinos.

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Thirdly, and in more general terms, I regard Sobrinos christology as

compatible with feminist concerns because it is critical and oriented
towards a liberating praxis on behalf of victims. Here, once more,
an enlightening passage from Schssler Fiorenzas latest work on
christology will suffice to show to what extent Sobrinos approach
coincides with fundamental traits of feminist theological reflection:
(A) critical feminist theology of liberation does not simply seek to analyze
and explain the socioreligious structures of domination that marginalize and
exploit women and other nonpersons, to use an expression by Gustavo
Gutirrez. Instead, it aims to change entirely structures of alienation, exploitation, and exclusion. Its goal is to transform theoretical and theological-religious knowledges and socio-political structures of domination and
subordination. Such a feminist theology understands itself as a critical theology of liberation because its critical systemic analyses and its intellectual
practices for the production of religious knowledge seek to support struggles
for wo/mens liberation around the world. Hence its articulations are diverse
and often in tension and conflict with each other.143

At the same time, however, feminist theologians have pointed to the

ambiguities and dangers lurking in the term victim. We need not
minimize the radicality of womens oppression in varied cultures
and communities nor minimize Christianitys continuing involvement in that oppression, Wildung Harrison underscores, but we
must not let that recognition confirm us in a posture of victimization.144 And closely linked to this, feminist theologians have raised
fundamental criticisms of traditional theologies of the cross, including the more recent expression these have found in i.a. Moltmanns
work.145 The question whether Sobrino may be seen as responding
satisfactorily to these critical feminist concerns, must await our further treatment in Chapters VI and VII.
143 Schssler Fiorenza 1994, 12.
144 Harrison 1985, 7.

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Here I conclude that while Sobrinos christology displays a

remarkable lack of explicit reflection on and treatment of vital feminist concerns, there seem to be no impediments in the fundamental method, structure or thrust of his work that would prevent him
from taking on these concerns approvingly. On the contrary, his
approach coincides to a large extent with those of leading feminist
scholars of today. This is the case not least, I should add, with the
emerging feminist theology from a Third World perspective.146

[8] Third Relation: Jesus and his Disciples.

The Primacy of Following
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Jesus is not only
imbedded in relations to God and Gods Kingdom (what traditionally might be labelled vertical relations). He is also deeply interrelated with other human beings (horizontal relations), whom he
145 Schssler Fiorenza reviews some of these criticisisms in op. cit., 98-107.
Referring to a study by the Swiss feminist theologian Regula Strobel (Feministische Kritik an traditionellen Kreuzestheologien in Strahm, Doris &
Regula Strobel (eds.): Vom Verlangen nach Heilwerden. Christologie in feministisch-theologischer Sicht Exodus, Fribourg 199, 52-64), Schssler Fiorenza
writes: The notions of innocent victimhood and redemption as freely chosen suffering enable militarist and capitalist societies to persuade people to
accept suffering, war, and death as important ideals for which people have
died in the past and for which it is still worthy to die. For women, a theology
of the cross as self-giving love is even more detrimental than that of obedience because it colludes with the cultural feminine calling to self-sacrificing
love for the sake of their families. Thus it renders the exploitation of all
women in the name of love and self-sacrifice psychologically acceptable and
religiously warranted. Op. cit., 102.
146 See, e.g., Fabella and Mercy Amba 1989, Tamez 1989a and Tamez 1989b.

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invites into a fellowship which comes to expression in discipleship

or following. This is a fundamental term in Sobrinos christology.
I shall now try to spell out more clearly how Sobrino describes this
relationship with a basis in his re-reading of the history of Jesus.
(1) Sobrino holds it a historically assured fact that Jesus of Nazareth called different people in his surroundings to follow him.147
This call was differentiated, however, both in terms of different
periods in Jesus public ministry and in terms of whom Jesus was
calling.
As we have just seen, Sobrino divides Jesus public ministry
into two periods. The dividing-line between these two periods is
what exegetes have called the Galilean crisis, when Jesus in Galilee
experiences an internal and external crisis, which in the synoptic
accounts culminates in Peters confession, followed by Jesus harsh
and surprising rejection of Peter (Mk 8:27ff. par; Jn 6:66 ff.)
Until this point, the public ministry of Jesus has been a service
to the coming Kingdom. The good news of the Kingdom that
God intervenes in history for the salvation of Gods people is particularly directed to the poor, in the two-fold meaning referred to
above. The preaching of Jesus and his miracles and salvific practice
make this clear. When Jesus calls disciples to follow him in this
period, it is not a universal call, in the sense that it would have the
same meaning for everybody. It is primarily a call to particular persons, and it is first and foremost a call to join Jesus in his mission:
the service of the Kingdom.
Jesus does, however, call everybody to conversion. But his call is
differentiated. To the poor and outcasts, the call to conversion is
primarily a call to gain new hope; not to despair, to believe that
God is gracious on their behalf, that God is intervening for their
147 Sobrino 1983b, 938: Es un hecho histrico asegurado que Jess llam a diferentes personas a seguirle en comunidad de vida, misin y destino.

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salvation, that the Kingdom is coming as grace and joy, not repudiation and exclusion. But, to the rich, those who are well off
within the social and religious society of that day, the call to conversion is a call to turn away from the security they believe they have in
their wealth and position, and to follow Jesus actively in his unselfish and humble service to the poor.
In the second period, after the Galilean crisis, the call to follow
Jesus takes on a new character. The Kingdom has not come in its
fullness as Jesus and his disciples had expected and resistance is
increasing. Jesus starts to speak of his suffering and death.
The following is now concretised in the following of the concrete person
Jesus, in a situation in which it is no longer obvious that Jesus himself would
have anything to do with the coming of the Kingdom, as was earlier
believed.148

Following Jesus now becomes acceptance of the Jesus scandal, a

following in suffering, darkness and apparently total failure.
The call to follow Jesus also becomes more universal at the end of
Jesus ministry, Sobrino believes.149
As noted above, Sobrino has been criticised for these differentiations in the interpretation of Jesus call to follow him, built upon a
disputable structure of Jesus ministry.150 Admitting and discussing
its difficulties, Sobrino relies less on the chronological structure and
the Galilean crisis in his more recent Jesucristo liberador than was the
case in Cristologia desde Amrica Latina.151 He maintains, however,

148 My translation of Sobrino 1976, 277. El seguimiento se concreta ahora en el

seguimiento de la persona concreta de Jess, en una situacin en la que ya no
pareca obvio que Jess mismo tuviera mucho que ver con la llegada del
reino, tal como haba sido pensado anteriormente., cf. Sobrino 1978a, 361.
149 Sobrino 1983b, 939.
150 Cf. e.g. Batstone 1991, 56-57.

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that Jesus has changed, and this change has not been simply peaceful and gradually developing.152
(2) If we now turn from a historical to a more systematic approach,
we must ask what this relationship between Jesus and his followers
actually means when seen as a constitutive relationship. A full treatment of the significance in and for theology of the centrality of this
relation in Sobrino must await our concluding chapter (VIII).
However, seeing it in the perspective of Jesus life and mission, it
may be helpful to address already at this stage some main elements
of the meaning and content of following Jesus today according to
Sobrino.
Because of historical as well as theological differences, following Jesus today cannot and ought not be pure imitation153,
Sobrino points out. The historical differences are obvious. Among
the most important theological differences are the (negative) fact
that the Kingdom has not come, and the (positive) presence and
action of the Spirit. This latter makes following today spirit, not
law. It is not supposed to be realised by everybody in the same
manner, but according to the personal carismas. One should for this
reason speak of an analogy of following.154 However, following
151 Sobrino 1991d, 259-262; 259: La historicidad de esta crisis es hoy discutida
o, al menos, matizada []
152 Sobrino 1991d, 262. Jess ha cambiado y ese cambio no ha sido simplemente evolutivo y pacfico. Se le llame o no crisis, se la pueda datar y localizar como crisis galilea o no, es secundario para el propsito de este
apartado. Lo importante es que Jess aparece en fidelidad a Dios hasta el
final, y esa fidelidad queda expresada como ir a Jerusaln, donde se va a
encontrar con Dios, otra vez de forma nueva, en la pasin y la cruz.
153 Sobrino 1983b, 940. El seguimiento de Jess en la actualidad no puede ni
debe ser pura imitacin, por la diversidad de circundancias histricas y
teolgicas. Cf. Sobrino 1976, xvi.
154 Sobrino 1976, xvi.

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is the structuring principle of any Christian life, which consists in

continuing (proseguir) in history the fundamental structure of
Jesus life: incarnation, practice and spirit of mission, cross and resurrection.155
Following Jesus today is continuing his mission. It is a mission
that presupposes an incarnation, a (Gr.:) knosis, into the world of
the poor. This should be real, not just intentional. It should therefore be possible to verify it. This should also be an exclusive mission, Sobrino believes; an incarnation in the world of the poor
signifies a rejection of the world of the rich and powerful. Thereby
it is conflictual and presupposes a conversion.156
The mission of Jesus was a mission for the sake of the Kingdom. This is the mission that should be continued by his followers.
It consists in preaching the good news of the coming Kingdom of
which the primary addressees are the poor , and making the
appropriate response to this in a liberating practice.157 This practice
grows out of the same misereor super turbas that was Jesus, and takes
concrete shape in the promotion of justice. As a Christian practice,
it should be carried out in the spirit of Jesus158, i.e. a spirit of joyful confidence in the Father and of obedient fidelity to the Father.
155 Sobrino 1976, xvi. El seguimiento, sin embargo, es el principio estructurante y jerarquizador de toda vida cristiana [] Ese principio no es otra cosa
que proseguir en la historia la estructura fundamental de la vida de Jess:
encarnacin, prctica y espritu de la misin, cruz y resurreccin.
156 Cf. Sobrino 1991d, 34. El seguimiento de Jess es, por esencia, conflictivo
porque significa reproducir una prctica en favor de unos y en contra de
otros, y esto origina ataques y persecucin.
157 Cf. Sobrino 1982a, 106ff.
158 This is a fundamental thought in all of Sobrinos writings on spirituality, cf.
Sobrino 1987a, 8: La teologa vive, antes que nada, de una prctica y de una
espiritualidad. Esa prctica no es otra cosa que el seguimiento de Jess, y esa
espiritualidad no es otra cosa que la actualizacin del espritu de Jess. See
also, cf. i.a., Sobrino 1992e; and Sobrino 1993a.

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As we can see, this is the kind of following that corresponds to the

first part of Jesus ministry.
Sobrino is convinced that a contemporary proseguimiento of
Jesus, as an incarnation into the world of the poor and a service to
the Kingdom, will lead to a participation in Jesus destiny. Thus,
following him becomes, as in the second part of Jesus ministry, a
following in suffering. Sobrino finds this theological statement confirmed by contemporary Latin-American experience. Following
Jesus means entering into conflict with the idols of death; it means
persecution and death. Following Jesus is following him to the cross
even today.159
There are crucified in contemporary history, then. Crucifixion is a consequence of following, and a confirmation that true following has taken place. Paradoxically, it gives credibility and
efficacy to the Christian service to the Kingdom. This is one of the
central propositions of Sobrinos christology, and the main scope of
this study. Here, we should note its close relation to the concept of
following.
Whoever follows Jesus in this manner, already participates in
his resurrection, Sobrino continues. Living as resurrected in history, the follower of Jesus has hope in the middle of darkness and
suffering. It is a hope which is not naive, but a hope against hope
(Romans 4:18).160 This point is stressed by Sobrino: The Christian
hope of resurrection is primarily a hope for the crucified.161 In
order to share this Christian hope it is necessary to participate in
the crucifixion, even if it be in an analogical manner.162 To this
theme, however, I shall return in the Postscript of this study.
159 Cf. e.g. Sobrino 1982a, 168 and 180.
160 Cf. Postscript, below.
161 Sobrino 1982a, 176.: (L)a resurreccin es esperanza en primer lugar para los
crucificados. Dios resucit a un crucificado, y desde entonces hay esperanza
para los crucificados de la historia.

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There is accordingly a significant, substantial relationship

between Jesus and other human beings, in Sobrinos view. Interestingly enough, being a constitutive relationship, Sobrino depicts it as
reciprocal. The followers of Jesus participate in some analogous way
(to be determined further) in Jesus status as Son, Messiah, and
(after the resurrection) Lord. This is what ultimately is expressed
in the phrase hacerse hijos en el Hijo.163 Jesus followers may
become as Jesus, they may become sons and daughters (hijos) of
God, just as he is the Son (Hijo) of God. But, at the same time,
Sobrino claims that there is a causal relation also in the opposite
direction: the fact that there are followers, constitutes Jesus as Lord
and Son of God. The most significant fact about the historical Jesus
is his ability to generate followers through history.164 Christs
actual lordship is shown in the fact that there are new human
beings, and these are the ones who make real in actu that Jesus
already is the Lord.165 Sobrino even maintains that if the figure of
Jesus ceased to be of interest to people, if nobody followed Jesus any
more which faith holds to be impossible then Jesus would no
longer be the revelation of human being, and thus not the revelation of God.166
These are remarkable statements. I shall return to a more
detailed consideration of them in Chapter viii.167 The main point
at this stage, is to note that there may be other mediators, messiahs,
162 Sobrino 1982a, 177: Hay que participar, pues, de la crucifixin, aunque sea
analgicamente, para que exista una esperanza cristiana.
163 Sobrino 1982a, 180. Cf. St. Augustines expression filii in Filio.
164 Sobrino 1976, xviii-xix: Y es a la vez la ms radical verificacin de la verdad
de la cristologa: que Jess es el hijo eterno del Padre porque a travs de su
Espritu es capaz de seguir engendrando seguidores suyos, configurando a
otros en su imagen.
165 Sobrino 1982a, 179: Ms an, existe una correlacin entre ambas novedades:
el seoro actual de Jess se muestra en que existan los hombres nuevos, y
stos son los que hacen realidad in actu el que Jess sea ya ahora Seor.

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and children of God, in Sobrinos view. We saw this clearly

expressed in the citation above: [] before and after Jesus other
mediators exist, related to him and authorized by him [] In fact,
Jesus wants there to be other mediators. Jesus calls his followers to
correspond to the coming of the Kingdom in the same manner as
he himself does, and he invites them into the same trusting relationship with God-Father. And Sobrino truly believes that there have
been and are others, from the prophets and messiahs of the Old
Testament, to martyrs and prophets of our days: Martin Luther
King, Ita Ford168, Mgr Romero.169
Accordingly, Jesus appears in horizontality with other human
beings, although as a particular human being. He is the firstborn
among brothers and sisters, Sobrino says, referring to Rom. 8:29.
This reciprocal relationship between Jesus and his followers in
Sobrinos christology will be important for my further study. I shall
consider both the soteriological and the methodological consequences of the primacy that Sobrino accords to the categories of
relationship and following. I shall also ask whether the reciprocity
of these relations also implies that they are totally symmetrical.170
However, some critical questions should be raised already.
The most urging one regards nothing less than the central core of
166 Sobrino 1976, 297. El da en que la figura de Jess dejase de interesar, dejase
de ser camino de salvacin lo cual la fe considera imposible ese da la frmula no sera verdadera, Jess hubiese dejado de ser la revelacin del hombre
y de esa forma tambin la revelacin de Dios.
167 See below.
168 Sobrino 1987a, 188: Maura, Ita, Dorothy y Jean som el Cristo muerto hoy.
Pero son tambin el Cristo resucitado, que mantiene viva la esperanza de liberacin. [] Con Maura, Ita, Dorothy y Jean, Dios pas por El Salvador.
169 See the bold statement by Ellacura in Ellacura 1990: Monseor Romero,
un enviado de Dios para salvar a su pueblo, an expression often recalled by
Sobrino.
170 See Chapter viii [3], below.

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Christian faith, viz. the divinity of Jesus. In answering that question, some basic observations will follow.

[9] From one son to the Son:

Is Jesus True Divinity Questioned?
The continuity between Jesus and other human beings before and
after him is a fundamental tenet in Sobrinos christology. It is, of
course, this tenet that makes it possible to focus on the relationship
between Jesus and other crucified ones in history. Does not underscoring this continuity question or even challenge the confession of
Jesus true divinity?
Sobrino admits that his interpretations of Jesus as mediator,
messiah, son, etc. do not present him in total discontinuity with
other human beings. Here, one may note in passing, Sobrino clearly
distinguishes himself from the main protagonists of the second
quest, in spite of the exegetical dependence which I have demonstrated. And we saw in Chapter ii, this is a point where Jngel and
Sobrino would disagree.
How does Sobrino actually reason in this matter?
[] Jesus in proclaiming and intiating the Kingdom of God, followed the
line of the anointed one, the messiah who responds to the hope for salvation of a poor and oppressed people. And by his relationship to God-Father
he followed the line of the son, of a human person who responds and corresponds to God. This does not force us to confess him as the messiah and the
son, but makes it credible so to confess him.171

Here we are at a crucial point in Sobrinos christology, with respect

to both its method and its content. Sobrino chooses a historicaltheological reading as his methodological approach. It is thus a

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reading which is conscious that it starts from a position in a particular moment of history in a particular community. In this community there is already present a confession, a faith in this Jesus of
whom the texts speak. At the same time this methodology stresses
that that which is read and confessed is something which appeared
in the same history as the one the readers experience and take part
in. There is a clear continuity between the communities in which
Jesus appeared and made a profound impact, and the communities
in which the christological reflection of today is carried out.
Now, this is the same continuity that we find in the testimonies
to Jesus relationship with other human beings, according to
Sobrino. Jesus actively seeks such continuity and horizontality:
[] the messiah seeks followers and the son wants all to call God
Father.172 This is a first step, so to speak, in the reflection on the
christological confession. Although it is consciously starting from a
position of confession, it applies a method (historical reading)
which makes it possible to stress this continuity of Jesus with other
human beings, and explain why this person could be called messiah, son etc.
Moving from a description of Jesus as a son or a messiah to an
outright confession of him as the Messiah and Son of God, is something which never ceases to be a leap of faith, Sobrino is convinced.
But he argues that from this position, through this methodological
approach, it is a leap of faith which seems more historically and
171 Sobrino 1994c, 159. / Sobrino 1991d, 272: Pues bien, a partir de lo que
hemos dicho, Jess, por su anuncio e inicio del reino de Dios, va apareciendo en la lnea del ungido, el mesas que responde a la esperanza de salvacin del pueblo pobre y oprimido. Y por su relacin con Dios-Padre va
apareciendo en la lnea del hijo, del ser humano que responde y corresponde a Dios. Lo dicho no fuerza a confesarlo como el mesas y el hijo, pero
hace verosmil que se lo pudiese confesar de esta forma.
172 Sobrino 1994c, 159. / Sobrino 1991d, 273: [] el mesas busca seguidores y
el hijo quiere que todos llamen Padre a Dios.

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soteriologically plausible.173 This historical-theological re-reading

which has stressed the particular relationships of Jesus with the
Kingdom of God and the God of the Kingdom lends credibility to
the confession that in this Jesus, the reality of God has appeared in
history in a decisive manner. It is a way of preparing for the possibility of a correct formulation of and not least a concrete understanding of the christological dogma, Sobrino believes.
In this way the possibility of formulating and, above all, of correctly understanding [the] christological dogma is being built up. Starting from Jesus
actual relationship to God and the Kingdom of God, and from his actual
relationship with his brothers and sisters, it becomes possible to confess
what his true divinity and true humanity actually consist of.174

The continuity between Jesus and other human beings does not represent a hindrance to the full confession of his divinity in Sobrinos
view. To the contrary, Sobrino holds that this continuity actually
founds that confession, both epistemologically and theologically.
This is a crucial point for the understanding of Sobrinos theology, and thus for his treatment of the theological significance of suffering by way of the relationship between the crucified and the
Crucified. It will continuously engage our attention. At this stage, I
shall make four basic observations emerging from my investigation
so far.
(1) The first observation deals with the rhetorical character of
Sobrinos christology. That Sobrinos christology is rhetorical is of
173 This is the point that Chow fails to understand, see Chapter iii [3] (1).
174 Sobrino 1994c, 159. / Sobrino 1991d, 273. De esta forma, se prepara la posibilidad de formulacin y, sobre todo, la correcta comprensin del dogma
cristolgico. A partir de la concreta relacin de Jess con Dios y su reino, y
partir de su concreta relacin con los hermanos se podr confesar en qu
consiste su verdadera humanidad y su verdadera divinidad.

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course no surprise. Any theological endeavour is rhetorical by

essence, in that it seeks to convince its public about the plausibility
and coherence of its theses.175 In the passage cited above, it is clear
that Sobrino makes use of this particular method in order to make
the confession more credible. His principal aim is to convince;
hence the rhetoric. Furthermore, it is a well-formulated and -performed rhetoric, thanks to Sobrinos systematic and logically
ordered argumentation, combined with his personal and emotional
tone all clothed in his very creative, at times splendid, linguistic
formulations.176
Nevertheless, perhaps because of the often reductionist or negative associations linked to the term rhetorical (which Sobrino
himself alludes to177), this obvious rhetorical character is not openly
admitted by Sobrino. Although this fact need not become problem175 Cf. Chapter iii [3]above. The term rhetoric has traditionally applied to the
principle of training communicators those seeking to persuade or inform
others; in the 20th century it has undergone a shift of emphasis from the
speaker or writer to the auditor or reader. In all, our century has witnessed a
return to rhetoric according to which the inescapability and importance of
rhetorics as a concern for audience, for intention, and for structure in linguistic formulations have been thoroughly underlined. See entry on rhetoric, Encyclopaedia Britannica 1995d.
176 Sobrinos style has certainly changed throughout the years. His prose is gaining in originality and accessibility, in my view. One can appreciate that he is
making a determined effort to make his writing more easily readable to a
large audience, without thereby losing its scientific precision and depth. His
ability to coin new phrases and twist traditional formulations has been demonstrated several times in this study, already. The personal and meditative
tone has also come to the fore, thus increasing the existential and spiritual
character of his writing. Yet, precisely this development makes a critical
reflection on Sobrinos own rhetoric interesting and necessary when one
seeks to make an appraisal of his theological proposals.
177 See e.g. the following formulation in Sobrino 1991d, 345 : [] mucho ms
que retrica piadosa []

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atic, it does so, in my view, when Sobrino puts forward his case with
key-terms like reality, history, and theological concept, that
remain vague and finally undefined. Accordingly, I think that
Sobrinos theology would benefit from a more explicit reflection on
the rhetorical character of the theological enterprise, and on the
nature of religious and theological language indeed, of language at
all.178
(2) My second observation regards the translation of Sobrinos
books into other languages, which sometimes is in danger of
obscuring this theological two-step method, e.g. from son to Son.
It can be seen most clearly in the translation of the Spanish title
Jesucristo liberador into the English Jesus the Liberator. What the
Spanish title indicates is that Jesus Christ i.e. the Jesus who is confessed as the Anointed one, Messiah is in fact one who can be perceived as a liberator. This is what Sobrino wishes to demonstrate
through his historical-theological re-reading. In the English title,
because of two changes, the most natural interpretation seems to be
a somewhat different one. Jesus stands here without its confessional predicative Christ, while the capital L in Liberator could
indicate that it should be understood as a confession; Jesus is the
(ultimate) Liberator. These are nuances, which do not amount to
contradictions, but the capitalisation of words in English titles and
headings seems to alter the original meaning in Sobrinos texts
here.179
178 The British theologian Gareth Jones faults Sobrino for his (lack of reflection
on) rhetoric. Jones 1995, 85-112, especially 110-111. For a further discussion
and development, see Chapter v, below.
179 There is also a considerable difference between the orginal Spanish title Cristologa desde Amrica latina and its English version: Christology at the Crossroads, which Macquarrie has correctly pointed out, Macquarrie 1990, 316:
The Spanish original edition bore the very sober and descriptive title Cristologa desde Amrica latina, but the English version has the more dramatic
title []

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(3) In the prevailing situation of pluralism, I find this two-step,

or rather two-dimensional method (historical-theological [re-]
reading) particularly relevant. In Chapter i raised the critical concern of whether the committed and practical character of Sobrinos
methodology made it become a closed circle, which in fact would
be irrelevant for anybody who does not uncritically accept its presupposi-tions.180 On the basis of what we have seen so far, this
concern can be discarded. In my view, this method answers both to
the requirements of honesty about ones own presuppositions and
openness for dialogue and mutual criticism vis--vis other interpretations and points of view. On such a basis, a Jesus-based ecumenism is possible, Sobrino rightly believes. 181 Although its point
of departure is clearly one of commitment and faith, this method
does not automatically lead to fideism. Nor should it be considered
a closed discourse from the outset. However, the interpretive move
that is implied in it, which does require a moment of critical distance even in the middle of the seguimiento, should be spelled out
clearer. I shall come back to this point in the next chapter. When
this moment of critical distance is preserved, then this method
opens up the possibility of a common quest for truth and justice,
mindful of the variety of perspectives and plurality of interpretations.182
(4) Finally, it becomes particularly clear here to what extent
Sobrinos christology is trinitarian. The distinction between Father
and Son is crucial in this respect. Jesus is Son, not Father. He is
understood as Way he is the expression of how one corresponds
to the mystery of God in history. By raising Jesus from the dead,
God-Father confirms the essential and unique relation between the
reality of God and the reality of this particular human life and
180 See Chapter i [4], above.
181 Sobrino 1994c, 158. / Sobrino 1991d, 271.
182 See Chapter viii [4], thesis 13.3.

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death. This constitutive relation confirmed in the resurrection and

effective in history through the presence of the Holy Spirit is thus
the theological basis for the confession of Jesus as the Son of God,
Sobrino holds:
Jesus is the eternal Son of the Father because through his Spirit he is continually capable of raising up followers, by shaping other human beings in his
image.183

The centrality of following in Sobrinos christology makes it clearly

trinitarian, not only with regard to its content, but even as a fundamental, structuring and methodological feature.

[10] Conclusions
What is the good news of Jesus? How does Jesus bring salvation
through his life, according to Sobrino?
Firstly, Jesus brings salvation by being mediator of the Kingdom
of God. Jesus initiates and proclaims the coming of the Kingdom in
the midst of a human history of sin and suffering. The Kingdom
brings multiple salvations, according to the different needs of
human beings. Jesus saves people around him through his merciful
183 Sobrino 1976, xviii-xix, my translation. [] Jess es el Hijo eterno del
Padre porque a travs de su Espiritu es capaz de seguir engendrando seguidores suyos, configurando a otros hombres a su imagen. The English translation in Sobrino 1978a, xxv-xxvi seems to me somewhat more moderate
than the Spanish original: We also provide the most radical and thorough
verification of the truth of Christology: i.e., that Jesus is the eternal Son of
the Father. For we thereby show that through his Spirit he is continually
capable of raising up followers and shaping other human beings in his
image.

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and helpful attitudes and actions towards them. He reacts in mercy

when faced with the concrete needs of persons and groups of people
that he meets. This responding to the concrete needs of the miserable, the outcasts and the sinners is at the same time a corresponding
to the coming of the Kingdom. It thus brings salvation in history.
Remembering that Sobrino defines the Kingdom as just life
for the poor always open to a more, it comes clear that the fundamental gift of salvation is life, understood as the basic essentials of
life, always open to a more, a life in abundance in the biblical
sense.
But this positive, joyful announcing and acting upon the coming of the Kingdom is also accompanied by a negative and conflictive side, which consists in a denouncing and reacting against
everything in history that opposes the coming of the Kingdom: sin,
the anti-Kingdom, the idols of death. I shall soon treat this important negative side of the issue in more detail; at this point I simply
note that this is also sub specie contrarii a part of the salvific function
of Jesus life.
Secondly, Jesus saves by being son of God. Jesus becomes an
authentic human being in the presence of a God-Father, to whom
he responds in love, hope and disponibilidad (readiness) in one
word faith. In this manner Jesus walks with God and to God, and
this finally makes possible the confession of him as participating in
the being of God, by living his creatureliness in fullness, i.e. by
being fully human. Jesus thus reveals what it is to be truly human,
and who the true God is, and how one corresponds in history to the
reality of this true God. This revelation is salvific.
Thirdly, this means that Jesus saves by being the Way:
Through his life and mission, Jesus shows how and where all
human beings can respond and correspond to the reality of God in
history, and hence become an authentic human being (humanisa-

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tion) by participating in Gods life (divinisation or deiformacin)

i.e. receiving salvation.
Let me finally return to my point of departure and rationale for
undertaking this detailed analysis of the account Sobrino gives of
Jesus life and its salvific effects. My motivation for doing so was to
find out how Sobrino can defend his thesis that the crucified people
or the crucified in history bring salvation in history. This would
have to have something to do with the constitutive relationship that
according to Sobrino exists between the crucified Jesus and the crucified people. Therefore, a definition of how and why Jesus brings
salvation in history was required.
I have not yet arrived at an analysis of the salvific effects of
Jesus death. But as argued earlier, the death of Jesus must be seen in
close relationship with his life, particularly as this comes to expression through relations and praxis. Furthermore, it is not merely
through his death that Jesus saves, according to Sobrino, but
through the totality of his life-death (and resurrection). Therefore,
having now set out how Sobrino portrays the salvific aspects of
Jesus life, it would follow that he sees the crucified in history as
(potentially) salvific in similar manners. This would have to mean
that insofar as the lives of the crucified people contain some of the
same main features of the life of Jesus features which, furthermore, lead towards the incomprehensible darkness of suffering and
death (crucifixion) these lives too bring salvation to history.
More concretely, if we follow the thrust of Sobrinos argument,
the crucified people can be seen as salvific to the extent that, firstly,
they function as mediators of the Kingdom. Jesus is the Mediator of
the Kingdom, but he calls for other mediators, to continue his
salvific work through history. These other mediators may be individuals or groups, communities, peoples. The crucified people are
mediators of the Kingdom as they correspond to the good news of
the Kingdoms nearness in hope, in struggle for liberation and jus-

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tice, and in concrete acts of love. They are mediators of the Kingdom when they provide a critical light that unmasks the injustices
of this world. They are mediators of the Kingdom when they do not
take revenge, but rather offer forgiveness and possibilities of conversion and reconciliation. They bring salvation to history as they celebrate the gift of life always open to a more, in the very presence of
circumstances and forces that threaten this life.
Secondly, the crucified people bring salvation to history in their
status as sons and daughters of God. As Jesus, in his responding and
corresponding to the nearness of the Kingdom, becomes the Son of
God true human being and true God in his relation to Godthe-Father, the crucified people through him enter into the same
relation. God calls all persons to this relationship as a child of God,
this filiation, which is simultaneously a process of humanisation
and deification. This process is salvific; and since salvation is a quality to be shared, it brings salvation to human history at large. In
their similarity with the destiny of the One whom Christians confess to be the ultimate revelation of that filiation, the crucified people can be recognised as offering this salvation in history.
This corresponds to a third perspective, namely that the crucified people bring salvation to history by being way. As Jesus is the
way to correspond to the Kingdom of God and the God of the
Kingdom in history, the crucified people in their likeness with
Jesus reveal a way through history. It is, in Sobrinos view, a way of
liberation, a way of authentic humanisation, a way of participating
in the love and life of God; hence, a way of salvation.
As the pattern and specific content of Sobrinos thought get
clearer, the critical questions return with new force: What is actually
implied in this interpretation? Is it not a somewhat idealised vision
of the destiny of suffering people today? Does it not make salvation
too much of a human effort? And, is it really admissible on Chris-

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tian terms to draw such a close comparison between Jesus and his
followers and even victims in general?
In other words, these views regarding the salvific function of the
crucified people seen in the light of Jesus life pose questions regarding the clarity and validity of the concept. One such question is
related to the observation that these characteristics (mediators,
sons and daughters, way) still seem to suppose the active and
conscious commitment of the crucified people. The theology of the
crucified people is closely related to ecclesiology, we note again, particularly with reference to the church of the poor, the Church Base
Communities (CEBs). But at the same time, Sobrino also wishes to
speak of crucified people in a wider sense, including innocent victims of history with or without awareness of an analogous relationship to Jesus. Perhaps the influence of Rahner here comes to the
fore through an implicit idea of anonymous mediators, sons and
daughters, followers. Is there an anonymous crucified people?184
Another question that arises regards the relationship between
the crucified people as receivers and mediators of salvation. Are they
themselves saved by bringing salvation to the world? How can they
be understood as saved recalling that salvation according to
Sobrino must show itself in history if salvation is life in fullness,
and this life is precisely what they as crucified are being
deprived of?

184 Sobrino 1991d, 448, n. 29: Este sera el lugar para mensionar a los mrtires
annimos. Segn la lgica de los cristianos annimos, y pensamos que su
tratamiento es necesario en la actualidad. Por decirlo grficamente, en vida
los seres humanos tenemos nombres y apellidos. Con la muerte, perdemos
los apellidos (cristianos, budistas, musulmanes, hindes, agnsticos, ateos
[]), pero con la muerte por amor recobramos para siempre el nombre de
humano que Dios nos ha puesto a todos.

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One should recall here that for Sobrino, it is fundamental to

underscore that the crucified people bring salvation to history by
being related to and authorised by Jesus. The constitutive relationality is the ultimate decisive reality. But is this relationship really
reciprocal in such a manner that what can be said of Jesus, can also
be said of the crucified in history?
To anticipate my evaluation for a moment, I would say that
Ellacuras and Sobrinos emphasis on the similarity between Jesus
and suffering people of today is of considerable significance for a
contemporary theology. The novelty and richness of their perspective should be appreciated. It represents a victimological turn in
theology which is firmly rooted in the Christian witness, while at
the same time responding to urgent needs of our time. Nonetheless,
there is still a need to maintain a difference or a distance between the
crucified and the Crucified, and to clarify the character of this difference. There is an otherness in Jesus as well as in the crucified
people that any theologian should respect. Only by paying due
attention to both similarities and divergences can a sound theology
of the crucified people be worked out. As noted above, Sobrinos
application of analogy in this connection does open up for both
resemblance and difference. But does he draw the line between
them with sufficient care?
A more thorough discussion of these interpretations and
judgements will be found in Chapter viii. Now I shall return to
Sobrinos re-reading of the history of Jesus.

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v. The Crucifying Conflict

A Struggle Between the God of Life and
the Idols of Death

En la historia existe el verdadero Dios (de vida), su mediacin (el reino) y su

mediador (Jess), y existen los dolos (de muerte), su mediacin (el antirreino) y
sus mediadores (los opresores).1

In some sense, the very root of the soteriological problem in all

Christian thinking can be summarised in the following question: If
God created the world good, why is salvation at all necessary? This
question comes in many versions, as do the answers. In Sobrinos
theology this question is framed in contemporary, historical terms.
If God is the God of history, the God of the poor and oppressed,
why is there still so much oppression, poverty, and premature
death? If God is the God of all reality, why does this reality appear
to be crucified? This, in Sobrinos view, is the quandary which sets
off theological reflection in Latin America.2 And when one reflects
on the history of Jesus, this question reappears as the enigma of why
Jesus the mediator of the Kingdom, the son of God, the messiahliberator is facing resistance, rejection and finally execution.
Thus this chapter will reach an inner core of Sobrinos theology
of the crucified people. When the questions are posed why salvation
(and thereby why Christian reflection and practice at all) is
required, why Jesus died, and why the people is oppressed and suffering, then Sobrino responds by claiming that reality, history and
human existence are all subject to a struggle of gods. I shall follow
1
2

Sobrino 1991d, 278.

Sobrino 1986, 37-44.

287

his reasoning in these ultimate matters by first considering Sobrinos

rendition of Jesus anti-idolatrous praxis, a praxis which leads to a
progressive aggravation of the conflict between Jesus and his opponents. We shall see how the theme of the struggle of gods moves
into the very centre of the interpretation, and leads Sobrino,
together with other Latin American theologians, to a critique of
what they see as European theologys virtual negligence of this fundamental biblical theme. In the eyes of the liberation theologians
the antithesis of faith is not primarily atheism, but idolatry.
Since this is such a fundamental and foundational feature in
Sobrinos theology, I shall subsequently discuss it critically in the
light of some of the main observations that I have made during my
inquiry so far. Having identified some crucial questions regarding
reality, history, and language, I shall then draw on the contributions
of Paul Ricoeur and Jos Severino Croatto in these areas. Their proposals will aid my analysis of the theological significance Sobrino
accords to the present reality of suffering.

[1] God is at Stake: Jesus Anti-Idolatrous Praxis

At this point of his interpretation of the history of Jesus, Sobrino
deems it useful to distinguish between practice, which he sees as a
broad sweep of activities in general, and praxis, which he defines
as a group of activities that has as its correlative society as such and
as its purpose the transformation of society as such.3 Yet this should
not necessarily be taken to include all the aspects of the common
(Marxist) use of the praxis-term, as for instance the role of ideology
and of an organised people as privileged subject in this process of
3

288

Sobrino 1994c, 161./ Sobrino 1991d, 276. Cf. Sobrino 1982a, 115-149.

transformation. It is sufficient to underscore its relationship to society as a whole and to the goal of transformation of this society as a
whole.
Jesus does have such a praxis, according to Sobrino. He does
relate to society as a totality with the goal of transforming it. However, Jesus only weapon in this praxis is the word. Therefore it is a
prophetic praxis, which basically consists in controversies,
unmaskings and denunciations.
(1) In the controversies as recounted in the gospels, Jesus engages in
discussions and bitter quarrels with particular persons and groups of
people, who are gradually depicted as Jesus opponents and adversaries. Jesus is questioned and criticised, and has to defend himself.
But it seems also that he deliberately provokes and engages in these
controversies with a particular purpose. In order to uncover this
basic cause and purpose Sobrino examines several of the controversies, especially as they are described in Mark: 1) the healing and forgiving of the paralytic in 2:1,12; 2) eating with sinners in 2: 15-17; 3)
the question of fasting in 2:18-22, 4) plucking grain on the sabbath
in 2:23-28 and 5) curing the man with a withered hand in 3:1-6. Furthermore, he undertakes an analysis of the controversy over the
greatest commandment (Mark 12:28-31; Luke 10:25ff; Matthew
22:34-40).
The main reason for the controversies, Sobrino concludes, is
God. God is the reality which is in question. But the basic question
is not whether God exists or not primarily a Western post-Enlightenment dilemma, it seems but who this God is, who the true God
really is and how this reality of God is adequately corresponded to.
Jesus purpose in engaging in these controversies seems to be primarily a defence. Jesus defends his vision of God as the true God of
life. This is necessary because God and Gods Kingdom are challenged.

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The history and reality in which Jesus realizes his prophetic

praxis, is a battleground. Just as Jesus himself, mediator of the Kingdom, is opposed by persons and groups who by opposing and
finally eliminating the mediator of the Kingdom act as mediators of
another Kingdom, the anti-Kingdom so also the true God of
Jesus is opposed by other divinities: the idols of death.4 The true
God has to be defended against the false divinities and their mediators, who seek to take Gods place.
So the controversies are interpreted as dealing with the correct
relationship with the true God. What is characteristic for Jesus
position regarding this relationship in the controversies, Sobrino
concludes, is that the correct vertical relationship is seen in close
connection with the horizontal relationship between human
beings. This comes out most clearly in the controversy about the
greatest commandment. Sobrino favours as the most historically
probable account of this controversy a reconstruction of the version
in Mark made by M.-E. Boismard. According to Boismards reconstruction, Jesus replies: It is: you shall love your neighbour as yourself; there is no greater commandment than this. As we can see,
love for God is not even mentioned here, because it is implicitly
understood in ones love for ones neighbour. What Jesus underscores, then, is that love for God cannot be separated from love for
ones neighbour an interpretation Sobrino probably would
defend, even if Boismards reconstruction of the text in Mark
should turn out to be inaccurate.
But in what sense does this relate to society as such? If the central issue of the controversies is the correct relationship with the
true God and this relationship is seen as expressed in and through
the horizontal relationships between human beings, then obviously
this issue affects the over-all structuring of such relationships in
society:
4

290

Sobrino 1994c, 160ff./ Sobrino 1991d, 275ff.

Jesus does not draw this picture for purely theoretical reasons, but for its
practical consequences: according to the particular God they accept, so
human beings behave, and so they structure society into the form of the
Kingdom or anti-Kingdom. 5

This frequent use of the term anti-Kingdom in Sobrino merits a

comment. It is somewhat curious that this term, which does not
occur in the New Testament, is given such a central position in
Sobrinos argument. If we look to, e.g., Matthew 12:26 or Luke
11:18, we find the term Satans Kingdom as the contrasting alternative to Gods Kingdom. Why does Sobrino avoid using this term,
and prefer anti-Kingdom? Correspondingly, we find little mention of Satan as Gods enemy in Sobrinos texts.6 He rather refers to
the idols (of death).
I suspect that Sobrino avoids speaking directly of Satan and
Satans Kingdom because he insists on the struggle of gods as a historical reality. The naming of Satan as Gods enemy in persona may
be seen as having too obviously mythological and even superstitious connotations in order to be able to open up such an understanding. If this is the case, then Sobrinos choice of wording may
indicate a problem which I shall address below, namely a fusion of
myth[olog]ical/theological language and historical explanation that
is not properly accounted for.
Now, what is at stake in the controversies the question of how
to correspond in history to the true God is in principle also the
essence of the other two forms of prophetic praxis in which Jesus
5

Sobrino 1994c, 167. / Sobrino 1991d, 287: Y esta ilustracin no la hace Jess
por razones puramente tericas, sino por sus consecuencias prcticas: segn
se acepte a un determinado Dios, as se comportan los seres humanos, y as
configuran la sociedad en forma de reino o de antirreino.
Cf., however, Sobrino 1991d, 167, where Sobrino defines Satan as [] la
fuerza negativa de la creacin, que la destruye y la hace capaz de destruir, la
cual se expresar histrica y socialmente como antirreino.

291

engages, according to Sobrino: namely, unmasking and denunciation.

(2) By his unmaskings (desenmascaramientos) Jesus exposes the fact
that the reality of God is distorted and manipulated by human
beings through their presentation of false visions of God. These
false visions are often presented in order to defend particular
(power-)interests and to justify various oppressive practices. That is
why they are not just false theories about God, but theories that
bear directly upon the structure of inter-human relationships and
society. What Jesus does, is to lay open the ignorance and lies about
God that sustain oppressive practices in his society.
Against this background, it becomes obvious that the misuse of
religion is a particularly grave problem. Hence, Jesus is often seen in
conflict with the religious professionals, such as the Pharisees, the
priests, and the Sadducees. Their discussions deal with fundamental
theological interpretations, such as the question of how to gain
knowledge of and respond to the true will of God. And it is finally,
as we shall see, this conflict with the religious leaders and institutions as symbolised in Jesus cleansing of the Temple that
turns out to have deadly consequences for Jesus.
(3) The unmasking of false interpretations of God, and unmasking
of the way in which the true God has been replaced by false idols, is
complemented and further sharpened through Jesus direct denunciations. Here Jesus takes up the tradition of the Old Testament
prophets, uttering harsh words and anathemas against dominating
groups in society. First, Sobrino points to Jesus denunciations of
the rich (Luke 6:24; 12:34; Matt. 6;21; Mark 10:25; etc.).7
The way in which Jesus sees wealth in a dialectic and mutually
exclusive relationship with poverty, mirrors how the God of life and
the idols of death, and the Kingdom of God and the anti-Kingdom,

292

are absolutely incompatible. This is what is so unconditionally

expressed in Jesus saying: You cannot serve God and mammon
(Matt 6:24 and Luke 16:13). Jesus calls mammon which Sobrino
directly translates wealth8 a master (Matt 6: 24) and thus
shows its character of idol. It is something which radically opposes
God because note the relational definition it is built on injustice
and causes other people to be poor (impoverished). As poverty is
premature death, what wealth does in its dialectic relation to poverty is to produce victims: mortal victims. And this is ultimately the
functional definition of an idol, as Sobrino sees it: it produces
mortal victims.
The fundamental pattern is clear, then: the God of life opposes
the idols of death. The gift of God is life for the poor; the gifts of
the idols are human sacrifices and deaths.
Jesus denuciations are also directed against the scribes, Pharisees and the priests. These groups are attacked primarily for their
manipulation of the knowledge of God, which gives them great
symbolic-exemplary power in society. They possess intellectual and
7

The choice of beginning with these is somewhat arbitrary, Sobrino comments, underlining that he does not want to attribute to Jesus a view that
would see the economic sphere as determining everything else. The not
here is important, since it is by mistake omitted in the English translation
(Sobrino 1994c, 170; cf. Sobrino 1991d, 292). However, the strong denunciations of the rich and their wealth, which furthermore is seen concretely in its
relational character vis--vis poverty, fits well with Sobrinos basic interpretation of Gods salvific gift in the Kingdom as just life for the poor. Furthermore, by following Ellacura in his definition of poor and poverty,
making material poverty the irreplaceable condition for all poverty, Sobrino
himself does seem to hold such a view of social reality, giving primacy to the
sphere of economy in configuring society. Even if it might be said to be
arbitrary, it suits Sobrinos purpose very well to begin with Jesus denunciations of the rich.
Sobrino 1994c, 173. / Sobrino 1991d, 297. [] no pueden ustedes servir a
Dios y al dinero.

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ideological influence9 of great importance, according to Sobrino.

But they do not use this to correspond to the coming of the Kingdom to the poor; rather, they block the coming of the Kingdom
with their narrow self-interests. Thus they oppress the truth, instead
of teaching it, and they hinder people instead of helping them.
Doing this in the name of God, makes it again a matter of falsification of true divinity, which leads to idolatry. This is why the gospels recount so many harsh attacks made by Jesus upon these
supposedly pious persons and groups.
The attack by Jesus on the Temple in words (Mark 13:2; Matt
24:2; Luke 21:5-6) as well as in (symbolic) action (Mark 11:15-19;
Matt 21:12-17; Luke 19:45-48; John 2:14-16) is the culmination of
this conflict. Jesus is highly critical of the Temple and its implications: rites, sacrifices, the priesthood.10 Sobrino assumes that Jesus
attack had both historical and theologal reasons. The way the
temple cult functioned in Jerusalem and in the Jewish society had
concrete, oppressive consequences. That this also had to do with
economic and political power, not just religious-ideological power,
may be deduced from the concrete content of the symbolic cleansing; it relates to economics, business, profits.
But in the end, what is really at stake here, as in all of Jesus prophetic praxis, is defending the truth about how to correspond to the
reality of the true God and Gods approaching Kingdom. The basic
presupposition is that put simply Jesus holds it to be good for
human beings to know the true God, because in his eyes the true
God is good. And, what is good for human beings, is good for society in totality. When false gods take the place that truly belongs to
God, then human beings are de-humanised and society becomes
oppressive. Because the God of Jesus lets human being be human,
9 Sobrino 1994c, 174. / Sobrino 1991d, 299.
10 Sobrino 1994c, 178. / Sobrino 1991d, 304: Jess es sumamente crtico del
templo y de lo que conlleva: el culto, los sacrificios, el sacerdocio.

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an authentic faith in God is humanising. This is why controversies,

unmaskings and denunciations are necessary. Knowing and corresponding to the true God requires an active attitude of both affirming and negating; affirming the God of the Kingdom, negating the
idols of the anti-Kingdom.
Did Jesus not also denounce the (explicitly) political authorities?
Not so much, Sobrino holds, citing only a couple of instances, as in
Luke 13:32, where Jesus calls Herod a fox. This is not to say that
Jesus mission was not political. On the contrary, if one employs a
comprehensive definition of political, then the totality of this prophetical praxis of Jesus is profoundly political. It has to do with
transforming society.

[2] Idols and Victims: The Anti-Idolatrous Character and

Victimological Orientation of Sobrinos Theology
(1) It is worth emphasising the degree to which this perspective of
the struggle of the gods moves into the very centre of Sobrinos
christology. He insists that the most important challenge to theology, the radical opposition to faith against which it must argue, is
not lack of faith or atheism, but false faith: idolatry. This anti-idolatrous emphasis is a common trend in Latin American theology,
beginning with Juan Luis Segundo11, and presented in breadth in
the book entitled La lucha de los dioses.12 Although there are predecessors in recent European theology such as Moltmann, but also
G. Auln13 this has nevertheless become one of the major distin11 In this sense, his Nuestra idea de Dios from 1970 was groundbreaking. The
issue of idolatry was always central to Segundo, a Uruguayan Jesuit and one
of the founding fathers of liberation theology. Cf. Sobrino 1996.

295

guishing marks of Latin American liberation theology. Sobrino and

the other liberation theologians accuse their European colleagues14
of having forgotten or played down this fundamental perspective of
the Bible.15 And the absence of this perspective is particularly serious, they hold, because its omission may contribute to covering up
the oppressive, idolatrous mechanisms of the contemporary situation. By posing the question of God only according to the dichotomy faith-atheism, and not faith-idolatry, one may consciously or
unconsciously be playing into the hands of oppression.16
But what does Latin American theology actually mean by
idols? Commenting on and further developing an analysis made
by Archbishop Romero with the help of I. Ellacura on the matter,17 Sobrino points out the following five characteristics: (1) The
idols are not something of the past, nor merely something that
occurs in the religious sphere. Idols [] currently and really exist:
they are actual realities that shape society and determine the life and
death of the masses.18 (2) They are called idols in the strict sense
since they take on divine attributes, such as ultimacy, self-justification and untouchability. (3) The principal idol, which originates all
12 Richard 1980. This significant collective work of Latin American biblical
scholars, systematic theologians and social scientists includes Jon Sobrinos
article La aparicin del Dios de Vida en Jess de Nazareth (79-122), which
was later also published in Sobrino 1982a, 115-152. See also Araya 1983, 149167.
13 See Chapter vii, below.
14 Although one may ask whether European as the cultural-geographical designation really is the important point here.
15 Sobrino exemplifies this view with a critical reading of Walter Kasper: Der
Gott Jesu Christi (Mainz 1982), Sobrino 1991d, 338f.
16 Sobrino 1994c, 182. / Sobrino 1991d, 339: [] se est haciendo el juego a la
opresin []
17 Desenmascarar las idolatras de nuestra sociedad in Cardenal, MartnBar, and Sobrino 1996, 145-149, cf. Sobrino 1991d, 343-346, and Sobrino
1992a.

296

the others, is the economic configuration of society, which is

unjust, structural, lasting, with many other organs at its service:
military, political, juridical, intellectual and often religious, which
partake analogously of the being of the idol.19 (4) The idols
demand a cult as well as orthodoxy, for which they in turn promise
salvation to their followers. But instead of receiving salvation, these
worshippers of idols are dehumanised, de-Latin-Americanised and
de-fraternised. And finally, but decisively, (5) these idols produce
millions of innocent victims, who suffer the slow death of hunger or
the violent death of repression.
The reason why the real existence of idols and hence the
importance of the perspective of idolatry to a contemporary theology has been recovered in Latin America seems to Sobrino to be
threefold. Primarily, the process of secularisation is not (yet?) as
advanced as in Europe. The question of God is therefore not posed
in terms of existence or not, but in terms of content: Who is God?
How is God? Where is God at work today, in this historical
moment, during these times of conflicts and crises? This makes a
reading from a Latin American context particularly attentive to the
biblical texts in these matters, because in these texts the existence of
God is also a fundamental presupposition. Again, Sobrino argues
on the basis of what Boff called isomorfismo estructural between the
original biblical context(s) and the context of interpretation today
18 Sobrino 1994c, 185-186. / Sobrino 1991d, 345: [] los dolos no son cosa del
pasado ni de realidades que slo aparecen en el mbito religioso, sino que en
verdad existen: son realidades histricas que configuran la sociedad y determinan la vida y la muerte de las mayoras populares.
19 Sobrino 1994c, 186. / Sobrino 1991d, 345: [] el dolo por antonomasia,
originante de todos los dems, es la configuracin econmica de la sociedad,
injusta, estructural, duradera, al servicio de la cual estn otras muchas realidades: el poder militar, el poltico, el cultural, el judicial, el intelectual y,
tambin con frecuencia, el religioso, los cuales participan analgamente en la
realidad del dolo.

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a similarity in situation which gives Latin America a hermeneutical

advantage, so to speak, in recapturing fundamental biblical concerns.20
Secondly, this perspective becomes particularly relevant in Latin
America because it gives absolute priority to the question of life and
death, rather than, e.g., to the question of the meaning of (personal) existence, Sobrino maintains. When God is believed and
experienced as the giver of life, then the issue of where so much premature and violent death actually comes from and why becomes
a fundamental concern. The experience of the struggle of forces of
life against forces of death is the historical and phenomenological
basis for posing the question of God in terms of faith-idolatry.
When idols of death are described as forces that produce victims,
require sacrifices, in history, then it should come as no surprise that
these idols are more easily discovered from the standpoint of a
world of victims, the world of the poor.
Thirdly, the concept of idolatry makes the question of praxis
crucial. With reference to Segundo, Sobrino reminds us that idolatry is by its nature a praxic concept.21 Since its very beginnings,
Latin American liberation theology has preferred orthopraxis to
orthodoxy. As I have shown in Chapter i, Sobrino shares in this
accentuation. And the concepts of ortho-praxis and of faith as
being anti-idolatrous illuminate and strengthen each other mutually. It is necessary to act against idols in order to serve God, and
serving God in truth is something that cannot be done through
20 Sobrino 1991d, 336: A esta forma de plantear la cuestin de Dios (i.e. the
question of atheism, my comment SJS), Jess no ofrece una especial iluminacin, pues tanto para l como para su auditorio la existencian de Dios no
estaba en cuestin, y, por supuesto, para Jess es evidente que Dios humaniza al hombre. En general, lo mismo ocurre todava hoy entre las grandes
mayoras de Amrica Latina [] .
21 Sobrino 1994c, 181. / Sobrino 1991d, 337.

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words alone, but requires a total life-commitment realised in praxis

(Matt 7:21). The relationship between an anti-idolatrous faith and
an orthopraxic faith is in Sobrinos outline intimately bound up
with the reality of victims: What we have to do is exactly the opposite of what idols do; if they beget victims, we must defend these,
do justice in Jeremiahs words. 22
(2) In my opinion, here we approach bedrock, the fundamental
concern and nerve-centre in Sobrinos christology. He frames all his
theology in what I propose to call a victimological perspective. As just
pointed out, it is from this perspective that the significance of the
battle between the God of life and the idols of death emerges.
Before continuing my analysis of this crucifying conflict, I shall
therefore draw particular attention to this characterisation. What
do I mean by victimological in this connection, and why is
Sobrinos theology accurately characterised thus?23
22 Sobrino 1994c, 190. / Sobrino 1991d, 352: Lo que hay que hacer es estrictamente lo contrario de lo que hacen los dolos: si stos generan vctimas, lo
que hay que hacer es defenderlas, practicar la justicia en el lenguaje de
Jeremas.
23 This ultimacy for the whole theological enterprise that Sobrino accords to
liberating praxis with and for the victims of this world, can be seen clearly in
the following key statement: Ortopraxis es, pues, responder a Dios, correspondiendo a su realidad. Y eso es, en definitiva, lo que Dios quiere. La
ltima fundamentacin de la ortopraxis es sumamente sencilla: es bueno que
Dios sea un Dios para las vctimas, y es bueno que as sean los hombres (sic).
Y parece que no se puede ir ms all de esta argumentacin. Sobrino 1991d,
352 (The English translation of this paragraph in Sobrino 1994c, 190 is not
satisfactory, in my judgement. I would propose the following translation:
Orthopraxis is, then, response to God, corresponding to Gods reality. The
basic foundation of orthopraxis is extremely simple: it is good that God
should be a God for the victims of this world, as it is good that we too
should be serving them. There seems to be no way of going beyond this reasoning.)

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The word victim has gained an increasing importance in

Sobrinos writings.24 To some extent, it seems to be replacing the
term poor. This may be a result of the heightened awareness of the
variety of oppressive relations and situations, which would render
the term poor at least the way it is commonly understood too
one-dimensional. Or this replacement may simply be seen as a
result of a certain exhaustion of the term poor and its potential in
liberation theology. Whatever the reason, this shift in terminology
is noteworthy.25
Yet, in spite of its centrality, Sobrino has not given any clear
definition of victim, nor has he discussed its implications. Since it
is a word originating in the institution of sacrifice the Latin victima means offering, sacrifice, sacrificial animal which in our
time has taken on an entirely secular meaning referring to a person struck by a tragedy or catastrophe, or offended by an act of
crime the possible connotations and interpretations of this term
within the framework of christology and soteriology are diverse and
even conflicting. A thorough analysis of it would therefore certainly
be needed in Sobrinos theology.
24 See e.g., Sobrino 1991d, 440ff (compare pp. 64ff.); Sobrino 1992b, 254-256;
Sobrino 1994d, 53-57; Sobrino 1995a.
25 In an article on the status and future of liberation theology, Hugo Assmann
interrelates opcin preferencial por los pobres, the Victim Jesus and
oppressed victims: Tenemos que reaprender, a cada paso, a convivir con las
implicaciones de la contigencia humana en el plano socio histrico. Rechazar
los dolos que exigen vctimas y renunciar los sacrificialismos, y, al mismo
tiempo, discernir los dioses mezclados, soportar la dursima realidad de no
poder eliminar, de una vez, las sacrificialidades idoltricas que crucifican el
don de s cmo vivir y operativizar todo eso en la prctica? Pienso que es
precisamente por eso que la opcin preferencial por los pobres se impone
como la referencia iluminadora, sin la cual no hay fidelidad serena posible.
Es el humilde aprendizaje de la escucha del clamor de la Vctima-Jess, y de
las vctimas oprimidas, el que puede mantenernos en un esperanzado estado
de metnoia. Assmann 1995, 110.

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The term victimology was coined in 1949 by an American psychiatrist, Frederick Wertham26. It gradually became a common designation for a specific area of study within criminology, namely the
study of criminal-victim relationships.27
When I submit that Sobrinos theology as liberation theology
in general opts for a victimological perspective or has a victimological orientation, I refer to his claim that the fundamental
theological questions questions of God, of Jesus, of salvation and
liberation can existentially best and most appropriately be posed
from the perspective of the victims. Furthermore, as should be clear
by now, their posture is not just one of perspective, but also one of
commitment: they hold that these questions therefore must be
posed here; face to face with victims, sharing in their sufferings and
hopes, already in active service for them and together with them in
order to remove the causes of suffering and bondage, or in the
words of liberation theologians: in the struggle for historical liberation. This praxis-orientation, which rather than a merely detached
study of victims presupposes and fosters commitment and active
intervention, seems to concur with the understanding of victimology which i.a. Emilio C. Viano advocates: [] the common
denominator of victimological work is crisis intervention and the
short- and long-term remedies that should be made available to victims.28

26 Wertham used it for the first time in his book The Show of Violence : The
murder victim is the forgotten man (sic). With sensational discussions on the
abnormal psychology of the murderer, we have failed to emphasize the
unprotectedness of the victim and the complaceny (sic) of the authorities.
One cannot understand the psychology of the murderer if one does not
understand the sociology of the victim. What we need is the science of victimology. Quoted from Fattah, Ezzat A.: Victims and Victimology. The
Facts and the Rhetoric in Fattah 1992, 31.
27 See Schafer 1977, 1.

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Such a practical and committed understanding of victimology

is not uncontroversial among victimologists, though. Ezzat A. Fattah, professor of criminology at the Simon Fraser University in British Columbia, Burnaby, opposes firmly what he sees as
[] (t)he ideological transformation of victimology from the study of the
victim into the art of helping victims, the over-identification with crime victims, and the missionary zeal with which the interests of those victims are
defended and pursued []29

Besides a rather conventional and highly disputable claim that such

transformation necessarily is jeopardizing the quality of scholarship 30, Fattah gives three arguments for his opposition to this
development and his call for a critical victimology, which are noteworthy also in connection with my proposal to apply the term victimological to liberation theology.
Firstly, Fattah sees in the diligent quest for victims rights a
manifest or latent willingness to sacrifice the rights of offenders. A
false contest is created between the rights of both groups.31 Secondly, he points to how easily the sympathy for crime victims is
turned into a cry for vengeance, thus leading to a more punitive
criminal justice policy, for instance. The strong right-wing bend of
much of the rhetoric and politics of victims rights in the United
States during the last decade proves this point, in Fattahs view. This
also shows the potential danger of manipulation related to any rhetorical claim of being on the side of the victims: who could be antivictim?32 Such manipulative rhetoric often exploits and consoli28 Introduction Victimology: A New Focus of Research and Practice in
Viano 1990, xiii.
29 Fattah, Ezzat A.: The Need for a Critical Victimology. in Fattah 1992, 12.
30 Ibid.
31 Fattah 1992, 13.
32 Op. cit., 5

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dates general stereotypes of sympathetic, blameless victims vs. monstrous, evil offenders that are both untrue and damaging, to both
groups. Media portrayals, turning victims into saints33, contribute
strongly to the maintenance of these stereotypes, while as a matter
of fact, research shows that these groups tend to have a lot in common. 34
This is not the place to discuss whether a committed, praxisoriented victimology really is incompatible with a truly critical victimology. But Fattahs arguments are important reminders also for a
theology which seeks to adopt the perspective of victims and promote their cause. Might a theology of the crucified people
become negligent of or even antagonistic towards the reality and
after all humanity of crucifiers, and thus miss what many hold to
be one of the major treasures of the gospel the forgiveness of sins?
Does such a theology portray the victims as saints and the offenders
as demons, and thus contribute to false stereotypes? Does it make
use of a manipulative rhetoric? Any theology with a victimological
orientation should be critically aware of these dangers. Even theology may end up re-victimising the victim.35
Victim and victimological are not unproblematic terms
then. Some of those who earlier defined themselves as victims prefer
now to present themselves as survivors, also in the Central American context.36 In Chapter iv, we were also reminded of a certain
uneasiness with this terminology among feminist theologians.37
Yet, it would be an even greater problem if the ambiguities of
the terminology victim and its possible manipulation were to
allow covering up the reality to which it refers. There is reason to be
33 Fattah refers to Ellis Coses article Turning Victims into Saints in Time
Magazine, Jan. 22, 1990.
34 Fattah speaks of striking similarities between the victim and offender populations. See Victims and Victimology: Facts and Rhetoric in op. cit., 33-41.
35 See: Viano 1990, xiii.

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concerned that a fear of applying such language could lead to the

convenient and complacent silencing of the reality of so many victims, and their just demands.
When I am applying the term victimological here, then, it is
with a clear awareness of these ambiguities and critical perspectives.
In fact, through this characterisation, I have been able to bring out
weighty critical questions for my further analysis of Sobrino.

[3] A Theologal-Idolatrous Structure of Reality

The ultimate reason or explanation of the soteriological problem
seems, to Sobrino, to depend upon a duellic (combative) vision of
reality, which he defines as the theologal-idolatrous structure of
reality la estructura teologal-idoltrica de la realidad.38 Basically,
this is a view of reality which claims that at the fundamental level,
reality is subject to an ongoing struggle of antagonistic forces.

36 The well-known leader of the Guatemalan Human Rights organisation

GAM Nineth Montenegro, later a Member of Parliament, underlined this in
a meeting in Oslo, fourth of December 1996: We dont speak of ourselves as
victims anymore. We are the survivors of this war. The point in this shift in
terminology, as far as I can understand, is to emphasise the active role of
these persons themselves; that they are in charge in spite of what has been
done against them. It is thus a way of escaping the objectifying and passive
overtones of victim. While maintaining the term victim I shall take this
crucial point into account, both when speaking of the Crucified One and
the crucified ones. I shall speak of Jesus as victorious victim. I shall also draw
attention to the question about the crucifiers. See below, Chapters VI [7],
and VIII [4] thesis 9.
37 See Chapter iv [7].
38 Sobrino 1991d, 277-278. Sobrino 1994c, 161-162.

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Here, however, I want to concentrate on examining the theologal-idolatrous

structure of reality, an aspect that is no less historical and effective. History
contains the true God (of life), Gods mediation (the Kingdom) and its
mediator (Jesus) as well as the idols (of death), their mediation (the antiKingdom) and mediators (oppressors). The two types of reality are not only
distinct, but present themselves to our eyes in an agonic disjunction. Thus
they are mutually exclusive, not complementary, and work against each
other.39

The struggle which goes on at the most profound level of reality,

then, is a struggle between the God of life and the idols of death,
according to Sobrino. This must be taken to mean that this struggle
structures all reality and all human history, and that the present
state of affairs derives from this structure of reality. It provides,
then, the framework for answering the basic soteriological problem.
It may be called the root of the soteriological problem in Sobrinos
christology. But is it also the root of the problem of Sobrinos
christology? At least, there are some basic difficulties here.
(1) Faced with the reality of unjust suffering in Latin America, it is
easy to see why some sort of dis-harmonious, conflictual view of
reality is favoured. This reality, experienced from the viewpoint of a
living and resisting faith, is the reason why Sobrino, together with
many of his Latin American colleagues, chooses to frame the question of God in terms of faith-idolatry rather than faith-atheism. But
where does this idea of a theologal-idolatrous structure of reality
39 My translation, SJS. Cf. Sobrino 1994c, 162. Spanish wording: Aqu, sin
embargo, nos concentramos en al anlisis de la estructura teologal-idoltrica
de la realidad, no por ello menos histrica y efectiva. En la historia existe el
verdadero Dios (de vida), su mediacin (el reino) y su mediador (Jess), y
existen los dolos (de muerte), su mediacin (el antirreino) y sus mediadores
(los opresores). Las realidades de ambos tipos no son slo distintas, sino que
aparecen formalmente en disyuntiva dulica. Son, por lo tanto, excluyentes,
no complementarias, y una hace contra la otra. Sobrino 1991d, 278.

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come from? It is certainly a wide-ranging contention. Saying that

reality is thus structured, and not otherwise, is surely something
which should require a thorough argument.
Naturally, Sobrino does rely on a basic biblical fundamentally
apocalyptic imagery. This is also the primary context of his argument here, namely an interpretation of the conflictual character of
the ministry and destiny of Jesus, as reflected in the biblical narratives and proclamations. Furthermore, such a world view, especially
focusing on the disjunctive alternative, has profound Jesuit roots40.
An Hegelian-Marxist dialectic view of the progress of history would
in many ways accord with this description of the structure of reality.41 The idea of a Kampf der Gtter also plays a significant role in
Max Webers sociology.42 Most of all, however, the concrete reality
of deadly oppression and open warfare even in the name of God
in Central America in the last decades would make such a conflictual approach understandable. After all, Sobrinos theology claims to
begin with historical reality from Latin America.
Nevertheless, there seems in the passage just quoted to be an
unwarranted fusion of the biblical, apocalyptical world view or view
of history, and a claim about the actual structure of reality in general. Again, we note in Sobrinos writing a rather general and undefined use of the terms history and reality, which creates
40 See Chapter i [3] above.
41 See Dussel 1993, 170-173, and 235-255. On Sobrino and Marxism, see Ratzinger 1990, 373f, responded by Ellacura in Ellacura 1984b, 168, 170.
42 Michael Lwy has recently made this a point of departure for an analysis of
the intimate relationship between religion, politics and social issues in Latin
America over the past thirty years; Lwy 1996, 2: The expression war of
gods is a reference to Webers well-known argument about the polytheism of
values and the unbridgeable conflict of ultimate beliefs (gods) in modern
society. For instance, in Science as Vocation (1919) Weber wrote: So long as
life remains immanent and is interpreted in its own terms, it knows only of
an unceasing struggle of these gods with one another [].

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difficulties in trying to reach clarity. What does it actually mean

when he states that the true God and the idols exist in history?43
In spite of the above-mentioned definitions or characteristics of
idol, Sobrino does not really explain. Rather, he presents this view
of reality as a given overall framework for interpreting reality.44 It
is in other words assigned an explanatory function, without itself
having been explained or at least carefully argued for. This structure of reality is what explains Jesus prophetic praxis []45
(2) This fundamental problem that it is given an explanatory
function without being explained itself is closely related to the
hermeneutical problem here. Observing that the terms used to
describe this theologal-idolatrous structure of reality are derived
from the biblical language God against idol, Kingdom
against anti-Kingdom, etc. one must ask what this language
may in fact mean today. Sobrino is of course aware of this problem,
mentioning as he does the issue of de-mythification.46 But he bypasses it too quickly, arguing that [] the primary task of enlightenment will therefore be, not to de-mythify, but to de-idolize
God.47
Sobrino and other liberation theologians have made a strong
case that the de-idolatrization of God is an urgent theological task.
But when one chooses to describe the structure of reality in lan43 This is a more direct translation of the Spanish: En la historia existe el verdadero Dios (de vida) [] Sobrino 1994c renders, as we have seen, History contains []
44 Sobrino 1994c, 161
45 Sobrino 1994c, 162. My italics, SJS. Esta estructura es lo que explica la
prxis proftica de Jess [] Sobrino 1991d, 278
46 For an early treatment of this issue by Sobrino, see Sobrino 1974, cf. Sobrino
1976, 207, n. 5.
47 [] la tarea primaria de la ilustracin no ser, por lo tanto desmitificacin,
sino la desidolatrizacin de Dios. Sobrino 1991d, 346ff.

