European Reaction to the US-British victory in Iraq

A focus on France and Germany

European Jewish Congress

Policy Study

Paris, May 2003

Co-authored by Manuel Seiffe and Dean Bahat

As the second Gulf war has ended, both more quickly and with significantly less bloodshed
than expected, one would expect the currents of European public opinion to shift in support of
the United States decision to wage war. However, in the weeks that followed the swift USBritish victory, public opinion condemning the US government for its policy, its general
behavior and in particular for its disregard of the UN, has remained static.

As could be

expected, European political leaders that previously opposed the war have been more
pragmatic in their response to the victory than the public itself, as leaders like Gerhard
Schrder attempt to maneuver their countries into a new era of US-European relations.
However, if one focuses on the two major European nations that attempted to impede the US
impetus to wage war, namely France and Germany, one observes that Gerhard Schrder and
Jacques Chirac differ in the post-war political behavior, while their respective constituencies
remain, by in large, unified in their criticism against the US government.

Contrary to the hopes of senior U.S. officials, the anti-US sentiment that prevailed prior and
during the war, remained fairly unchanged following the collapse of Saddams regime.
Although fewer people demonstrated across Europe the days following the US-British
victory, a sizeable amount of people marched the streets and it has become clear that the
majority of Europeans disapproves war and strongly believes the quick and relatively sanitary
US victory does not justify the war.

On Saturday, April 12, about 20 000 people

demonstrated against the US Iraq policy in Berlin.

During a mid-March protest in London,

about 200 000 people 1 attended, in sharp contrast to an April 12th march in which, according
to the police, about 20,000 demonstrators were present, while organizers estimated the turnout
at around 150,000. Rome counted 50,000, while 11 000 demonstrated in Paris.2 Despite the
rapid assault on Iraq and the relatively few allied casualties that resulted from the action, these
Europeans still insist that the victory does not justify the war, are suspicious of the United
Statess ability to preserve peace in post-war Iraq, and wonder if the suspected supply of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) ever existed in the first place. Many Europeans did
not trust the United States government prior to the war, and this includes long-term US
interests and reasons. European papers like the popular German daily the Sddeutsche, are
full of anti-American commentaries concerned with American imperialism, using such
phrases as imperial idea, hegemony, or guardian of the world when discussing US
1
2

Thousands join anti-war demos The Guardian www.guardian.co.uk

Weltweite Proteste gegen den Irak-Krieg flauen ab Frankfurter Rundschau www.fr-aktuell.de

policy. For example, when polled, 71 percent 3 of Germans believe that the US goal was the
implementation of its own national interests. In the same poll, only 25 percent believed that
the goal of the Americans has been the democratization of Iraq.

Another opinion poll in

France showed that a quarter of the French people actually wanted Saddam Hussein to win.5
This poll, while seemingly extreme in stance, should reflect the degree of anti-US sentiment,
as a significant amount is required to create a sizeable amount of people who hope to see the
victory of an evil dictator over a democratic power.

The Germans and the French, for their part regard American diplomacy in the approach to
the conflict as dishonest and reckless, concentrating mendaciously on weapons of mass
destruction, when all the time determined to go to war simply to change the regime.6
Concerning weapons of mass destruction, the fact that WMD were not found yet open fresh
wounds of mistrust from the European side, even among those allied with the United States.
In a comment in the English Guardian, writer Peter Preston asks regarding WMD:
Washington and London just make it all up? Did they play the UN for suckers?7

The

absence of the very weapons that the United States claimed were one of the main motivating
forces behind the US blitzkrieg, though now rarely mentioned in the US press, will not be
soon forgotten by those in Europe. Even those opinions that were not polarized to an extreme
pro or anti-war position could not fully rally behind the relatively aesthetic and swift US
victory. In a reflection in the German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) one week
after the victory, the poet Hans-Magnus Enzensberger raises the question Are we supposed
to be happy or not?8

Statements like these convey the impression that many European

skeptics have difficulties feeling at ease after the US victory precisely because of the US
victory. The U.S. assault on Baghdad, from a military standpoint, was an incredible success.
It did not live up to the shock and awe ideal of pre-war US predictions, but the wars
duration and allied casualty total defied those European critics who were predicting a second
Vietnam or, in a worst case scenario, a hostile Israeli response to a Saddam missile attack.
Despite these European critics failed predictions, their degree of skepticism and criticism of
US activity has not relented, and as post-war Baghdad sinks further and further into what

Poll taken by EMNID for the German TV channel N-TV

Ibid
5
Charlemagne: Frances man on horseback The Economist. May 24-30th 2003
6
Ibid
7
Preston, Peter The world wont forgive or forget in Guardian
8
Enzenberger, Hans Magnus Blinder Frieden Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. April 15, 2003
4

seems to resemble disarray, one can assume that the voice of opposition will continue to
increase in volume.
Yet, opposition to the war had not persisted as the dominant political theme in those nations
that opposed the war to from the start. For Germans, as well as for the majority of Europeans,
the Iraq conflict has decreased in importance as the statistics below from Infratest dimap, a
main German poll institute, proves. The poll reveals that in the beginning of April, the issue
of Iraq was the political topic that most occupied the minds of Germans (81 percent). In May,
this percentage is practically cut in half, with only 46 percent of Germans citing the war as the
most

important

political

issue.

