This essay will explain the iron law of oligarchy and see if trade union officials in Zambia

exhibit oligarchic tendencies. It will start by defining some terms and then give a detailed
account of the behaviour of trade union officials in Zambia in relation to the iron law of
oligarchy and finally ends with a conlusion. The Oxford Dictionary of English defines the
term oligarchy as a small group of people having contol of a country or an organisation such
as a political party, a trade union and so on. Janoski et al. (2005, p. 276) states that an
oligarchy result when a small coalition exercises power under complete institutionalisation.
According to Borgatta and Montgomery, the iron law of oligarchy was Robert
Michelsconclusion regarding the necessity of elite rule in modern societies (Vol. 3, p,. 2643).
In essence, the iron law of oligarchy postulates that any complex organisation self-generate
its own elite that has disproportional influence on the decisions made in the organisation.
According to Michels such an elite is autonomous from the rank and file members and is little
affected by by elections (1915, p. 368)
Cole defines trade unions as associations of workers in one or more proefessions carried on
mainly for the purpose of protecting and advancing the memberscollective action, the
economic and social status in connection with their daily work (Cited in Sinha 2009, p. 67).
Monappa sees the primary role of trade unions as to protect the workers and to chanelise their
efforts into more rational directions so that the viability of the organisation can be enhanced
(2007, p. 51).
In Zambia there are currently 25 trade unions according to the Commonwealth of Nations
with the two major groupings being the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the
Federation of Free Trade Union in Zambia. The officials managing the day to day operations
of these trade unions constitute a small group of people or elite in comparison with the entire
followership of that union. This arrangement, according to Michels, constitute an iron law of
oligarchy because all organisations including those committed to democratic ideals and
practices will inevitably succumb to the rule by an elite few or oligarchy (1915, p. 364).
According to the iron law of oligarchy there is always a small number of persons in an
organisation who actually make decisions despite authority seemingly being vested in in the
body of the membership. Thus the iron law of oligarcy stands in stark opposition to pluralism
and suggests that participatory democracy is a utopian idea and that democracy is always
limited to very narrow strata of existing oligarchy.

Michels argues by stating that the structural pattern of trade union organization is essentially
bureaucratic, rigid and non-democratic. According to him, formal organizations, such as trade
unions or political parties, like all forms of formal organizations are subject to an iron law of
oligarchy (1915, p. 362). This is because these organisations are usually run by a few
individuals who make most decisions resulting into them ultimately developing into
oligarchies. Michels further laments Who says organization says oligarchy.
There is also a tendency of some trade union officials in Zambia to be at the helm of the
union longer than would be necessary. During the end of tenure of office, those who have
plans to challenge the incumbent may not find it easy to be co-opted because the existing
union officials keep on recontesting the elections. Borgatta and Montgomery (Vol. 3, p. 2643)
attributes the prolonged stay in power to some union officials having resources available to
them and these resources give them numerous advantages in maintaining their power over the
unorganised rank and file or ordinary members of a group.
The oligarchic tendencies of the officials in Zambian trade unions can be traced to a numder
reasons. Michels (1915) has identified a number of reasons for the tendency towards
oligarchic control. These factors include:
a). the fact that general participation in trade union affairs by the vast majority of the people
is practically impossible;
b). the need for an efficient and expert decision making structure or system;
c). the natural human desire or avarice for power.
During campaigns enroute to trade union elections, some would be officials usually make
numerous promises to the electorates such as trade unions reforms, workers better coditions
of service i.e. accomodation and transport allowances, and even how approachable they will
be to their members, which is never usually the case. Once elected into office these promises
are rarely fulfilled as the these union officials become relaxed especially with the passage of
time. This been reinforced by Borgatta and Montgomery (Ibid. p. 2644) who have observed
that over time the leaders who have been co-opted into the trade union develop similar
intererst and intra-elite attachments that reflect their elevated positions and they end up
separating themselves from the members they are suppose to represent.
Trade union officials in Zambia have always been finding ways to increase their overall
membership. One would say the larger the union body the more the leaders will be detached
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from their members. As Michels (1915, p. 366) observed, as the organization becomes larger,
the smaller the controlling elite becomes. Also, recruitment into the leadership structure of
trade unions as formal organizations is drawn from the rank of those with experience and
expertise in union matters, for example, members campaigning for positions usually put
emphasis on their past experience in union matters.
One major issue or challenge for trade unions in Zambia is their structural rigidity and lack of
internal democracy. This has led to trade unions splitting resulting in the formation of new
unions. For instance, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions existed as a sole mother body to
which all the unions where affiliated to. This meant that one official was the overall head of
these sub unions. In their paper, Nyirenda and Shikwe (2003, p. 18) contends that before
1991 the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions enjoyed the monopoly of being the sole trade
union federation with the legal framework prescribing it to exist as such.
The lack of internal democracy in Zambian trade unions has been witnessed by the creation
of more unions in the recent past. Nyirenda and Shikwe (2003, p. 18) states that Zambia had
19 trade unions before the ratification of ILO Convention 87 and the subsequent amendment
of the Zambian Industrial Relations and Labour Unions Act of 1997 which gave birth to other
trade unions. These splinter trade unions later formed a federation known as the Federation of
Free Trade Unions of Zambia (FFTUZ). According to Nyirenda and Shikwe (Ibid.) the
formation of this federation was as a result of the differences among the trade union officials
after the quadrennial congress. Nyirenda and Shikwe further add that breakaway unions from
ZCTU have joined the FFTUZ due to among other things dissatisfaction with the services
provided by the original unions, political interference and selfishness among trade union
officials.
In Zambia, there are now currently 25 trade unions according to the Commonwealth of
Nations. Monappa (2007, p. 51) argues that the existence of a large number of unions has led
to the diffusion of union power at the top and therefore damages political leverage of trade
union officials and this is an act of oligarchy. The existence of a large number of unions has
also led to inefficient efforts to change or introduce new legislation so as to improve the
welfare of workers, which could have been possible if there was one cohesive body (Ibid.).
For example, there are a number of trade unions representing workers in the teaching
profession in Zambia each with its own leaders. Thus it is difficult for these different unions
to unite over a common cause of demands of their members as their different ideologies make
3