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guage which is close to or outright myth[olog]ical, it is not sufficient in my view to justify this by a reference to the similarity of
historical circumstances, nor to the common use of biblical language in Latin-America today. A thorough hermeneutical method is
also needed.48
The problem can be illustrated by the term anti-Kingdom.
What does it in fact refer to in historical terms? Avoiding the direct
expression Satans Kingdom does not in fact take away the difficult task of historicising the concept, giving it concrete meaning in
contemporary terms, without falling into the pitfall of a direct,
quasi-referential understanding of myth[olog]ical language. There is
here the risk of a dangerous shortcut, which may lead to a direct
demonizing of concrete, historical, political, or theological opponents.49 A famous example of such manipulative use of mythological language for political purposes is President Reagans labelling of
the Soviet Union as the evil Empire.
It would be exaggerated to claim that Sobrino commits this
error. There is a great distance between his careful theological analysis and Reagans rhetoric (in the pejorative sense). I do, however,
question whether Sobrino secures his approach sufficiently against
such unintended negative implications, or whether, in fact, he
remains rather vulnerable at this point.
(3) That these questions are not just speculative exercises growing
out of a secularized European context, can be demonstrated by
making reference to one of the most urgent Latin American challenges to liberation theology today, viz. the rapid growth of popular
48 The translator makes a mistake when he translates Sobrinos title Jess y la
cuestin de Dios: desidolatrizacin de la divinidad (Sobrino 1991d, 346)
with Jesus and the Question of God: Demythifying Divinity (Sobrino
1994c, 186). It is tempting to interpret this error as an unconscious indication of this lack of reflection on the mythological language in Sobrino.

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Protestantism. This phenomenon is complex, and often too superficially and stereotypically analysed by liberation theologians. It
would therefore merit closer consideration.50 The point which I
49 Raymund Schwager, in an interesting commentary on this aspect in
Sobrinos theology delivered as a response in the disputation in Graz referred
to above, recalls the inherent dangers in seeing the devil at work in ones enemies and opponents: Mindestens der Teufelsglaube war in der Geschichte
des Abendlandes eine sehr reale historische Macht, denn in seinem Namen
wurden Hunderttausende, ja vielleicht sogar Millionen von Menschen
schuldlos hingerichtet. Der Teufel war allerdings in erster Linie nicht dort
wirksam, wo man ihn glaubte zu erkennen, nmlich in den Hexen, sondern
im System, das ihn bekmpfte und das mittels der Folter selber jene Beweise
schuf, auf die sich die Verurteilungen sttzen. Schwager 1992, 45. He also
finds the above-mentioned relationship between the historical powers of
oppression and the biblical statements about the devil, Satan, etc. unclear in
Sobrino. This unclarity may be overcome however, Schwager is convinced,
and he presents his own proposal of how this may be done (51, n.7). In brief,
Schwagers proposal sees [] das Satanische als die letze Eigengesetzlichkeit
einer ffentlichkeit [], die sich selber verschliesst, das Bse in ihr auf
andere projiziert und diese zu Opfern macht [] (52). By way of this definition, emerging from an analysis of the biblical material which Schwager
has presented in various writings, it is possible to give an answer to what the
biblical statements may mean in todays context: Dazu muss die Eigengesetzlichkeit jenes Systems nher betrachtet werden, das unsere Welt vorherrschend bestimmt. Sobrinos prime criterion for recognising the
presence of idols, is that they produce many victims. While deeming this an
important criterion, Schwager thinks it should be strengthened by two other
criteria: 1) Eine Eigengesetzlichkeit ist dann satanisch, wenn sie sich in sich
selber einschliesst, dies heisst, wenn sie keine Zukunft erffnet. 2) [] ein
System [kann] erst dann im eigentlichen Sinn als teuflisch bezeichnet werden, wenn es nicht bloss physische Opfer zur Folge hat, sondern auch die
Wrde und die Seelen der Menschen angreift (53). Finally, Schwager thinks
that such an understanding of the demonic also gives important clues to
how Satan must be fought: [] kollektive Projektionen werden nicht
durch Gegenprojektionen, sondern nur durch das langsame Erarbeiten einer
wahreren Sicht der Wirklichkeit berwunden (54).

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wish to make here is related to the often fundamentalistic and apocalyptic character of these movements. Their preaching is frequently
highly speculative, using a mythological language that is not translated, i.e. without hermeneutical awareness. While Church Base
Communities combat social problems with the help of biblical concepts through secularising these concepts, many Pentecostal movements do the opposite; they sacralise social problems.51 It therefore
becomes crucial to pay particular attention to the hermeneutical
problems related to the use of an apocalyptic/mythological language, especially when addressing a situation in which this language
may not cause estrangement in the first place, but rather feel familiar. Under such circumstances, it may become an even more dangerous instrument for manipulation.
Jon Sobrinos hermeneutical method is a hermeneutics of
praxis. This method has many advantages and is an important corrective to the often theoretical-abstract explicative rather than
transformative hermeneutical methods that have been favoured in
mainstream Western theology since the Enlightenment. Nevertheless, as I have pointed out at several stages now, there still seems to
be a shortcoming in Sobrinos hermeneutics, which relates to an
insufficient account of the interpretative steps taken in any theological enterprise, however rooted in praxis it may be. In a short comment, Sobrino says at one point that we should not look to Jesus
for an answer to our modern systematic questions.52 I take this to
mean that we should not approach the figure of Jesus as norm and
foundation for Christian theology without a careful hermeneutical
awareness. The question arises, however, if it is not so that Sobrino
at times comes close to doing exactly that.
50 Cf. my article: Stlsett 1995d.
51 See Cecilia Mariz interesting comparison: Mariz 1994, 78.
52 Sobrino 1994c, 177. / Sobrino 1991d,302: [] ni hay que esperar de Jess
una respuesta a nuestras preguntas sistemticas de hoy.

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[4] Crucial Questions: Reality, History, Language

I am now mid-way in this study. Although I shall continue along
the course set out in the beginning since important pieces of the
total picture are still lacking, I am nevertheless at a turning point in
my analysis. I have encountered some difficulties along the way. Let
me briefly review some of the principal ones.
In Chapter i, I considered the foundations on which Sobrino
relies when he attempts to do theology in a crucified reality. I
found that although it plays a central role, he does not dedicate any
thorough discussion to the meaning of the term reality in his
work. He uses the word frequently, often with almost pleonastic
determinations true reality, real reality, etc. which give it a
strong polemical edge. The centrality of the term makes the absence
of a clear definition, or at least of a discussion, all the more deeply
felt. However, we saw that (1) his concept of reality seems to be
influenced by the open realism of Zubiri and Ellacura, also
including primary concerns from Marxist philosophy, (2) he
describes the structure of reality in theological terms, recognisably
influenced by Rahners transcendental method and (3) he thinks
that there are privileged accesses to reality, which are primarily (a)
the experience of the negativity of reality (it is crucified), which
leads to the epistemological prerogative of the suffering, the poor
and oppressed, and (b) working on reality in order to transform it,
i.e., the epistemological priority of praxis.
My primary difficulty with this regards the possibility of adopting a critical distance, which would take due account of our conditioned and often distorted access to reality. Sobrino is correct to
insist that a careful attention to and committed attitude towards the
negative aspect of reality is necessary in order to reach an adequate
interpretation of it. The strong emphasis on the epistemological
character of practice, and the practical character of cognition, is

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fully legitimate, and liberation theologies in this aspect represent an

advance in theological method. However, this must not preclude
the possibility of an open and critical conversation among all interpreters regarding the adequacy of our proposed new descriptions of
reality. And it must not lead to a praxis-determinism, in which the
arduous task of interpretation is reduced to something which occurs
almost automatically, once one engages in a correct practice
(whereby the question for the room for critical evaluation reemerges, as we have seen!) I emphasise that I have not yet said that
this is the case with Sobrino; I have only pointed to tendencies
which expose themselves to a critique along these lines.
In Chapter ii, I followed the term the crucified people from
historical reality to theological concept, taking this procedure to
be in accordance with Sobrinos own recommendations about what
the primary task of the theological endeavour should be. Tracing its
development and possible meaning from Ellacuras historical soteriology to Sobrinos christology, I ended up with questions regarding
the status of a theological concept in Sobrinos work, which subsequently revealed a lack of an explicit reflection on the status of religious and theological language. How can reality be elevated to
theological concept? The burning issues of reality, reference and
rhetorics are vital to any theology, and not least to a theology of
martyrdom and liberation, a theology of the crucified people. Here
I noted that there is a need for further elaboration in Sobrinos
work.
In Chapter iii, I showed that Sobrino, in order to safeguard
christology from its possible manipulations and abuses which
have been so frequent during and in the aftermath of the conquest
of Latin America seeks to root his own attempt in history. The
historical Jesus becomes the key to a liberating Christology. He is
seen as the norma normans both for the formulation of a relevant
christology, and for the search for effective liberations from the

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oppressive structures and realities of contemporary society. However, scrutinising Sobrinos further argument regarding the historical Jesus, and the de facto use he makes of this term in his own
writings, I found that it has a distinct meaning in his work. Both
poles of the historical existence are taken into consideration from
the very beginning. What Sobrino looks for is not the Jesus of
Nazareth in himself (who of course, is out of reach) nor primarily
as he is seen by scientific historians, but rather the Jesus of Nazareth as seen from the vantage-point of believing and struggling
Christian communities in Latin America. The connection between
these two poles is seen primarily as a chain of remembrance realised
in practice following.
Although recognising this distinctness of the Latin American
historical Jesus and its comparative advantages to (although at the
same time dependence on) the so-called three quests for the historical Jesus, I joined other critics bound in asking whether (1) it really
is helpful to make use of the term the historical Jesus while
acknowledging important differences from what has commonly
been understood by it, and whether (2) this term really is consistently applied in Sobrino. It seemed that he tends to slide between
this openly contextualised and interested quest for the Jesus of history or history of Jesus -, and a more traditional historistic argument where historical is used to lend scientific legitimacy and
objectivity to the results obtained or rather, the interpretation
presented.
Now, in this chapter, midway in my analysis of Sobrinos rereading of the life and death of Jesus, I have come to a point where
all of these hitherto unanswered crucial questions return, with
renewed strength. I have found that the ultimate explanation in
Sobrinos christology, the root cause of the experience of suffering
and main motivation for a praxis of theological cognition and liberating practice, is that reality has a theologal-idolatrous structure.

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The gods are at war with God. This is why there is a yearning for
and an objective need for salvation in and through history. This is
why the Son of God meets resistance and rejection, and finally execution. This is why sons and daughters of God in the world today
become victims of oppression, injustice and seemingly endless suffering.
Thus, at the very foundations of Sobrinos christology and soteriology, and subsequently, his whole theological project, lies an
explanation of the structure of reality which is expressed in theological-myth[olog]ical language, but which at the same time Sobrino
claims to be historical. How can it be? Should this be seen as an
inconsistency? Or should it rather be considered a necessity, because
what we deal with are attempts at putting the unspeakable into
words, the inexpressible into logical reasoning?
These basic questions still need further elaboration in Sobrinos
works. In a sum, there seems to be something of a short-cut in
Sobrinos general outline; a short-cut from reality to theology, from
history to theology, and from praxis to theory, which may in the
end result in a too tight interconnection of the crucified and the
Crucified. While appreciating the need for and attempt at a unified
perspective, I hold that this must not and need not be achieved at
the expense of a conscious and critical awareness of the distinction
between and relative independence of each pole.
Therefore I shall now draw on some perspectives and contributions that throw fresh light on these issues, and which in my opinon
could serve to complement and advance Sobrinos outline. I shall
turn to the hermeneutical methodology prepared by the philosophical contributions of Paul Ricoeur, and then applied in theology
with a particular regard to the Latin American situation by Jos Severino Croatto.

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[5] From the Problem of Evil to Hermeneutics: P. Ricoeur

We need some tools or alternative frameworks in order get a better
understanding of these tight interconnections of reality, (religious)
language, history and praxis that I have found in Sobrinos texts, so
far, and if need be, to loosen these. Where should we look? There
are certainly good reasons to turn to the French philosopher Paul
Ricoeur (b. 1913). His work presents a wide-ranging and multidisciplinary attempt to come to terms with problems parallel to those we
have detected in Sobrinos thinking. It has won a worldwide hearing, not least among theologians. A comprehensive analysis and
assessment of Ricoeurs work on these themes would of course be
far beyond the scope of my present study.53 I shall limit myself to a
heuristic search for elements that will advance my critical analysis of
Sobrinos liberation christology. The appropriateness of my recourse
to Ricoeur will be demonstrated primarily by the extent to which it
provides me with relevant tools for my further inquiry.54 More concretely, I will search for alternative ways of describing the interpretative moves from reality to language, from language to
understanding, and from understanding back to human interaction with reality.

53 See e.g. Uggla 1994, and Kemp 1996.

54 The objection might be raised that Sobrino himself shows little dependence
on Ricoeur. Though this is correct at least on an explicit level (although
Sobrino refers to Ricoeurs definition of symbol, Sobrino 1976, 175), it does
not at all invalidate Ricoeur as a source for further investigation into
Sobrino. I see a main common denominator between the two in a basic
theme to both: the problems of interrelating reality, reflection and human
action. Furthermore, they do also have some common influences, e.g.
another French Catholic philosopher, Gabriel Marcel, cf. Sobrino 1965a and
Sobrino 1965b.

315

The philosophical project of Paul Ricoeur has been described as

a journey from action to text and then back to action again.55 He
started out with action in the sense that, during the 1950s, he
worked on developing a philosophy of the will in dialogue with the
dominant phenomenological and existentialist philosophical trends
of the time. Identifying as one of the weak spots of existentialism its
failure to distinguish between the phenomena of finitude and guilt,
Ricoeur made a thorough analysis of their difference and their connection. During this work, however, Ricoeur discovered that in
introducing the dimension of evil into the structure of the will, a
fundamental change in the method of description itself was
required.56 The problem of evil led to a focus on the problem of
language, because it seemed that when dealing with evil, human
beings turn to a metaphorical and symbolic language.
(W)e speak of evil by means of metaphors such as estrangement, errance,
burden and bondage. Moreover, these primary symbols do not occur unless
they are embedded within intricate narratives of myth which tell the story of
how evil began: how at the beginning of time the gods quarrelled; how the
soul fell into an ugly body; or how primitive man was tempted, trespassed a
prohibition, and became an exiled rebel.57

These myths, expressed in a metaphorical and symbolic language,

need interpretation. This puts Ricoeur on the track towards his theory of interpretation and other contributions to philosophical
hermeneutics, which have come to be the most noted and appraised
parts of his work. I had to introduce a hermeneutical dimension
within the structure of reflective thought itself, Ricoeur comments.58
55 Frn hermeneutik till etik Introduction by Peter Kemp and Bengt Kristensson Uggla in Ricoeur 1993, 25. Cf. Ricoeur 1991.
56 Ricoeur 1978, 315.
57 Ricoeur 1978, 316.

316

This turning point is somehow parallel to the development I

have described so far in my analysis of Sobrinos writings. An honest
encounter with the negativity of human existence although seemingly on a more individual and existential level in Ricoeur than in
Sobrino, whose point of departure is more social and historical
leads to a consideration of the ultimate causes for this negativity,
expressed in terms of myth. Noting that an understanding of
human reality as a whole operates through the myth,59 Ricoeur
undertakes a particular analysis of the myths that speak of the
beginning and the end of evil.60
For Ricoeur, a myth is not a false explanation by means of
images and fables, but is rather
a traditional narration which relates to events that happened at the beginning of time and which has the purpose of providing grounds for the ritual
actions of men of today and, in a general manner, establishing all the forms
of action and thought by which man understands himself in the world.61

The problem with myths for modern man is however that they
cannot be connected with the time of history as this is understood
when applying a critical method, and likewise, that they cannot be
connected with geographical space. That is why myths cannot any
longer function directly as an explanation. Therefore, the call for
demythologisation is legitimate and necessary, according to
Ricoeur.
Does not this expel myths from the domain of modern
thought? No, because in losing its explanatory pretention, the myth
reveals another important function in the process of understanding,
namely its exploratory significance, which Ricoeur calls its sym58
59
60
61

Ibid.
Ricoeur 1969b, 6.
Ricoeur 1969b, 5.
Ricoeur 1969b, 5.

317

bolic function that is to say, its power of discovering and revealing

the bond between man and what he considers sacred. The value
and validity of myths in modern thought is thus discovered when
they are demythologised through contact with scientific history
and elevated to the dignity of a symbol []62 This means that
myth can no longer be defined in opposition to science. Myth consists in giving worldly form to what is beyond known and tangible
reality.63
The primary function of the symbol is that it gives rise to
thought, Ricoeur concludes.64 Myths can reveal and explore reality
through its symbolic expressions. But there must be an element of
explanation, in other words, a demythologisation. This process does
not invalidate the function of the myth, however, but enables us to
exploit its revelatory and exploratory qualities. By way of symbolic
language we reach a better understanding of our world. Already at
this stage in Ricoeurs work, one can see the major gain of what he
later develops into a more comprehensive theory of interpretation:
he manages to unify, by bringing into a dialectical relation, two
basic moments of any interpretative process, namely, the moments
of understanding and explanation.
But before dealing with the overcoming of this dualism, which
is a fundamental concern in almost all of Ricoeurs work, I shall follow his inquiries into the ambiguities of language a little further. He
began with the function of myths in religious language in particular, and this led to a reassessment of the function of symbol in the
interpretation of the totality of reality, of the world of human
beings. But this in turn led him to consider the more general problem of the creation of meaning in all language. Choosing metaphor
62 Ricoeur 1969b, 5.
63 Ricoeur, 60-61. The citation is actually Ricoeurs rendering of Bultmanns
defintion of myth, but it seems to be in accordance with his own view.
64 Ricoeur 1969b, 347-357.

318

as his next focus of study, Ricoeur takes a definite stand against

what he sees as a fatal error in the understanding of language until
our own days, namely the reduction of metaphor to a mere ornament.65 Instead he proposes to see metaphorical statements in a
similar way as symbolic discourse, namely as having a capacity of
giving a creative and suggestive redescription of reality. (M)etaphor
bears information because it redescribes reality.66 Metaphorical
discourse represents an imitation of reality, a mimesis in Aristotles
sense, which opens up the world to us in a new way, pointing to
new possibilities.67
This novel understanding of the function of metaphors is
extremely important, since it implies that the commonly held distinction between literal and figurative speech the former of which
is deemed capable of describing reality truthfully, while the latter is
seen as illusory and deceptive must be given up, or altered. The
idea that words possess a proper or original meaning in themselves
is an illusion. The only difference between the literal and the metaphorical lies in their use in discourse.68 There is even a metaphoric at work at the very origin of logical thought, Ricoeur
claims, at the root of all classification.69
Colin Gunton, drawing on Ricoeur, takes this to mean that :
the truth of a claim about the world does not depend upon whether it is
expressed in literal or metaphorical terms, but upon whether language of
whatever kind expresses human interaction with reality successfully (truthfully) or not.70

65
66
67
68
69
70

Ricoeur 1978, 45.

Ricoeur 1978, 22.
Ricoeur 1993, 23.
Ricoeur 1978, 290-291.
Ricoeur 1978, 22-23.
Gunton 1988, 35.

319

It is of course not possible here to deal exhaustively with Ricoeurs

extremely thorough and careful analyses in this field. Nevertheless, I
hope to show that this and other central aspects of his theory of
metaphor will prove helpful when I later make a final evaluation of
Sobrinos concept which I will suggest should be defined more
precisely as a symbol in the Ricoeurian sense71 of the crucified
people.
Returning now to the two moments of understanding (verstehen) and explanation (erklren), these have been set in dichotomical opposition since the birth of modern hermeneutics. They
concern epistemology as well as ontology.72 Ever since the rise of
the modern sciences there has been a split and even a competition
between the sciences that explain the world, such as the natural sciences, and sciences that seek to understand the world of human
beings, i.e. the human sciences. One of the major impulses behind
the renewal of hermeneutical reflection, beginning with Schleiermacher and continued by Dilthey, was the desire to justify the scientific status of the human sciences. But the solution was often
sought by seeing the two as alternative, albeit equally legitimate
ways of interpretation. Ricoeur traces this dispute between explanation and understanding all the way up to the hermeneutical
debates of our own time, particularly as it is expressed in the disagreement between Gadamer and Habermas on the role of the tradition.
Where Gadamer advocates something which critics see as close
to submission to the authority of tradition in order to obtain the
71 I define symbol as any structure of signification in which a direct, primary and
literal meaning designates, in addition, another meaning which is indirect, secondary and figurative and which can be apprehended only through the first.
Ricoeur, Paul: Le Conflit des Interprtations: Essais dHermenutique Seuil,
Paris 1969, 12 (his italics), quoted from Jeanrond 1988, 41.
72 Ricoeur 1993, 67.

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goal of understanding, which he calls a Horizontverschmelzung, a

fusion of horizons, Habermas struggles to maintain a critical position vis--vis the tradition, by opting for a hermeneutics of suspicion. Gadamer is reluctant to admit that the element of explanation
through the use of critical tools is legitimate in order to reach a true
understanding. This is why it has been suggested that his magnum
opus Wahrheit und Methode should rather be called Wahrheit oder
Methode.73 Habermas, on the other hand, is reluctant to see in tradition anything other than a possible distortion of meaning; he has
difficulties in seeing tradition as a constructive element in the hermeneutical process.
What is at stake here is really the place and role of criticism in
the hermeneutical process. As pointed out, this has been one major
concern in my reading of Sobrino.
Ricoeurs great achievement is to overcome this opposition. He
does so by interconnecting understanding and explanation: a
hermeneutics of suspicion and a hermeneutics of retrieval. Just as
the myth cannot any longer be accepted as an immediate explanation of the world, so we cannot yield ourselves totally to the tradition in order to reach understanding. The element of critical
assessment, of suspicion, of explanation through using all available
and fruitful methods, is totally legitimate and necessary. But this
can only take place after having listened to the myth and its symbolic expressions. First, we must receive what the symbol gives,
just as much as we must accept that the meaning of a text from the
past is not simply transmitted by the tradition, but also shaped by
it. This is the first moment of understanding, according to Ricoeur.
It is a kind of first navet, as he terms it. Then there is a second
73 See Jeanrond 1992, 69: The title of Gadamers magnum opus should really
be Truth or Method for he sees a radical conflict between his phenomenological approach to hermeneutics on the one hand and the host of modern
methodological proposals for an adequate text-understanding in the other.

321

navet, a second moment of understanding, after the intermediary

step of explanation through the use of critical methods.74 In
Ricoeurs remarkable expression: Beyond the desert of criticism, we
wish to be called again.75 This second understanding, to which we
are called again, is also called comprehension. For Ricoeur then,
interpretation embraces the whole dialectic process, encompassing
explanation and understanding.
I propose to describe this dialectic first as a move from understanding to
explaining and then as a move from explanation to comprehension. The first
time, understanding will be a naive grasping of the meaning of the text as a
whole. The second time, comprehension will be a sophisticated mode of
understanding, supported by explanatory procedures. 76

This dialectic unification of the two formerly competing interpretative moves in a hermeneutical method of understanding explanation understanding (comprehending) turns out to have vast
potential.77 Ricoeur demonstrates its usefulness not only in the
interpretation of texts, but also in the fields of a theory of action
and a theory of history. This is where we can follow the thrust of
Ricoeurs philosophy from the interpretation of texts and back
again to action, i.e. into the field of anthropological philosophy.

74
75
76
77

322

Ricoeur 1978, 318.

Ricoeur 1969b, 349.
Ricoeur 1976, 74.
I do, however, agree with Werner Jeanronds critique of Ricoeurs model
regarding its steps of interpretation. Jeanrond prefers to speak of dimensions: Ricoeurs clear differentiation of understanding-explanation-comprehension appears to me to be too idealistic and for this reason I find it
more appropriate to speak of dimensions of interpretation. It would be truer,
it seems to me, to speak of these dimensions as simultaneously coming to
pass on different levels of reflection and as being related to each other in a
state of mutual tension. Jeanrond 1988, 68.

The main goal in interpreting a text is not to understand the

world behind the text. Ricoeur clearly disagrees with the romanticist hermeneutics of e.g. Schleiermacher, to whom the ideal interpretation should result in the readers understanding the mind or
spirit of the author even better than the author himself. Other
ways of searching for what is behind the text belong to the other
pole (explanation), such as for instance different historical-critical
methods. Nor is it according to Ricoeur sufficient to understand the
world in the text, in the way that different structuralist and literary proponents argue (e.g. Northrop Frye). Instead, text-interpretation means uncovering what lies in front of the text, he holds.
Understanding has less than ever to do with the author and his situation. It
seeks to grasp the world-propositions opened up by the reference of the text.
To understand a text is to follow its movement from sense to reference: from
what it says, to what it talks about. 78

This creative and revelatory potential of a text and likewise of a

symbol, a myth, a metaphor which is so central for Ricoeur, is due
to the polysemy inherent in all signs. As the interpreter struggles
with or rather enters into a conversation (consisting in a dialectic
interplay of understanding and explanation) with these signs they
may open up a possible world and a possible way of orientating
oneself within it. Thus the process of interpretation becomes for
Ricoeur the process by which a human being relates to reality and
to ones own self.
I have already mentioned that Ricoeur makes use of Aristotles
term mimesis, by which is meant a creative imitation of human
action (from the Poetics), in his theory of interpretation.79 Ricoeur
78 Ricoeur 1976, 87-88.
79 Explanation and Understanding. On Some Remarkable Connections
between the Theory of Texts, Action Theory and the Theory of History,
Transl. by Kathleen Blaney, in Ricoeur 1991, 138.

323

uses this term to show the interconnection of text, action and,

finally, history through narration and interpretation of narratives.
Even human action can be seen as a quasitext.80 Every action
leaves behind it a trace, a mark, which has its own independence
once the act is done. In this manner, the action is a work, open to
be interpreted by an infinity of possible readers. This similarity of
texts and actions makes the overcoming of the dualism of explanation and understanding necessary even within a theory of action.
Showing how this field also has been divided into theories of causality which require explanation of human action on the one hand,
and theories of motivation and intention which call for understanding on the other, Ricoeur holds that what truly characterises human
action is that it relates to both the realm of causality and the realm
of motivation.81 These cannot be opposed to one another. Furthermore, seeing human action as interference in the world, making
something happen in it, i.e. causing a transformation of the world,
one is bound to admit, according to Ricoeur, that the opposition
between a mentalism in the understanding of human action and
the physicalism in explaining it, is untenable. To act is always to
do something that makes other things happen in the world, but at
the same time, there is no action without the possibility of acting in
the world (pouvoir-faire).82
80 Ricoeur 1991, 138.
81 Ricoeur 1991, 134-135: The human phenomenon is situated between causation that has to be explained and not understood and motivation belonging
to a purely rational understanding, Ricoeur claims.
82 Ricoeur 1991, 137: Acting is always doing something so that something else
happens in the world. Ricoeur continues: On the other hand, there is no
action without the relation between knowing how to do something (being
able to do something) and that which the latter brings about. Causal explanation applied to a fragment of world history goes hand in hand with recognizing and identifying a power that belongs to the reportoire of our own
capacities for action.

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This interaction of text-theory and theory of action is further

strengthened, Ricoeur believes, as we move into the field of history.
Again, Ricoeur has no difficulties in showing how historical science
has been affected by the same alternative approaches of understanding and explanation. As examples of the former, he mentions the
anti-positivist trend among French historians such as Raymond
Aron and Henri Marrou. They maintain that history has to do with
human action in the past that is guided by intentions, motivations
and projects. Hence it is only possible to interpret history through
the historians own, subjective Einfhling in these intentions and
projects. An objective approach of explaining, like the one prevalent
in natural sciences, is impossible. As one of the main proponents of
the opposite stance Ricoeur mentions Carl Hempel, who claims
that the explanation of a historical event must follow the same pattern as the explanation of a physical or natural process: one has to
describe the initial conditions, and then attempt to formulate a general law which may explain the event on the basis of these conditions.83
Again, Ricoeur intends to show how this opposition is false. In
doing so, he turns to a term which has gained increasing importance in his work: narration.84 One can see how understanding
and explanation interact dialectically in interpreting history, when
this is seen as the ability to follow the thrust of a narrated history.
To understand a narrated history implies understanding a chain of
actions, sentiments and thoughts that has a direction, but at the
same time is open to surprises. One cannot logically deduce what
has to be the end of the story. But on the other hand, the end of the
story has to be acceptable in some sense: it cannot be totally abrupt
83 Ricoeur 1993, 140.
84 This has been further developed in his monumental three-volume study
Time and Narrative Chigago, Chicago University Press 1984-1988, cf. Kemp
1996.

325

or without internal consistency, if understanding is to occur. There

is therefore a certain kind of logical continuity in all narrated history, Ricoeur concludes. And it is this continuity that calls for an
interplay of understanding and explanation. The narration seldom
explains itself. It leads to further questions: Why? - and so
what? In this sense, it is an unfinished structure, according to
Ricoeur. It calls for explanation an explanation that very well may
follow the method proposed by Hempel. But this explanation is
only a tool, a step on the way to reaching a better, more complete
understanding of the meaning of that which is narrated.85
As one can appreciate, Ricoeurs work covers a wide area. And it
has, as already mentioned, won worldwide attention, making him
one of the most important thinkers of our day. In his generally very
positive assessment of Ricoeurs contribution to hermeneutics,
Werner Jeanrond has, however, raised an important critical concern.
Acknowledging that Ricoeur opens up for a plurality of interpretations, he does not find Ricoeurs proposal sufficiently developed
with respect to the possibility of assessing the legitimacy of this plurality of readings. How can one distinguish between appropriate
and inappropriate interpretations?86 Ricoeur requires that a given
reading be validated through explanatory moves, as we have seen.
Yet, according to Jeanrond, he does not address the possibility of
conflicting readings which may all be validated by the respective
critical moves.87 In order to undertake such an assessment, Jeanrond holds an ethics of reading to be required.
85 For a critique and proposal for further development of Ricoeurs model of
interpretation in the perspective of a theological hermeneutics, see Jeanrond
1988, 56-64; and Jeanrond 1992, 70ff.
86 Any good pluralist should always be able to discuss the differences between
good, bad and downright awful interpretations. Isaiah Berlin, quoted by
David Tracy in Tracy 1987, 95.
87 Jeanrond 1992, 76.

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Sketching out some basic ingredients of such an ethics of reading,88 Jeanrond submits 1) that a readers claim to the appropriateness of his/her interpretation should correspond to the actual task
fulfilled,89 2) that a total adequacy of reading is impossible, but one
should indeed strive for a relative adequacy90 3) that such relative
adequacy can be achieved when a text is read through perspectives
which seem appropriate to its generic and stylistic identity, and
when the reader aims at responding critically to the text as far as
possible without claiming to have exhausted the text91, and finally
4) that distortion of interpretation may emerge both from the text
and from the reader, but such distortion may be unmasked when a
given interpretation is validated in a community of readers.
Jeanronds critique and proposal for a further development of
Ricoeurs thinking in terms of an ethics of reading is helpful. At the
same time, it confirms the importance and applicability of Ricoeurs
work. But can Ricoeur be of guidance also in Latin America, among
poor communities struggling for liberation? Jos Severino Croattos
answer to this is definitely in the affirmative.

88 Jeanrond 1992, 116-119.

89 Jeanrond 1992, 116. A reader may choose to interpret the text as thoroughly
as possible, or, for instance, to use the text rather as a springboard for further
reflections. Both reading strategies are legitimate, but the readers claim
should correspond to the actual kind of reading undertaken.
90 Jeanrond 1992, 117. This term is coined by David Tracy. Interpretation is
never exact but, at its best, relatively adequate. Tracy 1987, 44.
91 Jeanrond 1992, 117.

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[6] A Latin American Reception and Application of Ricoeur:

J. Severino Croatto
The philosophical and hermeneutical advances achieved by Ricoeur
have found a creative and fruitful application in a Latin American
theological context in the work of the Argentinian biblical scholar
Jos Severino Croatto (b.1930).92 Croatto chooses, as he says, a
markedly Ricoeurian approach93 in his effort to contribute to the
methodology of the theology of liberation.94 This approach leads
him to concentrate first of all on the theme of Exodus, which he
deems a hermeneutic key to the salvific message of the Bible, and a
theme in which Latin American theology finds a focal point and
an inexhaustible light.95 But he also explicitly deals with some of
the other central themes we have found in Sobrino, such as a christology with emphasis on the Suffering Servant and on the Messiah,
the relationship between history and myth, and the relationship
between interpretation and praxis. It is thus highly relevant to take
Croattos proposals into consideration at this stage.
The Ricoeurian influence is obvious in Croattos development
of a theory of reading as the production of meaning. Following the
thrust from semiotics to hermeneutics, Croatto strives to show how
the interpreter in fact enlarges the meaning of the text being interpreted.96 Any linguistic sign is polysemic. In language as a system
92 Although a professor of Old Testament Studies and Hebrew at one of the
most important Evangelical seminaries in Latin America, the Instituto Superior Evanglico de Estudios Teolgicos (ISEDET) in Buenos Aires, Croatto
is a Catholic scholar.
93 Croatto 1981, 1. Spanish original: Croatto 1978 See also: Croatto 1987: 1, 3,
17, etc. Spanish original: Croatto 1984. For the usefulness of Croattos proposals in another Third World context, see West 1995, 154ff.
94 Croatto 1981, iv.
95 Croatto 1981, iv.

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of signs (langue) there is an underlying potential polysemy, i.e. a

variety of possible meanings. Now, in the application of language
i.e., language as event (parole) 97 in an ordered discourse used by
someone in order to say something about something to someone,
there takes place a first distantiation, which is in fact a closure of
meaning.98 The speaker and the hearer determine the meaning of
the words they use. But once this discourse is inscribed in a text, the
discourse opens up again, and becomes polysemic anew. The
author, the original frame of reference, and the original addressee all
disappear, and only the linguistic codified structure remains. But
this disappearance is the very fact that opens up the text again, by
activating its semantic wealth.
As we can see, the distance between the original context of a
text (its author, frame of reference, addressee) and the reception
(reading) of it, is not a hindrance in the hermeneutical process
according to this Ricoeurian mode of thought. On the contrary, it is
this very distance that makes interpretation possible. The distantiation is hermeneutically productive, as it actualises or rather discloses
a meaning that was hidden in the original event (a concept to
which I shall shortly return) leading to its formulation in language.
Great distance actually represents a hermeneutic advantage in
Croattos view.99
A second distantiation occurs when the text reaches a reader.
The possible meanings of the text arising from its condition as linguistic sign, represent what Ricoeur called the world of the text,
which, as we remember, the interpreter must search for in front of
the text, and not behind it. The reader, approaching the texts from

96
97
98
99

Croatto 1987, 1.
This distinction has become a commonplace in linguistics since de Saussure.
Croatto 1981, 2; Croatto 1987, 13-15.
Croatto 1987, 37.

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her own horizon, produces or enlarges the meaning of the text, in

the sense that
the reading supersedes the first contextual meaning (not only that of the author
but also that of his first readers). This happens through the unfolding of a surplus-of-meaning disclosed by a new question addressed to the text.100

This is why any reading is a production of meaning, according to

Croatto. The reader actualises the competency of the text, which
is its openness to a plurality of readings. This openness is not due to
its ambiguity, but to its capacity to say many things at once.101
This is also why the commonly held opposition between eisegesis
and exegesis is inadequate, according to Croatto. In fact, all exegesis
is also eisegesis, in his view, because it is always practiced from
within a particular (social or theological) locus that is from within
a given (pre-)conception of reality.102 Here the congeniality with
Sobrinos methodological presuppositions discussed in Chapter i,
and particularly the emphasis on the locus theologicus, becomes
apparent.
The point where Croatto, in his own view, goes beyond the
proposals of Ricoeur103 is where he moves behind the text in order
to describe the step from historical events to texts.104 The text
whether written or not originates in some sort of experience. It
100
101
102
103

Croatto 1981, 3.
Croatto 1987, 21.
Croatto 1987, 67.
Without confusing things we shall see that the interpretation of texts supposes the existence of another process, that of the interpretation of particular
practices or events, and that the very constitution of those texts originates in
an experience that is interpreted. And so I go beyond the limitation imposed
by Paul Ricoeur, for example, when he defines hermeneutics as the theory of
the functions of understanding in their relationship to the interpretation of
texts. Croatto 1987, 1-2.
104 Croatto 1987, 36ff.

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may be a particular practice, an unexpected happening, a situation

of oppression, an action for liberation, or even a natural phenomenon; whatever makes an impact on human life. When this event,
as Croatto chooses to name it, is seen as important, it is interpreted
in a word. Interpretation takes place at two levels when this
occurs. First, the fact that the experience is seen as so significant as
to be given a word, is in itself an interpretative step. Second, the
word that narrates the event is simultaneously interpreting it. This
is what Croatto calls the phenomenon of selection-and-closure.
Thus we see that the original event does not exhaust itself , as
Croatto puts it, simply by occurring.105 But nor does the mere
description of what happened terminate its potential. The historical effect of an event lies in its capacity to generate other happenings, Croatto points out in accordance with Gadamers concept
Wirkungsgeschichte. But Croattos interest here is not at the level of
causality, i.e. that the first event actually unleashes the subsequent
events. Rather, he is concerned with this phenomenon from the
viewpoint of understanding: The meaning of the more recent
event is found to be already included within the prior event.106
This is why Croatto calls these original events foundational or
founding events.
This is a crucial point in Croattos hermeneutical theory, and it
is of particular interest to us since it in a way bridges the gap
between text and historical reality and practice. The interpreting
word forming a text springs from an experience, a particular
moment in history, a particular practice. It does not, however, offer
an objective representation or rendering of this moment or practice.
This experience, moment, or practice is always already interpreted.
When this foundational event is remembered from another particular moment in history, from within another concrete practice, it is
105 Croatto 1981, 1.
106 Croatto 1987, 36.

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recharged with meaning. The re-reading of the text interpreting

the event is a production of meaning, as we have seen, so that the
original event in fact takes on more meaning as history continues.
This is the surplus-of-meaning activated by the practice of the
interpreter.
An originary event broadens its meaning in readings made of it at a distance, as it incorporates new events [] But this is a two-way street. The
enrichment reading in turn invests with new meaning the events or practices from which it operates.107

The fact that this is a two-way street prevents interpretation from

becoming a merely subjective enterprise. The meaning of the original event is encoded in the text. Although the text is open to
polysemy, it does not permit just any interpretation. As Croatto
points out: There must be something in the event that permits the
derivation of such-and-such interpretation.108
This does not mean that we can escape conflicts of interpretations, of course. Rather, such conflicts are sharpened, since each
interpretation is totalizing, according to Croatto. It is exclusive; it
seeks to appropriate all meaning. One reading excludes the other.
Why are there different readings of the same event, then, if the
meaning of the event is codified in the text? What is decisive is
the praxis that generates the reading, Croatto responds. The conflict of interpretations corresponds to a conflict of praxises.
Hence Croatto holds that text and event or praxis mutually
condition each other.109 Furthermore, he insists that this is valid
with regard to both ends of the text. The two poles of interpretation are two existential, historical moments, which are both rooted
in human interaction with history. The text becomes an in107 Croatto 1987, 38.
108 Croatto 1987, 40.
109 Croatto 1987, 2.

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between, linking the founded event (contemporary praxis) to the

foundational (past praxis or happening), but only in a productive
remembrance through (re-)reading as the production of meaning.110
Given Ricoeurs application of his own hermeneutical method
in the field of theory of action, I am not convinced that Croatto
actually goes much beyond Ricoeur here. In our context however,
that is of minor importance. What Croatto does in any case is to
make Ricoeurs insights fruitful with regard to a contextual theology
of liberation, which in turn makes him an interesting comparison
to Sobrino. But more concretely, how does he relate this general
hermeneutical theory to liberation theology?
Foundational events are often, as a matter of fact, deeds of liberation. As a nation or people remembers its decisive moments in history, it furnishes these moments with a meaning which is intended
to inspire and undergird a contemporary socio-political praxis
directed towards the future.111 This general observation certainly
holds true for the biblical message, Croatto continues. The main
foundational event of the Bible is the Exodus: Gods liberating act
in favour of the Israelite people in Egypt. This event is subsequently
re-read and recharged with new meaning again and again. Each new
reading adds to the original interpretation of the event. At the same
time, it subsumes earlier interpretations in such a way that it actually conceals the transformations taking place. The actualised meaning of the original foundational event becomes its original meaning.
Thus, the theme of the Exodus reappears again and again
throughout the Bible, each time with a novel meaning arising from
the new situations of the people, from new events that have been
generated. Nevertheless this new meaning is now claimed as the
authentic meaning of the original Exodus-event. Hence the inher110 Croatto 1987, 2.
111 Croatto 1987, 39.

333

ent conflict of interpretations which can be witnessed throughout

the scriptures, but particularly in the New Testament. The kerygma
of Jesus Christ implies a new interpretation of the whole Jewish
faith, its foundational events and constitutive traditions. On this
basis, it should not cause surprise that the conflicts surrounding
Jesus escalate to such a serious level that they finally become intolerable.
Liberation is thus one main semantic axis of the biblical texts,
which becomes a kerygmatic axis on the level of message, according to Croatto.112 In fact, the very origin of the Bible was in a liberation process, he believes.113 This observation is important in two
aspects. First, the focus on semantic and kerygmatic axes is introduced as a safeguard against relative and totally random interpretations of the Bible message. To interpret the Bible well, is to follow
these axes: from the foundational event to the founded event, from
the past praxis to the present, and from an original revelation to
contemporary signs of the times and, since we are dealing with a
two-way-street here, vice versa. Secondly, this enables Croatto in
turn to argue for the hermeneutic advantage of a reading of the
Bible done from an actual praxis for the liberation of the poor.
If the Christian can read the signs of the times, this reading will be in harmony with the kerygmatic axes of the Bible, themselves coded in the
semantic axes (on the textual level) [] This hermeneutic perspective
reinforced by recourse to semiotics guarantees the legitimacy of grass-roots
theologies such as the theology of liberation.114

The option for the poor now becomes a hermeneutical principle,

according to Croatto, since the Bible itself has its principal origin in
experiences of suffering-and-oppression and is written with a pro112 Croatto 1987, 53.
113 Croatto 1987, 51.
114 Croatto 1987, 79-80.

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found hope of salvation. The most adequate ownership of the

Bible, and the most adequate pertinency for re-reading its
kerygma, is accordingly with the poor, he claims. They are on a
horizon of understanding that renders the biblical kerygma pertinent to them. Corresponding to this is their horizon of production. In other words, there is a common frame of reference.115
We recognize here clearly the emphasis on the hermeneutical
value of what Sobrino with Boff calls isomorfismo a similarity in
the situations of sender and receiver. However, this emphasis
seems to have a more solid underpinning in Croattos thought than
in Sobrinos. Croatto makes it quite clear that this similarity is not
something which automatically leads to a disclosure of a supposed
original and consistent meaning of the past event. This would be
the pitfall of concordism, he says, an approach to the Bible
according to which one seeks correspondences between real-life
situations and ocurrences related in the scriptures. Such a method
of interpretation is reductive, since it limits the biblical message to
situations having a parallel in the history of Israel or the first Christian communities, and since it confuses what happens with the
meaning of what happens.116
There is a fine balance in Croattos approach, then, between the
ever hermeneutically creative distantiations and the continuously
productive re-readings on the one hand, and the necessity of entering into the open ends of the biblical texts, harmonising or tuning in with their semantical and kerygmatical axes, on the other.
This process of interpretation goes on and on, and is in itself a part
of the biblical message, Croatto is eager to point out. New interpretations according to the contemporary situation are not just legitimate, they are called for. I shall finally show how Croatto

115 Croatto 1987, 62-63.

116 Croatto 1987, 6.

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exemplifies this in a way that becomes particularly relevant for our

study.
The Servant Songs of Deutero-Isaiah: to whom do they actually
refer? Who is the extra-linguistic referent of these texts? Joakim?
Zerubabbel? Israel herself? A prophet? A sage? We no longer know.
We know only that the texts present a royal figure with a mission to
rescue the people of Israel, who encounters fierce resistance, persecution and suffering until death. His suffering is interpreted as
vicarious, and ultimately salvific. Historico-critical methods
may help us in suggesting possible candidates for the original referent of these songs. But that would merely clarify the genesis of the
songs, not their meaning. If we content ourselves with uncovering a
probable, original Servant, then we are binding ourselves to a
kind of historicism, by reducing the meaning of the text to its first
production, Croatto maintains. 117
These texts are polysemous, not only by leaving the concrete
extralinguistic referent of the Servant open, nor merely by their
poetic and symbolic mode of speech, but in their very status as
texts, as structuration of signifiers and significates. And as religious texts, that have been and continue to be reinterpreted time
and again, they entail a very strong tendency not to retain the historical referent, according to Croatto. These texts call for the manifestation of a surplus of meaning. Every interpreter must heed
this call and enter into the process of ever new identifications of the
referent, through a re-reading of the texts that is a production of
(new) meaning, and not merely a repetition of their first meaning.
Croatto distinguishes four stages in the history of the re-reading
of the Servant Songs. Already in the canonical recension of these
texts their redaction, wording and selection we can detect the
hermeneutical process at work. According to Is. 49:3 the Servant is
identified with Israel, although this is in direct contradiction with
117 Croatto 1987, 25.

336

verses 5 and 6, where the Servant is sent to Israel. Croattos comment here is enlightening:
For literary criticism, this is an inconsistent gloss. Hermeneutically, this
gloss is rich, as a transfer of meaning to an updated referent in virtue of the
needs of the community that is handing down the text.118

A second stage is found in the Septuagint, where we still find a collective interpretation of Israel as the Servant, now seen in the light
of the experiences of persecution and exile in the diaspora. Israels
salvific mission is here highlighted. Moving to the New Testament,
the individual interpretation takes over totally. Because of the symbolic reference to one person in the songs, the christological reading
is facilitated. This reading was so powerful, in light of the Christian experience, that it permeates many pages of the New Testament.119 However, the collective exegesis is kept alive and can be
refound in the Targum of Jonathan (second century A.D.), which
in fact differentiates the references of the Songs, holding Is. 42:1-9
to refer to the Messiah and 50:4-11 to the prophet Isaiah.
In Croattos view, these manifold and different re-readings are
fully legitimate and prove the openness of the texts. And again, this
process of re-readings is bound to continue, even after the Christ
event:
By the same token, we too can reread [the Servant Songs] without being limited by the christological reading of the New Testament. Paul himself had
already extended the figure of the Servant as the light of the gentiles to himself (Gal. 1:15; in one of the Lukan accounts of Pauls vocation, Acts 26:18
and in the episode of Antioch, Acts 13:47.) Today, too, situations exist in
which persons, groups of persons, or whole peoples call for a new interpretation of these songs these mighty compendia of the presence of God and of
the trust of those working in Gods service.120
118 Croatto 1987, 28.
119 Croatto 1987, 28.

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Here Croatto takes us back to our main theme, the theological significance of contemporary suffering as this is conceptualised
through the crucified people in the theology of Jon Sobrino.
What Sobrino has done is in fact to present such a new interpretation of the songs from a particular historical perspective. After studying the contributions of Ricoeur and Croatto, we are better
equipped to continue our analysis of this new interpretation, its
meaning and implications. We have gathered some partly convergent and partly alternative perspectives on the crucial questions
regarding reality, history and language that have been raised so far.
By the help of these perspectives, I shall now continue the investigation. But first, I shall sum up the findings of this chapter.

[7] Conclusions
The root of the soteriological problem according to Sobrinos theology is that reality is subject to a continuous struggle between the
God of life and the idols of death. Reality has a theologal-idolatrous structure. This was the first main finding of the present chapter. Through an analysis of Sobrinos reading of the conflicts that
develop around the activity of Jesus particularly his prophetic,
anti-idolatrous praxis consisting in controversies, unmaskings and
denunciations we saw how this theme of the confrontation of
divinities is given the function of the ultimate explanation, not
just within the framework of the biblical worldview, but analogously in world history at large. This is indeed a crucifying conflict.
Idolatry, not atheism, is accordingly the main opponent of faith,

120 Croatto 1987, 28.

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Sobrino claims, in company with other Latin American theologians.

Idols exist in contemporary history, Sobrino claims. Their principal characteristic is that they produce mortal victims. Thus one of
the main reasons for the recovery of this biblical perspective of idols
and idolatry as the opposite of Christian faith in the God of Jesus, is
what I have chosen to call the victimological orientation of
Sobrinos christology. Along the same lines I would also claim that
the option for the poor in Latin American theology implies a victimological turn in modern theology. The perspective of victims
gains increasing importance in Sobrinos writings. By using the term
victimological, borrowed from the field of criminology, we are
also made critically aware of some of the problems that may be connected to the use of the terminology of victims. Furthermore, we
are thereby reminded of the question about the offenders in this
context the crucifiers.
The reference to a theologal-idolatrous structure as ultimate
explanation of the soteriological problem is expressed in a symbolicmyth[olog]ical language. It is in Sobrinos outline nevertheless
directly related to concepts as reality and history. I therefore
raised some critical questions regarding the function and interconnection of reality, history and language in Sobrinos theology. Does
this fundamental, ultimate explanation also uncover, if not the root
of the problem of Sobrinos christology, then at least a shortcoming
in it?
Making a brief review of the previous chapters, I recalled that
these issues are the ones that have caused difficulties and critical
comments at several stages so far. One principal critical objection to
Sobrinos outline, then, is that it lacks an explicit reflection on the
status of religious and theological language and how this relates to
reality and human history. This can be seen as a more general shortcoming or short-cut in Sobrinos hermeneutical approach, which

339

does not make due account of the interpretative steps taken, and
in particular does not leave sufficient room for a critical evaluation of this ultimate explanation of the structure of reality and the
root causes of suffering and evil.
Whether this is a fair evaluation of Sobrinos writings, and if so,
how it might be made constructive through proposals for overcoming these difficulties, are questions that remain to be answered. This
is the task of the rest of this study. I have looked for some alternative viewpoints and theoretical frameworks that shed light on these
issues, with the goal of clarifying, and if possible, modifying and
advancing Sobrinos conception. I suggest that Paul Ricoeurs profound work in the field of philosophical hermeneutics, and the
reception and creative further development of this by Jos Severino
Croatto in a Latin American theological context, are particularly
promising in this aspect.
In the account I have given of some main characteristics and
tenets in this Ricoeurian line of thought I have particularly highlighted the questions of (1) how symbolic and mythological language relates to historical reality and human experience of suffering
and evil (Ricoeur), (2) how there can be a critical, explanatory
moment in a hermeneutical process without thereby yielding to a
reductive and in fact, outdated sense of historicism and rationalism (Ricoeur and Croatto), and (3) how the interpretation of texts,
and particularly the biblical texts, may be open to ever new meanings without thereby becoming random and relativistic, and likewise without becoming separated from a committed historical
praxis for the liberation of the poor (Croatto).
This has furnished us with critical elements for our continuing
inquiry into the meaning and implications of the crucified people
for a contemporary theology.
Before moving on, I shall come back for a moment to Sobrinos
reading of the history of Jesus. Who is Jesus, according to Sobrino,

340

when one takes into consideration Jesus anti-idolatrous praxis?

Jesus is a prophet, standing in the long Jewish tradition of the great
prophets. Jesus arduous attacks on idolatrous faith and praxis, the
radicality of his envisioning of Gods will, and his committed and
consistent defence of the weak and destitute, reflect the earlier figures of Jeremiah, Amos, Micah, Isaiah, etc. Like the prophets of
old, Jesus enters into a total confrontation with powerful groups of
his time. His faithfulness towards the God of life and the Kingdom
of life makes it inevitable for him to confront the forces and lords of
death. It becomes his destiny; like so many prophets before and
after him, Jesus falls victim to the powers he has dared to confront.
Moreover, like so many prophets before and after him, Jesus radical
negation of the forces of death stands in the service of a more primary and comprehensive affirmation of life; his prophetical critique
is but the other side of his salvific restoration and invitation. And as
with so many of the prophets before and after him, we find indications that this exterior mystery the incomprehensible and paradoxical presence and power of these destructive forces in actual
history, culminating in the death of the mediator on the cross also
affects his interior, to the point of doubting even his deepest conviction, the faith in God-Father: My God, my God, why have you
forsaken me?
This is where our investigation will have to continue then: into
the dark history of Jesus suffering and death. It has taken some
time to get here, but I trust it will become clear why it was necessary
to take this path. For Sobrino, the theological significance of the
crucified people today is closely related to the significance of Jesus
death. And the theological significance and salvific value of
Jesus death cannot be seen without a careful examination of his life,
which should be analysed primarily in terms of constitutive relations and praxis.

341

Hitherto, as I emphasised and discussed in the previous chapter, Sobrino has presented Jesus primarily in continuity with other
human beings. This is valid here, as well, as I have signalled: []
like so many prophets before and after him. It is a continuity
which works in both directions. Just as Jesus follows Hosea and
Amos, so he himself has prophetical followers such as Mgr Romero
and Mgr Proao [], Sobrino repeatedly points out.121 Jesus is a
prophet. Not necessarily the Prophet, yet.122 The ultimate leap of
faith from son to the Son, from messiah to the Messiah, is
also a leap from seeing Jesus as one of the prophets to see him as the
one, unique and ultimate Prophet. This problematic concerning the
dialectic tension continuity-discontinuity is, as we shall see, crucial
for the assessment of our theme: the crucified and the Crucified. I
have warned about a possible short-cut between the two. In this
connection, it means that there is a need for an appreciation also of
the discontinuity in this relationship. Will perhaps Sobrinos analysis of Jesus death on the cross give a better foundation for making
the leap of faith required to see the discontinuity between Jesus and
other human beings?

121 Sobrino 1991d, 305-306.

122 Again, the English translation of the title is misleading: Jess profeta is
translated Jesus the Prophet. Sobrino 1991d, 305 / Sobrino 1994c, 178.

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vi. The Crucified Liberator (2)

Interpreting Jesus Death as Salvific

La muerte de Jess no fue un error. Fue consecuencia de su vida y sta, a su vez,

consecuencia de su concreta encarnacin, en un antirreino que da muerte, para
defender a sus vctimas.1

The heart of the matter in our inquiry into the relationship between
the crucified and the Crucified in Jon Sobrinos christology has to
do with the death of Jesus. What does this death mean, when seen
against the background of suffering and death of millions in our
time and history? Can it possibly be attributed a salvific significance? And what light can be thrown on this contemporary suffering around the globe and in our midst through an
interpretation of Jesus death?
In the present chapter I shall consider Sobrinos interpretation
of Jesus death.2 My analysis will basically follow Sobrinos own taxonomy in dealing with this topic in Jesucristo liberador. While his
treatment in Cristologa desde Amrica latina was governed to a considerable degree by Moltmanns approach, in Jesucristo liberador the
composition is basically inherited from Ellacuras article Por qu
1
2

Sobrino 1991d, 334.

In this core theme of the whole theological production of Sobrino, the influence from primarily Moltmann but also Ellacura becomes particularly visible. Sobrino follows the course pointed out by Moltmann in Moltmann
1974, sometimes even in details. Sobrino makes no attempt to hide this
dependence, although in Jesucristo liberador it is less obvious than in Cristologa desde Amrica Latina. Again, the particularity of Sobrino vis--vis
Moltmann is his attempt to root this theological reflection in a concrete historical context: the world of the poor in Latin America.

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muere Jess y por qu le matan, first published in 1977.3 That article

opens with a programmatic statement:
The intention of seeing Jesus in relation to history and, subsequently, the
Church in relation to history, is essential for the understanding and realization of Christianity, and for the realization and understanding of history. If
one does not achieve clarity regarding this relation, one will fall into the
pitfalls of purely religious or purely secular positions [en posturas religiosistas
o en posturas secularistas ], and in that way lose sight of what historical salvation really is.4

Ellacuras principal argument here is that there is an intimate relation between the historical reasons for Jesus death and its soteriological significance. He is contesting a theological thinking which
operates on two levels whether these are called religious and
secular, natural and supernatural, or otherwise. There is only
one historical reality, which is without separation and without confusion, in which God and human beings intervene respectively.5
This christological (Chalcedonian) approach to reality6, which in
modern Catholic theology has profound roots in Vatican II and
particularly Rahners theology, makes the intersection of the historical and soteriological/theological interpretations of the death of
3
4

5
6

344

Ellacura 1978b. The article was first published in the Spanish theological
review Misin Abierta, 70, 1977, 176-186.
My translation, SJS. El intento de poner en relacin a Jess con la historia,
y consiguientemente, a la Iglesia con la historia, es esencial para la comprensin y realizacin del cristianismo, as como para la realizacin y la comprensin de la historia. Si no se llega a tener clara esta relacin, se cae en
posturas religiosistas o en posturas secularistas, con menoscabo de lo que es
realmente la salvacin histrica. Op. cit., 65
Cf. Ellacura 1991b, 327.
Sobrino holds that [] el dogma cristolgico ofrece una categora estructuradora de la realidad, en palabras de J. I. Gonzlez Faus. Sobrino 1991d,
27. Cf. Maier 1992, 344-348.

Jesus particularly revealing. It lays bare the dual unity of God in

human being and human being in God, as Ellacura, Rahners student, formulates it.7 Thus one should not separate the theological
question of why Jesus died from the historical question of why he
was killed.8
Following this programme and pattern, then, Sobrino begins
with what he calls historical interpretation (Why was Jesus
killed?) and then proceeds to the soteriological interpretation
(Why did Jesus die?). I shall follow the same order. The strictly
theo-logical question (Where is God when Jesus dies?), which
Sobrino raises in direct continuity and discussion with Moltmanns
groundbreaking and influential study The Crucified God and the
harsh criticisms it evoked, will be dealt with in the next chapter.
This distinction historical/soteriological/theological is exactly
what I find to be diffuse in Sobrino. Even when he separates these
aspects for the sake of the argument he sees them as intrinsically
unified.9 This is consistent with the methodological principles laid
down by Ellacura in his historical soteriology and, of course, in
tune with Sobrinos own aspiration of presenting a historical-theological reading. It is, however, precisely this process of unification
which has caused problems in our analysis, so far. How do history
and theology, liberation and salvation, the crucified and the Cruci7

Ellacura 1991b, 340. Precisamente, la unidad total de una sola historia de

Dios en los hombres [sic] y los hombres en Dios no permite la evasin a una
de los dos extremos abstractos: slo Dios o slo el hombre; pero tampoco
permite quedarse en la dualidad acumulada de Dios y del hombre, sino que
afirma la unidad dual de Dios en el hombre y del hombre en Dios [sic!]. Cf.
Chapter ii above.
Ellacura 1978b, 73: [] el por qu muri Jess no se explica con independencia del por qu lo mataron; ms an, la prioridad histrica ha de buscarse
en el por qu lo mataron. A Jess le mataron por la vida que llev y por la
misin que cumpli.
Cf. also here Moltmann 1974, 113, 119.

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fied, continuity and discontinuity, etc., actually relate to each other

in Sobrinos outline? I have pointed to a tendency in his writings
towards making a short-cut, which blurs the distinction between
these and weakens the element of discontinuity. Also in my examination of the account Sobrino gives of the death of Jesus, I shall
point to this tendency. It was in order to expose the difficulties that
it entails, and find a way to overcome these, that I brought in the
perspectives of Ricoeur and Croatto in Chapter v. Now I shall show
how their proposals partly alternative, partly complementary to
Sobrinos may provide guidance.
In this chapter I shall also deal with another bipolar structure
which plays an important role in Sobrinos thinking, namely the
opposition between antagonistic and harmonious, or constitutive,
relations. This study focuses particularly on the importance of relationships or relatedness in Sobrinos theology. Sobrino speaks of a
constitutive relatedness as opposed to a traditional ontological
essentialism. In order to reach an adequate understanding of his
thought, it is necessary to pay due attention to how these relationships work. As was shown in the two previous chapters, Sobrino
portrays Jesus as profoundly embedded in relationships. His life,
identity and destiny are all defined and shaped out of and through
these relationships. But they are relationships of two quite distinct
kinds. In Chapter iv I examined the positive, constitutive relationships of Jesus: namely his relation to the Kingdom of God and to
the God of the Kingdom. In Chapter v we saw, on the contrary, the
negative, antagonistic relations which increased in strength during
Jesus historical life: the relation between Jesus as mediator of the
Kingdom and the mediators of the anti-Kingdom, which reflects
the antagonism on a more profound level between Kingdom and
anti-Kingdom, God of life and idols of death.10
As I shall demonstrate, Sobrino answers the question why Jesus
is killed with reference to the antagonistic relationships, whereas the

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radical question of why Jesus dies is dealt with primarily by taking

into account the positive, constitutive relationships. Whether this is
a fruitful mode of procedure, and if so, what results can be gained
from it and what problems it may generate, are accordingly the
major concerns in this chapter.

[1] Why was Jesus Killed? Historical Interpretation

(1) Rudolf Bultmann held that the real significance of Jesus person
and destiny, i.e. his suffering and death on the cross, was grasped
only when the concrete historical origins and circumstances of these
were emptied of importance.11 Jon Sobrino takes the opposite position. For him, the recovery of the concrete historicity of Jesus suffering and death on the cross is a primary concern. The kind of
evasion of concrete history represented by Bultmanns existential
interpretation is hardly better in his eyes than the evasion from history that has upheld the traditional christologies of domination in
Latin America (cf. Chapter iii.) But this devaluation of the historic10 Cf. Sobrino 1983a, 499: Todo lo dicho explica suficientemente por qu
matan a Jess, dada la relacionalidad conflictiva y antagnica con sus ejecutores. Pero no se ha esclarecido la respuesta a por qu muere, pregunta que
se impone por s misma, dada la relacionalidad constitutiva y altamente positiva de Jess con el Padre y su reino.
11 What Jesus means for me, in faith, he says in an essay from 1958, is hardly
touched by a historical point of view. We cannot find him by asking about
his historical origins. His real significance appears only when we refrain from
such a way of posing the question. We shall not ask about the historical
foundation of his life and suffering. Bultmann 1968, 57, my translation,
SJS. As regards the cross, he supports this view by claiming that [] not
even in the New Testament is the crucified preached as if the cross drew its
significance from his life. Bultmann 1968, 61, my translation, SJS.

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ity of the cross did not begin either with Bultmann nor with the
conquest christologies. The tendency is present already in the
New Testament.
There is a tendency to smoothen or even gloss over the scandal
of the cross. As early as in Pauls insistence on the preaching of the
cross to the Corinthians, one can deduce that it must have been a
great temptation for the first Christians to let the enthusiastic celebration of the triumph in Jesus resurrection take such a position
that the cross was regarded only as a brief moment of transition, or
even overlooked totally. It is therefore of utmost importance to Paul
and to the evangelists to show that the resurrected is none other than
the crucified. The tendency to bypass the concrete historicity and
scandal of the cross present already in the New Testament, is
accordingly a tendency which the New Testament itself corrects.
One interesting example of this development, as Sobrino sees it,
is the rapid disappearance of christological titles that link Jesus primarily with his suffering and death, such as the title comparing him
with the Suffering Servant of Is. 53. Instances of comparison
between Jesus and the Servant can be found, especially in traditions
apparently stemming from Peter (Acts 3:13, 26; 4:27, 30; 8:26; 1 Pet
2:22-24.). But they soon became replaced by other titles that stress
Jesus victory and exaltation in heaven, rather than his suffering.12
This tendency took other forms as well. One of them was the
increasing inclination to give priority to cosmological and soteriological aspects. After the resurrection, the questions about the reasons for and possible meaning of the death of Jesus were posed from
the viewpoint of eternity, so to speak: Why did the Son of God have
to die on a cross? When the drama of Easter was seen as Gods
design for the salvation of humankind, the more historical questions naturally lost interest. The cross was thus reduced from a real
historical scandal and tragedy to a noetic mystery. Furthermore,
12 Sobrino 1976, 140.

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according to Sobrino, the attempt was made to explain all this by

using pre-conceived, all-encompassing frameworks and concepts
about god and human being which were not derived from
Jesus.
Why, then, is it so important to recover the concrete historical
character of Jesus death? There are at least five reasons for this, in
Sobrinos opinion. First, because Latin American historical experience shows that the evasion of concrete historicity often implies
harmonising and idealistic interpretative frameworks, which usually
have the ideological effect of supporting status quo. Second,
because it is believed (in line with the soteriological presuppositions set out in Chapter ii) that Christian salvation takes place in
history. Since God is the God of history, Gods saving activity is
realised in concrete history and will make itself felt there. Accordingly, the salvific significance of the cross cannot be grasped apart
from the appreciation of its concrete historicity.
Third, this soteriological significance of historicity is grounded
in the incarnation. Jesus becoming flesh is taken at full force;
Jesus becomes a concrete human being, in concrete historical,
social, political circumstances. Since this has been Gods choice, the
salvation to be found in the cross cannot be explained apart from
these concrete circumstances.13 And fourth, because if one does not
see the cross in its concrete historicity, the scandal of it may easily
disappear. For Sobrino this scandal is crucial for a correct Christian
understanding of the world, of humanity, and of God. There is no
theology of the cross without offence and scandal.14 This scandal
does not pass away even with the faith in the resurrection Sobrino
13 Cf. Sobrino 1976, 150: 6a tesis: La teologa de la cruz debe ser histrica, es
decir, ha de ver la cruz no como un arbitrario designio de Dios, sino como la
consecuencia de la opcin primigenia de Dios: la encarnacin. La cruz es
consecuencia de una encarnacin situada en un mundo de pecado que se
revela como poder contra el Dios de Jess. Cf. Chapter vii [3] (b)below.

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holds, but remains an unfathomable mystery which finds its contemporary parallel in the crosses of history.
This is the ultimate reason for recovering the historicity of the
cross, then: it corresponds to the daily experience of millions of
Christians in Latin America. Again, Sobrino argues on the basis of
the similarity (isomorfismo) of Latin America today and Palestine in
Jesus time. Latin Americans are inclined to ask about the historical
reasons of Jesus death, because they know so many who die like
him today.
(2) Among the first and most difficult questions relevant to a
quest for the historical meaning of Jesus death are those related to
Jesus own consciousness. Did Jesus expect to die a violent death?
And if so, did he accord his forthcoming death a particular meaning?
Sobrino maintains that Jesus must have understood what was in
store for him. The whole climate of his mission was one of confrontation and persecution, and increasingly so. Jesus was a man in
conflict. That this conflict could eventually take serious proportions and have a dramatic outcome, must have become gradually
clear to Jesus. Ever since the violent death of John the Baptist, Jesus
must have lived with this risk. Furthermore, since he saw himself
and his own mission in line with those of the prophets, persecution
to the point of death would also be seen as indeed a possible consequence of his activity.15
It is important to emphasise this, according to Sobrino, because
it shows Jesus fidelity and loyalty to his mission. Jesus continues to
correspond to the reality of the coming Kingdom and the goodness
of the God-Father, in spite of all the opposition that this brings
14 In underlining this aspect, Sobrino can be seen in the tradition of inter alia
Martin Luther and Sren Kierkegaard, see McCracken 1994.
15 Sobrino 1991d, 317ff.

