Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
During World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill
formulated allied grand strategy at a series of high-level conferences held in Washington. DC,
Casablanca, Quebec, Cairo. Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. At the Tehran, Yalta. and Potsdam conferences,
the Russian leader. Joseph Stalin, also played a major role. Under policy guidance from their national
leaders, the newly formed US Joint Chiefs of Stall' and their British counterparts, known collectively as
the Combined Chiefs of StafT, hammered out tbe military detlils of allied strategy.
The minutes of the Combined Chiefs'meeting at the major conferences touch on virtually every policy
and strategy issue of World War II, from initial troop deployments to counter Axis aggression, tbrough the
debates about the location aDd timing of the principal Anglo-American ofTensives, to tbe settlement of
post-war occupation boundaries. Besides being an invaluable primary source on the early years of the Joint
Chiefs of Stair and on the planning and conduct of World War II, these documents also ofTer insights for
today on the problems of managing a global coalition war. Originally highlyclassified documents, the min
utes were declassified by JCS Regrading Memo 52-73 on October 3, 1973. The Joint History Office is pub
lishing these minutes on CD-Rom to make them readily available to present-day militlry planners, faculty
and students at the joint and service scbools, historians, and the generdl pUblic.
Historians hal'e served on the Joint StafT and its predecessors since 1945. Created by General Colin
L. Powell in 1993, the Joint History Office provides historical support to the Chairman and,Vice
Chairman of the Joint Cbiefs of StlfT, the Joint Chiefs of StafT, and the Joint StafT. Joint History pub
lications are available in federal depository libraries and can be accessed under History Publications in
tbe Joint Electronic Library on the World Wide Web at http://www.dtic.milldoctrine. Inquiries should
be directed to the Director of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaIr,
Wasbington, DC, 20318- 9999.
~Q.~a=;
DAVIDA. ARMSTRONG
Brigadier General, USA (Ret)
Director for Joint History
ARCADIA (Washington. DC, 24 December 1941-14 January 1942). Roosevelt. Churchill, and
the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staft conducted their first post-Pearl Harbor strategy confer
ence. The political leaders drafted and signed the Declaration of the United Nations. The
military chiefs discussed an invasion of North Africa, completed arrangements for Ameri
can forces to rel ieve British troops in Iceland and Northern Ireland. made plans for Ameri
can reinforcement of the South Pacific, and set up a combined allied command for South
east Asia.
POST-ARCADIA (Washington, DC, and london, 23 January 1941-19 May 1942). At twenty
meetings. the Combined Chiefs of Staff worked out the details of implementing the ARCA
DIA decisions. They dealt with force deployments to the Pacific and Great Britain, com
mand arrangements, and the allocation of shipping and supplies. The Combined Chiefs dis
cussed the U.S. relief of British forces in Iceland and Northern Ireland. arrangements for
the American buildup in the British Isles. and the availability of landing craft for possible
invasions of the European continent in 1942 and 1943.
CASABLANCA CONFERENCE (Casablanca, Morocco, 14-23 January 1943). This was the
first of the great Allied mid-war conferences, with Roosevelt. Churchill, their military
chiefs of staff, and the French leaders Henri Giraud and Charles de Gaulle in attendance.
In the major U.S .-British debate, the British prevailed. The Allies postponed the cross
Channel invasion until 1944, but organized a combined staff to plan for it. For the immedi
ate future. they would continue the Mediterranean campaign with an invasion of Sicily.
They also decided to launch a combined strategic air offensive against Germany, and the
Americans were to mount a Pacific offensive against Japan. Roosevelt and Churchill
issued the Unconditional Surrender doctrine.
TRIDENT (Washin.gton, DC, 15-25 May 1943). Principal participants were Roosevelt, Churchill,
their military chiefs of staff, and Generals Wavell, Chennault. and Stilwell from the China
Burma-India (CBI) theater. The Americans secured British agreement to a cross-Channel
invasion with a target date of 1 May 1944. The allies reaffirmed their commitment to the
strategic air offensive as preparation for the invasion. They agreed to continue the Mediter
ranean offensive with the aim of knocking Italy out of the war. The Americans won support for
a stepped-up offensive in the Pacific, and the allies discussed operations to assist Chi.na.
future United Nations organization and post-war Polish boundaries. In the Cairo Declaration,
the United States, Britain, and China stated their intention to strip Japan of all her pre-war
and wartime conquests.
OCTAGON (Quebec, 12-16 September 1944). Roosevelt. Churchill, and their military chiefs
QUADRANT (Quebec, 14-24 August 1943). Roosevelt, Churchill, and their military chiefs of
of staff convened in the last of their mid-war conferences . They agreed on British and
American occupation zones in Germany. Roosevelt and Churchill initialed the Morgenthau
Plan for post-war German de-industrialization. Decisions on the Pacific war included
approval of the U.S. invasion of Leyte and plans for British fleet participation in the final
campaigns against Japan.
staff decided that the cross-Channel attack, codename OVERLORD, was to be the main
Anglo-American effort in Europe for 1944, with a target date of 1 May. They approved the
outline plan developed by the combined Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander
(COSSAC) staff and authorized preparations. The combined bomber offensive was to con
tinue with the "highest strategic priority." At the same time, the offensive against Italy was
to continue. Planning was authorized for an invasion of southern France as a companion to
OVERLORD. The allies approved the U.S. schedule of operations in the Central and South
Pacific and established the Southeast Asia Command in the CBI. The leaders discussed the
shift of forces to the Pacific after Germany's defeat and established a twelve-month target
for finishing off Japan after Germany surrendered.
and their military leaders reached agreements on the occupation of Germany and Austria,
including the creation of a French zone in Germany. Roosevelt and Stalin made a secret
agreement on Soviet territorial gains in the Far East in return for Soviet participation in the
war against Japan. The Big Three settled the issues of United Nations voting rights and
Poland's government and frontiers. The three leaders issued a Declaration on Liberated Eu
rope in which they committed themselves to free elections and democratic governments in
the countries freed from the Nazis.
TERMINAL (Potsdam, 17 July-2 August 1945). This conference saw a changing of the guard
pants were Roosevelt, Churchill, the U.S. and British chiefs of staff, Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek (Cairo), and Josef Stalin (Tehran). The Americans, British, and Chinese discussed
plans for the CBI. The Big Three (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin) stated that OVERLORD and
the invasion of southern France would be the "supreme operations" in the west in 1944.
Stalin promised to attack in the east simultaneously with the cross-Channel invasion. The
Americans and British agreed that General Eisenhower would command the invasion. Stalin
stated that the Soviet Union would enter the Pacific war after Germany was defeated . The
allies agreed that the United States would continue its Central and South Pacific drives, in
cluding seizure of the Marianas as a base for B-29 raids on Japan. The allies discussed the
among American and British leaders. Harry S. Truman replaced President Roosevelt, who
had died on 12 April. In mid-conference, Clement Atlee replaced Churchill, whose party had
lost Britain's first post-war election. The conferees discussed surrender terms for Japan,
boundaries and peace terms for Europe, and Poland's frontiers and government. The
Potsdam Declaration reaffirmed the Allies' demand for Japan's unconditional surrender
and divestiture of its empire but promised to respect the human rights of the Japanese
people. Privately, Truman informed Stalin that the United States had successfully tested a
super-bomb.
ARGONAUT (Malta and Yalta, 20 January-ll February 1945). Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin,
39
COPY NO.
3 October 1973
pursuant
bound volumes contatsing the papers and minutes of Meetings of t h e I n t a r natSob&i Conferences hald during World War IT are dowungradcd to
UNCLA56IFIED:
CASABLANCA
CONFERENCE
- January 1943 (2
TRID?WT CONFEReNCE
- May lgb3
QUADRANT CONFERENCE
- Auast
V o l ~ c S )
1943
SEXTANT. CONFENCWE
- fovcmber-December
OCTAWN CONFERENCE
1943
September 1944
ARGONAUT CONFERENCE
- Jahuary-Februuy 1945
TWMINAL CONFERENCE
- July 19b5
E. A , WILCOX
D. L . JONES
Jo i n t Secretariat
C A S A B L A N C A
C O N F E R E N C E
J A N U A R Y 1943
PAPERS
AND
MlNUTES
OF
MEETINGS
Office, U. S. Secretary,
1943
U. S. SECRET
BRITISK MOST SECRET
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAPERS
C.C.S.
PAGE
75/3
153
153/1
Operations
154
155
155/1
156
11
.
.
15
P
157
A l l i e d P l a n s Xelating To Turkey
158
Axis O i l P o s i t i o n
159
159/1
Th
f f e n s i v e From Norlth A f r i c a
161
161/1.
Operation HUSKY
162
162/1
U . S. Aid To Russia
lb0
SKY
3.
23
%&
58
63
72
U. S. Aid To Russia
75
163
'7 8
154
164/1
80
82
165
165/1
165/2
.
.
84
84
166
166/1/D
167
168
169
99
U. S o SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAPERS
C.C.S.
170
PAGE
Report To The P r e s i d e n t And Prime M i n i s t e r
Draft Report On T h e Work O f The Conference
170/1
170/2
Symbol--Final
102
109
R e p o r t , T o The P r e s i d e n t And
Prime l l i n i s t e r Summarizing D e c i s i o n s By
The Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f
17I
Directive--Operation
171/1/D
D i r e c t i v e To Commander-In-Chief, A l l i e d
E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force I n North Africa--
HUSKY
D i r e c t i v e To Commander-In-Chief,
125
127
127
Allied
172
117
129
MINUTES
ANFA 1st Meeting
S i t u a t i o n i n North A f r i c a
ANFA 2nd Meeting
.
.
.
134
142
154
S e c u r i t y o f Sea Communications
Assistance t o Russia
Operations i n t h e Mediterranean
O p e r a t i o n s i n and from t h e United Kingdom
P a c i f i c and Far East Theater
C.C.S.
5 5 t h Ateeting
169
183
Combined S t r a t e g y P e r t a i n i n g t o t h e P a c i f i c S i t u a t i o n
vi
U. S . SECRET
TABLE OF CONTENTS
MINUTES
PAGE
C.C.S.
57th Meeting
Ant isubmarine Warfare
S i t u a t i o n i n North A f r i c a
S t r a t e g y i n t h e European Theater
C.C.S. 38th hleeting
. .
195
207
Theater
S u p p l i e s t o Russia
C.C.S.
59th Meeting
The E a s t e r n Theater
Iceland
Russian A i r Assistance f o r P.Q. Convoys
C.C.S. 6 0 t h Meeting
225
232
C.C.S.
Operations i n Burma
The S i t u a t i o n t o be Created i n t h e E a s t e r n Theater
( t h e P a c i f i c and Burma) i n 1943
E s c o r t Vessel s
P o t e n t i a l i t i e s o f P o l i s h Forces
Raids on B e r l i n
Naval S i t u a t i o n i n t h e Western Mediterranean
6 1 s t Meeting
248
C.C.S.
254
Axis O i l P o s i t i o n
Allied P l a n s R e l a t i n g t o Turkey
vii
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S R lrlOST SECRET
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
C.CoS. 63rd J f e e t i n g
U.
s.
263
A i d t o Russia
B r i t i s h Z e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Turkey
The Bomber O f f e n s i v e from North A f r i c a
6 4 t h Meeting
272
HUSKY
C.C,S.
Future Business
6 5 t h Xeeting
The U-Boat War
276
ANAKJM
BOLERO Suild-up
292
HUSKY
c c o s ,5 7 t h
hfeeting
Conduct of t h e !Yar i n t h e P a c i f i c Theater i n 1343
300
P r e s s Communique
C o n t i n e n t a l O p e r a t i o n s i n 1943
O r g a n i z a t i o n o f Command, C o n t r o l , P l a n n i n g and
T r a i n i n g f o r Cross-Channel O p e r a t i o n s
Landing Craft
3 10
EOLEXO Suild-up
C o n t i n e n t a l O p e r a t i o n s i n 1043
Xeport t o t h e P r e s i d e n t and Prime M i n i s t e r
Operation HUSKY--Directive
C.C.S.
INDEX
t o General Eisenhower
Landing Craft
5 9 t h Meeting
Xeport t o t h e P r e s i d e n t and Prime M i n i s t e r
O p e r a t i o n HUSKY--Directive t o General Eisenhower
A s s a u l t Shipping
Conclusion o f t h e Conference
viii
3 14
3 19
IT. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
75/3
(a) C.C.S.
3 8 t h Meeting, I t e m 3)
Report by Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s
1.
The e n c l o s u r e , p r e p a r e d b y t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s i n accord
ance w i t h r e f e r e n c e ( a ) , is p r e s e n t e d f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n by t h e Combined
Chiefs o f S t a f f . Annex "A", a t t a c h e d t h e r e t o , p r e s e n t s g r a p h i c a l l y t h e
p r i n c i p l e s of u n i f i e d command as c o n t a i n e d i n t h e r e p o r t .
2.
1.
U n i f i e d command i s t h e c o n t r o l , e x e r c i s e d by a d e s i g n a t e d com
mander, over a f o r c e i n t e g r a t e d from combined and j o i n t f o r c e s a l l o c a t e d
to him f o r t h e accomplishment o f a m i s s i o n o r t a s k . T h i s f o r c e w i l l
include a l l t h e means c o n s i d e r e d n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e m i s s i o n ' s s u c c e s s f u l
e x e c u t i o n . U n i f i e d command v e s t s i n t h e d e s i g n a t e d commander, t h e re
s p o n s i b i l i t y and a u t h o r i t y t o c o n t r o l t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f a l l a r m s a n d
s e r v i c e s composing h i s f o r c e , by t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t a s k f o r c e s , as
signment o f m i s s i o n s , d e s i g n a t i o n of o b j e c t i v e s , and t h e e x e r c i s e of
such c o n t r o l a s he deems necessary t o i n s u r e t h e s u c c e s s of h i s mission.
U n i f i e d command d o e s n o t a u t h o r i z e t h e commander e x e r c i s i n g i t , t o
c o n t r o l t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and d i s c i p l i n e o f any f o r c e s o f t h e United
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
N a t i o n s composing h i s command, beyond t h o s e n e c e s s a r y f o r e f f e c t i v e
control.
2.
more of t h e a r m s
3.
(U.
S.) o r s e r v r c e s
( B r i t i s h ) o f one n a t i o n .
1.
of t h e United N a t i o n s a r e t o b e employed on a s p e c i f i c m i s s i o n o r t a s k .
5.
c e r n e d a t t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e moment a f t e r t h e d e c i s i o n t o u n d e r t a k e
an o p e r a t i o n h a s been made.
6.
Be w i l l e x e r c i s e u n i f i e d command o v e r a l l f o r c e s of t h e U n i t e d
Nations a l l o c a t e d t o h i s o p e r a t i o n .
7.
He w i l l b e t h e r e c i p i e n t of a l l major d i r e c t i v e s p e r t a i n i n g t o
t h e arms and s e r v i c e s of h i s f o r c e .
8.
He w i l l be a s s i s t e d by a s m a l l composite s t a f f which w i l l i n c l u d e
i n p r i n c i p l e a Chief of S t a f f , a P l a n n i n g D i v i s i o n , an O p e r a t i o n s Divi
s i o n , a n I n t e l l i g e n c e D i v i s i o n , a L o g i s t i c a l D i v i s i o n , and a Communica
t i o n s C e n t e r , E a c h n a t i o n i n v o l v e d and e a c h of t h e s e v e r a l component
arms o r s e r v i c e s of t h e f o r c e w i l l b e r e p r e s e n t e d on t h e s t a f f i n o r d e r
t o i n s u r e a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s , r e q u i r e m e n t s , and l i m i
t a t i o n s o f e a c h component.
These Commanders w i l l c a r r y o u t t h e i r d u t i e s a t t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s
12.
T a s k F o r c e Commanders w i l l o r g a n i z e t h e i r commands as may b e
n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e t a s k s a s s i g n e d - Sub-Task F o r c e
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH ,YOST S E C R E T
Commanders w i l l be d e s i g n a t e d asmay b e n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e
subordinate t a s k s a s s i g n e d . The p r i n c i p l e o f u n i f i e d command w i l l a p p l y
throughout
13.
The o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t a s k f o r c e s w i l l b e governed by t h e n a t u r e
a i r and n a v a l - - n e c e s s a r y
f o r t h e accomplishment of t h e
and t h e
whether prepon
I n s o f a r as c o n d i t i o n s w i l l p e r m i t , t a s k f o r c e s w i l l be composed
U. S . SECRET
I
NOTE.'
INDICATES
0
INDICATES
U.S.
BRIT.
U. S - SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S. 153 (Revised)
J a n u a r y 17, 1943
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
A t t h e i r 5 6 t h meeting, t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f d i r e c t e d t h e
Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s " t o r e p o r t , on t h e b a s i s t h a t Germany i s t h e
p r i m a r y enemy, what s i t u a t i o n do we wish t o e s t a b l i s h i n t h e E a s t e r n
Theater (i.e
necessary t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t s i t u a t i o n , "
E n c l o s u r e "A" is a p a r t i a l r e p o r t on t h e above d i r e c t i v e p r e p a r e d
by t h e J o i n t U, S . S t a f f P l a n n e r s which h a s been d i s c u s s e d a t a meeting
of t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s
E n c l o s u r e "B" i s a c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e p a r t i a l r e p o r t g i v e n i n
Enclosure "A" p r e p a r e d by t h e J o i n t U
S . S t a f f Planners
V
DYKES,
DEANE,
Combined S e c r e t a r i a t
ENCLOSURE "A"
SITUATION TO BE CREATED I N THE EASTERN THEATER
(NAMELY PACIFIC AND BURMA)
I N 1943
ASSUMPTIONS:
1.
U.
S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
and p r e s s i n g enemy;
and t h a t t h e m a j o r p o r t i o n o f t h e f o r c e s o f the U n i t e d
Nations a r e t o be d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t Germany i n s o f a r a s i t i s con
s i s t e n t w i t h the over-all
o b j e c t i v e of b r i n g i n g t h e war t o a n
2.
T e n t a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n s a r e made
t h a t t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n as between R u s s i a and J a p a n w i l l
continue,
and t h a t t h e Chinese w i l l c o n t i n u e i n t h e war i f s u f f i c i e n t
s u p p o r t i s f u r n i s h e d by G r e a t B r i t a i n and t h e t l n i t e d S t a t e s i n
t h e way of s u p p l i e s and equipment.
SITUATION T O BE CREATED:
3.
he c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e accomplishment of t h e o v e r - a l l
objective,
as well a s t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h e s e c u r i t y of our p o s i t i o n i n t h e Pa
c i f i c , r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e b e k e p t under c o n t i n u a l p r e s s u r e s u f
f i c i e n t i n power and e x t e n t t o a b s o r b t h e d i s p o s a b l e J a p a n e s e m i l i t a r y
effort
4.
l i n e roughly 12,000 m i l e s l o n g - - f r o m t h e B e r i n g
Sea, t h r o u g h t h e Hawaiian
( i o e , yon t h e l a r g e r i s l a n d s ) a r e
capable of s t r o n g d e f e n s i v e e s t a b l i s h m e n t s
Other p o s i t i o n s s u c h as t h e
smaller i s l a n d s , l i k e Canton, c a n n o t b e s t r o n g l y d e f e n d e d
Economy i n
d e f e n s i v e s t r e n g t h of t h e l a r g e r i s l a n d s , and s e c u r i t y o f t h e s m a l l e r
i s l a n d s ? r e q u i r e t h a t we m a i n t a i n t h e i n i t i a t i v e b y o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n ,
This o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n m u s t be d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t Japanese o b j e c t i v e s of
By t h i s p r o c e s s w e i n t e n d t o p r e v e n t t h e J a p a n e s e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
f o r c o n s o l i d a t i n g (digging i n ) , t h u s s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e i r p o s i t i o n s , t O a n
e x t e n t t h a t would p e r m i t them t o i n i t i a t e o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n a t t i m e s and
p l a c e s of t h e i r choosing
We c o n s i d e r t h a t J a p a n e s e power I n r e s p e c t t o s h i p p i n g and a i r
c r a f t has been g e t t i n g p r o g r e s s i v e l y weaker; t h a t our a t t a c k s a g a i n s t
7.
s h i p p i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y by s u b m a r i n e s , s h o u l d be pushed t o t h e maximum
e x t e n t p o s s i b l e ; and t h a t our o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n s h o u l d be d e s i g n e d t o
e f f e c t a c o n t i n u i n g d e c r e a s e i n Japanese n a v a l and a i r power
t o c o n t a i n i n t h e P a c i f i c a r e a t h e J a p a n e s e F l e e t , i t is n e c e s s a r y t o
c o n t i n u e i n t h a t a r e a t h e major p o r t i o n of t h e United S t a t e s F l e e t
TO
g i v e f u l l implementation t o t h i s n a v a l f o r c e , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t s u f
f i c i e n t mobile ground f o r c e s , a i r f o r c e s , and s h i p p i n g be a v a i l a b l e i n
t h a t area t o undertake continuing limited offensives against Japanese
p o s s e s s i o n s - The c h a r a c t e r of t h e s e o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n s envisaged f o r 1943
I n p l a n n i n g t h e s e o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c , we t a k e
n o t e t h a t t h e a b i l i t y of t h e United Nations t o p r o j e c t m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s
a g a i n s t t h e enemy i n a l l a r e a s i s l i m i t e d by s h i p p i n g
I n the Atlantic
t h e r e is a f u r t h e r s e r i o u s l i m i t a t i o n c a u s e d by t h e l a c k o f a d e q u a t e
numbers of e s c o r t s
This
same c o n s i d e r a t i o n of l i m i t a t i o n of e s c o r t c a p a c i t y does n o t a t p r e s e n t
a p p l y t o t h e P a c i f i c , because of comparative absence of submarine menace
i n t h a t area a t t h i s t i m e
10
The a d v e r s e s i t u a t i o n i n r e g a r d t o t h e number of e s c o r t s a v a i l
a b l e i n c o m p a r i s o n t o t h e number of s u b m a r i n e p a c k s o p e r a t i n g i n t h e
A t l a n t i c , a n d t o t h e convoy n e e d s i n t h e A t l a n t i c , w i l l n o t b e g i n t o
show r e l a t i v e improvement b e f o r e October
OPEFlAT IONS :
11-
The p r o s p e c t i v e o p e r a t i o n s t o c r e a t e and m a i n t a i n t h e s i t u a t i o n
i n 1943 s e t f o r t h above a r e :
(a) S e i z u r e and c o n s o l i d a t i o n of U n i t e d N a t i o n s f o r c e s i n t h e
Solomon I s l a n d s , E a s t e r n New Guinea up t o Lae Salamaua pen
i n s u l a , N e w B r i t a i n New I r e l a n d (Rabaul) a r e a .
