American Philosophical Association Pacific Division, San Francisco, 30 March 2016

Book Symposium
Kasia M. Jaszczolt. 2016. Meaning in Linguistic Interaction:
Semantics, Metasemantics, Philosophy of Language. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.

Response to Critics

How much does pragmatics (pragmatic inference, default

interpretations) contribute to the semantic representation?

Can semantic representations be cognitively real and

compositional at the same time?

Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005, 2010, 2016)

JA: She and her generation have been the beneficiaries

of well-articulated Gricean, neo-Gricean and post-Gricean
views.

the Atlas-Kempson thesis

K.M. Jaszczolt. 2005. Default Semantics: Foundations of a Compositional

Theory of Acts of Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

K. M. Jaszczolt. 2010. Default Semantics. In: B. Heine and H. Narrog

(eds). The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. 215-246.

K. M. Jaszczolt. 2016. Meaning in Linguistic Interaction: Semantics,

Metasemantics, Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Part I:

Why primary meanings?

Part II:

Compositionality in Default Semantics

Part III:

The role of derivation in Default Semantics

Part I: Primary meanings

Assumptions
The output of syntactic processing often leaves the
meaning underdetermined.

The object of study of a theory of meaning is a

pragmatically modified representation.

There is no syntactic constraint on the object of study.

a rationale for a radical contextualist theory

(Default Semantics)

10

Primary meaning

(1) A: Shall we meet tomorrow?

B: Im in London.

(1a) B is in London at the time of speaking.

(1b) B will be in London the following day.
(1c) B cant meet A the following day.
11

Primary meaning

Primary meaning is the most salient meaning intended by the

Model Speaker and recovered by the Model Addressee. It need
not obey the syntactic constraint (pertain to LF or enriched LF).

Default Semantics rejects the post-Gricean imbricated picture

of meaning (Parikh 2010: 5) but preserves the core Gricean
assumptions concerning the provenance and type of meaning
that constitutes the object of analysis: intended, recovered,
based on general principles of rationality, formalizable, truthconditional.
12

Comparison with Equilibrium Semantics (ES)

DS agrees with ES on the uniform treatment of explicit and

implicit meaning (Parikh 2010: 162)
In DS, the primary/secondary distinction cuts across the said/
implicit divide
even on the contextualist construal of what is said as
allowing for enrichment.

13

Why primary meanings?

1. There is no evidence that enriched logical forms are

cognitively plausible candidates for what it said.
2. Enriched logical forms sit half-way between the semantic
representations adopted by minimalists (the output of
syntactic processing) and cognitively real primary
communicated content that can correspond to (i) the bare
logical form, (ii) enriched logical form, or (iii) override such
a syntactic constraint altogether.

14

Comparison with ES
Gricean pipeline picture: semantics first yields an
underspecified, context-free, and conventional content that is
subsequently filled in contextually by pragmatics.
In stark contrast, in [ES] the context of utterance drills down
into the lowest lexical levels of sentences, making even socalled literal content thoroughly situated (p. 123)
On this portrayal, Default Semantics (DS) is a non-pipeline
post-Gricean account and as such shares some assumptions
concerning the interaction of aspects of information with ES.

15

Comparison with ES

The basic idea of [ES] is that each part of a symbol

system has a certain semantic value that interacts with the
semantic ... values of all the other parts so that they are all
jointly in balance (Parikh 2010: 301)

Analogous assumptions can be adopted in a Gricean

framework, with the added advantage of psychological
explanations and psychological plausibility (discussed
later). Cf. lateral influences in:

16

(2)

The city is asleep.

(from Recanati 2012)

x (City (x) y (City (y) y = x) Asleep(x))

(i) enrichment: the city we are looking at

17

(ii)
resolving referential or attributive reading on the level of
semantics

Asleep (l)
l = London

18

(iii) resolving metaphors on the level of semantics:

Quiet (l)
or:
x (Inhabitant-of-l (x) Asleep(x))

or:

19

Comparison with ES

In DS, content is intended by the MS and recovered

by the MA in a situation. As such, it is the same for
the speaker and the addressee.
DS assumes intentions but calculates meaning from
the processes pertaining to different sources. In this
sense, DS agrees with ES that intentions are
invisible to the addressees; they are not used in the
derivation.

20

The role of the cancellability test

Grice (1989: 44): a putative conversational implicature can be
cancelled in two ways:

1.

It is explicitly cancellable when it is possible to add to

the utterance implicating p, but not p or I dont mean
to imply that p.

2.

It is contextually cancellable if there are imaginable

situations in which such a potential implicature would
not arise.

21

Contextual cancellation pertains to implicatures which are

only, so to speak, potential for the sentence, while explicit
cancellation pertains to implicatures which are in addition
potential for the given situation of discourse the utterance
implicating p, but not p or I dont mean to imply that p.

22

Parikh (2010: 166): cancelability and reinforceability

apply to all meanings but only in the presence of ambiguity

23

(3)

A: Was the performance good?