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him. It shows Jesus freedom: his voluntary decision to continue on

the same journey towards the mystery of God, even when this journey apparently leads to failure. And it shows his love and compassion: love of God and of his fellow human beings, unwavering even
in the face of senseless and violent destruction and death.
But does that mean that Jesus actually foresaw the salvific significance of his death? Certainly not in line with the post-paschal
theories and explanation of Jesus death, in terms of sacrificial expiation or vicarious substitution, Sobrino responds.16 Sobrino finds
no grounds for thinking that Jesus attributed an absolute transcendent meaning to his own death, as the New Testament did later.17
But this is not to say that Jesus could not look for and find meaning
in his destiny even positive, salvific meaning, he adds. The important question here is whether Jesus saw his death in continuity with
his life and mission, i.e., his cause, or if it would rather represent a
total rupture with this cause. A clear answer to this cannot be given
from the New Testament texts, Sobrino believes, but important
clues can be found, not least in Jesus eucharistic words, in the
account of the Last Supper (1 Cor. 11:23-27; Luke 22:14-20; and
Mark 14:22-25; Matt. 26:26-29).
Acknowledging that the present, liturgical form of these texts
strongly expresses post-paschal theological concerns, Sobrino nevertheless holds there to be a historical nucleus in them. When Jesus
understood what was going to happen, he organised a solemn farewell meal, during which through words and gestures he interpreted the meaning of his death. What can be clearly seen here
according to Sobrino, is that Jesus seeks a continuity between his
life and cause and the probable death that is approaching. In the
16 Sobrino 1991d, 319, 322.
17 Sobrino 1994c, 201./ Sobrino 1991d,319: En otras palabras, no hay datos
para pensar que Jess otorgara un sentido absoluto transcendente a su propia
muerte, como lo hizo despus el NT.

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face of death, Jesus reaffirms his eschatological hope in the coming

of the Kingdom of God: Truly I tell you, I will never again drink
of the fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it new in the
Kingdom of God (Mark 14:25 par.). Thus he expresses a belief that
his death will not represent a complete rupture with his cause, but
rather, in some way, advance this cause. Again, it cannot be deduced
from the texts exactly in what way, Sobrino says, but in very general terms, his death will be something good for others, for all.18
Seen in continuity with Jesus life, then, Sobrino holds that the
salvific significance that Jesus may have accorded to his own death is
that of sacrificial service. Jesus gives his life to others; he has lived
in service to others, and he dies on behalf of (Gr.: hyper) others.
This is what is subsequently expressed in different salvific themes in
these texts: the body given for you, the blood shed for many,
for the forgiveness of sins, as a new covenant.
Such service until death is not something Jesus reserves to himself alone, however. As he has called his disciples to follow him
throughout the course of his journey, the words and gestures of
Jesus also contain implicitly an invitation to participate in his
death. In the (theologised) version of John 13:15: I have set you an
example, that you also should do as I have done to you. So Jesus
death becomes a motivating example:
Jesus goes to his death with clarity and confidence, faithful to God to the
end and treating his death as an expression of service to his friends [] He
saw that this is good and required of him, and that it is good, and so
required of others. In this sense, we can say that Jesus went to his death with
confidence and saw it as a final act of service, more in the manner of an
effective example that would motivate others than as a mechanism of salvation for others. To be faithful to the end is what it means to be human. 19

18 Sobrino 1994c, 202-203. / Sobrino 1991d, 321: Dicho en forma muy general,
su muerte va a ser algo bueno para otros, para todos.

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By this, we are immediately brought back to Jngels argument outlined in Chapter ii. Does this confirm that Sobrino advocates a
(merely) exemplary soteriology/christology? We must remain attentive to this critical question.20
It may seem that an important shift has taken place in Sobrinos
thought on this point. We have just seen how Sobrino stresses the
continuity between Jesus life and his death, not only on an external
level (that the opposition that he met persisted and finally grew as
strong as to take his life) but also on an internal level: that the kind
of service that followed from his faithfulness to the heavenly Father
was a service that would remain unquestioned even in the face of
death. Now, if we go back to Sobrinos tenth thesis on the death of
Jesus in Cristologa desde Amrica Latina,21 we find quite another
version, in fact, one that seems to be in stark opposition to what has
just been cited:

19 Sobrino 1994c, 203-204. / Sobrino 1991d, 323: Jess va a su muerte con lucidez y con confianza, con fidelidad a Dios hasta el final y como expresin de
servicio hacia los suyos [] Ve que eso es bueno y exigido para l, y que eso
es lo bueno, y por ello, exigido a los dems. En este sentido, puede decirse
que Jess va a la muerte con confianza y la ve como ltimo acto de servicio,
ms bien a la manera de ejemplo eficaz y motivante para otros que a la manera de mecanismo de salvacin para otros. Ser fiel hasta el final, eso es ser
humano.
20 Once again, we also note here the close connection between Jesus soteriological role and his true humanity in Sobrino. Salvation and true humanisation seem close to synonyms. Cf. Sobrino 1993j, 887: La opcin por los
pobres es un modo de ver la historia, de reaccionar hacia ella y de encarnarse
en ella; pero es tambin la manera de llegar a vivir como ser humano. Es salvacin.
21 This chapter, La muerte de Jess y la liberacin en la historia, was published as early as in 1975: Sobrino 1975b.

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What typifies the death of Jesus, and what differentiates it from the death of
other religious and political martyrs, is that Jesus dies in complete rupture
with his cause. Jesus feels abandoned by the very God whose approach in
grace he had been preaching.22

It seems at least reasonable to assume that a significant change in

accentuation has taken place here, which may also reflect a growing
independence from Moltmanns suggestions. One could however
contest this assumption by saying that the two positions may not be
as contrary as they appear, if one takes into account the difference
in perspectives, or put otherwise: if one notes a certain chronological development between them. The fundamental question that we
just dealt with was whether Jesus before his death was expecting
what was going to happen and if so, whether he did interpret this
possible ending in continuity with his cause and his life. Although
in a tentative manner, Sobrino has given an affirmative answer. The
issue at stake in the tenth thesis is whether there still is such continuity in the very moment of death, so to speak, and when seen
from a theological perspective. Now the answer is negative.

22 Sobrino 1978a, 217. / Sobrino 1976, 162: Lo tpico de la muerte de Jess, a

diferencia de la muerte de otros mrtires religiosos y polticos, es que muere
en ruptura con su causa: Jess siente el abondono de aquel Dios a quien l
predicaba que se acercaba en gracia. Compare Moltmann 1974, 56: Jesus
suffered and died alone. But those who follow him suffer and die in fellowship with him. For all that they have in common, there is a difference. See
also p. 149: But as we have shown, for Jesus, according to his whole preaching, the cause for which he lived and worked was so closely linked with his
own person and life that his death was bound to mean the death of his cause.
It is this which makes his death on the cross so unique. This uniqueness has
to do with God, according to Moltmann: Why did Jesus die? He died not
only because of the understanding of the law by his contemporaries or
because of Roman power politics, but ultimately because of his God and
Father. The torment in his torments was his abandonment by God. Ibid.

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But even with this harmonising interpretation, the statements

are not easily conciled. If there has been a change here, then that
change may have something to do with the emerging theme of the
crucified people(s) in Sobrinos theological reflection.23
(3) Let us now turn to the issue of Jesus trial(s). Historically, the
conflicts in which Jesus becomes involved lead to his trial.24 This
trial is both religious, since the primary conflict is with the religious
authorities of his people, and political, as we see from the way he is
finally executed. Crucifixion was a sentence that could be meted out
only by the Roman authorities. And the final justification for this
conviction is expressed in the inscription on the cross: Jesus is condemned for pretending to be King of the Jews, and thereby a suspected subversive rebel in the eyes of the Roman authorities.
The historicity in detail of these trials is very much disputed.
Sobrino does not intend to supply any new evidence to that
debate.25 But he finds it to be beyond doubt that there was, at a
minimum, some public reason for putting Jesus to death, and that
this was carried out as the gospel narratives show, both by Jews and
Romans.26
Having considered Sobrinos argument for the importance of
recovering the concrete historicity of the reasons for Jesus death,
this modest ambition with regard to reaching a more secure historical foundation for the passion narratives gives rise to a certain perplexity. Was not the historical that important after all? It is clear
23
24
25
26

Compare Sobrino 1983a, 499.

See Chapter v, above.
Sobrino 1991d, 324.
One of the main proponents of the third quest, John Dominic Crossan, is
of a different opinion: (T)he Trial is, in my best judgment based entirely on
prophecy historicized rather than history remembered. It is not just the content of the trial(s) but the very fact of the trial(s) that I consider to be unhistorical. Crossan 1995, 117.

355

that it is not the historical-factual in a scientific meaning

which is Sobrinos concern. His concept of history is history experienced and remembered, i.e. interpreted, and then retold from a particular point of view, with particular interests and motives.
What is of primary interest to Sobrino is to show that the trial
against Jesus takes place also on a more profound level. As the conflict regarding Jesus is actually the struggle of the gods the God of
life against the idols of death the process against Jesus also
becomes a process against his God. And since the trials are both
religious and political, it means the God of Jesus is challenged by
two other gods: the god of the Law, of the temple, of the cultic sacrifice of the Jewish religious authorities on the one hand, and the
political god of the Romans, i.e., Caesar, on the other.27
The particularity and problem, it seems to me of Sobrinos
reasoning here, is that he insists that this other level, the struggle
of gods, is still the historical level. Through reconstructing the concrete historical circumstances around Jesus death, Sobrino claims to
show that what it is all really about is this theologal-idolatrous
struggle. This is where what I have called the short cut -tendency
i.e., a seemingly immediate move from reality or history to
theology and vice versa is notable again. In hermeneutical terms,
27 This framework is clearly expressed in theses 7 and 8 on the death of Jesus in
Sobrino 1976, 152-161: 7a tesis: Jess es condenado por blasfemo. El camino
de Jess al la cruz es un proceso sobre la verdad de Dios: o el Dios de la
religin, en cuyo nombre se puede someter al hombre, o el Dios de Jess que
es predicado como la buena noticia de la liberacin del hombre [sic]. La cruz
deja abierta la pregunta por la verdadera esencia de la divinidad. Sobrino
1976, 152. 8a tesis: Jess es condenado como agitador poltico. El camino de
Jess a la cruz es un proceso sobre el veradero poder que media a Dios: o el
poder del imperio romano y tambien los celotas o el poder de Jess. Este es
el amor situado y en este sentido un amor politico, no idealista. Desde la
cruz se agudiza la pregunta por la verdadera esencia del poder. Sobrino
1976, 156.

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this short cut implies a failure to make explicit every move in the
process of interpretation. Ricoeurs and Croattos contributions
show a way to avoid this, without thereby losing the substantial
point that Sobrino wishes to make in terms of theological content.
But let us first briefly review Sobrinos position on the trials of Jesus.
(a) With regard to the religious trial, Sobrino considers that the
underlying objective reason why Jesus was convicted was his
attacks in words and deeds on the Temple (Matt.26:61; Mark
14:58; cf. John 2:15).28 His attacks were not just critiques on certain
aspects of the Temple cult, but rather expressed a distinct and contrary alternative to the Temple.29 Harsh as their attitude may seem
in a post-paschal perspective, it is therefore nevertheless not difficult
to understand that the religious leaders felt offended and threatened
by Jesus. His provocative stance with regard to the law, expressed
clearly in his deliberate transgression of the law regarding the Sabbath, made him in the eyes of scribes, Pharisees, and priests guilty
of blasphemy. This would in itself be reason enough for the religious leaders to have him condemned to death. But the issue gets
even more antagonistic with the controversy regarding the Temple.
That the culmination of this conflict evolves around the significance and role of the Temple, is for Sobrino consistent with the
underlying struggle of gods and of their mediators and mediations:
[] the reason for Jesus condemnation is absolutely consistent with his
rejection right through his life. The anti-Kingdom (a society structured
around the Temple in this case) actively rejected the Kingdom and its mediators. What the religious trial makes clear even at an editorial level is that
the gods too are at war [] Jesus is condemned in the name of a god.30

28 Sobrino 1994c, 204 / Sobrino 1991d, 326.

29 Sobrino 1991d, 326.

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(b) That Jesus preaching and practice ultimately represented a radical threat to the religious authorities is beyond discussion, according to Sobrino. Indirectly, it was a threat to any oppressive power.
But the penalty for serious religious transgressions such as severe
blasphemy or assault on the temple was stoning, not crucifixion.
This is where the trial turns explicitly political. Here it should be
remembered, however, that the sharp distinction between the
spheres of religion and politics is a modern development. In the
days of Jesus the two were intimately connected, as the story of
Jesus condemnation clearly shows.
Politically, Jesus was convicted as a rebel, a dangerous subversive, a threat to Roman rule in Palestine. Sobrino finds the most
reliable sources from a historical point of view in Luke 23:2 and
John 19:12.-15: We found this man perverting our nation, forbidding us to pay taxes to the emperor, and saying that he himself is
the Messiah, a king.31 All of these three complaints about the
activity of Jesus can be traced back to particular episodes related in
the gospels. But at the end of the day, neither of these plausible
causes for seeing Jesus as politically dangerous to the Roman
authorities is the main reason for Pilates final conviction. On the
contrary, Sobrino notes, none of the accusations made against Jesus
really convinces Pilate. The turning point for Pilate is the general
reasoning that is most clearly expressed in John 19:12: If you release
this man, you are no friend of the emperor. Everyone who claims to
be a king sets himself against the emperor.
30 Sobrino 1994c, 206. / Sobrino 1991d, 326-327: Si todo esto es as, la causa de
la condena de Jess es absolutamente coherente con el rechazo a Jess a lo
largo de su vida. El antirreino (una sociedad configurado alrededor del templo en este caso) rechaza activamente al reino y sus mediadores rechazan activamente al mediador. Lo que juicio religioso esclarece, aunque sea al nivel
redaccional, es que tambin los dioses estn en lucha [] Jess es condenado en nombre de un dios.
31 Sobrino 1991d, 327.

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Pilate finds himself confronted with an absolute, i.e. mutually

exclusive, alternative: he can either be a friend of the emperor or a
friend of Jesus. He cannot be both. Because Pilate has to choose
within this necessary disjunctive, Jesus dies.32 Again, what is
expressed at an external level of events is a result of an underlying
structure, Sobrino claims, thus making his usual shift from historical to systematic reasoning:
In systematic language, at the trial there is a confrontation between two
mediators, Jesus and Pilate, representing two mediations, the Kingdom of
God and the Roman Empire (the pax romana). While at the level of the
mediators the progress of the trial is a sequence of individual irrationalities,
its deep logic is clear: the total encounter between Jesus and Pilate. The
confrontation between the mediators reveals the confrontation of the mediations and, above all, that of the divinities that lie behind them: the God of
Jesus or Caesar.33

The language of trials here then, points to something more than

the external legal process leading to Jesus death. It discloses the
continuous conflict going on at the very heart of historical reality:
the struggle of gods. Reality has a theologal-idolatrous structure.
Jesus death is therefore a necessity. Any opposition against the
idols is dangerous. A consistent and enduring opposition in the
name of the God of life is deadly. This necessity has to do with the
incarnation, Sobrino holds. It was not just an incarnation into the
32 Sobrino 1994c, 209. / Sobrino 1991d, 331: Por tener que eligir Pilato entre
esa necesaria disyuntiva muere Jess.
33 Sobrino 1994c, 209. / Sobrino 1991d, 331: Dicho sistemticamente, en el
juicio se enfrentan dos mediadores, Jess y Pilato, de dos mediaciones, el
reino de Dios y el imperio romano ( la pax romana). Si al nivel de mediadores, la marcha del juicio es un cmulo de irracionalidades concretas, su
lgica profunda es clara: el encuentro total entre Jess y Pilato. Y de esa
confrontacin de los mediadores se desprende la de las mediaciones y, sobre
todo, la de las divinidades que estn tras ellas: o el Dios de Jess o el Csar.

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world, but into a world that is anti-Kingdom, which acts against

the Kingdom.34 And once more, Sobrino insists that this explanation is historical.35

[2] Who Killed Jesus: Human Beings or Gods?

Two critical questions must now be posed: (1) Is not Sobrinos historical reconstruction, his historical interpretation of why Jesus was
killed, decisively governed by a pre-conceived (biased) systematic
interest in presenting Jesus death as the result of the struggle of
gods? And (2) does not as a matter of fact the application of a
myth[olog]ical language here lead away from the historical level?
(1) The suspicion that Sobrinos historical reconstruction could be
decisively shaped by a pre-conceived systematic interest, seems wellfounded. Sobrinos historical portrait serves his theological purposes
very well. It is true that a theological reasoning will be at work
explicitly or implicitly in any historical reconstruction of the life
of Jesus. Sobrino makes this circular interconnection of history and
theology a determinative feature of his method: a historical-theological reading. It becomes confusing, however, when, in a chapter
which to such an extent underlines the importance of coming to
terms with the historical causes for Jesus death, he proceeds directly
to a systematic analysis. His reasoning for doing so, is that history
has, in his opinion, a theologal structure.36 Thus, the external
events on a historical level reveal internal or underlying events
34 Sobrino 1994c, 210. / Sobrino 1991d, 333.
35 Sobrino 1991d, 330.
36 Sobrino 1991d, 331.

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on a theological level. This view, which makes it possible at least

in principle to read theology almost directly from historical events
(read the signs of the times), relies on basic presuppositions in liberation theology, as we recall: revelation takes place in history. Salvation is realised in and through history. There is only one history.
I have already pointed out some problems in Sobrinos use of
the term historical. It is, however, only if and when the historicity
of Sobrinos reconstruction or reading turn out to be clearly inappropriate or improbable, that his procedure would actually lead him
astray. In other words, although historical evidence in its more
regular, scientific meaning may not positively verify Sobrinos theological interpretation, it should at least be given the capacity to
question it. It will therefore be useful to ask if Sobrinos version of
the historical reasons for Jesus death does comply with the standards of contemporary biblical scholarship in this field, particularly
as we find it within the third quest?
There is considerable disagreement among scholars regarding the
historicity of the New Testament passion narratives. Luke Timothy
Johnson, a fierce critic of the Jesus-seminar37 and a self-proclaimed
defender of the truth of the traditional gospels, argues that these
narratives should be considered historically credible since they
present a lengthy, sequential and connected story, giving attention
to details, including the accurate time and place of events, about
which there is a relatively high degree of agreement not only among
the synoptics, but among all four Gospel versions. Johnson also
adds to this the way the passion narratives explicitly make the story
of Jesus intersect with the realm of real history:
Jesus is shown encountering well-known institutions (such as the Temple
and the Sanhedrin), persons (namely Herod and Pontius Pilate) situations
37 Cf. Chapter iii [3] above.

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(such as the mob scene in Jerusalem at pilgrimage feasts), and historical evidence (such as that concerning the holding of trials, and who had rights to
execute criminals for certain charges.38

Although Johnsons book is consciously polemical, the opinion he

voices is not exceptional. A more thorough and scholarly argument
is that of Raymond E. Brown, who in his monumental The Death of
the Messiah: From Gethsemane to the Grave. A Commentary on the
Passion Narratives of the Gospels39 also basically confirms the historical plausibility of these accounts.40 Browns work has however
evoked a sharp response from John Dominic Crossan, another leading scholar in this field. Crossans book Who Killed Jesus? Exposing
the Roots of Anti-Semitism in the Gospel Story of The Death of Jesus41
poses a flat alternative to Browns The Death of the Messiah 42, contending that [] (t)he units, sequences, and frames of the passion
narratives were derived not from history remembered but from prophecy
historicized. 43 Crossan holds that we know virtually nothing about
what actually happened during the trial against Jesus and the following execution, because since the disciples had fled from the
scene, those who knew did not care and those who cared did not
know.44 What Crossan positively affirms nonetheless is the barest
minimum: crucified by a conjunction of Jewish and Roman authority under Pontius Pilate at Passover.45
38 Johnson 1996, 111.
39 Brown 1994.
40 Although he expresses himself much more carefully, often applying litotes:
not implausible, not impossible. Cf. Crossans argument on this: Crossan
1995, x.
41 Crossan 1995.
42 Crossan 1995, xi.
43 Crossan 1995, 4. Crossan is here using the term historicize in a completely
different manner than Ellacura and Sobrino, cf. above, Chapter ii [2].
44 Crossan 1995, 219.
45 Crossan 1995, 220.

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Crossan is clearly among the more pessimistic in contemporary

scholarship as regards the historicity of the passion narratives. John
P. Meier, in a review article on the Jesus-of-history research today,
notes the ongoing controversy regarding this topic, which is due to
at least three reasons in his opinion: contradictions among the four
gospels, our uncertainty about Jewish and Roman law in pre-70
Palestine, and religious polemics that plague us still.46 He then lists
different versions prevailing in recent scholarship, each of which is
possible, although concluding that the historian must remain
uncertain.47 The general tendency seems in other words to be
more open towards the possibility of a historical grounding of the
passion narratives than Crossan is, although this openness in no
way implies certainty.
There is, then, in general and at least as a minimum, no strong
evidence against Sobrinos historical interpretation of why Jesus was
killed, according to which Jesus is put to death for having provoked
Jewish religious authorities particularly through his words and
actions against the Temple, and Roman political authorities for having attained a considerable popular following in a movement which
could appear to be implicitly subversive to Roman rule. One must
however ask whether this interpretation might not be defended
even on the basis of the barest minimum of Crossan: crucified by
a conjunction of Jewish and Roman authority.48
But is such a minimum sufficient to be held as norm? If the
historical analyses in line with the second or third quests were to be
46 Meier 1991, 103.
47 Meier 1991, 104.
48 Cf. citation above. Sobrino would find support in Crossan also in his view
on the decisive role of the conflict with the Temple: My best historical
reconstruction concludes that what led immediately to Jesus arrest and execution in Jerusalem at Passover was that act of symbolic destruction, in deed
and word, against the Temple. Crossan 1995, 65.

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all that Sobrino could count on in making in general the historical Jesus norma normans for his christology, and in particular
for recovering the historicity of Jesus death on a cross, then he
would seem to be building on a rather weak foundation. But our
recourse to Ricoeur and Croatto has shown a more solid, and thoroughly hermeneutical foundation for historicity. If we follow
Ricoeur, historical analyses of this kind belong to the explanatory
move, which, as we remember, is a completely legitimate and necessary although not sufficient step on the way to understanding or
comprehension. It is, as we recall, a step leading from a first
naivet to a second naivet.
Sobrino may draw support from such historical analyses, but
should not rely completely on them as fully accomplished interpretations. If he does not wish to take into account such analyses, he
will easily fall into what Croatto calls the pitfall of concordism
an uncritical search for correspondences between real-life situations
and occurrences related in the scriptures. If his interpretation is in
conflict with these historical analyses, then we have difficulty in
arguing that his position has come past the level of first naivet, of
spontaneous fideism. This would hardly be a way of making historicity normative. On the other hand, if he remains content with a
recourse to a historical analysis and cuts short his argument there,
then it will not be a fully completed process of interpretation. He
should not, in other words, give these historical analyses normative
status alone.
Furthermore, we learned from Ricoeur that what links understanding and explanation together when it comes to interpreting
historical events, is the category of narration. The narrative precedes
explanation; one has to enter into its dynamics, follow its thrust and
development, and be open to its surprising turns. But at the same
time the narrated story calls for explanation. There is a certain logical continuity in it. The end has to be acceptable in some sense, in

364

order to be understood. In short, interpreting a historical narrative

calls for an interplay of explanation and understanding.
Adding to this Croattos insistence in the crucial role of the contemporary praxis which generates the reading of the narration of
past events, past praxises, we may now again turn to Sobrinos
emphasis on the historicity of the passion narratives. Is the historicity of Sobrinos interpretation secured in this wider meaning?
It seems to me that it is. And this is, in my judgement, actually
one of the strengths and particularities of Sobrinos approach.
Again, it has to do with his point of departure. When asking about
the historical grounds of the story of Jesus suffering and death,
Sobrino places himself consciously in the place (lugar) and praxis of
suffering and persecuted Christian communities in his surroundings. From this place, he confirms a posteriori the historical verisimilitude of the biblical passion narratives. This is what Sobrino
confirms when he finds nothing mysterious in Jesus death,
because it is a frequent occurrence.49 Sobrinos application of historicity as normative is, in fact, done with a conscious interrelation
of the two poles of historical experience: past event and present
praxis.
As regards the two steps, which we, with Jeanrond, prefer to
call dimensions of historical interpretation according to the
Ricoeurian model (from understanding to explanation, and from
explanation to understanding or comprehension), Sobrino does not
systematise his approach in this way. Although this is not always
clear, as I have noted earlier, it seems to me that the historical analyses in Sobrinos outline mainly play the role of explanatory moves
which are given a correctional, although not definite or ultimate
function in his interpretation. Ricoeurs model helps us see this
more clearly, and may therefore secure Sobrinos approach against
possible misinterpretations arising from the correct observation of a
49 Sobrino 1994c, 209. / Sobrino 1991d, 332-333.

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certain inconsistency, or lack of balance between Sobrinos rhetorical emphasis on recovering and giving normative status to the historical basis, and the highly relative role played by more traditional
historical analyses in the strict sense in Sobrinos overall theology.
The weaknesses inherent to a methodology which tends to make
hermeneutical short cuts, may thus be overcome.
This means, in other words, that I hold that historicity as normative in Sobrinos approach should be understood in this wider,
Ricoeurian sense, and that, when so understood, it is a possible and
sound methodological criterion.
Coming back to my critical question regarding a possible preconceived systematic interest governing Sobrinos historical quest,
then, it must be said that 1) this interest is not illegitimate, but necessary in order to fulfil the task of interpretation, and 2) when
checked against contemporary historical findings Sobrinos tenets
are not invalidated; these findings (or at least the major thrust of
them) do in fact support Sobrinos interpretation, and may play the
role of an explanatory move in the process of reaching a fuller comprehension of the past; in casu the chain of events leading to Jesus
death on a cross.
Hence, Sobrino may well proceed from this historical interpretation to a more systematic theological one, which is what he does
when he interprets Jesus trial in terms of the scheme of the struggle
of divinities and their mediations.50 But what is actually implied in
this move from historical to theological? It is time to turn to our
second critical question.
(2) In Chapter v we were troubled by Sobrinos insistence in the historicity of the anti-Kingdom and its mediators, the idols or gods
or more plainly, although Sobrino avoids using these more common
terms devils, demons, or the Devil.51 Here it seems that he is
advocating a mythological and strongly dualistic world-view. Real-

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ity itself has a theologal-idolatrous structure. This is the reality that

reacts against Jesus and puts him to death. If this is so, it is not difficult to see why the move from historical to theological judgements
is such a short one, because then any study into the historical reality
will implicitly and almost in directo supply theological insights. At
the very bottom, historical reality is theological.
But if one accepts this point of view, and then tries to see it
within the framework of Sobrinos complete theological project,
then the existence of these idols becomes even more troublesome.
Is not Sobrino ontologising evil in a way that is actually subverting his whole theological project, by turning history, human beings
and reality itself into a real battlefield in which Jesus and his followers, and thereby seemingly God too, fall victims? Would not
such a world view encourage escapism, fatalism or resignation
50 Sobrino 1991d, 324 /Sobrino 1994c, 204. Again it should be noted that
Sobrino is not the first one to make this move from historical to theological
trial. The extent to which he is indebted to Moltmann for this interpretation
can be seen clearly in the following citation: The history of Jesus which led
to his crucifixion was rather a theological history in itself, and was dominated
by the conflict between God and the gods; that is, between the God whom
Jesus preached as his Father, and the God of the law as he was understood by
the guardians of the law, together with the political gods of the Roman occupying power. Moltmann 1974, 127. On the same page, we can find a citation which would almost be Sobrinos christology in nuce: But this death
cannot be understood without his life, and his life cannot be understood
without the one for whom he lived, his God and Father, and that for which
he lived, the gospel of the kingdom of the poor.
51 But note that the New Testament uses the Devil, etc. with more restraint
than the Church Fathers: As the Christian tradition took shape during the
early centuries, the way in which Satan and the demonic realm came to be
understood underwent some changes. In particular, there was an increasing
tendency to personify the devil as an individual being defeated by Christ on
the cross. Gunton 1988, 62. For a critical and thought-provoking study of
this development and its origins, see Pagels 1995.

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rather than responsible action in a praxis guided by faith in the God

of life and hope in the future? In short, who killed Jesus human
beings or gods?
I think that this apparent impasse in Sobrinos theology can be
solved by, first, paying due intention to Sobrinos critique of traditional ontology or essentialism. He replaces it, as we have seen, with
a relational approach. If we apply the category of constitutive relationality to the reality of anti-Kingdom and idols, then it
would mean that these exist in history to the extent that they
enter into relationships with persons, groups, forces in history and
configure or effect the development of things. What we are dealing
with here then, is an existence, a being that makes itself felt in history through relationships and effects. Such an understanding
would be in concordance with Sobrinos argument that we can
know that idols exist in history and particularly know this, experience this, in Latin America since they produce mortal victims. We
are not dealing here with an ontological dualism. The existence of
the idols depends on their being believed in, adored and served in
actual practice52 implicitly or explicitly, knowingly or not! What
we have here is rather images and functions of gods, not the
things-in-themselves. In other words: idolatry is real idols are
not. This, I think, should be more clearly spelled out than is the
case in Sobrinos texts, so far.
However, if I am right in this interpretation, then another crucial question must be raised immediately: is the status of Gods
existence of a similar kind? If God and gods are rivals, and the existence of gods depend on their relationality and effect in history,
does that mean that when Sobrino speaks of God, he speaks of a
similar constitutive relationality? To put it sharply: is Gods existence dependent on actual, historical faith in God?53 I shall have to
return to this below.54
52 Remember the praxical character of idolatry, cf. above, Chapter v [2].

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Second, I think the confusion regarding the actual status of

these anti-Kingdom-forces occurs because Sobrino, in this aspect, at
times confuses, at times completely overlooks the difference
between what Ricoeur calls explanation and understanding,
explanatory and exploratory moves. Myths and mythological
language are both legitimate and necessary even in scientific reasoning, according to Ricoeur. However, their principal function is not
explanatory. One cannot explain historical causality, for instance, by
a direct reference to myths. Rather, myths as symbols, models,
and metaphors are exploratory. Their potential is creative and
revelatory, they open up possible worlds in front of the texts, and
possible modes of existence for the interpreter in (the light of ) this
new world opened up by the myth. A mythological language allows
human beings to explore and try to grasp what lies beyond that
which is directly observed.
When Sobrino asks about the historical reasons for Jesus death
and answers by reference to the competing gods the God of Jesus
or the gods of Romans and Jews , he confuses these different
aspects of linguistic use, in my opinion. Seeing the process against
Jesus ultimately as a process on a theological level expressed in a
mythological language of battle of gods may be fruitful and
totally adequate. But it is not an historical explanation of the chain
of events. Why is this distinction important? It is important because
a direct reference to myths on a historical level without a due
hermeneutical awareness easily becomes dangerously manipulative, making human beings puppets in a cosmological drama which
they cannot influence and for which they have no responsibility.
Examples of such manipulative (mis-)use of myths abound. Using a
53 Compare the words of the famous Norwegian hymn by Petter Dass: God is
God, though every human being were dead. Gud er Gud om alle mann var
dde.
54 See Chapter viii [2].

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mythological language to explain why Jesus was killed, without

making the necessary explications and modifications, is thus counterproductive to Sobrinos own christological project. Human
beings in their complex interweaving in social relationships,
power-structures and organised interests killed Jesus, not gods.
That the priorities and actions of these human beings may be interpreted in a theological perspective as expressions of, or effects of,
their actual relationship to or even worshipping of gods in the
relational meaning argued for above, is another issue. This is most
likely the intention of Sobrinos thinking at this point. It is however,
not clear enough and in my opinion all too open to misinterpretations.
So why was Jesus killed? Sobrino, like Moltmann and Ellacura, sees
the cross as a direct consequence of Jesus life and mission. There
was an intimate relationship between the way Jesus lived and the
way he died. His death was no unfortunate coincidence; nor was it
only a mistake. People in power wanted to get rid of him, so they
consciously planned for it, and finally managed to realise their
plans. Although the trials against Jesus were as unjust as they were
irrational as the confused and diverging testimonies about them
show Sobrino finds in one sense nothing mysterious in Jesus
death, because it is a frequent occurrence.55 But he does find an
immense tragedy in this, though not primarily because it happened to Jesus
who was later recognized as the Son of God but because it occurs to so
many human beings, also sons and daughters of God. The fact that it was
the Son of God who was killed adds an incomparable depth to the tragedy,
but it is not its first expression.56

Here our primary interest, the relationship between the crucified

and the Crucified, clearly moves into focus again. As Jesus was put
55 Sobrino 1994c, 209. / Sobrino 1991d, 332.

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to death, so people are put to death today. Theologically considered

it is the same reality of sin, of anti-Kingdom, of idols that revolts
against the God of life and produces victims today.57 This situation cries out for a change for transformation, liberation, in a
word: salvation.

56 Sobrino 1994c, 209-210. / Sobrino 1991d, 332-333: Por qu matan a Jess

queda muy claro en los evangelios. Lo matan, como a tantos otros antes y
despus de l, por su tipo de vida, por lo que dijo y lo que hizo. En esto no
hay nada de misterioso en la muerte de Jess, pues ocurre con frecuencia.
Pero s hay en ello una inmensa tragedia, aunque no en primer lugar porque
lo ocurriese a Jess, quin ser reconocido como Hijo de Dios, sino porque
ocurre a muchos seres humanos, hijos tambin de Dios. El que sea el Hijo de
Dios a quien matan, aade una profundidad sin igual a la tragedia, pero no
es su primera expresin.
57 Is this perhaps where Sobrino parts company with Moltmann? Not completely, as yet. This focus is much more in the foreground in Sobrinos recent
writings than in Moltmann. But Moltmann does also explicitly note: There
are correspondences between the suffering of Jesus and the suffering of the
apostles and the martyrs. But the legitimation of these analogies is found
only in the identity of the person of Christ in the crucifixion and resurrection, which is determined by theological considerations. Moltmann 1974,
124. That Sobrino also sees Jesus death as constitutive in relationship to
the other deaths, is something to which I have pointed earlier. That Sobrino
furthermore holds there to be some kind of discontinuity between these, can
be seen from the incomparable depth of which he spoke in the citation
above. See also Sobrino 1976, 162. The main difference between the interpretations of Sobrino and Moltmann lies, in my view, partly in the degree of
elaboration of the theme of this relationship, and partly in the content of
these theological considerations to which Moltmann here refers.

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[3] Why Did Jesus Die? Soteriological Interpretation

Jon Sobrino maintains that the tragic ending of Jesus life was not
fortuitous, but the culmination of a historical and given the status
of historical reality necessary process. Jesus met persistent and
progressive persecution from both Jewish and Roman authorities,
who saw in his preaching and activity a potential, and even actual,
threat. In short, Jesus was killed for what he said and what he did.
Such an historical interpretation of Jesus death has considerable
support in the biblical sources, and is highly recognisable and therefore probable when seen from the viewpoint of contemporary Latin
American history. That the ones who challenge the prevailing power
relations whether violently or not are put to death, is an experience that has been repeated time and time again. Sobrino has lived
this experience himself, communally and personally.
When seen from this angle, then, Jesus death is explained from
the antagonistic, negative relationships that he is embedded in. He
opposes historically powerful forces and therefore has to pay the
price. But what about his constitutive, positive relationships? What
about the coming of the Kingdom when its mediator dies? What
about the confident approach to the God of the Kingdom as a loving and trustworthy Father when Gods Son, Gods faithful servant, is put to death? If God is the God of life, and Gods Kingdom
signifies life to the poor always open to a more why is the life of
Jesus cut short, so that the Kingdom seemingly turns out to be less
than was promised, expected, and hoped for? Why does premature,
unjust death continue to reign in history?
From the historical fact of Jesus death arises, almost automatically, the soteriological question of the significance, the meaning of
this death. As we can see, this question is closely related to the question of who Jesus is. Although any premature and unjust death is
shocking, this death has an incomparable depth added to its tragedy

372

 in Sobrinos wording since the one who dies is the one believed
to be Son of God.
At this point I should like to make three points of a more general character: First, this almost automatic move from a historical
to a soteriological mode of questioning is Sobrinos way of coming
to terms with one of the main problems in christological reflection
since the Enlightenment: the question of how a contingent, particular event in history can be thought of as having universal significance. Here, Sobrino procures to build his bridge over the ugly
great ditch of G. E. Lessing, the gulf between accidental truths of
history and necessary truths of reason.58 He does so not by harmonising the two, but by rooting them in contemporary, historical
experience. It is from within a concrete experience of suffering and
struggle for survival and for a better future that the question about
the universal through time and space salvific significance of
that which happened to Jesus becomes existential. Thus, the tension
between the two is not solved, but it can be dealt with in a coherent
manner. Sobrinos methodology (as that of liberation theology in
general), complemented with and corrected by the RicoerianCroattan approach, may thus show a way towards bridging the
ugly great ditch.
The second point has to do with the apparent shift in accentuation in Sobrinos christology noted above. Sobrino answers the
question of Jesus identity by reference to his relations. When analysed from the antagonistic relationships then, there is a continuity
between Jesus life and his death. But when we see his death in the
light of the constitutive relationships with the Kingdom and GodFather, there is a complete discontinuity, a rupture. In this sense, the
tension and apparent contradiction revealed above seem less prob58 This dilemma formulated by Lessing (d. 1781), can be found in his Theological Writings, A&C Black 1956, p. 83. Cf. Macquarrie 1990, 177-178, and
McGrath 1994, 314f.

373

lematic, although not solved. The question of how to come to terms

with the fundamental discontinuity, remains unanswered.
Finally we should note that Sobrino follows a common trend in
modern theology going back to Schleiermacher, in refuting the traditional separation between the christological question (who Jesus
is) and the soteriological question (what Jesus achieves for us).59 The
two questions are ultimately united, and can only be answered in
close connection, according to this modern view. The key to this
interconnection in Sobrinos outline is in my judgement the category of constitutive relationality. Jesus becomes who he is through
these relations. We can take part in, receive the blessings that Jesus
life-and-death brings through our taking part in similar constitutive
relationships: with Jesus the Liberator, with the Kingdom of God,
with the God of the Kingdom.60
Having made these initial observations, we are ready to approach
Sobrinos soteriological tenets with a closer attention. On the background of what we have called the crucifying conflict, the root of
the soteriological problem according to Sobrinos theology, anyone
familiar with the history of Christian soteriological frameworks
would now expect the so-called classic theory to play a major part
in Sobrinos soteriological interpretation of Jesus death. This theory, which was rediscovered and rehabilitated by the Swedish theologian Gustaf Auln in his famous Christus Victor (1931), has as its
central theme

59 Cf. also Philipp Melanchthons (1497-1560) famous dictum: Christum cognoscere est beneficia eius cognoscere. For a criticism, see Lnning 1984, 693.
60 See Sobrino 1976, 7: Por ltimo creemos que el Jess histrico es el principio hermeneutico para acercarnos tanto noticamente como en la praxis
real a la totalidad de Cristo, donde se realiza realmente la unidad de cristologa y soteriologa.

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[] the idea of the Atonement as Divine conflict and victory; Christ

Christus victor fights against and triumphs over the evil powers of the
world, the tyrants under which mankind is in bondage and suffering, and
in Him God reconciles the world to Himself.61

Auln contended that this dualistic-dramatic view was the dominant soteriological idea of the New Testament, and that it continued to have such a fundamental importance during the first
millennium of Christian history. Although these contentions were
overstated,62 there was no doubt that Auln had correctly uncovered a major trend of Christian soteriological thought that had
largely been forgotten in the centuries of struggle between an
objective approach dating back to Anselm of Canterbury (1033
1109)63 and a subjective approach, usually attributed to one of
Anselms earliest critics, Peter Abelard (1079 1142).
Strangely enough, Sobrino does not pay any attention to this
classic soteriological model,64 nor does he elaborate on the basic
New Testament themes of this model, such as salvation as victory,
struggle, ransom, redemption, etc. He mentions it only in a
footnote and in a quick rejection in passing.65 Given the fundamental importance of the theologal-idolatrous structure of reality in
61 Auln 1931, 17-22.
62 John McIntyre deems it inaccurate to give the classic theory such preeminence as Auln does. It is the case of a brilliant idea being over-stated.
McIntyre 1992, 43. Cf. McGrath 1994, 347-348; and a more elaborated critique in Gunton 1988, 54-59.
63 His classic work is Cur Deus Homo (1098).
64 His silence about Aulns seminal work is however understandable when one
takes into account that that work hardly enjoys the same status as classic
within Catholic theology as it does in the Protestant field. Furthermore, one
should remember that Sobrino does not discuss the historical development
of the soteriological dogma through the ages, but chooses to concentrate on
its beginnings.
65 Sobrino 1991d, 368. n.4 and Sobrino 1991d, 371 / Sobrino 1994c, 228.

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Sobrino, which I have discussed at length, this is highly surprising.

But before we can look for possible reasons for this significant
option, we must see what Sobrino positively affirms about the
salvific meaning of Jesus death on the cross.
(1) First of all, Sobrino repeatedly emphasises that the death of Jesus
is a scandal: a scandal that cannot be removed even after the resurrection. Yet it soon becomes a necessity for the community of faith
particularly after the resurrection experience to try to come to
terms with this scandalous fact of Jesus death on a cross. These
attempts start out as tentative explanations and are gradually developed into models and conceptions that intend to grasp not just how
this could happen, but also what positive significance this could
possibly have for the followers of Jesus, for the people, and ultimately for humanity and the world as a whole. The aporia with
which the early members of the community of faith find themselves
confronted, is how the ultimate good salvation is related to the
ultimate tragedy and evil the death of the Saviour.
How do they respond? The New Testament testifies to various
approaches, Sobrino points out.66 With respect to the first question
how this could happen one early way of coping with it is to see
Jesus death as the death of a prophet. The history and destiny of
the great prophets in the traditions of Israel were well known to the
people. For the believers, Jesus death would fit well into such a
scheme. He had lived and acted, denounced and announced like a
prophet; so he died like a prophet. But at the same time, the believing community would not hold this to be sufficient. In their eyes,
Jesus was like a prophet, but he was also more than a prophet. He
was the Messiah, he was Son of God. Accordingly, the comparison
with other prophets would carry only a part of the way.
66 Sobrino 1991d, 358-377. Cf. Sobrino 1983a, 499-500.

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A next step in the reflection on the traumatic experience of the

cross was to see it as predicted in the Scriptures. There are several
instances in the New Testament of such apologetic argumentation
from a new exegesis of the Holy Scriptures of the Jews. The main
challenge for the first Christians vis--vis their compatriots was not
merely to proclaim Jesus as the Messiah, but to explain how it was
possible that the Messiah died on a cross. Accordingly, the Scriptures were re-read on the basis of this new experience and concern,
and testimonies and prophecies were found. Nevertheless, not even
these arguments from the Scriptures could actually explain why the
Messiah had to die in such a shameful manner. Hence the believers
find no other resort, no other ground to rely on, than the mystery
of God. It was Gods plan and will that Jesus should die on a cross,
they affirm, boldly: In accordance with his own plan God had
already decided that Jesus would be handed over to you; and you
killed him by letting sinful men crucify him, Peter preaches to the
Israelites at Pentecost (Acts 2:23; cf. 4:28). According to the early
Christian kerygma, then, this happened because it was necessary:
Was the Messiah not bound to suffer thus before entering upon
his glory? (Luke 24:26).
Now, one must listen with great care to what the New Testament actually says when it attributes the death of Jesus ultimately to
God. What is implied in this? Primarily, it shows that in itself, the
cross has no meaning directly discoverable by human beings.67
This, Sobrino holds, is an utterly honest position taken by the New
Testament, because exactly at the point where it is about to find
explanations for the cross, it refrains from giving any such explanation, and leaves the question open in God. In that way, the cross
remains a scandal. But at the same time, this attempt of finding
some meaning in the absurd at least in God, shows on the one hand
the despair of human beings faced with the atrocities of history,
67 Sobrino 1994c, 221/ Sobrino 1991d, 359-360.

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and on the other hand their obstinacy in claiming that there

must be some meaning, in other words, that history is not absurd,
that hope continues to be a possibility.68 At root, it is the question
of theodicy which is raised: how to reconcile evil and injustice with
God? According to Sobrino, the New Testament claims that the
answer is only to be found in God.
The position taken here reminds us of Ellacuras interpretation
of the fourth Song of the Servant that I referred to above69 (which
was subsequently followed up by Sobrino) where he addresses the
most difficult and scandalous aspect of these songs, namely that
they see in the fate of the servant the hand of God: God accepts as
having been wished by himself, as salutary, the sacrifice of someone
who has concretely died for the reason of the sins of human
beings. This is only discoverable in a difficult act of faith, says
Ellacura, obviously having difficulties himself in trying to come to
terms with this aspect of the text.
Likewise, it is with great care that Sobrino treats this issue here.
Having pointed out the positive aspects of this resort to the mystery
of God, he immediately warns about its possible dangers. The relief
that naturally is experienced when explaining a scandal, can easily
lead to a smoothening of this scandal. It becomes logical and necessary, from a human point of view. The scandal ceases to be scandalous, and becomes reasonable. That is the grave error which is
revealed in all Anselmianisms, Sobrino states.70 If the cross
becomes reasonable, it ceases to reveal God: God understood in
advance, is what would make it possible to explain the cross, but
then the cross would tell us nothing about God.71

68
69
70
71

378

Sobrino 1994c, 221/ Sobrino 1991d, 360.

See Chapter ii [2-3].
Sobrino 1991d, 361.
Sobrino 1994c, 221 / Sobrino 1991d, 361.

Here one may recognise a significant current in Sobrinos christology: the influence of the theology of the cross from Paul and
Luther, mediated through Moltmann, and of the great tradition of
the mystics, especially in the way it has found expression in Jesuit
spirituality. Here there is a theologia negativa, with a profound insistence on discontinuity, on mystery, on revelation sub specie contrarii,
on the cross that criticises all human explanation and all natural and
human religion (in the sense of the early Barth), and on the ruptura epistemolgica.72 As I have repeatedly noted also the strong
emphasis on the continuity between Jesus and his followers, Jesus
life and his death, etc. in Sobrino, the vital question is how Sobrino
actually balances this tension. Will it stretch or break?
(2) The second question raised with regard to the meaning of the
death of Jesus is the soteriological question in the proper sense.
How could something good, even the ultimate good, emerge from
such a horrifying event? Here we move from the level of faith that
there is salvation in the cross of Christ to a more explicitly theological level how there can be salvation in the cross.73 In order to
come to terms with this, different theoretical models were introduced by the early Christians, models that subsequently would
grow more sophisticated and speculative. These models have gained
a major significance in Christian soteriological thinking, even to
such an extent that their provisional, tentative character of being
tools to help explain something which in the end is believed to
72 This current is at least in some important aspects less dominant in Jesucristo liberador than it was in Sobrinos earlier works, particularly Cristologa
desde Amrica Latina, as I have pointed out earlier. But here we may appreciate that it is still significant. Sobrinos understanding of the epistemological
breach (see Sobrino 1986, 34ff; and Sobrino 1976, 149) is criticised by Moltmann in Moltmann 1990, 244, see n. 43, p. 372.
73 Sobrino 1991d, 362, a salvation which furthermore now gradually is concentrated in the theme of salvation from sin, Sobrino adds.

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be beyond explanation, often has been forgotten. Again, the imminent danger of this is that the inexplicable scandal and offence
which have been part and parcel of the preaching of the cross since
its very beginnings may disappear.
So it is with due precaution that Sobrino moves to a brief presentation of what he regards as the principal soteriological models
which emerged from the reflection of the first Christians. He concentrates on four such models or frameworks. First there is the
model of sacrifice. The intrinsic logic of sacrifice according to the
Bible is that human beings present what is dearest to them as an
offering to God, in order to show their respect for the sovereignty of
God and so try to bridge the infinite distance between God and
human beings, a distance stemming from human bondage to sin.74
What they present to God they even destroy in order to separate it
from the world of human creatures, making it sacred, i.e. separated from the sinful world of the profane. But having done this,
human beings then symbolically take this offering back again, e.g.
by eating it, now receiving it from the hand of God in the hope that
God has accepted the sacrifice, so that their participation in it now
symbolises and/or effectuates a new community between human
beings and God. The gap has been bridged. The crucial point here
is, in Sobrinos interpretation, whether God accepts the sacrifice or
not.
According to this model then, Jesus death is seen as the perfect
and ultimate sacrifice for the sins of human beings. Sobrino follows
its trajectory from the Old Testament to its culmination and ultimate transformation by radical criticism when applied to the death
of Jesus in the Letter to the Hebrews (7:25; 9:12 and 24 et passim).
Jesus sacrifice is superior to all other sacrifices, the New Testament
affirms. It is without defect or blemish (1 Pet 1:19) and has been
accepted by God. Therefore, it is able to bring salvation. Great stress
74 Sobrino 1991d, 223.

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is put on Gods acceptance, in other words. This is the main criticism the Letter to the Hebrews makes of the earlier institution of
sacrifices. Only Jesus is an offering acceptable to God, it insists.
Then there is the model of the new covenant a model which
also draws its rationale from the Old Testament. The term of a covenant between God and Israel, seen as representative of humanity, is
one of the principal ways to describe the reality of salvation in the
Old Testament. A covenant was sealed by the shedding of blood (cf.
Heb. 9:18). Hence it was natural for the first Christians to see in
Jesus death the sealing of a new salvific covenant, one already
promised in the Old Testament (cf. Jer. 31:31-24). Again, this model
is explicitly taken up by the Letter to the Hebrews, which quotes
the text from Jeremiah twice, in 8:6-13 and 10:16ff. Furthermore, the
new covenant plays a primary role in the accounts of the Last Supper, in the Gospels as well as in 1 Corinthians 11: In the same way,
after the supper he took the cup and said, This cup is the new covenant sealed by my blood. Whenever you drink it, do this as a
memorial of me. (1 Cor. 11:25).
As a third model Sobrino presents the soteriological reflection
related to the figure of the Suffering Servant. Although there are
many indirect references to the Servant Songs in the New Testament75, it seems that the first Christians only gradually, through an
arduous and daring theological effort, came to apply the theological
insights of these songs directly to the death of Jesus, in order to
explain its salvific significance. It is important to remember the
strong and, at the time, well founded obstacles to such an application:

75 Sobrino mentions the following: Parts of Isaiah 42:1-9 are explicitly quoted
in Matthew 12:18-21; 11:10, and implicitly in John 1:32-4 (election), Matthew
3:17 and John 8:12 (to be a light for the Gentiles), and Luke 4:18, 7:23 (to
open the eyes of the blind). Sobrino 1994c, 225.

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These passages are unique in the Old Testament, and were not easily applied
to Jesus, because they assert that a human being sheds blood, innocently, in
the place of and for the benefit of those who deserved to do so, interceding
for them, for their justification and healing. In Israel, before, during and
after Jesus time, such an idea was unthinkable, because human sacrifices
were forbidden.76

This notwithstanding, the early community of faith gradually learnt

to see the death of Jesus in light of the vicarious expiation of the
Servant,77 an interpretative step of great importance for the further
development of soteriological models in Christian thinking.
Finally, Sobrino makes reference to the theme of the salvation
in the cross in Paul, highlighting the centrality of the theme in the
Pauline corpus, its paradoxical characteristic in claiming that the
negative aspects of human experience have become positive 78, and
that the cross means liberation from the law, which initially was
good, but became a curse to human beings because of sin.

76 Sobrino 1994c, 225. / Sobrino 1991d, 366-367: Estos pasajes son nicos en al
AT y no fueron aplicados a Jess con facilidad, pues en ellos se afirma que un
ser humano derrama sangre, inocentemente, en lugar y en favor de quienes
realmente lo merecan, intercediendo por ellos y en favor de ellos: para su
justificacin, su sanacin. En Israel, tanto antes como durante y despus del
tiempo de Jess, esta idea era impensable, pues se prohiban los sacrificios
humanos.
77 [] expiacin vicaria del siervo [] Sobrino 1991d, 370. Sobrino follows Boff in suggesting 4 Maccabees 5:1-17 as a text which shows a parallel
interpretative development. In this text the tragic martyrdom of innocent
children is interpreted in the context of Gods salvific work. Boff explains:
God always wins in the end. Despite the sinfulness of persecutors, God
does not permit the senselessness of their victims death to abide. God transforms it into a vehicle of forgiveness not of persecutors, surely, but of the
sinful people (2 Macc. 6:28, 17:20-22, 18:4, 1:11). Boff 1987b, 76. Cf. Sobrino
1991d, 367.
78 Sobrino 1994c, 227.

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It is not necessary to go deeper into Sobrinos presentation of

these models, since the important point for us is to consider which
answer Sobrino himself finally gives to the soteriological question.
Besides, these models are well-known, and Sobrino stresses that on
this point, he has nothing to add to what others have said.79
I would like to bring to attention, however, exactly this dependence on others. In this rendering of the development of soteriological reflection from the times of the New Testament and
onwards, there is once more an important reference text to
Sobrinos, a text from which he borrows the framework and even
the main content of his own presentation. This time it is neither
Moltmann nor Ellacura who is present between the lines in
Sobrinos text, but another Latin American colleague, Leonardo
Boff, and his Passion of Christ, Passion of the World. If we read these
two texts synoptically, the curious omission or playing down of
the principal concerns of the classic theory by Sobrino comes
clearly to the fore. While Boff presents this model, redemption as
ransom, on an equal footing with the other explicative frameworks,80 Sobrino bypasses it quickly. And when Sobrino draws to
his own conclusions with regard to the soteriological problem as it
is posed on the basis of the New Testament testimonies, then the
perspective of the struggle of gods seems to have disappeared
totally from sight.

79 Sobrino 1991d, 363. Once more, Sobrino shows that he is not hesitant to
borrow from the works of other theologians. See Sobrino 1991d, 358, note 1.
Sobrino also refers to material from E. Schillebeeckx, X. Lon-Dufour and J.
I. Gonzlez Faus.
80 Boff 1987b, 95-96.

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[4] The Cross as Salvific Manifestation

The soteriological models emerging in and from the New Testament explain nothing, strictly speaking, Sobrino audaciously
states.81 These words seek to maintain on the one hand the tentative and fragmentary character of these explicative tools, and on
the other hand the offence which is intrinsically related to the
salvific message of the cross. Precisely because they do not explain
anything, however, it is necessary to try to go beyond them in order
to lay bare what they actually say. What is Sobrinos answer to the
question of how the cross can bring salvation, then? It is twofold:
the death of Jesus on the cross is salvific because it is (1) the manifestation of what is pleasing to God82, and because it (2) demonstrates the credibility of the love of God.83
(1) By expressing the salvific significance of Jesus death by the
phrase the manifestation of what is pleasing to God, Sobrino
highlights the following soteriological aspects:
In the first place, salvation is understood as a manifestation. Salvation seems thus to be something that is revealed rather than effectuated. This revelatory character of salvation comes to expression
repeatedly in Sobrinos treatment: [] its importance for salvation
consists in the fact that what God wants human beings to be has
appeared on earth []; The Jesus who is faithful even to the cross
is salvation, then, at least in this sense: he is the revelation of the
homo verus []; The very fact that true humanity has been
81 Hemos insistido, sin embargo, en que estos modelos nada explican estrictamente hablando, y por eso, hay que precisar, al menos, qu es lo que en definitiva queran decir al afirmar que de la cruz provena salvacin, y qu es lo
que hoy nos puede decir. Sobrino 1991d, 370.
82 La manifestacin de lo que es grato a Dios. Sobrino 1991d, 370-374.
83 La credibilidad del amor de Dios. Sobrino 1991d, 374-377.

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revealed, contrary to all expectations, is in itself good news and

therefore is already in itself salvation: we human beings now know
what we are [] we can assert that love exists []; [] human
beings have been able to see love on earth, to know what they are,
and what they can and should be. 84
This emphasis on manifestation makes it legitimate to ask
whether Sobrino depicts salvation actually as a form of knowledge. It is not, in this case, merely a being informed of something but a much more profound knowledge which seems to be at
the same time historical and existential, personal and communal.
But nonetheless being saved seems then close to gaining knowledge of something. If this is a correct interpretation of Sobrino,
then at least two critical objections must be raised. First, it must be
asked if there is enough support in the Bible and the tradition to
hold this to be the central aspect of salvation in the cross of Jesus
Christ. And second, whether a salvation consisting in revelation or
manifestation and respectively a gaining knowledge of this really
could be seen as having sufficient power to decisively change the
state of reality from which human beings need to be saved. Will this
manifestation/knowledge in fact be able to bring salvation in
Sobrinos terms, liberation to the victims of this world? I shall deal
with these objections below.
In the second place, it is clear that Sobrino from the repertoire
of soteriological models that he reviews chooses to give priority to
84 Sobrino 1994c, 229-230. My emphasis, SJS. / Sobrino 1991d, 373: [] lo
salvfico consiste en que ha aparecido sobre la tierra lo que Dios quiere que
sea el ser humano []; El Jess fiel hasta la cruz es salvacin, entonces, al
menos en este sentido: es la revelacin del homo verus []; El hecho
mismo de que se haya revelado lo humano verdadero, contra toda expectativa, es ya buena noticia, y por ello, es ya en s mismo salvacin: los seres
humanos sabemos ahora lo que somos [] podemos afirmar que existe el
amor []; los seres humanos han podido ver el amor sobre la tierra, saber
lo que ellos son y lo que deben y pueden ser.

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the sacrificial model, although in a distinct version. Starting from

the observation that from the Old Testament times and onward it
was believed that sacrifices would have to be accepted by God in
order to be effective that is, in order to bring about salvation
Sobrino applies this to the death of Jesus. Its sacrificial character
relates to its being accepted by God. Sobrino struggles hard, however, to refute other aspects of the sacrificial metaphor: the death of
Jesus is certainly not to be seen as a sacrifice in an instrumental
manner, nor in an isolated manner. According to the former, God
would actually need the blood of Jesus in order to be able to change
from a condemning God of wrath to a forgiving God of love. The
idea of God taking delight in the death of Jesus, could open for
doloristic and even masochistic associations applied to God,
which Sobrino sternly rejects.85 According to the latter, the moment
of Jesus death would be seen in isolation as that which God
accepts, as if again it is death that God needs in order to renew
life, to save human beings.86
By contrast, that which is pleasing to God, that which is the
true salvific sacrifice, according to Sobrino, is the life of Jesus: a life
in service, love and fidelity, a life poured out for others. The death
of Jesus is salvific because it confirms that Jesus life was of such a
character, that it was governed by unselfish love towards God and
fellow human beings to such an extent that it did not withdraw
even in the face of cruel death. Again, we see the revelatory character in the foreground here. The death of Jesus unveils unmistaka85 Es decir, el NT no afirma ni menos se concentra en el hecho de que porque
hubo sufrimiento hay salvacin, y por eso, ni el dolorismo ni el masoquismo
encuentran justificacin en l, ni menos la idea de que Dios tuviese que
pagar a alguien un rescate oneroso. Sobrino 1991d, 370-371.
86 Lo que no hay que hacer es adecuar en el concepto amor y sacrificio, ni
menos afirmar que Dios se complace y aun exige el sacrificio de la cruz de
Jess. Sobrino 1991d, 372.

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bly, says Sobrino what has been present all his lifetime: steadfast
love.
Now in the New Testament what was pleasing to God was the whole of
Jesus life in words of the Letter to the Hebrews, a life in faithfulness and
mercy and what Jesus cross highlights, beyond any doubt, is that this is
how Jesus life was.87

Seeing the salvific significance of Jesus death in line with the sacrificial model, it is important for Sobrino to underline that it is not an
isolated understanding that he is advocating, but a process-oriented and integral understanding: it is the life-and-death of Jesus
as a whole which is pleasing to God. Furthermore, one should note
carefully that it is not suffering per se which brings about salvation,
but love. It is enduring love in spite of opposition opposition that
causes suffering and even death that reveals that there is a salvific
presence.
I stress these two points because they are of the utmost importance when assessing the theological significance of suffering in
light of Sobrinos reflections on the crucified people. Note the significance accorded to suffering here: it is not instrumental. Suffering does not bring about salvation, but reveals a salvific presence in
history in spite of the obvious and overwhelming opposition and
signs of the contrary: It is a conviction derived from accumulated
historical experience that love has to go through suffering.88 The
blood of Christ shows how costly salvation is, and salvation is costly
because to save is to recompose what has been torn asunder.89
87 Sobrino 1994c, 228. / Sobrino 1991d, 371: Pues bien, en el NT lo que ha sido
grato a Dios ha sido la totalidad de la vida de Jess, en palabras de la Carta a
los Hebreos, una vida en fidelidad y en misericordia, y lo que la cruz de Jess
pone de relieve, sin ninguna duda, es que as ha sido la vida de Jess.
88 Sobrino 1994c, 228. Que el amor tenga que pasar por el sufrimiento es conviccin histrica acumulada. Sobrino 1991d, 371.

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What then is it that is pleasing to God, according to Sobrino? It

is the whole of Jesus life until death, yes; but what in this life? We
have seen at several stages during this inquiry that according to
Sobrino salvation means humanisation.90 God takes such a delight
in the life of Jesus because it shows what it really means to be a
human being. Jesus is the revelation of the true and complete
human being the homo verus, rather than the vere homo, that is
of a human being in whom, as a matter of fact, all the characteristics of true human nature is present.91
At this point one can see clearly how closely interrelated soteriology and christology are in this outline. Jesus salvific significance is
related to his being; what he achieves for us by manifesting that
which is pleasing to God is inseparable from what he is: the true
and complete human being.
Jesus reveals what a true human life should be like according to
the will of God. It is, as we have seen, a life characterised by such
qualities as love, mercy, fidelity, service, faith and openness towards
the mystery of God, closeness and commitment to the poor and
89 This is the way the classic formulation of the Church fathers (rooted in the
Letter to the Hebrews 9:22), without the shedding of blood, there is no salvation, should be correctly understood, Sobrino believes. And he continues:
[] es hasta cierto punto comprensible que los seres humanos hayan asociado la salvacin con derramiento de sangre y, as, con sacrificio. Salvacin
siempre supone recomposicin de algo que se ha destruido, y esa recomposicin es siempre costosa histricamente. La sangre es smbolo de lo oneroso
de toda salvacin que realmente construye lo destruido. Sobrino 1991d, 371.
90 So also Boff 1987b, 66, et passim.
91 Sobrino 1994c, 229. / Sobrino 1991d, 373: El Jess fiel hasta el cruz es salvacin, entonces, al menos en este sentido: es la revelacin del homo verus,
del hombre verdadero y cabal, y no slo del vere homo, es decir, de un ser
humano en el que resultara que se cumplen fcticamente las caractersticas
de una verdadera naturaleza humana. See also Sobrinos treatment in
Sobrino 1982a, 40-50, under the heading Jesucristo verdadero hombre. Trascendencia humana..

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those excluded, welcome and forgiveness towards the sinners and

outcasts. In sum, a human life par excellence is una vida en el amor
hasta el final,92 a life like that of Jesus.
Paradoxically as it may seem, this process of true humanisation
is at the same time conceived as a process of divinisation, or deification, in Sobrinos christology. Becoming truly human means being
shaped in the image of God, because those qualities which are
revealed in Jesus life in love to the end, are the true properties of
God. In order to grasp the internal logic of this argument, it is necessary to keep in mind the link between relationship and transformation in Sobrinos soteriological thinking. The idea of constitutive
relations corresponds closely to the imitatio or sequela -perspective,
which is so basic to Sobrino. Jesus becomes what he is the true
and complete human being through his constitutive relationships
to the Kingdom of God and the God of the Kingdom the true
God. To be truly human means to walk (caminar) towards God,
thus being transformed in Gods likeness. As a human person enters
into a similar relationship with Jesus, and into relationships similar
to those of Jesus, she or he may become transformed in the same
manner: becoming truly human and thereby becoming like God.
True humanisation is divinisation. Salvation means both, at one
and the same time.93
Jesus life-and-death is salvific because it is the manifestation of
what is pleasing to God. Heeding this manifestation, human beings
92 Sobrino 1991d, 371.
93 This unity of and/or distinction between humanity and divinity, anthropology and theology, is a key controversy within modern theology. There is
obviously a dividing line between Protestant and Catholic soteriology on
this point, although there are clear differences of opinion also within Catholic theology, as Milbank has pointed out (see above). Cf. e.g., Jngel 1983,
Lnning 1984, Milbank 1993, 206ff. These different approaches to soteriology goes all the way back to the differences between the Greek and Latin
Church Fathers.

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may now know what they are and what they may become. This is
the essence which is expressed in the sentence: [] human beings
have been able to see love on earth, to know what they are, and
what they can and should be. The manifestation is closely followed
by an invitation, then. Having been shown what is truly human
according to the heart of God, all human beings are invited to realise this true humanity in history, by being shaped in the image of
God through the following of Jesus. The salvific significance of
Jesus life-until-death is, that of a causa ejemplar, according to
Sobrino:
Jesus leaves us with the legacy of being Servants like him. On this principle,
Jesus cross as the culmination of his whole life can be understood as bringing salvation. This saving efficacy is shown more in the form of an exemplary
cause than that of an efficient cause. But this does not mean that it is not
effective: there stands Jesus, faithful and merciful to the end, inviting and
inspiring human beings to reproduce in their turn the homo verus, true
humanity.94

These soteriological tenets of Sobrino invite further discussion and

reflection, and call forth objections. Since we are at the very core of
the Christian message of salvation, we see how important presuppositions with regard to a variety of theological questions are implied,
as for instance funamantal premises in the fields of anthropology,
hamartiology and theo-logy in a strict sense.95 Though I cannot
consider all of these implications of Sobrinos soteriological position, I shall shortly address some principal points, particularly in
94 Sobrino 1994c, 230. / Sobrino 1991d, 373-374: Jess nos deja el testamento
de ser serviciales como l. Segn esto, la cruz de Jess como culminacin de
toda su vida puede ser comprendida salvficamente. Esta eficacia salvfica se
muestra ms bien a la manera de la causa ejemplar que de la causa eficiente.
Pero no quita esto que no sea eficaz: ah est Jess, el fiel y misericordioso
hasta el final, invitando y animando a los seres humanos a reproducir el
homo verus, lo humano verdadero.

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view of their significance for the understanding of the concept of

crucified people. But first, let me consider more closely the issue
of the credibility of the love of God.
(2) The death of Jesus on the cross is salvific because it demonstrates
the credibility of the love of God, Sobrino maintains. What is meant
by this? First of all, it focuses on the means of salvation par excellence, according to Sobrino: love. It is the love of God that effectuates salvation. When all theoretical attempts at explaining what
actually happens in salvation have proved ineffective, there is in fact
one ultimate word which expresses the core of Christian salvation,
and that is love.
The cross does not only save as the culminating point confirming a life that is fully pleasing to God, then. It is also, by Gods own
choosing, the place where God reveals in what way God is pleasing to human beings. It is through the cross that God ultimately
makes self-revelation as love. Salvation is the result of Gods love,
and the cross expresses the ultimacy and credibility of that love.
Therefore, it is salvific. Again there is a stress on salvation as revelation. This time however, it is not the salvation by causa ejemplar,
but by causa simblica: It is not efficient causality, but symbolic
causality. Jesus life and cross are that in which Gods love for
human beings is expressed and becomes as real as possible.96
This means that Jesus is Gods initiative. That the life and mission of Jesus come from God, is not surprising. It is good news and
95 To some extent, one can also see how these fundamental premises reveal
Sobrinos preferred canon within the canon, which seems to be the synoptics and the Letter to the Hebrews in the New Testament and the Servant
Songs (as a whole) and Micah from the Old Testament.
96 Sobrino 1994c, 230. / Sobrino 1991d, 374: La vida y la cruz de Jess es
aquello en que se expresa y se llega a ser lo ms posible el amor de Dios a los
hombres.

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in harmony with the message of Jesus that God is good and that it is
good for human beings that there is a God. But that the death of
Jesus the cross on Golgotha is ultimately the result of Gods initiative, is scandalous. However, this scandalous fact must not be
interpreted in contrast to the love and goodness of God, Sobrino
insists, but in line with it. If the cross of Christ ultimately stems
from God, it must be because God [] could not find any clearer
way of telling us human beings that he really wills our salvation.97
But is this really such a clear way, such a forma inequvoca?
Can the cross of Jesus really be seen as an unmistakable expression
of love?
It is the love of God that brings salvation. Jesus salvific presence
in history is due to Gods own initiative. Here there is continuity: an
unbroken movement from God, in and through Jesus self-giving
life, and back to God. But the cross of Jesus is Gods initiative, too.
Here there is discontinuity, rupture, scandal. What it shows, however, according to Sobrino, is that there is no limit to the love of
God; no limit to Gods salvific will for human beings. Not even the
unbearable ending to the life of Jesus a life which is the ultimate
and definitive expression of that which is pleasing to God could
come between the love of God and sinful human beings:
The New Testaments language is powerful: not even what was dearest to
God, his own Son, placed a limit on Gods showing his love for human
beings. Not sparing the Son is the way of saying that there is no restraint on
Gods love for human beings.98
97 Sobrino 1994c, 231. / Sobrino 1991d, 375: [] no ha tenido otra forma ms
inequvoca de decirnos a los seres humanos que en verdad quiere nuestra salvacin.
98 Sobrino 1994c, 231. / Sobrino 1991d, 375: El lenguaje de del NT es
poderoso: ni lo ms querido por Dios, su propio Hijo, ha puesto lmite a que
Dios muestre su amor a los hombres. No perdonar al Hijo es el modo de
expresar que nada impide el amor de Dios a los hombres (sic).