(b) S e i z u r e and o c c u p a t i o n of Kiska-Agattu
(Western A l e u t i a n s )
IT. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S H XOST S E C R E T
C a r o l i n e I s l a n d s , up t o and i n c l u d i n g T r u k . I t i s p l a n n e d
(3) Burma
campaign. L i m i t e d o p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g p r e s e n t f a v o r a b l e
weather c o n d i t i o n s s u c h as t o p e r m i t improvement of communi
c a t i o n s from I n d i a t o China, t o h e f o l l o w e d by more e x t e n d e d
o p e r a t i o n s towards t h e end o f t h e y e a r w i t h t h e o b j e c t i v e of
r e e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e communications a l o n g t h e lower Burma Road.
The o b j e c t i v e of t h i s campaign i s t o s t r e n g t h e n f o r c e s i n
C h i n a w i t h t h e v i e w t o k e e p i n g C h i n a i n t h e war, k e e p i n g
p r e s s u r e on t h e J a p a n e s e i n t h i s a r e a , and t o t h e e s t a b l i s h
ment and o p e r a t i o n o f a i r s t r e n g t h
OIL
Japanese shipping i n
C h i n e s e and I n d o - C h i n a p o r t s a6 w e l l a s o n t h e f l a n k o f
J a p a n e s e s e a communications a l o n g t h e C h i n a c o a s t .
12.
o p e r a t i o n s l i s t e d above w i l l depend l a r g e l y on t h e s t r e n g t h of J a p a n e s e
d i s p o s i t i o n s . They w i l l be o f t h i s g e n e r a l o r d e r :
Ground F o r c e s , i n c l u d i n g a i r p e r s o n n e l
T.J.
250,000 t r o o p s
S. and U. K. - 500 a i r p l a n e s
t h e U. S. F l e e t , w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g i n t h e A t l a n t i c p r e s e n t
l a r g e s h i p s t r e n g t h a n d i n c r e a s i n g d e s t r o y e r and a n t i
submarine e s c o r t i n t h e A t l a n t i c .
Increase i n s t r e n g t h of the B r i t i s h Eastern f l e e t s u f f i c e n t t o
s u p p o r t o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t Burma.
Shipping
1,250,000 t o n s
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 17, 1943
153/1
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
1.
M
e have been i n s t r u c t e d by t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f t o com
ment on t h e p a p e r by t h e J o i n t U . S . S t a f f P l a n n e r s on t h e s i t u a t i o n t o
b e c r e a t e d i n t h e E a s t e r n T h e a t e r ( P a c i f i c and Burma) i n 1543 (C.C.S.
153).
2.
ASSUMPTIONS:
( a ) f a r a g r a p h 1:
k e f e e l t h a t t h i s s h o u l d be reworded a s f o l l o w s :
"The Combined P l a n n e r s assume t h a t t h e u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e
o f t h e b a s i c g l o b a l s t r a t e g y i s t o b r i n g t h e war t o a suc
c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n a t the e a r l i e s t p r a c t i c a b l e d a t e . T h e
q u i c k e s t way o f a c h i e v i n g t h i s w i l l be t o c o n c e n t r a t e on
d e f e a t i n g Germany f i r s t and t h e n t o c o n c e n t r a t e our combined
r e s o u r c e s a g a i n s t J a p a n . h!eanwhile
s u c h p r e s s u r e must be
m a i n t a i n e d i n J a p a n as w i l l p r e v e n t h e r from damaging i n t e r
e s t s v i t a l t o t h e A l l i e s , and w i l l h i n d e r h e r from c o n s o l i
d a t i n g her conquests."
(b) P a r a g r a p h 2:
We concur.
SITUATION To BE CREATED:
( c ) P a r a g r a p h s 3-10:
We a g r e e i n p r i n c i p l e w i t h t h i s e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e s t r a t e g y
r e q u i r e d , p r o v i d e d a l w a y s t h a t i t s a p p l i c a t i o n d o e s not
p r e j u d i c e t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e d e f e a t o f Germany.
OPERATIONS :
(d) P a r a g r a p h s 11-12:
[I.
S. SECRET
and c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f u n i t e d Nations f o r c e s i n
t h e Solomons, E a s t e r n N e w Guinea up t o t h e Lae-Salamaua
p e n i n s u l a , New Britain-New I r e l a n d (Rabaul) area.
(b) Burma--Limited
we a t h e r p e r i o d :
(1) T o r e c a p t u r e a n d e s t a b l i s h a i r f o r c e s a t Akyab
(Cannibal).
(2) T o e s t a b 1 . i s h a b r i d g e h e a d i n t h e Chindwin V a l l e y so
t h a t , when a n a t t a c k on Rangoon i s m a d e , s i m u l t a n e o u s
p r e s s u r e c a n be e x e r t e d on Mandalay (Ravenous).
(3) T o c o n s t r u c t t h e Hukawng V a l l e y r o a d from Led0 t o
M i j i t k y i n a and L u n g l i n g .
The a d d i t i o n s t o p r e s e n t f o r c e s i n t h e P a c i f i c t h e a t e r r e q u i r e d
t i o n s b u t w i l l be of t h e f o l l o w i n g g e n e r a l o r d e r :
.. :........
A i r c r a f t . ...............
Navy ....................
Amphibious f o r c e s .......
Shipping ................
Ground f o r c e s
No f o r c e s a d d i t i o n a l t o t h o s e now p r e s e n t w i l l b e r e q u i r e d i n
Burma.
12.
With t h e s u c c e s s f u l c o m p l e t i o n of t h e o p e r a t i o n s o u t l i n e d i n t h e
(Western A l e u t i a n s ) .
t h e G i l b e r t I s l a n d s , b!arshall
I s l a n d s , C a r o l i n e I s l a n d s up t o and i n c l u d i n g Truk.
( c ) E x t e n s i o n of o c c u p a t i o n o f N e w G u i n e a up t o a p p r o x i m a t e l y
t h e Dutch b o r d e r .
campaign.
T h i s w i l l be a n e x t e n s i o n o f t h e T r u k
U.
S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
For t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s t h e a d d i t i o n a l f o r c e s r e q u i r e d w i l l be of
t h e order of:
Ground f o r c e s . .
.....
............
Navy ................
Aircraft
Amphibious f o r c e s . .
Shipping
............
13.
f o r t h e c o m p l e t i o n of f u l l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r e p a r a t i o n s by O c t o b e r 1,
1943, have, however, a l r e a d y been g i v e n and p l a n n i n g i s p r o c e e d i n g i n
India.
The f o r c e s a d d i t i o n a l t o t h o s e now i n t h e t h e a t e r r e q u i r e d f o r
t h i s o p e r a t i o n must depend upon enemy s t r e n g t h and d i s p o s i t i o n s a t t h e
time h u t w i l l be of t h e f o l l o w i n g order:
Ground f o r c e s . . . . . . .
Nil
Aircraft............
Rival forces..
18 squadrons
.... Covering
s a r y i n t h e l i g h t of t h e n a v a l s i t u a
t i o n a t t h e t i m e . As much as p r a c t i c
a b l e would b e found from B r i t i s h re
sources.
6-8 E s c o r t C a r r i e r s
40 D e s t r o y e r s or E s c o r t V e s s e l s
Amphibious f o r c e s . . . A s s a u l t s h i p p i n g and l a n d i n g c r a f t suf
f i c i e n t t o l i f t 4 I n f . B r i g a d e Groups
and 1 Armored B r i g a d e .
Shipping
............ 6
0 MT
ships
20 P e r s o n n e l s h i p s
14.
I t i s c e r t a i n t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n o f t h e n a v a l and amphibious
l a t e r i n t h e l i g h t of t h e development of t h e war.
10
S. S E C R E T
BRITISH MOST S E C R E T
0.
C.C.S. 1.54
J a n u a r y 17, 1913
The r e c o n q u e s t o f Burma s h o u l d be u n d e r t a k e n a s s o o n a s r e
sources w i t h i n t h e e x i s t i n g s t r a t e g i c p r i o r i t i e s p e r m i t .
2.
The o u t s t a n d i n g t o p o g r a p h i c a l f e a t u r e g o v e r n i n g o p e r a t i o n s i n
(b) Lashio-Lungling-Yurinanyi-Iiunming-Chungking ( r o a d )
and road--from
T h a i l a n d , and t h e s e a r e a l r e a d y
s u f f i c i e n t t o e n a b l e them t o m a i n t a i n 3 d i v i s i o n s o p e r a t i n g i n Burma.
Communications i n Burma a l l o w t h e J a p a n e s e t o m a i n t a i n l a r g e r
f o r c e s i n t h e Mandalay area t h a n t h e B r i t i s h c a n m a i n t a i n a c r o s s t h e
Assam f r o n t i e r .
OPERATIONS J A N U A R Y - A P R I L
4.
1943:
F i e l d ? ; a r s h a l N a v e l 1 i s now c a r r y i n g o u t c e r t a i n o p e r a t i o n s
o f a i r f o r c e s a t , AKYAF- T h i s o p e r a t i o n h a s s t a r t e d .
(b) O p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t b y I V Corps
(two
d i v i s i o n s ) of a b r i d g e h e a d i n t h e Chindwin v a l l e y s o t h a t
when a n a t t a c k on Rangoon i s made, s i m u l t a n e o u s p r e s s u r e can
b e e x e r t e d on hiandalay.
(The r o u t e s from A s s a m s o u t h t o t h e
11
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
N e i t h e r o f t h e s e p r e l i m i n a r y o p e r a t i o n s w i l l however r e e s t a b l i s h
t h e o n l y m e t h o d s b y which
n o r t h e a s t w a r d s b y t h e "Burma
Road" p r o p e r .
An a l l - w e a t h e r ,
one-way
r o a d h a s b e e n s t a r t e d and t h e i n
route--one
o r two
n o t r e a c h Shingbwiyang u n t i l t h e w i n t e r of19.13-44;
a l t h o u g h i t may b e p o s s i b l e t o p u s h t h r o u g h a d r y - w e a t h e r
t r a c k a s f a r as M y i t k i n a a f t e r t h e monsoon of 1 9 4 3 ,
During c o n s t r u c t i o n i t w i l l n o t be p o s s i b l e t o m a i n t a i n more
t h a n one b r i g a d e g r o u p ( o r two C h i n e s e d i v i s i o n s ) on t h i s
M y i t k i n a a r e a where J a p a n e s e f o r c e s c a n b e m a i n t a i n e d b y
r a i l and a l l - w e a t h e r r o a d ,
(b)
A i r transport:
I t i s recommended t h a t t h e a i r t r a n s p o r t r o u t e s h o u l d b e
m a i n t a i n e d s i n c e i t i s t h e most immediate means o f b r i n g i n g
a i d t o China.
RECONQUEST OF BURMA (Operation ANAKIM) :
6.
The r e c o n q u e s t of Burma w i l l n o t b e p o s s i b l e b e f o r e t h e w i n t e r
of 1943-44 a t t h e e a r l i e s t , I t i n v o l v e s :
(a) The r e c a p t u r e of Rangoon..
(b) The c a p t u r e of t h e Moulmein a r e a w i t h a view t o b l o c k i n g
12
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H IYOST S E C R E T
J a p a n e s e o v e r l a n d r e i n f o r c e m e n t s from T h a i l a n d .
( c ) C o n c u r r e n t l y w i t h ( a ) and ( b ) a b o v e , p r e s s u r e by B r i t i s h
f o r c e s from Chindwin R i v e r b r i d g e h e a d s , and i f p o s s i b l e b y
C h i n e s e f o r c e s from Ynnnan, a g a i n s t Mandalay.
(d) The d e f e a t o f t h e J a p a n e s e f o r c e s i n Lower Burma, i . e . ,
Rangoon-Mandalay
the
area.
6-6 E s c o r t Carriers
40 D e s t r o y e r s and e s c o r t s
8 Submarines
6 F l e e t mine sweepers
i n a d d i t i o n t o s u c h c o v e r by heavy f o r c e s as i s r e q u i r e d by
t h e s i t u a t i o n a t t h e time.
Army
8 Infantry Divisions
1 Armored D i v i s i o n
Air
28 Bomber Squadrons
17 F i g h t e r Squadrons
4 C o a s t a l Squadrons
Assault Shipping )
(4 i n f . bde. groups)
assault
loaded.
The a s s a u l t s h i p p i n g a n d l a n d i n g c r a f t f o r t h e s e a s s a u l t s
amount t o :
9 L.S.I. (L)
10 L.S.T.
4 L.S.D.
inn
or L.S.G.
L.C.A.
C.P.
1c, >:
120 L.C.E.
16 L.C.S.
NOTE:
( 1 ) I f L.C.T.
c a n b e made a v a i l a b l e t h e numbers of
L.S.T.
could be reduced i n t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f o n e
L.S.T.
f o r e v e r y f o u r L.C.T.
U. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S H WOST S E C R E T
(e) Shipping
60 MT s h i p s
20 P e r s o n n e l s h i p s
I N WINTER OF 1943-44:
heather:
8.
be c o n c l u d e d b y A p r i l 3 0 , 1 9 1 1 , o n a c c o u n t o f t h e monsoon. To t a k e
Rangoon and hloulmein, c l e a r t h e whole o f S o u t h e r n Burma up t o Mandalay,
and reopen t h e Burma Road from klandalay t o L a s h i o , i t is e s t i m a t e d t h a t
t h e a s s a u l t must t a k e p l a c e a t t h e l a t e s t i n e a r l y December 1943.
To s e i z e and c o n s o l i d a t e t h e Rangoon-Moulmein
a r e a only, the
i n i t i a l a s s a u l t m i g h t b e p o s t p o n e d u n t i l t h e e n d o f J a n u a r y 1911.
A v a i l a b i l i t y of B r i t i s h I'orces:
9.
(a) Kaval
The B r i t i s h might be a b l e t o f i n d t h e c a p i t a l s h i p s and c a r
r i e r s r e q u i r e d f o r t h i s o p e r a t i o n , p r o v i d e d n o o t h e r am
p h i b i o u s o p e r a t i o n s were b e i n g c a r r i e d o u t c o n c u r r e n t l y i n
t h e European o r M e d i t e r r a n e a n t h e a t e r s ,
They would however r e q u i r e , u n d e r a l l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , con
s i d e r a b l e h e l p from American l i g h t n a v a l f o r c e s .
S u b s e q u e n t l y , i t w i l l b e n e c e s s a r y t o keep open t h e s e a com
m u n i c a t i o n s t o Rangoon~,
(b) Army
These w i l l b e a v a i l a b l e i n I n d i a by October 1 9 4 3 - - i n c l u d i n g
the brigades required t o b e t r a i n e d f o r the i n i t i a l a s s a u l t s .
(c) A i r
The a i r f o r c e s r e q u i r e d c o u l d b e made a v a i l a b l e i n t h e
I n d i a n t h e a t e r b y November 1913.
(d) A s s a u l t S h i p p i n g and L a n d i n g C r a f t
(1) If NO major amphibious o p e r a t i o n s are c a r r i e d o u t e l s e
where i n 1 9 4 3 , t h e a s s a u l t s h i p p i n g and l a n d i n g c r a f t
c o u l d b e found b y t h e B r i t i s h by O c t o b e r 1, 1 9 1 3 ,
(2) If O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE is c a r r i e d o u t n o t l a t e r t h a n t h e
end of J u n e 1 9 1 3 3 and no o t h e r a m p h i b i o u s o p e r a t i o n
takes place,
t h e a s s a u l v s h i p p i n g and l a n d i n g c r a f t
c o u l d b e found b y t h e B r i t i s h b y December 1, 1 9 4 3 , i n
I n d i a n w a t e r s . T h i s would p e r m i t o f an a s s a u l t on Ran
goon a b o u t December 30, 1943.
U. S. YECRET
BRITIM .YOST S E L I ET
( 3 ) I f HUSKY i s c a r r i e d o u t a f t e r cJurre 1 9 ? 2 - - o r
any ot,her
l a n d i n g c r a f t f o r ANAKIM from l i r i t i s h
s o u r c e s u n t i l about r e b r u a r y 19M.
(?) I f O p e r a t i o n AKAKIbl i s c a r r i e d o u t w i t l i H r i t i s l i a s s a u l t
i t would s e r i o u s l y c u r t a i l t h e B r i t i s h s h a r e o f
( e ) Shipping
T i l e a v a i l a b i l i t y of' s h i p p i n g cannot be f o r e c a s t now, b u t the
U.S.A.
w i l l have t o p r o v i d e a p a r t .
15
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
155
J a n u a r y 18, 1913
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
CONDUCT OF THE WAR I N 1943
Note by t h e S e c r e t a r i e s
I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e c o n c l u s i o n s of t h e Combined C h i e f s o f
S t a f f a t t h e i r 6 O t k l m e e t i n g , a d r a f t memorandum s e t t i n g o u t t h e t e n t a
t i v e a g r e e m e n t s a l r e a d y r e a c h e d h a s b e e n p r e p a r e d and i s c i r c u l a t e d
herewith for c o n s i d e r a t i o n a t t h e n e x t meeting.
DYKES,
J . R. DEANE,
Combined S e c r e t a r i a t
ENCLOSURE
DRAFT MSMORANDUM
The Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f have a g r e e d t o submit t h e f o l l o w
i n g recommendations f o r t h e conduct o f t h e war i n 1943.
1.
SECURITY:
The d e f e a t o f t h e U-boat
must remain a f i r s t c h a r g e on t h e r e
s o u r c e s o f t h e United K a t i o n s .
2.
secure.
(2) D i v e r t i n g German p r e s s u r e from t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t .
(3) I n t e n s i f y i n g t h e p r e s s u r e on I t a l y .
U. S. S E C R E T
BRITIS8 MOST
SECRE?
an a c t i v e a l l y .
In t h e 11. I<. :
( c ) '!tie
h e a v i e s t p o s s i b l e bomber o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t Germany.
(d) Such l i m i t e d o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s a s may b e p r a c t i c a b l e
w i t h the forces available.
the conti
I n o r d e r t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s a r e
not p r e j u d i c e d b y t h e n e c e s s i t y t o d i v e r t f o r c e s t o r e t r i e v e a n a d v e r s e
s i t u a t i o n e l s e w h e r e , a d e q u a t e f o r c e s s h a l l be a l l o c a t e d t o t h e P a c i f i c
arid Far E a s t e r n T h e a t e r s .
5,
( A N A X I M ) b e g i n n i n g i n 1943.
a f t e r t h e c a p t u r e of R a b a u l , a g a i n s t t h e
M a r s h a l l s and C a r o l i n e s i f t i m e and r e s o u r c e s a l l o w
without p r e j u d i c e t o ANAKIM
6.
ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA:
The r e s i s t a n c e o f t h e S o v i e t f o r c e s must b e s u s t a i n e d by t h e
g r e a t e s t volume o f s u p p l i e s t h a t c a n b e t r a n s p o r t e d t o R u s s i a , w i t h o u t
prohibitive cost i n shipping.
17
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
155/1
J a n u a r y 19, 1943
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
1.
SECURITY:
The d e f e a t o f t h e U-boat
s o u r c e s of t h e United N a t i o n s .
2.
must remain a f i r s t c h a r g e on t h e re
ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA:
s hipping.
3.
(3) I n t e n s i f y i n g t h e p r e s s u r e on I t a l y .
(b) To c r e a t e a s i t u a t i o n i n which Turkey c a n be e n l i s t e d as an
active ally.
I n t h e U.K.:
( c ) The h e a v i e s t p o s s i b l e bomber o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t t h e Germail
war effort.
(d) Such l i m i t e d o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s as may b e p r a c t i c a b l e w i t h
t h e amphibious f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e .
( e ) The assembly of t h e s t r o n g e s t p o s s i b l e f o r c e ( s u b j e c t t o (a)
and (b) above and p a r a g r a p h 6 below) i n c o n s t a n t r e a d i n e s s
t o r e e n t e r t h e C o n t i n e n t a s s o o n a s German r e s i s t a n c e i s
18
U. S. SECRET
I n o r d e r t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s a r e
not prejudiced by t h e n e c e s s i t y t o d i v e r t f o r c e s t o r e t r i e v e a n a d v e r s e
s i t u a t i o n e l s e w h e r e , a d e q u a t e f o r c e s s h a l l be a l l o c a t e d t o t h e P a c i f i c
and Far E a s t e r n T h e a t e r s .
6.
(a) O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e s e t h e a t e r s s h a l l c o n t i n u e w i t h t h e f o r c e s
a l l o c a t e d , w i t h t h e o b j e c t of m a i n t a i n i n g p r e s s u r e on Japan,
r e t a i n i n g t h e i n i t i a t i v e and a t t a i n i n g a p o s i t i o n of r e a d i
n e s s f o r t h e f u l l s c a l e o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t J a p a n b y t h e United
Nations a s soon as Germany i s d e f e a t e d .
(b) These o p e r a t i o n s m u s t b e kept w i t h i n s u c h l i m i t s as w i l l n o t ,
i n t h e o p i n i o n of t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f , j e o p a r d i z e
t h e c a p a c i t y of t h e United N a t i o n s t o t a k e advantage of any
f a v o r a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t may p r e s e n t i t s e l f f o r t h e d e c i s
i v e d e f e a t of Germany i n 1043.
(c) S u b j e c t t o t h e above r e s e r v a t i o n , p l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s
s h a l l be made f o r :
(1) The r e c a p t u r e of Burma (ANAKIM) b e g i n n i n g i n 1943.