B: Some people applauded.

PM: The recital was not very good. (implicit and primary
meaning; not normally cancellable on hearing Bs answer to
As question)
SM: Some but not all people applauded. (explicit and
secondary meaning; quite entrenched because PM goes
through)

24

Attempted cancellation: Some (>> but not all) people

applauded.

?(3a) But this does not mean the performance wasn't good;
most people left in a hurry to catch the last train.

25

JA: Bob doesnt LIKE garlic but he doesnt dislike it.

DS no cancellation, merely precisification.

intonation

26

Primary meanings are entrenched.

Secondary meanings are cancellable but relatively
entrenched when the primary meaning goes through.

In DS, there are no ambiguities (Gricean MOR, cf. Atlas 1989)

and no options of interpretation to be weighed against each
other. There is one MS-MA interpretation and one
corresponding merger representation of meaning.

27

Part II: Compositionality in Default Semantics

28

Merger Representations
Semantic representations of primary meanings are called
merger representations ().
Merger representations have the status of mental
representations (cf. DRT).
They have a compositional structure.
The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge
and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing.

29

Compositionality is a methodological principle

it is always possible to satisfy compositionality by simply

adjusting the syntactic and/or semantic tools one uses,
unless that is, the latter are constrained on independent
grounds.
Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991: 93)

30

Compositionality as an empirical assumption

Compositionality should be an empirical assumption about

the nature of possible human languages.
Szab (2000)

31

Lexicon/grammar/pragmatics trade-offs

What is expressed in the lexicon in one language may be

expressed by grammar in another.
What is expressed overtly in one language may be left to
pragmatic inference or default interpretation in another.

32

Conditionals: An example of trade-offs

(4)

The dog might bark. The postman might run away.

(3) Guugu Yimithirr (Australian, QNL): no overt conditionals

from Evans & Levinson (2009: 443)

331

Temporality in Thai: An example of trade-offs

(5) m3ae:r3i:I
Mary

kh2ian

n3iy3ai:

write

novel

34

(a)

Mary wrote a novel.

(b)

Mary was writing a novel.

(c)

Mary started writing a novel but did not finish it.

(d)

Mary has written a novel.

(e)

Mary has been writing a novel.

(f)

Mary writes novels. / Mary is a novelist.

(g)

Mary is writing a novel.

(h)

Mary will write a novel.

(i)

Mary will be writing a novel.

from Srioutai (2006: 45)

35

Amharic: context shifting

(6)

wndmme kne gar

alblamm

my-brother

I-will-not-eat, he-said

with-me

al

My brother refused to eat with me.

(from Leslau 1995: 778)

36

What is encoded in the grammar of Amharic, English

externalises by a conceptual shift to the context of
the current speech act (pragmatic process), opting
for the speakers perspective rather than the
perspective that belongs to the subject of the activity
or state in question.

37

 Compositionality is a semantic universal

Gricean principles of inference are a pragmatic

universal.
from von Fintel and Matthewson (2009)
38

A universal:
generative power of semantics/pragmatics
(conceptual structure)
Not a universal:
generative power of syntax
cf. no constituent structure as the organizing principle of
sentence structure (Warlpiri; Latin, Slavonic languages); no
recursion (Pirah)

39

Compositional merger representations

40

Sources of information for in DS

(i) world knowledge (WK)

(ii) word meaning and sentence structure (WS)
(iii) situation of discourse (SD)
(iv) properties of the human inferential system (IS)
(v) stereotypes and presumptions about society and culture (SC)

41

(iv) properties of the human inferential system IS

(6)

The author of The Catcher in the Rye was a genius.

referential reading, from strong intentionality:

(6a)

J. D. Salinger was a genius.

42

world knowledge (WK)

word meaning and sentence structure (WS)

merger representation

situation of discourse (SD)

stereotypes and presumptions

about society and culture (SC)

properties of human inferential system (IS)

Fig. 1: Sources of information contributing to a merger representation

43

sources of information

types of processes

44

Mapping between sources and processes

WK

SCWD or CPI

SC

SCWD or CPI

WS

WS

SD

CPI

IS

CD

(logical form)

DS makes use of the processing model and it indexes the components

of with a subscript standing for the type of processing.

45

Primary meaning:
combination of word meaning
and sentence structure (WS)

merger representation

social, cultural and

cognitive defaults (CD)
world-knowledge defaultspm (SCWDpm)

conscious pragmatic inferencepm

(from situation of discourse, social and
cultural assumptions, and world
knowledge) (CPIpm)

Fig. 2: Utterance interpretation according to the processing model of the revised

version of Default Semantics

46

Sources of meaning and salience

DS distinguishes default interpretations/meanings and

inferential interpretations/meanings where default is
predicated of units of all levels of analysis at all stages of
derivation.
vs. Giora 2003, Giora et al 2015:
Default interpretations automatic responses to a stimulus
Default meanings salient meanings, ranked high in the
mental lexicon (graded salience)
47

Primary meaning and systematicity:

an example form first-person indexicals

48

Belief de se with temporal slices of the self

I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor,

pushing my cart down the aisle on one side of a tall
counter and back the aisle on the other, seeking the
shopper with the torn sack to tell him he was making a
mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became
thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned
on me. I was the shopper I was trying to catch.
Perry (1979: 3)

49

Fig. 3: for I believed, in a sense, I was making a mess.