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So the rupture is bridged, faith discovers in the scandal of the cross

the ultimacy and credibility of Gods salvific love. But nothing is
really explained, Sobrino is quick to add. This affirmation
explains nothing, but says it all.99 There can be no logic here,
only faith.100
This point in Sobrinos soteriology is not clear, though. To the
traditional soteriological question of whether or not a change has
taken place on Gods side related to the drama on the cross,
Sobrinos answer is confusing. There is both continuity and discontinuity, both change and no change here: Jesus did not make God
change; Jesus is the historical sacrament in which God expresses his
irrevocable saving change toward us.101 It seems that the change
on Gods side is a continuous one, flowing out of Gods eternal love
towards Gods creatures. It is not effectuated by Jesus; it is demonstrated through Jesus. And the peak of that demonstration is that
not even the forces of death can extinguish that love. But can a
change be continuous? The implications are unclear.
Sobrinos solution is confusing in another sense as well. He
seems to be arguing a fortiori the fact that God accepts even the
death of Jesus, who is Gods own beloved Son, shows that Gods
love for human beings is even greater. And yet, he insists that
there is no argument here only confessions of faith.
We could hold these points to be paradoxes, and point to the
fact that no christology, if it remains true to the biblical witness, will
be free from paradoxes. Paradoxes will not automatically undermine
christology, because that which its logos is about, is believed to be
99 My translation (SJS), cf. Sobrino 1994c, 231. Sobrino 1991d, 375.: Esta afirmacin nada explica, pero lo dice todo.
100 Sobrino 1994c, 232. / Sobrino 1991d, 376: No hay aqu lgica, sino fe.
101 Sobrino 1994c, 230. / Sobrino 1991d, 374: No es que Jess haya hecho cambiar a Dios, sino que Jess es el sacramento histrico en el que Dios expresa
su irrevocable cambio salvfico hacia nosotros.

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in the end a mystery, which remains mystery even after the logical
reasoning. Nevertheless, it is not insignificant which paradoxes a
given christology contains, and how they function. In Sobrinos
attempt (whether one calls these vague points paradoxical or not)
difficult questions still remain unanswered. In my view, the most
pressing among them are these two: why should Gods love for Jesus
put limits to Gods love for humanity? And does not this make Jesus
death merely a demonstrative drama?
These questions are related to the centrality of the term credibility in Sobrinos approach. Why should the love of God need
credibility? The answer to this is not so difficult when one remembers the historical point of departure for Sobrinos soteriological
question. His inquiry into the salvific meaning of the death of Jesus
is not guided by purely intellectual nor pious interests. It emerges
from the perspective of the depth of contemporary suffering, on
contemporary Golgothas: what does Jesus death mean, when
seen from the suffering and death of millions in our time and history? The love of God that comes to expression through the salvific
life-and-death of Jesus needs credibility because of, and vis--vis,
the victims of this world. Seen from their place, their perspective,
the world still seems unredeemed. How can one know that this
(Jesus life-and-death) is what is pleasing to God, and how can one
believe in the love of God when Jesus still dies, and Jesus followers,
Gods children, continue to suffer and die? Sobrinos answer is that
Gods love can be credible to the victims of this world only if not
even the Godforsakenness of Golgotha where the gods of the antiKingdom triumph is unknown or actually forsaken by God or
Gods beloved son. If the love of God had actually drawn back from
the darkness of Golgotha, then it would not be trustworthy for
those who dwell on the Golgothas of today. Sobrino agrees with
Bonhoeffer: only a suffering God can save us. This is why not only
the life, but also the death of Jesus is Gods own initiative. If God

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had chosen to save Jesus from Golgotha then there would be no

credible salvation for those who experience Golgotha in their lives
today.
What does Jesus cross really say? It says that God has irrevocably drawn near
to this world, that he is a God with us and a God for us. And to say this
with the maximum clarity he lets himself be a God at our mercy.102

Yet the crucified Jesus dies and the crucified people continue to
suffer and die. The soteriological enigma is not solved. If the love of
God endures even the darkness of Golgotha, it is credible. Yet even
if or especially when the love of God is credible: why does it
seem to have no power? Thus the soteriological question is made
even more acute. Gods answer is not ultimately unequivocal. Or, at
least, not until the resurrection. Only faith in the resurrection sees
that Gods salvific love present in Jesus death on Golgotha is not
only credible, but also powerful, that is, able to deliver what was
promised: viz., salvation.103
At this point, regarding the sense in which it can be held that
the cross actually is the result of Gods initiative, I find Sobrinos
texts somewhat indeterminate. Is God actually present or absent on
the cross of Jesus? If the cross is a result of Gods initiative, does that
make God responsible for Jesus death? And what would Gods relation to the crosses of history mean in that case? I shall discuss this in
more detail in Chapter vii.
Sobrinos interpretation of Jesus salvific death ends with this paradox then: in Jesus death Gods salvific action towards humanity
102 Sobrino 1994c, 231-232. / Sobrino 1991d, 376: Qu dice, en definitiva la cruz
de Jess? Dice que Dios se ha acercado irrevocablemente a este mundo, que
es un Dios con nosotros y un Dios para nosotros. Y para decir eso con la
mxima claridad se deja ser un Dios a merced de nosotros.
103 See Postscript below.

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reaches its culmination in that it is the manifestation of what is

pleasing to God, namely a true and fulfilled human life (homo
verus), and simultaneously the ultimate expression of what the true
God is to human beings, namely unwavering, salvific love. This
manifestation is unequivocal and credible because of the death of
Jesus. Love which is ready to pay the highest price is true love.
There can be no doubt about it. But still, this love seems to be without power. Can an impotent, but true love save? The cross is highly
ambiguous, in this sense. Gods love is true and credible but can it
save? Is it really salvific love in a world of victims? The question
remains open.
And still and this is pivotal even before this question is fully
and definitely answered, Sobrino finds salvation in the cross:
There is something in a pure and credible love, even if it is impotent, that
paradoxically generates hope in the power of love as such. [] In this way
God wishes to show us his love on the cross and so save us. 104

What is the link between the historical reasons for Jesus death and
its soteriological and theological significance, according to Sobrino?
What is it that unites the question of why Jesus is killed with the
question of why he dies? As I have already noted, Sobrino prefers to
answer the two questions with reference to different explicative
models a dualistic battlefield-model and a monistic sacrificial
model. This is surprising, given that Sobrino underscores the intimate link between the two questions so strongly. It will therefore
occupy us in the subsections to come.
Yet Sobrino maintains that intimate connection. He does so by
reference to another key concept in christology, namely incarna104 Sobrino 1994c, 232. / Sobrino 1991d, 377: Algo hay en el amor puro y creble, aunque impotente, que, paradjicamente, genera esperanza en el poder
del amor en quanto tal [] De esa manera, Dios quiere mostrarnos su amor
en la cruz y, as, salvarnos.

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tion. The incarnation is not given any extensive treatment in

Sobrinos texts so far, but it does in fact play an important role as a
premise in his thinking.105 He even calls it the first principle of
christology.106 As can be seen from the quotation with which I
opened this chapter, Jesus death is seen as caused by his opponents
who are mediators for the anti-Kingdom, active in human history.
The fact that these forces have power over Jesus, the Son of God, so
that he actually dies, is interpreted as God accepting fully the consequences of incarnation. God has drawn near in love, with a saving
purpose so near as to actually suffer under the sinful and rebellious conditions of human history. Jesus dies because he is
killed. 107
In a sum, this is how I read Sobrinos interpretation of the salvific
meaning of the death of Jesus: the cross of Jesus is the culmination
of a life poured out, given freely for the sake of others, in particular
for the poor and outcast; a manifestation of authentic love in the
midst of the struggles of history. Faith sees in this event the ultimate
revelation to human beings of who God is: a God of steadfast love,
who has drawn so close that not even the death of Gods own Son
can come between God and a lost and bewildered humanity. And
faith sees in this event Gods own manifestation of what a true
105 Sobrino 1978a, 124, 207, 268, 215; Sobrino 1982b, 41, 51, 135, 146, 162-163.
Sobrino 1994c, 229, 243-244.
106 Sobrino 1978a, 124. But note also the warning that a christology which gives
too much prominence to the incarnation may become static and backwardsoriented: Quiz el punto decisivo en esa falta de fidelidad de la teologa cristiana ha sido una cristologa que se agota en la encarnacin, es decir, una
comprensin de Cristo que nos hace mirar al pasado, recobrando as la figura
de Cristo unilateralmente la funcin fundamentante del mito antiguo.
Sobrino 1974.
107 Jess muere por que lo matan, porque Dios acepta hasta el final la encarnacin como lugar del amor y de su credibilidad. Sobrino 1983a, 500.

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human life can be like, lived in and from the constitutive relationships with God and Gods Kingdom, expressed in consistent and
creative service of the poor of this world, the lost and destitute of
Gods world-wide people. In this event, faith sees that Gods love
does not draw back, even in the darkest hour of opposition and suffering. And faith heeds in this event Gods invitation to enter into
relationship with Jesus, and into the same relationships as Jesus: to
the God of the Kingdom and the Kingdom of God. So, faith finds
salvation in this event, even when it cannot know if the salvific love
of God come close on Golgotha actually is powerful enough to
claim victory over the anti-Kingdom, the gods of evil who crucify
the Son of God and continue to crucify children of God.

[5] Jesus the Liberator An Exemplary Martyr?

In this way God wishes to show us his love on the cross and so save
us. Such was Sobrinos concluding statement. Clearly, he lays great
stress on the revelational aspect of salvation. Key concepts in his
soteriology are manifestation, symbol, and example. It should be
noted that this manifestation awaits an answer; it is not a unilateral
statement about the actual state of affairs but rather an invitacinexigencia, a calling into community, into life-giving and life-transforming relationships. This unity of manifestation and invitation is
the kernel of Sobrinos answer to the question of how the cross may
bring salvation.
My main critical objections to Sobrinos considerations in this
difficult matter have already been signalled. Now is the time to spell
them out more clearly, and discuss them. The first relates directly to
this exemplarist emphasis of Sobrinos approach. The second deals
with the choice of (historical-)soteriological models, and the rather

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surprising shift that we have witnessed in Sobrinos use of such

models.
There is no doubt that one may find considerable support for
seeing the cross of Jesus as a demonstration of Gods love for
humanity, both in the New Testament and throughout the history
of theology. Indeed some very important and central New Testament references, such as for instance John 3:16, highlight this aspect
in particular: God loved the world so much that he gave his only
Son, that everyone who has faith in him may not die but have eternal life. And exemplarist approaches have been frequent in soteriology, particularly since the Enlightenment.108 Common to these
have been, first, an underscoring of the humanity of Jesus; second, a
stress on the impact of the cross on human beings (as distinct from
its potential impact on God), an impact that takes the form of
inspiration and encouragement to model ourselves upon the moral
example set us in Jesus himself ; and third, that the principal aspect
of the cross is that it demonstrates the love of God.109
Sobrinos preferred solution to the soteriological question
shares these traits. It is clear that these aspects of the exemplarist
approach are legitimate and even vital concerns to the New Testament witness and to the Christian tradition. Both God and Jesus
are presented in the Bible as examples for human imitation.110 The
difficulty arises, however, when these aspects are stressed too onesidedly; when they are made exclusive, to the detriment and even
oblivion of other, central concerns. This objection echoes to a certain extent the dissenting voice of Eberhard Jngel which I
brought in Chapter ii. As we remember, Jngel claims to be in line
with Augustine and Luther when he sternly warns against an exclusively ethical exemplum christology. The crucial point for Jngel is
108 See McGrath 1993, 622-624; Macquarrie 1990, 175-234. Cf. Moltmann 1974,
201.
109 McGrath 1993, 622.

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whether the story of Jesus Christ is conceived only ethically, as an

example of right human behaviour, only as exemplum, or beyond and
behind that, as a history which effectively changes the being of humanity, as sacrament. 111
My principal dissatisfaction with Sobrinos seemingly unilateral
promotion of the revelational character of salvation perhaps we
may call it the manifestation-invitation model is that it is in one
sense too weak, too modest, and in another sense too moralistic.
Is it really sufficient, or even adequate at all, to say that Jesus
dies so that God may convince human beings of Gods love? No, it is
not, in my view, neither when one takes into account the full
weight of the biblical witness and the Christian tradition, nor when
one contemplates the gravity of the situation or condition from
which human beings, and particularly the victims of history, need
to be saved. It seems to me to be too modest a statement on the
salvific significance of Jesus life-and-death, if it does not more
directly address the question whether God does in fact bring about
a determinative change, a transformation through Jesus. And it is
certainly not helpful if it actually rules out a more direct salvific
effectiveness of the cross than the possible changes which may (or
110 In the Old Testament, Israels calling is to be holy as God is holy, Lev. 11:44;
cf. Matt 5:48. Similarly, the Synoptic Gospels present the cross as something
to be taken up in imitation of Jesus example. In the writings of Paul, the
notion of following an example appears frequently. See particularly
Rom.12:1, where Paul admonishes the believers to present your bodies as a
living sacrifice, in clear echo of the sacrifice of Jesus. Similarly in the Johannine writings. Having noted this, Colin Gunton writes: If, therefore, we are
to establish a case for an objective, past atonement, it cannot be at the cost of
denying the subjective and exemplary implications. The story of Jesus, whatever else it tells, is presented as an example, a supreme pattern to follow
(Heb. 12.2), the one example of a genuine human life in the midst of a fallen
world. Gunton 1988, 57.
111 Jngel 1995, 169.

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may not) occur when human beings see the manifestation and
accept the invitation. Such an understanding seems to imply a too
limited explication of the bold and unexpected New Testament
confessions of what has actually happened on Golgotha. And it is,
in my view, a too low key, too cautious, interpretation compared
with the expectations and hopes expressed by suffering and struggling Christian communities today when they turn to the cross in
faith, and claim to find in it a source of liberation and hope for the
future.
In another sense, a unilateral exemplarist approach tends to be
too moralistic. When too much weight is laid on the human
responsibility and possibility of actually accomplishing salvation
for oneself, for each other, for humanity the imminent danger is
that the gravity and strength of that which hinders salvation from
becoming a present reality in full force is reduced or underestimated, at the same time as the power and ability and even the
good will of human beings are overstated.
This objection actualises traditional differences between Catholic and Protestant soteriologies. The idea of a cooperatio in some
sense present in the process of salvation is central in Catholic teaching in general, and in liberation theology in particular. Nevertheless, I deem it relevant to raise this critique with regards to Sobrinos
outline, because it is not insignificant even within Catholic thinking, actually how this cooperatio is conceived of, and because exactly
when one takes into account the main thrust of Sobrinos christology his point of departure and liberating interest it becomes
crucial not to advocate a too harmonious world view, expressed in a
overly optimistic anthropology and a too weak, and perhaps
abstract, hamartiology.
The issue at stake here may be formulated in the following critical question: Is Jesus the Liberator in the end depicted as an exemplary martyr by Sobrino? Interpreted as a variant of the exemplarist

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approach, this could seem to be an adequate characterisation. The

question is, however, whether it would reflect a fair evaluation of
Sobrinos thinking. Is examplarist approach really all there is to be
said about his outline? Do the critical objections that I have raised
above, with reference to the stern warnings voiced by Jngel,112
really do justice to the complexity and carefulness of Sobrinos reasoning on this point? In spite of resemblances, it is not correct to
present Sobrino as a spokesman for a crude exemplarist model, of
a rationalist, Enlightenment kind. His approach is not as one-sided
in this respect as it may seem. The primary reason for this, is the
centrality of relationships in his outline, and their constitutive and
transformational character. Sobrinos emphasis on relationships may
rescue his soteriology from the pitfalls of exemplarist and purely
subjective solutions. However, this important corrective to a merely
exemplarist model linked to the status and role of relationships is
present in Sobrinos texts more as potential, than as fully developed
arguments.
Salvation is effected by way of relations and consists in new
relationships, according to Sobrino. Since these relations are constitutive, they do in fact cause and effectuate a transformation. Since
they are relations, they transcend the isolationism and individualism
which in turn leads to moralism of a purely subjective approach.
At the same time, since they are relations, they affirm that salvation
is not something which only happens in heaven so to speak in a
cosmological, purely transcendental and abstract sphere, but something which happens between God and humanity/world within
concrete history. It is a restored relationship between them. Thus,
what one from Sobrinos position probably would see as shortcomings of a purely objectivist approach are also avoided. The emphasis on relationships may open up for a kind of cooperatio which does
respond to liberation theologys concerns to maintain the unity of
112 Cf. also Bedford 1993, 290f.

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salvation and history, without becoming purely immanent, activist,

or in dogmatic terms, Pelagian.
Salvation does therefore imply change in Sobrinos approach. It
is not a change in God or an objective change of the status of the
world or of human beings. It is a change in relationships, effectuated through relationships. They are transformational relations.
Once again, it must be asked, however: What is the role of Jesus
death on a cross in this change? Is it merely an example of what a
saving relationship is like, an illustration of how saving relation to
God and Gods Kingdom actually works, a proof that such salvific
relationships take place, and are possible, in history? If so, then the
accusation that Sobrino depicts Jesus as little more than an exemplary martyr may seem justified.
The crucial question here is what it is that constitutes the relationships. Is the possibility of entering into such saving relationships decisively opened up through Jesus life-and-death? Sobrinos
answer to this seems ambivalent, as we see in his diffuse statement
of Gods continuous change towards us,113 and in the unresolved
tension between continuity and discontinuity in his christology,
which I have repeatedly pointed out. In some aspects, it seems that
Jesus is only realising an ever present possibility inherent in the
human and historical condition, responding to an uninterrupted
presence of God in history. Jesus dies, just like so many (prophets)
before and after him. Because he realises this human possibility, and
responds to the divine presence, he is considered a witness. Since his
testimony is sealed with his own blood, Jesus is a martyr one
among many. Since he is the first one who does this fully, he is more
than just any martyr; he is the exemplary martyr. Jesus is depicted
in continuity with his sisters and brothers, although first among
them. He is the firstborn, in the words of the Heb 1:6.114
113 Sobrino 1991d, 374.

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In other aspects however, it is clear in Sobrinos account that

something decisively new and unique has occurred in and through
the life-and-death of Jesus. Through the ministry and destiny of
Jesus it has, contrary to all expectations, come definitely clear who
God is: that God is good, that Gods Kingdom signifies life and justice to the poor, that Gods actively searching love endures even
through the seemingly unbearable hardships of human history. And
through Jesus ministry and destiny it has become absolutely clear,
contrary to all expectations, how one corresponds in history to the
coming of the Kingdom of God and God of the Kingdom: not by
the seeking of earthly power but by an active service, not by
demanding but by giving, not by judging but by forgiving. Contrary
to all expectations, through Jesus we are shown a God who conquers
sin, injustice, hatred and other works of the evil forces through a
total identification with those who have fallen victim to these
forces. It is a victory won by a victim. This is good news to the victims of the world!115
In this way, new and unexpected possibilities have in fact
emerged in human history in and through the life-and-death of
Jesus. We may now know what we are, and what we can and
should be116 not in mere continuity with human ability, experience and knowledge,117 I want to add, but as a result of something
surprisingly new and previously unseen.
But how may these possibilities become realities? Merely
through the gaining of knowledge, merely through the inspiration
and invitation that emerges from the story of Jesus? Certainly,
114 Heb. 1:6 Again, when he presents the first-born to the world, he says, Let
all the angels of God pay him homage. Cf. Rom. 8:29.
115 See below, Chapter viii [4] and Postscript [2].
116 Sobrino 1991d, 373.
117 In other words, not facere quod in se est, as it was formulated in Scholasticism.

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according to the christology of Sobrino, these possibilities become

realities through the life-transforming relationships. We become
more truly human and hence more like God by living and growing
in these relationships, in and through the following of Jesus. This is
not a result of our own efforts, but because through them we gain
access to, or rather, we receive the salvific love of God.118
In order then to preclude a reductive, unilaterally exemplarist
interpretation of Jesus life-and-death, I think this should be
strengthened, more explicitly underlined, and even further developed in Sobrinos thinking: the cross of Jesus is not only salvific as
the culminating point in a manifestation of what is pleasing to God
and proof of the credibility of Gods love, but furthermore because it
is an actualisation, an unleashing of this love in concrete history. Salvation is not just knowledge of Gods love, but actual reception of
that love. The good news is not just an invitation to a salvific relationship with God and with fellow human beings through Jesus,
but actual facilitation of this relationship. Jesus liberates not only as
a motivating example, but by actually making present the pure love
of God in human history.

118 It is through these relationships that God, according to Sobrino, is preparing

us to being introduced into Gods own historical process. Desde aqu se
puede entender tambin el significado profundo de un pensamiento tradicional: por la cruz hemos sido salvados. Normalmente esto suele explicarse
segn modelos que presuponen ya quin es Dios y qu es salvacin, como si
sta fuese algo aadido al hombre ya constituido. Creemos ms bien que al
afirmar que la cruz es salvadora se dicen dos cosas: 1) que en ella se revela un
amor incondicional de Dios, expresin de la gratuidad y de la posibilidad de
salvacin en la existencia histrica. Si Dios nos ha amado primero (1 Jn 4, 10;
Rom 5, 8) hay un sentido ltimo para la historia. Que la culminacin de seramados por Dios consiste en la capacitacin para introducirnos en el proceso
histrico de Dios mismo, es decir en pasar del amor pasivo al amor activo.
Sobrino 1976, 169-170. English text in Sobrino 1978a, 227.

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In other words, I find it necessary and possible to balance the

strong illustrative tendency of Sobrino with some key insights from
more constitutive approaches. The justification and potential for
doing so are already present in Sobrinos outline.

[6] The Shifting of Models: From Struggle to Sacrifice

Now I shall turn to the second problematic area I see in Sobrinos
interpretation of the death of Jesus: viz., the solution he offers
somehow does not quite answer the problem he has raised. In short,
whereas the problem basically is stated in dualistic terms, the solution operates with a monistic frame of reference. Whereas Jesus is
killed because of the struggle of the gods, the explanation for his
actually dying is sought with reference to God alone. The choice of
soteriological, (non-)explicative models, the status they are given
and how they function, and once again the role and character of
relationships are the crucial issues here.
Sobrino is right in stressing the tentative and preliminary character of soteriological models. The fruitfulness and necessity of the
use of models in all scientific reasoning, as well as in theology in
particular, has recently been called to attention by several scholars.
Once again, Paul Ricoeur has been a forerunner. Ricoeur defines a
model as essentially a heuristic instrument that seeks, by means of
fiction, to break down an inadequate interpretation and to lay the
way for a new, more adequate interpretation.119 Building on
Ricoeur and others, Sallie McFague has made the use and renewal
of models the determinative feature of her metaphorical theology.120 She defines a model as a metaphor with staying power,
119 Ricoeur 1978, 240.

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i.e. a metaphor that has gained sufficient stability and scope so as

to present a pattern for relatively comprehensive and coherent
explanation.121 Much in the same vein, but with a more refined
and profound analysis on the use and meaning of soteriological
models, is Colin Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement.122
In line with what we have seen above, the role of models is not
primarily explanation in a strict sense, bur rather exploration. If we
underscore the heuristic instrument and means of fiction in
Ricoeurs definition and the emphasis on relative adequacy (Tracy)
obvious in both Ricoeur and McFague, we get a grasp of the risk
and incompleteness always present in the use of models. Sobrino
thus agrees with this approach when holding that these models do
not explain anything, but say it all.
This means that models should not be absolutised or, in McFagues wording they should not be idolatrized.123 A variety of
models are necessary. An endless number of metaphors and models
[] is no death by a thousand qualifications. Rather, it is life by a
thousand enrichments.124 Models are complementary rather than
mutually exclusive, although they may also be so contradictory that
the option for one will effectively bar the use of others. There are
always advantages and dangers with the use of models. Their intrinsic logic should not always be strictly followed. But the theologian
is lost without them; she does not have the luxury of deciding
between models and no models: the question is, which models?125
120 McFague 1982, particularly chapters 3 and 4, and McFague 1987. In a
sense, it could be said that religious language consists of nothing but metaphors and models, and theological langauge is rife with them. McFague
1982, 105.
121 McFague 1987, 34.
122 Gunton 1988. Compare McFagues too superficial treatment of soteriological
models in McFague 1987, 53ff.
123 McFague 1982, 4-7.
124 Ian Ramsey, quoted by McFague in McFague 1982, 106.

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In this chapter we have seen a remarkable shift in Sobrinos

choice of models. Moving from the historical question to the soteriological, he changes from the battlefield to the cult from the
struggle of gods to a sacrificial model. Why is this? And is it justified? We saw that the answer to the historical question of why Jesus
was killed, was drawn from antagonistic relationships: Jesus faces
opposition and persecution. Metaphors from the battlefield lay thus
close at hand. There is a war going on; there are victors and
victims, etc. The whole framework of this interpretation is dualistic: two forces are in direct and continuous contradiction; reality is
theologal-idolatrous. When Sobrino subsequently moves from
this battlefield-model as illuminating the deep logic of historical
developments leading to Jesus death, to his explicitly soteriological
interpretation, relying primarily on the sacrificial model with distinct elements from the Suffering Servant-christology, I see at least
two difficulties.
First, while Sobrino correctly underscores the tentative and
explorative character of the models in the latter soteriological
perspective (they do not explain anything), he seems much more
confident about the adequacy of the battlefield-model as a historical
explanation of the turn of events. This critique was already voiced
above. Sobrino should rather treat his heuristic tools with the same
caution, whether they be used to answer historical or soteriological
concerns. In other words, Sobrino should give the same status to
the models, regardless of the perspective from which he has
recourse.
Second, Sobrino does not show how these preferred models
actually relate to each other in his approach. In Sobrinos interpretation of the soteriological meaning of the cross what happened to the
gods, to the anti-Kingdom powers? If the fundamental problem is
the dualistic and antagonistic structure of historical reality and it
125 McFague 1982, 105.

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is a basic pre-understanding and requirement that salvation is something which happens in history and to history then why is his
answer to the soteriological question framed in an exclusively monistic framework? How do the dualistic/antagonistic and the monistic/constitutive relationships relate to each other here?
It should be remembered that this difficult integration of dualism/monism is at the heart of practically all Christian theology.
Some form of dualism whether moderate or more extreme will
always be present. The whole need for such a concept and reality as
salvation itself depends upon it. Something is wrong; there is
something opposing or obstructing the good will of God from
being realised in history. There must be, in one form or another,
some forces contrary to God. They may be found inside or outside
of human beings; they may be under the control or outside the control of God. At the same time it is pivotal for Christian theology to
maintain that the last word remains with God alone. Christians do
not believe in an Anti-God; they are not di-theists. How can one
integrate the dualistic perspective in a monistic one? In the end, it is
really the theodicy-problem we are facing, once again: how can we
reconcile the existence of God with the existence of evil?
There is thus no cause for surprise that Sobrino too is struggling
in order to come to terms with this aporia of dualism-monism in his
thinking. Theologians through the ages have sought a variety of different solutions to this problem. Much painstaking effort has been
dedicated to avoiding the idea of God being directly responsible for
the evil forces, and on the opposite end, of taking evil as seriously as
it merits: facing the reality of seemingly meaningless and absurd
human suffering, without thereby postulating forces that actually
threaten God, the Creator of Heaven and Earth. And it is noteworthy that there is not one canonically or dogmatically sanctioned
answer to this dilemma.126

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But still, is Sobrinos attempt helpful? Is it a good suggestion to

deal with dualism by way of antagonistic relationships which configure historical reality on the one hand, and monism as constitutive, transformational, i.e. salvific, relationships, on the other? In
order to respond to this we need to see how Sobrino moves from
one to the other, and how he integrates them. And this is where we
uncover the remarkable blank spot. Jon Sobrino moves from the
battlefield-model to the sacrificial model, without mediating
between them. They are simply left side by side. In spite of his
strong insistence on the inter-connectedness of history and salvation, he uses totally distinct frameworks of interpretation depending on whether he looks at the cross from the former or the latter
perspective.
This is all the more strange as there is, as mentioned above,
both in the New Testament and in the early Christian tradition a
model which makes use of the imagery of struggle and victory in
order to explain how the cross brings salvation.127 I refer to what
Gustaf Auln has called the classic model. It may also be called
the dramatic-cosmological model, which may include although
this is debated the ransom or redemption model. Central in
Aulns classic model is the idea of the salvation of mankind as a
divine conflict and victory in which Jesus Christ on the cross triumphs over the evil powers of this world and of this age, tyrants
under which mankind has been kept in perpetual bondage and suffering ever since the fall.128
The context of this view is clearly dualistic. Auln calls it dualistic-dramatic129, and claims that it is the dominant idea in the
New Testament, which forms the basis of ransom theories, and gov126 This observation is the point of departure for McIntyre in McIntyre 1992.
Cf. the discussion in Chapter vii below.
127 See, for instance, Heb. 2:14ff, which one would suppose had much in store
for a liberation soteriology along Sobrinos lines.

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erns the dominant soteriology of the first thousand years of the

Churchs history. In spite of this solid basis, and its centrality in
influential Christian thinkers such as Irenaeus and Luther, it almost
disappeared, primarily as a result of the scepticism towards dualism
after the Enlightenment, Auln believes.130
Even if the critics of Auln are right in deeming this an overstatement, there is still sufficient support in biblical sources and
from the history of dogma to sustain the claim that this is at least
one of the more important soteriological motifs in the Christian
tradition.131
There are several reasons why one would expect this model to
play a central role in a soteriology of liberation such as that of
Sobrino. First, and most obviously, because Sobrino describes historical reality in similar terms. Second, because its imagery and
vocabulary are closely linked up to natural associations of the key
term liberation: conflict, struggle, power, oppression, captivity,
freedom, victim-victor, etc. A soteriology which makes historical
128 I quote from the original Swedish version, Auln 1930, 10: Den frsoningstyp jag har i sikte kan preliminrt beskrivas som den dramatiska.
Huvudtemat r tanken p frsoningen ssom en gudomlig kamp- och segergrning, p Kristus ssom den der kmpar med och segrar ver tillvarons
frdrvsmakter, de tyranner, under vilka mnskligheten trler och lider, p
Gud ssom den vilken hrigenom frsonar vrlden med sig sjlv.
129 Auln 1930, 21.
130 Auln 1930, 21: Elimineras dualismen, frsvinner tanken p frfintligheten
av makter, som st fientliga i frhllande till gudsviljan, s har drmed
ocks frutsttningen fr det klassiske frsoningsmotivet frsvunnit. Nu er
emellertid den ledande teologien frn upplysningstiden och sedan 1800-talet
igenom under innflytande av idealistisk metafysik utprglat monistisk
och evolutionistisk instlld. Cf. McIntyre 1992, 43.
131 Auln supports his view with particular references to Pauline soteriology,
Revelation and the Gospel of John. These texts are not as frequently referred
to by Sobrino. But also in the synoptics, this perspective is clearly present, as
Sobrino himself is very much aware. See Sobrino 1991d, 166ff.

411

liberation an integral aspect of salvation would certainly be

expected to draw more on this model. Third, because Sobrino himself has shown that this dualistic perspective is decisive in order to
understand the life-and-death of Jesus, and that it most probably
was an important feature of Jesus own world-view and self-consciousness.
So why then does Sobrino finally omit it when it comes to soteriology? One must presume that he knows this model well, and
therefore tacitly, but consciously avoids it. This may be because he
fears the possible triumphalist consequences of such a model.
Applied directly to the historical and political struggles, a liberation
christology profoundly marked by this model might become
another kind of conquest christology although with the opposite orientation to those described in Chapter iii.
It might also be that Sobrino wishes to make clear that in the
end, the God of life and the idols of death are not on the same level
at all. God, Creator and Redeemer constitutes relations; the idols
pervert relations, make them antagonistic, destructive. Following
this train of thought, it is not just that their modes and levels of
action are contradictory and incompatible; more than this, God
and idols do also have completely different ontological status. In
this way he can avoid the undesirable consequence of emphasising
the relational ontological status of the idols, which may threaten to
make even the existence of God something dependent on Gods
being believed in.
On the other hand, it is clear that the classic model not only
highlights the dualistic and antagonistic structure of reality; it also
unifies the dualistic and monistic perspectives, by subordinating the
former to the latter: God controls the evil powers. In fact, in the
end these powers actually exercise their influence in some sense with
Gods permission, or even on behalf of God.132 Such an understanding, which has found expression in the history of theology in

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terms like the hidden God and Gods opus alienum, might seem
a consequence of the classic model which Sobrino wishes to evade.
All in all, I suspect that Sobrinos main reason for not following
this dualistic model all the way through, is due to his reluctance to
advocate an excessively combative, aggressive christology. It is vital
for him to speak with utter honesty and seriousness of the tangible
and terrible consequences of evil forces in history; he must speak of,
from and faced with the constant suffering of the poor. Therefore, a
conflictual dualistic framework of interpretation suits him well in
addressing this historical situation. At the same time, however, he is
reluctant to state the salvation brought forward by God in Jesus,
manifested in the cross, in similar terms. It is obviously important
to Sobrino that Jesus the Liberator should not be visualised as a
Jesus warrior; and that the God of the Kingdom not be seen as
some kind of Supreme Warlord. Although such consequences are
by no means necessary consequences of using the classic model, as I
shall try to show, they may lie close at hand.
So these precautions are intelligible and justifiable to a certain
extent. Nevertheless, I hold that it would be possible for Sobrino to
132 Auln 1930, 10-11: Frsoningsdramat avtecknar sig mot en dualistisk bakgrund. Det gller ett vervinnande av de frdrvsmakter, som p samma gng
ro gentemot gudsviljan fientliga makter. Gud tnkas vara i eminent mening
engagerad i den kamp- och segersgrning, som Kristus utfr. Den er strngt
taget den gudomliga viljans eget verk. Om en frsoning r det frga redan
drigenom att, i och genom segern ver de fientliga makterna, en frvandlad
och av frsoning prglad situation kommer til stnd mellan Gud och
vrlden. Men frsoningsmotivet framtrder i nnu skarpare belysning, om
man ger tillbrligt akt derp, att de fientliga makterna eller tminstone
vissa av dem p samma gng, frn viss synspunkt sett, tnkas ssom
stende i den gudomliga domsviljans tjnst och utfra dess uppdrag. Frn
denne utgngspunkt kommer segergrningen, makternas vervinnande, tillika att te sig ssom ett Guds frsonande: Han frsonas i och med det att
han sjlv frsonar vrlden med sig.

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include in his outline decisive elements of the classic model. This

would even make his outline more coherent, and in a way fill the
blank spot that I discovered in relation to the unexpected shift from
one model to another.133 How could it enrich Sobrinos approach?
How could it help build the bridge, so to speak, to the sacrificial
model, or to the Suffering Servant motif?

[7] Jesus The Victorious Victim

The main problems with the classic model as one can find it in
Auln, building particularly on Irenaeus and Luther, are, when seen
from Sobrinos position, firstly, a possible premature triumphalism,
which at worst might end up as a converted conquest christology.134 Its dualism is taken too far. Secondly, although dramatically
dualist, it sees the evil powers incorporated in the ultimate will of
God. They are at the service of Gods judgement. Paradoxically, its
monism is also taken too far. I shall now propose how this dilemma
could be overcome in a manner which is congruous to Sobrinos
overall framework.

133 Once again, there is nothing wrong in using two or several different models
as Sobrino does. They do not even need to be integrated or coherent. Different approaches are necessary in order to grasp the complexity of the theme
which is under consideration. Nevertheless, the more the relation between
the models can be explained, the clearer the whole picture will be.
134 As will have become clear to the reader, Sobrinos rendering of the story of
Jesus builds to a large extent athough not exclusively on the version
found in the Gospel of Mark. This gospel gives particular reasons to be critical of all triumphalist frameworks. Sobrino agrees with X. Alegre in that
Mark is anti-triumphalist. Sobrino 1991d, 397.

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The question is whether Jesus death on the cross can be conceived as a victory. Sobrino prefers to postpone the perspective of
victory to the resurrection. It is the evil forces who triumph at
Golgotha.135 Yet, Sobrino speaks of an overcoming of the evil
forces from within, which takes place on the cross.
[] on the cross we see God submerged within the negative. The possibility
of overcoming the negative is realised by submersion within the mechanisms
and processes of the negative. 136

Thus one can see the cross as victory, even within the confines of
Sobrinos christology, when it is seen as a victory won by a victim.
We have seen that Sobrino attaches the utmost importance in
his christology to Jesus relationality to the Kingdom of God and to
the God of the Kingdom. Jesus, as mediator and inaugurator of the
Kingdom, proclaims the good news about its coming in words and
deeds, directed particularly to those considered less dignified and
fortunate in social, economic and religious terms. Jesus makes a
preferential option for the poor, since the Kingdom is in the end
just life for the poor, always open to a more. This is all a reflection of and a response to the reality and nearness of God the loving
father, in whom Jesus trusts and rests, and with whom he experiences an intimate communion, yet also by whom he sees himself
questioned, called, and sent to a consistent service for those whom
God especially loves: the weak, the forgotten, the victims in history.
Jesus has to proclaim the good news to the poor against the bad
news of their exclusion, marginalisation, and finally their condemnation. The salvific service of Jesus life is realised within a dualistic
135 Sobrino 1994c, 248.
136 Sobrino 1978a, 221. Sobrino 1976,165: Dios no aparece como quien tiene
poder sobre lo negativo desde fuera; en la cruz se le ve sumergiendo dentro
de lo negativo. La posble superacin de lo negativo, se efecta sumergindose en los mecanismos de lo negativo.

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perspective; there are forces that hold people down, and there is the
saving force of God, which restores, liberates, redeems. We recognise clearly the traits of the classic soteriological model. Because of
his many acts of restitution, of forgiveness, of healing, Jesus is confessed as messiah: liberator. But does the liberator triumph in the
final struggle against these deadly forces? Does the liberator become
victor?
Because of this surprising and even scandalously partisan service, Jesus faces opposition and persecution. In the midst of these
conflicts, the biblical witnesses report that Jesus experiences profound temptations. The temptations deal primarily with questions
of power. Jesus is engaged in a struggle against the powers of evil,
actively present in human history. This struggle is real and serious
so serious that it in the end leads to Golgotha. Now the question is:
with which power, with what means is Jesus struggle to be fought?
With the power of effective, retributive justice or with the power of
suffering love? What is really at stake here is whether the option for
the poor, the scandalous partisanship of the Kingdom, will be consequently maintained. A Jesus warrior, a messiah according to
traditional theocratic expectations: would he actually be a true liberator of the poor, of the victims of history? Are they not the ones
who always fall outside or in between; the ones who never can
expect to gain anything from the directly confrontational and violent competition for power in history?137 If Jesus responded to the
attack from the anti-Kingdom forces by following their own deadly
logic, by using their own means, would he not then be caught in
their perverted logic of power?

137 See to this the criticism that liberation theology has failed to appreciate poor
peoples actual strategies for survival and resistance, raised i.a. by David Stoll
(Stoll 1990, 313ff et passim) and David Martin (Martin 1990, 290f.) I have
commented on this criticism in Stlsett 1995d, 231-234.

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Jesus chooses differently; he chooses the way of suffering love.

Thus the liberator falls victim to the idols of death. Nevertheless,
this is not tantamount to resignation or defeat; this is his victory.
The forces of death could not make him retreat from his loyalty to
the God who has chosen to identify with victims, not even when
they make Jesus himself become a victim. Thus the victim becomes
victor. It is a victory from within, and a victory from below. It is
won from within the concrete and deadly conflicts of history. The
cross on Golgotha was not primarily a cosmological drama; it was
an historical happening and as such, it has universal significance.
It is a victory from below, won by a true human being in loving
response to the true God, to such an extent that human being and
God is totally unified in this love. It is a victory from below, won by
sharing the lot of victims, thus avoiding to become merely another
action of rescue on their behalf and over their heads, something that
in the end would not be capable of grasping the depth of their destiny and would therefore not be authentically salvific.
There is then salvation understood as victory in the cross.138
The forces of evil whose origin and existence are in the end inexplicable, a true mysterium inequitatis, but whose dreadful works can
be clearly detected in human history, in Jesus times as well as today
are definitively defeated by Jesus, the victorious victim. That the
victim is actually a victor,139 and that the victory is definitive in
spite of the continuing presence of destruction and suffering, can be
discovered only from a perspective of faith.

138 This perspective of a victory, an overthrow of the ruler of this world, i.e.
the Devil, etc. is clearly more Johannine than Synoptic. See John 6:70; 13:2
and 27; 12:31; 16:11. See Ladd 1974, 192, however.
139 As Sobrinos christology rightly underlines, Jesus is an active victim. Jesus
is the one who gives his life, faithful to the end. Jesus is not a passive victim; he does not resign.

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Here we reach the leap of faith which is required in order to see

Jesus in discontinuity with all other human beings, prophets, martyrs, liberators. He is the one who realised the victims victory and
therefore made possible all victims victory; he is the one who made
present, real, the power of suffering love to the end in our human
history. And though there may have been other martyrs who preferred the way of suffering love to resignation or violent resistance,
Jesus is the one who in an incomparable manner has experienced,
brought near and mediated the reality of Gods salvific presence in
human history through Gods Kingdom. And even having lived all
this, he willingly shares the fate of the worlds victims to the end:
execution, annihilation, crucifixion. This shows that he is unique;
he is Jesus the Liberator, the true Messiah of God.
From this perspective, and bearing in mind the central features
of the classic soteriological model, we can make this leap of faith
from within the world of the victims. It is not a leap of faith over
the victims, so to speak. Their suffering is taken utterly indeed,
deadly seriously. This is the salvific significance of Jesus death: the
death of a victim.
This interpretation draws on the classic model, while at the
same time criticising it. In a similar vein to my proposal here, Colin
Gunton faults Auln for not seeing that the victory won is not only
Gods victory but a human victory (cf. Sobrino: Jesus, homo
verus)140, and for not seeing that the victory belongs not only to the
past, but is a victory to be won by Jesus friends and followers in a
continuing struggle until the end of this age.141 As one can see,
140 [] Auln is right to speak of a victory, but [] it is not merely a divine
victory. The victory is at once human and divine a divine victory only
because it is a human one and although the Synoptic Gospels do not
explicitly describe the ministry of Jesus as a victory, they clearly see it as in
part a conflict between the authority of God represented by Jesus and that
which would deny it. Gunton 1988, 59.

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these points echo vital concerns in Sobrinos thinking, and open up

the possibility for also seeing victory sub specie contrarii in the
many crosses in history.
This may seem a contradiction. Above, I criticised Sobrino for a
tendency towards making a short-cut, i.e. a too unmediated or
unmodified application of mythical language to historical events.
Here, I propose that he should be more consistent in his use of a
model which is heavily dependent on the same language, by taking
it all the way to the ultimate soteriological question. As I have
shown above with reference to Ricoeur and Croatto however, mythical language (like other kinds of metaphorical and symbolic language) is wholly legitimate and fruitful, even necessary, in religious
and theological discourse. The danger occurs when one does not
take due notice of the metaphorical character of this language, and
how it is used in a given situation. And yet it is true that metaphorical is not unreal; metaphors are not mere ornaments, they are
capable of unveiling profound truths about the reality in which we
exist. It is an exploratory, rather than explanatory language, but not
thereby less real or truthful.
If one takes the mythical language too literally, then the war of
gods becomes a cosmological struggle of which human history is
141 The victory is both a continuing and an earthly one. Both sides must be
stressed if we are to see the matter as more than a myth, a story of the gods.
In the first place, the victory of Christ is seen to continue in the life of the
Christian, so that Paul can say that in all things we are conquerors through
him who loved us (Rom. 8.37), while the Johannine authors conceive the
victory as continuing in the life of the Christian community: For whatever
is born of God overcomes the world; and this is the victory that overcomes
the world, our faith (1 John 5.4). Similarly, Rev. 15.2 echoes the language we
recently met in speaking of those, possibly the martyrs but perhaps more
generally all Christian believers, who have conquered the beast. Gunton
1988, 57.

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only a stage, and in which human beings are only helpless spectators, incapable of affecting the outcome of the struggle, and thus
bearing no responsibility for it. But if this language is used in order
to express the seriousness and mystery of the presence of evil in the
midst of human history, without ontologising it, then it may prove
to be de facto revelational and thus appropriate in theological reasoning. Perhaps this could be described as a way of using mythical
language in a non-mythological way.142
Sobrino could well have used the soteriological model that highlights struggle, victory and redemption in interpreting the salvific
meaning of Jesus death on the cross. That would bring his argument to a more consistent conclusion. Instead, as I have shown,
Sobrino chooses the sacrificial model as his primary tool for such
interpretation. This is certainly not wrong. The sacrificial model has
solid support, both in the Bible and in the tradition. In doing so,
Sobrino succeeds in avoiding some of the common misinterpretations and misuses of this model which have had such unfortunate
consequences for the perception of God in much theological reasoning. One may ask, however, if Sobrinos rather one-sided emphasis on acceptance as the inner meaning of sacrifice actually does
justice to the New Testament use of sacrifice in understanding the
142 Gunton (op. cit., 65) claims that this is what Paul does when speaking of
principalities and powers. To undergird this view, Gunton quotes the following interesting passage from Caird, G.B.: The Language and Imagery of
the Bible Duckworth, London 1980, 242: They [i.e. the principalities and
powers] stand, as their names imply, for the political, social, economic and
religious structures of power [] of the old world order which Paul believed
to be obsolescent. When therefore he claims that on the cross Christ has disarmed the powers and triumphed over them, he is talking about earthly realities, about the impact of the crucifixion on the corporate life of men and
nations. He is using mythical language of great antiquity and continuing
vitality to interpret the historic event of the cross.

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death of Jesus. It seems that Sobrino is eager to cleanse the concept

of God of antagonistic, excluding features. God is love; Gods love is
compassionate, and therefore partisan, but precisely by being partisan vis--vis the lowly and despised, it is all-encompassing love. 143
This is a fully legitimate concern. Yet one could ask: although
there is no exclusion or antagonism in God, could there not still be
an element of conflict between humanity and God? Or put more
directly: Do the strong and deep concerns of traditional Christian
soteriology expressed in terms of humanitys sin, rebellion against
God, and guilt on the one hand, and Gods justice, holiness and
even wrath on other, disappear in Sobrinos outline? In a certain
sense, they are certainly toned down.144 In the history of theology,
this cluster of concerns and motifs have also had their model,
according to which the cross is seen primarily as judgement and
penalty, and Jesus death as vicarious penal death, expiation and satisfaction for the sins of humanity.145 In fact, the sacrificial aspect is
decisive in this model, but it draws on other features of the sacrificial tradition, aspects that Sobrino with his aversion to all
Anselmianisms tries to avoid.
Perhaps further development of the Suffering Servant-theme as
key to the salvific meaning of Jesus death could fruitfully make
room for the legitimate concerns of this model too. Given that the
143 Hugo Assmann highlights this effort of Sobrino: [] preciso eliminar da
imagem de Deus tudo o que possibilite anexar prpria ida de Deus, que
amor, um princpio ou elemento que reinstaure e legitime qualquer lgica de
excluso, inclusive em Deus mesmo. Amor , em sua exprea mxima, a
plena- auto- e hetero-aceitao. Jon Sobrino tem trabalhado intensamente
nesse esforo de total purificao do conceito de Deus de qualquer resqucio
de ausncia de amor, com-paixo e misericrdia. Assmann 1994b, 6.
144 Cf. what I have said above regarding the threat of a too optimistic anthropology, and a too shallow hamartiology in his approach, also coming to
expression i .a. in a tendency to naturalise the supernatural.
145 Cf. Whale 1960, 61ff; Gunton 1988, 83ff; Boff 1987b, 95ff.

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Servant Songs play a fundamental role in Sobrinos soteriology

especially as this concerns the crucified people it is rather surprising that Sobrino does not exploit it more in his interpretation of
the cross. He might find a potential bridge here between the models
of battlefield and sacrifice, as well as an opportunity to reflect more
deeply on the gravity and character of the critical interruption of the
relationship between humanity and God (the moment of discontinuity), which I see as the main intention expressed in more objective and Anselmian soteriological models.
The Suffering Servant is clearly described in the fourth song as a
victorious victim. In this connection, it is interesting to note the
centrality of the theme of the struggle between Yahweh and the
gods of the nations in the book of Deutero-Isaiah. This is especially
reflected in the so-called trial-speeches, Is. 41:1-5, 21-29; 43: 8-15;
44:6ff.; 45:20-25, and, possibly, 45:11ff. But this struggle takes place
in court, so to speak, and no longer on the battlefield. In this, Old
Testament scholar Claus Westermann sees a complete innovation
on the prophets part, which in his view represents the first move
in human history towards the dissolution of the link between religion and politics.146
It does not, however, in any way imply a severance of the link between Gods
action and history; it only means that the hitherto accepted proof of a gods
divinity, his power to win military victory for his people, was replaced by
another, the dependable and unremitting continuity between what a god
says and what he does.147

The beginning of the process from depicting salvation as the victory

of a God-warrior, to seeing Gods salvific work in a victorious victim, is thus to be found already at this point. And in the book of
Isaiah, this process culminates in the fourth Servant Song:
146 Westermann 1969, 15.
147 Westermann 1969, 15.

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Yet Yahweh took pleasure in him [who was crushed] and [healed] the one
who made his life an offering for sin. He will see his seed, he shall prolong
his days and the purpose of Yahweh shall prosper in his hand.148

Here the victim wins victory, in the context of a struggle of gods, by

becoming an offering, a sacrifice. This fits Sobrinos interpretation
perfectly, since it is the life of the Servant which is made an offering,
and since weight is put on Gods accepting this offering. But furthermore, it is an offering for sin, we are told. In context, this sin is
closely related to Gods peoples failure to resist the temptation to
idolatry: an idolatry which causes human victims like the servant.
Gods judgement over Gods people is thus clearly linked to the sin
of idolatry, which has human victims.
Thus it would be possible for Sobrino, following the lines
already drawn up in his soteriology, to incorporate in a much more
comprehensive manner the concern of the community which is
behind this Song of the Servant. By singing the song, the members
of the community are confessing their sins against the Servant and
against God their sin against the Servant as a sin against God.
And they are rejoicing in the gift of salvation which comes totally
unexpectedly from God by way of the victorious victim against
whom they sinned.149
While Sobrino has addressed the Crucified from the perspective
of the crucified the question of how this looks from the perspective
of the crucifiers remains unanswered. I think Sobrinos soteriology
needs to be complemented by this perspective, in order to address
the full complexity of the reality of continuous crucifixions in
human history. Again, there are elements already present in
148 Is. 53:10, translated by Westermann in op. cit.
149 In this matter, one could draw on interesting insights from Ren Girards
works on the relationship between violence, communal unity and the sacred,
particularly his scapegoat mechanism-theory. See particularly Girard 1986,
and Girard 1987. See below, Chapter viii [4], thesis 6.6.

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Sobrinos texts that would be helpful in such an undertaking.150 But

they would need further elaboration.151

[8] Conclusions
The following findings will sum up this lengthy chapter. In line
with basic presuppositions in liberation theology soteriology and
the corresponding view of history, Jon Sobrino sees the theological
significance of Jesus death as closely related to the historical reasons
for the crucifixion. On the historical surface, so to speak, Jesus is
killed because of his critical attitude and symbolic actions against
the Jewish Temple, and because the Roman authorities fear that he
might become dangerous, having gained a considerable following
amongst the impoverished and subjugated populace of Palestine.
The deeper logic of the killing of Jesus, however, is found in the
struggle of the gods. Jesus passion and death mark the culmination
of a confrontation between the mediators of the god of the institutionalised and self-protective religious establishment of Israel and
the mediators of the political gods of the Romans in particular the
Emperor Caesar on the one hand, and Jesus as mediator of the
God of the Kingdom, who has drawn graciously near in and
through his life and mission, on the other.
Evaluating this interpretation, I have argued that although there
does not seem to be any strong evidence against Sobrinos interpretation on a strictly historical basis, it comes clear that Sobrinos
application of historicity should be understood in a RicoeurianCroattan sense, according to which explanatory and exploratory
150 See particularly Sobrino 1992b, 97-158.
151 See below, Chapter viii [4], thesis 9.

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moves come together in one, comprehensive process of interpretation. When it is so understood (and only then), it is defensible and
legitimate to speak of historicity as normative in the way Sobrino
does. Sobrino, however, does not make it explicitly clear that we are
to understand it in this way: we see this from the ambiguity that
follows his reference to the struggle of the gods as a historical explanation for Jesus death. Ricoeurs distinction between explanatory
and exploratory moves would allow Sobrino to overcome this ambiguity.
Moving to the strictly soteriological question, I discovered a
shift in Sobrinos perspective, from a dualistic to a monistic framework. This is clearly reflected in the soteriological model to which
he gives preference. Having made the battlefield-model central in
his outline so far, he suddenly leaves this model aside, and proceeds
to a sacrificial model, with strong emphasis on Gods manifestation,
Gods acceptance and the credibility of Gods love. On the cross,
seen in continuity with and as the culmination of Jesus life and
misson, faith discovers Gods manifestation of what a true human
being (homo verus) is, at the same time as Gods love for fallen
humanity is made unequivocally clear and credible in the eyes of
those experiencing Golgothas in their own lives, according to
Sobrino. This manifestation is in itself salvific.
Noting this strong illustrative emphasis I discussed whether this
approach should be criticised for being reductively exemplarist.
Pointing out the difficulties and risks with Sobrinos interpretation
that it might be too modest and too moralistic I sought elements in Sobrino that might balance these exemplarist features with
what I see as legitimate traits of a more constitutive or objective
soteriological approach. I found this in the centrality that Sobrino
gives to constitutive relationality in his theology. Salvation is
brought about through these relationships, and it consists in new
and healed relationships. These relationships are constitutive, as

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well as transformational. Salvation is something that is effectuated,

then and not merely manifested.
Nevertheless, the question of how the cross effectuates salvation
in concrete terms, is still not clear in Sobrinos account. The crucial
issue is whether this event is something which decisively brought
about a change that made possible and opened up constituted
these salvific relationships. Concluding my consideration of
Sobrinos interpretation on this point, I wrote:
In order then to preclude a reductive, unilaterally exemplarist interpretation
of Jesus life-and-death, I think this should be strengthened, more explicitly
underlined, and even further developed in Sobrinos thinking: the cross of
Jesus is not only salvific as the culminating point in a manifestation of what
is pleasing to God and proof of the credibility of Gods love, but furthermore
because it is an actualisation, an unleashing of this love in concrete history.
Salvation is not just knowledge of Gods love, but actual reception of that
love. The good news is not just an invitation to a salvific relationship with
God and with fellow human beings through Jesus, but actual facilitation of
this relationship. Jesus liberates not only as a motivating example, but by
actually making present in human history the pure love of God.

Moving then to consider the surprising shift in models as Sobrino

moves from a historical to a soteriological discourse, I first held
that Sobrino should treat his models with the same degree of precariousness and tentativeness, regardless of whether they are
employed to explain historical or soteriological issues. Again, I
pointed to the fruitfulness of a Ricoeurian approach which gives full
legitimacy to the use of myths, metaphors and models in different
scientific discourses, as long as they are applied with an explicit linguistic-hermeneutical awareness and included in a wider process of
interpretation. I suggested that what Sobrino does when interpreting historical events with reference to myth(s), is in fact to use
mythical language in a non-mythological way.

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Then I showed that Sobrino overlooks or rather avoids a

soteriological model which has solid basis both in the New Testament witness and in tradition, and would seemingly correspond to
the concerns that have guided his interpretation so far. I refer to the
so-called classic model, which stresses the event of the cross as
Gods victory over the devil(s). Asking why Sobrino pays little
attention to this model, I suggested that it might be due to an antitriumphalist strand in his thought, and a fear that such a model
might lead to an overly combative soteriology. Although seeing the
reasonableness of this, I proposed an interpretation answering to
the concerns of the classic model and consonant with Sobrinos earlier tenets, which could also take into account these legitimate
objections.
This interpretation sees Jesus as the Victorious Victim, who
wins victory over the forces of death exactly when he falls victim to
them. By not giving in to the temptation of following the destructive and violent logic of power and anti-power, Jesus shows that the
only way to victory, the only way to the life-restoring community
with God and human beings goes through a loving and faithful
commitment which does not resign even in the face of suffering and
death. In line with Colin Guntons well-argued critique of Aulns
model, I stressed that the victory of Jesus must be seen also as a
human victory, and as a victory that is still to be won by Jesus followers.
To see Jesus apparent defeat at the hands of the anti-Kingdoms
forces as the ultimate victory, however, requires faith. Thus, there is
a discontinuity which requires a leap of faith, but this leap can
now be taken with due account of the reality of the victims in history. Jesus the Victorious Victim is the one who opens up the possibility of a future victory for all victims in history.
Finally, I raised the critical question whether Sobrinos interpretation and use of a sacrificial salvific model fail to take into account

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the full gravity of the conflict between sinful humanity and the holy
God which has been fundamental to this model throughout the history of Jewish and Christian faith. Holding that this is partly so, I
suggested that Sobrino should develop further the interpretation of
Jesus sacrifice in the light of the fourth Song of the Servant, where
he can, in fact, find useful elements for building the bridge between
the battlefield- and sacrificial models, and for widening his use of
the sacrificial model. Jesus the Victorious Victim is Jesus the Suffering Servant. This would also allow for a consideration of a perspective which is almost absent in Sobrinos treatment, so far, namely
the perspective of the crucifiers.
These issues are of great importance in considering the viability of
Sobrinos introducing the crucified people(s) into his christology
as an expression of the theological significance of contemporary suffering. But still there is one important step to be taken, before I can
undertake that final assessment. It deals with the issue of what the
cross says of God. Is God crucified?

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vii. The Crucified God

Historical Theodicy and the Mystery of God

Si no olvidamos a los crucificados actuales ms difcil ser olvidar al crucificado

Jess. Pero si se lo mantiene presente, hay que preguntarse por Dios necesariamente.1

What Cicero once said of crucifixion is true of the cross of Jesus as

well as of all the other crosses throughout history: that it is a crudelissimum taeterrimumque supplicium, an exceedingly cruel and terrible torture.2 Crucifixion is a scandal; just as innocent suffering and
premature, unjust death are. The Christian preaching of the cross
introduces this scandal with full force into the mystery of God.
Faith holds Jesus to be Gods chosen One; he is the mediator and
inaugurator of the Kingdom of God, he is the anointed Messiah, he
is Son of God. Seen from the vantage-point of oppressed communities in Latin America, he is the Liberator. Yet, he dies on a cross
seemingly not in calm and confident assurance of Gods ultimate
triumph, but rather in deep distress and a feeling of abandonment:
My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? (Mk.15:34).
Jesus death cry raises sharply the question of the strictly theological significance of the cross. Where is God when Jesus dies?
What does the cross say about God? Does Jesus suffering affect
God? Given that the one who suffers on the cross is confessed to be
one with God: does God suffer on the cross? If so, in what sense?
And given that Jesus actually dies on that cross: does God die on the

1
2

Sobrino 1991d, 394

Against Verres, book 2, chapter 5, no. 165. Quoted from Boff 1987b, 84.

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cross? In what sense is it possible and even legitimate and necessary

to speak of the death of God?
Jon Sobrino and liberation theology in general emphasise that
Jesus death cry echoes in the cries of suffering and oppressed people
and communities today.3 Theology takes thus the shape of theodicy: the question of how it is possible to believe in God even justify God in the face of so much suffering. For the poor, Christian
communities in El Salvador which inspire, inform and nurture the
theological reflection of Sobrino, the issue is not abstract nor purely
theoretical. Since suffering is a daily reality, their theodicy needs to
be historical and practical. It arises from concrete historical experiences. Where was God in those horrible moments of the Rio
Sumpul massacre?4 Where was God in El Mozote?5 Where is God
when the newly born in San Jorge die because of lack of nutrition
and adequate sanitary conditions? And the main aim of these communities in struggling with the issue is not primarily to find an
explanation for suffering, but to remove it. Their theodicy is practical.6
In the previous chapter, we saw that Sobrino affirmed Bonhoeffers lapidary statement: Only the suffering God can help.7 But
what help can those who suffer possibly find in a God who also suffers? What help can a crucified people find in a crucified God?
These are the questions that we now must deal with. They are
at the cutting edge of contemporary Christian theology. Hence it
will be impossible to give an extensive treatment of all the issues
3
4
5
6

430

See e.g., Comblin 1988. Compare bibliography in Chapter ii [1] above.

United Nations 1993, 121-126.
United Nations 1993, 114-121; Danner 1994.
In Surin 1986 the author distinguishes between theodicies with theoretical
(A. Platinga, R. Swinburne, N. Whitehead) and practical (D. Slle, J. Moltmann, P. T. Forsyth) emphases.
Bonhoeffer 1971, 360f. Cf. Moltmann 1974, 47, n.2.

involved and positions taken. I shall, however, make a brief survey

of some main trends and developments in this area, to serve as a
background against which the profile of Sobrinos own contribution
will become clear. We shall find that Sobrino has both modified and
developed his views in this matter. Exposing his tenets to a critical
assessment will provide us with insights that will be central to our
final evaluation of the theological significance of contemporary suffering and the viability of seeing the relationship between the crucified and the Crucified as an expression of this.

[1] The Possibility of Gods Passibility

It has been widely studied how and to what extent Greek patterns
of thought influenced and even transformed central Christian
tenets and conceptions during the first centuries.8 The influence
was decisive, even on key doctrines such as the very understanding
of God. From Greek philosophy, the early Christians inherited the
idea of God as the most perfect being, ens perfectissimum. That was
taken to imply at least two things. First, because God is perfect,
God cannot change. If someone who is perfect changes, s/he will
either become less perfect, or else it will be proved that s/he was not
perfect in the original state, after all.9 Hence the immutability of
God.10 Secondly, that God is perfect, means that God rests only in
God-self. God cannot be affected. And therefore, it is held, God
cannot suffer.
8

This was perhaps the most important leitmotif in Adolf von Harnacks
groundbreaking Dogmengeschichte [History of Dogma (1886-1889)]. See also
Boman 1981 (an English version is found in Hebrew Thought Compared with
Greek, New York: Norton, 1970.)

431

This is the main content of the doctrine of classical theism on

the impassibility of God. Impassibility is derived from the Latin
impassibilitas, in its turn derived from the Greek apaths. Its original
meaning is incapable of being acted upon by an outside force,
which in its use in early Christian theology is extended to including
incapable of experiencing emotions and incapable of suffering.11
This central doctrine built on Greek suppositions would clearly
seem to run counter to the essential point in Christian faith: viz.,
that Jesus is true God and true human being, at the same time as
Jesus actually not just seemingly (vs. docetism) suffers and dies
on a cross. How could the early Christian writers come to terms
with this contradiction? Their solution was found in the doctrine of
the two natures of Christ, according to which Jesus was held to suffer only as a human being, i.e. only according to his human nature,
and not as God. There was a wide consensus on this doctrine on the
impassibility of God all the way through patristic and medieval
periods and up until the beginnings of the Enlightenment.12 The
drift of the argumentation was often linked to the safeguarding of
9

The strength of this seemingly irrefutable logic made it a persuasive argument even as late as in the eighteenth century, when Benedict Spinoza drew
the conclusion that God is without passions (deus expers est passionum)
from it: Again, God cannot pass to a higher or a lower perfection: and
therefore he is affected with no emotion or sadness. Q.E.D. Ethics V, 17; in
Opera: Lateinisch und Deutsch, vol. 2, ed. Konrad Blumenstock, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1980: 526.31-528.6. Quoted from
McGrath 1995, 115.
10 Cf. Philo of Alexandrias (c. 30 BC c. 45. AD) influential treatise Quod Deus
immutabilis sit (That God is unchangeable).
11 Sarot 1992, 26.
12 One indicator of how uncontroversial the doctrine of impassibility was is the
absence of any serious treatment of the matter as such between Gregory the
Wonderworkers Ad Theopompum and Marshall Randles The Blessed God
from 1900. Sarot 1992, 1.

432

Gods absolute freedom. It was held that God could be thought of

as totally free only if God was dependent on no one, linked to no
one, affected by no one.
But still, there was always another strand, a theological undertow so to speak, which would not accept the isolation of God from
suffering and vulnerability. Dissenting voices were heard. Already
Ignatius of Antioch spoke of the sufferings of my God (Rom.6:3).
In a seldom-quoted and noteworthy passage from the third century,
Origen writes that the Father himself is not impassible, ipse Pater
non est impassibilis. The quotation is somewhat uncertain however,
since the original Greek text is lost, and since the affirmation seems
to be in direct contradiction with what Origen himself says in other
texts.13 Jngel traces the idea of a crucified God, deus crucifixus,
back to Tertullian,14 thus refuting Moltmanns claim that it it is in
the theology of the mysticism of the cross in the late Middle ages,
that we first hear the monstrous phrase the crucified God which
Luther then took up. 15
Martin Luthers daring thesis of a theologia crucis presented at
the disputation in Heidelberg on the 26th of April 1518 is a decisive
step towards overcoming the doctrine of impassibility. Of particular
significance are the theses 19, 20 and 21, in which Luther addresses
the question of how one may gain a true knowledge of God. His
interest is primarily an epistemological one, in other words. But the
consequence has profound theological and christological impact.
Luthers radical contention is that God may only be known through
13 Quoted from McGrath 1995, 96-97.
14 See Tertullian: Tertullianus against Marcion (Anti-Nicene Christian Library,
vol. VII), tr. P. Holmes, eds. Rev. A. Roberts and J. Donaldson, T&T Clark,
Edinburgh 1868, book II, chapter 16: 113: God was found little, that man
might become very great. You who disdain such a God, I hardly know
whether you ex fide believe that God was crucified. Quoted by Jngel in
Jngel 1983, 65, n.26.
15 Moltmann 1974, 47.

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Gods visible being, by Gods back-side (posteriora dei), which is

humanity, weakness and suffering; in a word: Jesus death on the
cross.
So it is not enough and no use for anyone to know God in his glory and his
majesty if at the same time he does not know him in the lowliness and the
shame of the cross [] Thus true theology and true knowledge of God lie in
Christ the crucified one.16

This statement makes a decisive breach in the theistic concept built

on Greek presuppositions which upholds the doctrine of impassibility. Following the drift of Pauls argument in 1 Cor. 1, Luther rejects
not the possibility, but the actuality of a natural knowledge of
God through Gods wonderful works in nature and history. Because
of Gods unity with the crucified Christ, God is hidden in suffering17, and it is consequently only by approaching God in the crucified one, that a true, Christian knowledge of God may occur. This
strong emphasis of Luthers on the unity of God with Christ to
such an extent that God for us, the only God whom we may know
and in whom we may trust and believe, is the God revealed in
Christ makes it possible for Luther to overcome the strict restrictions which scholastic theology prescribed to the use of the communicatio idiomatum doctrine, in order to prevent that God be
understood as affected by suffering.18 For Luther, the person of
Christ is determined by the divine person. So Luther may speak
directly of the suffering, crucifixion, and even death of God: Vere
dicitur: Iste homo creavit mundum et Deus iste est passus, mortuus,
16 From the probationes to Thesis 20. Luther 1966 WA. 1, 362: Ita ut nulli iam
satis sit ac prosit, qui cognoscit Deum in gloria et maiestate, nisi cognoscat
eundem in humilitate et ignominia crucis [] Ergo in Christo crucifixo est
vera Theologia et cognitio Dei.
17 Deum absconditus in passionibus. Thesis 21, ibid.
18 Moltmann 1974, 227-235.