(2) O p e r a t i o n s , a f t e r t h e c a p t u r e o f R a b a u l , a g a i n s t t h e
a r s h a l l s a n d C a r o l i n e s if t i m e and r e s o u r c e s a l l o w
without prejudice t o ANAKIM~
19
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
U. S.
C.C.S.
156
J a n u a r y 18, 1943
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH THE AGENDA
OF THE CONFERENCE
Note by t h e S e c r e t a r i e s
(C.C.S.
140).
1.
The n e x t s t a g e of t h e d i s c u s s i o n s s h o u l d b e t o examine e a c h o f
t h e o p e r a t i o n s s e t o u t i n t h e (C.C.S. 155) d r a f t p r o p o s a l s f o r t h e con
d u c t of t h e war i n 1043, w i t h a view t o d e t e r m i n i n g :
( a ) The r e s o u r c e s of a l l k i n d s r e q u i r e d f o r each.
( b ) How t h e y a r e t o be made a v a i l a b l e .
(c) T a r g e t d a t e s , where p r a c t i c a b l e .
2.
&BOAT WARFARE:
The n a v a l and a i r f o r c e s r e q u i r e d t o d e f e a t t h e U-boat
are al
r e a d y u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n by t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s whose r e p o r t
s h o u l d form t h e agenda f o r an e a r l y meeting.
3.
MEDITERRANEAN:
of
(b) HUSKY:
(Reference: Paragraph 3 ( a ) , C.C.S.
155)
20
U. S. SECRET
B r i t i s h J o i n t P l a n n i n g S t a f f . A summary o f t h i s and of t h e
o u t l i n e p l a n w i l l b e c i r c u l a t e d f o r d i s c u s s i o n b y t h e Com
b i n e d C h i e f s of S t a f f . Agreement s h o u l d b e r e a c h e d as t o t h e
r e s o u r c e s t o b e p r o v i d e d by U. S. and 3 . K. r e s p e c t i v e l y and
on t h e arrangements f o r p l a n n i n g and command.
(c) A i r o f f e n s i v e from N o r t h A f r i c a a g a i n s t I t a l y , B a l k a n ob
j e c t i v e s , and Axis s h i p p i n g .
4.
TURKEY:
(Reference: Paragraph 3 ( b ) , C.C.S.
155)
A d r a f t p a p e r b y t h e B r i t i s h J o i n t P l a n n i n g S t a f f on Allied
Plans relatingtoTURKEY which has n o t y e t been c o n s i d e r e d by t h e B r i t i s n
Chiefs of S t a f f w i l l b e c i r c u l a t e d a s a b a s i s f o r d i s c u s s i o n . B r i t i s h
Chiefs of S t a f f t o c i r c u l a t e a n o t e on t h e Axis o i l p o s i t i o n f o r d i s c u s
sion i n connection w i t h t h i s i t e m .
5.
155)
B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f t o i n d i c a t e t h e p r e s e n t and p r o j e c t e d
build-up of t h e R.A.F. Bomber Comnand and t h e B r i t i s h c o n c e p t i o n of t h e
Bomber f o r c e s i n t h e U n i t e d K i n g
K. :
, C.C.S.
155)
t o c i r c u l a t e a paper o u t l i n i n g t h e i r
7.
155 and t h e r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e .
BOLERO BUILD-UP:
(Reference: Paragraph 3 ( e ) , C.C.S.
155)
B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f t o c i r c u l a t e a p a p e r showing t h e f o r c e s
which i n t h e i r view c o u l d b e made a v a i l a b l e f o r a r e t u r n t o t h e C o n t i
ANAKIM.
(Reference:
, C.C.S.
155)
B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f t o c i r c u l a t e a p a p e r g i v i n g t h e b r o a d
21
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
of t h e f o r c e s c o n s i d e r e d
n e c e s s a r y . Agreement should be reached a s t o t h e r e s o u r c e s t o be p r o v i d e d
by U. S. and U. K. r e s p e c t i v e l y .
c o n c e p t f o r o p e r a t i o n ANAKIM, with
9.
M indication
c e p t f o r o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e S o u t h w e s t P a c i f i c w i t h i n d i c a t i o n s of t h e
f o r c e s involved.
10.
ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA:
(Reference: Paragraph 6, C . C . = .
155)
T h e f o l l o w i n g i t e m s which a p p e a r i n t h e a g r e e d Agenda of t h e
f o r Dakar-
F r e n c h W e s t P f r z c a n A r e a r e q u i r e d t o be s e t t l e d a s e a r l y a s
p o s s i b l e . A d m i r a l King t o be i n v i t e d t o make p r o p o s a l s .
(b) I n c r e a s e d e f f t c t e n c y i n t h e c a s e of S h z p b i n g .
Lord L e a t h e r s and General Somervell t o be i n v i t e d t o d i s c u s s
and make a p p r o p r i a t e recommendations t o t h e Combined C h i e f s
of S t a f f .
22
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST S E C R E T
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 18, 1943
157
135/2 h a s been t a k e n a s t h e
b a s i s f o r o u r f u r t h e r e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e problem of i n d u c i n g Turkey t o
j o i n the A l l i e s and of u s i n g t h a t c o u n t r y f o r t h e development of of'fen
sive o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e A x i s .
s u c h as t h e Rumanian o i l f i e l d s and B l a c k S e a
conimurric a t i o n s
(b) T o c l o s e t h e D a r d a n e l l e s t o t h e A x i s and open t h e m t o t,he
I!n i t ed F a t ions
(c) To f o r c e an i n c r e a s e d d i s p e r s a l of German f o r c e s b y u s i n g
Turkey a s a b a s e f o r p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t s i n t h e B a l k a n s and
South R u s s i a
(d) To deny T u r k i s h chrome t o (lermany,."
INDUCEMENTS TO TORKEY:
2.
pend a r e :
(a) Her f e a r of tiermany now;
(b) Her f e a r of R u s s i a a f t e r t h e war..
e x p l o i t h e r f e a r of
(b)
FEAR OF GERMANY:
3.
T u r k e y ' s a n x i e t i e s under
( a ) w i l l o n l y b e a s s u a g e d when s h e i s
s a t i s f i e d e i t h e r t h a t t h e A l l i e s have so s t r e t c h e d t h e A x i s a s t o re.
s t r i c t the l a t t e r ' s a b i l i t y t o h u r t h e r , or t h a t m a t e r i a l p r o v i s i o n of
23
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H .YOST S E C R E T
FEAR OF RUSSIA:
4.
With r e g a r d t o ( b ) , Turkey must now a p p r e c i a t e t h a t her hopes of
a weak R u s s i a a r e n o t l i k e l y t o b e r e a l i z e d . C o n s e q u e n t l y , h e r b e s t
c h a n c e of post-war
s e c u r i t y l i e s i n o b t a i n i n g f o r h e r s e l f a p l a c e and
s u p p o r t a t t h e P e a c e Conference. She i s p a r t i c u l a r l y a f r a i d t h a t R u s s i a
may s p r e a d h e r i n f l u e n c e t h r o u g h Rumania aiid B u l g a r i a and c o n f r o n t h e r
w i t h t h e f a c t of b e i n g the power i n c o n t r o l a t T u r k e y ' s w e s t e r n door
i n t o Europe as w e l l as a t h e r back door i n t o Asia. She a l s o f e a r s t h a t
R u s s i a , h a v i n g s e c u r e d c o m p l e t e c o n t r o l o f t h e B l a c k S e a , w i l l demand
u n r e s t r i c t e d r i g h t s o f p a s s a g e through t h e D a r d a n e l l e s . She would l o o k
t o the A l l i e s ,
and e s p e c i a l l y t o t h e B r i t i s h F h p i r e , t o s u p p o r t h e r i n
r e s i s t i n g . e x a g g e r a t e d Russian c l a i m s i n r e g a r d t o .passage o f t h e S t r a i t s .
5.
R u s s i a n d e s i r e s r e g a r d i n g p a s s a g e o f t h e S t r a i t s seems a m a t t e r f o r
u r g e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n , f o r i f we thwarted R u s s i a i n t h a t r e s p e c t we should
p r o b a b l y b e c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a c l a i m f o r r i g h t s of t r a n s i t through P e r s i a
t o a p o r t on t h e P e r s i a n G u l f .
T h i s , from o u r p o i n t o f v i e w ,
would be
most u n d e s i r a b l e .
6.
B r i t i s h and Ameri.cail d i p l o m a c y . s h o u l d be d i r e c t e d t o e x p l o i t
T u r k i s h f e a r s o f R u s s i a . I t s h o u l d be made c l e a r t h a t p u b l i c o p i n i o n
w i l l have l i t t l e sympathy, when p e a c e comes, f o r a c o u n t r y which r e
mained a l o o f when we needed h e r a i d .
might be a u s e f u l weapon, p a r
t i c u l a r l y i n view o f t h e d e t e r i o r a t i o n of t h e T u r k i s h p o s i t i o n .
8.
s t o r e . F i r s t l y , s h e i s d e t e r m i n e d t o kiave complete c o n t r o l of t h e r a i i
way which a t p r e s e n t runs o u t i n S y r i a n t e r r i t o r y a t Aleppo. S e c o n d l y ,
s h e r e q u i r e s some m a t e r i a l f a c i l i t i e s i n , arid some g u a r a n t e e s f o r , t h e
T u r k i s h p o p u l a t i o n of t h e Ilodecanesc I s l a n d s . T h i r d l y , she d e s i r e s a
r e c t i f i c a t i o n o f h e r f r o n t , i e r w i t h B u l g a r i a . \Ye can s e e no s t r a t e g i c a l
o b j e c t i o n t o t h e i r r e a l . i z a t i o n a f t e r t h e war p r o v i d e d we c a n r e t a i n
II. S . SECRET
c e r t a i n r i g h t s t o u s e t h e Aleppo-Mosul r a i l w a y , b u t w e must n o t l o s e
sight o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s a s t r o n g French i n t e r e s t i n t h i s r a i l w a y .
We have also g u a r a n t e e d t h e f u t u r e i n t e g r i t y and independence o f S y r i a n
territory.
Creek i n t e r e s t would b e d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d by t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f
'
fighting a l l y .
We d o u b t whether t h e s e t h r e e sops would m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t Tur
key's d e c i s i o n on the main i s s u e .
SUMMARY O F DIPLOMATIC POLICY:
9.
We s h o u l d e x p l o i t T u r k i s h f e a r s t h a t s h e s t a r i d s t o l o s e i f she
10.
An u n d e r t a k i n g t o a s s i s t T u r k e y a g a i n s t A x i s a g g r e s s i o n has
already been g i v e n . T h i s i n c l u d e s a p l a n f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g c e r t a i n f o r c e s
i n Turkey (Sprawl P l a n ) arid t h e p r o v i s i o n of equipment and s u p p l i e s t o
augment T u r k i s h r e s o u r c e s . A summary o f t h e s e m e a s u r e s i s g i v c l r a.3
Enclosures "B",
reached Turkey.
11.
(a) To g a i n and m a i n t a i n a i r s u p e r i o r i t y .
(b) Assist T u r k i s h l a n d arid a i r f o r c e s i n t h e d e f e n s e o f Thrace
and Western A n a t o l i a ~ .
(c) P r o v i d e s u p p o r t f o r T u r k i s h f o r c e s a g a i n s t s e a b o r n e a t t a c k
i n t h e Izmir a r e a .
(d) Assist i n t h e d e f e n s e o f Ankara.
(e) A t t a c k s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e 3 i n S o u t h e a s t Europe.
(f) P r o t e c t b a s e p o r t s .
S. SECRET
LJ.
CHANGED CONDITIONS:
12.
THE A I R THREAT:
13.
The a b i l i t y o f t h e Axis t o d e l i v e r a heavy a i r o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t
Turkish v i t a l a r e a s cannot be f o r e c a s t .
I t i s c e r t a i n , however, t h a t
p r e p a r a t i o n s made i n Turkey b e f o r e h a n d - - t o
have o p e r a t i o n a l about 6
F i g h t e r s q u a d r o n s w i t h l i m i t e d a n t i a i r c r a f t d e f e n s e s w i t h i n three days
o f the Turkish i n v i t a t i o n .
To a c h i e v e t h i s , a p p r o x i m a t e l y 100 t r a n s p o r t
and we see no o b j e c t i n p e r s u a d i n g t h e
15.
The f o r c e which w e s h o u l d e s t a b l i s h i n T u r k e y ,
26
i n the first
LI. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
p l a c e , s h o u l d c o m p r i s e t h e minimum d e f e n s i v e e l e m e n t t o s a t i s f y t h e
Turks, and t h e maximum o f f e n s i v e e l e m e n t , w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s of communi
c a t i o n s , t o meet our own f u t u r e r e q u i r e m e n t s .
16.
We c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n s t i t u t e a s u i t a b l e d e f e n s i v e
o f f e r t o t h e Turks:
AIR:
26 s q u a d r o n s . Of t h i s f o r c e , 6 F i g h t e r s q u a d r o n s would c o n s t i
t u t e t h e immediate a i r d e f e n s e c o n t i n g e n t r e f e r r e d t o i n p a r a g r a p h 13
above. The t y p e s o f t h e remaining s q u a d r o n s p r o p o s e d i n t h e Sprawl p l a n
may r e q u i r e a d j u s t m e n t i n t h e l i g h t of changed c o n d i t i o n s , b u t s i n c e a
t o t a l o f 25 s q u a d r o n s h a s been o f f e r e d t o Turkey and t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s
f o r t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of t h i s f o r c e a r e i n h a n d , w e c o n s i d e r thaL t h e
t o t a l f i g u r e of 28 s q u a d r o n s s h o u l d s t a n d . A d d i t i o n a l a i r c r a f t f or u s e
by the Turks c a n be s u p p l i e d from r e s o u r c e s i n t h e Middle E a s t if p r i
o r i t y over o t h e r commitments is c o n s i d e r e d t o j u s t i f y such a c n u r s e .
LAYD;
7 2 H.A.A.
g u n s f o r d e f e n s e of I s t a n b u l , e t c .
96 H . A . A .
guns
215 L t .
A.A.
guns)
f o r a i r f i e l d defense.
4 B a t t a l i o n s f o r defense o f t h e L.
of C.
I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e Turks w i l l r e g a r d t h e p r o v i s i o n of armored
f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e s as an added inducement. I n view o f t h e Turks' i n a b i l i t y
t o use o r m a i n t a i n armored f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e s w e s h o u l d p r e f e r t o s u p p l y
be p r e p a r e d t o d o .
NAVAL:
17.
1 s t r i k i n g f o r c e o f s u b m a r i n e s , M.T.B.'s and p o s s i b l y d e s t r o y e r s .
The n e x t s t e p i s t o b u i l d up f o r c e s t o u n d e r t a k e o f f e n s i v e
o p e r a t i o n s and t o s e c u r e a i r b a s e s i n T u r k e y . T h i s i s c o n s i d e r e d i n
P a r t 111.
PART 1 x 1
DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFENSIVE
18.
Turkey w i l l b e of v a l u e t o t h e A l l i e s as an o f f e n s i v e b a s e f o r
a i r r a t h e r t h a n l a n d o p e r a t i o n s . Owing t o t h e i n i t i a l d e f e n s i v e needs of
27
t h e Turks it w i l l b e i m p o s s i b l e t o i n c l u d e i n t h e f i r s t a i r c o n t i n g e n t a
s t , r i k i n g f o r c e adequate f o r a widespread heavy and s u s t a i n e d o f f e n s i v e .
S i n c e , however, t r a n s - A n a t o l i a n communications w i l l be s t r e t c h e d t o t h e
l i m i t of
Of
p r i m a r y importance.
19.
011
It is c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e opening o f t h e Aegean c o u l d be a c h i e v e d
b y t h e c a p t u r e of t h e Dodecanese. W i t h a i r p r o t e c t i o n b a s e d on Turkey
and t h e Dodecanese i t s h o u l d t h e n be p o s s i b l e t o p a s s s u f f i c i e n t s h i p
p i n g through t o make f u l l use of T u r k i s h p o r t c a p a c i t i e s i n s p i t e of t h e
\Ye e s t , i m a t e t h a t .
PKOTECTION O F SHIPPING:
22.
t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of o u r s h i p p i n g t h r o u g h t h e Aegean. The
e s t i m a t e d f o r c e s r e q u i r e d f o r t h i s p u r p o s e a r e g i v e n below.
NAVAL:
23.
W i t h C r e t e s t i l l i n enemy hands, s h i p p i n g m u s t b e r o u t e d a s f a r
ea.st of t h a t i s l a n d a s p o s s i b l e . I t is n o t l i k e l y t h a t t h e t h r e a t . i n t h e
Aegean w i l l exceed t h a t of submarines, E-boats and a i r c r a f t . I t is e s t i
mated t h a t S-knot
convoys o f 30 s h i p s r u n n i n g e v e r y 14 d a y s b e t w e e n
U.
SECRET
BRITISH XOST S E C R E T
S.
group of about 8 s h i p s .
AIR:
24.
A r e g r o u p i n g of t h e s q u a d r o n s a l r e a d y i n Turkey s h o u l d s u f f i c e
b o t h f o r p r o t e c t i o n of s h i p p i n g and g e n e r a l d e f e n s i v e r e q u i r e m e n t s . The
necessary a i r f i e l d s e x i s t b u t must b e developed and s u p p l i e d i n advance.
LAND:
25.
K O a d d i t i o n a l l a n d f o r c e s w i l l b e r e q u i r e d o t h e r t h a n a few
guns w i l l be n e e d e d .
PHASE I1
SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS
A i r f o r c e s o p e r a t i n g from Turkey w i l l be r e q u i r e d f o r :
(a) A t t a c k s on Rumanian o i l r e f i n e r i e s and t h e i r communications.
T h i s i s t h e primary t a s k .
(b) A t t a c k s on Icalkan chrome mines and communications g e n e r a l l y ,
b o t h of Hhich are d i f f i c u l t t a r g e t s .
(c) A t t a c k s a g a i n s t A x i s s h i p p i n g i n t h e B l a c k S e a and t h e
Aegean.
(d) Support of any A l l i e d land o p e r a t i o n s .
(e) A s s i q t a n c e t o t h e R u s s i a n s i n t h e Ukraine.
For t h e s e p u r p o s e s a f o r c e o f 15-20 Heavy Bomber s q u a d r o n s w i l l
be r e q u i r e d and c o u l d b e m a i n t a i n e d t h r o u g h Smyrna. E x i s t i n g a i r f i e l d s
ii. 5 . SECOET
31.
e s t a b l i s h e d t h e r e , f u r t h e r f o r c e s c o u l d b e l a n d e d and arms f o r p a t r i o t
f o r c e s of Greece, A l b a n i a , and S o u t h e r n Y u g o s l a v i a i m p o r t e d . I t should
t h e n be p o s s i b l e , i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e p a t r i o t s ,
t o s e v e r A x i s com
i t might be d e s i r a b l e t o c a p t u r e C r e t e a t an e a r l i e r
s t a g e t o a s s i s t i n o p e r a t i o n s on t h e Greek mainland. Such a n o p e r a t i o n
would be b e s t mounted i n A f r i c a , though some a i r s u p p o r t c o u l d b e given
Alternatively,
31.
A f u r t h e r a d v e r s e f a c t o r i s t h a t w h i l e t h e l i n e of advance
i t s e l f i s b a d l y s e r v e d w i t h a i r f i e l d s , i t i s f l a n k e d by a l i m i t e d number
o f i n d i f f e r e n t a i r f i e l d s i n enemy h a n d s w i t h i n S . E . f i g h t e r r a n g e .
T h e r e f o r e , a i r f i e l d s w i l l have t o be p r o v i d e d i n T u r k i s h Thrace b e f o r e
o p e r a t i o n s can s t a r t , and o t h e r s c o n s t r u c t e d as t h e advance p r o g r e s s e s .
This w i l l take t i m e .
35.
I t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o a s s e s s t h e chances of s u c c e s s of l a n d opera
U. S . SECRET
firmer f o r e c a s t t h a n i s now p o s s i b l e of t h e A x i s m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n a s i t
w i l l then b e . The p r i z e is g r e a t b u t t h e p r o s p e c t s are poor.
SUMMARY
COURSE OF OPERATIONS:
36.
O f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s might t a k e t h e f o l l o w i n g course:
PART IV
SUMMARY OF FORCES REQUIRED
AIR:
37.
Immediate A i r Defense
6 Squadrons
20 Squadrons
Opening of t h e Aegean and Support o f Land Offensive
12 Squadrons ( a d d i t i o n a l t o t h o s e above)
Bomber Offensive
LAND:
38.
Defensive Requirements
for l o c a l defense
168 Heavy A.A. guns ) For p o r t s , a i r f i e l d s and
215 L i g h t A.A. guns ) v i t a l a r e a s .
4 battalions
31
U . S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
Opening t h e Aegean
3 divisions
3 b a t t a l i o n s f o r l o c a l derense
18 tieavy A.A.
guns )
84 L i g h t A.A.
guns )
For p o r t s and a i r f i e l d s .
O p e r a t i o n s i n Greece
2-1/23 t o 5 d i v i s i o n s , i n c l u d i n g ) With p o s s i b l e s u b s e q u e n t
a t l e a s t 1 Armored d i v i s i o n
) r e i n f o r c e m e n t o f up t o 4
divisions
( t o include
Crete)
NAVAL:
39.
F o r c e s as n e c e s s a r y t o a s s i s t , i n t,he c a p t u r e o f t h e Dodecanese.
A s t r i k i n g f o r c e o f d e s t r o y e r s , submarines, M.T.B.'sandM.G.B.'s.
A commitment o f a b o u t 8 e s c o r t , v e s s e l s f o r s h i p p i n g i n t h e
Aegean.
PART V
CONCLUSIONS
40..
f o r a i r r a t h e r than l a n d o p e r a t i o n s "
POLICY TO HASTEN TtRKEYOS ENTRY I N T O THE: WAR:
41..
(a) P o l i t i c a l :
W
e s h o u l d make c l e a r t o Turkey t h a t o u r good o f f i c e s a t t h e
P e a c e C o n f e r e n c e w i l l deperid upon h e r e n t r y i n t o t h e war
without delay.