(marked reading)

x y

[Kasia]CD (x)
[Kasia]CPI (y)
[y=x]WS
[[x]CD [believe]CPI]WS
:

[[y]CPI is making a mess]WS

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Part III
The Role of Derivation in Semantic Theory

51

The role of derivation in semantic theory

PP: when there are multiple derivational processes available
such as unconscious default reasoning or language
processing or conscious pragmatic reasoning, then a metalevel decision is required for which path to take in different
circumstances.
finding appropriate meaning representations vs. deriving
intended and optimal meanings through use (Parikh 2010)
Default Semantics: finding and modelling the output of one
derivation process pertaining to the main intended (MS) and
recovered (MA) meaning (Gricean)

52

Derivation

the most interesting part of the book (Parikh 2016) or a

necessary preamble to merger representations establishing
the fluid characters on which the identified processes
operate?

preemptive normative stance

53

Derivation and fluid characters (Jaszczolt 2012)

(7) [Ians book won a Man Booker] Prize.
(8) [Ian McEwans book] won a Man Booker Prize.

+> the one he authored (vs. owns, borrowed)

DS construes pragmatic inference and defaults as operating

on a unit that is adequate for the case at hand, ranging from
a morpheme to the entire discourse.

54

Instead of computing meanings by assessing all feasible

interpretations, DS predicts that algorithms can be built as a
result of researching patterns of neuronal activation that result
from speech-related actions (Pulvermller 2010, 2012).

55

The role of rational agency

Whose meaning?

Model Speaker Model Addressee

the question of psychologism

56

JA: Default Semantics, though psycholinguistically motivated

is not a psycho-linguistic model.

57

Psychologism in semantic theory

?
Should psychological explanations be present in
definitions of truth-conditional content/primary
meaning?

58

Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Frege1884: 90):

[t]here must be a sharp separation of the psychological
from the logical, the subjective from the objective

Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Frege1893: 202):

being true is quite different from being held as true

corrupting intrusion [of psychology on logic]

59

Areas in which (moderate) psychologism is necessary

[1] The selection of the perspective to be adopted:
that of the speaker, the addressee, or a Model
Speaker Model Addressee interaction;
[2] The unit on which pragmatic inference or default
enrichment operate;
[3] The definition and delimitation of automatic
(default) interpretations vis--vis conscious
pragmatic inference;
[4] The stance on the syntactic constraint (primary
meaning)
60

Psychologism in [2]:
Atlas (2006): against armchair psychologising and
in favour of empirical psychology of sentenceprocessing.

But: psychologising must appear before empirical

studies in order to identify the unit for experimental
testing (viz. fluid characters: Ians book.)

61

[3] Automatic default interpretations

vs. conscious pragmatic inference
(9)

Leonardos painting was stolen from Czartoryskis

Museum in Krakw.

(10)

Larrys book is a thrilling account of negation.

(11)

bread/kitchen/steel knife

DS does not concern itself with miscommunication

62

(12)
A:

So, is this your first film?

B:

No, its my twenty second.

A:

Any favourites among the twenty two?

B:

Working with Leonardo.

A:

da Vinci?

B:

DiCaprio.

A:

Of course. And is he your favourite Italian director?

Richard Curtiss, Notting Hill,

1999
63

[4] The stance on the syntactic constraint

Should primary meaning obey the syntactic

constraint?
Limiting pragmatic contributions to enrichment of
the logical form is not independently justified or
psychologically plausible.

64

(13) I havent eaten.

(13a) I havent eaten lunch yet.
(13b) I am hungry.

Psychologism in [4]:

65

Negation and PM

(14)
A: You should have chosen garlic for the crest.
B: I dont like garlic.
PM: I dont [particularly] like garlic.

66

(15)
A: Why arent you eating?
B: I dont like garlic.
PM: I hate garlic.

67

devastation caused by the irruption of

psychology into [pragmatics] (Frege 1894: 209)
Primary meaning, default interpretation, pragmatic
inference, fluid character, MS/MA perspective, all
require psychologism in DS;
These are decisions within the psychology of
processing rather than as to whether to admit
psychologism into pragmatic theory. E. g. S, A, MS/
MA perspectives are all contaminated, albeit to
different degrees.
68

Default Semantics: Future prospects

PP: noting only that the evidence from
contextualism or maximalism is overwhelming and
that a formal approach is desirable as far as one is
possible, the only viable option in my view is what
the author attempts.
but the task is formidable

69

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