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sepultus, etc.19 He does so, however, with an explicit awareness of

the difficulties such a formulation creates for the traditional understanding of God:
In his nature God cannot die. But now that God and man are united in one
person, when the man dies, that is rightly called the death of God, for he is
one thing or one person with God.20

Luthers rediscovery and revitalisation of Pauls theologia crucis was

certainly a breakthrough with far-reaching consequences for theological reasoning in the Reformation era and thereafter. However,
the full depth of its devastating implications for a traditional theistic concept of God, linked as the latter is to traditional metaphysics,
has perhaps not been appreciated until quite recently.
In our day it may seem that the doctrine of Gods impassibility has
lost credibility to such an extent that the opposite stance, claiming
Gods passibility, almost has become a new orthodoxy or at
least, a theological commonplace.21 Throughout the 20th Century,
and particularly during its last decades, the issue of the vulnerability, suffering and even death of God, has been among the central
concerns in both philosophy and systematic theology.
Why is this? Several plausible causes for this noteworthy change
in the Christian conception of God have been suggested. Concerning the suffering of God, one main reason for this development is to
be found in an increased, existential awareness of and experience
with the presence of suffering in the world. From the World War I,
through the Holocaust and Hiroshima of the mid-century, and on to
the gravity of world poverty, the horrors of former Yugoslavia and of
19 WA 39, II, 93ff, quoted from Moltmann 1974, 233.
20 WA 50, 590, 19, quoted from Moltmann 1974, 234.
21 Sarot 1992, 2.

435

Rwanda, and the ecological crisis towards the end of the millennium, this cumulative experience has created a cultural and intellectual climate in which the idea of an impassible God seems
unacceptable, on moral and intellectual, as well as on strictly theological grounds.
Furthermore, this development has been forged by a deepened
understanding of the nature of love. It is a central New Testament
affirmation that God is love (1 John 4,8; 16.). But can God really be
conceived as love and simultaneously as devoid of passion, totally
unrelated and self-sufficient? Human experience, showing that the
inner core of love means vulnerability, relatedness and affection
makes many theologians respond with a clear refusal. This has
become particularly obvious as traditionally marginalised voices
have been making themselves increasingly heard in theological
issues, through feminist and liberation theologies of distinct kinds.
A loving God cannot be devoid of passion, they say that would
contradict fundamental human experiences of the essence of love.
Furthermore, these theologians support their case with an abundance of both Old and New Testament references describing Gods
passion, and thus severely questioning the early Christian conception of Gods perfection stated in Greek terms.22
This new tendency to see God as in some way participating
in the suffering of the world, is also motivated by the emergence of
a new awareness with regards to the world as a living organism. On
the basis of this awareness, process theology sees God as being in
22 See i. a. Gen.6:5-7; Exod.32:12-14; Dt.32:36; Jg.2:18; 10:16; 1 Sam 15:11;
Ps.78:40, 90:13, 95:10, 106:45, 135:14; Isa.42:14, 63:9-10.15; Jer.4:19, 31:20,
42:10, 48:35-36; Hos.11:1-11; Jon.3:9-10, 4:2-3.10; Lk.6:36, 10:21; Jn.3:16, 5:19,
10:30.38, 14:7-10, 15:13, 17:4; Acts 20:28; Rom.5:8; 8:32; 2 Cor.4:4; Eph.4:30;
Phil.2:6-8; Heb.11:5, 13:16. On the other hand, there are biblical references
used to support the impassibilist stance, such as Num.23:19; 1 Sam.15:29;
Ps.102:25-28; Isa.40:18.25, 41:4, 43:10; Ezek.5:11; Hos.13:14; Mal.3:6; Acts
14:15; 1 Tim.6:15-16; Heb.1:10-11, 6:17 and James 1:17. Sarot 1992, 13, n.34.

436

development in and through the historical and cosmic evolution of

nature. This framework of interpretation allows its most influential
thinker, A. N. Whitehead, to speak of God as a fellow-sufferer who
understands.23
Last, but not least, the advancement of christological reflection
in the 20th Century has in itself contributed to this surprising shift
in the conception of God. Among Protestant theologians, the principal renewal in this field has come through a rediscovery and further development of the potential in Luthers theologia crucis most
notably as we have already seen in the fragmentary, but enormously
influential statements of Bonhoeffer in his letters from prison:
And we cannot be honest unless we recognize that we have to live in the
world etsi deus non daretur. And this is just what we do recognize before
God! [] Before God and with God we live without God. God lets himself
be pushed out of the world on to the cross. He is weak and powerless in the
world, and that is precisely the way, the only way, in which he is with us and
helps us. Matt. 8.17 makes it quite clear that Christ helps us, not by virtue of
his omnipotence, but by virtue of his weakness and suffering. [] The Bible
directs man to Gods powerlessness and suffering; only the suffering God can
help.24

Contemporary Catholic theologians have in general been more

inclined to make the doctrine of incarnation their point of departure for a critique of the doctrine of impassibility. Sobrino is however without doubt deeply influenced by this train of thought from
23 Whitehead, Alfred N.: Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology Macmillan,
New York 1929: 532. What is done in the world is transformed into a reality
in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. By reason of
this reciprocal relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven,
and floods back again into the world. In this sense, God is the great companion the fellow-sufferer who understands. Quoted from Johnson 1992, 251.
24 From 16 and 18 July 1944, Letters and Papers from Prison, 360f, reprinted in
Dudzus 1986, 122-123.

437

Luthers theologia crucis via Bonhoeffer to Moltmann even to the

point of having to defend himself against accusations of being too
Lutheran.25 Closely linked to these developments though not
totally identical, the lively discussion on the death of God has in
broad terms two sources. One is philosophical and cultural, the
other strictly theological. Both have to do with the shortcomings
and ultimate downfall of traditional theism.
Since the Enlightenment, the concept of God has suffered the
misfortune of having to be anchored in or secured by something
which is not God, namely first and foremost the human subject.
The rooting of all possible human knowledge in the Cartesian cogito
meant that God in Godself God as the ens perfectissimum, the
Supreme Ruler, the Reality greater than which nothing could be
conceived of, etc. would no longer seem to be accessible in the
way that had been taken for granted throughout the centuries. In
different ways, the thinking of Descartes, Kant, Schleiermacher and
Hegel indirectly shows just how difficult this actual sphere and presence of God had become. Their ways of relegating to God the
spheres of morality, human self-consciousness as a dependent being,
or world history as totality, all reveal the problematic status of a theistic concept of God in the Modern Age.
Accordingly, this situation led many to the conclusion that
there was no longer room for such a God. Such a God could only
be seen as a projection of desires and aspirations of the very same
experiencing subject in which they occur. Theology is thus dis25 Tampoco nos mueve la fidelidad a una determinada tradicin cristiana;
algunos preguntan si no estamos muy influenciados por la tradicin luterana, bajo el presupuesto, que a veces se convierte en una autntica mana, de
que nada se puede pensar si no es relacionndolo con algo ya pensado anteriormente. Indudablemente, en sta, como en cualquier otra cristologa unas
tradiciones influyen ms que otras, pero el influjo fundamental proviene de
la misma realidad crucificada. Sobrino 1991d, 394.

438

closed as (a deceptive) anthropology.26 This is the common core

and main sting in the critique of religion voiced by Feuerbach,
Fichte, Marx, Nietzsche and later Freud. This atheist stance
emerges most radically and provocatively in the thinking of Friedrich Nietzsche. He held the death of God to be an historical fact
although still in the process of becoming and in The Happy Science (1882) he puts the announcement of this fact into the mouth of
a madman: God is dead! He remains dead! And we have killed
him! Nietzsche announces this as good news to humanity, because
it could finally pave the way for humanitys advancement towards
its true destination, which is to become superhuman(s) through the
revalorization of all values.
Partly dependent on these philosophical developments, partly
causing them, the historical and social progress of modernity at
least in the Western hemisphere, it should be noted led to a cultural mode according to which the thought of God as a necessary
foundation for all existence became ever less plausible. There just
seemed to be no use of the working hypothesis God in order to
explain the universe or to make progress as human beings and societies. The process of secularisation was rapid and seemed irreversible. For all practical purposes, God was dead. The autonomous
human being, the modern man which for the most part meant
the European, white, middle-class male, we should again recall
had taken over all of the world stage.
What theological response should be given to this cultural situation? Was it to be deemed legitimate or illegitimate? It is in this
context Bonhoeffer formulates the monumental statements quoted
above: And we cannot be honest unless we recognize that we have
to live in the world etsi deus non daretur. And this is just what we do
recognize before God! To live in the world as if there were no
26 E. Jngel gives this development a thorough treatment in Jngel 1983,cf.
especially pp. 127-152.

439

God, that is what Christians are called to do! For Bonhoeffer then,
the human autonomy of the Modern Age is no accident, but rather
the world finally come of age. His call for a religionless interpretation of the Gospel is a theological recognition of the legitimacy
of the process of secularisation. How can such an interpretation be
possible? It is possible by way of a theologia crucis, according to
which God is revealed not as the one ruling the world in power and
glory, but rather as the one letting Godself be pushed out of the
world in the event of the cross on Golgotha. Only in this way can
God be a God for human beings, Bonhoeffer says, echoing Luther.
And so, from the Nazi prison cell in 1944, awaiting a forthcoming
execution, the profound and pointed maxim takes form: Only the
suffering God can help. The radical and yet preliminary and fragmentary character of Bonhoeffers statements has made them particularly open to a variety of interpretations. Different aspects of
Bonhoeffers thinking have been weighted. Those who have continued on the project of a theology of secularisation, such as William
Hamilton (Death of God: The Culture of Our Post-Christian Era,
1961), Paul van Buren (Secular Meaning of the Gospel, 1963), and
Thomas J. J. Altizer (Gospel of Christian Atheism, 1966), developed
something which came to be called a God-Is-Dead-theology. This
theology, which attained world-wide attention after the magazine
Time had made it the main story of an edition in 1965, took its lead
from the general perception of the cultural mode just referred to.
They concentrated on the task of reformulating the gospel in secular terms, and thus giving the freedom and autonomy of modern
man full theological legitimacy.27
To others, like Moltmann and Jngel, it has been Bonhoeffers
christological solution to the deadlock of theism and atheism by
way of a theologia crucis that has been the main impetus. Gods unification with Christ signifies that suffering, vulnerability, perishability and death do affect God. This being so, the theistic concept of

440

God has come to its end. The Modern Ages atheistic critique of
religion may in fact be affirmed from a Christian point of view, to
the extent that it rejects this conception of God and its metaphysical
premises. Yet this affirmation does not lead to a complete doing
away with either metaphysics or Christian faith in God, but rather
to a different, specifically Christian i.e. rooted in faith in Gods
identification with the crucified Christ conception of God,
which, although not simply free of metaphysics, still is free in relationship to metaphysics.28 It leads beyond theism and atheism(Moltmann29), to a theology after the death of God
(Jngel30).
Liberation theology and Third World theologians in general
have taken up the heritage from Bonhoeffer in a distinct manner.
From the perspective of the poor peoples and nations, it has become
increasingly clear what an ambiguous project modernity is.31 It is
ambiguous because, in spite of having the liberation of humankind
as its aspiration, it creates victims. From the perspective of these victims then, the autonomy of modern (European) man is not just
27 Inge Lnning has rightly observed a critical weakness inherent to theological
attempts of this sort, namely that they easily lend themselves to making the
death of God bluntly into a [] Legitimation der restlosen bertragung
traditioneller Gottesattribute auf den Menschen [] Interessant ist die Feststellung [des Todes Gottes] dann hchstens als Symptom des gesellschaftlichen Herrschaftsanspruches einer eindimensionalen, skularistischen
Daseinsdeutung. Eine Theologie, die sich auf solche Prmissen als eine Theologie des Todes Gottes etablieren wollte, wre ein verfngliches, im bestem
Falle ein berflssiges Unternehmen kulturpolitischer Art. Lnning 1984,
701.
28 Jngel 1983, 48.
29 Moltmann 1974, 249-252.
30 Jngel 1983, 43-105; 43.
31 Nor has the process of secularisation advanced as much in the poorer areas of
the world. Its irreversibility even in the First World as a social phenomenon at least is now widely called into question.

441

a blessing. It has rather become a damnation. The liberation of

some individuals and nations has perhaps not necessarily, but certainly as a matter of fact led to the oppression or exclusion of
masses of other people. For this reason it becomes pivotal to a theology from the underside of history (Gutirrez) that the heritage
from Bonhoeffer not be used primarily to support the liberty of the
strong in world history, but rather to point out Gods partisanship
and presence with the powerless and poor. Gods suffering on the
cross of Christ is taken as an ultimate testimony to Gods solidarity
with all those who suffer. Bonhoeffers words again: [God] is weak
and powerless in the world, and that is precisely the way, the only
way, in which he is with us and helps us. Sobrinos reception and
use of Bonhoeffer clearly belongs to this category.

[2] How Does God Suffer?

The classical theistic concept of an impassible God has largely been
given up in contemporary theology.32 But how is God vulnerable;
how does God suffer? And in what sense is it correct to speak of the
death of God? Responding to these questions, theologians differ
widely. The debate is at times extremely polemical and heated. It is
thus easily noticeable that much is at stake in these discussions. Let
us review some main positions, in order to get a better grasp on
where Sobrino stands.
In order to be able to speak correctly of Gods suffering and of a
deus crucifixus, it is not only necessary to recover Luthers theology
of the cross, according to Jrgen Moltmann. One must also restore
32 Although there still are defenders of the classical impassibilism. See analysis
in Sarot 1992, 67-102.

442

the trinitarian character of Christian faith in God. God is a trinitarian process at the centre of which stands the cross.33 On the cross
God is dead, and yet not dead. This can only be maintained by the
help of trinitarian thinking.34 On the cross, both the Father and the
Son suffer, but in distinct manners. The Son suffers the death of the
cross. The Father does not suffer death (which would be to adhere
to the patripassianist heresy, he holds), but suffers his own abandonment, his own giving up (Gr.: paradidonai)35 of the Son on
the cross. The abandonment of Jesus (derelictio Jesu) becomes a central point in Moltmanns argument. The Father actually abandons
the Son on the cross.36 That is ultimately why Jesus dies, and
that is also what distinguishes Jesus death from all other deaths in
history. Jesus dies forsaken by God; his death cry should be taken in
its utterly radical meaning, as recorded in Mark.
Thus the event of the cross actually becomes not primarily an
event between humanity and God, according to Moltmann, but an
event in God. On the cross there is a confrontation between God
and God; nemo contra Deum nisi Deus ipse. Through this event all
suffering, sin and godforsakenness is taken into Gods very being,
Moltmann boldly goes on.
In that case, what is salvation? Only if all disaster, forsakenness by God,
absolute death, the infinite curse of damnation and sinking into nothingness
is in God himself, is community with this God eternal salvation, infinite joy,
indestructible election and divine life.37

33 Drawing on the Greek theology of the Cappodocians and Luthers theology

of the cross, one main thesis in Moltmanns book is that the materiality of
Trinitarian thinking is the cross; the formality of the cross is Trinitarian
thinking, Moltmann 1974, 240-241.
34 Moltmann 1974, 200-290.
35 Moltmann 1974, 241ff.

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The suffering of the world thus becomes Gods suffering. There is

no suffering which in this history of God is not Gods suffering; no
death which has not been Gods death in the history on
Golgotha.38 This conception of the suffering of God as a suffering
in God cannot be thought of within the framework of the traditional, theistic image of God, according to Moltmann. It requires
no less than a revolution in the concept of God.
36 Although John Macquarrie holds that The Crucified God would have a good
claim to be regarded as possibly the most important theological book to be
published in the second half of the twentieth century (321), he joins in what
seems to have become a quite general critique of Moltmann, faulting him
for a certain conceptual vagueness. With regard to this central point of the
Fathers abandonment of the Son on the cross, Macquarrie finds Moltmann
to contradict himself: [] Moltmann wants to say that [Jesus] really was
abandoned, and this is in plain contradiction to his claim that the Father was
suffering in and with Jesus. Macquarrie 1990, 323; cf. also note 86 on page
440: The language is ambiguous or even unintelligible: In the forsakenness
of the Son, the Father forsakes himself. The quotation (which actually
lacks an also between Father and forsakes) here is from Moltmann 1974,
243. Although Moltmanns paradoxical thinking here is not ultimately
convincing, I think it is fair to point out that Macquarries critique seems to
forget the basic point Moltmann is making about the different modes of suffering of the Father and the Son. Suffering with need not necessarily be suffering in the same way as. Having said this, I do agree with Macquarrie in
that this is a problematic area in The Crucified God. The crucial issue is
whether God in this outline is seen not only as crucified, but also in some
sense as crucifier. This seems to be the implication in Moltmann 1974, 235
and Moltmann 1981, 83, where the author quotes the following sentence of
Patriarch Philaret of Moscow with approval: The Father is crucifying love,
the Son is crucified love, and the Spirit is the unvanquishable power on the
cross. And yet, defending his view against his critics in Moltmann 1990,
Moltmann maintains that [] God does not cause Christs suffering [] It
is pure lack of comprehension to maintain that one of the Trinity suffered,
but the other caused the suffering. See my further discussion below.
37 Moltmann 1974, 246.
38 Ibid.

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For this radical and audacious approach, Moltmann soon

attained a world-wide attention. There were both enthusiastic
appraisals and harsh criticisms. Dorothee Slles response certainly
belonged to the latter category. She has great difficulties in accepting and even understanding Moltmanns reasoning, she says.39 And
the worst point for her seems to be that Moltmann holds Jesus
death ultimately to be caused by the Father. God is not only crucified; God is also crucifier.40 Thus, with reference to the Lutheran
thought model of God against God, Moltmann is in fact portraying God as an executioner, a killer. The trinitarian solution of this
dilemma is not of any help, according to Slle. It rather worsens it,
by dissolving the difference between victim and perpetrator crucified and crucifier making God indifferent to this fundamental distinction by being, so to speak, beyond it, and simultaneously
making us human beings merely puppets on a string in the trinitarian process which is the drama of salvation.41 Slles polemic is
very sharp, to the point of clear and offensive exaggeration: The
author is fascinated by the brutality of his God, she writes.42
39 Slle 1979, 112. This chapter is a shortened version of a text originally published in Wissenschaft und Praxis in Kirche und Gesellschaft 7, 1973: 358-372.
Slle gives a more complete development of her views on this theme in her
book Slle 1978.
40 Welches Interesse hat nun Moltmann an der exklusiven Einzigkartigkeit
des Leidens Jesu? Es ist ein Interesse an Gott, der nicht vollstndig der in
Christus Leidende ist, der nicht nur der gekreuzigte Gott ist, sondern
zugleich auch der, der kreuzigt, der Leiden macht, der aktiv das opfer Abrahams vollzieht. Slle 1979, 112.
41 Das trinitarische Modell scheint mir allerdings die Schwierigkeiten eher zu
vergrssern als zu lsen. Slle 1979, 114. Der entscheidende Punkt, den ich
nicht verstehe, ist ein Denken ber das Leiden, das die Unterscheidung
zwischen Opfern und Henkern merkwrdig verschleiert [] Das
Unfruchtbare des trinitarischen Schemas, das auch dort geschlossen bleibt,
wo es sich heilskonomisch formuliert, ist, dass wir in ihm nicht erscheinen
oder nur als Marionetten fungieren.

445

In the same vein as Slle, Leonardo Boff too launches severe

accusations against Moltmanns argument on this particular issue.43
The problem is not, according to Boff, the move from an a-pathetic
to a pathetic God, i.e. a God with pathos, who can suffer. On the
contrary, he shares the conviction that such a move is absolutely
appropriate and necessary. The problem, however, occurs when
God at the same time is seen as agent in the process of suffering,
one who actually causes pain in the world. This is the consequence of Moltmanns thinking, with its adherence to the Deus
contra deum maxim, Boff believes. This kind of language, which
Boff renders as a revolt of God against God, a disunion in God,
or an enmity between God and God without making it clear
whether these are actually direct quotations of Moltmann or not
he sternly rejects.
Moltmanns language betrays a profound lack of theological
rigor, Boff claims. His propositions [] are no longer uttered in
an awareness of the ambiguity and analogical nature of our discourse upon God. It is, however, not only Moltmann who is making such a fatal mistake, according to Boff: All the most celebrated
theologians of the moment are guilty of this naive error.44
Boff s critique seems to me like that of Slle to go much too
far. He even reaches the extreme of drawing [] a surprising parallelism between this theology, which unloads all the burden of violence on God, and the baleful vision of Nazism.45 Such a
parallelism must of course be taken as extremely offensive by any
42 Der Autor ist fasziniert von der Brutalitt seines Gottes. Op. cit., 115.
43 Boff 1987b, 102-116;111. It seems to me that Boff s criticism of Moltmann
takes much colour from that of Slle. For instance, he repeats with his own
words her insult that Moltmann is fascinated with a God Father who does
what Abraham did not do, namely kill his own Son (p.112).
44 Ibid.
45 Op. cit:, 113.

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serious theologian. The fact that Moltmann himself was a prisoner

of war during World War II, does not make the insult less severe.
Why does Boff go to such extremes? Obviously, because he feels
that some extremely vital theological distinctions are at stake.46
Boff s strong language could be taken as an important reminder of
the extreme delicacy and seriousness of the issues discussed. It is as
if Boff wants to underline as strongly as at all possible that everything stands or falls with our being able to conceive God as participating in human suffering, being affected by human suffering,
without either making God responsible for that suffering, or making suffering a reality in God. Because if God is responsible for suffering or it is a part of Gods very being, then suffering is in fact
eternalised and divinised. There will then never be no salvation
from suffering.
Boff s very critical reading of Moltmann is neither totally adequate nor fair. It is also dubious whether the thought of a suffering
in God, which is indeed something Moltmann does maintain47,
must necessarily lead to the fatal consequences held by Slle and
Boff.48 This notwithstanding, seeing the Father in the last resort as
causing the death of the Son is a very problematic contention
indeed. I have already raised questions with regards to such an
approach in the previous chapter. At the end, it is once again the
problem of choosing between, or seeking to integrate, dualistic and
monistic frameworks. Having in mind my own critique of Sobrinos
46 It should also be noted that, although Moltmann has been an important
source of influence, the relationship between Moltmann and Latin American
liberation theologians was quite strained at one stage, culminating with
Moltmanns Open Letter to the Argentinean liberation theologian Jos
Mguez Bonino in 1976, Moltmann 1990 (1976). Moltmanns letter was a
sharp response to some criticisms made by Bonino in Bonino 1975, 144-150.
This controversy may have added to the critical tone of Boff s argument
here.
47 See also Moltmann 1981, 21-60 and Moltmann 1990, 170-181.

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unwarranted shift of soteriological models (from dualistic to monistic, cf. above), it is interesting to see the following similar objection
made to Moltmann by Boff :
In Moltmanns vision the passion is reduced to a single basic causality; that
of God the Father. The causality of Jesus adversaries, who produced the historical death of Jesus Christ with their moral introversion and self-centeredness goes by the board.49

Particularly when we see in general how close the christologies

of Boff and Sobrino seem to be to one another, it is significant to
note at this point their totally conflicting appraisals of Moltmanns
contribution. I shall return to this disagreement which never to
my knowledge has led to any direct confrontation between the two
in my treatment of Sobrinos views below.
Boff s own attempt at solving the dilemma is to say that suffering is not something in God, but something other-than-God,
which God out of love takes on in the event of the cross.50 This is
48 A. Gonzlez suggests a third alternative: Si bien hay que afirmar con Moltmann (y Bonhoeffer) que un Dios que no sufre no puede salvar, tambin hay
que decir con Boff que un Dios que es causa del propio dolor ni es un Dios
verdaderamente encarnado ni es un Dios que puede salvar del dolor, como
tampoco puede salvar un Dios eternamente sufriente. La teologa de la liberacin ha de afirmar, dado su inters soteriolgico y su opcin por la perspectiva de las vctimas de la historia, la solidaridad real de Dios con esas
vctimas, de modo que la pasin no puede ser algo que slo concierne a su
humanidad. Por otra parte, el dolor es una realidad temporal que no puede
ser eternizado. Gonzlez 1994, 106.
49 Boff 1987b, 113.
50 God assumes the cross in order to be-in-solidarity with those who suffer
not to sublimate and eternalise the cross, but to enter into solidarity with
those who suffer on the cross and thus transform the cross into a sign of
blessing, a sign of suffering love. Love, then, is the motive for this assumption of the cross by God. Op. cit., 115.

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something new, even to God. It opens up the possibility of a suffering for the sake of others, a suffering which does not nullify human
dignity, a suffering which may still uphold hope. This is a suffering
born of the struggle against suffering, Boff explains, a definition
which he subsequently develops with regard to the Latin American
experience.51
In her book SHE WHO IS,52 the Catholic feminist theologian
Elizabeth A. Johnson takes up the issue of the suffering God from
the vantage point of womens experience. In a much less polemical
style than that of Slle and Boff even when speaking of anger
and wrath as female metaphors for suffering53 she too cautions
against predicating suffering of God in such a way that suffering
becomes a value in itself, or that God becomes essentially weak or
powerless []54 With a critical reference to some of Moltmanns
most radical and paradoxical statements55, Johnson holds that the
depiction of a helpless God, powerless in suffering, is particularly
dangerous when directed to women and oppressed people, since in
her view, one of the key ingredients in the maintenance of systems
of oppression is inculcating a feeling of helplessness in those
oppressed.56

51 Op. cit., 117-128.

52 Johnson 1992, 246-273.
53 In a creative and suggestive analysis, Johnson elaborates on these and three
other metaphors or symbols generated by experience of pain to evoke the
mystery of God (op. cit., 254-264; 254). The other ones are birth, grief
and degradation.
54 Op. cit., 253.
55 God is not greater than he is in this humiliation. God is not more glorious
than he is in this self-surrender. God is not more powerful than he is in this
helplessness. God is not more divine than he is in this humanity. Moltmann 1974, 205.
56 Op. cit., 253.

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Johnson also asks the justified question whether the symbol57

of the suffering God is helpful to the sufferer at all. Having fallen
into a deep, dark pit, would one not rather cry for a God with a
bright light and a long ladder, a Rescuer, than for a God to come
and sit in the pit and share the suffering and darkness?58 Johnson
admits the element of truth in such an objection, and summing up
all the risks, she considers seriously the option that feminist theology should forego any speaking of Gods suffering.59
Still, she holds that it should not take this option. The symbol
of a suffering, compassionate God is actually of benefit to women
who know in their own experience a full cup of anguish.60 It must
be held up against the pathological tendency in the present culture
of the First World to deny suffering and death in human experience, which leads to banality in thought and superficiality in values.61 Although the sufferer longs for someone to free her from the
suffering, there are also strong testimonies from persons and communities saying that the experience and faith that God had not left
them alone in their misery was the only thing that could make
them uphold some sense of hope and dignity. This communion
with the sufferer in her pain, as she experiences it, is the presence of
love that is a balm to the wounded spirit, Johnson quotes Wendy
Farley.62
This emphasis on Gods communion with the sufferer corresponds to the fact that Jesus was not ultimately abandoned, according to Johnson. It is this communion of God with the victim Jesus,
57 Elizabeth Johnson uses symbol with reference to Ricoeurs axiom: Symbol
gives rise to thought. Op. cit., 47
58 Op. cit., 267.
59 Op. cit., 254.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Op. cit.,267. The quotation is from Farley 1990, 81.

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as with all the other victims in history, that opens up the future
through even the most negative of experiences. The victory is won
through a living communion of love, which overcomes evil from
within.63
Johnson seems to take a via media between Moltmann and
Boff, when she states that suffering can be conceived of ontologically as an expression of divine being insofar as it is an act freely
engaged as a consequence of care for others.64 As in Sobrinos outline, Johnsons ontology here seems to be founded on the category
of constitutive relationality. God is love. Gods essence as love is
relational; faced with a suffering world, Gods love relates to this
suffering. In this way, through the loving relation to those who suffer, suffering affects Gods own being, and Johnson may speak of a
suffering in God: In the light of the feminist prizing of mutuality
as moral excellence, love does entail suffering in God.65
From the perspective of womens interpreted experience then,
Bonhoeffers powerful statement may be affirmed, according to
Johnson: Only a suffering God can help. And from that particular
experience, new elements are brought forward to the reflection on
the question of how the suffering God helps. In developing these
elements, it is interesting to see the degree to which Johnsons reflection resembles that of Sobrino in many aspects. Key words for both
of them are, as we have seen, relationality, community, and the
power of love expressed in solidarity and praxis. They share the
belief that speaking of Gods suffering may help in strengthening
human responsibility in the face of (other peoples) suffering. Johnson too, takes up Archbishop Romeros profound pastoral intuition
when he spoke of the corpses piled up, here in our land and
throughout the world as the presence of the body and blood of
63 Op. cit., 268-269.
64 Op. cit., 265. My emphasis, SJS.
65 Op. cit., 266.

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Christ. In an impressive manner, Johnson applies this to the holocaust of women, particularly all those women who have been marginalised and mistreated in and by the Christian tradition and
history itself from the violated and tortured Bethlehem woman
told of in that text of terror (Phyllis Trible) in Jgs. 19:25, to the
perhaps more than a million women annihilated in the name of
God by the Inquisition. Johnson holds these women to be images
of the crucified in an unspeakable way. 66
It is important for Johnson to stress that her choice to maintain
the symbol of the suffering God, in spite of being well aware of its
possible dangers, is far from a conceptual solution to the problem of
suffering. Like Boff, she insists that it is crucial not to forget the
analogical character of our language on the mystery of God, and the
mystery of suffering. But perhaps more strongly than Boff, she
keeps in mind that one must speak of, and is confronted with, a suffering that is and remains totally absurd; a suffering which is not
freely taken on in the struggle against suffering; a suffering which
totally destroys faith, hope and human dignity. That is what Wendy
Farley calls radical suffering.67 When speaking of such suffering, and
of Gods suffering in connection with it, Elizabeth Johnson insists,
we may only do so under the rule of darkness and broken
words.68 The most astute theodicies pale before the torment in
the history of the world.69
66 Op. cit., 263.
67 Johnson quotes Wendy Farleys definition of radical suffering: Radical
suffering is present when the negativity of a situation is experienced as an
assault on ones personhood as such [] This assault reduces the capacity of
the sufferer to exercise freedom, to feel affection, to hope, to love God []
In radical suffering the soul itself has been so crippled that it can no longer
defy evil. The destruction of the human being is so complete that even the
shred of dignity that might demand vindication is extinguished. Johnson
1992, 249, quotation taken from Farley 1990, 53-55.
68 Johnson 1992, 272.

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Is there a conflict in God? Is Jesus actually abandoned on the

cross, i.e., is God absent or present when Jesus dies? Are suffering
and death to be thought of as phenomena external or internal to
Gods own being? These are the among the most debated questions
among theologians who all accept that a contemporary conception
of God must leave the traditional impassibilist stance in favour of
some form of passibilism. Eberhard Jngels contribution to this
debate is original and thorough.70 He deals with these issues not
primarily in terms of suffering but rather focuses on Vergnglichkeit
a term which in the English translation reads perishability,
though it could also (and more accurately, perhaps) have been rendered as transience or transitoriness.71
Jngel holds that there is no conflict, no contradiction in
God.72 God corresponds to God. And when it comes to God as
revealed in Christ, the alternatives of absence and presence are actually false: God is in fact to be thought of as a being which explodes
the alternative of presence and absence.73 God freely, out of love
involves God-self with perishability in such a manner that this
becomes a phenomenon internal to Gods own being. But does
this not lead to eternal suffering, or to making God (co-)responsible
for the destructive forces in reality? No, the opposite is true, Jngel
claims and this is where the originality of his contribution can be
seen since perishability is not totally destructive per se.74 It also has
69 Op. cit., 271.
70 Jngel 1983, particularly Chapter iii, 13: Gods unity with perishability as
the basis for thinking God, 184-225. See also his essay from 1968, Jngel
1968, reprinted in Jngel 1972, 80ff.
71 Alister McGrath prefers the latter alternatives: McGrath 1994, 222.
72 Jngel 1983, 346: Briefly, the differentiation between God and God can
never be understood as a contradiction in God. cf. 225, n.73: [] Gods
own being is subject to nothingness in such a way that the confrontation is
made possible, without God contradicting himself in the process []
73 Op. cit., 62.

453

a constructive, affirmative side, which is the possibility.75 In the process of perishing new possibilities emerge. By involving Gods self in
perishability through the self-identification with the dead man
Jesus, God participates in the struggle within perishability between
its destructive aspect the tendency to absolute nothingness76
and its constructive aspect the possibility. This struggle pertains to
Gods own being. God is in this struggle,77 which ultimately means
that Gods being is in becoming, as Jngel audaciously formulates
it, reversing thus Aristotles priorities of actuality and potentiality.78
Contrary to what Aristotle held, Jngel gives ontological priority to
potentiality, that which is in the process of becoming, the possibility.
In bearing annihilation in himself, God proves himself to be the victor over
nothingness, and he ends the negative attraction of hell, death and the
devil. By proving himself to be this victor, God reveals what he truly and
ultimately is. God is the one who can bear and does bear, can suffer and does
suffer, in his being the annihilating power of nothingness, even the negation
of death, without being annihilated by it.79
74 What is revealed to be the actual premise of the ultimate thought of that
metaphysics which understands itself as theo-onto-logic is the negative metaphysical evaluation of perishability. Its basic ontological structure is fixed as
that of annihilation. That which perishes is destroyed. The word of the cross
speaks in opposition to that. Its objection does not imply that perishing is a
harmless affair. Rather, in the word of the cross, the seriousness of death is
expressed in an unsurpassable way. The objection is directed toward the
ontological discrediting of that which is perishable. Op. cit., 203-204.
75 That which is ontologically positive about perishability is the possibility. Op.
cit., 213.
76 A tendency towards nothingness certainly appears to be an aspect of that
which is actually negative in perishability. For the tendency not to be is a
threat to everything perishable! Op. cit., 211 .
77 Op. cit., 217.
78 Op. cit., 214.
79 Op. cit., 219.

454

Jngel concentrates on the (natural) process of perishing and dying.

Though this is most often a painful and existentially threatening
experience for human beings, it seems not automatically to cover
what Johnson with Wendy Farley called radical suffering. Radical
suffering is [] distinct from the general consciousness of pain and
death.80 While the process of perishing may be accepted as a process in or from which new possibilities actually emerge, it is difficult
to say the same of radical suffering. Jngel does not (in this context
at least) contemplate this difference nor if there really is one, in
his view.
However, in spite of the fact that his statements seem to deal
with perishability as a general phenomenon, it should not be forgotten that he examines this phenomenon in view of the totally
unexpected and unprecedented event of Gods self-identification
with the dead Jesus on the cross. Hence, there is an opening to
approach even radical suffering with hope that it will ultimately be
overcome: viz., resurrection. In fact, it is Christian faith in God as
one with the crucified one, which makes it possible for Jngel to
reverse the priorities of traditional ontology, giving priority to
potentiality and possibility even beyond and contrary to what can
be observed in the natural processes of perishing.
These dense statements and sophisticated trains of thought do
without doubt in spite of their extreme degree of abstraction and
corresponding lack of concrete and practical rooting in a particular
context contribute to the advancement of theological reflection
on the subject under consideration. And in the midst of his sytematical and rigid reasoning, Jngel preserves a profound sense of
Geheimnis, of mystery and secrecy, as the title of his book shows.
However, the lack of any consideration of human praxis as a potentially adequate, Christian response to the phenomenon of perishing
makes one wonder if Jngels outline does not turn out to be an
80 Farley, Wendy: Op. cit., 55.

455

overly theoretical and conceptual solution to the theodicy question

after all?81
Johann Baptist Metz seems to think so. Although this influential
Catholic theologian has been the most insistent reminder of the fact
that contemporary theology is profoundly determined by its postAuschwitz context as we saw at the very outset of our study82 he
himself cannot follow the tendency in recent theology from Karl
Barth to Eberhard Jngel, from Dietrich Bonhoeffer to Jrgen Moltmann.83 Metz cannot and will not speak of a suffering in God or
a suffering between God and God. He fears that in the end this is a
way for theology to ally itself with God behind the backs of those
who suffer namelessly, innocently, as he so strongly formulates it.
Is not a reconciliation with God at work here that is too speculative, too
proximate to Gnosis, achieved to much behind the back of the human history of suffering? Is there not and especially for theologians that negative
mystery of suffering which will not allow itself to be made sense of in anyones name?84

81 It is difficult to avoid the perception that to think is the central category to

Jngel. Although Jngels own background and life experience could have
much relevance to the themes discussed, he chooses not to draw explicitly on
them (or on the experience of others), but remains within a universal and
abstract framework. When Jngel on p.202 defines the root of the problem
in that [] both God and perishability have been thought inadequately
until now, the sense of an academic remoteness from the real suffering of
people is close at hand.
82 Cf. p.1 above.
83 Metz 1994, 619. This quite recent article represents a pointed and polemical
reflection on the issues we are discussing. Hence I find it helpful for our purposes. It should not be taken as an indication that Metz is only reactive in
these issues, attacking other positions. Quite to the contrary, Metz has rigorously developed his own position, which has been highly influential in
recent European theology. Cf. particularly Metz 1980, 119-135;132.
84 Metz 1994, 619.

456

Metz finds too much of Hegel, i.e. too much sublation of the negative in this language of suffering in God; a language which he also
deems to violate the classical doctrine of analogy concerning the
maior dissimilitudo that holds between God and the world. He fears
that a secret aestheticization, a quasi-mythical universalization
and, in the end, an eternalisation of suffering are the results of such
theology. Not even christology necessitates nor legitimates theology
speaking of a suffering God or of suffering in God, in Metz opinion.
These powerful and noteworthy objections do not lead Metz to
defend the classical impassibilist stance, however. Instead, he advocates a mysticism of suffering unto God.85
Suffering, which makes us cry out or finally fall wretchedly silent, knows no
majesty. It is nothing great, nothing sublime; at root it is something entirely
different from a powerful, solidaristic suffering-with [Mitleiden]. It is not
simply a sign of love; rather it is much more a horrifying sign of no longer
being able to love. It is that suffering which leads into nothingness if it is not
a suffering unto God.86

Such a mysticism of suffering unto God is a mysticism with open

eyes.87 Its orientation is profoundly eschatological, since it holds
that all the biblical predicates of God from the self-definition of
God in Exodus to the Johannine word God is love bear the
85 Op. cit., 620, (my emphasis, SJS). The German expression used by Metz is
Leiden an Gott, which could also come close to suffering from God or suffering by God. The translator of the essay, J. Matthew Ashley, notes that
while he is conscious of the fact that a play of words in the German Metz
correlation of Leiden an Gott with Rckfragen an Gott is lost in the English
version, he has chosen suffering unto God in order to express (a) that this
is a form of relationship to God, and (b) that it is an active, dynamic state
and not just a passive enduring. Op. cit., note on p.611.
86 Op. cit., 619.
87 Op. cit., 622.

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mark of a promise. Its language is not consoling88, but a language

of passionate requestioning that arises out of suffering, a requestioning of God, full of highly charged expectation.89 It is a mysticism
with a practical and political90 character; a mysticism marked by the
poverty of spirit of the first beatitude; a mysticism like that of Jesus.
The radicality of Metz refusal to answer the question of how
God relates to (radical) suffering is impressive. Taking into account
his common point of departure with Moltmann in the 1960s,
which eventually led to their being considered founding fathers of
European political theology, the distance to Moltmanns position on
this particular and crucial! matter is all the more remarkable.
Metz reasoning here is a powerful No! to any theology that
knowingly or not gives in to the ever lurking temptation of explaining away or easing the pain of most often other peoples suffering by way of interpretative frameworks or theoretical conceptions,
be they trinitarian, christological or other.
This No! must always be heeded. Any theological labour on
these ultimate issues of evil and suffering in the world must be done
under a constant consciousness of the limits, fragility and theologically considered sinfulness of its own efforts. The attempts at
answering these ultimate questions must never silence them or
make them disappear.
Having said this, I do think it is proper to ask Metz if it is not
possible, and even necessary given the Christian rootedness in the
88 Op. cit., 621: But is this sort of mysticism at all consoling? [] Was Israel,
for example, happy with its God? Was Jesus happy with his father? Does religion make one happy? Does it make one mature? Does it give one an identity? Homeland, security, peace with ourselves? Does it soothe anxiety? Does
it answer questions? Does it fulfill desires, at least our most burning ones? I
doubt it.
89 Op. cit., 621.
90 Political in the sense of being preoccupied with those who suffer unjustly,
the victims and vanquished in our history, op. cit., 620, cf. Metz 1980.

458

event of the cross, to reflect further on the relationship of human

suffering and God on Golgotha. Is there not a danger here that the
theologian, from fear of stepping over the line, might in fact fail to
see the crucified Jesus as actually a revelation of God? Might not
Metz approach imply an overstating of the distance between Jesus
and God, and eventually lead to their separation?
As will have become clear, the issue of the suffering and death of
God is a live and pressing controversy in contemporary theology.
What conclusions can be drawn from this survey so far? At least
this: even though sharing to a large extent I would say (1) the
main presupposition that the (theistic) doctrine of divine impassibility is no longer tenable, (2) the central New Testament affirmation that God is love and that (3) this must imply relatedness and
vulnerability, and (4) the principal intention of reflecting and acting
responsibly on the Gospel message in our contemporary world,
these theologians differ considerably when they try to be more precise about the relationship between God as revealed in Christ, and
suffering.
One can detect at least three significant dividing lines here, it
seems to me: one concerning the language which is appropriate to
God-talk, another having to do with human responsibility and praxis
face to face with suffering and evil, and the third regarding the issue
whether the event of the cross may also be seen as in some sense
reflecting a conflict in God. Yet reading these texts carefully, it is not
at all easy to draw these lines very sharply. Neither do they run parallel to each other, so the pattern emerging is a rather confusing
one.
I would also note that the temperature of the debate and the
harshness of the polemics used by some of the participants do not
quite correspond to the actual difference between the positions
taken. To mention only the most obvious example, I cannot find

459

Boff s position to be so far from that of Moltmann as to justify the

strong indignation colouring every word of Boff s rendering of
Moltmanns views. The explanation for this high temperature, I
think, must be the very character of the issue under consideration.
Being aware of the dreadful consequences of all the manipulative
and oppressive attempts at speaking authoritatively and confidently
about God and suffering through the history of theology, none of
these contemporary theologians wishes to go wrong. They balance a
very sharp edge by, in a way, speaking although knowing that in
these matters, perhaps silence and praxis is the more appropriate
response. But then again, given exactly this tragic history, one
should not forget that there might be crucial distinctions at stake in
their seemingly small divergences. I see such crucial distinctions
particularly related to the questions of whether or not God actually
abandons the Jesus on the cross; and whether and if so, in what
sense suffering in some sense must be deemed necessary according to the Christian interpretation of the cross.
Before considering Sobrinos own explication of the crucified
God in view of this debate, I should like to draw attention to what
the Dutch theologian Marcel Sarot deems a widely neglected problem implied in opting for some sort of passibilism. It has to do
with corporeality. One of the classic arguments against divine passibility was in fact that it would necessarily imply corporeality.91 Very
few of the present defenders of the shift to divine passibility, do in
fact pay any attention to this traditional objection, however. Having
opted for a qualified form of passibilism himself, Sarot points out
this lacuna, and then moves on to a consideration of whether it
really is true that the passibilist stance must imply that God is
91 Thomas Aquinas, for instance, considered the case thoroughly, and found a
close connection between emotion and corporeality. Therefore he concluded
that since God must be thought of as incorporeal, God is also without emotions. Passibility is incompatible with incorporeality. Sarot 1992, 103-118.

460

thought of as having some form of embodiment. His finding is

affirmative. Passibilism requires that God be able to have emotions.
The ability to have emotions requires corporeality. If God can suffer, then God must have a body.92
What kind of body can God have? Now, Sarot argues that there
are various degrees and forms of embodiment. He thinks it fruitful
only to examine whether a limited form of embodiment may be
prescribed to God, namely in the sense that [] when something
is my body, my feelings and sensations will be located in it.93 Analysing three recent theories of divine embodiment those of
Charles Hartshorne, Grace Jantzen and Luco van den Broom
with particular attention to the requirements of a passibilitist
stance, Sarot concludes that it is in fact possible to move towards a
theory of divine corporeality which could support the notion of a
suffering God. In particular, he thinks Jantzens contributions are
helpful in that respect.94
In his suggestive thesis, however, Sarot does not fully present
such a theory. Much remains to be worked out in this directon. But
whether one accepts his argument or not, it is Sarots merit to have
raised this issue. His focus on corporeality is a particularly timely
reminder, as we are in many aspects witnessing a return of the
body in theology as well as in ethics, theory of law and other traditionally theoretical sciences. In this connection I find Hugo Assmanns recent proposal of seeing corporeality as a source of criteria
for an ethics of solidarity in a Latin American context particular
noteworthy.95 Feminist theory has been one important contributing
92 Op. cit., 206-208.
93 Op. cit., 208. Sarot is here building on Jonathan Harrisons theories concering embodiment, see: The Embodiment of Mind or What Use is Having a
Body? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1973-4), 35-55.
94 Sarot 1992, 209-243.
95 Assmann 1996, 387-390.

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factor to this development, as shown above. A representative example from the theological scene is Sallie McFagues book The Body of
God and the interest it has aroused.96
Jon Sobrinos christology has been criticised for being too disembodied.97 This criticism is not fair, particularly when one considers the emphasis on the concrete materiality of the Kingdom of
God in his understanding. The phenomenology of bread98 has
much to do with corporeality. It is true however, that these aspects
could be further developed by Sobrino, particularly with respect to
what the corporeality of the Kingdom as mediation might mean
for the reality of God. If one takes the cue from Sarot and asks what
kind of embodiment could be thought of as Gods from the viewpoint of Sobrinos christology, then the suggestion that the crucified
people represent in some form Gods suffering body in history is
close at hand.

96 McFague 1993.
97 Referring to Sobrinos discussion in Sobrino 1994c, 189-191, Anne Primavesi
raises the following critique against Sobrino in Primavesi 1995, 108-109:
Christian descriptions of God tend to reinforce this image of God as disembodied male voice. One of the clearest advocates for it is the liberation theologian Jon Sobrino, who invokes it, in Jesus name, on behalf of the poor and
oppressed of Latin America [] An antagonistic, conflict-laden FatherGod without appearance, without body, but with a voice that challenges, is
offered as the image on which to build a liberating praxis. Yet this image of
the God who spoke as disembodied, all-conquering voice in conflict with
other gods contributed in no small measure to the kind of colonizing, militarist Christianity which, against all that Sobrino would wish for, brought
devastation to so many indigenous peoples and to their lands.
98 See Chapter iv [2] (4), above.

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[3] God Crucified in the Suffering and Death of the Poor

For Jon Sobrino, stating Gods real participation in the passion of
this world has been a basic point in his theological production since
the mid-1970s.99 And it continues to be so.100 Even though he is
perfectly aware that the formulation is limited and open to questions, he finds no substitute for calling God the crucified
God.101 In his recent writings, the historical, existential and personal character of Sobrinos reflections on this issue as opposed to
a purely theoretical and conceptual approach is increasingly
99 If we go back to an article from 1967, Sobrino 1967, we do not find this concern in Sobrinos reflections on the mystery of God (pp.654f.). But since his
return to El Salvador in 1974 (cf. his autobiographical reflections in Sobrino
1992b, 11-28, referred to above), the theme has become central and consistent
in his writings: Sobrino 1976, 166: [] la mediacin priveligiada de Dios
sigue siendo la cruz real del oprimido. Sobrino 1986, 160ff, on el Dios
menor and el Dios crucificado; Sobrino 1982a, 178: [] si Dios estuvo en
la cruz de Jess, si comparti de ese modo los horrores de la historia,
entonces su accin en la resurreccin es creble, al menos para los crucificados. And furthermore: Sobrino 1987b,.78: En la vida amenazada de los
pobres nos encontramos con nuestros hermanos, nos encontramos con Dios
y nos encontramos con nosotros mismos; Sobrino 1989c, 367: [] en un
mundo de pobres y de vctimas aparece tambin, agigantado, el misterio
insondable e inmanipulable de ese Dios, como un Dios en la cruz; Sobrino
1991c, 475, where the author quotes a phrase by Porfirio Miranda to which
he often returns: no se trata de buscar a Dios, sino de encontrarlo all donde
l dijo que est, en los pobres de este mundo; and finally, Sobrino 1992b,
260-261, where Sobrino describes the faith of his martyred colleagues with
the following words: En las palabras con que los jesuitas hemos definido
nuestra misin para el mundo de hoy palabras que estn sobre sus tumbas
, unificaron fe y justicia, Dios y vctimas de este mundo.
100 See for instance Sobrino 1994d and Sobrino 1995a.
101 Y, aunque la formulacin sea, como todas, limitada, y est abierta a cuestionamientos, creemos insustituible llamar a ese Dios el Dios crucificado.
Sobrino 1991d, 394-395.

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underlined. Contemplating the connection between God and suffering is necessary since history goes on producing crosses even
after the resurrection of Jesus.102 It is a horror that history is like
this and that not even God changes things. This horror can never be
removed by theological reflection. However, the scandal that sin
does appear to have power in history even power to kill Gods
own Son, as well as Gods children is an aporia that prompts theological reflection, now in the shape of historical and practical theodicy.
Sternly rejecting the idea that his concentration on suffering
and cross should have anything to do with proposing a cult of suffering or masochism, with providing a basis for some conceptual
Platonic or Hegelian dialectic, or with wanting to diminish the
resurrection, Sobrino once again recurs to his fundamental theological programme of honesty to reality.103 It is reality itself that
forces theology to place itself at the foot of the cross. Jon Sobrinos
personal, experiential basis for his dwelling on the theme of the
cross could hardly be more forcefully stated than this:
Allow me to say this with a very personal experience. On 16 November 1989,
when the Jesuits of the Central American University were murdered outside
their house, the body of Jun Ramn Moreno was dragged inside the residence into one of the rooms, mine. In the movement one book from the
bookcase in the room fell on to the floor and became soaked in Juan
Ramns blood. That book was The crucified God. It is a symbol of course,
but it expresses [what I intend to develop in] this chapter, Gods real participation in the passion of the world.104

Nevertheless, it began conceptually, also for Sobrino. During his

doctoral studies in Germany, he became profoundly influenced by
Moltmann, and particularly by Der gekreuzigte Gott, as we have
102 Sobrino 1991d, 391-395.
103 Ibid. Cf. Honradez con lo real, Chapter i [2] (a) above.

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seen. As Sobrino biographically recalls, it was not until returning to

El Salvador in 1974 that he discovered true reality, the world of
the poor.105 He then began to see his task as that of salvadorising
what he had learnt from Moltmann, as well as from Rahner and
others.106
In his Cristologa desde Amrica Latina Sobrino consequently
develops his own theologia crucis in close conversation with Moltmanns. He intends to reflect on suffering as a possible mode of
being for God, giving concrete reality to the New Testament intuition that God is love.107 The very heart of his reflections is
expressed in his 13th thesis on the death of Jesus:
On the cross of Jesus God himself is crucified. The Father suffers the death
of the Son and takes upon himself all the pain and suffering of history. In
104 Sobrino 1994c, 235. The words in brackets represent my own translation of
the original text, differing slightly from the translation in Jesus the Liberator,
which reads the themes of . Sobrino 1991d, 395: Cuando el 16 de noviembre de 1989 fueron asesinados, fuera de la casa, los Jesuitas de la UCA, el
cuerpo del P. Juan Ramn Romero fue arrastrado hacia el interior de la residencia a uno de los cuartos el mo. En el trajn se cay un nico libro del
estante de la habitacin y qued empapado con la sangre de Juan Ramn.
Ese libro es El Dios crucificado. Un smbolo, por supuesto, pero que expresa
lo que se quiere decir en este captulo: la participacin real de Dios en la
pasin del mundo.
105 Sobrino 1992b, 11-28.
106 Por decirlo en palabras concretas: no es que Rahner o Moltmann, a quienes
estudi a fondo, ya no tuvieran nada que decir, pero comprend que era una
insensatez tener como ideal rahnerizar o moltmanizar a los salvadoreos. Si
algo poda ayudar yo con mis estudios, la tarea tena que ser la inversa:
salvadoreizar, si era posible, a Rahner y a Moltmann. Sobrino 1992b, 15.
107 Sobrino 1976, 162: Si en la teologa actual se va incorporando la intuicin
de que el futuro es el modo de ser de Dios (W. Pannenberg), lo que ahora
intentamos reflexionar es el sufrimiento como modo de ser de Dios, para
hacer concreta y real la ms profunda intuicin del NT sobre Dios: Dios es
amor.

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this ultimate solidarity with humanity he reveals himself as the God of love,
who opens up a hope and a future through the most negative side of history.
Thus Christian existence is nothing else but a process of participating in this
same process whereby God loves the world and hence in the very life of
God.108

In this dense thesis, which in fact entails much of Sobrinos christology in nuce, we see first of all that Sobrino clearly joins the current
change to passibilism. Suffering and death do affect God on the
cross; God himself is crucified. This is explained in trinitarian
terms: The Father suffers the death of the Son. But what does this
suffering the death of the Son mean? Does Sobrino say that Jesus
is actually forsaken by God on the cross? Sobrinos language is
ambiguous; it is as if he is hesitating. In the sub-chapter The Presence of God on Jesus Cross note the title! he speaks of Jesus
feeling that he had been abandoned by God109, and of Gods
seeming absence on the cross.110 Yet he argues following Moltmann that Jesus died in theological abandonment111, and that
this is actually the ultimate reason for his death, making it a complete scandal even after the resurrection. In order to hold this

108 Sobrino 1978a, 224. / Sobrino 1976, 168: En la cruz de Jess el mismo Dios
est crucificado. El Padre sufre la muerte del Hijo y asume en s todo el dolor
de la historia. En esa ltima solidaridad con el hombre se revela como el
Dios de amor, que desde lo ms negativo de la historia abre un futuro y una
esperanza. La existencia cristiana no es entonces otra cosa que participar en
ese mismo proceso de amor de Dios al mundo y de esa forma participar de la
misma vida de Dios.
109 Sobrino 1978a, 218 (quotation from Moltmann), my emphasis, SJS. /
Sobrino 1976, [] el abandono experimentado de Dios.
110 Ibid.: my emphasis, SJS. / Sobrino 1976,163: Esta discontinuidad entre la
expectacin de Dios y su (aparente) ausencia en la cruz es lo tpico de la
muerte de Jess; note the parenthesis.
111 Sobrino 1978a, 219. / Sobrino 1976, 163.

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together conceptually, Sobrino turns to dialectics: God was both

absent (cf. Mk 15:34) and present (cf. 2 Cor 5:19f ) on the cross.112
In what way? Sobrino reasons along the following lines: the
absurd and scandalous presence of suffering and evil in the world is
experienced as the absence of the God of life and justice, which
leads to a legitimate protest against God. In some sense, God can be
justified, God is trustworthy in the eyes of the victims, only if Godself participates in this protest against the absent God. This is actually what happens on the cross, and therefore Sobrino accepts the
maxim nemo contra Deum nisi Deus ipse. Correspondingly, Gods
love and solidarity can be experienced as credible by forsaken and
suffering humanity only if God-self actually shares this situation of
abandonment, of having been given over to the evil forces in history, suffering under their power. This too, happens on the cross;
Jesus falls victim to the powers of sin, and thus participates fully in
the condition of fallen humanity. On the cross, Jesus the Son experiences abandonment by the loving Father in whom he had trusted.
The Father surrenders the Son, abandoning him to the power of
sin.113 Paradoxically then, this surrendering of the Son is interpreted as the ultimate demonstration that Gods love is truly incarnate, truly historical. Gods absence from Jesus on the cross, is
therefore at the same time Gods presence among human beings,
according to Sobrino.
This presence of God among humans is salvific. When God
completely shares the conditions of humanity under the reign of
forces of sin and evil, then God overcomes these powers. Therefore
this presence brings salvation. One may recognise at this point once
112 Cf. Jngels position, presented above.
113 Sobrino 1978a, 225. Sobrino 1976, 168: La pasividad consiste en dejarse afectar por lo negativo, la injusticia y la muerte. En la cruz de Jess Dios estaba
presente (2 Cor 5, 19ss) estando al mismo tiempo ausente (Mc 15, 34).
Estando ausente para el Hijo estaba presente para los hombres (sic).

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again the fundamental soteriological tenet of Sobrino: redemption

of sin is brought about through suffering its consequences to the
end.
By taking on all suffering and evil in the event of the cross, God
is in fact overcoming these negative, destructive realities from
within.114 Suffering has become a mode of Gods being, because
that is the way love by necessity expresses itself when encountering
the evils of history. Is this a suffering in God? Yes, although theoretically it could also be described as God in suffering. Incarnation
means God entering into human history, which, because of the
reign of sin, is a history where suffering is prevalent. The Father
suffers the death of the Son and takes upon himself all the pain and
suffering of history.115
It is not easy to follow the logic in Sobrinos reasoning here.
Note, for instance, the centrality of experience in these statements. Is the experience of having been abandoned by God equivalent to actual God-forsakenness? And does the credibility of Gods
love actually depend on Gods absence? Is it not, on the contrary,
Gods faithful presence even under the dreadful works of sin and
evil that would make Gods love credible to victims? And why
should Gods presence among humanity necessarily correspond to
Gods absence from Jesus?The soteriological tenet that sin and evil
can only be redeemed by suffering under them, is also a tenet that I
have questioned earlier. Does it not lead thought in the direction of
necessary suffering? And if so, is that not a potentially dangerous
thought if applied also to contemporary suffering?
I shall soon deal thoroughly with these objections. But first, we
must examine the more general question whether Sobrino, in
adopting so much of Moltmanns thinking on these matters, makes
114 Sobrino 1978a, 221. / Sobrino 1976 165.
115 Sobrino 1978a, 224. My emphasis, SJS. / Sobrino 1976, 168: El Padre sufre la
muerte del Hijo y asume en s todo el dolor de la historia.

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himself vulnerable to the same criticisms as those Slle, Boff, Metz

and others so harshly raised against Moltmann? In other words: (a)
Does Sobrinos position (unintentionally, but nevertheless) imply
an eternalising of suffering? (b) Is this a purely conceptual solution, obtained behind the back of the victims? (c) Does this make
the difference between victim and perpetrator disappear? (d) Does
this in the end make God responsible for suffering?
Basically, Sobrino may defend himself against such charges with
reference to the clearly historical, practical, partisan and contextual
character of his theology. Yet there remains a weakness in his position, which he seems to inherit from Moltmann.
(a) Though speaking of suffering as a mode of Gods being,
Sobrinos argument does not imply an eternalisation of suffering,
since God is viewed as a trinitarian process which still awaits its
consummation. God is not yet all-in-all.116 Suffering, death, negativity are not ultimately overcome yet. Not only does incarnation
mean that God takes on suffering; even more so, it means that there
is made room for history in God. But this means that history in
itself is opened up. Suffering is not eternalised since God, opening
up history by entering into it, prevents history from being an eternal more of the same. History is now definitely marked by the
promise of future, a promise that gives reason for hope. God []
116 In a way, it can be said that it is implied in this line of thought that neither
history nor God have arrived at their completion. Cf. Batstone 1991, 113,
who concludes his treatment of Sobrinos interpretations of the death of
Jesus with the following comment: (M)ost liberationists would want to
affirm with the Apostle Paul that God will only be all in all once the
redemption of humanity and all of creation has taken place. As strange as it
may sound to those of us inculcated with classical categories of theological
thought, Gods completion is integrally related to our redemption. In that,
sense, the destiny of Gods future is connected with the unfolding of human
history itself.

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opens up a hope and a future through the most negative side of history.117
The mystery of God, thus spelled out in terms of trinitarian
process, into which the history of suffering has been given room by
Gods assuming the suffering of Jesus on the cross, makes theology
profoundly historical. God is present in history; history is present in
God. But this is not seen merely as a passive being in history, but
rather an active transformation of history towards its ultimate goal:
God all-in-all. Every human being is invited to take part in this process, Sobrino points out: Thus Christian existence is nothing else
but a process of participating in this same process whereby God
loves the world and hence in the very life of God.118
This active transformation of history the process whereby
God loves the world is revealed to us through the Son. The life
and mission of Jesus is the ultimate revelation of how Gods transforming love is concretised in human history. It is a life and a mission to be continued. Jesus, the Son of God, sets in motion a chain
of following; he is the revelation of the Way to the Father. It is a
Way to be travelled, not merely worshipped. Hence the profoundly practical character of this theological interpretation. It gives
no impetus to passive resignation, but summons all Gods children,
all human beings, to an active participation in the transforming of
history from within. Thus, salvation history may become salvation
in history.
(b) Does Sobrino present a merely conceptual solution, behind
the backs of the victims, as Metz warns? I cannot see that. Sobrinos
insistence on seeing God in unity with the dead Jesus on the cross,
117 Sobrino 1978a, 224. / Sobrino 1976, 168.
118 Sobrino 1978a, 224. My emphasis, SJS. / Sobrino 1976, 168: La existencia
cristiana no es entonces otra cosa que participar en ese mismo proceso de
amor de Dios al mundo y de esa forma participar de la misma vida de Dios.

470

and on seeing the cross not as Gods arbitrary design but rather as
the ultimate consequence of a life in correspondence to Gods love
a praxis in concrete solidarity with victims within the constraints
of human history, prevents it from becoming such a conceptual
solution. The death of Jesus shows that the way to be travelled may
lead to suffering. Through this event of the cross, it is revealed that
God is so immersed in history that not even the depths of human
tragedy remain untouched by Gods love. Christian life consists in
the following of Jesus in merciful service to the victims of this
world, at the risk and cost of becoming a victim oneself.119 Christian reflection on the mystery of God and how it relates to the presence of suffering theodicy must therefore become partisan,
committed and practical.120 In this, Sobrinos mysticism of following actually seems to parallel to a large extent Metz mysticism of
suffering unto God with open eyes.
(c) What about the powerful objection voiced by Slle and Boff
and after them by several other feminist and liberation theologians?121 Is the difference between victim and executioner implicitly
made irrelevant in Sobrinos approach? Sobrino himself would of
course vehemently defend himself against such charges. Nonetheless this is where some difficulties related to his argument begin to
show.
Sobrino rightly affirms that God identifies on the cross with the
victim Jesus. Jesus as Way shows how this identification is expressed
119 Cf Sobrino 1976, 150 6a tesis: La teologa de la cruz debe ser histrica, es
decir, ha de ver la cruz no como un arbitrario designio de Dios, sino como la
consecuencia de la opcin primigenia de Dios: la encarnacin. La cruz es
consecuencia de una encarnacin situada en un mundo de pecado que se
revela como poder contra el Dios de Jess.
120 Cf. Sobrino 1986, 15-47 and Sobrino 1988c, reprinted in Sobrino 1992b, 4780.

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in historical terms, becoming an identification with all victims

through the victim Jesus. At this point Sobrino goes further than
Moltmann already in Cristologa desde Amrica latina, as far as I can
see, thus making his approach less vulnerable than Moltmanns to
this particular objection. It is the real cross of the oppressed that is
the privileged mediation of God, Sobrino claims.122 In this way
the theology of a crucified God leads to a theology of the crucified
people, which Sobrino develops later, rooting it more firmly in the
reality that is, the contextual and historical character of these
crosses.
Yet if the victim Jesus is actually made a victim due to his abandonment by God the Father, then this identification with the victims of this world becomes in my view dangerously ambiguous.
Is it in fact the perpetrators identification with the victim, the
crucifiers solidarity with the crucified, that we have here?
(d) This leads to the last and most serious objection to be considered, viz. whether God in Sobrinos interpretation is made ultimately responsible for suffering in the world. For Sobrino, there is
no doubt about the human responsibility for oppression, suffering
and evil. After all, liberation theology grows out of a profound real121 At its most radical, this criticism can lead to the rejection of Christianity
altogether, as in this extreme statement: Christianity is an abusive theology
that glorifies suffering. Is it any wonder that there is so much abuse in modern society when the predominant image or theology of the culture is of
divine child abuse God the father, demanding and carrying out the suffering and death of his own son [] This bloodthirsty God is the God of
the patriarchy who at the moment controls the whole Judeo-Christian tradition. Joanne Carlson Brown, Rebecca Parker, & Carol R. Bohn (eds.):
Christianity, Patriarchy and Abuse: A Feminist Critique Pilgrim Press, New
York 1989:2, quoted from Schssler Fiorenza 1994, 99. See also Chapter iv
[7], above.
122 Sobrino 1978a, 222-223. Sobrino 1976, 166.

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isation and awareness of this responsibility. In Latin America,

theodicy is concretised as anthropodicy.123 And yet, there is more to
be said. The crucial point here is again how one should understand
the derelictio Jesu, Jesus real abandonment by God on the cross.124
As we have seen, this abandonment is perhaps the most controversial tenet in a theologia crucis of this sort. Sobrino maintains it, well
aware of the criticisms it has evoked. How can he defend this
without undermining or even contradicting all that he has said
about Gods solidarity, sympathy with the victims and revelation/
mediation through them? In other words: does Gods abandonment
directly cause Jesus death? Is God not only crucified but also crucifier?

[4] Gods Abandonment of Jesus?

It is enlightening to see how Sobrino deals with this in Jesucristo liberador, fifteen years after the publication of Cristologa desde Amrica
latina. Here we find both modification, confirmation and further
developments of his thinking. He takes a careful step away from
Moltmann, and presents an even more contextual reflection, introducing, above all, with much emphasis, the crucified people. He
now deems the Deus contra Deum a Lutheran exaggeration,
although still defending its element of truth. Furthermore, Sobrino
develops an Ignatian perspective: to the traditional definition of the
mystery and transcendence of God as a God who is always greater,
123 Sobrino 1976, 167. [] en Amrica Latina la teodicea es concretizada en la
antropo-dicea. The English translation is not satisfactory here: Latin
American theology turns theodicy in to anthropocity (sic.). Sobrino 1978a,
224.
124 Cf. Ladd 1974, 191.

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he adds the experience of a God always lesser. God is also in what is

small, in suffering, in negativity; all this also affects God and reveals
him.125 Reflecting on the event of the cross, we must move from
Dios mayor to Dios mayor y menor, Sobrino holds. And this redefinition, far from diminishing the mystery of God, only makes God
become more transcendent, more unencompassable, more indescribable, more a mystery.126
Sobrinos thinking has been developing with regards to these
matters then. But these modifications and further developments do
not change the core of Sobrinos reflections on this issue: He still
speaks of the crucified God. He maintains that on the cross there is
an aspect of God questioning God; God against God. And he
maintains that God actually abandons Jesus on the cross.
Against this background, it is interesting to see how he avoids
entering into an open conflict with Leonardo Boff, who as we
recall sternly rejected Moltmanns formulation of the same concerns. Although explicitly following and commenting on Boff s
discussion,127 he does not argue polemically against Boff s treatment of Moltmann. He simply notes that in his opinion, Moltmanns approach (together with that of Urs von Balthasar) has not
always been correctly understood.128 And summing up his treatment of the issue, Sobrino even quotes Boff at length exactly on
the significance of Gods silence on the cross.129 Is Sobrino covering
up a profound disagreement here or is it Boff who exaggerates the
125 Sobrino 1994c, 248. / Sobrino 1991d, 414-415. Dios est tambin en lo
pequeo, en el sufrimiento, en la negatividad; todo ello le afecta tambin a
Dios y lo revela.
126 Sobrino 1994c, 248. / Sobrino 1991d, 415. [] al mencionar conjuntamente
ambas cosas, ese Dios se hace ms transcendente, ms inabarcable, ms inefable, ms misterio.
127 Sobrino 1994c, 240. / Sobrino 1991d, 404.
128 Sobrino 1994c, 241. / Sobrino 1991d, 405.
129 Sobrino 1994c, 246. / Sobrino 1991d, 412.

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differences with respect to the issue of a possible abandonment of

Jesus by God? In my opinion, the answer to this depends on
whether Sobrino actually manages to explicate the derelictio Jesu and
the necessity of Gods suffering without betraying Gods ultimate
solidarity with historys victims.
The abandonment of Jesus by God on the cross is a scandal,
Sobrino holds. As with the other scandals inherent to the gospel
(e.g. that the Kingdom is for the poor, that the Risen One is the one
who was crucified, etc.), Sobrino detects a tendency to smoothen it
out. A clear example is the disagreement between the evangelists on
Jesus death cry. Although assuming that historically, Jesus uttered
no words when dying, only a scream130, Sobrino holds the most radical and scandalous formulation of this cry, i.e. Marks version, to
represent the primordial theological reflection on Jesus death.131
The subsequent theological development reflected in the other Gospels and the Church Fathers only proves to show [] how difficult
it is to maintain a (possible) abandonment by God on Jesus cross.
132

It is decisive not to domesticate this scandal, Sobrino continues: Jesus is abandoned on the cross. God is silent. God does not
intervene to save Jesus from the powers of death. There is a radical
discontinuity between what Jesus experienced in his life and what
he experiences on the cross. God the intimate Father is no longer
near, no longer accessible.