it impossible to take a united stance with each unions officials seeking to gain more leverage
from a bargaining process. This attitude of the union officials is thus seen to be oligarchic.
The selection of trade union leadership in Zambia may sometimes present a facade of
democratic process but in reality, those elected are usually the products of the present leaders
and or ex-leaders of the unions. The immediate consequence of lack of democracy is the
development of inter-personal or inter-group conflicts within the unions. Some of the
decisions taken by the elitist leaders do not usually reflect majority opinions, especially those
of the ordinary rank and file. The obvious reason is that the leadership of most of the unions
had become aristocratic and oligarchic. As Michels (1915, p. 365) observed, large-scale
organisations no matter how democratic its official ideology is, requires a division of labour
between expert officials and rank and file members. This inexorably leads to oligarchic
control by small elite.
The foregoing has been echoed by C. Wright Mills who contends that the structure of any
trade union organization is no doubt democratic as the officers of the unions are elected.
However, according to C. Wright Mills, leadership succession is usually governed by
grooming and a period of tutelage (Mills, 1956). Furthermore, the unions are not immune
from the effects of modernization on the larger society where rationalization of thought is
increasingly gaining ground.
Weber (1947), states that with the modernization of society, leadership has become
increasingly professionalized and this has led to power being concentrated in bureaucracies.
According to this thesis of Max Weber, the stability of bureaucratic organizations is also
bedevilled by intransigent and unanswerable elite of power holders. Weber has further
observed that trade unions as bureaucratic organizations are affected by this structural
malaise. Some trade unions membership in Zambia may constitute people with minimal
education i.e. general workers. Officials in these unions, usually with some decent level of
education, may stay longer in power due to lack of challengers among the rank and file
members.
The rigid structure of power and its tendency towards oligarchic control of trade unions often
leads to alienation, mass apathy and acquiescence among the rank and file members. This
according to Mills (1956) makes it easy for the masses to be easily manipulated and exploited
by the ruling elites who rule in their own interest. The estrangement that occurs leaves the
masses of workers sullenly ignorant, powerless and moulded by mass culture dictated by the
4

ruling oligarchy. Weber (1947) in a similar vein argues that the concentration of power in the
hands of a bureaucratic elite puts enormous amount of human, material and intellectual
resources under its firm and rigid control. This leads to the entrenchment of power in the
hands of the elite at the top of the hierarchical ladder of control.
Elections in Zambian trade unions are usually held in accordance with democratic norms of
political parties in general elections, but succession is usually determined by the fact that new
leaders of trade unions are drawn from those that have in the union for a relatively longer
period. These opinion shapers are usually made up of former leaders of the unions who have
become referential, respected and consulted either as patrons or ex-officio members of the
unions. Consequently, their views or opinion may be regarded or seen as sacrosanct and
highly respected.
Gordon (1971, p. 157) asserts that the iron law of oligarchy is just a new name for the central
elitist principle that trade union is infact leadership by a few. Because trade union officials in
Zambia constitute a minority compared with the members, they are deemed an oligarchy.
Gordon has further stated A system is oligarchic if policies are determined by a small group
of leaders and there is no mechanism which ensures that these policies correspond in any way
with the wishes of the members. A case in time is where the union members suggest to their
officials that they should negotiate for a minimum of thirty percent and the union officials
only only manage twelve percent. This is usually done without the consulting the rank and
file members of the union.
Trade Union officials in Zambia sometimes will beseech their members to go back to work
despite having taken longer than necessary in their negotiations with respective employers.
The workers may not be happpy but union officials usually defy their anger and nevertheless
remain in power as was the case with the nurses at the Unversity Teaching Hospital. Michels
(1915, p. 158) gives an example of the miners of the Ruhr basin in 1905 who were enraged
with their leaders when they had taken it upon themselves to declare the great miners strike
over. In this case, Michels further conteds that in times of strike, the trade union members are
often sulky but they never rebel for they do not have the ability to punish the treachery of the
the union officials (Ibid.)
Sometimes workers have lost their jobs due to what employers have described as illegal
strike. Trade union officials have failed to have these workers reinstated despite them making
financial contributions on a monthly basis. For example, about two years ago, nurses at the
5