(b) F i n a n c i a l and Economic:
II. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
(c) E i l i t a r y :
We should o f f e r :
(1) An "iminediate a i r d e f e n s e " c o n t i n g e n t f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n
(3) M i l i t a r y equipment t o b r i n g a l l T u r k i s h i n f a n t r y
forma
t i o n s i n T h r a c e up t o a s a t i s f a c t o r y s c a l e of weapons.
(4) Armored f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e s o n l y i f t h e s e a r e c o n s i d e r e d
vehicles efficiently,
( a ) A i r f i e l d Development
C e r t a i n a i r f i e l d developments a r e a l r e a d y included i n t h e
Sprawl P l a n , , We s h o u l d p r e s s f o r f u r t h e r development of a i r
f i e l d s and s u p p l i e s i n t h e f o l l o w i n g a r e a s :
(1) I n t h e I s t a n b u l and Ankara areas t o o p e r a t e f i g h t e r s f o r
t h e d e f e n s e of t h o s e s i t e s . .
(2) I n t h e Southwest o f Turkey t o a s s i s t our c a p t u r e o f t h e
Codecanese .,
(3) I n A n a t o l i a a n d A r m e n i a t o o p e r a t e b o m b e r s a g a i n s t
A.A.
g u n s , ammunition and R , , D . . F . , n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e d e f e n s e
33
I'. S. S T C Y E T
3 1 I T I . V VO.ST S E C l E T
(b) P e r s o n n e l :
s u r e p r o p e r i n s t r u c t i o n i n t h e m a i n t e n a n c e and u s e of
t h e A l l i e d m i l i t a r y equipment.
(2) Reconnaissance p a r t i e s f o r p r e p a r i n g t h e l a y o u t of a i r
f i e l d d e f e n s e s and f o r s t u d y i n g t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n problems.
A number of T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g
liaison officers
s h o u l d be
c o l l e c t e d i n t h e Yiddle E a s t .
( c ) Communications
We recommend t h a t :
(a) The F o r e i g n O f f i c e b e i n v i t e d t o examine t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s
of d i p l o m a t i c a c t i o n i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e s u g g e s t i o n s con
t a i n e d i n t h i s p a p e r . ,Ye p a r t i c u l a r l y u r g e t h a t a f i r m
p o l i c y s h o u l d be d e c i d e d w i t h r e g a r d t o our post-war a t t i t u d e
on t h e D a r d a n e l l e s q u e s t i o n and o t h e r m a t t e r s of a primary
i n t e r e s t t o t h e Turks.
(b) A copy o f t h i s p a p e r s h o u l d h e s e n t t o t h e Commanders-inChief, Viddle E a s t ,
i n r e p l y t o t h e i r t e l e g r a m (C.C./166
U. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
which are a v a i l a b l e .
A s r e g a r d s n o n - m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s , we have o f f e r e d t o l e n d Tun.
key s t e r l i n g t o e n a b l e h e r t o p a y f o r her e s s e n t i a l n e e d s f r o m t h e
s t e r l i n g a r e a . She i s a t p r e s e n t a v a i l i n g inersr.lf of Lhese f a c i l i t i e s t o
the e x t e n t o f approximately 2 m i l l i o n Pounds.,
3.
Turkey's e x i s t i n g f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s a r e those of i n t e l n a l
f i n a n c e . I n r e g a r d t o t h i s we can g i v e no r c a l h e l p .
ECONOMIC:
4.
Our economic a s s i s t a n c e i s as g r e a t as o u r s h i p p i n g r e s o u r c e s
and t h e l i m i t a t i o n s of a v a i l a b l e p o i n t s of e n t r y i n i u Turkey w i l l p e r r n i t There is, however, one form of a s s i s t . m i c e which i s now under act,ive
COII-.
20,CJOO
t,or:s
Sugar i s also n
Success
iii
prn
5.
1.
p a r a g r q 1 i : s 3 and 4
A s a r e s u l t o f t h e s t a f f c o n v e r s a t , i o n s i n 4nkar;i
~iii
Cicr.ot>ei
With t h e e x c e p t i o n o f f o u r s q u a d r o n s R . A F
which a r e t o be
35
.-.~.sEt';.r
ti..;.
:vas mads s u b j e c t t o o u r o p e r a t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s e l s e w h e r e
and L k p r o v i s i o n of a d e q u a t e m a i n t e n a n c e f a c i l i t i e s .
A p l a n (Sprawl P l a n ) has a l r e a d y aeen worked o u t f o r t h e move of
2.
:,:i?~.!
a . i r c o n t i n g e n t of 26 squadrons t o a i r f i e l d s i n Turkey s o u t h of a
, accomp8nied
by an A r m y
cor,!ponrnt of f o u r b r i g a d e g r o u p s f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f a i r f i e l d s . The
ntairitendnce @ f
t h i s f o r c e i s e q u i v a l e n t t o t h a t of 2-1/2 d i v i s i o n s . , The
a i r t'orce c o n s i s t s o f :
12 Sho:t-range
I I,or.g-range
ti
I. ig h t,
F i g h t e r Squadrons
F i g h t e r Squadroil
Squadr oris
il ombe r
1 l o r p e d o Eomber Squadron
3.
:iirl
ill
posi
t i o n a t nandirma and B a l e k e s i r i n a b o u t t n e l v e d a y s .
1.
Tk!re.:e
This
p l a n w a s d e s i g n e d t o a s s i s t i n t h e T u r k i s h d e f e n s e of
36
U, S.
SECRET
ENCLOSURE "C"
R - A = F . AND ARiMy STOWS AUIEADY DUMPED INTO TURREY
( i n tons)
R,A.F.
P.O.L.
B a l i k e s i r Area
Kutahya iirea
Bfyon Area
483
1,785.1
5,466.7
Bombs
...
181
773.2
Adam Area
357
i l l u k l s l a Area
231
...
...
8,322.8
954.2
A r m y ( i n tons)
Amn.
18.2
Sups.
455
...
P.O.L. Amn.
322
326
R.E.
Stores Sups.
112
...
...
.-...
21.9
83
3,367.3
1,288
728
1,047
457
...
1,022
366
639.9
735
284
5,000
135.1 4 , 4 6 2 . 2
4,095
2,480
5,000
...
T o t a l R.A.F.
--
13,874.3 tons
T o t a l Army
--
tons
2 7 , 1 1 5 . 3 tons
37
13,241
658
224
392
280
1,666
U. S . S E C R E T
B F I T I S K VOST S E C R E T
ENCLOSURE "D"
SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT
1.
. Column
(d) g i v e s a n i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e q u a n t i t i e s
A l l o c a t e d up t o
end of 1912 b u t
Possible future
allocation
I tem
Shipped
(a)
(b)
(C)
S t u a r t l i g h t tanks
o t h e r thea
40
(d)
171
2 00
Valentines
37-mm. A/Tk.
guns
116
?92
50 p e r month
3.7-in.
guns
208
l?
3 p e r month
...
I s9
18 p e r month
Searchlights
111
...
F i e l d guns
101
25
GO
...
1,075
205
50 p e r month
L i g h t machine guns
5,450
...
\fiddle East t o l d
A.A.
Uedium hows.
t o s u p p l y 150
p e r month
Sub-machine guns
G ,500
2 .so0
Anti-tank r i f l e s
673
275
81-mm m o r t a r s
3 00
R.D.F.
Order completed
l i g h t warning
25
sets
T h i s a d d i t i o n a l a l l o c a t i a n ( i n column (c) a b o v e ) i n c l u d e s t h e
f o l l o w i n g s p e c i a l o f f e r made b y t h e r r i m e Y i n i s t e r i n September:
S t u a r t l i g h t tan!.-s
.3G
I n f a n t r y tanks
200
37-mm.
13s
a n t i - t a n k guns
40-mm. Bofors
3s
25
S SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
3.
Kingdom :
(a) A i r c r a f t
Tomahawks
Promises
Fulfilled
42
76
Vastage
Elenheim IV's
D oniini e
4 by end of
..
l'arch 1942
..
..
o r IIC
@) P.C.F.
10 receniber
F,et?
(a ) L o c o m o t i v e s
C ' h i p p e d ~? 5
(b) Wagons
O r d e r e d l,2l? o f r l i i c i ,
7 9 2 have been
5.
skinped
I f f u l l b e n e f i t i s t o be g a i n e d b y t h e e n t r y o f Turkey i n t o t h e
39
U . S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 19, 1943
158
(Intelligence)
Hart l e y Commi t t e e
"
by t h e J o i n t I n t e l l i g e n c e
Sub
7,895,000
4,510,000
Balance a v a i l a b l e f o r c i v i l i a n consumption:3,355,000
According t o p r e v i o u s e s t i m a t e s , t h e n o n - m i l i t a r y r e q u i r e m e n t s
f o r t h e p e r i o d s h o u l d have amounted t o 4,334,000 t o n s , if i n d u s t r i a l ef
f i c i e n c y was t o b e m a i n t a i n e d . To t h i s s h o u l d h e a d d e d , s a y , 150,000
f o r Occupied R u s s i a making an a p p a r e n t t o t a l d e f i c i e n c y of about 1,150,000
tons.
T h i s d e f i c i e n c y might have been met by:
Tons
Reduction of consumption i n Germany
and Occupied T e r r i t o r i e s
GL50,000
Withdrawal from s t o c k s
500,000
TOTAL
1,150,000
U. S . SECRET
Tons
I n c r e a s e from S y n t h e t i c P l a n t s
100,000
E x p l o i t a t i o n of Waikop o i l f i e l d
(b) Reduced consumption:
M i l i t a r y - by reduced a c t i v i t y i n R u s s i a
100,000
500,000
180,000
C i v i l - b y u s e o f producer gas
TOTAL
880,000
L e s s S e r v i c e consumption
,I
m0,ooo
,
I e a v i n g b a l a n c e f o r c i v i l i a n consumption
2,060,000
8,100,000
E s t i m a t e d minimum c i v i l i a n r e q u i r e m e n t s
(assuming r e s t r i c t i o n s c o n t i n u e d and pro
ducer gas f u r t h e r e x p l o i t e d )
3 , G54,OOO
SURPLUS:
406,000
Assuming, t h e r e f o r e , reduced a c t i v i t y on t h e E a s t e r n F r o n t , ex
p l o i t a t i o n of Maikop, c o n t i n u a n c e o f p r e s e n t r e s t r i c t i o n s and i n c r e a s e d
use o f p r o d u c e r gas, Germany m i g h t b e a b l e t o r e p l e n i s h h e r s t o c k s by
some 400,000 t o n s d u r i n g t h e n e x t s i x months. She would b e u n l i k e l y ,
however, t o be i n a p o s i t i o n t o r e s t o r e t h e c u t s i n c i v i l i a n consumption
or t o u n d e r t a k e t h e mechanized e x p l o i t a t i o n of R u s s i a f o r t h e 1943 h a r
v e s t . I n t h e meantime, t h e Rumanian o i l f i e l d s , which c o n t r i b u t e 33 p e r
cent of t o t a l A x i s s u p p l i e s , would remain o f v i t a l importance t o h e r .
T h e p r o d u c t i o n t r e n d i s i n c r e a s i n g . By t h e m i d d l e of 1943,
a d d i t i o n a l p r o d u c t i o n a t t h e r a t e of one m i l l i o n t o n s p e r y e a r may b e
expected from s y n t h e t i c o i l p l a n t s now i n c o u r s e of e r e c t i o n . T h i s w i l l
p o s s i b l y b e i n c r e a s e d by a f u r t h e r 500,000 t o n s a n n u a l c a p a c i t y b y t h e
end of 1913.
3.
E x t r a c t s from J o i n t I n t e l l i g e n c e Subcommittee's R e p o r t :
Germany's
o i l s i t u a t i o n is c r i t i c a l . She c a n n o t hope t o o b t a i n
any s u b s t a n t i a l a d d i t i m a l s u p p l i e s from h e r p r e s e n t r e s o u r c e s b e f o r e
the middle of 1943, e v e n if she r e t a i n s Vaikop. D e s p i t e r u t h l e s s econo
mies i n s e r v i c e a n d c i v i l i a n u s e , t h e r e a r e a l r e a d y d i s t r i b u t i o n a l
41
U. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S H KOST S E C R E T
breakdowns which a r e b e g i n n i n g t o a f f e c t m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s . During the
n e x t s i x months a t l e a s t h e r o i l s i t u a t i o n w i l l c o n t i n u e t o e m b a r r a s s
h e r o p e r a t i o n s and r e s t r i c t h e r p l a n s . I t w i l l p r e v e n t h e r from provid
i n g t h e o i l n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e 1943 U k r a i n i a n h a r v e s t , w i t h o u t which her
food p o s i t i o n w i l l remain p r e c a r i o u s , and w i l l c o n t i n u e t o d e p r e s s h e r
i n d u s t r i a l c a p a c i t y . If, i n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , s h e i s f o r c e d t h i s win
t e r t o consume o i l f o r m i l i t a r y purposes a t the same r a t e a s i n t h e win
t e r o f 1911-42,
s h e w i l l be i n c r e a s i n g l y h a n d i c a p p e d i n h o l d i n g h e r
p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n and w i l l be u n a b l e t o u n d e r t a k e an o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t
S o u t h o r e v e n N o r t h C a u c a s i a i n t h e summer o f 1913. I n t h e s e c i r c m
s t a n c e s s h e may be f o r c e d o r m a y d e c i d e t o s h o r t e n her l i n e . On t h e o t h e r
hand, i f s h e i s a l l o w e d t o remain i n a c t i v e d u r i n g t h e w i n t e r , t h e r e
s u l t a n t s a v i n g i n o i l , p l u s t h e new s o u r c e o f d o m e s t i c s u p p l y t h a t w i l l
become a v a i l a b l e t o h e r i n t h e m i d d l e o f 1943, s h o u l d e n a b l e h e r t o
u n d e r t a k e t h e m i l i t a r y e f f o r t n e c e s s a r y a t l e a s t t o complete t h e occupa
t i o n of North Caucasia.
If Germany i s g i v e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o m p l e t e n e x t y e a r t h e
o c c u p a t i o n o f N o r t h C a u c a s i a and s e c u r e s t h e s e a p a s s a g e a c r o s s t h e
B l a c k Sea, s h e s h o u l d command enough o i l ( i n c l u d i n g i n c r e a s e d domestic
s u p p l i e s , which a r e e x p e c t e d i n mid-1943)
commitments,
t o m e e t her future m i l i t a r y
t o i n s u r e a s u b s t a n t i a l g r a i n s u r p l u s from t h e Ukraine i n
4.
f o l l o w i n g developments:
The R u s s i a n c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e i s f o r c i n g t h e Germans t o r e t r e a t
on a l m o s t e v e r y s e c t i o n o f t h e E a s t e r n F r o n t , i n c l u d i n g t h e Caucasus.
Not o n l y , t h e r e f o r e ,
a r e t h e c h a n c e s o f Germany o b t a i n i n g o i l from
w i l l be g i v e n t o t h e Germans t h i s w i n t e r t o remain i n a c t i v e i n o r d e r t o
c o n s e r v e t h e i r o i l s u p p l i e s f o r a new o f f e n s i v e i n t h e North Caucasus
d u r i n g t h e s u m m e r o f t h e y e a r . Fven a withdrawal t o a s h o r t e r l i n e w i l l
r e s u l t i n a heavy e x p e n d i t u r e of o i l r e s o u r c e s .
Germany i n h e r campaigns i n 1913 w i l l ,
42
t h e r e f o r e , have t o r e l y
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
on:
(a) The lxumanian O i l t i e l d s
(b) S y n t h e t i c P r o d u c t i o n
( c ) Producer Gas
She w i l l b e u n a b l e up t o Xay 1943 t o make t h e s a v i n g of 500,000 t o n s by
Her a s s e t s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d w i l l ,
t h e r e f o r e , b e 600,000 t o n s l e s s t h a n t h o s e e s t i m a t e d i n t h e H a r t l e y
report
5.
.
I t , i s of i n t e r e s t t h a t i n s t a n c e s have a l r e a d y o c c u r r e d of f l y i n g
t r a i n i n g b e i n g d i s o r g a n i z e d and c u r t a i l e d by s h o r t a g e of f u e l .
43
U. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
C.C.S. 159/1
January 2 0 , 1943
U. S . SECRET
BRITISH MOST S E C R E T
C.C.S.
1m
I t i s e s t i m a t e d t h a t w i t h U . S.. a s s i s t a n c e on
I t i s o f p r i m a r y importance t h a t U
K , imports i n the f i r s t h a l f
of t h e y e a r s h o u l d n o t f a l l s h o r t o f t h e t a r g e t f i g u r e o f 12 m i l l i o n
t o n s , s i n c e any d e f i c i t w i l l b e c a r r i e d i n t o t h e second h a l f of t h e y e a r ,
and w i l l t h u s impose a n e v e n more s e v e r e s t r a i n on U n i t e d N a t i o n s r e
s o u r c e s , which w i l l h e s e v e r e l y t a x e d i n o r d e r t o a c h i e v e t h e b a l a n c e of
15 m i l l i o n t o n s . An a d d i t i o n a l r e a s o n f o r m a i n t a i n i n g t h e r a t e of im-.
3.
T h i s would amount
i n t h e U. K .
i n c l u d e t h e r u n n i n g of
Dutch West I n d i e s t o U . K .
( a ) a d i r e c t t a n k e r convoy from t h e
on a 20 day c y c l e ;
45
@) a d i r e c t f a s t t a n k e r
U. S . SECRET
BRITISH WOST SECRET
convoy from t h e C u t c h West I n d i e s t o t h e TOUCH a r e a . T h e s e commitments
w i l l c o n t i n u e t h r o u g h o u t t h e y e a r s i n c e t h e y do n o t s u f f i c e t o b u i l d up
CONVOYS TO N O R T H RUSSIA:
5.
With t h e i n c r e a s i n g h o u r s o f d a y l i g h t and t h e more s o u t h e r l y
l i m i t reached by t h e i c e i n t h e s p r i n g , i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o i n c r e a s e t h e
s c a l e of e s c o r t t o convoys t o K o r t h R u s s i a , i n o r d e r t o d e a l w i t h the
t h r e a t of a t t a c k from German s u r f a c e and a i r f o r c e s . I t i s considered
t h a t i n t h e circumstances prevailing,
a minimum s t r i k i n g f o r c e o f 15
F l e e t d e s t r o y e r s i s r e q u i r e d i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e convoy e s c o r t .
U . . S~ EAST COAST:
6.
Although U-boat a c t i v i t y on t h e e a s t c o a s t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
The p r o t e c t i o n o f s h i p p i n g employed i n t h e t r a n s p o r t of v i t a l
9.
t h i s s h i p p i n g c a r r i e s m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s t o t h e Middle E a s t and b r i n g s
b a c k a b o u t o n e - t h i r d o f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom i m p o r t s . The e x p e r i m e n t of
s a i l i n g such outward bound s h i p p i n g i n s o u t h e r l y r o u t e d t r a n s - A t l a n t i c
convoys and b r e a k i n g i t off
i n m i d - . A t l a n t i c h a s p r o v e d t o o c o s t l y and
I t i s t h e r e f o r e n e c e s s a r y t o r e c o n s t i t u t e t h e s e convoys on a
46
minimum c y c l e o f 2 0 d a y s .
R E O P E N I N G T i B \IEDITEKRANEAN:
10
The s h i p p i n g running t o
considerably.
'
E a s t has a l r e a d y been r e d u c e d
11
The
12
U-BOAT
THREAT
r e q u i r e t o be p r o t e c t e d i s s t e a d i l y i n c r e a s i n g . U-boats a r e now o p e r a t
ing i n g r o u p s o f 12-18;
may be t a k e n as a b o u t 15 U-boats.
13
The s c a l e of s u r f a c e e s c o r t r e q u i r e d t o s e c u r e convoys a g a i n s t
For t h e immediate
a i r e s c o r t c a n o n l y b e i n s u r e d b y the p r o v i s i o n of
47
U. S. SECRET
shore based a i r c r a f t
14.
I n a s s e s s i n g t h e s c a l e of e s c o r t , r e q u i r e d f o r t h e v a r i o u s con
( o v e r 200 f e e t i n
l e n g t h ) a r e c o r i s i d e r e d t o b e t h e minimum a c c e p t a b l e :
(1) For convoys o p e r a t i n g i n a r e a s where p a c k s of U b o a t s
u n l i k e l y , s t r o n g a i r s u p p o r t i s n o r m a l l y a v a i l a b l e and
e s c o r t s can be s t r e n g t h e n e d by v e s s e l s under 206 f'set i n
lengCh
%iriimum e s c o r t 1 p l u s 1 f o r e v e r y 20 s h i p s i n
con ..oy
(4,
a i r cover is a v a i l a b l e
T h
minimum e s c o r t g i v e n & m e
In o t h e r words, e s c o r t s t r e n g t h ( w i t h p a r t i c u l a r r e g a r d
1.0
lantic
Llnder such c o n d i t i o n s e s c o r t s t r e n g t h as c a l c u . .
as s t a t e d , t h e minimum a c c e p t a b l e
O p e r a t i n g w i t h t h i s minimum i t i s not
at the desired r a t e (i e
i n e x c e s s of t h e p r o d u c t i o n r a t e )
48
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
16.
If convoys a r e o p e r a t e d w i t h e s c o r t s i n s t r e n g t h s less t h a n t h a t
given i n p a r a g r a p h 1 4 , i n c r e a s e d l o s s e s a r e t o b e e x p e c t e d . T h e a c c e p t
ance of i n c r e a s e d l o s s e s must b e b a l a n c e d a g a i n s t t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f
other a c t i v i t i e s t h a t n e c e s s i t a t e the i n t e r f e r e n c e .
17.
Taking i n t o a c c o u n t a l l t h e p o i n t s d i s c u s s e d , t h e s c a l e of e s
re
q u i r e m e n t s of s h o r e b a s e d a i r c r a f t f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t r a d e corn
munications
18
CONCLUSION:
On t h e b a s i s of t h e t a b l e s i n c l u d e d i n t h e e n c l o s u r e s i t w i l l b e
seen t h a t minimum a c c e p t a b l e r e q u i r e m e n t s a s t o e s c o r t c r a f t w i l l b e m e t
a p p r o x i m a t e l y i n August and September
W
e w i l l n o t he i n a p o s i t i o n ,
49
U. S . SECRET
J R I T I S K MOST SECRET
ENCLOSUXE "A"
DETAILED ESTIMATE OF CONVOY ESCORT REQUIREMENTS
North Russian
Days
Special
30
U.S -U. K.