130 Sobrino 1991d, 396.

131 Sobrino 1991d, 396-397.
132 Sobrino 1994c, 238. / Sobrino 1991d, 398: Lo nico que queremos mostrar
es cun difcil es mantener el (posible) abandono de Dios en la cruz de
Jess. (Note the parenthesis.) The author of the Gospel of John, for
instance, does not allow himself even to suggest that Jesus was deserted by
God. Barrett 1978, 547.

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Whereas for Jesus, the infinite distance of God as mystery was always
accompanied by the absolute closeness of God as Father, this vanishes on
the cross: there is no closeness of God, there is no experience of God as a
kind Father.133

What does this radical discontinuity say about God then? In trinitarian terms, God the Son suffers and dies, abandoned by God the
Father. But this, in Sobrinos outline, is not taken as far as saying
that God actually is directly causing the death of Jesus. God is not
an executioner, not a crucifier, according to Sobrino.134 On the
contrary, what we have here is the silence, the non-intervention, the
non-action of God. It is the forces of evil, the idols of death that
actually kill Gods Son. The scandal is that God does not prevent it
from happening. (T)he fundamental objective fact is death
inflicted unjustly on the just man Jesus and the countless unjust
deaths throughout history which God did nothing to prevent.135
This distinction, I think, is vital. But is it sufficient?136
If this non-intervention is not to be taken as cruelty on Gods
behalf, it must be interpreted paradoxically as Gods real participation in the passion of the world, Sobrino continues. God suffers
[] on Jesus cross and on those of this worlds victims by being
their non-active and silent witness.137

133 Sobrino 1994c, 239. / Sobrino 1991d, 401: Si para Jess, la distancia infinita
de Dios como misterio iba acompaada de la absoluta cercana de Dios
como Padre, eso desaparece en la cruz: no hay cercana de Dios, no hay experiancia de Dios como Padre bondadoso.
134 Sobrinos strongest formulation in Jesucristo liberador is [] Dios deja
morir a Jess [] Sobrino 1991d, 409.
135 Sobrino 1994c, 240. / Sobrino 1991d, 403: [] el hecho fundamental es la
muerte infligida injustamente al justo Jess, y las innumerables muertes
injustas a lo largo de la historia, ante las cuales Dios no interviene.
136 This raises again the question of how to relate God and the idols to each
other; how to relate a dualistic to a monistic framework.

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The abandonment of Jesus is not in contradiction with Gods

solidarity with the crucified in history, in Sobrinos own view, then.
On the contrary, his argument must be taken to mean that it actually is Gods non-intervention on Jesus cross which makes possible
and credible Gods salvific presence on all crosses. On Jesus cross
God is present in absence; God is revealed sub contrario. Clearly
Sobrinos thinking here is dialectical. God is absent, and yet present.
God is passive, and yet active. Gods absence from the dying Jesus
permits God to be fully present also outside Gods sphere of influence, so to speak, where the forces of the anti-Kingdom still triumph. The crux of Sobrinos argument seems to be that Gods
passivity on Golgatha actually makes possible Gods active solidarity
with those who dwell on the contemporary Golgothas. But this dialectical approach is not ultimately convincing.
Again: set within the framework of Sobrinos emphasis on the
mystery of God as trinitarian process and Christian existence as a
following of Jesus, this dialectics is not dissolved or overcome in
some conceptual synthesis. That is not the main problem. As a matter of fact, Sobrino does not think that there are suitable words at
all with which one could describe the reality of God on the cross.138
Rather the radical discontinuity can only be bridged in a praxis.
The crucified God is not a phenomenon that can be approached
through theoretical concepts, but through practical concepts,
Sobrino writes, it is not a case for theo-logy, but for theopraxis.139
This notwithstanding, Sobrino does also find a certain continuity, a certain logic, in speaking of Gods suffering:
137 Sobrino 1994c, 244. / Sobrino 1991d, 409: Para ello, de manera antropomrfica, por supuesto, creemos que basta decir que Dios sufre en la cruz
de Jess y en la de las vctimas de este mundo al ser testigo in-activo y silencioso de ellas.
138 Sobrino 1991d, 408, passim.

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Gods suffering is, then, very likely, if it is true that God wanted to reveal
his solidarity with this worlds victims. If from the beginning of the gospel
God appears in Jesus as a God with us, if throughout the gospel God shows
himself as a God for us, on the cross he appears as a God at our mercy and,
above all, as a God like us.140

Yes, but not a God absent from us, nor from Jesus. This is where I
have difficulties with Sobrinos argument. It is the point where he
tries to explain more precisely why God must remain inactive vis-vis Jesus death, why Jesus must suffer. He argues both with
credibility and efficacy here, as these quotations show: God is
inactive on the cross so that we human beings can rely on his
love.141And further: What this crucified God reminds us of constantly is that there can be no liberation from sin without bearing of
sin, that injustice cannot be eradicated unless it is borne.142
But these formulations may easily lend themselves also to
clearly untenable interpretations, in stark opposition to Sobrinos
explicit intentions, because, faced with the innocent suffering of an
Other, non-intervention can and must be seen as cruelty that is,
139 Sobrino 1994c, 246. / Sobrino 1991d, 412: El Dios crucificado no es una
realidad que pueda abordarse con un concepto terico, sino con un concepto
prxico; no se trata pues de teo-loga, sino de teo-praxis; qu es lo que desencadena el Dios crucificado.
140 Sobrino 1994c, 245. / Sobrino 1991d, 410: El sufrimiento de Dios es, pues,
bien verosmil, si es que Dios ha querido revelar su solidaridad con las
vctimas de este mundo. Si desde el principio del evangelio, Dios aparece en
Jess como un Dios con nosotros, si a lo largo de l se va mostrando como un
Dios para nosotros, en la cruz aparece como un Dios a merced de nosotros y,
sobre todo, como un Dios como nosotros.
141 Sobrino 1994c, 244 / Sobrino 1991d, 409: Dios est inactivo en la cruz para
que los hombres (sic) podamos fiarnos de su amor []
142 Sobrino 1994c, 246 / Sobrino 1991d, 412: Lo que ese Dios crucificado
recuerda siempre es que no hay liberacin del pecado sin cargar con el pecado, que no hay erradicacin de la injusticia sin cargar con ella.

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given that intervention is a possible option. The question is therefore, whether suffering on the cross of Golgotha and on the crosses
on our planet is due to Gods deliberate abstention from salvific
intervention. Put in another way, the question may be formulated
thus: Which God is absent from Jesus cross the God of Jesus or
the (Greek) almighty and impassible God?
In line with my deliberations and proposals in the previous
chapter which I hold to be consonant with the explicit intentions
of a liberation christology I submit that deliberate non-intervention in the face of suffering is not an option for the God who is
revealed in and through the life, ministry and death of Jesus. The
principal point, which is truly scandalous in the eyes of the world, is
not that God is absent, but rather that Gods salvific presence on the
cross is not as expected. God saves through a love so strong that it
even endures the radical suffering of the cross. God saves through
(co-)suffering love. This love is as Sobrino himself rightly argues
both credible and efficacious. It shows that there is no pain so great,
no burden so heavy, no evil so vicious as to actually separate human
beings from Gods salvific love.143
In order to overcome the ambiguity of God being portrayed as
both crucified and crucifier, it is therefore preferable in my view to
refrain from speaking of Gods absence from Jesus on the cross, or
of the Fathers abandonment of the Son as the cause for the death of
the Son. It seems that the patterns of thought that Sobrino inherited from Moltmann is an obstacle rather than a help for Sobrinos
liberation christology at this particular point.144
But if this conclusion is justified, what then about Jesus cry
recorded by Mark? And what about all those who experience Gods
abandonment in their lives? The crucial point here is to distinguish
between the experience of Gods abandonment, and its possible
actuality. The Crucifieds (as well as the crucifieds) experience of
143 Cf. Rom. 8:17-19.

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abandonment is real, and should be taken with utter seriousness.

Yet the principal tenet of Christian faith concerns Gods unity with
the crucified human person Jesus, even into the darkness of death.
Gods apparent absence is actually presence.145 This tenet should be
consequently maintained. On this relies the confession of Gods
healing communion with the sufferers: the crucified Gods solidarity with the crucified people.146
Sobrinos more recent publications indicate that he is in fact
moving away from the doctrine of the abandonment by God, in
spite of his earlier statements, including those in Jesucristo liberador.
What then about the necessity of suffering? I have several times
questioned the soteriological presupposition that sin must be carried, i.e. suffered under, in order to be carried away, i.e.
redeemed. This becomes particularly sensitive when the concept of
a crucified God is followed up in a theology of crucified peoples:
What does it mean in the context of crucified peoples to say that

144 In a careful analysis of this debate, with references to Moltmanns, Boff s and
Sobrinos positions, Sobrinos younger colleague Antonio Gonzlez reaches a
conclusion which comes close to my own: Es el pecado del mundo y no el
Padre quien crucifica al Hijo. Si solamente Dios puede estar contra Dios,
ste no se ha hecho verdaderamente hombre (sic) y estamos ante una forma
de docetismo o de monofisismo. Gonzlez 1994, 105.
145 This point should be elaborated pneumatologically as well; God is present
with the sufferers the C/crucified in the Holy Spirit. Cf. Gonzlez 1994,
124: Para que el Padre de Jess sea verdaderamente el Dios de los pobres es
menester que en la ruptura radical que se da en la cruz con toda imagen
tradicional de Dios, el Padre siga misteriosamente presente y unido al Hijo.
La garanta de esta unidad es el Espritu (Heb 9, 14), el cual ser quien
resucite al hijo (Rm 1, 4; Tim 3, 16); compare pp. 125ff.
146 Por el Espritu sigue el Padre unido al Hijo y as se nos muestra como verdadero Padre bueno y se nos descubre lo inaudito: Dios estaba al lado de todos
los aparentemente abandonados de Dios y no al lado de todos los aparentemente por El benditos con el poder y la gloria. Gonzlez 1994, 125.

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crucifixion is a necessity for salvation; that injustice and suffering

must be borne in order to reach liberation from suffering?
If one is to defend this point, at least this much must be thoroughly underlined, in my assessment: Firstly, that such necessity
originates with sin and evil the origin of which is an inexplicable
and tragic mystery, a true mysterium iniquitatis and not with God.
And secondly, that any idea of the necessity of other peoples suffering must be shunned. Apart from the ambiguity intrinsic to his
defence of the derelictio Jesu, does Sobrino comply with these two
conditions?

[5] The Crucified God and The Crucified People

The Necessity of Suffering?
In an article from 1994 entitled La fe en el Dios crucificado. Reflexiones desde El Salvador,147 Jon Sobrino takes as his point of departure the question of how a crucified God can be good news to a
crucified people. In this fine piece of contemporary contextual theology Sobrino brings his reflections one step further. It is a step in a
promising direction with respect to the criticisms I have just made,
since it involves a shift from absence presence to the much
more fruitful binary categories of alteridad (alterity) and afinidad
(affinity).
In which God do the victims of the Salvadoran civil war
believe? Approaching his theme historically first, Sobrino points
out four characteristics of the faith in God which is prevalent
among the popular majorities in his country: (1) God continues to
have absolute priority as ultimate reality to them; (2) in the midst of
147 Sobrino 1994d.

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oppression they have discovered the liberating dimension of this

God; (3) sometimes, though, they have doubts, which may even
lead them to protest against this God; and (4) they find liberation
in the crucified God, too.
In general, it is Sobrinos experience that the victims do not
question or blame God. Their attitude is rather one of gratitude and
defence, even in the moments of trial and hardships. If it werent
for God, we would have been even worse off, says the civil population of a war zone, having lived through terrible bombardments and
atrocities of war.148 God, for them, is the God of life, a God who
gives them strength in all their daily struggles. But there come
times, when the crudeness of evil and the vastness of suffering cause
even these people to ask: What has happened to God?149 In these
moments God appears to them as a crucified God seemingly unable to help, unable to resist the forces of death Sobrino thinks,
even though he is perfectly aware that they, poor campesinos and
slum-dwellers, would not normally formulate it in this way.
This God, like themselves, is made a victim. Can they see any
good in such a God? In fact, sometimes in a difficult synthesis,
and in reality more than in concept, again they find liberation
even in this crucified God, Sobrino believes. When the God of life
suddenly appears powerless like themselves, they experience this as
Gods presence with them in their sufferings. And they rejoice in
this God.

148 Op. cit., 54: Ayer tuvimos un bombardeo y nos salvamos por Dios []
Dios acta, Padre [] Dios est con nosotros, Padre, porque si no hubiera
estado Dios, hubiera sido an peor.
149 Op. cit., 55: Cuntas veces no decimos que Dios acta en nuestra historia
[] Pero, Padre, y si acta, cundo acaba esto? Y tantos aos de guerra y
tantos miles de muertos? Qu pasa con Dios? Quotation from Vigil 1987b,
119.

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Which God do the victims prefer then? The God of Life, a liberator God of the Exodus or the suffering God, the God of the
cross? We may recall here the lone sufferer in the deep, dark pit
mentioned by Elizabeth Johnson. A liberator God would be the
God with the bright light and long ladder. This God saves out of
Gods difference with the poor. God has power to redeem, they do
not. A crucified God is the God who simply shares the situation of
suffering; a God who comes near, is in communion with those who
suffers; a God who is bearing the consequences of evil, just like
them. This God saves also, but now out of Gods similarity with the
poor. Only such a complete sharing can actually understand, heal
and thus save.
In his discussion of these two opposites, Sobrino now makes use
of the categories affinity and alterity. The poor know and expect
that alterity can be liberating. When people enter into their world
who have what they dont economic resources, political power,
education they hope that this difference will be used in a way that
will benefit them. (And besides the poor are numerous enough;
they dont need or wish more people to become poor like them!)
Again, Sobrino takes Archbishop Romero as the prime example.
His alterity was received by the poor as something positive. Nevertheless, when Romero refused to receive particular protection from
the Government, and subsequently was killed for his brave stance
for justice and the rights of the poor, then Romero became like
them. He shared the destiny of many among the poor, who suffer
unprotected at the hands of oppressors. In spite of the immense
tragedy that this was for the poor who lost their most prominent
defender it was simultaneously to them an expression of love and
solidarity which awoke new hope and inspired new struggle to overcome evil and suffering. In this sense, the tragic event became
salvific, in Sobrinos interpretation.150

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When some sort of affinity appears together with the alterity,

the poor of this world feel that something good has happened to
them.151 Therefore, there is no simple answer to the question of
which God the victims prefer, the God of affinity or alterity, the
Crucified or the Liberator. The answer is complex and dialectical152, Sobrino claims.
The total liberation which comes from God is experienced [by the victims]
dialectically, then, in two different and complementary manners. One which
is made possible by the alterity of God, and another which is made possible
by Gods affinity. Logically, the former precedes the latter, but the latter may
also be real, and become unified with the former.153

Moving now to a theoretical approach, Sobrino develops further

the notion of affinity as it relates to salvation. It is a basic theological intuition that without affinity, there is no salvation. This intuition, which has its primary roots in the writings of Mark and Paul,
echoes all the way through history of theology from the Council of
Nicea and up to the contemporary theologies of Bonhoeffer and
150 Sobrino 1994d, 56: As cuando no-pobres con prestigio y poder han participado hasta el martirio en los sufrimientos de los pobres, stos han sido en
medio de lgrimas y protestas algo positivo, algo salvfico.
151 Ibid.: Es un hecho tambin que cuando las personas que se les acercan con
su alteridad participan de alguna manera en su destino (hostigamiento,
difamacin, persecucin, indefensin, asesinato []) es decir, cuando junto
a la alteridad se da algn tipo de afinidad, los pobres de este mundo sienten
que algo bueno les ha ocurrido.
152 Ibid.: Y por eso, si tratamos de responder a la pregunta qu Dios prefieren
las vctimas, si el del Exodo o el de la cruz, la respuesta es compleja y dialctica.
153 Op. cit., 56-57. La liberacin total que proviene de Dios la experimentan,
entonces, dialcticamente, de dos formas diferentes y complementarias.
Una, que es posiblitada (sic.) por la alteridad de Dios, y otra, que es posibilitada por la afinidad. Lgicamente, la primera precede a la segunda, pero la
segunda puede ser tambin real, y quedar unificada con la primera.

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Moltmann.154 The other side of this intuition is recall that salvation is tantamount to humanisation in Sobrinos understanding
that pure alterity does not humanise.155
In what, exactly, does this salvific character of affinity consist?
In other words: how does the crucified God save a crucified people?
The key word to Sobrino is as it was to Elizabeth Johnson communion. The experience of communion with God in the midst of
darkness and radical evil is, in spite of everything, an experience of
salvation. Any communion, and particularly this communion, is
something which produces identity, dignity and joy. Whereas the
alterity of God as liberator expresses the efficacy of the salvation
that the victims long for, the affinity of the crucified God expresses
the graciousness and tenderness of this salvation.
(T)hat which is salvific and liberating in a crucified God lies in the overcoming of the orphanhood, the radical destituteness and the total degradation
which the poor of this world experience.156

Describing further what kind of salvation the crucified God brings,

Sobrino underlines three elements. Firstly, a crucified God brings,
like the Suffering Servant, light: light to see the truth of reality.
Second, a crucified God questions and criticises our traditional
vision of God. This questioning is something healthy, Sobrino
believes, something which awakens hope, and not resignation.
154 Op. cit., 58: Se mantuvo, pues, y qued confirmado el escndalo expresado
ya en Pablo y Marcos, pero ello no slo por mera fidelidad formal a los textos
del Nuevo Testamento, sino por una intuicin, que, en nuestra opinin, se
mantiene hasta el da de hoy: sin afinidad no hay salvacin.
155 Op. cit., 59.
156 Op. cit., 59. (L)o salvfico y liberador de un Dios crucificado est en la
superacin de la orfandad, de la soledad radical, de la indignidad total que
experimentan los pobres y las vctimas de este mundo. Note again that it
is the experience of abandonment that is to be overcome.

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Finally, and most importantly, a crucified God saves by being an

ultimate expression of historicised love. As we remember, these elements were also central in Sobrinos treatment of the soteriological
significance of the crucified Liberator, Jesus, as well as that of the
crucified people(s).
In Sobrinos understanding, this is where the question of the
necessity of suffering properly belongs. Since there is tragic and
incomprehensible suffering in the world, God must suffer, in
order to save the world from suffering. It cannot be removed by
simply confronting it from above or from the outside, because
without affinity, there is no salvation pure alterity does not
humanise. This is in line with basic insights from the early church,
which remain valid in Sobrinos view, however unsatisfactory their
formulations may sound today (in Greek theology: What he did
not assume, he did not redeem157; in Latin theology: Without the
shedding of blood, there is no salvation158 [cf. Heb. 9:22]). These
insights are taken up by liberation theology as Ellacura and
Sobrino have developed it, in the soteriological tenet that only by
taking on, suffering under sin, can it be definitively overcome. Only
by carrying the burden of sin, can the burden of sin be carried away.
The necessity of suffering is then primarily a historical necessity, stemming from the character of historical sin and evil. Yet history is not blind fate, but an open-ended process in which all
human beings are invited to participate in Gods life in an ongoing salvific praxis of carrying the burden of sin away. This is why
Sobrino and liberation theologians deal with the mystery of God in
terms of a practical and historical theodicy.
Why is history like this? Why does sin have power? Where do
the powers of the anti-Kingdom come from? Sobrino makes here a
further determination of historical evil which is of particular inter157 In Spanish: Lo que no ha sido asumido, no ha sido redimido.
158 In Spanish: Sin derramiento de sangre no hay salvacin.

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est to us. From the outset, he held that the traditional theodicy
from the vantage-point of Latin America turns into anthropodicy.
Historical suffering, radical suffering, cruelty and oppression originate from human beings. At the same time, the framework of a
struggle of divinities, i.e. the actual reality and destructive effectiveness of the idols of death in history has come to play an increasing role in Sobrinos christology. In Chapter v, The Crucifying
Conflict, I have discussed this at length and laid bare what I see as
limitations in Sobrinos thinking at this point. Here, however, these
two perspectives are explicitly linked together:
In the processes of liberation [] the problem of the human being and of
anthropodicy which also has its equivalent in religious language: the idols
makes itself present with great impact. Thus the problem is not just to find
light, but to find strength, firmness and love to be able to defend the victims
and combat the idols.159

Sobrino explicitly calls the idols crucifiers.160 There is certainly no

unloading all the burden of violence on God (Boff ) here, then. By
turning to the mythical language of idols, a sense of inexplicable
mystery is maintained in the face of evil in history. Yet human
responsibility is not done away with. On the contrary, it is strongly
affirmed. Sobrino does, in my view, comply with the first condition
that I put forward above regarding the necessity of suffering: that
such necessity does not originate with God.

159 Op. cit., 71, my emphasis, SJS. En los procesos de liberacin [] se hace
muy presente tambin y con gran fuerza el problema del ser humano y de la
antropodicea, lo cual tiene tambin su equivalente en lenguaje religioso: los
dolos. Y entonces el problema no es slo de encontrar luz, sino sacar fuerza,
firmeza y amor para defender a las vctimas y combatir a los dolos.
160 Ibid.: Y se podr o no aceptar a un Dios crucificado, pero hay que estar muy
claros en la existencia de dolos crucificadores.

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But how then, can one confess God to be the ultimate source of
life, and Jesus to be the ultimate liberator, the victorious victim? Do
the idols actually threaten God? Do we not already know the outcome of the struggle? How can one integrate the dualistic framework in a monistic one? Again the answer is that evil and
therefore also the idols, cf. Chapter v above belong to history. At
the end of history there will be no crucifixion, no struggle, no suffering. (I)n history we believe simultaneously in the God of liberation and the God of the cross, but at the end there can be no
crucifixion.161 God will then be all in all; not as a result of a quasiautomatic law, but as a result of Gods salvific presence and activity
in and through history.
In this sense because without affinity, without communion
there is no salvation it may be seen as a necessity that God suffers. But importantly it cannot be said in the same sense that it
is a necessity that the people suffer. God suffers in order to save
the people from their sufferings. The people suffer because of historical sin. Following the drift of this logic, the suffering of the people is no necessity; it is rather a tragic fact. This clarification is
important.
However, the case is not closed. Because, if salvific love in history must pass through suffering; if we see the call to salvation as an
invitation to participating in Gods life in history (which involves
suffering); if we see the crucified people as the body of the crucified
God; then the question is whether it is possible to avoid the conclusion that there is a sense in which the suffering of the people too is a
necessity. Obviously, such a conclusion does not seem to be in
accordance with the intention and interest that moves Sobrinos
theology. For one thing, it would be likely to encourage resignation
rather than a compassionate and courageous faith-praxis. Further161 Op. cit., 72. (E)n la historia creemos, a la vez, en el Dios de la liberacin y
en el Dios de la cruz, pero al final no puede haber crucifixin.

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more, the accusations of some sense of cruelty and hence total

incompatibility with Christian faith inherent in a thought that
led to such a conclusion would again have a strong case. And yet, is
this the necessary consequence here?
This brings us full circle, and we are ready to embark on our
final evaluation of the viability and adequacy of seeing the interrelationship between the crucified and the Crucified as an expression of
the theological significance of contemporary suffering. But first, let
us look back at this chapter, to sum up its findings.

[6] Conclusions
At the centre of any truly Christian theology stands the cross. What
faith in God emerges from Jesus cross on Golgotha? What light is
shed or shadow cast on the mystery of God from the many
crosses of our time? Is God too crucified? These questions which
are ultimate limit-questions and thus can be asked only with a clear
consciousness of the short-sightedness of our vision and the brokenness of our words have been the object of my considerations in
this chapter.
I began by describing and analysing a remarkable shift in the
Christian conception of God, which has occurred mainly during
the last century. That was the shift away from a firm belief, built on
Greek presuppositions, that God-self could not be affected by suffering. Since God was held to be immutable, almighty and incorporeal, God could not suffer. This perception of God was supported
by the doctrine of Christs two natures, according to which Jesus
suffers and dies only in his human nature, leaving his divine nature
unaffected. Although this view was generally held up until modern
times, we have traced a theological undertow which confesses Gods

489

participation in the suffering and death of Jesus. This passibilist

stance, radically formulated in the phrase deus crucifixus, originates
in the earliest Christian witness, and is found in fragments and
glimpses throughout the history of theology, most notably in Martin Luthers powerful theologia crucis. For several reasons, I suggested, this passibilist undertow has become the strongest in
contemporary Christian theology, emerging as the dominant view, a
theological commonplace. In the 20th Century, the suffering and
even death of God has been a main topic in theology as well as in
philosophical and cultural debates. The atheist nihilism of
Nietzsche, and, from an opposite position, the profound theological
reflections of Bonhoeffer from his prison cell in Germany at the end
of World War II, have been very influential in these debates. The
new emphasis on relatedness and mutuality as an intrinsic quality of
love which applies a fortiori to the love of God was also seen as a
significant factor in this theological development.
But how does God suffer? And in what way is it legitimate to
speak of the death of God? When exploring these more precise
questions that follow from the shift to a passibilist stance, the consensus among contemporary theologians disappears. On the contrary, we have witnessed a heated debate on these issues during the
last decades. Starting with Moltmanns position in his book The
Crucified God and the reactions (Slle, Boff ) it evoked, I reviewed
some of the relevant arguments and stances in this debate (Johnson,
Jngel, Metz, Sarot). The critical problems here are primarily
related to (a) the question of a possible conflict in God (Deus contra
Deum), (b) the question of whether Jesus is actually abandoned by
God on the cross (derelictio Jesu) and (c) the question whether suffering and death are to be thought of as phenomena external or
internal to Gods own being. Vital to this discussion is also (d) the
question as to what extent and in what way theological or religious
language is appropriate to deal with these topics, and (e) how

490

attempts at coming to terms with these problems in the view of

contemporary experiences of radical suffering and evil (theodicy)
relate to human praxis.
Analysing Sobrinos writings on the subject in view of this contemporary debate, I found that he joins in the change to passibilism, and taking the cue from Moltmann, he speaks of a crucified
God, but sees this intimately related to the suffering and death of
the people. This is the original characteristic of Sobrinos elaboration on theo-logy as seen from the cross, then: God is seen as crucified in the suffering poor. Nonetheless, this enigmatic mystery of
God as it is seen from the foot of the cross(es) is and remains a scandal; it cannot be resolved through any conceptual synthesis, but
represents a lacuna which can only be bridged in a praxis of mercy
towards the victims of this world, the crucified. Since the possibility
of Gods passibility seems to depend on ascribing some sense of corporeality to God (Sarot), I suggested that the crucified people may
be implicitly seen as the body of the crucified God in Sobrinos
approach.
While affirming these fundamental traits of Sobrinos interpretations, I have challenged two other central points in it. The first
one deals with Gods (possible) abandonment of Jesus on the cross.
Sobrino defends this point, influenced by Moltmann: Jesus dies
abandoned by the Father. However, I have noticed that Sobrino
seems to be moving away from this thought. In some of his more
recent writings, one may detect a shift from absence presence,
to another binary opposition, affinity alterity, which I find to
be a much more fruitful approach. Speaking of Gods absence on
Jesus cross should be avoided, I submit, since, firstly, it is not necessary from the early Christian witness (Mk. 15:34 may be seen as an
expression of Jesus experience of Gods abandonment, which is not
equivalent to a de facto absence on the part of God), and secondly, it
is counterproductive to a christology of liberation, since it makes

491

Gods role in the suffering of the victim Jesus ambiguous: God

seems to become both crucified and crucifier.
My second critical question to Sobrinos outline regarded the
necessity of suffering. Scrutinising his line of thought, I found
that it can lead to the conclusion that Gods suffering is seen as a
necessity given the atrocious and inexplicable presence of evil and
sin in human history, whereas the suffering of the people is not a
necessity, but rather a tragic fact, due to these same historical
forces. The case is not clear, however. Sobrino repeatedly puts forward the soteriological presupposition that sin must be carried,
i.e. suffered under, in order to be carried away, i.e. redeemed. The
crucial question arises thus, whether speaking of the crucified people carrying the sins of others in some sense implies that their
suffering is seen as necessary. In my view, it is warrantable to
make use of the term the crucified people, only if such an implication is clearly avoided.

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viii. The Crucified People (2)

The Theological Significance of Contemporary Suffering:
Towards a Critical Appraisal

Y ese pueblo, que en los setenta fue crucificado por las dictaduras militares, que
en los ochenta fue crucificado por la democracia formal sin vida real, y que en los
noventa est siendo crucificado por el neoliberalismo que se desentiende de los
pobres, ese pueblo sigue siendo para nosotros la mxima presentizacin de Cristo
crucificado y de Dios en l.1

What meaning can it possibly have to speak of a crucified people

or of the crucified in history? Any theological meaning of this terminology must be derived from a relationship to the One who was
crucified outside the city walls of Jerusalem: Jesus of Nazareth. The
theological significance of the crucified is dependent on the Crucified. But the opposite is also true, according to Jon Sobrino: the
reality of the crucified in history bears upon the theological significance of the crucified Jesus. Having examined thoroughly both
poles of this connection as Sobrino presents them in his christology,
we are now prepared to assess and reflect further upon his proposal
of integrating this theologoumenon the crucified people as a way
of naming suffering human beings of our time, and expressing their
christological and hence theological significance. The crucified
and the Crucified: is it an acceptable proposal? What possibilities
does it open up in our theological discourse and praxis? What limitations might it impose? In sum, is it helpful or harmful?
These are the questions to be answered in this chapter. I shall
do so in four steps, which are all related to what I in the introduc1

Sobrino 1993g, 359.

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tion defined as the specific theme of this study: The theological

significance of contemporary suffering as it is expressed in the symbol of the crucified people and its constitutive relatedness to the
crucified Jesus in Jon Sobrinos christology. First, I shall deal with
the issue of contemporary suffering. What does it mean? What
kind of suffering does Sobrino refer to? And is it justified to make
this reality of suffering the central key to the interpretation of the
Christian gospel? Secondly, we must look at the crucified people
as reality and as linguistic expression of that reality. What is the linguistic status of the crucified people? I shall propose that it should
be called a symbol. But will it not then lose its essential relation to
reality? Thirdly, I have shown that the category constitutive relationship plays a central role in Sobrinos thinking, and in fact is
what makes possible the theological significance that Sobrino
attributes to the crucified people. Is this properly founded? What
are the advantages in using this category? What may be its limitations or even risks?
Following these three subchapters, I shall deal with the main
issue in directo: the theological significance. By theological significance I refer to its theological content (i.e. systematic theology
or dogmatics), as well as its methodological implications (i.e. fundamental theology). Although distinguishing between these aspects, I
have nevertheless chosen to treat them together. I find it fruitful to
do this by proposing a set of theses, structured according to the
three axes I proposed in Chapter ii: the epistemological-hermeneutical, the historical-soteriological, and the ethical-praxical.
These theses will express my own interpretation of the theological
significance of the symbol of the crucified people, as the result of
my critical appraisal of Sobrinos proposals.

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[1] Christian Theology and Suffering: Relevance and Identity

By the centrality that he gives to the crucifixions going on in contemporary history, Jon Sobrino places the question of suffering at
the very core of Christian theology. Is he justified in doing so? One
way of responding to this question is to check it against its relevance
to the Latin American and world situations on one hand, and
against its identity with the Christian sources and tradition on the
other. As I cannot make a full depth analysis, an investigation of
some key elements will have to suffice.
(1) First: the relevance of this focus. Sobrino himself gives much
importance to the criterion of relevance. In my treatment of his
fundamental presupposition for doing theology in a crucified reality,2 I pointed out that Sobrino requires a profound honesty regarding reality; that he gives fundamental importance to the
epistemological and hermeneutical significance of the location of
theological reflection; and that he views theology fundamentally
and foremost as an interpretation of reality. In this, one can see that
Sobrinos theology may be called a correlational theology.3 It consciously seeks to combine contemporary experience and biblical/
traditional/confessional witness.
2
3

Cf. Chapter i [2],above.

The term method of correlation is closely associated with Paul Tillichs theology, see Tillich 1951, 34-68, especially 59-66. His formulation and application of this method have been widely discussed and criticised. Holding
liberation theology to be a correlational theology, Roger Haight, S.J. defines
this not in a strictly Tillichian sense, but rather holds that correlation simply means that adequate and intelligible method in theology today requires
that the two poles of contemporary human experience, including religious
experience, and of history, especially the record of the originating experiences of Christianity as found in the Scripture, be held together in dialogue,
tension, correlation with eachother. Haight 1985, 48.

495

I also found that, according to Sobrino himself, it is the intention of an absolute honesty to reality that leads him to identify
this reality as crucified, and to see the true reality, the true world,
as the world of the poor. Hence, Sobrino makes this world of the
poor, more particularly, the church of the poor, the primary theological location. In this connection I raised the critical question
whether this really is an appropriate description of reality. Is suffering really such an hecho mayor, such an indispensable fact for
gaining a true view of our time?
In Chapter iii, I found that Sobrinos recourse to the historical
Jesus actually depends on the master-narrative within which he
sees the quest as being pursued. This master-narrative is for
Sobrino the liberation of the poor, which he sees as a theological
objective in its own right. As I have pointed out on several occasions, Sobrino postulates a structural similarity, an isomorfismo
estructural, between his contemporary situation and outlook and
the sources of the past. At this point, I missed in Sobrinos writings
a more explicit description of the hermeneutical move from history or reality to theology. In Chapter v I showed that this move
could be more thoroughly analysed and founded by paying attention to Croattos appropriation and further development of
Ricoeurs hermeneutics. Now, on this background, should we
accept Sobrinos claim that the reality of suffering is so relevant that
it must be made central in and to the theological endeavour?
(a) We need to define more precisely the term suffering. What
kind of suffering does Sobrino address? There are two principal
aspects of suffering that are central. They often come together, but
not always, and not necessarily. Firstly, there is a suffering stemming
from poverty. This poverty may be either economical, i.e. material,
or sociological, referring to all sorts of social exclusion and deprivation. Secondly, it is a violent suffering. It is the suffering of perse-

496

cution, repression, oppression, war crimes, massacres [] In both

cases, Sobrino sees this as suffering inflicted by others, be it indirectly, as in the first case,4 or directly, as in the second case. Suffering occasioned by so-called natural causes, such as catastrophes or
epidemic diseases, or by the mere contingency of human existence,
such as accidents, casual and natural deaths, etc., are not directly
dealt with within Sobrinos framework.
Though this does not necessarily mean that his concept the
crucified people a priori excludes this third, natural aspect, it must
be asked why the two first aspects are given priority? The reason is
that Sobrino always operating within the hermeneutic circle
between revelation and reality sees this suffering as analogical to
the suffering of Jesus. The fact that Sobrino does include also the
passive suffering of simply being a victim as a suffering analogical to
that of Jesus, points to a noteworthy expansion of the traditional
understanding of participating in the sufferings of Jesus, i.e. the
theological concept of martyrdom. Sobrinos crucified people is a
martyr people,5 but that does not imply that the people as such
do possess all the virtues, faith, and acts of holiness that are traditionally implied in the term martyr. It is sufficient, according to
Sobrino, that they experience sufferings that in some way resemble
those of Jesus.
There is, however, a danger here, namely that this approach
may point in the direction of a classification, even a ranking of
suffering. Is not any form of human suffering, inflicted by others or
not, an unbearable burden, and an incomprehensible enigma for
those who experience it? Is not anyone who suffers, regardless of
cause, consciousness, or even dignity embraced by the love of

4
5

The poor are impoverished, and there is a dialectical opposition between poor
and rich.
Sobrino 1991d, 440-451 / Sobrino 1994c, 264-271.

497

God? And, returning to the biblical argument for a moment, is not

the Suffering Servant someone hit by illness like Job?
Despite the particular classification or qualification of suffering
which Sobrino implicitly makes, there is no reason why his theological reflections concentrated as they are on Gods love expressed in
history as mercy towards victims should not be made relevant also
to this third, natural form of suffering.6 The distinction he makes,
however, is fruitful because the coincidence between the relevance
for his particular context and the identity with the content of the
Christian tradition is more easily detectable with reference to these
two former aspects. The natural suffering and death, moreover,
raises other wide-ranging questions, e.g. on the relationship between
creation and salvation, the role of perishability in the process of evolution, the cruelty inherent in the natural order of things, etc., to
which Sobrino has chosen not to pay closer attention so far. One
reason for this is probably that he holds these latter questions to be
more fruitfully addressed in light of the former, than vice versa.
(b) Is focus on these forms of suffering poverty and violence relevant in Latin America at the turn of the millennium? Sadly
enough, there can be little doubt that it is. Although experts differ
on the question of whether and to what extent the Latin American
economies are improving, there seems to be no denial of the fact that
poverty is widespread and actually increasing. According to figures
from the Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), there will be
about 220 million Latin Americans living in poverty in the year
2000, a number which will then equal 57% of the population. In
1996, this percentage is just above 50. The number of poor in the
6

498

For an application of Sobrinos thinking together with those of other

prominent theologians with emphasis on a theology of the cross to the
more general challenge of human pain related to illnesses and natural processes of dying, see Peinado 1995.

region will have increased by 60 million since the end of the 70s.7
Yet there are at the same time many analysts who speak of something close to an economic miracle in the region in the last years.
Latins ride high was the heading for the cover story of The Economist of July 18, 1992.8
This paradox clearly shows that in spite of the much desired
and welcomed process towards democracy and peace, the issue of
justice and equity is by no means solved in the region. It also shows
that democratisation has not yet reached the sphere of economy in
7

These figures are given by Bernhard Kliksberg, an economic expert in the

BID, according to Carta a las Iglesias 15, 1995. Other figures mentioned in
the same article confirm this tendency and further underscore the seriousness of the perspectives: 44% of the population suffers from malnutrition.
54% belongs to the informal economy, without any social protection. Those
who are most severely affected by poverty are children, women, youth
between 15 and 24 years old, disabled persons, indigenous groups and the
new poor, i.e. impoverished people formerly belonging to the middle class.
About 3,000 children die each day from malnutrition or other easily curable
diseases, making a total of 900,000 each year. 60% of all deaths are caused
by poverty. Kliksberg concludes that sustainable development in Latin
America is impossible under these conditions.
See The Economist July 18th, 1992, which presents an optimistic analysis of
the Latin American economies, stating that the continent is on its way to
becoming the fourth economic bloc in the world. An interesting contrast,
which illustrates the point I am making here, is found in the November 30th
1996 issue of the same review (The Economist). Here the front page heading
reads Backlash in Latin America, and the editorial opens in the following
way: A malaise is abroad in Latin America [] A decade of democratic
regimes broadly committed to low inflation, free economies and open trade
has not, except in Chile, brought sustained growth; and, while laying the
groundwork for that, it has both made old woes visible and added some new
ones. The region stuck to its chosen path through the buffeting of Mexicos
1994-95 currency crisis. But the results are fairly meagre: it may grow by only
3% this year, and, with luck, 4-5% next. And little of such growth as there is
finds its way to the poor. Economist 1996, 17.

499

the sense that citizenship would imply some welfare security

which again justifies Sobrinos and liberation theologys option to
see poverty in a conflictual perspective: as suffering inflicted on people by other people.
And yet, both poverty and violence in Latin America have
changed character lately. The region is no longer the scene of ruthless military dictatorships and violent struggles in the form of open
(internal or external) warfares. Since 1982, Latin America has
undergone a double transformation that has significantly altered the
regions physiognomy.9 It has experienced a severe economic and
social crisis. Simultaneously, it has been living through its most
substansive and broadly based process of democratisation since the
thirties.10 This double transformation means that the role and situation of Latin Americas poor has changed, and changed in a way
that has implications for Sobrinos christology as well as for liberation theology at large.
In short, one could say that the poor have passed from being
openly oppressed and abused, to being insignificant, excluded and
expendable masses. They have become left-overs.The economic system does not need them to the same extent as it did earlier. The
neo-liberal policies with their privatisation and their drastic cuts in
public spending promise opportunities to anybody who can compete. Their result, however, at least in the short and medium term,
is an increased concentration of wealth.11
9 Castaeda 1993, 5.
10 Op. cit., 6
11 Castaeda, Jorge: Op. cit., 6-7. In the long term, it was foolish to discard
the possibility of the neoliberal policies success in triggering growth,
employment and competitiveness as well as reducing social disparities. But
in the short and medium run, they aggravated inequality, deepened the gap
between the rich and poor, ripped the slender safety net, and bred resentment among the poor and poorer over the fortunes of the rich and richer.

500

At the same time, there has within the social sciences been an
increasing awareness of and focus on the varieties and internal differences within that all-encompassing term poor. The poor have
many faces. They are urban slum-dwellers or landless peasants.
They are unemployed, factory workers in free trade zones, or belong
to the informal economy. They are indigenous, blacks, women,
children. They suffer from malnutrition, drug abuse, street violence, lack of proper health care and education. Their strategies for
survival both legal and illegal are countless and still largely
undiscovered by analysts. In sum, the poor have different, sometimes even conflicting interests. And furthermore, the disenchantment with politics, the deep distrust of traditional parties and
politicians, the death of ideologies, together with explosive
growth and diffusion of senseless media propaganda the rule of
the telenovelas make it reasonable to expect that the general awareness of these (self-) interests among the poor is on the decrease.
This changing reality of the poor has also affected their cultural
and religious characteristics. The contemporary suffering which is
the starting point for Sobrino and the other liberation theologians,
finds particular expression in what Gutirrez called the irruption of
the poor. This irruption was seen as the awakening and mobilisation of the poor themselves, in a struggle for liberation and justice.
Their liberation praxis was interpreted in the light of Christian faith
as the principal force for salvation in history, in the one and only
history there is, according to liberation theologians. Its primary
ecclesial expression was the Ecclesial Base Communities (CEBs). It
is doubtful whether one can speak of an irruption of the poor in
this sense in Latin America or elsewhere in the world today.
Hugo Assmann is among those who now believe that the expectation that the poor would be the principal protagonists in the transformation and humanisation of society that was implied in the
emphasis on the irruption of the poor (an expectation held by the

501

poor themselves and by others), was far too optimistic, and did not
take realistically into account the strength of the counter-forces.12
The paradoxically optimistic climate and widespread conscientisation and mass mobilisation of the late sixties are long gone. The
world of the 1990s seems to present itself as a world without credible alternatives. From now on, it appears, it will only be more of
the same celebrated by Francis Fukuyama and those who agree
with him, but mourned by many groups and agents in solidarity
with the poor and the excluded.
As for the CEBs, these reached their culmination in the period
from 1975 to 1982. Today, they probably gather no more than 1 or
2% of the population; and this population is not even among the
poorest. Instead, the CEBs form a small elite, which because of
their social condition become somewhat separated from the poorest.13 Instead put broadly the poor are becoming Pentecostals.
To put it polemically, but not altogether incorrectly, we may say
that the church of the poor is no longer Catholic base communities, but independent, charismatic and often fundamentalist Pentecostal congregations and churches.14 The spread of popular
Protestantism, particularly among the poor segments of the population, implies what many see as a revolutionary change in the religious configuration of the continent. Its social, economic and
political consequences are already notable, and may be expected to
be even more considerable, although the fundamental character of
these consequences are not as clear as many hold.15
12 Assmann 1994b, 7.
13 (L)as comunidades eclesiales de base renen hoy slo el 1% o el 2% de la
poblacin, y no precisamente entre los ms pobres. Forman una pequea
lite que por su condicin social se separa un poco de los ms pobres.
Comblin 1993, 39. My translation, SJS.
14 See the Introduction [3], above.
15 Cf. particularly Mariz 1994; Sjrup 1995, in addition to the other relevant literature that is suggested in the Introduction [3], above.

502

In this situation, profound questions arise as to the role of poor

as main protagonists in the processes of liberation. Similarly, the
traditional strategies for liberation appear exhausted and in need of
renewal. They clearly need to be multiplied and differentiated.
These changes present fundamental challenges to Sobrino and liberation theology at large. But do they alter the fundamental priorities: to make the mere presence of the suffering of victims of
poverty and violence the point of departure for theological reflection and praxis? Do the changes in the characteristics of these sufferings, from the political and social martyrdoms in the form of
disappearances, assassinations and massacres of the 1970s and 1980s
to the social exclusion and general human deprivation of the
1990s16, undermine the legitimacy and relevance of putting the
16 This tendency is not without important exceptions. In El Salvador, political
assassinations, death threats and death squad activity continue even after the
war has ended. One of those who have received death threats recently, is the
Lutheran bishop Medardo E. Gmez, who like the Jesuits of the UCA -has
taken a clear stance on the side of the poor and the victims during the years
of conflict. He has also had the courage to criticise the Governments failure
to complete successfully with the Peace Accords. See Carta a las 1996.
Another notable exception is the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico. It
resembles the conflicts of yesterday an armed guerilla movement in open
warfare against the national army but has at the same time as its core issues
the problematics of today: it begun during the first days of January 1994,
the very days Mexico became fully part of the NAFTA (North American Free
Trade Agreement), thus intending to symbolically lay bare the other side of
the neo-liberalist heyday; it takes on the full agenda of the cultural, social
and political rights of the indigenous participation; its aim seems not to be a
military take-over, but rather to represent a critical opposition force to the
Government, in a broad alliance with other forces of the civil society. See i.
a., Hinkelammert 1996a. This article, which takes its title from a Zapatista
phrase, appears in an important collection of contributions to the Cuarta
Jornada teolgica de la CETELA. Teologa de Abya-Yala en los albores del
siglo XXI, held in San Jeronimo, Medelln 10-13 July 1995. On the Zapatista
rebellion, see also my article, Stlsett 1994c.

503

crucified people on the top of the theological agenda?

In my judgment, these changes do not invalidate the basic concern and methodological point of departure of liberation theology.
It is in this new situation still relevant to speak theologically of crucified people. The basic fact is unchanged and even more imperative than before: human suffering from violent, social injustice
continues to be an hecho mayor in Latin America.The option for
the poor now imposes itself by being not so much an historical as
an evangelical necessity. For that reason it is better founded than
ever.17
(c) Making suffering particularly suffering related to poverty and
violence central in a contemporary interpretation of the Christian
faith is clearly relevant then, when seen from the perspective of
Latin America. Still, since Sobrino presents his interpretation as a
challenge to the worldwide theological community, and since this
present study is made in a cross-cultural, global perspective, it is
necessary to ask whether this specific relevance in Sobrinos close
context also can be generalised. In other words, is it relevant on a
global scale to choose this particular perspective?
The answer to this question must also be affirmative, both in
quantitative and qualitative terms. Suffering from poverty and violence are widespread phenomena in the world today. The report on
Human Development issued by the UNDP in 1992 clearly shows
that increasing poverty and exclusion is a dominant social and political feature of our era.18 Inequality is continuing to grow. In 1989,
one fifth (20%, about a billion people) of the world population
controlled 82,7% of the income; 81,2% of the world trade; 94,6% of
17 La opcin por los pobres ya no se impone tanto como una necesidad
histrica sino como una necesidad evanglica, y por ello est ms fundamentada que nunca. Comblin 1993, 42.
18 Quoted from Gorostiaga 1993, 126.

504

the commercial loans; 80,5% of the investments. In terms of

resources, the panorama is equally alarming. The rich countries
have about 25% of the world population, while they consume 70%
of the worlds energy, 75% of its metals, 85% of its wood and 60%
of its food. The report concludes that this pattern of development is
sustainable only if the extreme inequality is maintained, because
otherwise the world resources will be too scarce. In this perspective,
inequality is not the deformation of the system, but a necessity for its
growth and permanency.19
This indicates why the suffering addressed by Sobrino has
attained an even more serious, incomprehensible, and evil character
in the 20th Century. We live after Auschwitz. We live in the times
of the ethnic cleansing of Srebreniza, starvation as a strategy of war
in Southern Sudan, the genocide of Rwanda. We live in the times of
the unimaginable daily sufferings of Indias millions and millions of
poor. Yet there is enough food in the world. There are enough economic resources to solve the poverty crisis.20 There are ways in
which to prevent much of this from happening. This tragedy goes
19 According to the UNDP, the number of people living in absolute poverty is
increasing by nearly 25 million a year. This calculation is based on the World
Bank and the United Nations definition of absolute poverty: those people
whose incomes are no more than $370 a year. The number of people currently living in absolute poverty is roughly 1.3 billion. Recent data from the
World Bank and the Human Development Report suggest that the aggregate number of poor people world-wide is increasing at roughly the same
rate as the annual population growth of the developing world, or about 1.88
per cent. (Information according to the UNDP homepage on Internet, http:/
/www.undp.org/undp/poverty/clock.htm., 26.01.97.)
20 Whatever else the Gulf crisis of 1991 showed, it clearly demonstrated that
when the rich world cares to unite efforts and intervene in a particular situation, there is an almost unlimited supply of resources available. Sadly, the
most plausible explanation of why it cared in this particular instance is
that it saw its own economic interests fundamentally threatened (the oil reservoirs of Kuwait).

505

on in an age with the knowledge, resources and ability to reduce it

considerably, but without the political or ethical will to do so.
Hence, the optimistic, teleological schemes of Modernity have
entered a severe crisis, and are found lacking in credibility. The
question of an anthropodicy has become even more radical as this
inflicted suffering and destruction has expanded to encompass even
nature and the ecological environment, thus threatening the very
basis for human existence.
All this adds to the seriousness and centrality of the reality of
suffering, even radical suffering, in our age. And it obviously concerns the whole of the human community, not just some parts of it,
so that the relevance of Sobrinos perspective may be confirmed also
at this level.21
(2) Let me now turn to the question of identity. Is it compatible
with the foundational Christian sources, the biblical scriptures,22 to
make suffering, particularly unjustly inflicted poverty and violence,
the primary lens through which one reads the gospel of Jesus
Christ?23
21 Haight 1985, 25-42, discusses the universality of liberation theology in this
sense. Holding that the problem of human existence appears when the free,
historical and social human phenomenon is looked at in the concrete terms
of its actuality which is so characterized by poverty, by oppression and by
sheer human suffering [] (p. 34), and furthermore that all human beings
share in this general situation because all share a common human existence
[] (p. 35), it follows that [] this is not only a problem of the poor. It is
a problem of meaning for every thinking person who pauses to consider it
(p. 37).
22 Christian identity is no doubt formed both by its foundational sources, the
biblical scriptures, and its history and tradition. Catholic and Protestant traditions view the normative status of the two, and their interrelationship, differently. My choice here is made from practical reasons as well as reflecting
my own Protestant priority.
23 For the following analysis, see Scharbert, Wolter, and Sparn 1990.

506

In the Old Testament, suffering is a fundamental theme. It is

often interpreted as a punishment for personal sins (cf., e.g.: Num
12:10f; 2 Chron 21:15-1), for the sins of the people against their God,
or for the misdeeds of the pater familias or the king (Ex 7-12; 2 Sam
21,1; 24, 11-17). National catastrophes are interpreted as caused by
the peoples failure to be faithful to the covenant (Lev 26:14-35;
Deut 28:15-68). According to the prophets, this failure is particularly obvious in the lack of social justice and the exclusion and
oppression of the poor, the widows and strangers in Israel (Amos
5; Is 1:15-17; 3: 16-26). In the wisdom literature the causality between
deed and consequence (Tat-Folge) is strongly emphasised (Prov 5:4;
23:29, Job 5:2-7.) This idea will be almost totally abandoned in the
New Testament. And, already in some strands of the Hebrew Scriptures, such as in the book of Job, and in the vicarious suffering of
the Servant of Yahweh in Deutero-Isaiah, there emerges a protest
against this explanation of suffering. Historical experience clearly
shows that the causal bond is broken: it is not only the unjust,
wicked or evil persons who suffer. There is no escape from the
painful enigma of innocent or inexplicable suffering.
As Sobrino rightly emphasises, Jesus principal concern according to the synoptic accounts is to proclaim and respond to the coming of the Kingdom, which is particularly addressed to the poor,
and to whom it brings (in Sobrinos wording) just life, always open
to a more.24 The salvific reality of Gods Kingdom is accordingly
recognised in that it invalidates contemporary experiences of suffering and changes them to their opposite.25 Jesus salvific praxis is a
service particularly directed to suffering people, to the poor and
outcast. It is aimed at overcoming their suffering by defending their
rights and dignity through prophetic preaching and action (including exorcisms and unmaskings), and by curing their sicknesses and
restoring their faith and hope through healings and acts of wel24 Sobrino 1994c, 131, see above, Chapter iv [2].

507

come-forgiveness, which are paradigmatically symbolised through

Jesus table-fellowships and parables. In sum, there is considerable
support in the synoptic witnesses for the claim that the reality of
violent and unjust suffering is relevant to Jesus of Nazareth.
Soon after Jesus suffering and death, the Jesus-movement
(Theissen), inspired by faith in the resurrection, re-interprets its
own experiences of persecution and distress as following (cf. e.g.,
Mk 1:17; Lk 9:57f par.). Their sufferings are now seen as a consequence of the mission they have received from the Lord himself,
and as a participation in his historical destiny (Mk 8:34; Lk 14:27
par.; Mt 10:38). This permits Jesus followers to see these painful
experiences paradoxically as gain rather than loss, giving reason to
hope rather than despair (Mk 8:35; Mt 10:39 par.; Lk 17:33.)
Sobrino seems to be in accordance with this New Testament
strand of thought when he sees contemporary experiences of suffering as closely related to the category of following. One could
note, however, that suffering in the New Testament is given such a
paradoxical interpretation primarily because of its explicit connection with Jesus. In other words, the focus is on the believers suffering because of their faith. Sobrinos interpretation is wider, as we
have seen. Yet since the promise inherent in this communion in suffering with Jesus goes back to Jesus own solidarity with and service
to the victims he met, regardless of any prior faith in him, of
national adherence, ethical standard, or other qualities, there should
25 Scharbert, Wolter, and Sparn 1990, 677: Jesu Hinwendung zu den Leidenden steht in direktem Zusammenhang mit seiner Ansage des unmittelbar
bevorstehenden Anbruchs der Herrschaft Gottes. Die Teilhabe an ihr wird
gerade den materiell Armen zugesprochen (Lk 6,20; vgl auch 16, 19-26) und
das mit ihr anbrechende eschatologische Heil nach 6,21 den Hungernden
und den Weinenden (Mt 5,4: den Trauernden) verheissen. Die Heilswirklichkeit der Gottesherrschaft ist hiernach dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass in
ihr gegenwrtige Leidenserfahrung aufgehoben und in ihr Gegenteil verkehrt wird.

508

be no theological reason to see only suffering (explicitly) for Jesus

sake as a suffering embraced by the suffering of Jesus. This point is
crucial, I think, if one is to accept Sobrinos proposal regarding the
crucified people.
In Paul, his own sufferings as an Apostle and the hardships of
the Christian communities are seen as reflecting their communion
(koinonia, Phil 3:10) with the crucified Jesus. Thus external weaknesses and all kinds of opposition and difficulties are seen in this
light as something which will not last, something which will not be
able to crush them ultimately. Since the One who was crucified is
believed to live and reign among them as the Risen Lord so that
the victims victory on the cross is thus confirmed they may
rejoice in hope in the midst of disaster, and celebrate triumph in
defeat (2 Cor 1:9f; 4,10f; 13:4). In an eschatological perspective
(Rom 5:2-5; 8:17-39), suffering becomes the place where the future
breaks in to the present, making salvation a present reality through
the firm hope that arises in those who suffer.26
In the Letter to the Hebrews, which Sobrino often refers to, the
suffering of Jesus followers is not seen as their participation in
Jesus suffering, but vice versa: Jesus hardships and trials show his
com-passion, his suffering-with, all his brothers and sisters. He
suffers in order to help them in and free them from their sufferings
(Hebr 2,9f; 4:15; 5,2.)27
In sum, the general tendency seems to be that in the early
Christian witness suffering is integrated paradoxically as part of
26 Hierbei wird das Leiden als der Ort bestimmt, in dem die Zukunft in die
Gegenwart hineinreicht und Heil stiftet, insofern sie im Leidenden als Hoffnung Gestalt gewinnt, die ihrer Erfllung gewiss ist. Op. cit., 683. This
indication, suffering as Ort place is particularly important in view of
Sobrinos theology.
27 Das Geflle lautet hier nicht: Weil Christus litt, leiden auch die Christen,
sondern (sinngemss): Um seine leidenden Brder zu erlsen, hat Christus
das Leiden auf sich genommen. Op. cit., 685

509

Christian existence and can be endured and resisted because it

clearly bears within itself the promise of salvation. This promise is
founded in the communion of those who suffer with Jesus; and the
communion of Jesus with those who suffer. Does this make suffering a necessity, a prerequisite for salvation? Is it something which is
required in an authentic imitatio Iesu? No; it is rather an expression
of realism regarding the state of affairs in human history, and a confession of faith in the love of God as strong enough to bear one
through even the darkest moments of radical suffering.28
From this brief review it seems clear that it is consonant with
the Christian sources to make the contemporary experience of suffering a fundamental starting point and guiding principle for an
interpretation of the meaning of the Christian message today.29
However, as I have shown, the particularity and novelty of Sobrinos
emphasis is the widening of the concept of martyrdom, of participating analogically in the sufferings of Christ. He does not address
only the sufferings that follow from confessing Christ in a sinful
world. For him, the crucified is not only a Mgr Romero or the
four North American Church women killed by Salvadorean soldiers, but also the anonymous victims of El Mozote, Rio Sumpul,
and other man-made disasters.
28 Die sich durch das gesamte Neue Testament hindurchziehende Benennung
der hypomone als der in der Situation des Leidens vom Glaubenden verlangten Haltung [] intendiert darum unter den genannten Voraussetzungen weder eine Leidensrechtfertigung [] noch akzentuiert sie die
Forderung die passiven Hinnahme und Widerstandslosigkeit gegenber dem
Leiden. Ihr ist es vielmehr allein darum zu tun, den Glaubenden in die
Bewahrung der allein heilstiftenden Existenzorienterung an Jesus Christus
auch im Leiden einzuweisen [] Op. cit., 687.
29 One interesting way of expanding this analysis of the identity-question with
regard to Sobrinos usage of the crucified would be to analyse if and how
the poor are seen as representatives of Christ through Church history: See
Gonzlez Faus 1991.

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This expansion is admissible, in my assessment, when based on

a consistent emphasis on what it is that constitutes the fellowship in
sufferings with Christ. It is not the believers confession which constitutes this fellowship, but solely the merciful love of God towards
all victims in history revealed in and through the victim Jesus.30
In this sense I cannot see that the biblical and Christian witness
taken as a whole would preclude or prevent the interpretation that
the crucified people participate in the sufferings of the crucified
Jesus, and Jesus himself is present in the sufferings of the crucified
people. On the contrary, this interpretation may find considerable
support which Sobrinos re-reading of Jesus salvific praxis in the
horizon of the coming of the Kingdom to the poor shows (cf.
Chapter iv). It does raise some questions concerning the scope and
range of such an interpretation, however. I shall address these below.

[2] The Crucified People Reality and Symbol

Both from the perspective of the Christian sources and from an
analysis of the contemporary human condition, not least in Latin
America and other parts of the (two thirds) world that is left over,
it is in my assessment well founded to make contemporary suffering
a central concern for Christian theology, influencing both its
method and its content. But is it fruitful to designate this suffering
as crucified and people(s)? What is implied by such a designation? Which reality does the expression refer to; and how is reality
30 This shows to what extent a theology of the crucified people is incarnational
God has entered into the world of suffering through the Son and pneumatological Gods presence with all the crucified in history is mediated by
the Holy Spirit which in turn makes explicit its trinitarian structure.

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represented by or in it? In other words, we must address once more

the issue of reality and linguistic representation or reference.
(1) Which reality does the linguistic term crucified people refer to?
In Chapter ii I pointed out that by defining the historical phenomenon of contemporary suffering from poverty and violence by the
word crucified, at least three central traits are indicated. First, it is
thereby designated as a dialectical and conflictual reality. Where
there are crucified, there are also crucifiers. This conflictual perspective inevitably brings in a second trait, which is the political. The
determination crucified carries political connotations. As we have
seen, execution by crucifixion was clearly a political penalty. Third,
and most obviously, it indicates that this historical phenomenon is
not adequately described in purely secular terms. To call poor and
oppressed people crucified, is to give them theological significance. Closely related to these three traits, Sobrino holds that it is
useful and necessary to speak of crucified peoples on three levels: the level of concrete reality (nivel fctico-real), the historicalethical level, and the religious level.31
What more can be said of the terminology in itself? As I have
shown, Sobrinos usage is flexible; he speaks of the crucified people(s), the crucified in history, historical crosses; referring to
the poor, the victims, the outcast, the marginalised, the
Third World, etc. The term people is central here, though. It
points to the fact that the crucifixions going on in history are a
collective, not merely an individual reality.32 Yet the term people
central as it is to the Catholic Church after Vatican II in general,
and to Latin American liberation theology in particular is also an
ambiguous term. It is far from having only one semantic meaning.
31 Sobrino 1991d, 424.
32 Desde el tercer mundo, no cabe duda de que hay cruz, no slo cruces individuales, sino colectivas, las de pueblos enteros. Sobrino 1991d, 423.

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This ambiguity makes it important to analyse in what way it is

used, since it is also a powerful term: in a modern society it is
claimed that all power comes from the people. Defining who the
people are means defining who can legitimise power.33
An analysis of the term people made by Pedro Ribeiro de
Oliveira is helpful in this respect.34 Within a Latin American context, he deems it relevant to point to the different character and
meaning this term has within the frameworks of two distinct sociopolitical discourses or projects: that of populism on one hand, and
that of the popular movement, on the other.
In the Latin American version of the populist project, it was the
State that took on the leading role in uniting the different classes
around the project of national development. It was thus effectively
under the control of the middle classes, but had to take on a form
that would be acceptable to the masses.35 The people is seen as
this broad alliance, then, under the leadership of the ruling middle
class.
Within the popular movement, this is understood differently.
Here, people means, above all, (a) those living in poor areas, who
are despised by established society.36 These see themselves as (b)
opposed to the ruling elite: those who hold political power, who
have land or capital, the police force, or religious authorities, etc.
However, within this understanding, the people (c) only acquire
social power when they cease to be a mass and organise themselves
in such a way as to influence their own destiny. Hence the crucial
role of the popular movement: it makes the masses emerge from
their state of passivity and become a people. As a consequence of

33
34
35
36

Ribeiro de Oliveira 1984, 82.

Op. cit.
Op. cit., 83.
Ibid.

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this mobilisation, (d) belonging to the people, is no longer a disgrace or shame, but rather a source of pride.
These two understandings depend on different political
options, defining different political agents or subjects. The populist
version holds the State, controlled by the middle class, to be the
principal political agent and thus embodiment of the people,
whereas in the other version this role is attributed to the civil society, the different groups be they neighbourhood associations,
labour unions, human rights groups, indigenous movements, religious communities or others that together make up the popular
movement. Ribeiro de Oliveira concludes:
When we use the term in one or the other sense, we are placing ourselves
within one or the other framework or reference. Therefore, by taking up the
definition of the people given by the popular movement, we are taking up a
stance that implies seeing the reality of the Church in Latin America from
the standpoint of the oppressed classes.37

It is clearly this definition given by the popular movement which is

closest to Sobrinos understanding of people in the crucified people(s). It fits very well also with his description of the CEBs the
church of the poor. As I have indicated, one often wonders if it is
actually these Christian base communities that Sobrino specifically
has in mind when he speaks of the crucified people, especially when
he elaborates on their salvific role.38
Given the latest developments in Latin America described
above, however, one may ask whether this understanding is satisfactory. The CEBs do actually make up only a small percentage of the
Christian communities, and not even among the poorest. Though
this does not falsify the value of their experiences and interpretations, it raises the question whether it is reasonable to generalise
37 Op. cit., 85.
38 See above, Chapter ii [3] (2) and Chapter iv [10].

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these to the level implied in Sobrinos use of the crucified people.39 Likewise, the popular movement as a unified political subject is deeply questioned in our day. Its diversity and internal
tensions now attract considerable attention. In his analysis of the
socio-political transformations in Latin America between 1972 and
1992, Manuel Antonio Garretn claims that one should no
[longer] identify the transforming action with one historical subject
only, not even if this be seen as the victims of domination.40 This is
particularly a lesson valid for liberation theology in the 1990s, he
thinks.41 Thus it seems that Ribeiro de Oliveiras analysis today at
least would have to be further refined, perhaps even considerably
altered. In fact, if one follows his line of thought, one may have to
end up by stating that the people in Latin America today those
united, organised and committed civil forces belonging to the popular movement even in sum is only a small minority.42
This said, there is a danger of overstating the level of precision
intended in the term the crucified people. In Sobrinos use as in
Romeros, it seems the function of such a designation is more suggestive and generative, than definitory. As we have seen, Ignacio
39 Sobrino is aware of this lack of representativity: No hay que exagerar, pues,
la cuantitativa de la nueva imagen [de Cristo como liberador, my addition,
SJS] y de la nueva fe en actualidad, sometidas ambas al bombardeo de religiosidades contrarias y no suficientemente apoyadas por la Iglesia institucional
[] Sobrino 1991d, 35. Nevertheless it remains unclear what this lack of
representativity means for his concept of crucified people.
40 Finalmente, supone no identificar la accin transformadora con un solo
sujeto de la historia, aunque sea las vctimas de la dominacin, al que todos
deben supeditarse. Garretn 1993, 27.
41 Among the tenets that liberation theology should review in light of these
socio-political tranformations, Garretn underscores this: [] la visin de
la unidad de un sujeto de la historia, identificado con las vctimas de la
opresin, sin considerar a veces la diversidad de actores y sus intereses reales
muchas veces contradictorios entre s. Op. cit., 28.

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Ellacura gave the more precise, socio-political definition of the

term, which today may be in need of revision, at least if it is seen as
referring to a more or less uniform group.43 Sobrinos definition is
more open and flexible, less ideological. Sobrino thus makes the
term less precise, but also more useful in a changing environment, a
changing reality. Yet Sobrino insists strongly that the term relates to
concrete reality.
It seems that Sobrinos terminology is faced with the following
dilemma, then: the more he elaborates it in the direction of an
ideal version of the CEBs, the less it deserves the general term
people.44 And the less precise he makes it, the more appropriate is
the term people but then its theological significance becomes

42 On the other hand, there has been much talk of a grassroots explosion in
Latin America and elsewhere in the South during the last decade. While
old popular movements have stagnated, new ones, with different characteristics and agendas, have emerged: urban movements consisting of squatters and slum-dwellers, indigenous groups, women groups, etc. An
interesting discussion of this development is found in Castaeda 1993, 175236. Although highlighting the difficulties encountered by the CEBs, and
stating that (t)he importance of the grass roots religious movements in
Latin America has been both exaggerated and idealized (p. 217), Castaeda
deems it indisputable [] that as the economic and social situation in the
region continues to stagnate or regress, while forms of political expression
open up, the role of the Church in grass roots social movements will continue (p. 218). And as the Salvadoran example clearly shows, according to
Castaeda: If and when the Church ceases to be a defender of status quo
and becomes a force for social change, the consequences are momentous (p.
216).
43 See above, Chapter ii [2].
44 In a sociological sense, that is. With regard to the theological meaning of the
term people this is of course more directly applicable to the CEBs,
although it raises the question of the relationship between these and the
whole people of God.

516

more vague, and the term is in danger of losing its concrete relation
to reality, to concrete persons and communities.
Sobrino attempts to solve this dilemma by suggesting a distinction between an active meaning and a passive meaning, unified by
the category analogy. On the one hand, the crucified people are
those who actively take up the challenge and mission of establishing
justice in the world, and who for that reason encounter opposition
and persecution. On the other hand, the crucified people includes a
majority of human beings who are put to death, not because of
what they actively do or seek to accomplish, but simply because of
what they (passively) are. These are all the innocent victims of history. Analogy unites these distinct groups of people because they
both though in different ways experience a kind of suffering
which resembles that of Jesus. Thus Sobrino also seems to apply
people both in a more precise meaning i.e. as understood in the
popular movement, and in a more general, wide meaning.45
(2) In what way does the linguistic expression the crucified people
refer to reality? What is the linguistic status of this expression? I
have repeatedly signalled the need for a further reflection on these
questions within the confines of a theology of the crucified people(s). It appears that it is Sobrinos loyalty to the principle of
being honest to reality that has prevented him from such explicit
reflections on the nature and role of theological language. It is as if
he fears that reality will disappear in language, and result in what
he sees as post-modernist irrealism, cynicism, and (ironically) indifference.46 Therefore it seems that he is unable to make up his mind
with regard to the linguistic status of the crucified people. It is
certainly metaphorical,47 but then again not metaphorical at
45 See above, Chapter ii [6].
46 Sobrino has a few, rather polemical references to post-modernism, see e.g.,
Sobrino 1993g, 359.