By contrast, topics such as reforms of the welfare system (27 percent) or the economy and
employment (17 percent) have increased in importance for the public in the recent weeks.
Thus, it has become clear that domestic issues do play an important role again.

It is also

interesting to note that the approval rate of Chancellor Schrder has decreased steadily in the
last weeks. According to a poll, on May 9, 2003 only 29 percent of Germans would vote for
his Social Democratic Party (SPD), while by the end of May this number had decreased to a
record low of 25 percent.9 The SPD, on the other hand, managed to win the national election
of September 2002 with 38.5 percent of the votes.10 In stark contrast to Schrders approval
rate, one finds the French public highly satisfied with President Chiracs policy. However, his
9

Umfrage: SPD fllt auf Allzeittief Der Spiegel http://www.spiegel.de May 27, 2003

huge popularity during the war period also decreased in the weeks directly following the war
as a poll proved on April 23 that his approval rates sank from a record of 75 percent in mid
march to a still high 64 percent in mid April.11

Prior to his election, Gerhard Schrder pigeonholed himself into an obligatory anti-war stance
in the eyes of his constituency, one of many reasons that allowed him to win the election in
September 2002. At that time, it must be noted that Germany, not France, was leading the
anti-war rhetoric opposed against action in Iraq.

However, Schrder and the German

government escaped being vilified by the US government because, in the crucial few weeks
prior to the actual outbreak of the war, France and President Chirac took the helm of
opposition leadership and thus were the primary focal point of US rage. Though France and
Germany shared the exact same position and views regarding the war, proved by the February
10th meeting in which Chirac, Putin and Schrder found a common position, the fact that
Germany somehow escaped being placed in the same classification as France, by both the
White House and the American public, assisted Schrder as he tried to maneuver Germany in
a position to repair the US-German diplomatic relationship.

And indeed the US-German

relationship seemed to improve, as the German weekly Der Spiegel wrote on May 9th that the
German and US governments seem to be willing to further improve its relationship12 and
only days later Powell visited Berlin to meet Schrder, a mere impossibility a couple of
months ago.

This resonates in stark contrast to the words of Paul Wolfowitz, US Vice-

Secretary of Defense, who bluntly stated that France will have to pay for its opposition to the
war,13 or even those of President Bush himself, who stated that he doubted [President
Chirac] would be coming to the ranch anytime soon.14

Schrders pragmatic choice to

pursue policy of re-engagement with the United States is no doubt motivated, at least in part,
by a desire to play a role in the potentially lucrative task of reconstructing Iraq, a role that
may be denied to France.

The German governments pragmatic post-war policy can be

described as a wish and need to normalize the diplomatic relationship to pre-war status.

As previously mentioned, the shift in leadership that propelled France to the forefront of those
opposing the war in Iraq triggered hostile reactions from the United States, deepening the
10

INFRATEST DIMAP http://www.infratest-dimap.de/sonntagsfrage/default.htm

ZDF heute (Second German TV channel) http://www.heute.t-online.de April 25, 2003
12
Treffen Powell-Schrder wahrscheinlich Der Spiegel www.spiegel.de
13
Le Figaro. April 12, 2003
14
Interview with Tom Brokow on NBC news
11

transatlantic divide between the two allies. Though Russia, being a permanent member of the
UN Security Council, also threatened to veto any initiative to war, France somehow bore the
full force of US anger. In the eyes of many US politicians, the damage to diplomatic relations
between the two allies was seemingly irreparable. Richard Perle went further by saying that
resentment over Frances opposition to the war ran so deep in the United States that he
doubted there could ever be a basis for constructive relations between the two
governments.15 In contrast to Germany, France has not softened its stance toward the US in
the least, leading some to speculate whether France is attempting to spearhead a jointEuropean effort to eventually counterbalance the present global hegemony of the United
States. Such an effort could be suspected, considering the meeting on April 29th in Brussels
between the leaders of France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg, aimed at discussing the
formation of a joint EU security force, a European Rapid Reaction Capability and the creation
of a central military headquarters for the EU that would exist and operate independently.
Critics of the meeting dismissed it as shallow and uneventful, but one could also view the
meeting as a step in the direction of a European effort to provide a potential counterbalance to
US military hegemony and to boost its own defense capabilities and military cooperation.
The mini summit was criticized by some as being anti-US, yet European leaders like Jacques
Chirac insist the contrary, as he stated, We are not questioning the transatlantic alliance. We
want to reinforce itbut, in order to have a balance, we have to have a strong Europe, as well
as a strong US.16

Opposition to the plan has arisen from within the EU itself, as some

leaders fear that such a plan would undermine the structure and security provided already by
NATO.