1s
\lid-Ocean
40
11
40
..
..
..
24
10
110
& 1 i . X . Western
Local
8 6 4
..
..
D.W.1.-U.K.
40
20
10
30
24
30
30
30
16
18
60
16
12
36
U.K. -Freetown
40
20
11
33
U.S.-TORCH
(Troop)
20
25
18
U.S. -TORCH
(Cargo)
45
25
Special
A
10
30
18
Guantanamo-New Yor k
30
15
Guantanamo-Key West
10
Guantanamo-Tr i n i d a d
23
Guantanamo-Panama
14
Special
24
38
6
Tanker
Tanker
D.W.1.-TORCH
U.K.
(OG/HG)
TORCH (KMF/WS)
(ms)
6 t o 10
15
..
3
..
Special
..
10
20
..
Special
..
..
..
Shuttle
Service
U.S.
P a c i f i c Convoys
..
..
..
..
..
36
511
50
U. S . S E C R E T
BRITISH X O S T S E C R E T
ENCLOSURE "B"
WORLD-WIDE ESTIMATE OF REQUIREMENTS O F
FLEET DESTROYERS AND OCEAN- G O I N G ESCORT VESSELS
( O v e r 200 f e e t i n l e n g t h )
Fleet
Escort
Destroyers
Vessels
30
North R u s s i a n Convoys
18
T r a n s a t l a n t i c Convoys
110
\lid-ocean e s c o r t s
-
fx
Canadian L o c a l Convoys
24
Freetown Convoys
33
30
Wester-n L o c a l e s c o r t s
54
E a s t C o a s t Convoys
52
L o c a l !iome Commands
28
M i n e l a y i n g Squadron
15
G i b r a l t a r L o c a l E s c o r t s & I n s h o r e Sq..
39
Freetown L o c a l e s c o r t s
18
South A t l a n t i c Local e s c o r t s
18
UK-Torch and
lli S.
Convoys
UK-Local E s c o r t s
Eastern Fleet
East I n d i e s L o c a l E s c o r t s
20
28
Red Sea
A u s t r a l i a 9r P a c i f i c
74
54 5
125
U - S. P a c i f i c Convoys
36
Atlantic Fleet
48
18
t a1
PRESENT U . S. RESPONSIBILITIES:
P a c i f i c Fleet
51
rscort
iiessels
i~.
T . Torch Car50 Convoys
3':
Tanker ionvoys
i:bI--'?orcii
h-ew York--Ney
hest
Cuai?taiiaii;o--~~ew
York
Guantanaino--Key
15
\lest
Guant anamo--'Tr i n i d ad
15
Cuan t ananlo--!ariama
3
6
20
6
Total
107
ENCLOSURE "C"
FLEET DESTROYERS AND OCEAN-GOING
ESCORT VESSELS
( O v e r 200 f e e t i n l e n g t h )
COMPARISON OF M I N I M U M REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITY
The sum of minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s shown i n E n c l o s u r e "Bn i s :
P r e s e n t l y under B r i t i s h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
P r e s e n t l y under U . S. r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
Total
Fleet
Ocean Going
Destroyers
E s c o r t Vessels
74
546
235
107
309
653
5 p e r month
5 p e r month
U S SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
Fleet Destroyers
us
BR
Ocean-Going E s c o r t V e s s e l s ( o v e r 2 0 0 f t . )
us
ri
rd
.d
"
RR
To s e r v i c e
.
l
Jan 1943
c
o
L QI
idUrl.4
186
72
us
BR
Constr
Constr
<E z z z
.3 0
a-0 m
1Jan 1M3
riZ
uoi
oi.3
c
U L o i O
CdUri'3
To s e r v i c e
3m.4
um
0c 3
uo
'3 0
a**
m
0.3
l
.3
uO oC
id@
>Q
Gi
63
437
us
RR
Constr
Constr
rd
rlunu
SCdL32
2S @
uoi> oi
*d
d.u
January
10
264
January
500
February
10
270
February
496
March
10
276
March
496
April
12
286
April
499
May
June
10
292
510
12
300
May
June
16
17
538
July
11
309
July
26
568
August
13
318
August
32
12
607
September
10
325
September
38
11
65 1
326
October
37
13
696
November
11
337
November
49
18
758
December
10
343
December
56
20
829
October
ENCLOSURE "D"
UNITED NATIONS REQUIREMENTS OF ESCORT CARRIERS
I t is c o n s i d e r e d t h a t e v e r y ocean convoy e s c o r t s h o u l d i n c l u d e
10
It can be assumed t h a t s u c h a t t a c k w i l l be c o n c e n t r a t e d l a r g e l y on t h e
53
L J . S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
e s c o r t c a r r i e r . The p r o b a b l e l o s s of a l l f i g h t e r p r o t e c t i o n i f o n l y one
e s c o r t c a r r i e r were s e n t w i t h e a c h convoy would have s u c h consequences
t h a t i t i s c o n s i d e r e d t h a t two e s c o r t c a r r i e r s s h o u l d be p r o v i d e d f o r
e a c h convoy. The r e q u i r e m e n t i s t h e r e f o r e :
North Russian convoys
T o t a l Requirements of Convoy
escort
25
AVAILABILITY:
u. s.
BRITISH
End J a n u a r y
11
End February
13
End March
13
End A p r i l
11
19
End May
18
26
TOTAL
End J u n e
21
11
32
End J u l y
24
13
37
14
.22
28
End August
A p a r t from o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s a l l o w a n c e must b e made f o r a
number o f t h e s e c a r r i e r s b e i n g employed on t r a i n i n g , a n t i - r a i d e r d u t i e s
and a i r c r a f t t r a n s p o r t i n g , w h i l e 20 p e r c e n t w i l l b e undergoing r e f i t a t
any one t i m e .
ENCLOSURE 'E"
The V.L.R.
Area:
Very l o n g r a n g e a i r c r a f t a r e r e q u i r e d t o e s c o r t c o n v o y s and
operate a g a i n s t U-boats i n t h e North A t l a n t i c a t r a n g e s g r e a t e r t h a n
Area.
They a r e a l s o r e q u i r e d t o e s c o r t convoys as f a r s o u t h as 5 2
54
N.
S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
[I.
so t h a t f l e x i b i l i t y may be g i v e n t o r o u t i n g .
I t must b e assumed t h a t any convoy p a s s i n g
l i a b l e t o be p i c k e d up and shadowed by a U-boat. I t
the shadower d i v e . IVe s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e b e a b l e t o
during d a y l i g h t h o u r s . W i t h i n t h e V.L.R. a r e a t h i s
through t h i s a r e a is
i s e s s e n t i a l t o make
e s c o r t e v e r y convoy
p r o b a b l y means a b o u t
three convoys d a i l y .
The o p e r a t i o n of t h r e e s t r o n g packs of U-boats s i m u l t a n e o u s l y i n
e must b e p r e
the North A t l a n t i c i s w e l l w i t h i n t h e enemys r e s o u r c e s . W
pared f o r two convoys t o b e a t t a c k e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y and s h o u l d b e a b l e
t o r e i n f o r c e e a c h of t h e s e w i t h l o n g r a n g e a i r c r a f t t o h a r a s s and s i n k
the U-boats
purpose
For t h e s e t a s k s i t i s e s t i m a t e d t h a t 80 V.L.R.
a i r c r a f t are re
a s t r o n g o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t U-boats
on p a s s a g e t o and from t h e i r b a s e s ,
Northern Approaches:
E a s t Coast:
b e h: R
Gibraltar:
The d e f e n s e o f t h e f o c a l p o i n t s i n t h e approaches t o t h e hlediter
ranean r e q u i r e s t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f s u i t a b l e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and a n t i
submarine a i r c r a f t a b l e t o u n d e r t a k e d a y and n i g h t o p e r a t i o n s .
SECTION 2
EAST COAST OF U
S , AND CANADA:
The f o c a l p o i n t s of t r a d e r o u t e s on t h e U.
require a l a r g e s c a l e of a i r p r o t e c t i o n
55
S . A t l a n t i c seaboard
P r a c t i c a l l y a l l A t l a n t i c convoy
C. S.
SECRET
B P I T I S R ,h:OST S E C K X
r o u t e s converge i n t h i s arcla.
SECTIOK 3 - THE CARIBBEAN:
The s h i p p i n g r o u t e s t o t h e o i l f i e
Is o f Venezuela a n
Trir
lad
d u c e d . However, s u r f a c e r a i d e r s o p e r a t e c o n t i n u o u s l y i n t h i s a r e a and
a i r p a t r o l s a r e r e q u i r e d t o g u a r d a g a i n s t them.
SECTION 6 - THE MEDITERRANEAN [EXCLUDING GIBRALTARj :
In t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n t h e s e a communications a r e c o n t r o l l e d t o a
U. S. S E C R E T
BG'ITISH MOST S E C R E T
i n t h e above s e c t i o n s a r e s e t o u t i n t h e f o l l o w i n g s c h e d u l e :
SCHEDULE V
SCHEDULE OF REQUIREMENTS OF SHORE-BASED AIRCRAFT
FOR THE PROTECTION OF TRADE COMMUNICATIONS
Section
Area
1
North A t l a n t i c t o 2S0iY.
F'B
VLR
LR
31R
MR/TB
Caribbean
West A f r i c a 2G01<. t o
96
72
120
18
P o r t u g u e s e West A f r i c a
.45
48
Xedi t e r r a n e a n
1s
I n d i a n Ocean
South P a c i f i c
Southwest P a c i f i c
10
11
Alaska
12
South A f r i c a
117
.
24
. 150
. 72
12
.
.
24
SR
T/F
200
250
180
32
80
80
96
80
96
95
120
Iio d a t a a v a i l a b l e
140 d a t a a v a i l a b l e
72
30
110
No d a t a a v a i l a b l e
F l y i n g Boats
.
)
Long Range
)
A l l o t h e r p l a n e s r e q u i r e d f o r coverage of h a r b o r s , s t r a i t s
and f o c a l p o i n t s of t r a d e r o u t e s .
57
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H NOST S E C R E T
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 20, 1943
161
OUTLINE PLAN:
1.
The main f e a t u r e s o f t h e p l a n a r e :
(a) B r i t i s h a s s a u l t s :
(1) On t h e s o u t h e a s t c o r n e r of t h e i s l a n d by t h r e e d i v i s i o n s '
on D d a y t o s e c u r e t h e a i r f i e l d s i n t h a t a r e a and t h e
p o r t s o f S y r a c u s e and A u g u s t a . These a i r f i e l d s a r e re
q u i r e d t o e n a b l e t h e a s s a u l t on C a t a n i a t o be p r o t e c t e d .
(2) On C a t a n i a by one d i v i s i o n on D 3 t o s e c u r e t h e p o r t and
airfields.
(b) American a s s a u l t s :
(1) On t h e s o u t h w e s t s h o r e by one d i v i s i o n on D d a y t o se
c u r e t h e a i r f i e l d s i n t h a t a r e a . These a i r f i e l d s are
r e q u i r e d t o c o v e r t h e a s s a u l t s on P a l e r m o
(2) On t h e Palermo a r e a b y two d i v i s i o n s on D 2 t o c a p t u r e
t h e p o r t of P a l e r m o and a d j a c e n t p o r t s and a i r f i e l d s .
E s c o r t c a r r i e r s w i l l p r o v i d e a d d i t i o n a l s u p p o r t f o r the
assault.
(c) Follow-up:
One B r i t i s h d i v i s i o n w i l l b e l a n d e d t h r o u g h C a t a n i a and one
American d i v i s i o n t h r o u g h Palermo.
FORCES REQUIRED:
2.
i c a n and B r i t i s r i commitments.
MOUNTING OF BRITISH PORTION:
3.
I t is assumed t h a t t h e U S S O A Sw i l l r e q u i r e F r e n c h North A f r i c a n
p o r t s f o r t h e mounting of t h e i r s h a r e of t h e o p e r a t i o n . Such p a r t o f t h e
B r i t i s h e x p e d i t i o n as i s mounted i n s i d e t h e Y e d i t e r r a n e a n mus't t h e r e f o r e
De mounted from Middle E a s t p o r t s , e . g
Malta.
, Haifa,
L i m i t a t i o n s of p o r t c a p a c i t y make
Alexandria, P o r t Said,
i t i m p o s s i b l e t o mount t h e
S, SECRET
U.
4.
In ordeF t o u s e b a t t l e - e x p e r i e n c e d
t r o o p s of t h e E i g h t h A r m y ,
If t h e e x p e d i t i o n i s t o be
T o f i n d t h e t h r e e d i v i s i o n a s s a u l t from t h e U
C a t a n i a a s s a u l t (one d i v i s i o n ) and t h e follow-up
and t h e
(one d i v i
s i o n ) from t h e Middle E a s t
B
T o f i n d t h e t h r e e d i v i s i o n a s s a u l t and t h e f o l l o w - u p
(one
(one
d i v i s i o n ) from t h e U.
K.
ALTERNATIVE A
6
(a) Advantages:
(1) P r o v i d e d North A f r i c a i s c l e a r e d of t h e enemy by A p r i l
3Oth, i t e n a b l e s t h e B r i t i s h a s s a u l t s t o b e c a r r i e d o u t
i n l a t e July,
(2) It i s more economical i n s h i p p i n g .
@ ) Disadvantages :
(1) I t d o e s n o t u s e f o r c e s i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t which a r e
a v a i l a b l e o v e r and above s e c u r i t y commitments
(2) I t i n v o l v e s t h e p a s s a g e of a l a r g e a s s a u l t convoy through
t h e S i c i l i a n n a r r o w s i n m i n e a b l e w a t e r s and u n d e r a i r
a t t a c k . T h i s i s an u n a c c e p t a b l e r i s k t o t h e s p e a r h e a d of
the attack.
ALTERNATIVE B
(a) Advantages:
(1) I t p e r m i t s a s l i g h t r e d u c t i o n i n e s c o r t .
(2) I t o b v i a t e s t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e s o f A ,
and, t h e r e f o r e ,
g i v e s t h e o p e r a t i o n g r e a t e r chances of t a c t i c a l s u c c e s s .
@ ) Disadvantages:
(1) P r o v i d e d N o r t h A f r i c a i s c l e a r e d of t h e enemy on A p r i l
59
U.
S. S E C R E T
B R I T I S H <YOST SECRET
3 0 t h , the B r i t i s h a s s a u l t s c o u l d t a k e p l a c e a t t h e end
o f S e p t e m b e r . T h i s i s n e a r t h e t i m e when t h e w e a t h e r
breaks.
(2) I t i n v o l v e s t h e d i s p a t c h o f 16 p e r s o n n e l s h i p s t o the
M i d d l e E a s t which a r e n o t o t h e r w i s e r e q u i r e d i n t h a t
area.
(3) I t i s w a s t e f u l of s h i p p i n g a n d w i l l p r e v e n t us making
any a p p r e c i a b l e B r i t i s h c a r g o s h i p p i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n t o
Bolero.
(4) W i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o t h e M i d d l e
E a s t w e cannot s t a t e
w h e t h e r t h e p o r t and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s i n t h e
Middle E a s t a r e c a p a b l e of mounting an a s s a u l t o f t h i s
size.
PROVISION OF NAVAL FORCES:
8.
The B r i t i s h Naval f o r c e s c a n b e p r o v i d e d .
0.
Thus t h e y can o n l y p r o v i d e t h e e s c o r t r e q u i r e d i f t h e i n c r e a s e d r i s k in
v o l v e d i n t a k i n g them o f f convoy p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e p e r i o d o f t h e oper
a t i o n can be a c c e p t e d
10.
Even i f i t were p o s s i b l e , t h e m o u n t i n g of a l l a s s a u l t s from
N o r t h A f r i c a would n o t r e s u l t i n any f u r t h e r r e d u c t i o n o f e s c o r t s , as
t h e l i m i t i n g f a c t o r i s the number r e q u i r e d f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of s h i p
p i n g and c r a f t o f f b e a c h e s .
PROVISION OF A I R FORCES :
11.
The B r i t i s h a i r f o r c e s r e q u i r e d w i l l b e a v a i l a b l e i n North
A f r i c a and t h e Middle E a s t .
PROVISION OF LANDING CRAFT:
12.
B r i t i s h l a n d i n g c r a f t r e q u i r e m e n t s c a n b e made a v a i l a b l e pro
v i d e d e x p e c t e d d e l i v e r i e s from t h e U . S. a r e p u n c t u a l .
There may,how
e v e r , be d i f f i c u l t y i n g e t t i n g t h e r e q u i r e d number s h i p p e d t o t h e Middle
E a s t i n t i m e . . T h i s w i l l r e q u i r e d e t a i l e d examination.
13.
Any l a r g e i n c r e a s e i n t h e u s e of L . C . I . (L) and L.S.T. f o r the
American a s s a u l t w i l l p r o b a b l y have t o b e a t t h e e x p e n s e of t h e p r e s e n t
B r i t i s h a l l o t m e n t . T h i s would p r e v e n t our a s s a u l t s b e i n g u n d e r t a k e n as
proposed.
li. S . SECRET
BRITISH MOST S E C R E T
PROVISION OF SHIPPING:
14.
The s h i p p i n g c a n be p r o v i d e d .
t h e United
S t a t e s w i l l have t o p r o v i d e a heavy n a v a l c o v e r i n g f o r c e i n a d d i t i o n t o
the f o r c e s shown.
LAMBE,
STEWART,
ELLIOT
ENCLOSLijRE
F0INX.S IILQLiIRF.;>
XAVAL
ilritish
Battleships
U.S.
Total
r l e e t Carriers
Escort Carriers
Crnisers
10
14
Pestroyers
30
20
50
Escorts
69
55
124
Minesweepers S s m a l l c r a f t
ARMY
British
u s
Total
(a) , A s s a u l t .
Infantry Divisions
1 1/3
7--1/3
Armored Regiments
Parachute Srigades
(b) F a 1 1 ow - U p
Infantry Civisions
U. S . SECRET
SPITISH MOST S E C R E T
AIR FORCES
British
American
m - LL- i l
51
S.E.F.
T.E.F.
(day)
T.E.F.
(P-38)
12
T.E.F.
(Xight)
L i g h t - V e d i u m Bombers
2c
Ill
G.R.
F i g h t e r Xecre.
P . i t . u.
Transport
2
Torpedo Bombers
SHIPS AND L A N D I N G CRAFT
British
l~i.
0. S h i p
L . S . I . (L)
American
13
rota1
5
21
1 . . S . I . (I?)
L.S.2.
L.S.T.
56
11
100
L.C.A.
98
C?
150
L.C.P.
100
190
2 90
L.C.S.
14
12
2fi
?00
71
271
3U
3u
120
L.C.T.
72
Personnel Ships
?O
23
Ill
Ships
31
77
171
.
L . C .I . (I.)
I.. C !i.
H.T.
62
c,
U.
S. SECRET
BRITISH YOST S E C R E T
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 21, 1943
lOl/l
" IIUSKY"
R e p o r t b y E r i t i s h .ioint, P l a n n i n g S t a f f
EARLIEST DATE FOit TM! A'iSAirLT:
1.
After f u r t h e r e x a m i n a t i o n we have concluded:: t h a t t h e e a r l i e s t
s a f e d a t e on which we c a n r e l y f o r t h e R r i t i s h a s s a u l t s i s August 3 0 t h
a d d o n o t c o n s i d e r t h a t t h i s d a t e can be advanced u n l e s s o p e r a t i o n s i n
Tunisia conclude c o n s i d e r a b l y e a r l i e r t h a n a n t i c i p a t e d .
The u s e o f a i r t r a n s p o r t
t o move the l e a d i n g b r i g a d e of
the
I f t h e B r i t i s h c o u l d use A l g i e r s and a s e c t o r of t h e e a s t c o a s t
of T u n i s i a f o r t h e t r a i n i n g and l o a d i n g o f one o f t h e i r d i v i s i o n s , t,he
2.
e a r l i e s t d a t e b y which t h e E r i t i s h c o u l d a s s a n l t c o n l d he advanced b y
one month. F u r t h e r e x a m i n a t i o n b y t h e U . S. P l a n n i n g S t a f f s may? however,
show t h a t T u n i s i a i s e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e ' A m e r i c a n s t o mount t h e i r t w o s h o r e
t o shore a s s a u l t s . I n t h i s e v e n t t h e s h i p - b o r n e p o r t i o n o f t h e E r i t i s h
a s s a u l t (about 40 s h i p s ) would have t o p a s s t h e S i c i l j a n Narrows on 1)
day.
.3.
how t h e i r p o r t i o n o f t h e o p e r a t i o n w i l l be c a r r i e d o u t and i n c o n s e q m n c e
the t y p e s a n d numbers of l a n d i n g c r a f t t h e y w i l l u s e g o r t h e d a t e on
which t h e y c a n mount t h e o p e r a t i o n . ' T h e l i m i t i n g f a c t o r s are t,he p r o
v i s i o n of t r a i n i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t s and o r g a n i z a t ' i o n and e a r l y p r o v i s i o n
* Vide
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
o t h e r than L.C.I.
(L) s u p p o r t e d by L.C.S. No c r a f t of t h i s t y p e e x i s t
Channel o p e r a t i o n s .
IMMEDIATE ACTION:
5.
Beach r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , e x p a n s i o n o f t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s i n North
ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND:
6.
f o r O p e r a t i o n HUSKY.
7.
8.
9.
w i t h p a r a g r a p h s 6 t o 8 above.
(signed)
C . E , LAMBE
G , M , STEWART
W, ELLIOT
ENCLOSURE "A"
OPERATION HUSKY
OUTLINE PLAN:
1.