University Teaching Hospital and other government hospitals went on strike. The government
ordered them to return to work despite their demands not having been met. Due to non
compliance to the governments directive the nurses were fired. Part of a story carried out in
the Zambia Daily Nation Newspaper dated 30th November 2013 read as follows: All striking
nurses and midwifes at the University Teaching Hospital (UTH), the countrys largest
referral hospital have been dismissed with immediate effect for participating in what
government is calling a wild-cat strike. The trade union officials at Civil Servants and Allied
Workers Union of Zambia (CSAWUZ), the union which the nurses are affiliated to, failed to
have them reinstated but the union officials remained in office despite that development.
The iron law of oligarcy among Zambian trade union officials is also exhibited by the
multiplicity of the unions. Monappa (2007, p. 51) has observed that multiple trade unions
leads to union officials squabbling among themselves for dominance thus depriving their
members of the wages they are expected to receive after negotiations. This observation has
been echoed by critics of trade union democracy (Lipset 1961, p. 6) who agues that union
democracy is one of the causes of irresponsible bargaining demands and unnecessary strikes.
Furthermore, those union leaders who face the possibility of desposition in a succeeding
election seek to justify their incumbency by a show of extreme militancy in advocating major
improvements in the management of union affairs.
According to Lipset (1961, p. 12) most union officials have risen from the ranks of industrial
workers to prestigious positions allowing them to enjoy many middle class comforts, the full
time union functionary is powerfully motivated to maintain himself in office. During union
elections, a defeat usually means having to return to a relatively low-status, low-paying
occupation. In this case, Lipset sees many union officials, Zambia inclusive, as being led by
self-interest to circumvent efforts at greater membership control and democratic rights in
order to remain in office (Ibid.).
Trade unions have a tendency, as Robert Michels cautioned, of becoming highly
bureaucratised resulting in rank and file union members inevitably being controlled by a tiny
minority in process thwarting democratic aspirations within the union structures (Burgmann
and Burgmann 1998, p. 63). This view is aslo echoed by Duverger (1963) who acknowledged
that all systems of governannce are necessarily oligarchic in the sense that it is virtually
impossible for everyone to equally participate in decision making.

In conclusion it has been seen that trade union officials in Zambia exhibit the iron law of
oligarchy. Usually, internal democracy is practiced in these unions but a common trend is that
same individuals are returned into office over and over on the premise that they have
experience in union affairs. Some trade union officials have made office bearing like full-time
employment. Thus, despite these organizations having been formed to fight for greater
internal democracy and improved welfare of their employees, they turn into oligarchies with
power concentrated in the hands of a few individuals. The multiplicity of unions within one
profession, for example teaching, implies that they are usually internal wrangles within these
unions. One would be tempted to conclude that these union internal wrangles among officials
are due to various benefits accrued to them by virtue of their positions. Also, trade union
officials in Zambia have a challenge on how to consult their members to come up with a
collective agreement.

REFERENCES
Borgatta, E.F. & Montgomery, J.V., Encyclopedia of Sociology, 2nd Ed., Vol. 3, Macmillan, New York

Burgmann, M. & Burgmann, V. (1998) Green Bans, Red Union Environmental Activism
and the New South Wales Builders Labourers Federation, University of South Wales
Press, Sydney
Duverger, M. (1954) Political Parties, Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State,
Methuen Publishing, London
Gordon, H., (1971) Robert Michels and the Study of Political Parties, British Journal of Political
Science, Vol. 1:2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Janoski, T. et al. (2005) The Hanbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies and
Globalisation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Lipset, S.M., (1961) The Law and Trade Union Democracy Virginia Law Review, Vol.
47:1, Virginia
Marx, K. (1978). Capital. Vol. I. Penguin, Harmondsworth
McGovern, P. (2009) The Young Lipset on the Iron Law of Oligarchy: A Taste of Things to Come,
London School of Economics & Political Science, London
Michels, R. (1915) Political Parties: A Sociological Study of The Oligarchical Tendencies of
Modern Democracy

Nyirenda, E.J. & Shikwe, A. (2003) Trade Union Country Report-Report, Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, Lusaka
Sinha, P.R.N. (2009) Industrial Relations, Trade Unions and Labour Legislation, 4th Edition
Weber, M. (1947) The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations, Oxford University
Press, New York
Wright, M.C. (1956) The Power Elite, Oxford University Press, New York

Zambia Daily Nation Newspaper, Pursuing Justice and Equity with Integrity (30 th November 2013)
http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/sectors-zambia/civil_society/trade_unions/ (2015)