STATEMENT

ReleasedApril29,2016
AUTOMATEDELECTIONSYSTEMWATCH(AESWatch)

CALLONCOMELEC,VOTERS,
POLLWATCHERS:GEARFORPOLL
DISASTERPREPAREDNESSAND
MITIGATIONONMAY9

Toensuretransparent,honestandpeacefulelectionsWillthemachinescountyourvotesright?
____________________

Mitigatingmeasures:

*AlltimeandmotionPrecinctelectionresults(ERs)
nottotals
anddefinitely
notdatacomingfrom
thecentralserverandtransparencyserver
receivedbytheC/MBOCsSHOULDbepublished
asthey
are
andshownonapublicorComelecwebsitethatisaccessibletoeveryonefurthermore,thewebsite
mustbemaintainedfor2yearsasthelawrequires

**Everyvoterhastherighttocopyinwritinghis/herballotIDandprecinctnumberthatappearinthe
screen,documentdescriptionofthevoterreceiptifthereceiptiswrong,thevoterhastherightto
correctitinwritingandlodgeaprotestwiththeBEIinwriting(onthelogbook)accordingly,theBEIs
shouldbewarnednottopreventthevoterfromexercisingsuchrightbyarbitrarilydeclaringsuchact
asunlawful

***COMELECmustrescindComelecResolution10083immediatelyasitopensupwideconditions
fordatamanipulationthroughSDcardswitchingandtampering.
_______________

Thehotlycontested,emotionallychargedelectioncampaignwillfinallyconclude10daysfromnow
whenthewholenationgoestothepollsonMay9.Whethertheelectionswillbringthecountry
politicalstabilityorinstabilitywilldependheavilyonwhethertheautomatedelectionsystemwill
workwithallthetrustworthiness,accuracy,andreliabilitythatamodernelectiontechnologyrequires.

ThecurrentCOMELECnowunderadifferentsetofMalacaangappointedcommissionersand
chairmanbutworkingwiththesameinsiderpolloperatorsandelectionsystemsupplierhasboastedit
hasimplementedmoresafeguardsthanthepreviousComelecdministrations.Partiallytrue,thanksto
thepressurebyelectionwatchdogsandthepublic.Butwhatlurksbehindthisseemingandpartial
compliancewiththelawistoopenupbiggerrisksthat,absentremediesandcontingencies,pose
greaterdangertothesecurityandaccuracyofthecountingofthevotes.Asofthisdate,themachines
havenotbeencertifiedbythirdpartyagencytorunassecurelyandaccuratelyastheyshould.

FortheITandmanagementsystemexperts,aswellassocialscientists,professionalsandinterfaith,
NGOleaderswhohavelongbeenengagedinensuringhonestandpeacefulelectionsabigdisaster
loomsintheMay9electionsifComelecinsistsonSPEEDANDEASEOFBEIover
TRANSPARENCYandACCURACYofDATA.

Wecallonthecountrys55millionregisteredvotersandtherestofthenationtonotallowtheir
guardsdown,towatchtheirvotemorevigilantlyandmethodically,andtoprepareforanelection
disasterthatmayyetunfoldsothatourvotesaresecuredandareproperlycountedenablingusto
exerciseoursovereignvoiceinchoosingthenextadministration.

WHYDANGER

First,neverbeforehastheautomatedelectionsystembeenmostvulnerabletomanipulationandfraud
asaresultofthehackingoftheComelecwebsiteonMarch27thatcompromisednotonlytheelection
databutalsotheprivateinformationof55millionvoters.WehaveseennumerouscasesintheUnited
Statesandothercountrieswherestolenelectiondatabaseledtothemanipulationofvotes,changeof
voterregistration,andthelossofpublictrustintheirelectionsystems.IftheComelecwebsitecanbe
hackedforlackofsecurity,reportedlywithinsidersconspiracy,howcanyounowtrustthewhole
systemsandinfrastructuresthatwillbeusedbyComeleconelectiondayandthereafter?