(a) B r i t i s h a s s a u l t s :
(1) On t h e s o u t h e a s t c o r n e r of t h e i s l a n d by t h r e e d i v i s i o n s
on D. day t o s e c u r e t h e a i r f i e l d s i n t h a t a r e a and the
p o r t s of S y r a c u s e and Augusta. These a i r f i e l d s are re
q u i r e d t o e n a b l e t h e a s s a u l t on C a t a n i a t o be p r o t e c t e d .
(2) On
C a t a n i a b y one d i v i s i o n on D 3 t o s e c u r e t h e p o r t
and a i r f i e l d s .
64
S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST S E C R E T
[I.
(b) American a s s a u l t s :
(1) On t h e s o u t h w e s t s h o r e by one d i v i s i o n on D d a y t o s e
c u r e t h e a i r f i e l d s i n t h a t a r e a . These a i r f i e l d s a r e
r e q u i r e d t o c o v e r t h e a s s a u l t s on P a l e r m o .
(2) On t h e Palermo a r e a by two d i v i s i o n s on D 2 t o c a p t u r e
t h e p o r t of Palermo and a d j a c e n t p o r t s and a i r f i e l d s .
E s c o r t c a r r i e r s w i l l provide a d d i t i o n a l s u p p o r t f o r t h e
assault.
( c ) Follow up:
One B r i t i s h d i v i s i o n w i l l be landed t h r o u g h C a t a n i a and one
American d i v i s i o n through Palermo.
FORCES REVJIRED:
2.
into
w i l l r e q u i r e French North A f r i c a n
Haifa, A l e x a n d r i a , P o r t S a i d ,
t h e U . K . t h r o u g h S i c i l i a n n a r r o w s i n m i n e a b l e w a t e r s and u n d e r a i r
a t t a c k i s u n a c c e p t a b l e for t h e i n i t i a l a s s a u l t s . The t h r e e d i v i s i o n
a s s a u l t on D day on t o t h e S.E. c o r n e r of t h e i s l a n d must t h e r e f o r e be
mounted i n t h e Middle E a s t . The f o l l o w up must be mounted from TRIPOLI
U S , SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
T h i s a l t e r n a t i v e of mounting two d i v i s i o n s from t h e Middle East
and f o u r d i v i s i o n s from N o r t h A f r i c a would r e s u l t i n t h e B r i t i s h share
o f the a s s a u l t b e i n g r e a d y by August 1 s t . I t may, however, w e l l result
i n t h e American s h a r e o f t h e a s s a u l t b e i n g d e l a y e d beyond August 31st.
from Middle E a s t
1 d i v i s i o n (D + 3 a s s a u l t )
from U. K .
1 division
from T r i p o l i t a n i a
( f o l l o w up)
There a r e four p o s s i b i l i t i e s :
(A) Use 5 t h and 5 6 t h from P e r s i a - I r a q and N.Z.
d i v i s i o n from T u n i s i a
d i v i s i o n or 78th
t o Egypt. 5 6 t h , N.Z.
s h i p p e d round Cape
or 78th d i v i s i o n -
(C) September 2 5 t h
@) September 1 0 t h
7..
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S B MOST SECRET
(a) Only one i n s t e a d of two b r i g a d e s must b e b a c k from T u n i s i a
i n t i m e t o s t a r t t r a i n i n g on June 1st. It may be p o s s i b l e t o
withdraw one b r i g a d e i n time t o do t h i s .
(b) Only one i n s t e a d of two d i v i s i o n s w i l l have t o b e r e f i t t e d
i n Egypt a f t e r r e t u r n from T u n i s i a .
(c) Two o u t of t h r e e i n s t e a d o f one d i v i s i o n w i l l be a v a i l a b l e
8.
f o r t h e a s s a u l t be f i x e d a t August 3 0 t h . T h i s w i l l mean t h e t h r e e d i v i
s i o n D. day a s s a u l t s h o u l d be mounted w i t h :
5 t h and SGth D i v i s i o n s from Persia-Iraq.
N 2
and 7 8 t h D i v i s i o n s from T u n i s i a .
10.
11.
and t h e Middle E a s t .
PROVISION OF LANDING CRAFT:
13.
B r i t i s h l a n d i n g c r a f t r e q u i r e m e n t s c a n b e made a v a i l a b l e pro
Any l a r g e i n c r e a s e i n t h e u s e of L . C . I . ( L )
and L,S.T.
for the
67
U. S . SECIiET
B Q I T I S B MOST S E C R E T
PROVISION OF SHIPPING:
15.
LAMBE
. . STEWART
G W
W . ELLIOT
ENCLOSURE "B"
FORCES REQUIRED
NAVAL
British
U.S.
Total
Battleships
Fleet Carriers
Cruisers
10
.1
14
Destroyers
30
20
50
Escorts
60
55
124
U.S.
Total
Escort c a r r i e r s
Minesweepers
& small craft
ARMY
B r i t is h
(a) Assault.:
Infantry Divisions
4-1/3
7-1 /3
Armored Regiments
P a r a c h u t e Brigades
(b) Follow-up:
I n f a n t r g L)ivis i o n s
68
U. S. SECRET
BRITISB MOST SECRET
A I R FORCES
:*
u. s.
British
U.E.
Groups
21
432
480
54
240
Squadrons
S.E.F.
T.E.F.
day
U.E.
U. S. Groups
P-38.
T.E.F.
night
54
Ex c l u d i ng
d e f e n s e North
Africa.
L i g h t Bombers
108
57
Includes
observation &
Army s u p p o r t
Squadrons.
Medium Bombers
90
285
Heavy Bombers
2
3
36
48
215
80
57
G.R.
(V.P.B.)
Torpedo
8-26 Torpedo
Bombers.
PRU
T o t a l Combat
Transport
35
13
938
1,376
80
312
These f i g u r e s a r e f o r a l l A l l i e d a i r c r a f t c o n c e n t r a t e d i n
t h e Central Mediterranean f o r offensive operations prepara
t o r y t o and d u r i n g BCJSKY. They exclude a i r c r a f t f o r d e f e n s e ,
p r o t e c t i o n of s h i p p i n g , r e s e r v e s f o r Turkey, e t c . , e l s e w h e r e
i n t h e Mediterranean.
SHIPS AND LANDING C R m
British
American':'"
Total
H . 2 . Ship
L.S.I.
(L)
13
21
L.S.I.
(M)
L.S.D.
L.S.T.
56
44
100
59
U. S. S E C R E T
BRITISH /*fOST S E C R E T
SHIPS AND LANDING CRAFT
(Continued)
British
American':"
Total
L.C.A.
59
52
150
L.C.P.
100
190
290
L.C.S
14
12
26
L.C.M.
200
170
370
90
30
120
L.C.T.
72
72
Personnel S h i p s
20
20
40
Ships
91
77
171
L.C.I.
'V.T.
(L)
::"American
f i g u r e s a r e given in terms of B r i t i s h
types of l a n d i n g c r a
E"-LOSURE
"C"
D i v i s i o n s from:
Tunisia
U.K.
v i a Cape
1 (h.Z.
or 7 8 t h )
2 fLJ.2.
& 78th)
70
U. S, S E C R E T
BRITISH MOST S E C R E T
T u n i s i a c a n be r e l e a s e d i n time t o s t a r t t r a i n i n g i n Egypt
b y June 1 s t
(f) W
e have assumed t h a t none of t h e s h i p p i n g saved as a r e s u l t
o f t h e r e c e n t c u t on Middle E a s t and I n d i a n maintenance c a n
b e used f o r t r a n s p o r t i n g t h e U. K . d i v i s i o n s round t h e Cape.
I n consequence, t h e s a i l i n g d a t e of t h e s e d i v i s i o n s i s de
CASE A
harch I - A p r i l
Ma) 1 - J u n e 3 0
30 ( a ) B a s i c t r a i n i n g f i r s t d i v i s i o n from P.A.I.C.
( b ) E a s i c t r a i n i n g s e c o n d d i v i s i o n f r o m P.A.I.C.
71
U. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S B MOST S E C R E T
C.C.S.
162
J a n u a r y 1 9 , 1943
E x i s t i n g U. S. e s t i m a t e s on t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of s h i p p i n g and the
TABLE
Total
(a) To North R u s s i a
(b) To P e r s i a n Gulf
(c) I n P a c i f i c
15
15
15
15
15
15
90
and R u s s i a n P o o l ) 3 1
31
31
31
31
31
186
46
46
46
46
46
46
276
(Average from U. S
c o n t i n u a n c e of t h e N o r t h A t l a n t i c r o u t e , U
commitments u n d e r t h e
e x i s t i n g P r o t o c o l have been o n l y a h o u t 50 p e r c e n t of r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r
t h e l a s t s i x months, n e c e s s i t a t i n g t h e shipment of t h r e e - f o u r t h s of the
year's t o t a l d u r i n g t h e f i r s t h a l f of t h e y e a r 1943. T h i s w i l l r e q u i r e a
t o t a l of 1 3 2 s a i l i n g s f r o m t h e U L S , t o R u s s i a p r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1943.
If P r o t o c o l commitments a f t e r J u l y 1 a r e a t t h e same r a t e a s f o r t h e
year p r i o r t o t h a t t i m e , t w o - t h i r d s t h i s number, or 288 s a i l i n g s , w i l l
be r e q u i r e d .
$s t h e r o u t e t h r o u g h t h e P a c i f i c i s s u b j e c t t o i n t e r r u p t i o n b y
t h e J a p a n e s e a t any moment and as arms and ammunition do n o t move v i a
t h a t r o u t e , i t c a n n o t b e r e l i e d on f o r a n y g r e a t i n c r e a s e above t h e
3.
present s a i l i n g s .
4.
I t is e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e c a p a c i t y of P e r s i a n Gulf p o r t s c a n be
For t h e n o r t h e r n r o u t e on t h e b a s i s of 1 2 B r i t i s h c a r g o s h i p s
U.
S., S E C R E T
BRITISH MOST S E C R E T
every convoy. Owing t o the r e s t r i c t e d supply of e s c o r t s , i t seems t h a t
the convoy i n t e r v a l w i l l not be reduced below 42 days. With ice hazards
and the menace o f submarines and a i r a t t a c k s , i t is hardly p o s s i b l e t h a t
t o t a l s a i l i n g s w i l l exceed t h i s r a t e .
6.
lowing order:
TABLE I1
Jan
Feb
16
16
Mar
NORTH RUSSIA
June J u l y Aug Sep
Apr
May
16
16
Oct
Nov
16
16
31
63
16
16
Dec
Total
16
128
16
16
16
222
31
31
31
31
372
47
63
63
47
722
PERSIAN ROUTE
16
18
20
22
24
26
16
16
PACIFIC ROUTE
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
TOTAL
63
65
51
69
71
57
63
TBBLE I11
Jan
17
8.
Feb
Mar
Nov
Dec
Total
5
23
25
11
17
17
1 17
17
1
170
19
The e f f e c t of meeting the Russian P r o t o c o l on the movement of
TBBLE I V
1943
No, of troops
1st Q u a r t e r
46,000
2nd Q u a r t e r
82,000
3rd Quarter
55,000
4 t h Quarter
4,000
TOTAL
187,000
73
17. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
9.
10.
might be made a v a i l a b l e :
( a ) by r e d u c t i o n i n t h e r a t e of submarine
l o s s e s below t h e 2 . 6 p e r c e n t assumed i n t h e s e c a l c u l a t i o n s ;
e l i m i n a t i n g conversion of 100 EC Z S s i n t o t r a n s p o r t s ;
through t h e use of t h e Mediterranean r o u t e ;
(b) by
(c) b y savings
(d) r e l e a s e of U . S . from
o b l i g a t i o n t o r e p l a c e B r i t i s h l o s s e s i n l i k e amount.
11.
2.6 percent per month t o only 2.0 percent per month would i n c r e a s e t h e
t r o o p c a r r y i n g c a p a c i t y i n 1943 by 500,000 men. Even a t h i r d of t h i s ,
12.
g a i n i n t r a n s p o r t c a p a c i t y of 153,000 would be p o s s i b l e .
If l o s s e s are
13.
14.
Supplement B r i t i s h a s s i s t a n c e , a s p r e v i o u s l y a g r e e d , up t o
300,000 tons per month, cumulative. Even on t h i s b a s i s , with a reduction
i n sinkings, there may be some r e l i e f on t h i s s c o r e "
74
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 20, 1943
162/1
COMBINED CHIEFS O F STAFF
U.
S . A I D TO RUSSIA
1.
E x i s t i n g U. S. e s t i m a t e s on t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of s h i p p i n g and t h e
p o s s i b i J i t y o f moving t r o o p s , n a v a l f o r c e s , s u p p l i e s and e q u i p m e n t
d u r i n g 1943 a l l o w f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g U . S . s a i l i n g s f o r R u s s i a n a i d .
TABLE I
J a n Feb Mar
Apr
May
June
Total
(a) To North R u s s i a
(b) To P e r s i a n Gulf
15
15
15
15
15
15
90
31
31
31
31
31
46
46
46
46
46
Shipments beyond June are e s t i m a t e d a t t h e same rate.
31
46
186
276
(c) I n P a c i f i c
(Average from U. S .
and Russian Pool)
2.
Owing t o l i m i t e d c a p a c i t y of P e r s i a n G u l f p o r t s and t h e d i s
c o n t i n u a n c e of t h e h o r t h A t l a n t i c r o u t e , U.
S . commitments under t h e
e x i s t i n g P r o t o c o l have b e e n o n l y a b o u t 50 p e r c e n t o f r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r
t h e l a s t s i x months, n e c e s s i t a t i n g t h e shipment of t h r e e - f o u r t h s of t h e
y e a r ' s t o t a l d u r i n g t h e f i r s t h a l f of t h e year 1943. T h i s w i l l r e q u i r e a
t o t a l of 432 s a i l i n g s f r o m t h e U. S . t o R u s s i a p r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1943.
If P r o t o c o l commitments a f t e r J u l y 1 a r e a t t h e same r a t e as f o r t h e
year p r i o r t o t h a t t i m e , t w o - t h i r d s t h i s number, or 288 s a i l i n g s , w i l l
be r e q u i r e d .
3.
A s t h e r o u t e t h r o u g h t h e p a c i f i c i s s u b j e c t t o i n t e r r u p t i o n by
I t i s e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e c a p a c i t y of Persian G u l f p o r t s c a n b e
expanded t o handle a t o t a l of 26 s h i p s per month by June 1943.
5.
For t h e n o r t h e r n r o u t e on t h e b a s i s of 12 B r i t i s h c a r g o s h i p s
and two t a n k e r s t h e r e would remain a v a i l a b l e 16 s a i l i n g s from t h e U. S .
4.
75
U. S. S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
e v e r y convoy. Owing t o t h e r e s t r i c t e d s u p p l y o f e s c o r t s , i t seems t h a t
t h e convoy i n t e r v a l w i l l n o t be reduced below 42 days. With i c e hazards
and t h e menace of submarines and a i r a t t a c k s , i t i s h a r d l y p o s s i b l e t h a t
t o t a l s a i l i n g s w i l l exceed t h i s r a t e .
6.
The t o t a l s a i l i n g s f o r t h e y e a r could t h e r e f o r e be on t h e f o l
lowing o r d e r :
TABLE I1
NORTH RUSSIA
Jan
16
Feb
16
Mar
Apr
May
16
16
June
July
16
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Total
16
16
128
16
16
16
16
222
31
31
31
31
31
372
63
47
63
63
47
722
16
PERSIAN ROUTE
16
18
20
22
24
26
16
16
PACIFIC ROUTE
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
TOTAL
63
65
51
69
71
57
63
S a i l i n g s on t h i s o r d e r woilld f a i l t o meet P r o t o c o l r e q u i r e m e n t s i n J u l y
by 56 s h i p s , b u t would p e r m i t meeting f u l l commitments by t h e end o f the
calendar year.
I t w i l l be n o t e d from T a b l e s I and I1 t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g a d d i
7.
t i o n a l s a i l i n g s would be r e q u i r e d f o r s u c h a program r e s u l t i n g i n t h e
n e c e s s i t y f o r t h e u s e o f a d d i t i o n a l c a r g o s h i p s for t h e p e r i o d o f a year.
TABLE I11
ADDITIONAL SAILINGS REQUIRED
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
17
19
23
25
8.
The e f f e c t o f m e e t i n g t h e R u s s i a n P r o t o c o l on t h e movement of
U. S.
June
July
Bug
Sep
Oct
Nov
17
17
17
17
11
following order:
TABLE I V
1943
1st Q u a r t e r
No
of t r o o p s
46,000
2nd Q u a r t e r
82 000
3rd Quarter
55,000
4 t h Quarter
4,000
187,000
TOTAL
7fi
Dee
1
Total
170
S. SECRET
B R I T I S K MOST S E C R E T
[I.
9.
A s r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r o t h e r t h e a t e r s a r e more or less f i x e d , t h e
blow would f a l l on movements t o t h e U. K . Some a d j u s t m e n t m i g h t b e
necessary i n t i m i n g of R u s s i a n shipment t o a v o i d i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h
special requirements.
10.
A d d i t i o n a l t o n n a g e above t h a t assumed i n e x i s t i n g e s t i m a t e s
might b e made a v a i l a b l e :
( a ) by r e d u c t i o n in t h e r a t e of
submarine
l o s s e s below t h e 2 . G p e r c e n t assumed i n t h e s e c a l c u l a t i o n s ;
e l i m i n a t i n g c o n v e r s i o n o f 100 kC 2's i n t o t r a n s p o r t s ;
through t h e u s e of t h e Y e d i t e r r a n e a n r o u t e ;
(b) b y
( c ) by s a v i n g s
(d) r e l e a s e of U . S . from
o b l i g a t i o n t o r e p l a c e B r i t i s h l o s s e s i n l i k e amount.
11.
A r e d u c t i o n i n r a t e of l o s s of U n i t e d N a t i o n s s h i p p i n g from
2.6 p e r c e n t p e r month t o o n l y 2.0 p e r c e n t p e r month would i n c r e a s e t h e
troop c a r r y i n g c a p a c i t y i n 1943 by 500,000 men. Even a t h i r d of t h i s ,
or a r e d u c t i o n of t h e l o s s r a t e t o 2.4 p e r c e n t , would make t h e s e s h i p
m n t s t o R u s s i a p o s s i b l e , w i t h o u t l e s s e n i n g t r o o p movements. With t h e
measures p r o j e c t e d by t h e J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f , such an improvement i s
a possibility.
12.
If c o n v e r s i o n of EC 2's were s t o p p e d a t t h e end of F e b r u a r y , a
gain i n t r a n s p o r t c a p a c i t y of 153,000 would b e p o s s i b l e . If l o s s e s are
not reduced o r no a s s i s t a n c e from B r i t i s h s o u r c e s f o r t h i s purpose c a n
be o b t a i n e d , s u c h a c o u r s e would be d e s i r a b l e .
13.
The B r i t i s h have a l r e a d y d i s c o u n t e d t h e e s t i m a t e d g a i n i n t h e
Mediterranean by d i v e r t i n g t h i s tonnage t o B r i t i s h i m p o r t s .
14.
15.
I t i s c o n c l u d e d from t h e above t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s o f
meeting R u s s i a n P r o t o c o l d e l i v e r i e s on t h e p r e s e n t s c a l e d u r i n g 1943
without r e d u c i n g t e n t a t i v e s c h e d u l e s , b u t t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s
t h a t movements t o t h e U. K . may b e r e d u c e d b y as much as 100,000 men.
The a d v a n t a g e s of f u r n i s h i n g a i d t o R u s s i a a r e s u c h t h a t t h i s h a z a r d
should b e a c c e p t e d . Owing t o t h e s c a r c i t y o f s h i p p i n g , t h e r e s h o u l d b e
77
ll S SECRET
B R I l I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
163
J a n u a r y 20, 1943
There s h a l l h e a p p o i n t e d a n A i r Commander-in-Chief
o f t h e whole
h!editerranean T h e a t e r w i t h h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s a t A l g i e r s u n d e r whom w i l l
h e the A.O.C.
Piddle East
2.
in C
Malta.
west A f r i c a n T h e a t e r and t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s
(2) T h e o p e r a t i o n s of o t h e r Mediterranean a i r f o r c e s i n con
j u n c t i o n w i t h o p e r a t i o n s conducted i n o r from t h e North
west A f r i c a n T h e a t e r
(p) The Commander- i n - C h i e f , A.E.F,
i n Northwest A f r i c a , w i l l
a f f o r d t o t h e A i r Commander- i n . C h - e f , M e d i t e r r a n e a n
all
p o s s i b l e s u p p o r t and f a c i l i t i e s i n t h e N o r t h w e s t A f r i c a n
T h e a t e r f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n a i r f o r c e s
and f o r t h e i r e f f i c i e n t c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e l a n d and s e a
forces i n the theater
3.
NORTHWEST AFRICA:
T h i s w i l l b e d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e suhcommands:
(a) Iieavy and medium bombers and a p p r o p r i a t e e s c o r t f i g h t e r s
(h) General r e c o n n a i s k a n c e and f i g h t e r s f o r t h e d e f e n s e of s h i p
p i n g , p o r t s and hack a r e a s .
(c) An A i r S u p p o r t Command, which i s d e a l t w i t h i n d e t a i l in
paragraph 4 below.
The d e t a i l e d o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e Command m u s t , however, h e l e f t
t o t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e A i r Commander-in-Chief
78
when he i s a p p o i n t e d
U. S. S E C R E T
BRITISH MOST S E C R E T
A i r Force s u p p l y , m a i n t e n a n c e , and r e p a i r arrangements i n t h e whole o f
Northwest A f r i c a s h a l l be c e n t r a l i z e d u n d e r one c o n t r o l , d i r e c t under
t h e A.O.C.
4.
i n C . Northwest A f r i c a .
I n o r d e r t h a t l a n d o p e r a t i o n s may be e f f e c t i v e l y s u p p o r t e d by
a p p o i n t e d t o c o o r d i n a t e t h e o p e r a t i o n s of a l l t h r e e
a r m i e s i n t h e T u n i s i a n Theater--the
whence he c a n
d i r e c t t h e o p e r a t i o n s of t h e A i r Fopces t o t h e b e s t advantage o f t h e l a n d
battle.