517

all.48 Likewise he seems to be saying: it is certainly rhetorical, but

not rhetorical at all.
However, a certain linguistic turn seems to be under way in
Sobrinos own development. In his more recent works the issue is
addressed, and he seems to gradually admit the narrative and rhetorical character of his theology.49 He can do so without losing the
primary reference to reality. Sobrinos polemics is directed against
the reductive understanding of these categories merely a metaphor, or pure rhetoric, in a negative sense. But these reductive
understandings should clearly be abandoned by now. As my
recourse to Ricoeur and Croatto showed, a liberation christology
has much to gain from hermeneutical and linguistical reflections of
the kind they propose. In fact, particularly when theology is to
address and reflect upon the reality of victims, it is quite unthinkable that it could do so without paying close attention to the principal mode of expression of these people themselves: narration. The
victims tell the story of their lives, of what has happened to them or
to their families by way of testimonies and stories, which are often
filled with symbolism and directly intertwined with mythologies
and biblical narrations.50
In a deep sense, suffering is a theory-resistant reality,51 and
should therefore never be used merely to point beyond itself. At the
same time, conceptualisations are needed in order for us to get a
grasp on that obscure reality of suffering, in order to resist, endure,
and overcome it. There is in our time a gap between the extremity
47 Sobrino 1992b, 85.
48 Sobrino 1991d, 425.
49 See e.g. Sobrino 1991d, 427, and Sobrino 1993g, 356. Cf. above, Chapter iii
[4].
50 Cf. los impresionantes testimonios publicados por UCA en Carta a las Iglesias, los libros de Mara Lpez Vigil: Vigil 1987b; Vigil 1987c, etc.
51 Sparn, Walter: Scharbert, Wolter, and Sparn 1990, 699: [] den theorieresi-stenten Charakter des Leidens []

518

of suffering and the triviality of our symbolic and conceptual

worlds, as Wendy Farley formulated it.52 What we need, then, is a
definition of the crucified people which preserves the reference to
concrete reality, while at the same time opening up for mystery, plurality, and imagination.
The crucified people may appropriately be seen as concept,
analogy, and even typology. Whereas concept may imply connotations in a too strictly analytical-scientific direction, analogy in the
traditional sense more clearly preserves the mystery of the reality
referred to, and the brokenness of the words used to name this reality.53 Following Ricoeur, who sees metaphorical and symbolic discourse as having a capacity to give a creative and suggestive
redescription of reality, these candidates for linguistic categorisation
metaphor and symbol should also be considered. The risk
inherent in calling the crucified people a metaphor or a symbol is
that it may thereby be understood according to the reductive
scheme as merely an image, merely something pointing beyond
itself, i.e. a signification. Once this reductive scheme is abandoned,
I think the expression the crucified people can be seen as both
metaphor and symbol. Yet, all taken into account, I would suggest
the designation symbol as the more appropriate categorisation of
the crucified people in Sobrinos christology.
Well aware of the multitudinous definitions and theories of the
symbol in our day, I shall refrain from developing one myself. I shall
rather rely on Ricoeur, once more. In his definition, we clearly see
that both reference to concrete reality and openness to incomprehensibility, mystery and creativity are well preserved:

52 Farley 1996, 124.

53 Johnson 1992, 112ff.

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I define symbol as any structure of signification in which a direct, primary and

literal meaning designates, in addition, another meaning which is indirect, secondary and figurative and which can be apprehended only through the first. 54

Ricoeurs more well-known functional definition of symbol, however, is the one from Symbolism of Evil: A symbol gives rise to
thought.55 The symbol of the crucified people in Sobrinos christology is geared towards exactly this: to give rise to (new) thought
on the reality of the suffering of millions and millions in our
present as well as in the past56 contemplating its radical seriousness and its close connection to the central core of Christian faith,
the cross of Christ. But furthermore, given the practical orientation
of Sobrinos christology, I am tempted to alter Ricoeurs definition
sligthly: The symbol of the crucified people in Sobrinos christology
gives rise to compassionate action.57
Hence the rhetorical character in a good sense of Sobrinos
theology. By redescribing suffering persons and groups around the
globe today as crucified people, he seeks to mobilise a Christian
worldview and praxis in favour of these victims of history. This is in
fact how the centrality of the mercy principle works in his own theological endeavour: by way of rhetoric. His theological reflection is
meant to give rise to compassionate action, to undergird a Christian
praxis that ultimately will serve the liberation of the poor and
excluded. The mediation through discourse is crucial in that undertaking.
Unlike other liberation theologians, Sobrino has not been very
explicit about which other mediations should be given priority in
54
55
56
57

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Ricoeur 1969a, 12. This passage is italicised in the original.

Sobrino refers to this definition by Ricoeur in Sobrino 1976, 175.
Cf. Metz 1980, particularly pp. 100-118.
An interpretation of symbol and symbolism that would fit well with
Sobrinos christology, further developing what I have said here, is found in
Snchez 1993.

the liberation praxis itself. In other words, he has not prescribed in

any detail what actions are to be taken, which are the remedies for
the illness; he has not stated very clearly how liberation of and by
the poor is to be achieved concretely. Gutirrez and Ellacura were
initially more specific on this. This could be seen as a weakness in
Sobrinos writings. But given the enormous changes that have
occurred, it has rather turned out to be a strength. In this manner,
Sobrinos theology remains faithful to the honesty to reality the
need for mercy and acts of liberation while at the same time not
presenting solutions determined in advance, but rather preserving
an explorative, suggestive, and generative profile in that respect. In
this, the symbol of the crucified people plays a primary role.

[3] Constitutive Relatedness as Central Category

The possibility and potential usefulness of designating suffering in
the world by the determination crucified relies on its relatedness
to the suffering and death of Jesus, the Crucified. I have repeatedly
emphasised this relatedness, since it is a central and structuring category in Sobrinos theological work. This view holds that it is not
something intrinsic to an object or a person which defines what it,
he or she is. The ontological status is rather decided in and
through the relations in which the object or person is embedded.
How should we assess Sobrinos application of this category of relatedness? First of all, it should be recalled that the emphasis on the
constitutive character of relations and relatedness is not something
original to Sobrino. In Chapter iv, we saw that this emphasis corresponds with a main trend in recent feminist theology. Yet Sobrino is
hardly influenced by feminist theory. In traditional Christian theology, the issue of relations has been particularly at the forefront in

521

the trinitarian discussions and treatises. In connection with the

return of trinitarian thinking in modern theology, the advantages of
a relational approach to ontology as opposed to a substance-ontology have been explored by several leading European theologians.58
Although Sobrino has not written anything explicitly on the Trinity,
his christology is clearly trinitarian. Here too, the influence from
Moltmann on Sobrino is evident. But also Zubiris philosophy,
mediated through the reception and further elaboration of Ellacura, has had a notable impact on this feature of Sobrinos theology.
In spite of the centrality of this category in Sobrinos theology,
he does not anywhere explicitly discuss its philosophical or theological foundation, nor its qualities and limitations. Such an analysis is
called for, in order to strengthen his proposal and demonstrate its
applicability in other areas of theological reflection, as well as in
other contexts. It is beyond the scope of the present study to make a
full analysis of the philosophical and general theological standing of
this category. I shall rather make an assessment of how the premise
of constitutive relatedness functions internally in Sobrinos theology, in order to see what possibilities it opens up, and what limitations it might entail.
As we have seen, there are both constitutive and antagonistic
relationships in Sobrinos christology. The constitutive relationships
are primarily Jesus <-> God of the Kingdom <-> Kingdom of God,
on one hand, and God <-> Jesus <-> Jesus followers, on the other.
58 Eberhard Jngel holds that Gods being is constituted by relations; the relations are Gods existence, see Jngel 1983. A relational ontology as alternative
to an ontology of substance is a basic presupposition in Gerhard Ebelings
theology as well; see, for instance Dogmatik des christlichen Glaubens I,
Tbingen 1979, 346-355. Wolfhart Pannenberg too rejects the ontology of
substance in favour of an ontology built on the inner-trinitarian relations of
God, and the relationships between God, humanity and world.

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It is these constitutive relations which make possible the mutual

relation between the crucified and the Crucified. The antagonistic
relationships in Sobrinos thought are primarily and ultimately tied
to the theologal-idolatrous structure of reality, which takes shape
in history as a struggle of gods, of evil forces and structures of sin,
that crucified Jesus the Son of God and continue to crucify Gods
children today.
(1) What are the strengths and potential in this relational approach?
With respect to the conception of reality, the relational approach
shows a clear strength in that it gives room for the dynamic and
transformative dimensions of experienced reality. It shows a way
beyond the static concepts of traditional ontology, opening up for a
more radical appreciation of such categories as change and development. It also allows full weight to be given to the interdependency
and interconnectedness of human existence as well as of the global environment. This is obviously a gain in a situation where both
the vulnerability and the vital importance of this interconnectedness are becoming urgent public concerns. Furthermore, the relational approach, with its emphasis on transformation and
interdependency, clearly paves the way for a fuller appreciation of
human praxis. It is through praxis in its wide meaning that human
beings enter into relations, change relations, and are formed by relations.
All of this serves Sobrinos theological purposes very well. In
the strictly theo-logical questions, we see that it enables him to concretise the New Testament statement God is love in a conception
of God as loving relations, both internally in the inner-trinitarian
relations, and externally directed towards humanity and the whole
of Gods creation. It means that God quoad se is affected by and
involved in what happens in the world. The aporias of the theistic,

523

static, impassible God, built on Greek presuppositions, are thus

clearly overcome.59
It also means that God is accessible. The God who is loving
relations invites human beings to take part in these loving relationships. This invitation is extended by way of the Son, Jesus Christ,
and realised through the Holy Spirit. In this manner the concept of
relationality becomes highly relevant also to christology, soteriology
and pneumatology.
I have also shown that it is such a perception of constitutive
relationality that makes it possible to accept Sobrinos claim that the
gods, the idols, exist in human history, while at the same time
maintaining human responsibility for the evils and atrocities occurring. The idols exist insofar as they are believed in. They are realised in history, and thus attributed existence through the actions of
the human beings who adore them. However, this mode of thought
is utterly problematic if applied to the reality of God too, as I have
indicated.
With regard to christology, Sobrino moves from an anthropological consideration which holds praxis and relationality to be constituent of a human persons identity, to an analysis of what we may
know of exactly these two traits of the life of the historical Jesus,
through the stories about him, and the impact these stories make on
believing communities today. The fundamental christological question of who Jesus is, is answered by describing his relations: through
his relation to God as Father, Jesus is the Son of God; through his
relation to the Kingdom, Jesus is the Messiah; through his relation
to the disciples, followers, believers, Jesus is the Firstborn, the Lord,
Saviour and Liberator. The clear advantage of this approach is that
it does not proceed deductively from a pre-understanding of what
these titles might mean prior to their application to Jesus, but vice
versa, that these christological titles are defined and explicated
59 See Chapter vii [2], above.

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through what we may know of the historical relations that they are
meant to qualify.60 In this manner, the revelational primacy of Jesus
historical life is maintained.
The relational category with its dynamic character also enables
Sobrino to see a development, growth and even change in Jesus
with respect to these confessional titles. Jesus becomes Son, Messiah,
Lord and Liberator through his life, mission, death and resurrection. This is what the centrality of the rather controversial concept filiation in Sobrinos thinking clearly shows.
There are moreover two advantages with this approach for the
christological endeavour as such. First, by this way of proceeding
from concrete, historical relations to the limit-questions of faith in
Christ, it gives the latter a historical rooting which can rescue christology from the lofty abstractness which so often has been attached
to it. Second, by seeing these relations not only as historical in a
past sense, but also as relations which the community and hence the
theologian him-/herself participate in today, the christological
endeavour gains actuality and takes on a concrete contextual as well
as existential character.
Moving now to soteriology, I have noted several strengths in the
use of a relational approach. In Chapter iv, I argued that this makes
Jesus maleness lose its salvific significance. Hence a major obstacle
for a liberating soteriology as seen from a feminist perspective is
removed. In Chapter vi, I demonstrated how this relational emphasis though not fully developed in this direction by Sobrino himself saves Sobrinos christology from the pitfalls of a mainly
exemplarist or subjectivist soteriology.61 Christ saves by way of
relations. Through these salvific relations the believer is trans60 Although it should be noted that these approaches (deductive inductive,
from above or from below) tend to be more complementary than alternative.
61 See Chapter vi [5], above.

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formed, being shaped in Jesus image, becoming thus more truly

human and at the same time, in Sobrinos interpretation, more
like God. Jesus is true human being and true God.
The dynamic, transformative character of these relationships,
concretely expressed through human praxis, makes salvation a reality in history. Filiation is thus not only a christological category,
but also a soteriological category. Salvation means becoming Gods
children in history, like Jesus became Gods Son. It is simultaneously a process of filiation, humanisation, divinisation (deiformacin) and historical liberation, all effectuated by way of relations.
We see here then, that the relational category also enables Sobrino
to maintain a strong emphasis on the continuity between Jesus and
other human beings.
Seeing salvation as mediated through loving relations implies
giving full soteriological value to such concepts as nearness, affinity,
proximity,62 solidarity, communion and incarnation.63 God saves
by drawing near, by including human beings in Gods own life as
relations, through Jesus, a human being like us. The communion
that God is, is extended in the incarnation to all humanity and all
Gods creation. This communion with God is in itself the salvific
reality par excellence. By this a way is shown that leads beyond the
negative aspects and impasses inherent in an overly judicial and
expiatory soteriology of an Anselmian kind.
All of this demonstrates that a relational approach for a contemporary, liberating christology has many virtues. Sobrino is quite justified in choosing this as one of his main methodological and
interpretetative tools. He uses it in a creative and constructive manner, which in my view proves its appropriateness through its results.
62 Cf. E. Lvinas, E. Dussel, see Chapter i [2] notes 133 and 136, and Thesis 12 1
below.
63 La salvacin de Dios es cercana que llega hasta la solidaridad con los abismos de horror de la historia humana. Sobrino 1982a, 37.

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Its potential could however be even further developed in Sobrinos

work. Its theoretical basis and theological implications should be
brought out more explicitly. This would reveal not only the further
potential, but also the costs and limitations attached to such an
approach to which I now turn.
(2) One of the main problems with a relational approach, at least
when it is applied too onesidedly and without due precautions, is
that it may result in an excessively harmonising view of reality that
does not do justice to the radical experience of rupture, conflict and
chaos. This, of course, would be particularly damaging to a theology that intends to be liberating. The very word liberation points
to a need for a rupture in relations, for breaking bonds.
Sobrino does, however, make it very clear that there are both
positive, constitutive, salvific relations, and destructive, antagonistic
relations. There is not only continuity, but also discontinuity. This
balance must be preserved. The main difficulty, then in any
Christian theology, one should add is how to integrate or how to
relate continuity and discontinuity, constitutive and antagonistic
relationships to one another. This tension is perhaps not ultimately
solvable. Yet it must be treated in a theologically responsible manner. Maintaining this tension in an adequate way is a problem
which appears in practically all the theological themes or loci that
we are concerned with here. In terms of theo-logy, too strong an
emphasis on Gods relatedness with creation can overshadow the
experience of God as ultimate mystery, Gods radical otherness, and
the fundamental difference between God and the world that has
always been safeguarded by Christian theology. Though constantly
engaged in debates on the relations in God, and between God,
humanity, and creation, the Church fathers were always particularly
careful not to make God an intrinsic part of creation. This difference may be at stake in an interpretation that sees God as loving

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relations, extending themselves into history. The tension is then

expressed in the need to take the incarnation in its full and radical
meaning on the one hand, and the need to maintain Gods otherness vis--vis humanity and creation on the other.
Sobrino deals with this tension in terms of the dialectics of a
God who is Father (intimate benevolence) and a Father who is
God (radical mystery), and the Dios mayor y Dios menor. By so
doing, he shows a clear awareness of the problems, and avoids simplistic solutions. His emphasis on relationality does not generally
make him embrace a naivistically harmonious world-view, nor
present a completely immanent God. Yet, the striking immediacy
which characterises his reflections on God and historical reality,
Jesus and the victims etc., threatens to some degree this tension.
The element of distance and rupture is not always safeguarded in
Sobrinos texts.
This means that one should maintain that though God is relations, God is also in some way prior to and beyond these relations. One must accordingly move beyond a general analysis of how
relationships work, from a philosophical relational ontology to a
strictly theological relational ontology of some kind. God is the
reality that constitutes the constitutive relations. Though affected by
the relations with the world, God quoad se is not constituted
through these relations. If this were to be the case, the atheistic criticism which sees God as merely a human projection would have a
strong case.
By maintaining this balance/ tension between God as loving
relation and as ultimate reality constituting the salvific, loving relationships, it is also possible to preserve a vital, ontological difference
between God and the gods. God as Ultimate Reality has reality in
Godself not an isolated, relation-less reality, but embedded in
relations that God has chosen to establish freely and out of love. The
gods, on the other hand, owe their existence completely to the his-

528

torical fact of being believed in and worshipped. Their reality is

constituted through (perverted) relations.
What about christology and soteriology then? The problems
which the relational approach raises here are densely present in the
term filiation. Sobrino early received criticisms of his application
of this term, and of the formulation hacerse Hijo, describing Jesus
divine Sonship. These formulations may be interpreted as adoptionist or similar in the direction of christological schemes which
traditionally have been seen as reductionist. Furthermore, if the filiation which Jesus undergoes, becoming Son of God, is seen in principle as parallel, or even equal, to the filiation Jesus followers
undergo by becoming Gods children, then this accusation gains
strength. When the continuity between Jesus and his sisters and
brothers is strongly underscored, the question about Jesus true
divinity becomes critical. When the development in Jesus relationship to God is emphasised, then the pre-existence of Christ and the
eternal Sonship may be seen as disputed. From a strictly orthodox
dogmatic point of view moreover, it is a question whether the (Gr.:)
homoousin to patri of the Nicene Creed, reconfirmed in the formula
from Chalcedon, really is appropriately taken care of by way of a
relational approach alone.
Admitting the ambiguity of these formulations hacerse Hijo
and filiacin Sobrino defends his views by introducing the following noteworthy precisions and distinctions:64 First and foremost, he distinguishes between historical and divine filiation.
The divine filiation of Jesus is the ultimate, limit-reality discovered
by faith, namely that Jesus is the eternal Son of God, consubstantial
with the Father. The historical filiation, on the other hand, is what
is expressed in the historical relationships of the human being Jesus
with God, as narrated in the Gospels. This historical filiation is
characterised by development and change. It is a process of becom64 Sobrino 1982a, 15-70, cf. particularly pp. 54ff.

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ing. In this context, then, it is appropriate to use the expression

hacerse Hijo. Closer examination reveals that this historical relationship in fact is unique. This means, in other words, that Sobrino
distinguishes between the ultimate reality, confessed in the christological creeds and dogmas that Jesus is the eternal Son of God
and the historical apparition of that reality, expressed in Jesus
unique and unrepeatable65 historical relationship with God.
Now, it is crucial to Sobrino that the knowledge of Jesus historical filiation represents the possibility of arriving at a firm confession of Jesus divine filiation, both as regards its truth and as
regards its content. Through Jesus historical process of becoming
son of God, the eyes of faith see who he is from eternity: the Son of
God. There is no opposition in this understanding between the
divine reality of Christ and the historical filiation of Jesus, Sobrino
insists. Rather, the latter is the way of gaining knowledge of the
former. Thus he proposes the following path of three steps from the
historical to the divine filiation:
(1) the registration or observation of the historical relationship of Jesus to
[the Father], which can be aptly described as filiation; (2) a consideration
of that filiation as the supreme, unrepeatable, and unique oneness of Jesus
with [the Father], described in John as a oneness of knowledge and will; (3)
the assertion of the divine filiation of Jesus that is, of his being Son of
God, consubstantial with [the Father].66

65 Sobrino 1982b, 46 / Sobrino 1982a, 56.

66 Sobrino 1982b, 46. The words in brackets are mine [SJS], since the English
translation (Jesus in Latin America) in this passage changes el Padre in the
Spanish original to God. Sobrino 1982a, 56 : (1) la constatacin de la relacin histrica de Jess con el Padre que puede ser aptamente descrita como
filiacin; (2) la consideracin de esta filiacin como unidad suprema e
irrepetible de Jess con el Padre, descrita en juan como unidad de conocimiento y voluntad; (3) la afirmacin de la filiacin divina de Jess, es decir
su ser Hijo de Dios, consustancial al Padre.

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This is clarifying, in my opinion, not only for this particular christological topos, but for the role of relationality in Sobrinos theology
at large. It may be seen as Sobrinos way of integrating continuity
and discontinuity, historical and theological, immanent experience
and transcendent mystery in his thinking. This is an integration
that I have repeatedly asked for in this inquiry. In what way does
this respond to my concerns?
First and foremost, this is clarifying because it shows in what
way the necessary discontinuity may be preserved even within a
profoundly relational approach. The ultimacy and mystery of Jesus
as One with God from eternity is firmly maintained. But simultaneously, a way is shown towards the recognition and verification of
the significance of this doxological confession in human history.
This way is the historical life of Jesus from Nazareth. This human
life in the midst of the conflicts, struggles and sufferings of
human history is Gods ultimate apparition, Gods salvific presence in history. And that it is a real presence, is shown through the
cross: God is present in history even at the point where it is most
profoundly anti-God in cruelty, evil, and radical, systematically
inflicted suffering.
Hence, the early Christian confession of Jesus as Way is clearly
emphasised. Thus secondly there is also a possibility of speaking
of any human beings filiation: in the likeness and following of
Jesus amidst the conflicts of history, faith embraces the promise of
Gods presence as a loving Father. Filiation understood as historical filiation becomes thereby a soteriological concept too.
In other words, the history of Jesus/the Jesus of history represents the access to God for all human beings. This is the third way in
which this clarification answers to a concern that I have raised: the
question of Jesus as example and/or sacrament. Jesus becomes thus
example, since he is the way to follow. But he is also clearly sacrament, since he is the true and salvific presence of the eternal God in

531

history. And although it is the latter which is the foundation for the
former as Jngel rightly insisted it is the former which is the historical path to the recognition and appreciation of the latter, as
Sobrino maintains.
I affirm this clarification since it in my judgement should make
it possible for Sobrino to maintain both continuity and discontinuity, arguing that a method based on continuity is the best manner to
reach the ultimate leap of faith (discontinuity) on which any full
confession of Jesus as the Christ, Jesus as the Liberator, ultimately
relies.
It should also enable him to hold together the opposite perspectives of salvation as a process filiation, deification, etc. and salvation as a breakthrough, an irruption, a liberation. The first
perspective relies on the relations historical, dynamical, transformative by which we become in history what we are in the
image of God, being transformed into the likeness of the Son
through the faith in and following of him. This is what it means to
hacerse hijos en el Hijo (Rom. 8:29). Here there is room for praxis,
for human labour and effort, in a kind of cooperatio which does not
found or condition salvation, but concretises it, actualises it in history.
The second perspective strongly maintains that the initiative as
well as the completion of this is all the work of God, who is mysteriously and graciously present in history through Jesus the Son.
God is the one constituting the salvific relationships, opening them
up and inviting everyone into them through the history of Jesus/the
Jesus of history. Here there is room for grace alone, faith alone, and
God as the mystery to whom only doxological statements are ultimately appropriate.67
Yet this clarification is not in every aspect consistent with other
tenets of Sobrino. Firstly, it raises anew questions as to the basic presupposition of the unity of history. If there is a distinction between

532

who Jesus ultimately is (divine) and how this is made known in

history, the idea of something other than history seems inevitable.
Secondly, this takes us back to an important observation in
Chapter ii above: that the relationship which Sobrino postulates
between the crucified and the Crucified is a reciprocal relationship.
It works both ways. This made us find in Sobrinos proposal a
kind of communicatio idiomatum between Jesus and suffering people of today. And certainly, if one follows Sobrinos reasoning here,
God is affected by the world through these relationships. And Jesus
becomes/is Son, Lord, Liberator, etc. by way of his relationship with
the God of the Kingdom, the Kingdom of God, and with his sisters
and brothers, his followers in history. Yet what this clarification
means, as I have interpreted it here, is that although mutual, there is
a certain asymmetry in the relationships between God and the
world, and between the Crucified Jesus and the crucified people.
God is the one who constitutes these relationships. The initiative is
Gods alone. This initiative is expressed in history in a unique and
unrepeatable manner in Jesus, the Son. It is necessary, in my view,
to stress this assymetry in order to avoid the reductionism and even
the functionalism (affirming, for instance, Jesus status as saviour
only insofar as he actually functions as saviour) that would follow
from a relational approach that underscored this mutuality without
paying sufficient attention to its ultimate theologal foundation.

67 My interpretation here is notably coloured by the Lutheran tradition to

which I belong. It is possible that Sobrino would not express and explicate
these tenets in the same manner. Moreover, the first perspective, salvation as
growth, cooperatio, would still need more precision and elaboration in order
to meet fundamental Lutheran concerns. Any kind of Lutheran testing of
Sobrinos tenets is certainly not the purpose of my analysis here, though.
What I have done, rather, is to show how this clarification made by Sobrino
meets some of the major concerns that I have raised during the inquiry so
far.

533

Thirdly, by this clarification Sobrino implicitly corrects one of

his earlier formulations, which stated that if the figure of Jesus
ceased to be of interest to people, if nobody followed Jesus any
more which faith holds to be impossible then Jesus would no
longer be the revelation of human being, and in this manner neither
the revelation of God.68
These inconsistencies and questions lay bare some of the
unclarity that remains in Sobrinos outline still. The mutual, yet
asymmetrical relationship becomes particularly crucial with regard
to a potential salvific role of the crucified people, a point to which I
shall return shortly.
One more possible weakness of the relational approach must be
considered, this time concerning the christological endeavour as
such, that is, concerning fundamental christology. Above, I have
pointed to the advantages of this approach, making christology a
contextually rooted, actually relevant and personally existential
undertaking. Now, it must be asked on the other hand in line
68 Sobrino 1976, 297. El da en que la figura de Jess dejase de interesar, dejase
de ser camino de salvacin lo cual la fe considera imposible ese da la frmula no sera verdadera, Jess hubiese dejado de ser la revelacin del hombre
y de esa forma tambin la revelacin de Dios. If this is to be understood
as saying that Jesus in fact is constituted as Son of God and as Lord only
insofar as he is being followed, a functional reductionism of christology is
threatening here. The hypothetical character of this statement thus becomes
decisive. If impossible according to faith is taken to mean that it is impossible since Jesus is Son of God and Lord, and therefore he will never cease to
be of interest to people, then it is not necessarily in conflict with the interpretation I have supported above, namely that historical filiation is the
process of revelation of what faith believes to have been the case since eternity: that Jesus is the Son of God, and hence, Lord. If, to the contrary,
impossible according to faith signifies that it is in principle possible, since
Jesus is constituted as Son and Lord (only) through the following of him,
but that faith believes that it will never happen, then the case is more dubious. Sobrino should be clearer here.

534

with my critical questions in Chapter i [4] above: does this imply

that the following of Jesus and christological reflection in fact
become inseparable? And would not that in case make faith a precondition for entering into a christological debate, which subsequently
would seem to effectively preclude a critical conversation with all
interpreters, regardless of faith, the praxis of following, etc.? If one
emphasises too much the identity of the relationship with Jesus in
faith and the christological endeavour as such, one may in fact end
up with a closed christological discourse, representing a form of
fideism. In some of his most pointed statements on this issue for
instance, in a direct and radical application of the maxim to know
Jesus is to follow Jesus Sobrino seems to come close to such a
position.
What may enable one to avoid these consequences, however, is
the centrality of historicity. What happens in history is in principle
equally open to observation, interpretation and judgement by all
observers, regardless of preconditions. Gods revelation in Jesus is a
revelation in history. Exactly by insisting on an interpretation of
this historical life as the appropriate path for posing and answering
the ultimate limit-questions, that is, for an interpretation and possible acceptance or rejection of the confessional statements, Sobrino
may escape the trap of a christological discourse totally closed in on
itself, irrelevant to anyone but those already convinced.
In sum, the category of constitutive relatedness proves itself to be
particularly helpful in a contemporary christological reflection with
a liberating intention. This relational approach could be further
developed, however. It would need a more substantial philosophical
and theological foundation. It also represents a potential which
Sobrino himself has not yet fully developed. In spite of this, the
relational approach as Sobrino makes use of it in his historical-theological method, represents in my view one of the major strengths

535

of his christology. Though not a novelty, Sobrinos characteristic

formulation and application of this category from the committed
perspective of the poor and downtrodden is thus an important contribution to contemporary christology and theology.
Yet this relational approach does also entail weaknesses and possibly misleading tendencies, as I have indicated. Although Sobrino
shows explicit awareness of these, I still find in Sobrinos approach a
tendency to underline the similarity, continuity, and harmonious
relatedness between the crucified and the Crucified to such a degree
that it threatens to overshadow some, in my view, crucial elements
of dissimilarity, rupture and discontinuity. This is demonstrated by
the unanswered questions emerging from his own clarification on
the issue of filiation, which may be seen as revealing certain
inconsistencies in his approach.
Still I hold that it would be possible to elaborate a theology of
the crucified people(s) along the lines of Ellacuras and Sobrinos
proposals or, in my own wording, a theology in a victimological
key which would manage to maintain in tension both continuity
and discontinuity. The formula the crucified and the Crucified
may at best open up for an appreciation of Gods radical identification with the victims in our time, which could make Christian theology take on or rather regain a committed and praxical
character. Thus it may also give new historical relevance to key concerns in Christian doctrine, inviting ever new re-readings and reformulations of the old testimonies of faith in Jesus Christ. And yet
there is an otherness of God and an otherness of the victims that
theology also needs to heed.

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[4] The crucified and the Crucified: Theological Significance

It is Jon Sobrinos (and that of his forerunners in this matter, Ignacio Ellacura and Mgr. Oscar A. Romero) great merit to have
audaciously and firmly put the reality of the crucified people on
the christological and theological agenda. At the very least, it
implies that theologians should not address the issue of the meaning and relevance of the crucifixion of Jesus without also contemplating the reality of so many crucifixions in our day. This simple
statement is a minimum of what this proposal entails, but even so it
is a statement with ample consequences.
What can be said then, on the basis of this critical appraisal of
Sobrinos theology, of the suffering people, the victims in human
history, in terms of their relationship to Jesus? What is their theological significance, i.e. both their significance in theology, particularly in christology, and their significance for theology, i.e., for
fundamental theology? As I have argued, in Sobrinos outline the
crucified are related to the Crucified by way of three axes: an
epistemological-hermeneutical axis, a historical-soteriological axis,
and finally, an ethical-praxical axis. I shall now consider these critically, by proposing my own interpretation of the theological significance of the reality and symbol of the crucified people in the form
of thirteen theses.
In proposing these theses, my stance with regard to Sobrinos
positions will become clear. Yet I would like to point out that these
theses are not to be seen as an attempt at correcting and improving
Sobrinos theology of the crucified people. From liberation theologians I have learned that we all theologise from different contexts,
responding to different concerns, and even in this case setting
out from different confessional traditions. Therefore I would rather
ask that these theses be seen as my response to the invitation issued

537

by Jon Sobrino to take seriously the reality of suffering people in

our theological work.

(i.) First, with regard to the epistemological-hermeneutical significance of the crucified people, I shall submit two theses.
(1) The crucified people make possible and promote the process of gaining true knowledge (i.e. knowledge as comprehensive and appropriate
as possible) of the world, of God, and of Jesus as the Christ.
[1.1] Epistemology is the reflection on the possibility of gaining
knowledge. Any process of cognition is set in motion and directed
by a determined interest. Any process of cognition takes place: it
happens in a historical, geographical, social, etc. location which
informs and shapes it. And any process of cognition is intimately
united with human praxis, to the extent that it is an integral part of
that praxis. Yet, while being conditioned and moulded by its driving interest, its location, and the praxis of which it is an integral
part, the process of gaining knowledge is not fully determined by
these. What is known through this process is reality, which is ultimately external to the same process of cognition itself. Reality can
never be grasped in its totality through any process of human cognition. However, the process of cognition aims at a knowledge as
comprehensive and appropriate as possible, true knowledge. The
possibility of gaining true knowledge is dependent on this process
interest, location and praxis.
In order to gain true knowledge it is necessary to pay particular
attention to those aspects of reality that are normally consciously
or unconsciously, with or without the use of power kept beyond
the horizon of the knowing subject. These aspects are disharmonious and unpleasant, and there is a strong tendency to cover them

538

up. This tendency to cover up negative aspects of reality may be

prompted by interests in the knowing subject, as well as by socially
or communally organised interests.
In order to gain true knowledge of the world today, it is necessary to make an effort to resist and overcome the tendency to cover
up its negative aspects, such as, for instance, the reality of the suffering and exclusion of millions of human beings; the serious threat to
the environment and hence to human survival at all; the coincidence of factual ability and yet apparently systemic lack of political
and ethical will to intervene in order to bring about the transformation, reduction and, as far as possible, removal of these negative
realities.
There is no access to adequate knowledge which does not pass
via the reality of the other the person excluded, covered up,
coming from beyond the horizon of the knowing subject. The
poor, the insignificant, the barbarians are indispensable for knowing the truth of the world. In order to gain true knowledge of the
world today, therefore, it is necessary also to place oneself in the
location of the crucified people, i.e. the excluded and oppressed
persons and communities, with the interest of taking them down
from the cross, i.e., of their inclusion into the community with full
dignity and full rights, and of their liberation and well-being, realised in a credible praxis with this objective.
[1.2] Theological epistemology is the reflection on the possibility of
gaining true knowledge of reality in the light of faith in God, and
correspondingly, of the possibility of gaining adequate knowledge
of God as revealed in this reality. Christian faith in God is rooted in
Gods self-identification with the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth, confirmed in his resurrection from the dead.
The fundamental aporia that moves the process of theological
cognition is accordingly how God, who is revealed through the life

539

and mission of Jesus as gracious and merciful love, Creator and Sustainer of the entire universe, is compatible with a world in which
there is destruction and senseless evil; correspondingly, how it can
be the case that Jesus, who is believed to be the ultimate revelation
and presence of God in history, ends his life in desolation, shame
and apparent failure on the cross outside the city walls of Jerusalem.
The reality and symbol of the crucified people helps to overcome these fundamental aporias: By making present and exposing
the underside of history and the reality of the other who is normally expelled and suppressed, the crucified ones make possible a
more appropriate approach to reality, and to the totality of reality.
By thus laying bare its negative aspects, the crucified people
through their mere presence testify to the evil and sinfulness of
human history and the present world. A truthful approach to gaining knowledge of reality leads to admitting its present state of
incompatibility with the will of God as this is revealed in the history
of Jesus of Nazareth.
Yet seeing oppressed and excluded human beings today as crucified, implies seeing them as related to the cross of Jesus, in which
Christian faith sub specie contrarii finds the ultimate revelation of
God in history. Holding God to be ultimate reality, Creator and
Sustainer of the whole universe, and holding the totality of reality
to be accessible only by way of a consistent confrontation with its
negative aspects, requires thus that God be known also in and
through these negative aspects (in order to confess God as God of
the totality of reality). The crucified people as reality and symbol thus points to Gods identification with the victims of evil and
sinful forces of human history, an identification which is paradigmatically and constitutively revealed in Gods self-disclosure in
unity with the human person Jesus who dies as a victim on the
cross. Thus the crucified people makes it possible to know God as
the true God, the God of the totality of reality, since they testify to

540

Gods ultimate historical solidarity with the victims. The true God
in a history of suffering is the God of the victims.
[1.3] Reflection on the possibility of gaining true knowledge of Jesus
as the Christ, i.e. the ultimate Saviour of the world, may be called
christological epistemology. Gaining knowledge of Jesus as the
Christ means knowing him as Saviour, i.e., as one who responds to
the utmost concerns of human existence both on a personal and on
a communal level. But knowing Jesus as Saviour also means being
able to see him as Saviour even while acknowledging the fact that he
was condemned and crucified, and moreover, being able to see him
as the one who saves through this apparent failure.
By exposing the negativity of reality, the consequences of sinfulness and evil of human history, the crucified people as reality
and symbol helps in gaining adequate knowledge of this utmost
concern which makes salvation necessary, this fundamental anxiety
and problem of humanity: the tremendum, the interruption, the
radical suffering, El Mozote, Srebrenica it is a reality with many
names, but which in the end remains an unexplicable and unnameable mysterium iniquitatis.
A credible Saviour must respond to this mystery of evil. Since it
is obviously not yet resolved nor removed, a Saviour must be seen as
sharing the burden of this ultimate mystery, being affected by it,
but simultaneously as having the capacity to overcome it definitively. By seeing Jesus as the One who in his life vehemently resisted
this sinfulness inherent in human history, and willingly confronted
it even to the point of suffering its ultimate consequences; by seeing
him as the One who did not resign when confronted with the
deadly logic of power, but who remained faithful to the new reality
of the Kingdom of God which had appeared in and through him in
history, Christian faith sees Jesus as Saviour. The victim who did
not give in to the powers that made him a victim, has become victor

541

over these deadly forces, by conquering them from within. Faith

finds confirmation of the reality and finality of this victory in Jesus
resurrection from the dead. For this reason he is confessed as the
ultimate Saviour, the Liberator of the poor, the Victorious Victim.
The crucified people thus provide help in gaining knowledge of
Jesus as Christ, by reminding us of (the consequences of ) the reality
of sin from which he saves, and by making credible and understandable why Jesus cross is fundamental to his being Saviour.
[1.4] The reality and symbol of the crucified people can thus be seen
as law and light. The mere existence of crucified people in history reveals the presence of sin, the gravity of this sin, and the large
extent of human complicity in and responsibility guilt for the
sinful processes that lead to the crucifixion of others. The presence
of the crucified people thus exposes the need for salvation, and
becomes indirectly, but forcefully, a call to conversion.69
In this same sense, it can be said that the reality and symbol of
the crucified people shed light on the true condition of this
world, of human history, and of human nature. This light is revealing: it does not only mean that a part of reality which otherwise
would be hidden, kept in the dark, becomes visible; it is also a light
with which to regard all of reality, approaching its totality.
(2) The crucified people facilitate and promote a relatively adequate
interpretation of the Christian sources; the gospel of the Kingdom and
the testimonies to Jesus as the Christ (kerygma).
[2.1] Human access to reality goes by way of interpretation. There is
a constant need for hermeneutical mediation of all human interaction with reality.
69 Cf. Martin Luthers second use of the law, usus legis theologicus seu spiritualis.

542

The Christian faith in Jesus as the Christ is an interpretation of

an event which has taken place in history: the life, mission, and
death of Jesus of Nazareth, and the occurrence of faith in his being
raised from the dead. The testimonies about this event, in themselves already interpretations of it, are the formative and authoritative Christian sources. They contain the proclamation of the good
news of the coming of the Kingdom, and of Jesus as the inaugurator
and ultimate mediator of this salvific presence of God in human
history. This original kerygma, orally, symbolically, and literally
communicated and handed on through the ages, has been constantly interpreted and re-interpreted, and is in permanent need of
new interpretations.
One ultimate, correct interpretation is beyond human reach.
Nevertheless, as there are more and less appropriate interpretations
of any event, any sign, any text, so there is a need to search constantly for an interpretation of these Christian sources that is relatively adequate (Tracy). The crucified people as reality and
symbol facilitates and promotes such a relatively adequate interpretation of the testimonies to Jesus as the Christ:
[2.2] The location from which the sources are interpreted co-determines the content of their interpretation. The location of the crucified people the world of the poor, excluded, and victims
represents an appropriate location for interpreting these sources,
because their message, although ultimately universal, is addressed in
a specific manner to these small and insignificant persons, exiled
and excluded, prisoners and strangers. The God of Exodus has seen
the chosen people suffer a people chosen for its smallness, its
insignificant status and intervenes for its liberation; Jesus proclaims that the Kingdom is for the poor; and the early Christian
community ultimately identifies Jesus with the hungry, naked,

543

imprisoned [] even in an eschatological perspective (cf. Matt

25).
[2.3] The authoritative norm (norma normans) for the interpretation
of the sources is the event to which they bear witness: the life, death
and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. Our access to this event is
mediated through a chain of interpretations, of story-telling and
proclamation, of hearing and following. We do not have direct
access to the Jesus of history any more, we only have the history (or
rather histories) of Jesus.
Nonetheless, the event founding this history is the decisive criterion for assessing conflicting interpretations and versions of the
history of Jesus. In order to give a relatively adequate interpretation
of that authoritative story, one must pay due attention to the master-narrative the particular purpose with which the story is told,
and which governs and directs it and the praxis from which it
emerges. Since the determination of this master-narrative and
praxis always occurs inside the hermeneutical circle, it cannot be
definitively decided upon. But here too, it is necessary and possible
to reach a relative adequacy, in order to prevent manipulative and
distorted interpretations.
The symbol and reality of the crucified people give rise to the
fundamental interest of a merciful intervention on behalf of victims, a praxis of the liberation of the poor. This fundamental interest and purpose master-narrative corresponds to a basic
semantic axis in the biblical material, as shown above. It also corresponds with the core of the Gospel message, according to Lk 4:1430. The perspective of the crucified people thus makes it possible to
tune in to the principal semantical and kerygmatical axes of the
Bible, thus securing a relatively adequate interpretation of its normative content, the history of Jesus. That Jesus, from the perspective of the world of the poor, is seen as liberator, a messiah,

544

responding to the profoundest concerns of those dwelling in this

world, can be seen as a confirmation a posteriori of the appropriateness of the hermeneutical perspective chosen.
[2.4] An ethics of reading (Jeanrond) aimed at preventing fraudulent interpretations requires that a text if one claims to interpret it
as text is read in accordance with its genre and style, and with
attentiveness to the addressees and purpose which the text itself
indicates.70 Although this, again, cannot be decided outside the
hermeneutical circle, the appropriateness of a given interpretation
can be assessed on the basis of these criteria.
Euangelion means news that gives cause to joy.71 Joy is not
only the content of the message, but also the result of its being communicated. From which vantage-point, then, does the preaching of
the gospel accompanied by credible service in order to make good
news become good realities in history appear as good news, giving
cause to joy? There is good reason to claim that one such vantagepoint is that of the crucified people, since these are the primary
addressees of the message of the coming of the Kingdom, and furthermore the first ones to enter into it according to the early
Christian witness, and since they are the ones who today suffer
most radically under the powers of the anti-Kingdom, under the
consequences of the sin of the world.
[2.5] An ethics of reading also requires that the interpretation of a
given text be validated in a community of readers. The early Christian sources can most appropriately be interpreted in communion
with the crucified people the others, the poor and destitute

70 See Chapter v [5].

71 See Gerhard Friedrichs article on euangelizomai and euangelion, Friedrich
1964 1974. Cf. Stlsett 1996a.

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since these are the ones who are made central persons in these texts,
and (again) to whom they are primarily addressed.
(ii.) The second axis the historical-soteriological is the one that
has given most rise to critical questions. The following seven theses
are dedicated to clarifying the salvific aspects of the relationship
between the crucified and the Crusified.
(3) Since God is present on the cross of Jesus, Gods presence on the historical crosses today can be analogically affirmed in faith.
[3.1] Christian faith holds that God is present on the cross of Jesus.
In spite of the experienced absence of the God of the Kingdom, the
loving God of life and justice, (an experience most radically
expressed in Mark 15:34), it is maintained that God has chosen to be
present on Golgotha. God did not ultimately abandon Jesus, but
remained in communion with him, even to the point of being made
a victim by the powers of the anti-Kingdom, the powers of death.
This means that God is affected by suffering and human history.
The conception of God as impassible and unaffected is criticised
and ultimately overcome on the cross. God has freely and out of
love chosen to be different. God is a crucified God, a suffering God,
a Dios mayor y menor.
[3.2] Christian faith holds Jesus Christ to be the ultimate and
unique revelation of the true God and of true humanity. The execution of Jesus thus testifies to the scandalous and incomprehensible
presence and power of evil forces in history. By killing Gods Son,
and continuing to kill Gods children, these forces show themselves
as forces contrary to God. Since these forces are directed against
God, they are labelled as sin.

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Since these forces require human sacrifices and produce victims

in history, they show themselves to be profoundly anti-human and
de-humanising. They spread death, premature and unjustly
inflicted death. Since the presence and reality of these forces goes
beyond human reason, a mythical language is appropriate in order
to name them. They can be called idols, since they aspire to ultimacy, are object of adoration, and require human victims. But this
naming substracts nothing from the human responsibility for their
being operative in human history. Nor does it substract anything
from the scandal which the power of these forces represents.
[3.3] Because Christian faith recognises sub specie contrarii Gods solidarity and communion with the victim Jesus on Golgotha, it is
possible to affirm Gods solidarity and communion with all in
human history who fall victims to the same forces in spite of all
apparent evidence to the contrary. Since God is believed to be
present with the Crucified One, opposing the crucifying forces,
there is no longer anything that should prevent faith from affirming
analogically Gods presence with all crucified ones, with the crucified people. This presence is rooted only in Gods free decision, out
of merciful love.
(4) Since Gods presence with the crucified Jesus according to the Gospel
is a salvific presence, there are signs of Gods salvific presence also in the
crosses in history.
[4.1] Jesus announced that God has drawn near in grace, becoming
involved in human history for the salvation of all humankind. Faith
sees Jesus as the ultimate historical revelation of this merciful God.
According to the gospel of the Kingdom, brought near and proclaimed by Jesus, Gods presence is salvific. God, drawing near in
Christ, enters into relationship, communion, with human beings.

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This presence founds a new communion (Gr.: koinonia) which is

salvific. It would therefore be self-contradictory and in direct opposition to the gospel for Christian theology to affirm Gods presence
with the crucified people without at the same time affirming this
presence as salvific.
[4.2] Jesus showed in words and deeds that the love of God, having
entered history for the salvation of all humankind, shows itself with
a predilection for those who are particularly made victims by the
evil forces of history, and in this way carry the sins of the world.
The loving presence of God thus shows itself as a power for life and
justice, opposing all crucifying forces.
[4.3] Faiths affirmation of Gods presence with the crucified is particularly good news euangelion to the crucified people. It means
that they can rely on Gods mysterious presence, in spite of the
experience of (Gods) abandonment. Gods presence is salvific for
the crucified themselves. The gospel should therefore be communicated to them and celebrated together with them, so that they may
recognise, accept and celebrate this presence, and thus their faith
may be strengthened, their hope affirmed, their dignity restored,
and their struggles for survival, transformation, and well-being
empowered. A credible communication of the gospel to the crucified people requires that it be communicated in words and deeds
that it be accompanied by an effective service for, on behalf of, and
together with the crucified ones themselves for their healing and
liberation.72
[4.4] The affirmation of Gods presence with the crucified ones in
history is a statement of faith in the God of Jesus, the Crucified One.
Like Gods presence with Jesus on the cross, Gods presence with the
72 See theses 10-13 below.

548

crucified people is a hidden presence. It is by no means obvious or

natural for human beings to encounter God on the Golgothas of history, but something which requires faith. This does not mean, however, that there are no explicit signs of this salvific presence which
faith can heed and by which faith can be nurtured. 73
[4.5] Since this faith in Gods presence with the crucified ones is
rooted in Gods self-revelation in Jesus, it is a particularly Christian
faith in God. Yet Gods presence with the crucified does not depend
on faith at all. God is present because God has chosen to be present.
This means that Christian faith audaciously maintains Gods presence with all the crucified in history, regardless of their faith, praxis,
level of consciousness/organisation, or worthiness.
[4.6] This obviously does not render faith void of soteriological significance. Neither does it mean that salvation occurs automatically,
so to speak, for all victims:
(a) Faith is trust in the love of God for Christs sake. It is the
reception of this love, the letting oneself be involved in a salvific
relation with God. Faith in God through Jesus Christ is acceptance
of the scandalous claim that God is the God of victims, and that
through this partisanship, God is the God of all, of sinners and
sinned-against alike. This acceptance brings forth in the believer
fruits of salvation: hope, acts of mercy, resistance and liberation, etc.
Yet again, this acceptance (faith) does not rely on anything other
than Gods salvific presence and merciful invitation.
(b) Theology should always respect both the otherness of God
and the otherness of each human being, in concreto, each victimised person. Therefore it cannot speak in terms of a quasi-automatic salvation. Nevertheless the Christian gospel, claiming that
salvation is constituted by God alone; that the faith of the believer
73 See below, thesis 5.

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is the work of the Holy Spirit; and that the Holy Spirit works ubi et
quando visum est Deo;74 gives good reason to expect that this ubi et
quando (whenever and wherever else God out of love may choose
to be present) points to Gods salvific presence with the crucified
people.
(5) Since salvation is a reality always flowing over, a reality always to
be shared, the crucified people may be seen as sharing salvation with the
world by testifying to Gods salvific presence, and by transmitting and
communicating signs and fruits of this salvation to others.
[5.1] Salvation is a dynamic reality, not a static condition. Salvation
is a reality to be shared, to be communicated, not be kept or
guarded for oneself. To bring salvation means going out of oneself
in love, entering into healing, mutual relationships with the
other.
If we hold that God is present on Jesus cross, and therefore,
analogically, on the crosses in human history, and that this presence
is salvific, one may see the crucified people as sharing salvation with
the world. The crucified people share salvation with the world by
testifying to Gods salvation, transmitting signs of this salvation,
and thereby even mediating, in a derived sense, Gods salvation in
history.
[5.2] The testimony of the crucified people is a testimony to the saving presence of God, contrary to all expectation and appearance.
The testimony of the crucified people is, therefore, a testimony to
the qualities and values of the Kingdom of God: life in its fullness,
justice, community and sharing. The testimony of the crucified
people becomes at the same time a testimony against all crucifying
forces, that is, against everything that de-humanises persons and
74 Cf. Confessio Augustana, art V.

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communities, and thereby opposes the coming of the Kingdom. In

other words, it is a testimony against everything that prevents the
realisation of peace, justice and reconciliation in the full meaning
of these qualities as implied in the biblical vision of shalom.
The crucified people testify: they are witnesses. Since their witness emerges from suffering, they can be considered martyrs. The
crucified people is a martyred people, yet in distinct ways. Some
among them proclaim openly Gods salvific presence in Jesus
Christ, and suffer for this. Others proclaim and promote the
humanising values and qualities of the Kingdom of God, and suffer
for this. These two groups can be named crucified and martyrs
in an active sense. Others again testify only through their silence,
their mere presence, their being made victims by forces of sin and
destruction like Jesus. They can be called crucified and martyrs in a passive sense. Yet since their status as witnesses is not
dependent on their own achievements, but solely on Gods presence among them by way of the constitutive relationship God has
established with them through Christ, they are all, in a Christian
discernment, crucified and martyred people, bringing signs of
salvation.
[5.3] By testifying to Gods salvation, the crucified people transmit
salvation to others. They do so by preparing others to acknowledge
Gods gracious presence and to accept its salvific character as an
offer for all to embrace. This happens when the reality and symbol
of the crucified people brings light, i.e. reveals the truth of reality
and the inclination to cover it up, and thereby offers an opportunity
for conversion (cf. 1.4).
The crucified people also transmit salvation to others by spreading signs or traces of salvation in history. This happens more or less
explicitly, and to a greater or lesser degree. It happens when crucified people have hope in spite of their struggle being against all

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odds, making therefore their hope a hope against hope. It happens when the crucified people promote life in its fullness, with justice and well-being for all a community in which there is room for
everyone (una sociedad donde todos quepan) and resist and confront all crucifying forces which prevent the fullness of life. It happens occasionally, and contrary to all expectation and beyond
everything that might be required from them, in the midst of this
struggle for life when they accept the cost of this struggle, even to
the extent of laying down their own lives for the sake of others.
They thus testify that true love existence for others is possible in
sinful history. It also happens when, contrary to all expectation and
beyond everything that might be required of them, they embrace
and forgive those who have done wrong against them: their oppressors, perpetrators, crucifiers. The crucified people bring forth signs
of salvation when, as a result of their mere existence or their active
commitment, they generate solidarity and mercy values that are
indispensable for the healing and survival of humankind and all of
creation. And finally, they transmit salvation to others when they
confess and celebrate faith in the God of life, the true God, the God
of Jesus, thereby negating and denying all the idols that are offered
them obedience and adoration.
[5.4] Salvation as a fundamental reality is constituted and offered by
God in Christ, in its fullness and once and for all. It is therefore
helpful to distinguish between these signs or fruits of salvation,
and the salvific reality in se. Salvation and the fruits of salvation
should not be identified with one another.75 The salvation which
comes from God does not come in portions, to varying degrees. But
explicit signs of this reality may show themselves in history to a varying degree, and in different manners. Where there are signs of salvation, faith may confidently celebrate Gods presence. However,
75 Sobrino 1991d, 160f / Sobrino 1994c, 89-90.

552

more often than not, radical suffering gives a clearer sign of dehumanisation, of no longer being able to love, than of salvation.
Yet, faith also knows Gods presence where there seem to be no
salvific signs. Although faith believes that God is present on Jesus
cross, it recalls the scandalous silence and darkness of Golgotha.
[5.5] In a derived sense, then, it can be said that the crucified people
mediate salvation. Jesus is the Mediator of the salvific reality of the
Kingdom of God in history. The reality of salvation is that the
Kingdom has come. Jesus mediates this firstly, by causing and representing its presence in directo, and secondly, by making its presence visible. In this second capacity, Jesus calls others to follow him,
in order to continue this mediating function of making salvation
visible and tangible in history. Entering into relationship with Jesus
implies being introduced into the same relationships as Jesus: relationship to the God of the Kingdom and to the Kingdom of God.
The crucified people are taken in a particular though not
exclusive manner into this relationship by God. Therefore they
also may in a particular manner mediate the reality of salvation, by
following Jesus in being (a) mediators of the Kingdom, (b) sons and
daughters of God, (c) way to God. The degree of this mediation,
of making salvation a visible and tangible reality in history, varies.
The crucified peoples awareness of and self-understanding with
regard to this mediating mission vary too. However, in the final
analysis, whether this mediating mission is carried out by the crucified people or not, depends on God alone.
(6) Although the crucified people is indispensable for salvation in history, they do not constitute salvation. They are not saviours; they do not
play a salvific role, in the ultimate sense. God alone constitutes salvation. Jesus alone is Saviour.

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So far, I have stressed the continuity between the Crucified and the
crucified. Now it is time to address the matter of discontinuity, in
other words, to clarify wherein the difference between them lies.
[6.1] Although the crucified people testify to, transmit and mediate
Gods salvation in history, they do not constitute salvation.76
Salvation is Gods nearness and communion, expressed in and
through profound relationships. These relationships are reciprocal.
Yet only God properly constitutes these constitutive, salvific relationships. This is where there is an asymmetry in the relationships.
Asymmetry in this case does not mean that the relationships are not
reciprocal, but that one of the poles in the relationship is ultimately
the constitutive, founding pole upon which the relationship relies.
The crucified ones share salvation with the world as a result of
the particular relationship God has established with them through
Jesus, the Crucified One. The crucified people is light only
because they reflect Jesus, the Light of the world.77 The crucified
people bring signs and fruits of salvation to the world only insofar
as they reflect the salvific reality of Gods predilection for and presence among them.
[6.2] The crucified people are not saviours, nor do they play a
salvific role in the ultimate sense. This clarification is important in
order (i) to maintain that to the crucified people too, salvation is
grounded in Gods grace alone; it is not something that builds on
their capacities, efforts or circumstances (i.e., it is euaggelion, in the
76 Contrary to Ellacura and Sobrino, who both speak of the poor as saviours.
See Sobrino 1991d, 437: Pobres con espritu puntualizaba I. Ellacura, para
recalcar la totalidad salvfica de los pobres; pero aada que en la materialidad de la pobreza y no en otras materialidades se da la connaturalidad para
ese espritu que les hace vivir como salvados y como salvadores; and Sobrino
1993g.

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deepest sense); (ii) to avoid an exaggerated expectation of what the

poor and destitute in fact may accomplish in world history;78 (iii)
to preclude the false conclusion that since the crucified people bring
salvation, it is good for the world that there should be such crucified people.
[6.3] The crucified people do not have any expiatory function. Nor
is their suffering vicarious. They are not instrumental in healing the
wounds of human existence; they should not be considered instru77 This point of view may find an interesting and somewhat surprising parallel
in the theology of the late Karl Barth, as Kjetil Hafstad has shown: In the
Church Dogmatics IV/3, Barth says that the created world has its own lights
and utters its own truths. In this way, thanks to the Creators fidelity, the
creature shines and speaks. Whether humanity knows it or not, whether
humanity acknowledges it or not, moreover, the creature has this light. In
another place (reference to KD IV/3:134, English translation, p.119f ), Barth
affirms therefore that we have to be prepared for true words outside the
Church, i.e. from human beings who do not yet believe in Jesus Christ or
bear witness to him, and from so-called un-conscious Christians, words
which find expression in the way they operate in society. Jesus is able to to
raise up extraordinary witnesses who utter true words [] They may appear
to be without Jesus Christ, but he is not without them. As we can see,
Barths interpretation here is more related to the doctrine of creation than is
Sobrinos. However, Barth, true to the deeply christological foundation of
his theology, maintains that, in Hafstads words: The true words from outside the sphere of the Church and the Bible have nothing other to say than
Gods one word, Jesus Christ, and it is this one word which commissions,
moves and empowers them to attest it. Hafstad 1985, quoting from the
unpublished English translation, Excursus 3: Barths Doctrine of the
Lights in the Light of his Doctrine of the Light and Dark Sides of the Created World. English Translation, unpublished, pp. 104-121; especially 104106.
78 This is what Bedford sees as an overburdening of the crucified people by
giving them a salvific role; an [] berhaupt nicht befreiende Belastung
auf die Schultern des gekreuzigten Volkes [legt]. See Bedford 1993, 293-295.

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ments or sacraments of salvation. Rather, they are the most visible expression of the need for salvation. They lay bare the wounds
of human existence.
In this sense, however, they are indispensable for salvation in
human history: there can be no salvation without them. Therefore,
God has chosen to be near them in a particular manner. And this
presence produces unexpected and life-bringing fruits of salvation
which are beneficiary to all human beings.
The Kingdom is primarily for the poor. The resurrection is primarily a sign of hope for the crucified ones. But through them, these
realities become signs of hope for salvation and eternal life for all,
for humanity as a whole, and for all creation.
[6.4] This means that I cannot agree with Ellacuras and Sobrinos
boldest statements: that the crucified people are a principle of salvation, by carrying the sins of others (away). The typology/analogy Servant-Jesus-victims today is theologically admissible and
fruitful. However, as in any analogy, there is also an element of dissimilarity. One basic dissimilarity between the suffering of Jesus and
the suffering of victims today regards those aspects of Jesus salvific
life-and-death which in the history of theology have been expressed
through the terms of substitution and expiation. Regardless of
what precise meaning these terms should be given in a contemporary interpretation, there is an element of uniqueness, of something
accomplished once-and-for-all, which should be preserved. Any
continuance of these in history through the crucified people
would in fact threaten the validity of what Jesus accomplished on
behalf of many (Rom 5:19 ).
[6.5] What furthermore makes the cross of Jesus different from
other crosses, is that faith sees in it the completion of a human life
lived in full and unambiguous devotion to God and to other

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human beings, thereby restoring the broken relationships between

Creator and creation. Jesus is homo verus, the true and complete
human being, in and through his constitutive relationships with
God, the Kingdom, and his brothers and sisters. This makes Jesus
not only the first among many, but furthermore Alpha and Omega,
the first and the last. This makes him not only a motivating example, but the one who establishes and facilitates new, salvific relationships within human history. In this sense, only Jesus is Saviour.
[6.6] Yet although the crucified people do not have any expiatory or
vicarious function, there is a sense in which one might state that the
crucified people carry the sins of others in a way similar to the Suffering Servant. Not seldom, the crucified people are given de facto
the function of a scapegoat. As Ren Girard has shown, this seems
to be a particular phenomenon which comes to expression in many
ways and nuances in human history, myths, literature and culture:
the phenomenon of a victim who through his/her/their sufferings is
seen as safeguarding the well-being and survival of the whole community.79 This positive effect is obtained through the channelling
of violence on to these victims scapegoats. This sacrificial drama
seems in many cases to function: it does in fact reduce violent tension, it does strengthen the community.
Yet the uniqueness of the Biblical witness is that the versions of
scapegoats themselves are heard, and moreover, through their
voices, the voice of God is heard. In that way, in spite of the scapegoat-mechanisms efficaciousness on an historical level, the Christian revelation breaks the logic of violence inherent in this
mechanism, by revealing the face of the victim, and revealing Gods
face as unequivocally on the side of victims. There is in this aspect,
then, a close connection between the theology of the crucified people of Ellacura and Sobrino, and the thinking of Ren Girard.
79 Girard 1986; Girard 1987, et passim. Compare Assmann 1991.

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But this conception also enables us, in my view, to indicate just

why this role of the crucified people is not salvific in the direct
sense. It is not their potential temporary redeeming the community of its own violence (carrying the sins of others away) which
should be called salvation. Rather, it is their breaking out of this
role, empowered and enabled by Gods identification with them in
Christ, thereby rendering the whole scapegoat-mechanism obsolete
and invalid, which testifies to Gods saving work.
(7) Suffering is not salvific, neither in the cross of Jesus nor in the crosses
of history. That which is salvific is the love of God, present in spite of the
overwhelming and inexplicable power of the death-bringing forces
which apparently are still triumphant in human history.
[7.1]Suffering is never good. Crucifixions are never desirable. However obvious, this must be stated clearly and explicitly against any
doloristic or masochistic misconceptions that could follow from an
erroneous Christian soteriology. This is particularly important in
connection with a theology of the crucified people. Any responsible theological talk of crucified peoples must be aware of this danger: to aestheticise, theorise, or explain away the cruelty and scandal
of radical suffering.
[7.2] Nevertheless, a responsible theological consideration of the
crucified people can also contribute to the rejection and correction
of these faulty soteriologies. It can lead to a healthy revision and critique of some aspects of traditional Christian soteriologies, as well
as of the traditional mysticism of suffering. By mobilising to an
active accompaniment of all those stricken by real sufferings and
crucifixions today, the reality and symbol of the crucified people
can convince us that God does not will such suffering, but counters
it firmly. It may thus also become clear that it is not suffering which

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is salvific, but love. Nor is it suffering which makes love salvific, but
the fact that true love endures also in spite of senseless evil and pain.
This is valid not only for the crosses of history, but for the cross
of Jesus too. The cross can be seen as expressing the will of God, not
in the sense that God wills the suffering of Jesus, but in that it
shows that true, salvific love in a reciprocal relationship, a communion, between human being and God survives and conquers
even the historical reality of sin and evil.
[7.3] There should be no necessity of suffering, then. Christian
faith holds that God does not endorse suffering and evil, but firmly
opposes them. These tragic historical realities do not stem from
God. Through Christ, God summons all human beings to counter
these realities, to work for their abolition. The only sense in which
it is theologically legitimate to speak of a necessity of suffering, is
that it is an accumulated historical experience that in this work for
its abolition, in this struggle to remove suffering, suffering is often
the cost. There is a suffering for the sake of freedom, communion,
salvation; a suffering out of love for the sake of love. The cross of
Jesus, Gods own suffering, shows that this fact does not imply that
the love of God has lost, nor that those who suffer this situation are
abandoned from the God of life. On the contrary, it shows that this
God remains mysteriously present with all the crucified ones, so
that this reality in which crucifixions occur will not ultimately triumph.
[7.4] As to the soteriological premise that, in Ellacuras words, the
power of sin can only be overcome through bearing its consequences: suffering under it, or in Sobrinos words, (A)s to what
should be done about sin, [] the answer is clear, eradicate it, but
with one essential condition: by bearing it, this can be accepted
only in the following sense: Given the historical reality of sin and

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evil, on the one hand, and the fact that the salvific love of God is
not to be understood in idealistic, a-historical terms, but rather is
incarnated, concrete and historical, on the other hand, the salvific
love of God shows its strength and ultimacy by letting itself be
affected truly and wholly even by this negative historical reality.
The love of God is present, even where evil apparently reigns. If it
were not, none of those who fall victims under these forces would
be within reach of Gods salvific love. This is where the necessity
of Gods suffering under sin lies.
And yet, this necessity of suffering cannot and should not be
transferred analogically or otherwise to the crucified people.
Their suffering is not a salvific necessity; it is a tragic fact.80
(8) Since God constitutes salvation in solidarity with the victims of history, there can ultimately be no salvation which does not imply the full
restoration of the rights and dignity of the victims.
[8.1] The true God in a world of suffering is a God of victims.
Christian faith affirms that this true God is revealed in history in
unity with the victim Jesus of Nazareth. Thus, it can be said that
Christian theology and soteriology has a victimological orientation.
[8.2] The victimological orientation of Christian theology does not
imply that victims are called to accept their destiny and quietly reconcile themselves with it. Much to the contrary, Christian theology
summons all those who suffer to endurance (Gr.: hypomone)81 and
active resistance, not resignation. And it offers a hope in the ultimate overcoming of the reality in which human beings are victimised.

80 See Chapter vii [5], above.

81 See [1] above.

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[8.3] This victimological orientation, the priority that is given to the

perspective of the victims, has important consequences for both
soteriology and eschatology. Since God constitutes salvation in solidarity with the victims of history, there can ultimately be no salvation which does not imply the full restoration of the rights and
dignity of the victims.
Salvation can never be obtained at the expense of other persons.
This negation includes all victims of the past. Contrary to an ideology of progress which de facto accepts its even human costs if
only the final result is positive, Christian theology can never accept
the cost of those who were trampled down, shut out, or shot dead
in the course of history. This reluctance to forget the victims of the
past, but rather to keep them always present through memory and
narration (Metz), makes Christian theology take on an eschatological character. The last judgement and the ultimate restoration are
closely linked to the destiny of the victims in human history. The
end of history will dawn upon humanity only when God restores
their right once and for all. Crucifixions will ultimately be ended
when God becomes all in all.
[8.4] This means that not even today should Christian salvation be
preached without the accompaniment of a consistent effort for the
full restoration of the rights and the dignity of victims.82
(9) Since God constitutes salvation in solidarity with the crucified people, the victims of history, there is hope even for crucifiers : perpetrators and offenders.
[9.1] A theology of the crucified people should address also the
reality and situation of the crucifiers. This concern grows out of the
experience of the reality of the North at the turn of the Millen82 See theses 10-13 below.

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nium. The experience of being co-responsible for other peoples suffering and at the same time being tied up in systems and networks
which paralyse both the ability and the willingness to break out of
this situation of guilt, leads many into an apathy and resignation
which may come to expression as despair, restless pursuit of satisfaction, ennui, or emptiness.
The concern for the inclusion of the crucifiers also emerges
from a wish to take due account of and come to terms with the
insight expressed in the Pauline statement they had all sinned,
and in the Lutheran formula simul iustus et peccator.
However, this concern becomes crucial from a consistent perspective from the South, or from the crucified peoples, too. History shows the complexity and ambiguity of all human interaction.
Even though it is pivotal that one never blur the distinction
between perpetrator and victim, crucifier and crucified, it is also
true that there are seldom clear-cut borders between the two in
actual history. This only shows the radical nature of evil: the victims
in one relation may become offenders in another. The spiral of
oppression is an illuminating example of this complexity of human
relationships.83
In El Salvador, as in other war-ridden countries, the post-warsituation shows how the armed conflict itself often de-humanised
both parties, even those who in principle defended a just cause, or
were innocently and against their will drawn into the hostilities. It
also clearly points to the necessity of reconciliation, forgiveness, restoration, and inclusion of even war-criminals and murderers crucifiers in the new community. This is not contrary to a theology
of crucified people. What such a theology should always make clear,
however, is that this reconciliation, forgiveness, and new beginning
can never be established at the expense of the victims.
83 Compare the striking similarities between the victim and offender population indicated by Fattah, Chapter v [2], above.