Tony Blair, publicly stated that the UK wont except, and neither will the rest of

Europe, anything that either undermines NATO or conflicts with the basic principals of
European defense weve set out. 17 Though the British Prime Minister may feel opposed to
the plan, the general European citizenry feels differently. According to a survey carried out
by the EUs statistics office (Eurostat), 63 percent of those asked are in favor of a common
foreign policy while 71 percent want a common defense policy.18

An analysis of French political behavior following the war can be approached from several
different standpoints.

First, one might question if France would have acted differently if

15

James, Barry A strong warning to Syria International Herald Tribune, April 16, 2003
McCartney, Robert J. 4 European Leaders Form Pact to Boost Defence Cooperation Washington Post,
April 30, 2003
17
Statement by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair to the BBC. April 28, 2003
18
European Comission (Public opinion) http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/
16

Germany had been the focal point of US rage. Would France have taken steps to reengage the
United States, in the same manner as Germany, if the diplomatic ties between the two allies
had not been so strained? Some statements made by French politicians may hint at a French
government that fears the steps taken by the US to punish France economically for its
opposition to the war. Even in the week prior to the fall of Baghdad, French Prime Minister
Jean Pierre Raffarin reaffirmed his governments intention to clamp down on any expression
of anti-Americanism, which would be unacceptable, and said that French leaders were
siding with democracy.19 In sharp contrast to language used prior to the war, these words
seem softened, toned down for the media that was eager to sensationalize the growing
resentment between the two allies. Thus, the distinct change in tone may suggest that France
is attempting to salvage any remaining opportunities to pragmatically reengage the United
States, as the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson stated on April 18th , after the
fall of Baghdad, that as things stand now, we must act in stages, with pragmatism and
collectively.20 Secondly, could one even argue that Frances opposition has been motivated
by pure economics, a result of the remaining dept owed to France by Saddam Hussein, money
that would not be returned if Baghdad fell to the Americans? It is estimated that Iraq owes
Russia and France about 8 billion dollars each, mostly for sales and contracts concluded in the
1980s, when Iraq was at war with neighboring Iran21 Lastly, is Frances position, the pure
result of its traditional ideology and not a response to US anti-French sentiments?
Henceforth, if one explains the French attitude as derivative from a traditional and national
ideology,

a tradition of Gaullist independence that has always stuck in Washingtons

craw,22 the anti-war stance taken by France could be explained as a result of the countrys
wish to remain a first-rank power in the world. Leading US hawk Robert Kagan seems to
agree, believing that the Chirac government continues to present itself as the builder of a
great counterweight to the United States,23 while in an editorial for the The New York Times,
William Pfaff writes that France is the only European country that says U.S. power should be
contained.24 It has become clear that France is no longer the powerful empire it used to be.

19

Statement by French Prime Minister Jean Pierre Raffarin, April 1, 2003

Statement by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson (Paris, April 18, 2003)
www.diplomatie.gov.fr
21
Donovan, Jeffrey U.S.: After Iraq Victory, Will Washington Seek to Repair Ties to Europe?
22
Pfaff, William Europe will follow France International Herald Tribune. May 22, 2003
23
Donovan, Jeffrey U.S.: After Iraq Victory, Will Washington Seek to Repair Ties to Europe?
24
Pfaff, William Europe will follow France International Herald Tribune. May 22, 2003
20

History has yet to judge the long-term implications of the US-led assault on Iraq and
Sadaams Baaath government, as the power vacuum left by the fallen dictator has yet to be
filled.

Whether the removal of the Iraqi dictator will prompt the spread of democracy

throughout the region, whether weapons of mass destruction will ever be found, whether the
United States has set a dangerous precedent for pre-emptive war, are all questions that will be
answered in the coming years.

Each will have a serious bearing on the way Europe will

retrospectively view the war itself and their own opposition to it.

Those Europeans whose

opinions are polarized against the United States may reconsider their opposition, but only if
the reconstruction of Iraq succeeds and if the United States takes steps to engage Europe with
a more multilateral approach.

Considering the immense volume of trade that is annually

exchanged between the two and considering that Europe has accounted for half of the total
global earnings of U.S. companies, engagement, not unilateralism, is in the interest of both
powers. As mentioned earlier, for most Europeans, their anti-war position towards the USBritish campaign has not fundamentally changed.

As framed by EU Commissioner for

External Relations Chris Patten, Europeans and their leaders recognize that the last few
weeks have been miserable for those of us who believe in European unity.25 They see the
need to work in the same direction again as all European leaders believe in the EU. They
further recognize the importance of a strong trans-Atlantic partnership and how much the
United States and Europe need one another.26

Manuel Seiffe and Dean Bahat

25
26

Patten, Chris and Lamy, Pascal Lets put away the megaphone in International Herald Tribune
Ibid