Army Support Wings w i l l be a t t a c h e d t o each of t h e three armies
The Wing Commanders w i l l a c t as A i r A d v i s e r s t o t h e Army Commanders and
5.
MIDDLE FAST:
T h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of Middle E a s t w i l l remain as i t i s a t p r e s e n t
i n C . Northwest A f r i c a .
79
Air
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
C.C.S.
lfi4
J a n u a r y 2 0 , 1913
OF FORCES
Report b y B r i t i s h J o i n t Planning S t a f f
1.
o u t i n C.C.S.
151.
ASSUMPTION:
2.
U n t i l an o u t l i n e p l a n i s r e c e i v e d from I n d i a no a c c u r a t e e s t i
REQUIRED
BRITISH RESOURCES
(a) N a v a l Forces:
G-8 E s c o r t c a r r i e r s
40 D e s t r o y e r s and e s c o r t s
REMARKS
The p r o v i s i o n of naval
sweepers w i l l prob-
f o r c e s must be decided
8 Submarines
a b l y be a v a i l a b l e
upon a t a l a t e r
date
6 F l e e t minesweepers and
O f t h e remainder
W i l l be a v a i l a b l e
i n
cover by heavy f o r c e s
t h e B r i t i s h a r e un
depending on t h e s i t u
l i k e l y t o be a b l e t o
ation a t the t i m e .
p r o v i d e more t h a n
half.
(b) Army:
8 Infantry df--isions
I n d i a by October 1 ,
Yes
including sufficient
1 Armored d i v i s i o n
a s s a u l t t r a i n e d troops.
(c) A i r :
28 Bomber squadrons
W i l l be found from a i r
Yes
f o r c e s a l r e a d y i n In
17 F i g h t e r squadrons
dia, raised
4 C o a s t a l squadrons
t o requi
s i t e strengthbytrans
f e r from Middle E a s t
SO
U. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
AVAILABLE
REQUIRED
mOM
BRITISH RESOURCES
REMARKS
(d) A s s a u l t s h i p p i n g and
Landing Craft:
1 H.Q.
Ship
(L)
(2)
9 L.S.I.
40 L.S.T.
5 L.S.5.
10 L.C.T.
(5)
120 L.C.M.
Yes
Yes
From 7-13
NO
from B r i t i s h r e s o u r c e s
No
w i l l r e q u i r e t o b e pro
100 only
v i d e d a n d manned b y
.$.A.
Yes
40 L.C.P.
Yes
100 L.C.A.
16 L.C.S.
This deficiency w i l l
10
have t o be m e t b y i m
provisat ion.
(e) Shipping:
20 P e r s o n n e l s h i p s
No estimate
T h i s requirement has
60 M.T.
yet possible
n o t y e t been confirmed
ships
b y C--in-C I n d i a .
CONCLUSION:
81
li S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
C.C.S. 164/1
J a n u a r y 21, 1943
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
OPEIIAXON INAXI6i--PROVISION
OF FORCES
Report by B r i t i s h J o i n t P l a n n i n g S t a f f
1.
o u t i n C.C.S.
154.
ASSUMPTION:
a s now
f o r e c a s t , are:
REQUIHED
AVAILABLE FROM
BRITISH RESOURCES
REMARKS
( a ) Naval F o r c e s :
6 Escort c a r r i e r s
40 j!estroyers
and e s c o r t s
sweepers w i l l prob-
f o r c e s must be decided
8 Submarines
a b l y b e a v a i l a b l e . O f upon a t a l a t e r d a t e .
6 F l e e t minesweepers and
t h e remainder, t h e
cover b y heavy f o r c e s
B r i t i s h are unlikely
depending on t h e s i t u
t o be a b l e t o p r o v i d e
a t i o n a t t h e time.
more t h a n h a l f .
W i l l be available i n
I n d i a by October 1, in
(b) Army:
8 Infantry divisions
Yes
c l u d i n g s u f f i c i e n t as
s a u l t t r a i n e d troops.
1 Armored d i v i s i o n
(c) A i r :
28 Bomber squadrons
W i l l b e found from a i r
Yes
17 F i g h t e r squadrons
forces already i n In
4 C o a s t a l squadrons
d i a , r a i s e d t o requi
s i t e s t r e n g t h b y trans
f e r from
ranean.
82
t h e Mediter.
S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
RE$ U I RED
AVAILBBLE FROM
BRITISH
REMARKS
RESOURCES
(d) A s s a u l t s h i p p i n g and
Landing Craft,:
Ship
Yes
L.S.I.
(L)
Yes
4 0 L.S.T.
(2)
From 7-13
1 H.Q.
5 L.S.D.
KO
10 L . C . T .
120 L.C.M.
(5)
YO
100 only
Ex IIusky o r o t h e r Med
i t e r r a n e a n Operations.
w i l l r e y u i r e t o b e pro
v i d e d a n d manned
by
u . s .A.
40 5.C.P.
Yes
100 L . C . A .
Yes
16 L.C.S.
10
T h i s deficiency w i l l
h a v e t o b e met by i m
prov i s a t i on.
(e) Shipping:
20 P e r s o n n e l s h i p s
60 M.T.
ships
No e s t i m a t e
yet possible
n o t y e t been confirmed
by C-in-C
India.
CGYCLUSIOK:
4.
The Combined C h i e f s o f F t a f f a r e a s k e d t o :
!a) Approve Vovember 15, 1 9 4 3 , a s p r o v i s i o n a l d a t e f o r AFAKIhI
assault.
( b ) Approve p r o v i s i o n a l s c h e d u l e of f o r c e s l a i d o u t i n paragraph 3
a b o v e , i t b e i n g r e c o g n i z e d t h a t a c t u a l p r o v i s i o n of
f o r c e s , a s s a u l t s h i p p i n g , l a n d i n g c r a f t and s h i p p i n g
naval
must
U . S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 22, 1943
165/2
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
DRaFT TELEGRAM
Prepared by t h e Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f
1.
2.
We a r e i n no doubt t h a t o u r c o r r e c t s t r a t e g y i s t o c o n c e n t r a t e
we
must
maintain
s u f f i c i e n t p r e s s u r e on J a p a n t o r e t a i n t h e i n i t i a t i v e i n t h e P a c i f i c and
F a r E a s t , s u s t a i n China, and p r e v e n t t h e J a p a n e s e from e x t e n d i n g t h e i r
a g g r e s s i o n t o o t h e r t h e a t e r s s u c h as your Maritime P r o v i n c e s .
3.
A c o n s t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n h a s been t h e n e c e s s i t y of d i v e r t i n g
t o R u s s i a t h e m a x i m u m flow of s u p p l i e s , c o n s i s t e n t w i t h e q u a l l y urgent
e s h a l l s p a r e no e x e r t i o n t o send you
requirements i n o t h e r t h e a t e r s . W
material a s s i s t a n c e by e v e r y a v a i l a b l e r o u t e , b u t i t would be no more
i n your i n t e r e s t t h a n o u r s t o do s o a t a c o s t which would c r i p p l e our
c a p a c i t y t o r e l i e v e p r e s s u r e on you by c o n t i n u i n g an i n t e n s i f i e d o f f e n
s i v e e f f o r t on our p a r t .
4.
84
ll. S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
i n Egyptian and North A f r i c a n p o r t s . T h i s c o n c e n t r a t i o n w i l l c e r t a i n l y
be known t o o u r e n e m i e s , h u t t h e y w i l l n o t know where o r when, o r i n
what s t r e n g t h , w e propose t o s t r i k e . They w i l l , t h e r e f o r e , he compelled
t o r e i n f o r c e w i t h b o t h l a n d and a i r f o r c e s t h e South of F r a n c e , C o r s i c a ,
S a r d i n i a , S i c i l y , t h e h e e l o f I t a l y , Y u g o s l a v i a , Greece, Crete, and t h e
Dodecanese
6~
7?
U, K - a g a i n s t Germany a t a r a p i d r a t e a n d , by midsummer, i t s h o u l d b e
more t h a n d o u b l e i t s p r e s e n t s t r e n g t h . , Our e x p e r i e n c e s t o d a t e have
shown t h a t t h e day bombing a t t a c k s r e s u l t i n d e s t r u c t i o n and damage t o
l a r g e numbers o f German F i g h t e r A i r c r a f t
W
e b e l i e v e t h a t an increased
W
e s h a l l a l s o c o n c e n t r a t e i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom t h e maximum
American l a n d and a i r f o r c e s t h a t s h i p p i n g w i l l p e r m i t
These, combined
w i t h t h e B r i t i s h f o r c e s i n t h e United Kingdom, w i l l h e h e l d i n c o n s t a n t
r e a d i n e s s t o r e e n t e r t h e C o n t i n e n t of Europe as soon as t h i s o p e r a t i o n
o f f e r s r e a s o n a b l e p r o s p e c t of s u c c e s s . ,
9.
I n t h e P a c i f i c i t i s our i n t e n t i o n t o e j e c t t h e J a p a n e s e from
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S. 166
J a n u a r y 20, 1943
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
I t i s s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g d i r e c t i v e be i s s u e d by the
Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e B r i t i s h and U . S. A i r Force
Commanders t o g o v e r n t h e o p e r a t i o n s of t h e B r i t i s h and American Bomber
Commands i n t h e United Kingdom.
DRAFT DIRECTWE
Your o b j e c t w i l l b e t h e p r o g r e s s i v e d e s t r u c t i o n and d i s l o c a t i o n
t h e e x i g e n c i e s of w e a t h e r and of t a c t i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y , w i l l f o r t h e
p r e s e n t be i n t h e o r d e r of p r i o r i t y set o u t below. T h i s o r d e r of p r i o r
i t y may b e v a r i e d from t i m e t o t i m e a c c o r d i n g t o d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e
strategic situation
I t i s n o t t o be taken t o p r e c l u d e a t t a c k s on B e r l i n
3.
There may b e c e r t a i n o t h e r o b j e c t i v e s o f g r e a t b u t f l e e t i n g
an example would b e i m p o r t a n t u n i t s of t h e
German F l e e t i n h a r b o r o r a t s e a .
4.
You s h o u l d t a k e e v e r y o p p o r t u n i t y t o a t t a c k Germany b y d a y , t o
d e s t r o y o b j e c t i v e s t h a t are u n s u i t a b l e f o r n i g h t a t t a c k , t o s u s t a i n
86
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
87
U. S
SECRET
B R I T I S H MUST ShCHli'1'
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 21, 1943
166/1/0
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFT
1.
(c) T r a n s p o r t a t i o n .
(d) O i l p l a n t s .
have agreed t o be a
f i r s t c h a r g e o n o u r r e s o u r c e s . Day and n i g h t a t t a c k s on t h e s e
b a s e s have been i n a u g u r a t e d and s h o u l d be c o n t i n u e d s o t h a t
an a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e i r e f f e c t s can be made as soon as p o s
s i b l e , , I f i t i s found t h a t s u c c e s s f u l r e s u l t s c a n b e achieved,.
t h e s e a t t a c k s should c o n t i n u e whenever c o n d i t i o n s are f a v o r
a b l e for as l o n g and as o f t e n as i s n e c e s s a r y . T h e s e o b ~
j e c t i v e s have n o t b e e n i n c l u d e d i n t h e o r d e r o f p r i o r i t y ,
88
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
which c o v e r s long-term o p e r a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e b a s e s
are n o t s i t u a t e d i n Germany.
(2) B e r l i n , which s h o u l d b e a t t a c k e d when c o n d i t i o n s a r e s u i t
a b l e for t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f s p e c i a l l y v a l u a b l e r e s u l t s un
f a v o r a b l e t o t h e morale of t h e enemy o r f a v o r a b l e t o t h a t of
Russia
3.
You may a l s o b e r e q u i r e d , a t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e t i m e ,
t o attack
There may b e c e r t a i n o t h e r o b j e c t i v e s of g r e a t b u t f l e e t i n g i m
p o r t a n c e f o r t h e a t t a c k o f which a l l n e c e s s a r y p l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s
should be made. Of t h e s e , an example would be t h e i m p o r t a n t u n i t s of t h e
German F l e e t i n harbor o r a t s e a .
5.
You s h o u l d t a k e e v e r y o p p o r t u n i t y t o a t t a c k Germany by d a y , t o
6.
When t h e A l l i e d a r m i e s r e e n t e r t h e C o n t i n e n t , you w i l l a f f o r d
I n a t t a c k i n g o b j e c t i v e s i n o c c u p i e d t e r r i t o r i e s , you w i l l con
89
U S SECRET
B R I T I S A MOST S E C R E T
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 22, 1943
167
2.
ASSUMPTION AS TO DATE:
3.
I'ihere f i g u r e s a r e q u o t e d , we h a v e assumed a t a r g e t d a t e o f
August 1st.
RESOURCES:
4.
The number o f d i v i s i o n s a v a i l a b l e w i l l be twelve B r i t i s h , i n ,
c l u d i n g one a i r b o r n e , and a b o u t f o u r American.
5-
T r a i n i n g of n a v a l crews w i l l be t h e l i m i t i n g f a c t o r i n t h e pro..
v i s i o n of l a n d i n g c r a f t f o r t h e i n i t i a l a s s a u l t s
I t is estimated t h a t ,
w i t h o u t U . S . a s s i s t a n c e , t h e maximum l i f t which c a n b e p r o v i d e d w i l l b e :
I n i t i a l a s s a u l t force:
Two b r i g a d e g r o u p s , w i t h p r o p o r t i o n of
i n i t i a l a s s a u l t force:
b r i g a d e on l i g h t s c a l e s , o f which two
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
5.
American, t o s u p p o r t a l i m i t e d c r o s s - c h a n n e l o p e r a t i o n e i t h e r a g a i n s t
the Pas de Calais o r t h e COTENTIN PENINSULA, p r o v i d e d o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e
M e d i t e r r a n e a n have n o t drawn t o o h e a v i l y on our F i g h t e r r e s e r v e s . The
d e c i s i o n t o c a r r y o u t s u c h an o p e r a t i o n would, however, e n t a i l a r e o r
g a n i z a t i o n of p a r t of t h e M e t r o p o l i t a n A i r F o r c e w i t h a consequent b r a k e
7.
I t may b e assumed t h a t t h e G e r m a n s w i l l c o n t i n u e t o d e v e l o p t h e i r
s y s t e m of c o a s t d e f e n s e s , b u t i t i s f a i r t o e x p e c t t h a t t h e f o r m a t i o n s
h o l d i n g t h e s e d e f e n s e s w i l l be of p o o r e r q u a l i t y t h a n a t p r e s e n t .
8.
, 41 d i v i s i o n s
I t i s i m p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e German A i r F o r c e on
t h e Western F r o n t w i l l be l e s s t h a n i t h a s been d u r i n g t h e l a s t s i x
months, i a e ~ about
9
1,000 f i r s t l i n e a i r c r a f t of a l l t y p e s I n t h e e v e n t
of a c l e a r t h r e a t of a l a r g e s c a l e l a n d i n g by our f o r c e s i n North France
R a i d s of which t h e p r i m a r y o b j e c t i s t o provoke a n a i r b a t t l e
f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s of which t h e o b j e c t is t o r e m a i n on t h e C o n t i n e n t ,
a s i t i s t h e o n l y a r e a w i t h a s h o r t and e a s i l y d e f e n s i b l e l i n e w i t h i n
91
U . S. S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
r e a s o n a b l e d i s t a n c e o f t h e b e a c h e s , and one which,
a t t h e same time,
by evening of I! + 1.
General Eisenhower d i d n o t h i m s e l f s e e t h e p l a n , b u t his r e p r e
s e n t a t i v e s c o l l a b o r a t e d i n i t s p r e p a r a t , i o n and f u l l y c o n c u r r e d i n t h e
c o n c l u s i o n as t o minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s .
With t h e r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e i n 1943, n e i t h e r t h e s i z e of t h e
seaborne a n d a i r b o r n e a s s a u l t f o r c e s n o r t h e r a t e o f b u i l d up c a n approach
t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e Combined Commanders
It is c l e a r , t h e r e f o r e ,
t h e r e f o r e , be n e c e s s a r y
t o make a d e t a i l e d e x a m i n a t i o n t o d e t e r m i n e :
o u r f o r c e s a r e a s o n a b l e c h a n c e o f h o l d i n g t h e PENINSULA
I t c a n , however, be s a i d a t once, w i t h o u t f u r t h e r examination,
that:
92
IT. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
16.
CONCLUSIONS:
19.
(a) Unless t h e Germans are forced t o reduce t h e i r reserves end
93
U. S. S E C 8 E T
B R I T I S I j YOST SECRET
t h e i r b e a c h d e f e n s e s i n Northwest Europe s u b s t a n t i a l l y , no
l i m i t e d o p e r a t i b n t o s e i z e and h o l d a f o o t i n g i n F r a n c e i s
p r a c t i c a b l e w i t h the resources l i k e l y to be a v a i l a b l e i n
194.1.
(b) A d e t a i l e d p l a n f o r a n o p e r a t i o n t o s e i z e and h o l d t h e COTEN-
( e ) O u t l i n e p l a n s s h o u l d be made f o r f u r t h e r o p e r a t i o n s t o ex
p l o i t s u c c e s s i n t h e e v e n t o f a breakdown i n German morale,
e.g.,
t o e x t e n d t h e b r i d g e h e a d t o i n c l u d e CAEN and s u b s e
draw up p l a n s for a r e t u r n t o t h e C o n t i n e n t i n t h e c a s e of
German d i s i n t e g r a t i o n .
( 9 ) U. S . Government w i l l have t o p r o v i d e :
vehicles.
(Signed) C. E. LAMBE
G. M. STEWART
W. ELLIOT
94
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C C.S, 168
S
J a n u a r y 22, 1943
COMBINEB CHIEFS OF STAFF
Memorandum b y J o i n t L'.
1.
S . C h i e f s of S t a f f
J a p a n h a s expanded t h e s c o p e o f tier o c c u p a t i o n s o t h a t i t i n
c l u d e s n o t o n l y h e r former h o l d i n g s of
(3) a l l o f Indo-China,
Malaysia, T h a i
Dutch E a s t I n d i e s .
2.
T h e u l t i m a t e d e f e a t o f J a p a n p r o p e r w i l l be a c c o m p l i s h e d by
measures which g r e a t l y r e s e m b l e t h o s e which would be e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t
the B r i t i s h Isles- blockade
( a t t a c k on s h i p s a n d s h i p p i n g ) , bombing
( a t t a c k on f o r c e s , d e f e n s e s , i n d u s t r i e s , and m o r a l e ) , and a s s a u l t ( a t t a c k
v i a t h e s e a ) . Of
t h e s e m e a s u r e s , a t t a c k s on s h i p s and s h i p p i n g a l o n g
enemy l i n e s o f communications a r e i n h e r e n t i n a l l o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s ;
in
the
The
g e n e r a l c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e A l l i e d e f f o r t i n t h e P a c i f i c i n 19-13 comprise:
(a) Keep J a p a n from f u r t h e r e x p a n s i o n , and f r o m c o n s o l i d a t i n g and
exploiting her current holdings-.
(b) M a i n t a i n t h e v i t a l Midway Hawaii l i n e (key t o t h e P a c i f i c )
(c) S e c u r e t h e 1ineofcommunicationstoAustralia and N e w Zealand
95
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
(d) Block enemy a p p r o a c h e s t o A u s t r a l i a (1) from t h e Northward
' v i a Elabaul;
(as to
..
C a l e d o n i a l i n e , which c o v e r s the
(i) Of t h e . a b o v e
again b u t i s u n l i k e l y t o succeed;
(d) i s now u n p r o f i t a b l e
( f ) i s u n p r o f i t a b l e e x c e p t t o f o r e s t a l l A l l i e d ad
(g) i s f e a s i b l e e x c e p t t h a t
enemy p o s i t i o n i s a l r e a d y w e l l e x t e n d e d ; (h) same a s (g)-
U. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S B MOST S E C R E T
(b) B l o c k i n g of enemy a p p r o a c h e s t o E a s t e r n A u s t r a l i a ;
(c) Points d'appui for further action;
6.
( d ) A t t r i t i o n of enemy f o r c e s w h i c h o p p o s e o u r o c c u p a t i o n .
A d d i t i o n a l to t h e o b j e c t i v e s a t t a i n e d by t h e s e i z u r e and occupa
Alaska.
(f) D u t c h E a s t I n d i e s v i a \ f a l a y b a r r i e r
line.
( a s Timor).
(9) P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n AKAKIY.
(h)
of
t h e above
graph 4 above):
( a ) Is m e r e l y p o t e n t i a l u n l e s s and u n t i l war t a k e s p l a c e
between J a p a n and H u s s i a ;
(b) Is u n p r o f i t a b l e w i t h meam i n s i g h t i n 1943 and i s b e s t
undertaken, if a t a l l , i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h ( a ) ;
(c) Is most u s e f u l , n o t o n l y as t o
(I) R e t e n t i o n o f i n i t i a t i v e ;
( 2 ) P a r t i a l c o u n t e r t o enemy p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of p a r a
g r a p h 4 ( c ) ; and, p a r t i c u l a r l y ,
(3) T o draw o f f enemy f o r c e s involved i n h o l d i n g Rabaul
area;
(d~) Is e f f e c t i v e
(1) To f o r e s t a l l enemy p o t e n t i a l i t i e s in p a r a g r a p h 4 (d) ;
(2) To make tie. l i n e of c o m m n i c a t i o n s t o A u s t r a l i a and
Yew Z e a l a n d f u l l y s e c u r e ; and
(3) To draw off enemy f o r c e s involved i n Rabaul a r e a ;
s h o u l d , perhaps must, e v e n t u a l l y
U. S. SECRET
(f) Useful on l i m i t e d s c a l e
(1) To c o u n t e r e n e m y p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of p a r a g r a p h 4 (f);
(2) T o draw o f f enemyforces elsewhere i n t h e P a c i f i c j
(3) To employ f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e i n A u s t r a l i a [ a f t e r
completion of paragraph 5 ) which would n o t o t h e r
wise be employable;
N.B.
are n o t t o be developed f u l l y , as
t h i s might l e a d t o e x t e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s
of t h e n a t u r e of f r o n t a l a t t a c k s . .