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One final reason for including an explicit concern for the crucifiers is the observation that crucifiers also crucify themselves in their
act of crucifying others. The very misdeed threatens the identity
and integrity of the human person committing it. The crucifiers are
always in the danger of being identified with their wrongdoings.
This parallels the danger of the crucified persons of becoming one
with what has been done against them.84 But according to Christian anthropology, a human person is always more than what he or
she does, and more than that which has happened to him or her.
This is said, again, without blurring the real distinction
between offender and offended. Crucifiers primarily offend other
persons victims. But in the same act, they also victimise themselves. Therefore they must be included in a theological reflection
on crucified people.
[9.2] The crucifiers active and passive collaborators in the
destruction of others cannot be saved qua crucifiers without their
victims, those whom they have crucified. Since it is the perverted
relation to the other (oppression) which defines who these human
persons are in these relations (oppressors), it is only by the cessation
of these perverted relations that they can be freed from that status.
But once such a destructive relation has been established, it is only
the victimised part who has the possibility of breaking it, and of reestablishing new, positive relations.85 This is due to the historical
dimension of human existence. There is no way to undo what has
been done. And there are no others than those against whom evil
has been done, those who have been sinned against, who have the
84 Cf. the ambiguities of the terms victim and victimisation discussed
above.
85 As the oppressed, fighting to be human, take away the oppressors power to
dominate and suppress, they restore to the oppressors the humanity they had
lost in the exercise of oppression. Freire 1972, 32.

563

authority and right to forgive and forget that wrong which has been
committed against them.86
[9.3] However, it cannot be demanded of victims that they forgive. It
does happen that the crucified people in fact welcome and forgive
their crucifiers. When this occurs, it represents signs of salvation,
miracles of the Kingdom occurring in history. But this can never be
expected, still less required from the crucified people.
Furthermore, the tragic fact is that most victims are dead.
Given that they are the only ones with the authority and capacity to
undo the oppressive relations, this fact may seem to eternalise the
perverted relationships. There can be no ultimate forgiveness nor
liberation for the perpetrators without the victims.
However, Gods identification with all victims through the victim Jesus makes possible the healing of these perverted relations
even when the victim in person is not able to do so. Therefore, the
message of the cross is good news even to the crucifiers. Since God
is in solidarity with victims, sharing their lot to the ultimate consequences, God can do what they may no longer be capable of doing.
God can forgive on behalf of others, living or dead. The God of victims is therefore the true God also for crucifiers, with the ability
through Jesus the Victorious Victim to save even them. And by
being God also for crucifiers by being primarily the God of victims,
God is shown as the true God, the God of all people, of all of reality.
This means however, that Gods authority to forgive on behalf
of living and dead victims is founded on Gods credible solidarity
with these, in other words, on the historical revelation of Jesus, and
86 I am grateful to Paul Leer-Salvesen for his contributions, comments and
responses regarding this particular aspect. See particularly his original and
groundbreaking doctoral thesis, Leer-Salvesen 1991, and furthermore LeerSalvesen 1996 and Leer-Salvesen 1995.

564

on the promise that God shall restore the lives and rights of all victims.
[9.4] In this way, a theology of the crucified people inclusive of the
crucifiers presents also an important lesson for theologies of
Pauline, Lutheran, or other origins and inclinations, whenever these
de facto promote a salvation which neglects the reality and rights of
the victims of history, through (i) giving an excessive priority to the
relationship between God and the individual human being at the
cost of the relationships between human beings, and/or (ii) a misguided equalising of all persons and groups in their complicity with
evil and guilt, to such an extent that concrete trespasses and the very
real distinction between the offender and the victim are made less
important.
(iii.) Finally, I move to the ethical-praxical axis between the crucified
and the Crucified. My deliberations here can be summarised in the
following four theses:
(10) A responsible theological application of the theologoumenon the
crucified people depends on a credible affirmation and promotion of a
praxis for taking the crucified down.
[10.1] The acceptance of the crucified people as theological symbol is only recommendable as long as it is made explicitly clear that
their crucifixion, their situation of suffering, is something which is
caused by the inexplicable presence of sinfulness and evil in human
history, and not by God. The best way of making this clear is by
affirming, promoting and committing oneself in a credible praxis
for reducing, removing and ultimately overcoming this situation of
suffering.

565

[10.2] The formula taking the crucified people down, a formulation with roots in Jesuit spirituality, 87 expresses the urgency, ultimacy and content of this praxis. In this sense, it can be affirmed. It
is an open question, however, how well this formula may function
within the framework of other Christian traditions and confessions,
in which the idea of taking Jesus down from the cross does not play
any significant role in spirituality or theology. It also leaves a certain
unclarity with regard to how the difference between taking down
from the cross and rising from the dead should ultimately be
understood.
[10.3] However one wishes to designate this praxis, it is a praxis of
mercy, with no reason other than the suffering of the other, and
with no other aim than the removal of the suffering of the other.
This praxis is rooted in a pre-reflexive, pre-theological heeding and
accepting the call of the suffering other, and therefore needs no theological or religious foundation. It is in this sense a purely human,
even secular praxis. Yet, since this mercy-principle is ultimately
founded in God according to the biblical revelation, God is primarily known through Gods merciful acts in history it becomes a
praxis rooted in God. As such, it may be called a theo-praxis. Since
this praxis de facto takes the shape of Jesus praxis in history the
history of Jesus shows a unique pro-existence on Jesus part, dedicating his life not only to the other, but particularly to that other
who is a victim it may also be called a praxis of following, or a
christo-praxis.88

87 See Sobrino 1991d, 437.

88 Sobrino 1991d, 70: [] as la cristologa debe comprenderse ante todo
como cristopraxis, no para anular el logos, pero s para que ste ilumine la verdad de Cristo, desde los impulsos del mismo Cristo para que la liberacn
llegue a ser realidad.

566

(11) The praxis of the crucified people or, analogically, of all followers of
Christ in solidarity with the crucified people, may be called salvific only
in the sense that it actualises in history that salvific reality which is
already and once and for all initiated by God through the coming of the
Kingdom.
[11.1] In correspondence with the distinction between salvation and
fruits and signs of salvation maintained above, the praxis of the crucified people or, analogically, of all followers of Christ in solidarity
with the crucified people, is salvific only in a derived sense. It does
not effectuate or constitute salvation, but, responding to the reality
of the Kingdom which has appeared in human history in Jesus, it
actualises in history that salvific reality.
This is a necessary clarification, in order to preclude a possible
conception of a cooperatio which effectively leaves it up to human
beings, and in particular to victims, to bring about salvation in the
ultimate sense. If this were the case, the implication would be that
salvation would be only for the strong, active, committed, etc., or
more precisely for the strong, committed, etc. among victims. To
avoid the moralisation of salvation implied in any thought of God
helping (only) the ones who help themselves, the urgency and
indispensable character of Christian praxis should be seen as reflecting that movement of praxis which is already initiated and empowered by God in Christ, and which one day will be completed by
God.
[11.2] This emphasis need not in any way render human praxis void
of theological significance. On the contrary, such praxis may be
seen as reflecting and making visible and tangible Gods salvific love
in history. It may also be seen as an actualisation of what it means to
be fully human: being able and willing to intervene actively on

567

behalf of and for the sake of the suffering other, and to enter into
community with him/her (face to face).
(12) The reality and symbol of the crucified people demands and founds
an ethics which is at the same time an ethics of proximity and an
ethics of following.
[12.1] The ethical orientation and foundation of this praxis of taking the crucified down from the cross has accordingly common
traits with that which has been called an ethics of proximity (Levinas, Dussel, and also K. E. Lgstrup). Its basis is the demand that
occurs in the face-to-face encounter with the other, particularly
with the suffering other.
[12.2] Simultaneously it is an explicitly Christian ethics in that it
finds this demand expressed and communicated in the gospel of
Gods identification with the crucified Jesus, and in that it sees in
the life of Jesus the ultimate, illuminative example of how to
respond to this demand of the suffering other. It becomes thus an
ethics of following. However, this following cannot rely on written norms, nor on a pure imitation of Jesus, but is ultimately based
only in the reality of the suffering other, in which God in Christ is
believed to be present.
(13) The reality and symbol of the crucified people makes theology as
such take on a profoundly practical and committed character; it
becomes an intellectus amoris. Theology does not necessarily become
thereby a closed discourse, however, but participates in a common quest
for truth and justice.
[13.1] Since the reality of the crucified people calls for transforming
action, i.e. praxis, theology, as reflection on this reality in the light

568

of faith in God, emerges from such praxis. When the reality and
symbol of the crucified people is reflected theologically upon in the
light of the history of Jesus, it leads to a new praxis: a merciful
praxis of following. Theology, then, becomes a markedly practical
endeavour: emerging from, reflecting on, and resulting in a liberating, healing praxis.
[13.2] Since the reality of the crucified people calls for a partisan
praxis for and with them, against everything which oppresses and
excludes them, a theological reflection on this praxis must necessarily become a committed endeavour too. Thus it gives priority to a
process of cognition which is empathic and built on the cognisant
subjects personal engagement in what is known: the object of the
process of cognition. In this sense, theology becomes an intellectus
amoris, with a clearly mystagogical orientation.
[13.3] This practical and committed character does not make theology tantamount to fideism, however. There is no need for theology
to become a closed discourse. On the contrary, because it is engaged
in historical reality, and seeks to interpret the situation of victims
and the signs of the presence of God in that reality, it may join in a
common quest for truth and justice together with all persons
regardless of their theological, philosophical or ideological presuppositions.

569

570

Postscript
Hope Against Hope:
The Resurrection of the C/crucified

Cuando la Iglesia [] est junto al crucificado y los crucificados, sabe cmo

hablar del resucitado, cmo suscitar una esperanza y cmo hacer que los cristianos vivan ya como resucitados en la historia.1

In one sense, this postscript might as well have been a foreword.

Our reflections have taken place within a circle. It is a circle from
resurrection to resurrection: from faith in the resurrection of Jesus,
the Crucified One, to hope in the resurrection of the crucified people. Yet as we have seen, Sobrino does not recommend that the resurrection be taken as a (methodological) point of departure in the
christological endeavour. Neither does he think that it is necessary
to have already developed all the implications of faith in resurrection in order to say what has been said here regarding the relationship between the crucified and the Crucified. Although it is the fact
of faith in the resurrection of Jesus which makes it possible to speak
in this way of the C/crucified, it is at the same time the memory of
the life, mission, and destiny of the One who was crucified, Jesus,
which gives concrete content to the understanding of the resurrection.2 Paradoxically enough, the more we plunge into the cross,
the more we plunge into the resurrection.3
1
2

Sobrino 1982a, 183.

Sobrino 1982a, 174. [] a travs de esa identificacin, de la narracin e
interpretacin de la vida del crucificado, se entiende de qu se trata en la resurreccin de Jess. Quien as ha vivido y quien por ello fue crucificado, ha
sido resucitado por Dios.
Sobrino 1978a, 230.

571

Accepting this point of view, I have not dealt explicitly with the
resurrection. Although I trust that the results of this study as presented in Chapter viii have proved the appropriateness of my
approach, it is obvious that an analysis of faith in the resurrection as
thorough as that which we have carried out with regard to the crucifixion would have been helpful, and would have added important
insights to what has been said. Yet such an analysis falls outside the
framework of the present study. It does so for obvious reasons of
space. But furthermore, my procedure has been justified by the fact
that I chose to approach my theme from the perspective of the concrete and historical reality of suffering and oppression crucifixion(s). That starting point inevitably drove me to the cross of
Jesus. The reality of the world as seen from the perspective of the
victims directed my quest to Jesus as the Crucified One.
However, Christian faith holds that this Crucified One was
raised by God. And it insists that the one who has risen, is none
other than the one who was crucified, Jesus from Nazareth. Without intending a complete analysis, then, I shall briefly sketch out
some basic features of what this faith in the resurrection means for
what has been said about the relationship between the crucified and
the Crucified. I shall ask what particular light faith in the resurrection sheds on the reality and symbol of the crucified peoples, and
vice versa, what this contemporary suffering implies for Christian
faith in the resurrection. This will be done first by presenting some
main traits of Sobrinos position in this matter, and then by suggesting some further developments on the basis of my own reflections
and proposals in this study.

572

[1] The Crucified People and the Resurrection of Jesus

The daily reality of crucifixions going on in human history represents in a radical sense a question about the ultimate meaning of
this history. As we have seen, Jon Sobrino finds this question echoed in the life-and-death of Jesus of Nazareth. The definitive answer
to this question is, according to Christian faith, given in the resurrection of Jesus.4 This is why it is so important to always remember
that the one who was risen is the very same human person Jesus of
Nazareth, who was condemned, excluded, and executed (cf. Acts
2:24; 3:13 ff ).5
This means that the resurrection of Jesus today should be
addressed from the perspective of the countless crosses of history. It
is necessary always to remember the crucified people in order to
ensure that Jesus resurrection be understood as a concrete and
Christian good news, and not something abstract and idealistic.6
Approaching the proclamation of the resurrection from this
perspective then, it becomes clear that the resurrection of Jesus
according to the early Christian witness is presented, not primarily
as Gods answer to the problem of death in general, but more specifically as Gods answer to the problem of the death that was
unjustly inflicted on Jesus. In this manner, resurrection is presented
4
5

Sobrino 1976, 234.

Sobrino 1982a, 173. Queremos recordar otra verdad no menos fundamental
para la fe: que el resucitado no es otro que Jess de Nazaret crucificado. No
nos mueve a ello ningn a priori dolorista, como si no pudiera haber en la fe
un momento de gozo y esperanza, ni tampoco ningun a priori dialctico que
fuese necesario conceptualmente para la reflexin teolgica. Nos mueve ms
bien una doble honradez, con los relatos del Nuevo Testamento por una
parte y con la realidad de millones de hombres y mujeres por otra.
Sobrino 1982a, 173-174: [] para que la resurreccin de Jess sea buena
noticia concreta y cristiana, y no abstracta e idealista.

573

as the triumph of justice over injustice.7 This is the good news of the
resurrection then: that at least once justice has completely triumphed over injustice, and the victim definitively triumphed over
the executioner.8
The resurrection thus becomes an expression of hope in justice
against the prevalent experience of injustice. It is not a general hope
equivalent to optimism, nor equivalent to a dialectical approach
which reckons that any progress has to pass through a negation.
Rather, it is hoping against hope (Rom. 4:18). This Sobrino sees as
a third approach, between despair and optimism.9 It is a hope
which emerges paradoxically exactly at that point were all hope
seems to be lost: at the foot of the cross(es). For this reason, the
crosses of the crucified in history represent the location from which
to proclaim Jesus resurrection today.10
The resurrection of Jesus means hope for the crucified ones of
history. Is it only their symbol of hope, in Sobrinos view? It is not
exclusively theirs, but primarily. This is another result of the scandalous partisanship of the Gospel11: just as the Kingdom belongs to
the poor, the Christian hope of resurrection is primarily a hope for
the crucified.12 And just as it is only by accepting this partisan
7

Sobrino 1982a, 174: La resurreccin de Jess es presentada ms bien como la

respuesta de Dios a la accin injusta y criminal de los hombres.
8 Sobrino 1982a, 174-175: [] la resurreccin de Jess muestra en directo e
triunfa de la justicia sobre la injusticia; no es simplemente el triunfo de la
omnipotencia de Dios, sino de la justicia de Dios, aunque para mostrar esa
justicia Dios ponga un acto de poder. La resurreccin de Jess se convierte
as en buena noticia, cuyo contenido central es que una vez y en plenitud la
justicia ha triunfado sobre la injusticia, la vctima sobre el verdugo.
9 Sobrino 1978a, 233.
10 Desde los crucificados de la historia, sin pactar con sus cruces, es desde
donde hay que anunciar la resurreccin de Jess. Sobrino 1982a, 183.
11 Sobrino 1982a, 177: [] escandalosa paradoja cristiana: la buena noticia es
para los pobres, la resurreccin es para los crucificados.

574

character of the Kingdom by entering into the world of the poor

and sharing with them that the Kingdom becomes a salvific reality
for everyone, in the same way it is necessary to participate in the
crucifixion, even if it be in an analogical manner in order to share
this Christian hope, Sobrino boldly states.13 Again: this is not to deuniversalise the Christian hope in resurrection, he insists, but rather
to point to the correct location for its universalisation.14
That the resurrection is primarily a symbol of hope for the crucified ones does not mean that it is valid in directo only for a few
people. The crucified are many; Sobrino even refers to immense
majorities of humanity. As we recall, people may partake in the
crucifixion of Jesus analogically in different ways. Seen from this
location, then, the resurrection of Jesus also becomes a critical question to all human beings: do we participate in the scandal of killing
the just one/s? Are we on the side of the crucified or the crucifiers?15
It is, in other words, communion with the life and destiny of
Jesus seguimiento which makes one participate in the hope of
resurrection. And furthermore, in this communion, the resurrection
is not merely a future hope, but even a present reality. Whoever
follows Jesus in this manner, does already participate in his resurrec-

12 Sobrino 1982a, 176. (L)a resurreccin es esperanza en primer lugar para los
crucificados. Dios resucit a un crucificado, y desde entonces hay esperanza
para los crucificados de la historia.
13 Sobrino 1982a, 177. Hay que participar, pues, de la crucifixin, aunque sea
analgicamente, para que exista una esperanza cristiana.
14 Sobrino 1982a, 176-177. La correlacin entre resurreccin y crucificados,
anloga a la correlacin entre reino de Dios y pobres, que predic Jess, no
significa desuniversalizar la esperanza de todos los hombres, sino encontrar el
lugar correcto de su universalizacin.
15 Sobrino 1982a, 175 La pregunta que lanza la resurreccin es si participamos
nosotros tambin en el escndalo de dar muerte al justo, si estamos del lado
de los que asesinan o del lado de Dios que le da vida.

575

tion. Living as resurrected in history, the follower of Jesus has

hope in the midst of darkness and suffering: hope against hope.
Because Jesus was raised from the dead and already is the Lord
of history, his followers participate in his lordship. But, as already
emphasised, it is of utmost importance to remember that the risen
Lord is none other than the crucified One. Thus, participating in
the lordship of the Risen Christ means following/continuing the
praxis of the historical Jesus for the Kingdom of God:
The believer is lord of history in toil for the establishment of that kingdom,
in the struggle for justice and for the integral liberation, in the transformation of unjust structures into other, more human and humane ones.16

The follower of Jesus participates in Jesus lordship. And, at the

same time, the fact that there are followers, shows that Jesus is Lord.
Christs actual lordship is shown in the fact that there are new
human beings, and these are the ones who make real in actu the
fact that Jesus already is the Lord.17 This present lordship in which
Jesus followers participate is not, in Sobrinos mind, an escape from
the world (a misconception which can be seen in the charismatic
movement), nor is it something which, so to speak, places Jesus followers on top of the world (as is sometimes implied in ecclesiastical authoritarianism and triumphalism). The Christian paradox
implies that to be lord means to serve, in precisely the way the
Lord Jesus served. 18
16 Sobrino 1982b, 155-156. / Sobrino 1982a, 181: El creyente es seor de la historia en el trabajo por la instauracin de ese reino, en la lucha por la justicia y
por la liberacin integral, en la tranformacin de estructuras injustas en otras
ms humanas.
17 Sobrino 1982a, 179. Ms an, existe una correlacin entre ambas novedades:
el seoro actual de Jess se muestra en que existan los hombres nuevos, y
stos son los que hacen realidad in actu el que Jess sea ya ahora Seor.
18 Sobrino 1982a, 180.

576

Yet to follow Jesus in service to the world, particularly to the

victims of the world, is something to which we are summoned
already, prior to a direct treatment of the resurrection. Does the resurrection add anything new to the understanding of Christian existence and mission in history? Concerning the content of this service,
the answer to this question is negative, according to Sobrino. The
mission the call to follow Jesus and become sons and daughters
of God in history by celebrating and responding to the nearness of
the Kingdom remains the same. However, the resurrection adds
two new modalities to this mission: freedom and joy.19
Counting on the presence of the Resurrected One, the followers
of Jesus may experience freedom in the midst of slavery and oppression. There is no longer any need to be paralysed by the terrifying
presence of the powers of sin and evil, because Jesus, whose victory
over these forces was confirmed in the resurrection, is present with
his Spirit. And wherever the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom (2
Cor 3:17).20
Last but not least, the resurrection adds a profound sense of joy
to Christian existence in a crucified reality. Even when faced with
and crushed by the crucifying forces, there is now good reason for
the crucified people, and for all who those who join them in solidarity, to celebrate and rejoice. This joy is generated by the certainty
of the presence of the Risen One. And in this joy, the Risen One
makes himself present.
In sum, what light does the reality and symbol of the crucified
people shed on the resurrection of Jesus? Basically, that the resurrection first and foremost is a symbol of hope in the triumph of an
ultimate justice and restoration of the rights and dignity a vindi19 Sobrino 1982a, 181.
20 For creative analyses of freedom, evil and human dignity in a European context, drawing on insights also from Latin American liberation theology, see
Hafstad 1993.

577

cation for the victims of history, in spite of all evidence to the

contrary (hope against hope). Through this, and only through
this, it becomes a universal symbol of hope. And what can we know
of the crucified people from the perspective of the resurrection of
Jesus? That they may celebrate freedom and rejoice even in the
midst of historical bondage and tragedy, because the Risen One is
present among them, empowering their struggle and ensuring their
victory. Therefore, ultimately, there is a close connection between
the praxis of the Kingdom and joyful celebration of its presence in
Latin American terms: lucha and fiesta belong together.21

21 Although la lucha clearly may have belligerent connotations (like the struggle in English) the term is wider, implying all sorts of hard, day-to-day work
for bread and survival. It is in this wider sense I use it here. The dimension
of fiesta and celebration such a central feature of Latin culture has come
more to the fore in Latin American theology during the last years. Cf.
Taborda 1987, and Assmann 1996, (see particular his conclusion: [] hay
toda una vasta gama de vivencias del placer de la vida cotidiana que tampoco
han tenido mucho espacio en las elucubraciones teolgicas.). Sobrino frequently reflects on the experience of joy in the midst of hardships: No es lo
mismo adorar, rezar, obedecer a Cristo y rendirle culto y nada digamos de
organizar cruzadas para seguir su santa voluntad que sentir el gozo en el
Dios que se ha manifestado en l [] Dicho en lenguaje ms conceptual, a
la doble perspectiva de ortodoxia en nuestra relacin con Jesucristo, queremos aadir una tercera que, a falta de mejor expresin, pudiramos llamar
ortopathos, es decir, el modo correcto de afectarnos por la realidad de Cristo.
Y en ese afectarse debe estar centralmente presente el gozo que causa el que el
Cristo es Jess de Nazaret y no otro [] As como el creyente ha de aceptar
su verdad y proseguir su praxis para corresponder a su realidad, as al Cristo
que es buena noticia se le corresponde con gozo. Sobrino 1993e; cf. Sobrino
1993g, 368-369.

578

[2] Claiming the Victims Victory

Reflecting further along the lines of Sobrinos liberation christology,
I have suggested that Jesus can be seen as the Victorious Victim,
and that theology faced with the sufferings of our time should take
on a victimological orientation. Proclaiming the resurrection of
Jesus in this connection may be seen as a way of claiming the victims victory.
In the eschatological event of the resurrection faith finds confirmation of what could only be seen sub contrario at the foot of the
cross: that the victim Jesus won victory. Gods powerful act of raising the dead Jesus is not the moment of his victory; it is the affirmation of his victory. The resurrection reveals what was already a fact
on the cross: that Jesus triumphed over the death-bringing forces
because he never gave in to them, never accepted their deadly logic
of power, never accepted wealth, power, or outward piety and honour in preference to communion with the true God of life and with
those particularly beloved by this God: the poor and outcast. The
victory of Jesus the Victim showed itself in that he was faithful in
his loving pro-existence for others God and the poor to the very
end. This victory breaks the deadly logic of the powers of evil once
and for all. A way is opened up for the victory of all victims of history. Since God has affirmed the victory of Jesus, the eschatological
victory of all victims is certain, and may be celebrated already.
It is important to stress that the victimological orientation of
this interpretation does not imply an idealising of the life-situations
of victims. Nor is it an attempt to portray them as saints. The victimising powers are so destructive that they frequently even make
the victims themselves part of the very logic and structures which
hold them down. Or, it may drive them into new relationships in
which they themselves make others victims. Theology with a victimological orientation should always be attentive to the dangers of

579

either idealising victims and thereby de facto playing into the hands
of their offenders by helping to make the victims content with their
lot, and passively resigned, or excusing all victims and thereby
adopting a naive and simplistic approach to the analysis of the patterns of human interaction, thus in fact becoming blind to the radical nature of evil.
Proclaiming faith in the resurrection as a way of claiming the
victims victory can help to prevent these dangers. By pointing to
the resurrection as a future promise, it can promote a hope and a joy
which can free the victims from the bondage that their present situation represents, and from the despair and fear that this situation
causes in them. By pointing to the resurrection as present reality,
through the empowering presence in their midst of the Crucified
and Risen One, the Victorious Victim, it can restore their dignity
and affirm their hope even now, and not only in view of a (possibly)
distant future. By pointing to the fact that the One who was raised
from the dead is none other than Jesus, it can summon all victims
and all others who join them in solidarity and service to follow
the example of him who did not give in to the powers that create
victims, but remained faithful to the life-restoring reality of the
Kingdom of God and the salvific presence of the God of the Kingdom.
Thereby, at best, the victims self-esteem may be restored and
their passivity broken. Thus they may also be set free to testify to
Gods salvation and make it visible and tangible in history. The victims, the crucified people, may share salvation with the world, contrary to everything that would and could be expected of them.

580

[3] End of the Millennium The End of History?

We are at the end of the millennium. It is perhaps not surprising,
then, that we also hear proclamations of the End of History precisely in these times. Fukuyamas confident celebration of Western
liberalism and capitalism as the ultimate and eternal solution for
humankind may be read as another example of a realised eschatology: the end has come, and is now. Rejoice!22 Yet Fukuyama and
those who agree with him do not seem to be aware of the presence
and reality of the many victims caused by the very system that they
are cheering. At least, they do not seem to be willing nor able to
take the lot of these victims with utter seriousness.
The times of Jesus too were times highly charged with realised
eschatologies.23 Although recent Jesus-research has questioned the
profoundly eschatological orientation of the second quest24, there
is little doubt that there was a general eschatological spirit prevalent
in Jesus days. Strongest among these realised eschatologies was
clearly that of the Roman Empire. Well aware of the prophetic
eschatologies with roots in both Jewish apocalypticism and Hellenistic utopian concepts which dominated the Roman world, the
Emperor Augustus consciously announced his new order of peace
as their fulfilment.25 That this new order, this new age of peace
and well-being, was proclaimed as true and ultimate good news, is
evident in the following quotation from the inscription of Priene
(from year 9 BCE):
Because providence that has ordered our life in a divine way [] and since
the Caesar through his appearance (epifaneis) has exceeded the hopes of all
22
23
24
25

Fukuyama 1992. Cf. Introduction above.

See Koester 1992.
See Patterson 1995.
Koester 1992, 11.

581

former good messages (euangelia), surpassing not only the benefactors who
came before him, but also leaving no hope that anyone in the future would surpass him, and since for the world the birthday of the god was the beginning
of his good messages (euangelion), [may it therefore be decided that] []26

This Roman imperial eschatology was presented as the fulfilment of

prophecy, announcing a new order which was to include the earth
as well as the heavens, and all nations of the world under the protection of the Roman Empire. And not least, the new age had a saviour
figure, the greatest benefactor of all times, the divi filius usually
translated into Greek as huios tou theou Son of God the victorious Augustus.27
This was the new world order which executed Jesus. Whatever
the degree of complicity by leading members of the Jewish religious
community at the time, Jesus death was the direct consequence of a
political decision of the Roman authorities. The inscription on the
cross Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews (John 19:9; cf Mark 15:26
par.) makes this confrontation between Jesus and the Roman
Empire explicit. Since he was perceived as a threat to the pax
romana, Jesus fell victim to it.
Yet within a short time-span, Jesus followers bravely spread the
message throughout the Empire that this Jesus who was the victim
of the Romans, had been vindicated by God. He had been raised
from the dead. The Early Christian preaching is thus formulated in
direct confrontation with the prevalent realised eschatology of the
Roman Empire. (I)n every instance Jesus followers believed that
the new world and the new age had arrived, or could be obtained,
through the one who was rejected, who suffered, who did not find a
home in this world, and who had been put to death.28 The true
Son of God was not Augustus the Emperor, but Jesus the Victim.
26 Quoted from Koester, op. cit., 12, emphasis added.
27 Op. cit., 13.
28 Ibid.

582

And since this Jesus had become victorious, it implied that there
was a future surpassing the present age good news to its victims!
even a future that was radically different. For if it was the victim
Jesus who had been proved victorious, then the values and the system that had made him a victim were proved wrong and invalid.
This perspective certainly brings out the anti-authoritarian, revolutionary character of the early Christian preaching. Likewise, it
lays bare its profound victimological orientation. It is tempting to
draw a parallel to our own times here. We hear the joyful proclamations of the End of History and a New World Order, while the
number of people expelled and exploited by this Order continues to
grow. Instead of pax romana, the world community gives clearer
and clearer signs of being subject to a pax americana.29 However far
one might wish to go in exploiting this parallelism (and perhaps it
should not be pressed too far), at least this much is clear: that
choosing the perspective of victims, making the reality and symbol
of the crucified people central in Christian theology particularly at
the turn of the millennium, is in accordance with the core and origin of the Christian gospel.

29 We are the one indispensable nation on earth. President Bill Clinton, in

his Inaugural Speech during the Election Campaign, Autumn 1996.

583

584

Afterword
The Reality of Continuing Crucifixion
in a Globalised Age

Crucifixion continues to be an almost everyday experience to too

many Latin Americans. It may take on different forms from the
sudden, violent deaths of innocents, to the gradual but nonetheless
deadly processes of social exclusion caused by neo-liberalist globalisation:
On the 22nd of December 1997, in the small indigenous village
of Acteal, in Chiapas, Mexico, 45 people were massacred as they
were gathered in the local Chapel in a vigil for peace. 21 women, 14
children, 19 men and a newborn baby, all of them members of the
local community organization Las Abejas, were murdered in cold
blood by a government-related paramilitary group from nearby villages. One of the survivors expressed words of pain, but also of faith
and commitment, in the midst of tragedy:
We will never forget the blood of our sisters and brothers; even if they continue to kill us, we shall not be silenced because our sisters and brothers continue to walk side by side with the God of life. We will never forget this pain.
This painful Christmas. We will never forget our fallen sisters and brothers
because God is the one who suffers with the poor and with those who struggle for the good of their people.1

In La Quiaca, in the far north of Argentina, mid January 2002, a

group of 11 unemployed persons and a local parish priest let themselves be symbolically crucified, in a previously unheard of protest
in demand of employment. Five men, six women, and the parish
1

Durn & Boldrini, 1998, 53, my translation.

585

priest, Jess Olmedo, tied themselves on to several telephone and

electricity posts with chains and ropes. The crucifixion is symbolical and real, because it is the cross of every day hunger, injustice,
and pain, Olmedo commented. This is a horrible situation.2
Between October 2000 and 2001 the amount of Argentineans living
below the poverty line increased by 1,4 million.3 Argentina is just
one case, albeit more evident than many others, of how neo-liberalist globalisation excludes and sacrifices or in the words of the parish priest, crucifies millions and millions of people in the name of
the free market.
Today, it is particularly evident that a truly liberating theology
must respond to the negative impact of this neo-liberalist globalisation. Globalisation has not invalidated rather sharpened the
basic issues that led to the development of liberation theology in
general and Sobrinos christology in particular; issues of justice and
a life of dignity for the oppressed and excluded masses. In this sense,
globalisation signifies more of the same to the worlds poor. Yet
there is at least one aspect which is unique to this situation, and
which therefore merits reflection. It deals with space and time.
Like Latin American liberation theology in general, Jon
Sobrinos approach stresses the unity of history. God acts in this history. Salvation history is not another history, above or beyond this
concrete human history in which we live and love, suffer and struggle, cry and celebrate. In the present age of globalisation it seems to
me of particular importance to draw attention to the spatial (rather
than to the temporal) aspect of this negation of a traditional theological thinking that operates in two spheres, levels or rooms.
It is often claimed that in the globalised age something has happened to time and space. The technological revolution, particularly
within telecommunication and computerization, has led to the
2
3

586

La Nacin, San Jos, 17.01.02., p 17A: Tensin en Argentina en aumento.

According to figures provided by La Nacin, San Jos, 21.02.02.

compression of both time and space. We have seen a tremendous

acceleration, through the reduction of the time it takes to travel distances in space. In this sense it has been claimed that the present situation represents not only the End of History (F. Fukuyama), but
even more so the End of Geography (P. Virilio4). What used to be
of utmost political significance, such as borders, geographical distances, territories, topography etc. on the one hand, and long-term
processes of development, planning and progress on the other hand,
seem to have lost much of their importance in our cybernetic
present. In the propagandistic and quasi-mythological version of
globalisation as freedom and global unification, this is presented as
the potential availability of everything to everyone right here and
right now. We all live in a global village. But the reality clearly is
different.
The present globalisation divides more than it unites. The idea
of a global village is but an illusive harmonization. The actual state
of affairs, rather, is one that benefits a small global elite. While globalisation spells unlimited mobility and independence of space and
time to some, it actually means forced localisation and limited
movement to many others. As pointed out by Zygmunt Baumann,
mobility has become the most powerful and most coveted stratifying factor in the contemporary world.5 Consequently, being local
in a globalised world has become a sign of social deprivation and
humiliation.6
For the first world, the world of the globally mobile, the space has lost its
constraining quality and is easily traversed in both its real and virtual
renditions. For the second world, the world of the locally tied, of those
barred from moving and thus forced to bear passively whatever change may
be visited on locality they are tied to, the real space is fast closing up. 7
4
5
6

Virilio, 1997.
Baumann, 1998, 9.
Baumann, 1998, 2.

587

For those who are not free to leave, those who do not possess the
means to buy themselves out of local dependency, the situation is
increasingly difficult. Through privatization, flexibilisation of
labour and technocratisation of politics, these people lose ever more
of the influence they may have had on the living conditions in their
local place a place at which they are now condemned to remain.
Or rather, they are condemned to remain in their place, forbidden
to cross borders and yet they must move, out of desperate need.
Ours is also a time of migration. When the locally tied move, they
are obligated to take great risks. Many do not reach their destination alive. And those who do are often arrested and returned by
force upon arrival.
It is faced with this new challenge the free, unrestricted
mobility of the few, and the local captivity or forced migration of
the many that I think it is fruitful to reconsider one important
aspect of liberation theologys claim of one history. What this
claim implies, is not merely that salvation takes place now, and not
primarely in Gods future; but furthermore that salvation takes
place here, not in another place, in the beyond, in heaven nor in
the virtual wonderworld of cyberspace. Jon Sobrinos strong emphasis on the locus theologicus, the theological place or location, thus
gains a particular relevance in relation to the forces of globalisation.
The theological place is both the apt place for theological perception and interpretation, and the place in which Gods saving power
is at work. God liberates concrete places, spaces, and human communities the very places that to the globalised elite have become
insignificant, but to the excluded majorities signify social deprivation and humiliation.
This approach calls for a much more critical awareness of the
deep interdependence between humanity and nature, an aspect that
liberation theology has been rather slow to address. The theological
7

588

Baumann, 1998, 88.

place is also a concrete geographical, topographical, ecological place

in which humans live with, in and from nature. Attention should
therefore be drawn to the ways in which the forces of globalisation
crucify places places that give life to human beings, places that are
filled with the life of nature. In keeping with Ellacura and Sobrino,
the fact that salvation history means salvation in history could
today also be expressed in terms of salvation in and of local space.
Finally, if in a globalised age mobility represents the very factor
that divides the world and excludes people, condemning them to a
life in poverty, the theological perspective presented in this book
fosters a different kind of mobility. Jon Sobrino underscores that
Christianity is a religin del caminar. Christian identity is about
travelling. The gospels portray Jesus constantly on the move. He
calls his disciples to leave behind their hometown and all its ties,
and follow him, i.e. wander about with him. The first Christians
were called followers of the Way. And yet, travelling as a governing
metaphor in the Christian universe is neither about being on the
run, nor wandering about freely without any particular purpose.
There is a particular point of departure, and the wanderers are
heading towards a point of arrival. The past is related to the future
through our present travelling. Christian travelling is a pilgrimage.
The pilgrimage is a venture into the world, with a purpose. It is a
mission, in a sense, from God to the world, with the purpose of diakonia, marturia and koinonia - service, witness, and communion.
Only in this sense, by being a venture into the world with the goal
of bringing good news and bringing about good realities, transformation, is it a pilgrimage to God.
Retrieving this characteristic of Jesus as being a way to follow,
and of Christian identity as a following of Jesus, a pilgrimage and a
mission is, I suggest, an act of resistance in a globalised world. It
offers an alternative kind of mobility, which moves towards an alternative kind of globalisation, that of koinonia, or oikoumene.

589

Since the writing of the manuscript for this book, Jon Sobrino
has published another important work in Christology, La Fe en Jesucristo. Ensayo desde las victimas (1999). The main focus of my book
the crucified in history, the crucified people is given the most
thorough treatment by Sobrino in Jesucristo liberador. In La Fe en
Jesucristo Sobrino does not present significant changes or modifications to this theme. Yet the theme is further developed. Whereas in
Jesucristo liberador Sobrino develops the theme of the crucified people, in Fe en Jesucristo he asks the question of what realistic hope
these people may have of becoming a resurrected people.8 This
close interconnection between the crucified people and a (possibly)
resurrected people is explored in several aspects. Most notably,
Sobrino boldly puts forward the possibility of being resucitadores.
This is not a question of actually repeating in history what God did
to Jesus in the unique event of the resurrection. It is rather the possibility, within the analogical consciousness of similarity-in-difference, to give signs (Gr.: semeia) of the reality of the resurrection
through a committed service to and with the victims, a service that
is imbued with a certain power (Gr.: dynamis)9. Such resurrectionpraxis will always have a sense of impossibility attached to it; it is
working against all odds for the restoration of the justice and dignity of the victims in history.10
I believe that it is this possible impossibility that continues to
make the cross of Jesus a sign and source of hope in our time. In the
midst of the struggle, in the graceful following of Jesus, we may
Sobrino, 1999, 32: [] qu esperanza y con qu realismo tiene un pueblo crucificado de ser tambin un pueblo resucitado; []
9 Sobrino, 1999, 93: Se trata de analoga, obviamente, pues no podemos pretender llevar a cabo una praxis que reproduzca el acontecimiento escatolgico de la resurreccin de Jess, aunque s podemos como lo haca Jess en
su anuncio del reino poner semeia (signos), a travs de una determinada
dynamis (fuerza).
10 Ibid.
8

590

experience life as resurrection in history in local space and

present time.11

11 Sobrino, 1999, 150.

591

592

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Selected index of names

A
Abelard 375
Altizer 440
Anselm 104, 375, 378, 421, 422,
526
Aquinas 256, 460
Aristotle 214, 319, 323, 454
Aron 325
Assmann 34, 75, 79, 188, 189,
190, 194, 215, 300, 421, 461,
501, 502, 557, 578, 593, 594
Augustine 104, 170, 273, 399
Auln 295, 374, 375, 410, 411,
413, 414, 418, 427, 594
B
Balthasar 474
Barth 379, 456, 555, 607
Batstone 188, 255, 269, 469, 594
Baumann 587, 588
Bedford 24, 118, 154, 166, 172,
173, 204, 211, 402, 555, 594
Berkhof 21, 48, 594
Boff 27, 34, 57, 79, 80, 114, 119,
125, 132, 188, 189, 191, 220,
297, 335, 382, 383, 388, 421,
429, 446, 447, 448, 449,
451, 452, 460, 469, 471,

474, 480, 487, 490, 595,

596, 598, 614, 621, 625
Boismard 290
Bonhoeffer 96, 138, 394, 430,
437, 438, 439, 440, 441,
442, 448, 451, 456, 484,
490, 596, 600
Bonino 38, 79, 81, 188, 447,
593, 596, 614, 624
Borg 197, 201, 596
Bornkamm 197
Bravo 240, 597
Brown 362, 597
Bultmann 196, 318, 347, 348,
597
Bush 19
C
Casaldliga 16
Castaeda 30, 31, 32, 500, 516,
597
Chow 34, 203, 204, 205, 206,
207, 214, 277, 597
Clarke 265
Clement of Alexandria 98
Clinton 583
Columbus 180, 181, 182
Comblin 21, 28, 34, 70, 430,
627

502, 504, 597, 598, 604,

605
Corts 179, 182
Croatto 288, 314, 327, 328, 329,
330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335,
336, 337, 338, 340, 346, 357,
364, 365, 419, 496, 518, 598,
599
Crossan 197, 201, 220, 355, 362,
363, 599
D
Dahl 196, 197, 220, 238, 599
Dass 369
Depuis 203, 599
Descartes 68, 438
Dilthey 320
Donovan 265
Duquoc 26, 34, 118, 119, 120,
600
Dussel 21, 66, 80, 84, 114, 116,
132, 306, 526, 568, 600, 601
E
Ellacura 21, 23, 28, 39, 42, 43,
44, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53,
54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62,
63, 64, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74,
75, 77, 78, 79, 84, 85, 86,
87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94,
96, 102, 105, 106, 108, 110,
111, 112, 115, 116, 117, 118,

628

119, 120, 123, 127, 131, 133,

134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139,
140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145,
146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151,
152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 163,
164, 165, 167, 168, 173, 174,
175, 176, 177, 200, 210, 211,
223, 224, 227, 230, 231, 233,
255, 274, 286, 293, 296,
306, 311, 312, 343, 344, 345,
362, 370, 378, 383, 486, 516,
521, 522, 536, 537, 554, 556,
557, 559, 595, 599, 600, 601,
602, 603, 605, 606, 610,
611, 615, 618, 620, 622
F
Fanon 68
Farley 17, 18, 450, 452, 455, 519,
603
Feuerbach 77, 439
Fichte 439
Ford 265, 274
Freire 82, 563, 604
Freud 68, 439
Frye 323
Fukuyama 19, 502, 581, 587,
604
G
Gadamer 320, 321, 331
Garretn 30, 34, 515, 604

Girard 423, 557, 593, 604

Gmez 42, 503, 605
Gonzlez 48, 87, 88, 223, 448,
480, 605
Gonzlez Faus 34, 70, 86, 108,
125, 242, 257, 344, 383, 510,
598, 604, 605
Gorostiaga 20, 29, 504, 605
Gregory the Wonderworker
432
Grey 261, 606
Grovijahn 265, 606
Gunton 319, 367, 375, 400,
407, 418, 419, 420, 421,
427, 606
Gutirrez 16, 34, 46, 51, 57, 64,
65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 77,
79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 87,
96, 100, 105, 114, 116, 128,
132, 133, 137, 138, 167, 168,
183, 186, 211, 230, 232, 253,
266, 442, 501, 521, 598,
606, 607, 611, 620
H
Habermas 320, 321
Hafstad 555, 577, 607
Haight 495, 506, 607
Hamilton 440
Harnack 431
Harrison 262, 266, 461, 607
Hegel 68, 84, 88, 306, 438, 457,

464
Hempel 325, 326
Higgins and Letson 112
Hinkelammert 75, 132, 503,
608
Horsley 197
I
Iparraguirre 105, 106, 608
J
Jeanrond 320, 321, 322, 326,
327, 365, 545, 596, 608
Jeremias 197, 199, 208, 210,
230, 246, 247, 248, 249,
251, 608
John Chrysostom 98
Johnson 154, 265, 361, 362, 437,
449, 450, 451, 452, 455, 483,
485, 490, 519, 608
Jones 214, 279, 608
Jngel 169, 170, 171, 172, 173,
175, 176, 275, 353, 389, 399,
400, 402, 433, 439, 440,
441, 453, 454, 455, 456, 467,
490, 522, 532, 609
K
Khler 196
Kant 77, 438
Ksemann 196, 199, 210, 235
Kazel 265

629

Kierkegaard 350
King Ferdinand 181
Kliksberg 499
L
Las Casas 132, 133, 186, 190,
607
Leer-Salvesen 564, 610
Lon-Dufour 383
Lessing 196, 373
Lvinas 83, 526
Libnio 34, 112
Lgstrup 83, 568
Lnning 374, 389, 441, 611
Lwy 306, 611
Loyola 95, 96, 98, 106, 110, 112,
608, 615
Luther 170, 223, 350, 379, 399,
411, 414, 433, 434, 435, 437,
438, 440, 442, 443, 445,
473, 490, 533, 542, 562, 565,
610
Luther King 274
M
Mack 197
MacIntyre 213, 611
Macquarrie 47, 161, 167, 188,
224, 279, 373, 399, 444, 611
Maier 24, 44, 118, 344, 611
Marcel 315, 618
Marcuse 68

630

Mardones 134, 135, 611

Mariz 310, 502, 611
Mrquez 29
Marrou 325
Martin 32, 416, 611
Marx 26, 28, 58, 68, 77, 88, 105,
113, 117, 143, 205, 206, 260,
288, 306, 311, 439, 600
McFague 25, 221, 222, 406,
407, 408, 462, 612
McGovern 26, 28, 34, 79, 89,
207, 208, 612
McIntyre 375, 410, 411, 612
Meier 197, 201, 207, 208, 363,
612
Melanchthon 374
Mesters 132, 199, 612
Metz 16, 96, 213, 456, 457, 458,
459, 469, 470, 471, 490,
520, 561, 612, 613
Miranda 463
Moltmann 16, 17, 24, 36, 96,
105, 118, 120, 128, 129, 150,
161, 171, 201, 222, 227, 266,
295, 343, 345, 354, 367, 370,
371, 379, 383, 399, 430, 433,
434, 435, 438, 440, 441,
442, 443, 444, 445, 446,
447, 448, 449, 451, 456,
458, 460, 464, 465, 466,
468, 469, 472, 473, 474,
479, 480, 485, 490, 491,

522, 613, 614, 618, 623

Montenegro 304
Montesinos 183
N
Negre Rigol 188, 614
Nietzsche 88, 439, 490
O
Oliveira 513, 514, 515, 615
Oliveros 42, 66, 614
P
Pannenberg 128, 184, 193, 465,
522, 615, 618
Patriarch Philaret of Moscow
444
Philo of Alexandria 432
Pilate 219, 358, 359, 361, 362
Pinochet 179
Placher 249, 615
Poma 188, 190
Prebisch 65, 66
Proao 342
Q
Queen Isabella 181, 183
R
Rahner 47, 48, 90, 98, 99, 105,
106, 107, 108, 109, 112, 121,
137, 149, 161, 224, 285, 311,

344, 345, 465, 601, 603, 611,

615, 617, 619
Randles 432
Ranke 195
Ratzinger 26, 28, 89, 116, 117,
306, 615
Reagan 28, 308
Reimarus 196, 198
Richard 34, 66, 197, 296, 616
Ricoeur 213, 214, 288, 314, 315,
316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321,
322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327,
328, 329, 330, 333, 338, 340,
346, 357, 364, 365, 366, 369,
406, 407, 419, 424, 425,
426, 450, 496, 518, 519, 520,
609, 616, 624
Romero 15, 18, 39, 42, 43, 73,
131, 152, 154, 173, 274, 296,
342, 451, 465, 483, 510, 515,
537, 597, 602, 616, 619, 620
S
Sanders 197, 205, 206, 208
Sarot 432, 435, 436, 442, 460,
461, 462, 490, 491, 617
Schillebeeckx 23, 197, 199, 207,
228, 383, 617
Schleiermacher 320, 323, 374,
438
Schssler Fiorenza 260, 263,
266, 267, 472, 617

631

Schwager 309, 617

Schweitzer 196
Segundo 26, 43, 79, 81, 100,
112, 114, 188, 207, 208, 295,
298, 617, 618, 622
Socrates 93
Slle 430, 445, 446, 447, 449,
469, 471, 490, 623
Spinoza 432
Stoll 32, 416, 622
Strobel 267
T
Tertullian 209, 433
Tillich 495, 624
Trible 452
Trinidad 181, 182, 184, 185, 187,
190, 624

632

V
Vaage 199, 625
Verms 241, 248, 625
Viano 301, 302, 303, 625
Virilio 587
W
Weber 306
Weiss 196
Wertham 301
Whitehead 430, 437
Widmann 235, 623, 626
Williamson 208, 209, 210, 626
Wrede 196, 255
Z
Zubiri 47, 48, 84, 88, 105, 108,
137, 200, 223, 311, 522, 601,
605, 606, 626

STUDIEN ZUR INTERKULTURELLEN GESCHICHTE DES CHRISTENTUMS

ETUDES DHISTOIRE INTERCULTURELLE DU CHRISTIANISME
STUDIES INTHE INTERCULTURAL HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY
Begrndet von / fond par / founded by
Walter J. Hollenweger und / et / and Hans Jochen Margull
Herausgegeben von / edit par / edited by
Richard Friedli
Universit de Fribourg

Jan A.B. Jongeneel

Universiteit Utrecht

Theo Sundermeier
Universitt Heidelberg

Klaus Koschorke
Universitt Mnchen

Werner Ustorf
University of Birmingham

Band

1 Wolfram Weie: Sdafrika und das Antirassismusprogramm. Kirchen im Spannungsfeld

einer Rassengesellschaft.

Band

2 Ingo Lembke: Christentum unter den Bedingungen Lateinamerikas. Die katholische Kirche
vor den Problemen der Abhngigkeit und Unterentwicklung.

Band

3 Gerd U. Kliewer: Das neue Volk der Pfingstler. Religion, Unterentwicklung und sozialer Wandel
in Lateinamerika.

Band

4 Joachim Wietzke: Theologie im modernen Indien Paul David Devanandan.

Band

5 Werner Ustorf: Afrikanische Initiative. Das aktive Leiden des Propheten Simon Kimbangu.

Band

6 Erhard Kamphausen: Anfnge der kirchlichen Unabhngigkeitsbewegung in Sdafrika.

Geschichte und Theologie der thiopischen Bewegung. 18801910.

Band

7 Lothar Engel: Kolonialismus und Nationalismus im deutschen Protestantismus in Namibia

19071945. Beitrge zur Geschichte der deutschen evangelischen Mission und Kirche im
ehemaligen Kolonial- und Mandatsgebiet Sdwestafrika.

Band

8 Pamela M. Binyon: The Concepts of Spirit and Demon. A Study in the use of different
languages describing the same phenomena.

Band

9 Neville Richardson: The World Council of Churches and Race Relations. 1960 to 1969.

Band 10 Jrg Mller: Uppsala II. Erneuerung in der Mission. Eine redaktionsgeschichtliche Studie
und Dokumentation zu Sektion II der 4. Vollversammlung des kumenischen Rates der
Kirchen, Uppsala 1968.
Band 11 Hans Schpfer: Theologie und Gesellschaft. Interdisziplinre Grundlagenbibliographie
zur Einfhrung in die befreiungs- und polittheologische Problematik: 19601975.
Band 12 Werner Hoerschelmann: Christliche Gurus. Darstellung von Selbstverstndnis und Funktion indigenen Christseins durch unabhngige charismatisch gefhrte Gruppen in Sdindien.
Band 13 Claude Schaller: LEglise en qute de dialogue. Vergriffen.
Band 14 Theo Tschuy: Hundert Jahre kubanischer Protestantismus (18681961). Versuch einer
kirchengeschichtlichen Darstellung.
Band 15 Werner Korte: Wir sind die Kirchen der unteren Klassen. Entstehung, Organisation und
gesellschaftliche Funktionen unabhngiger Kirchen in Afrika.
Band 16 Amold Bittlinger: Papst und Pfingstler. Der rmisch katholisch-pfingstlerische Dialog und
seine kumenische Relevanz.
Band 17 Ingemar Lindn: The Last Trump. An historico-genetical study of some important chapters
in the making and development of the Seventh-day Adventist Church.

Band 18 Zwinglio Dias: Krisen und Aufgaben im brasilianischen Protestantismus. Eine Studie zu den
sozialgeschichtlichen Bedingungen und volkspdagogischen Mglichkeiten der Evangelisation.
Band 19 Mary Hall: A quest for the liberated Christian. Examined on the basis of a mission, a man
and a movement as agents of liberation.
Band 20 Arturo Blatezky: Sprache des Glaubens in Lateinamerika. Eine Studie zu Selbstverstndnis
und Methode der Theologie der Befreiung.
Band 21 Anthony Mookenthottam: Indian Theological Tendencies. Approaches and problems for
further research as seen in the works of some leading Indian theologicans.
Band 22 George Thomas: Christian Indians and Indian Nationalism 18851950. An Interpretation in
Historical and Theological Perspectives.
Band 23 Essiben Madiba: Evanglisation et Colonisation en Afrique: LHritage scolaire du Cameroun
(18851965).
Band 24 Katsumi Takizawa: Reflexionen ber die universale Grundlage von Buddhismus und Christentum.
Band 25 S.W. Sykes (ed.): England and Germany. Studies in theological diplomacy.
Band 26 James Haire:The Character andTheological Struggle of the Church in Halmahera, Indonesia,
19411979.
Band 27 David Ford: Barth and Gods Story. Biblical Narrative and theTheological Method of Karl Barth
in the Church Dogmatics.
Band 28 Kortright Davis: Mission for Carribean Change. Carribean Development As Theological
Enterprise.
Band 29 Origen V. Jathanna:The Decisiveness of the Christ-Event and the Universality of Christianity
in a world of Religious Plurality. With Special Reference to Hendrik Kraemer and Alfred George
Hogg as well as to William Ernest Hocking and Pandipeddi Chenchiah.
Band 30 Joyce V. Thurman: New Wineskins. A Study of the House Church Movement.
Band 31 John May: Meaning, Consensus and Dialogue in Buddhist-Christian-Communication.
A study in the Construction of Meaning.
Band 32 Friedhelm Voges: Das Denken von Thomas Chalmers im kirchen- und sozialgeschichtlichen
Kontext.
Band 33 George MacDonald Mulrain: Theology in Folk Culture. The Theological Significance of
Haitian Folk Religion.
Band 34 Alan Ford: The Protestant Reformation in Ireland, 15901641. 2. unvernderte Auflage.
Band 35 Harold Tonks: Faith, Hope and Decision-Making. The Kingdom of God and Social PolicyMaking. The Work of Arthur Rich of Zrich.
Band 36 Bingham Tembe: Integrationismus und Afrikanismus. Zur Rolle der kirchlichen Unabhn-gigkeitsbewegung in der Auseinandersetzung um die Landfrage und die Bildung der
Afrikaner in Sdafrika, 18801960.
Band 37 Kingsley Lewis: The Moravian Mission in Barbados 18161886. A Study of the Historical
Context and Theological Significance of a Minority Church Among an Oppressed People.
Band 38 Ulrich M. Dehn: Indische Christen in der gesellschaftlichen Verantwortung. Eine theologische und religionssoziologische Untersuchung politischer Theologie im gegenwrtigen
Indien.

Band 39 Walter J. Hollenweger (ed.): Pentecostal Research in Europe: Problems, Promises and
People. Proceedings from the Pentecostal Research Conference at the University of
Birmingham (England) April 26th to 29th 1984.
Band 40 P. Solomon Raj: A Christian Folk-Religion in India. A Study of the Small Church Movement
in Andhra Pradesh, with a Special Reference to the Bible Mission of Devadas.
Band 41 Karl-Wilhelm Westmeier: Reconciling Heaven and Earth: The Transcendental Enthusiasm
and Growth of an Urban Protestant Community, Bogota, Colombia.
Band 42 George A. Hood: Mission Accomplished? The English Presbyterian Mission in Lingtung,
South China. A Study of the Interplay between Mission Methods and their Historical Context.
Band 43 Emmanuel Yartekwei Lartey: Pastoral Counselling in Inter-Cultural Perspective: A Study of
some African (Ghanaian) and Anglo-American views on human existence and counselling.
Band 44 Jerry L. Sandidge: Roman Catholic/Pentecostal Dialogue (19771982): A Study in
Developing Ecumenism.
Band 45 Friedeborg L. Mller:The History of German Lutheran Congregations in England, 19001950.
Band 46 Roger B. Edrington: Everyday Men: Living in a Climate of Unbelief.
Band 47 Bongani Mazibuko: Education in Mission/Mission in Education. A Critical Comparative
Study of Selected Approaches.
Band 48 Jochanan Hesse (ed.): Mitten im Tod vom Leben umfangen. Gedenkschrift fr Werner
Kohler.
Band 49 Elisabeth A. Kasper: Afrobrasilianische Religion. Der Mensch in der Beziehung zu Natur,
Kosmos und Gemeinschaft im Candombl eine tiefenpsychologische Studie.
Band 50 Charles Chikezie Agu: Secularization in lgboland. Socio-religious Change and its Challenges
to the Church Among the Igbo.
Band 51 Abraham Adu Berinyuu: Pastoral Care to the Sick in Africa. An Approach to Transcultural Pastoral Theology.
Band 52 Boo-Woong Yoo: Korean Pentecostalism. Its History and Theology.
Band 53 Roger H. Hooker: Themes in Hinduism and Christianity. A Comparative Study.
Band 54 Jean-Daniel Plss: Therapeutic and Prophetic Narratives in Worship. A Hermeneutic Study
of Testimonies and Visions. Their Potential Significance for Christian Worship and
Secular Society.
Band 55 John Mansford Prior: Church and Marriage in an Indonesian Village. A Study of Customary
and Church Marriage among the Ata Lio of Central Flores, Indonesia, as a Paradigm of
the Ecclesial Interrelationship between village and Institutional Catholicism.
Band 56 Werner Kohler: Umkehr und Umdenken. Grundzge einer Theologie der Mission
(herausgegeben von Jrg Salaquarda).
Band 57 Martin Maw: Visions of India. Fulfilment Theology, the Aryan Race Theory, and the Work
of British Protestant Missionaries in Victorian India.
Band 58 Aasulv Lande: Meiji Protestantism in History and Historiography. A Comparative Study
of Japanese and Western Interpretation of Early Protestantism in Japan.
Band 59 Enyi B. Udoh: Guest Christology. An interpretative view of the christological problem in
Africa.

Band 60 Peter Schttke-Scherle: From Contextual to Ecumenical Theology? A Dialogue between

Minjung Theology and Theology after Auschwitz.
Band 61 Michael S. Northcott: The Church and Secularisation. Urban Industrial Mission in North East
England.
Band 62 Daniel OConnor: Gospel, Raj and Swaraj. The Missionary Years of C. F. Andrews
190414.
Band 63 Paul D. Matheny: Dogmatics and Ethics. The Theological Realism and Ethics of Karl Barths
Church Dogmatics.
Band 64 Warren Kinne: A Peoples Church? The Mindanao-Sulu Church Debacle.
Band 65 Jane Collier: The culture of economism. An exploration of barriers to faith-as-praxis.
Band 66 Michael Biehl: Der Fall Sadhu Sundar Singh. Theologie zwischen den Kulturen.
Band 67 Brian C. Castle: Hymns: The Making and Shaping of a Theology for the Whole People
of God. A Comparison of the Four Last Things in Some English and Zambian Hymns in
Intercultural Perspective.
Band 68 Jan A. B. Jongeneel (ed.): Experiences of the Spirit. Conference on Pentecostal and
Charismatic Research in Europe at Utrecht University 1989 .
Band 69 William S. Campbell: Pauls Gospel in an Intercultural Context. Jew and Gentile in the
Letter to the Romans.
Band 70 Lynne Price: Interfaith Encounter and Dialogue. A Methodist Pilgrimage.
Band 71 Merrill Morse: Kosuke Koyama. A model for intercultural theology.
Band 73 Robert M. Solomon: Living in two worlds. Pastoral responses to possession in Singapore.
Band 74 James R. Krabill: The Hymnody of the Harrist Church Among the Dida of South Central Ivory
Coast (19131949). A Historico-Religious Study.
Band 75 Jan A. B. Jongeneel a.o. (eds.): Pentecost, Mission and Ecumenism. Essays on Intercultural Theology. Festschrift in Honour of Professor Walter J. Hollenweger.
Band 76 Siga Arles: Theological Education for the Mission of the Church in India: 19471987.
Theological Education in relation to the identification of the Task of Mission and the
Development of Ministries in India: 19471987; with special reference to the Church of
South India.
Band 77 Roswith I.H. Gerloff: A Plea for British Black Theologies. The Black Church Movement
in Britain in its transatlantic cultural and theological interaction with special reference
to the Pentecostal Oneness (Apostolic) and Sabbatarian movements. 2 parts.
Band 78 Friday M. Mbon: Brotherhood of the Cross and Star. A New Religious Movement in Nigeria.
Band 79 John Samuel Pobee (ed.): Exploring Afro-christology.
Band 80 Frieder Ludwig: Kirche im kolonialen Kontext. Anglikanische Missionare und afrikanische Propheten im sdstlichen Nigeria.
Band 81 Werner A. Wienecke: Die Bedeutung der Zeit in Afrika. In den traditionellen Religionen und
in der missionarischen Verkndigung.
Band 82 Ukachukwu Chris Manus: Christ, the African King. New Testament Christology.
Band 83 At lpenburg: All Good Men. The Development of Lubwa Mission, Chinsali, Zambia,
19051967.

Band 84 Heinrich Schfer: Protestantismus in Zentralamerika. Christliches Zeugnis im Spannungsfeld von US-amerikanischem Fundamentalismus, Unterdrckung und Wiederbelebung
indianischer Kultur.
Band 85 Joseph Kufulu Mandunu: Das Kindoki im Licht der Sndenbocktheologie. Versuch einer
christlichen Bewltigung des Hexenglaubens in Schwarz-Afrika.
Band 86 Peter Fulljames: God and Creation in intercultural perspective. Dialogue between the
Theologies of Barth, Dickson, Pobee, Nyamiti and Pannenberg.
Band 87 Stephanie Lehr: Wir leiden fr den Taufschein! Mission und Kolonialisierung am Beispiel
des Landkatechumenates in Nordostzaire.
Band 88 Dhirendra Kumar Sahu: The Church of North India. A Historical and Systematic Theological
Inquiry into an Ecumenical Ecclesiology.
Band 89 William W. Emilsen: Violence and Atonement. The Missionary Experiences of Mohandas
Gandhi, Samuel Stokes and Verrier Elwin in India before 1935.
Band 90 Kenneth D. Gill: Toward a Contextualized Theology for the Third World. The Emergence
and Development of Jesus Name Pentecostalism in Mexico.
Band 91 Karl O. Sandnes: A New Family. Conversation and Ecclesiology in the Early Church with
Cross-Cultural Comparisons.
Band 92 Jan A.B. Jongeneel: Philosophy, Science and Theology of Mission in the 19th and 20th
Centuries. A Missiological Encyclopedia. Part I: The Philosophy and Science of Mission.
Band 93 Raymond Pfister: Soixante ans de pentectisme en Alsace (19301990). Une approche
socio-historique.
Band 94 Charles R.A. Hoole: Modern Sannyasins. Protestant Missionary Contribution to Ceylon
Tamil Culture.
Band 95 Amuluche Gregory Nnamani: The Paradox of a Suffering God. On the Classical, ModernWestern and Third World Struggles to harmonise the incompatible Attributes of the
Trinitarian God.
Band 96 Geraldine S. Smyth: A Way of Transformation. A Theological Evaluation of the Conciliar
Process of Mutual Commitment to Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation World Council
of Churches, 19831991.
Band 97 Aasulv Lande / Werner Ustorf (eds.): Mission in a Pluralist World.
Band 98 Alan Suggate: Japanese Christians and Society. With the assistance of YAMANO Shigeko.
Band 99 Isolde Andrews: Deconstructing Barth. A Study of the Complementary Methods in Karl
Barth and Jacques Derrida.
Band 100 Lynne Price: Faithful Uncertainty. Leslie D. Weatherheads Methodology of Creative
Evangelism.
Band 101 Jean de Dieu Mvuanda: Inculturer pour vangliser en profondeur. Des initiations
traditionnelles africaines une initiation chrtienne engageante.
Band 102 Allison M. Howell:The Religious Itinerary of a Ghanaian People.The Kasena and the Christian
Gospel.
Band 103 Lynne Price, Juan Seplveda & Graeme Smith (eds.): Mission Matters.
Band 104 Tharwat Kades: Die arabischen Bibelbersetzungen im 19. Jahrhundert.

Band 105 Thomas G. Dalzell SM:The Dramatic Encounter of Divine and Human Freedom in theTheology
of Hans Urs von Balthasar.
Band 106 Jan A. B. Jongeneel: Philosophy, Science, and Theology of Mission in the 19th and 20th
Centuries. A Missiological Encyclopedia. Part II: Missionary Theology.
Band 107 Werner Kohler: Unterwegs zum Verstehen der Religionen. Gesammelte Aufstze. Herausgegeben im Auftrag der Deutschen Ostasien-Mission und der Schweizerischen
Ostasien-Mission von Andreas Feldtkeller.
Band 108 Mariasusai Dhavamony: Christian Theology of Religions. A Systematic Reflection on the
Christian Understanding of World Religions.
Band 109 Chinonyelu Moses Ugwu: Healing in the Nigerian Church. A Pastoral-Psychological
Exploration.
Band 110 Getatchew Haile, Aasulv Lande & Samuel Rubenson (eds.): The Missionary Factor
in Ethiopia: Papers from a Symposium on the Impact of European Missions on Ethiopian
Society, Lund University, August 1996.
Band 111 Anthony Savari Raj: A New Hermeneutic of Reality. Raimon Panikkars Cosmotheandric
Vision.
Band 112 Jean Pierre Bwalwel: Famille et habitat. Implications thiques de Iclatement urbain. Cas
de la ville de Kinshasa.
Band 113 Michael Bergunder: Die sdindische Pfingstbewegung im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine historische
und systematische Untersuchung.
Band 114 Alar Laats: Doctrines of the Trinity in Eastern and Western Theologies. A Study with Special
Reference to K. Barth and V. Lossky.
Band 115 Afeosemime U. Adogame: Celestial Church of Christ. The Politics of Cultural Identity in a
West African Prophetic-Charismatic Movement.
Band 116 Laurent W. Ramambason: Missiology: Its Subject-Matter and Method. A Study of MissionDoers in Madagascar.
Band 117 Veli-Matti Krkkinen: Ad UltimumTerrae. Evangelization, Proselytism and Common Witness
in the Roman Catholic Pentecostal Dialogue (19901997).
Band 118 Julie C. Ma: When the Spirit meets the Spirits. Pentecostal Ministry among the Kankanaey
Tribe in the Philippines. 2., revised edition.
Band 119 Patrick Chukwudezie Chibuko: Igbo Christian Rite of Marriage. A Proposed Rite for Study
and Celebration.
Band 120 Patrick Chukwudezie Chibuko: Paschal Mystery of Christ. Foundation for Liturgical
Inculturation in Africa.
Band 121 Werner Ustorf / Toshiko Murayama (eds.): Identity and Marginality. Rethinking Christianity
in North East Asia.
Band 122 Ogbu U. Kalu: Power, Poverty and Prayer. The Challenges of Poverty and Pluralism in African
Christianity, 19601996.
Band 123 Peter Cruchley-Jones: Singing the Lords Song in a Strange Land? A Missiological Interpretation of the Ely Pastorate Churches, Cardiff.
Band 124 Paul Hedges: Preparation and Fulfilment. A History and Study of Fulfilment Theology in
Modern British Thought in the Indian Context.

Band 125 Werner Ustorf: Sailing on the Next Tide. Missions, Missiology, and the Third Reich.
Band 126 Seong-Won Park: Worship in the Presbyterian Church in Korea. Its History and Implications.
Band 127 Sturla J. Stlsett: The crucified and the Crucified. A Study in the Liberation Christology of
Jon Sobrino.
Band 128 Dong-Kun Kim: Jesus: From Bultmann to the Third World.
Band 129 Forthcoming.
Band 130 Uchenna A. Ezeh: Jesus Christ the Ancestor. An African Contextual Christology in the Light
of the Major Dogmatic Christological Definitions of the Church from the Council of Nicea
(325) to Chalcedon (451).
Band 131 Chun-Hoi Heo: Multicultural Christology. A Korean Immigrant Perspective.