Secondly,thepresentComelecisrepeatingpreviouscommissionersnoncompliancewiththe
minimumsystemrequirementsofelectionautomationsince2010.Inwhatsmacksofanabuseof
discretionandauthority,theComelecenbancquietlyissuedResolution10083lastMarch15
mandatingallBEIstoimportallSDcardstransmittedornottransmittedERsfromthe92,509
precinctVoteCountingMachines(VCMs)tothecity/municipalitycanvassingcenters.Underthe
law,Comelecmustensurethe100%transmissionofERsfromtheprecincttocomplywithanother
provisionthatONLYTRANSMITTEDERsshallbethebasisfortheproclamationofwinning
candidates.Sucharbitrarychangeofruleswillopenwideelectioninterventionandmanipulationsuch
astheswitchingofmicroSDcardswithfakeorpreviouslyfabricatedones.Wastheresolutionissued
becauseofanticipatedwidespreadtransmissionglitchesonMay9aswhathappenedin2010(where
10%ofERswerenottransmittedandin2013withthetransmissionfailureof25%ERs)?Isthe
Comelecfoolingusagain?

TheComelechasbeenhypingthatitis100%readyfortheelection.
Butdothecommissionerssay
theyrereadybecausetheyhavecompliedwithalltheminimumsystemrequirementstomake
theelectionscredible?

Letuslookagain:

1)Forthethirdtime,allERswillnotbeauthenticatedbydigitalsignaturesoftheBEIsinrepeated
violationofSection30ofRA9369(orautomatedelectionlaw)whichmandatesthatONLYERs
THATAREDIGITALLYSIGNEDANDELECTRONICALLYTRANSMITTEDshallbeconsidered
asOFFICIALELECTIONRESULTS.Withthisviolation,howcanyoutrusttheelectionoutcomeas
credible?

2)Welikewiseraisethefollowingquestions:HastheAESsystembeenclearedandcertified100%
readybytheTechnicalEvaluationCommittee(TEC)againasrequiredbylaw?Thesourcecode
reviewhasnotbeenfullysatisfactorilyconcluded.Willthevoterreceiptaccuratelyreflecttheballot

castunlikewhathappenedinmanycountriesintheongoingOverseasAbsenteeVoting(OAV
Whathappensifnamesofcandidatesdonotappearinthemachinegeneratedresultsorifnamesof
votersinthecertifiedlistaremissing?

Likewise,neverseenbeforearenumerousglitchesinvolvingtheongoingOAVvotinginmany
countrieswhichportendofthingstocomeonMay9.MigranteInternationalhasreportedVCM
malfunctioningintheUS,Canada,Italy,andRomeresultinginvoterdisenfranchisementdelayed
ballotdeliveryalsointheUSnamesofmorethan100registeredvotersfoundmissinginthemaster
listofvotersinJapanreportsofincompletevotesinthereceiptsforsenatorialraceinItalyinHong

Kong,somevotesfoundmissinginvoterreceiptswithonevicepresidentialcandidatecomplaining
thathisvoteswerenotreflectedinvoterreceipts.

WHYDISASTER

COMELECinsiststoonlypartiallyenabletheautomatedsystemsafeguardstoensureandgivemore
premiumtospeedandeaseofvotingovertransparency,securityandaccuracyofelectionresults.

Voterverificationisimplementedbutvotersreceiptsifnotsecuredcanbeeasilyreplacedwithbogus
piecesofpaperwithnosecuritymarksknowntothevotersandthepublic(precinctlocation,machine
source,etc.).
PostingoftheelectionresultsontheComelecpublicwebsitebutifthedataisonlyasummaryofvotes
orifitcomesfromthetransparencyserverorcentralserver,thiswouldbedisastroustotransparency
andaccuracybecausethereisdefinitelynoassurancethatthedataintheCentralServerwouldbethe
sameasthoseintheC/MBOC,ashappenedinthe2010and2013elections
ComelecissuedResolution10083whichnowmakesthePollAutomationLawinutilewheresections22
and25ofRA9369statethatonlyelectronicallytransmittedresultsaretheofficialresultstobasethe
proclamationofwinners.

