176 U.S.

481
20 S.Ct. 398
44 L.Ed. 554

ROBERT WRIGHT, Plff. in Err.,

v.
COLUMBUS, HOCKING VALLEY, & ATHENS RAILROAD
COMPANY.
No. 91.
Submitted December 13, 1899.
Decided February 26, 1900.

This was also a petition in the same court to enjoin the railroad company
from entering upon or taking possession of the canal property and
constructing a railroad thereon, but in certain particulars differs from the
case already considered.
Plaintiff averred that he is the owner in fee simple of a certain tract of land
in the county of Hocking, through and along which said canal passes; that
he is also the owner of a mill located on said land on the south side of the
canal, which is now and has been for many years past operated by water
power supplied by the canal; that such mill was originally constructed
before the location and construction of the Hocking canal, and was run
and operated by water power from the Hocking river until the canal was
constructed, when it became necessary to appropriate the Hocking river
and the water power which had been used to supply his mill for the
purposes of the canal; that at that time the land and the mill were owned
by one Worthington, who entered into a contract with the state, by which
the latter agreed to enlarge and forever maintain the dam across the
Hocking river above the grist mill, in order to afford an ample supply of
water, in consideration of his granting to the state the right to construct the
canal through his lands; that the canal was constructed and the dam built
in pursuance of such contract, and that all the water power necessary to
operate the mill has been supplied from the said canal and the Hocking
river up to the present time; that the plaintiff is the present owner of the
land by deeds from Worthington, and that the grist mill has been supplied
by such power from the Hocking river and the canal from the date of the
construction of the canal, a period of fifty-seven years; that, relying upon

such contract, he has made improvements and repairs upon said mill, put
the same in excellent condition, and is doing a large and profitable
business; that if the defendant is permitted to enter upon the canal and
construct its railroad the water power will be cut off and destroyed, and
the property rendered of little value; that he is also the owner of other
lands on both sides of the canal for a long distance, to the amount of 1,000
acres, and that the construction of the railroad will place increased
burdens upon his lands, and cut off and destroy his access to parts of them
through the highways, and that he will be deprived of watering privileges
for his stock.
A general demurrer was filed to this petition, which was sustained by the
court and the petition dismissed. Plaintiff appealed to the circuit court,
which also sustained the demurrer and dismissed the petition. Whereupon
plaintiff appealed the case to the supreme court of the state, which
affirmed the judgment of the dircuit court, whereupon plaintiff sued out
writ of error from this court.
Messrs. J. B. Foraker, T. E. Powell, and D. J. Ryan for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. C. H. Grosvenor, D. L. Sleeper, and John J. Stoddart for
defendant in error.
Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff insisted before the supreme court that he made the improvements on
his mill with reference to the contract between the state and the Federal
government, but the supreme court was of opinion that he had no legal right to
make investments on the faith of a contract between others, and to which he
was not a party or privy, and insist for that reason the contract should be
observed by either of the parties; that, so far as related to the contract between
Worthington and the state, his remedy would be in damages for breach of the
contract, and not an injunction against the company entering upon the lands
purchased from the state in which he had no interest. The decree against him
was therefore affirmed.

The Federal question set up in the assignment of errors was precisely the same
as in the other cases, and the issues which arise from such assignments are the
only ones called to our attention by counsel. The judgment of the Supreme
Court is therefore affirmed.