ToaddressthesethreatstotheMay9election,westronglyurgetheComelec,amongothers:

1)ThatalltimeandmotionPrecinctelectionresults(ERs)nottotalsanddefinitelynotdatacoming
fromthecentralserverandtransparencyserverreceivedbytheC/MBOCsbepublished
astheyare
andshownonapublicorComelecwebsitethatisaccessibletoeveryonefurthermore,thewebsite
mustbemaintainedfor2yearsasthelawrequires

2)Thatallvotersbeallowedtocopyinwritinghis/herballotIDandprecinctnumberthatappearin
thescreen,and,ifthereceiptiswrongforthevotertocorrectitinwritingaccordingly,theBEIs
shouldbewarnednottopreventthevoterfromexercisingsuchwritebyarbitrarilydeclaringit
unlawful

3)TorescindComelecResolution10083immediatelyasitopensupwideconditionsfordata
manipulationthroughSDswitchinganddatatampering.

ThesearenosuresolutionsagainstfraudonMay9.Aftertwoautomatedelections,shrewdveteran
electioncheatshavemasteredelectroniccheating.Thecontroversial603010preprogramming
votepatternuncoveredbyCenPEGinMay2010remainsunresolvedtodaywithit,thecredibilityof
theelectionresults.TherecenthackingofthevoterregistrationsystemandtheComelecdatabasehave
exposedtheFilipinovoterspersonaldatatorisk.TheillpreparednessoftheComelecinfestedwith

thenomoreorlackoftimementalitymadeworsebyitsobsessiontospeedandeaseinmanaging
electionsoverensuringtransparency,securityandaccuracyofelectiondata,becomesmoreworrisome
aselectiondaydrawsnear.Resolution10083,forone,isreckless,kneejerkreactiontoavoidamore
disastrousrepeatofthe23%failedtransmissionin2013.Themodetodaythereforeistogearfor
disastermitigationoraNoElorpostponeelectionscenariowhichComelechaddangledbeforein
MarchaftertheSupremeCourtruleditshouldimplementthevoterreceiptrequirementofthelaw.

WeanticipatetheComelecmaynotheedourdemandsandtoinstituteappropriatecontingency
measuresunlessasinthevoterreceiptissueanothercaseisbroughttotheSupremeCourt.Given
thethreatsanddeficienciesoftheautomationsystemandthecompromisingstanceoftheComelecin
electionmanagement,alltheseleavethevotersalongwiththepollwatchersaswellascandidates
andpoliticalpartieswithnochoicebuttoguardthevotesandtoremainvigilantandtakeappropriate
actionsagainstelectronicfraud,transmissionglitches,machineerrors,andthepossibilityofinsider
hackingwheretheelectionresultswillnotreflectthetruewillandintentoftheelectorate.xxx

Announcement:

AESWatch
PollMonitoringCenterisbeingsetupattheMagsaysayCenter,Pamantasanng
LungsodngMaynila,IntramurosManilatoreceive,monitor,relayneededinformationandprovide
assistancetopollwatchersonmonitoring&reportingthebehaviorofthecountingmachines.

FortrainingsandbriefingsonPOLLWatching,monitoringandrespondingtoHOWTHEVote
CountingMachines(VCMs)formerlyknownasPCOS(PrecinctCountOpticalScanners)actuallyand
securelybehaveonElectionDay.ENSUREyourvotesarecountedright!

Contact:
+6329299526(Landline)
Mobilenos:09272092500
09985344650
09175198547
09272818288

ImmediateFlashDate:May26:

FTSorFinalTestingandSealingnationwideforall92,509VCMsinthesamenumberofCPs
(Clusteredprecincts).CopytheIDnumberoftheVCMandmakesurethatthehashcodeassignedto
VCMwhichisanimageofthesupposedsourcecodeputinescrowbytheComelecwiththeCentral
Bankisreflectedinthevotersreceipttobereceivedaftercastingtheballotintothemachine.

The
HASHCODEoftheVCM(VoteCountingMachine)putinescrowwiththeCentralBankbythe
Comelec:

A14791C42FDA957C47DBE3EAS2FB2AA3
9DBFDAAFF683687A80B69F61A113EOF7

DuringtheFTS,ensurethatTRANSMISSIONisconsummated,theSDcardimplantedintheMachine
isnotremovedarbitrarilyandwithoutproperdocumentationofSDcardnumberanddate/timeof
removaltobecomparedwiththeauditlogtobemadeavailabletopollwatchersofpoliticalparties

for
checkingandaudit.Report,recordandcomplainalldiscrepanciesandabnormalbehaviorofthe
machinesandoperatorsinwritingtotheBEIs,themedia,AESWatchandallwatchdogsinthe
vicinity.