- Attacks
ANAKIM i s o f s u c h i m p o r t a n c e i n r e
October--but
s p e c t of i t s o b j e c t i v e
( b r i n g i n g C h i n e s e manpower
and g e o g r a p h i c p o s i t i o n t o b e a r on J a p a n e s e f o r c e s
and p o s i t i o n s ) as t o merit t h a t p r i o r i t y which may
be found i n d i s p e n s a b l e t o mount i t .
7.
R e f e r r i n g now t o t h e g e n e r a l c a p a b i l i t i e s of A l l i e d a c t i o n l i s t e d
a d d i t i o n a l t o t h o s e of paragraph 5 above- t o :
~
( a ) a nd ( b ) Make t h e A i e u t . i a . n as s e c u r e as may be
implement 3 ( a ) . ( g j
N.B.
which w i l l
(h);
- Germany c a n be e x p e c t e d t o i n t e n s i f y p r e s s u r e on Japan
t o a t t a c k R u s s i a i n S i b e r i a (Maritime P r o v i n c e s )
( c ) U n d e r t a k e a d v a n c e f r o m Midway t o w a r d s Truk-Guam
practicable--to
l i n e as
l i n e t o implement 3 ( a ) .
( C ) f (h) ;
( e ) R e f r a i n from advance from Rabaul area towards Truk-.Guam l i n e
s c a l e t o c o u n t e r enemy c a p a b i l i t i e s and d i v e r t h i s f o r c e s
t o implement 3 ( a ) , (d) ( 2 ) , ( e )
(h)
U . S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
C.C.S.
169
J a n u a r y 2 2 , 1943
A C r O S S THE CHANNEL,
CONTIKEE:T
BEGIPFIEG IF 1943
( h o t e by t h e Combined F t a f f s )
1.
S t r a t e g i c B a s i s : The Combined C h i e f s of F t a f f a g r e e t h a t t h e r e
i s no c h a n c e of o u r b e i n g a b l e t o s t 8 g e a l a r g e s c a l e i n v a s i o n of t h e
Continent a g a i n s t unbroken o n p o s i t i o n d u r i n g 1947. T h e i r p o l i c y i s , h o w
ever, t h a t we should:
(a) [ J n d e r t a k e such l i n i i t e d o p e r a t i o n s as may be p r a c t i c a b l e w i t h
t h e f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e and
( b ) Assemble
p r i o r commitments i n o t h e r t h e a t e r s ) i n c o n s t a n t r e a d i n e s s
t o r e e n t e r t h e C o n t i n e n t a s s o o n a s German r e s i s t a n c e
is
wemakened t o t h e r e q u i r e d e x t e n t .
2.
the
e x i s t i n g organization.)
( b ) The need t o r e e n t e r t h e C,ontinent w i t h a l l a v a i l a b l e f o r c e s
a t t h e s h o r t e s t p o s s i b l e n o t i c e i n t h e e v e n t of a sudden a d
u n e x p e c t e d c o l l a p s e of German r e s i s t a n c e . T h e aim would b e
t o seize c r i t i c a l p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y c e n t e r s i n Germany
i n t h e s h o r t e s t p o s s i b l e time.
t o seize a b r i d g e h e a d l a t e i n 1923, l e a d i n g Up t o
a r a p i d e x p l o i t a t i o n or
(d) An i n v a s i o n i n f o r c e i n 1944.
3.
Need for a D i r e c t i v e : The f i r s t t h i n g t h a t is e s s e n t i a l , what
e v e r o r g a n i z a t i o n i s s e t u p , is a c l e a r d i r e c t i v e from t h e combined
C h i e f s o f S t a f f s e t t i n g o u t t h e o b j e c t s of t h e p l a n s and t h e r e s o u r c e s
l i k e l y t o be a v a i l a b l e . I n t h i s l a t t e r c o n n e c t i o n sane i n e v i t a b l e diffi
c u l t y a r i s e s from t h e f a c t t h a t - - e x c e p t for t h e o p e r a t i o n i n p a r a g r a p h
(c) Operations
99
U . S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
2 ( a ) - p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r t h e o t h e r p o s s i b l e o p e r a t i o n s must h e based, not
on any g i v e n s t r e n g t h o f f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e nor on any f i x e d e s t i m a t e of
enemy o p p o s i t i o n t o h e e n c o u n t e r e d , b u t on t h e maximum f o r c e s t h a t a r e
l i k e l y t o b e a v a i l a b l e i n t h e U. K . a t any g i v e n t i m e .
Moreover, i t Is
b e f i x e d a t t h r e e months. But p l a n n i n g f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n d e s c r i b e d i n
paragraph 2 (h) above must be on t h e b a s i s of immediate r e e n t r y i n t o the
Continent a t t h e s h o r t e s t p o s s i b l e n o t i c e with whatever r e s o u r c e s are
available a t the t i m e
5.
P r i n c i p l e s of Command and P l a n n i n g : I t i s s u g g e s t e d t h a t 2 ( a ) ,
' s o r g a n i z a t i o n on t h e same
l i n e s a s was t h e Dieppe r a i d
6-
As r e g a r d s t h e l a r g e r o p e r a t i o n s i n 2 (b)
( c ) , and (d)
the
g o v e r n i n g p r i n c i p l e s h o u l d h e t h a t t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p l a n n i n g and
t r a i n i n g s h o u l d rest w i t h , o r under t h e d i r e c t i o n o f , t h e Commanders who
a l l three o p e r a t i o n s , These s h o u l d be d e s i g n a t e d a t
7;
once^
I t i s c o n s i d e r e d d e s i r a b l e t h a t t h e Supreme Commander s h o u l d be
appointed a t once
J f t h i s i s n o t f e a s i b l e , h i s Chief o f S t a f f o r Ueputy
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
U. S .
inter-Allied
s t a f f drawn from a l l t h r e e s e r v i c e s h a s b e e n i n e x i s t e n c e
a great d e a l of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e work
a s t h e a c q u i s i t i o n and p r e p a r a t i o n of
p u t i n hand.
U.S.A.
These H e a d q u a r t e r s s h o u l d , however, a p p o i n t r e p r e s e n t a
101
U. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S S MOST SECRET
c.c.3.
170
J a n u a r y 22, 1913
by t h e S e c r e t a r i e s
I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e d i r e c t i o n s of t h e Combined C h i e f s of
S t a f f a t t h e i r fi5th Meeting ( I t e m 6 ) , a d r a f t r e p o r t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
and Prime M i n i s t e r of t h e d e c i s i o n s reached subsequent t o t h e submission
of C.C.S.
153/1 i s c i r c u l a t e d h e r e w i t h f o r a p p r o v a l .
V . DYKES,
J . R. DEANE,
Combined S e c r e t a r i a t
ENCLOSURE
155/1) t h e Combined C h i e f s of
t a i n t h e s e a communications of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s h a s b e e n c o m p l e t e d
(C.C.S.
1GO).
s c a l e s of o c e a n - g o i n g e s c o r t v e s s e l s as t h e minimum a c c e p t a b l e . Our
b r o a d c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t t h e minimum a c c e p t a b l e r e q u i r e m e n t s of e s c o r t
e s h a l l not
c r a f t w i l l n o t be met u n t i l about August or September 1943. W
be i n a p o s i t i o n t o a c c o m p l i s h t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of submarines a t a r a t e i n
e x c e s s o f t h e p r o d u c t i o n r a t e b e f o r e t h e end of t h e y e a r - If i t i s d e
s i r e d t o p r o v i d e e s c o r t s f o r o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s , t h e a c c e p t a n c e of
i n c r e a s e d l o s s e s must b e h a l a n c e d a g a i n s t t h e importance o f t h e o p e r a t i o n s
102
[I.
S. S E C R E T
B R I T I S F MOST S E C R E T
i n q u e s t i o n . We have adopted t h e f o l l o w i n g r e s o l u t i o n s onmeasures neces
s a r y t o i n t e n s i f y the anti-U-boat war. (C.C.S. 6 5 t h Meeting, Item 1)
2.
W
e are a g r e e d t h a t i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e n e x t P r o t o c o l w i t h
Russia ( s h o u l d t h i s be n e c e s s a r y j t o c o v e r t h e p e r i o d a f t e r J u l y 1, 1943,
a c l a u s e s h o u l d be i n s e r t e d t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e commitments i n c l u d e d
i n t h e P r o t o c o l may be reduced i f t h e s h i p p i n g l o s s e s
OP
the necessities
of o t h e r o p e r a t i o n s r e n d e r t h e i r f u l f i l l m e n t p r o h i b i t i v e
Meeting,
3.
(C..C , S 6
~3 r d
(1) To
a t t a c k S i c i l y i n 1943 w i t h t h e f a v o r a b l e J u l y moon a s
the target date
(2) To i n s t r u c t G e n e r a l Eisenhower t o r e p o r t n o t l a t e r t h a n
March 1: f i r s t , w h e t h e r any i n s u r m o u n t a b l e d i f f i c u l t y
a s t o r e s o u r c e s and t r a i n i n g w i l l c a u s e t h e d a t e of t h e
a s s a u l t t o b e d e l a y e d beyond t h e f a v o r a b l e J u l y moon;
and, secondly, i n t h a t event t o confirm t h a t t h e d a t e
w i l l n o t b e l a t e r t h a n t h e f a v o r a b l e August moon,
(3) T
hat t h e f o l l o w i n g s h o u l d be t h e Command s e t - . u p f o r t h e
operation :
103
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
a. G e n e r a l E i s e n h o w e r t o b e i n Supreme Command w i t h
G e n e r a l Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief,
re
s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e d e t a i l e d p l a n n i n g and p r e p a r a t i o n
and f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e a c t u a l o p e r a t i o n when
launched.
f o r t h w i t h , a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h General Alexander, a
s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a f f ,
own Chief o f s t a f f ,
with its
f o r p l a n n i n g and p r e p a r i n g t h e opera
t ion
The n e c e s s a r y d i r e c t i v e t o General Eisenhower conveying the
above d e c i s i o n s h a s been d r a f t e d ,
@) Cover P l a n s :
We i n t e n d t o i n s t r u c t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e a g e n c i e s i n Washington
and London and t h e Commander-in-Chief,
A l l i e d Expeditionary
f o r t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n The p o s s i b i l i t y o f c a r r y i n g o u t f e i n t s
o r minor o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e E a s t e r n M e d i t e r r a n e a n w i l l be
examined
(c) Command i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n T h e a t e r :
W
e have a g r e e d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g Command a r r a n g e m e n t s i n the
Mediterranean:
(C.C.S.
163)
(1) Sea:
sume t h e t i t l e of Commander-in-Chief,
p r e s e n t Commander-in-Chief,
n a t e d Commander-in-Chief',
M e d i t e r r a n e a n " The
Eediterranean, willbedesig
Levant
The
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , w i l l , however, be re
as a whole.
104
u. s.
SECPE"7
A t a moment t o be d e t e r m i n e d a f t e r t h e B r i t i s h 8 t h Army
h a s c r o s s e d t h e T u n i s i a n b o r d e r , G e n e r a l Alexander w i l l
become Deputy Commander-in-Chief
t o G e n e r a l Eisenhower,
frontier,
(3) A i r :
of t h e whole
i~ii
S h o l t o Douglas)
We h a v e d e f i n e d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p and
m u t u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f t h e A i r Commander . i n - C h i e f ,
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , and t h e Commander-in-Chief,
p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e s i n Northwest A f r i c a ,
A l l i e d Ex.
and we have l a i d
down c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s f o r t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e Medi
t e r r a n e a n A i r Comnard s u b j e c t t o any minor changes which
t h e A i r Commander-.-in-Chief may f i n d n e c e s s a r y a f t e r h i s
appointment
( d ) The Bomber O f f e n s i v e f r o m N o r t h A f r i c a :
W
e have l a i d down t h e f o l l o w i n g a s t h e o b j e c t s of t h e bomber
o f f e n s i v e from North A f r i c a i n o r d e r o f time: ( C , C . S - 159/1)
(1) The f u r t h e r a n c e of o p e r a t i o n s f o r t h e e v i c t i o n of a l l
A x i s F o r c e s from A f r i c a .
( 2 ) When (1) h a s been a c h i e v e d , i n f l i c t i o n o f t h e h e a v i e s t
p o s s i b l e l o s s e s o n t h e Axis A i r and Naval Forces i n prep
a r a t i o n f o r HUSKY, i n c l u d i n g bombing r e q u i r e d by c o v e r
plans
(3) The d i r e c t f u r t h e r a n c e o f O p e r a t i o n HUSKY.
105
U . S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
(4) T h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e o i l r e f i n e r i e s a t P l o e s t i
So f a r a s i s p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e achievement
of o b j e c t s (l), ( 2 ) , and (3) above, hombing o b j e c t i v e s w i l l
4.
Under t h i s
g e n e r a l d i r e c t i o n t h e United S t a t e s Commanding G e n e r a l w i l l
d e c i d e upon t h e t e c h n i a u e and method t o b e employed
(C.C.S.>
6 5 t h L e e t i n g , Item 2)
he have a g r e e d upon a d i r e c t i v e t o h e i s s u e d t o t h e B r i t i s h
Commander- in-Chief Bomber Command and t o t h e Commanding Gen
e r a l United S t a t e s A i r F o r c e s i n t h e United Kingdom t o govern
t h e bomber o f f e n s i v e from t h e United Kingdom; a copy of this
d i r e c t i v e i s a t Annex *A'
(C.G.S.
166/1/3)
@ ) BOLERO
(C
68th M e e t i n g , I t e m 2)
W
e have examined t h e problem o f amphibious o p e r a t i o n s from
t h e United Kingdom i n 1943 There a r e t h r e e t y p e s of o p e r a . .
t i o n f o r which p l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s must now h e made:
(1) Raids w i t h t h e primary o b j e c t of provoking an a i r b a t t l e
and c a u s i n g enemy l o s s e s
(2) O p e r a t i o n s w i t h t h e o b j e c t o f s e i z i n g a n d h o l d i n g a
b r i d g e h e a d a n d , i f t h e s t a t e of German m o r a l e and t h e
s t r e n g t h o f h e r resources permit. o f e x p l o i t i n g successes
(3) A r e t i i r n t o t h e C o n t i n e n t t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f German
disintegration
P l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r (1) above w i l l proceed a s a t pfes
enc
P e n i n s u l a w i t h r e s o u r c e s which w i l l h e a v a i l a b l e , t h e t a r g e t
d a t e b e i n g s e t a t August 1, 1943. T h i s o p e r a t i o n c o m e s u n d e r
106
U. S .
SECRET
B R I T I S R MOST S E C R E T
t y p e ( 2 ) above.
'l'e have a g r e e d t o e s t a b l i s h f o r t h w i t h a Combined S t a f f under
a B r i t i s h C h i e f o f S t a f f u n t i l s u c h t i m e as a Supreme Com
mander i s a p p o i n t e d . A d i r e c t i v e t o g o v e r n t h e p l a n n i n g i s
i n c o u r s e of p r e p a r a t i o n . !Ye i n t e n d t o i n c l u d e i n t h i s d i - .
reCtiVe p r o v i s i o n f o r a r e t u r n t o t h e C o n t i n e n t under
(3)
(C.C.!;
168 and C C S
6 7 t h Meeting, Item 1)
The f o l l o w i n g i s a n o u t l i n e of t h e o p e r a t i o n s which i t i s
i n t e n d e d t o c a r r y out i n t h e P a c i f i c i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e
p r o v i s i o n s of our p r e v i o u s r e p o r t (C C S
15.5/1):
and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e o p e r a t i o n s now
i n hand f o r t h e c a p t u r e of Rabaul
(3) An advance a l o n g t h e l i n e Samoa~J a l u i t
(4) An advance on t h e Malay B a r r i e r ( a s Timor) on a l i m i t e d
s c a l e t o c o u n t e r enemy c a p a b i l i t i e s a n d d i v e r t h i s f o r c e s
( 5 ) I t i s n o t i n t e n d e d t o advance from t h e Rabaul a r e a t o
6 5 t h il4eeting, Item 1)
We have p r e p a r e d a p r o v i s i o n a l s c h e d u l e of t h e f o r c e s r e q u i r e d
f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n and have i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of
t h e i r provision
p r o v i s i o n of n a v a l f o r c e s - a s s a u l t s h i p p i n g , l a n d i n g c r a f t
and s h i p p i n g c a n n o t be g u a r a n t e e d s o f a r i n advance and must
107
S SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
U
164)
61st M e e t i n g , I t e m 3 ) :
forces
8..
TURKEY:
W
e have agreed upon t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e measures n e c e s s a r y t o give
e f f e c t t o t h e d e c i s i o n t h a t a l l m a t t e r s connected with Turkey s h o u l d be
handled by t h e B r i t i s h (C.C.S.
63rd Meeting,
108
Item 2 ) .
U. S. SECQET
B R l T I S Y NOST SECRET
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 23, 1943
17011
155/1) t h e Combined C h i e f s Of
S t a f f p r e s e n t e d t h e i r p r o p o s a l s f o r t h e Conduct o f t h e War in 1 9 1 3 .
These p r o p o s a l s were i n b r o a d o u t l i n e and w e have s u b s e q u e n t l y examined
them and r e a c h e d c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s on p o i n t s of d e t a i l . We have a l s o
s t u d i e d a number o f m a t t e r s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e s e p r o p o s a l s .
The
t a i n t h e s e a communication5 o f t h p U n i t e d N a t i o n s h a s b e e n c o m p l e t e d
(C.C.S.
1 6 0 ) . I n t h e c o u r s e of t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n we have l a i d down c e r
We have a d o p t e d c e r t a i n r e s o l u t i o n s on measures n e c e s s a r y t o i n t e n s i f y
6 5 t h U e e t i n g , Item 1).
S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
[I.
(C C.S.
63rd
M e e t i n g , I t e m 1, and C.C.S. 1 6 2 ) .
3.
OPERATIONS I N THE MEDITERRANEAN:
(a) O p e r a t i o n s f o r t h e Capture of S i c i l y :
We have c a r e f u l l y examined p o s s i b l e o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Medi
t e r r a n e a n theater and we have r e c o r d e d t h e f o l l o w i n g conclu
sions:
(C.C.9
161/1")
w i l l n o t be l a t e r t h a n t h e f a v o r a b l e August moon
(3) That t h e f o l l o w i n g s h o u l d be t h e Command s e t - u p for the
operation:
w i t h Gen
for t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e a c t u a l operationwhenlaunched.
b _ . A d m i r a l Cunningham t o b e Naval Commander, a n d A i r
C h i e f M a r s h a l T e d d e r t h e A i r Commander.
c_. Recommendations f o r t h e o f f i c e r s t o b e a p p o i n t e d West
e r n and E a s t e r n Task Force Commanders t o b e submitted
i n due c o u r s e by General Eisenhower.
(1) That G e n e r a l Eisenhower s h o u l d b e i n s t r u c t e d t o s e t up
f o r t h w i t h , a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h G e n e r a l Alexander, a
s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a f f , w i t h i t s
own C h i e f of S t a f f , f o r p l a n n i n g a n d p r e p a r i n g t h e
operat ion
110
U . S. S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
Allied Expeditionary
f o r t h e ilediterrctnean. The p o s s i b i l i t y of c a r r y i n g o u t f e i n t s
o r minor o p e r a t i o n s i n tkie E a s t e r n V e d i t e r r a n e a n w i l l b e
examined.
(c) C
ommand i n t h e h i e d i t e r r a n e a r l T h e a t e r :
We have a g r e e d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g Command a r r a n g e m e n t s i n t h e
Mediterranean:
(C.C.?.
63-d V e e t i n g , I t e m
A,
arid C.C.S.
163)
(1) Sea:
F o r o p e r a t i o n W > K Y t h e ? a v a l Cor!tmander F o r c e X w i l l
assume t h e t i t l p of Commarider-in-Cliief,
The p r e s e n t Commarider-in-Cliief,
Fediterranean.
Xediterranean, w i l l be
d e s i g n a t e d C . ~ , , a r i d e r - i n - C t , i e f , Levant.. The b o u n d a r y
b e t w e e n t h e two Commands w i l l b e drawn from Z a n t i t o
E a r d i a . The Commader-in-Chief,
V e d i t e r r a n e a n , w i l l , how
e v e r , b e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r n a v a l ~m a t t e r s which a f f e c t t h e
M e d i t e r r a n e a n as a whole.
(2) L a n d :
A t a moment t o b e d e t e r m i n e d a f t e r t h e B r i t i s h 8 t h Army
h a s c r o s s e d t h e T u n i s i a n b o r d e r , General Alexander w i l l
become Ceputy Commander-in-Chief
t o General Eisenhower,
t h e 8 t h A r m y a t t h e same t i m e b e i n g t r a n s f e r r e d t o Gen
e r a l Eisenhowers command
S u b j e c t t o t h e c o n c u r r e n c e of
w i l l b e t o command t h e A l l i e d f o r c e s on t h e T u n i s i a n
f r o n t w i t h a small H e a d q u a r t e r s of h i s own p r o v i d e d from
t h e Middle E a s t and a f t e r t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e s e o p e r
a t i o n s t o t a k e c h a r g e of O p e r a t i o n HI!SKY.
The boundary
W i l l
frontier.
(3) A i r :
111
o f t h e whole
U . S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST ' S E C R E T
( G e n e r a l S p a a t z ) , and t h e A i r O f f i c e r
A l l i e d Expe
may f i n d n e c e s s a r y after
h i s appointment.
( d ) T h e Bomber O f f e n s i v e f r o m K o r t h A f r i c a :
We have l a i d down the f o l l o w i n g as t h e o b j e c t s o f t h e b o d e r
o f f e n s i v e from North a f r i c a i n o r d e r of time (C.C.S.
159/1):
( 1 ) The
f u r t h e r a n c e o f o p e r a t i o n s f o r t h e e v i c t i o n of a l l
A x i s F o r c e s from A f r i c a .
( 2 ) When ( I ) h a s been a c h i e v e d , i n f l i c t i o n of t h e h e a v i e s t
p o s s i b l e l o s s e s on t h e A x i s A i r a n d Kaval f o r c e s i n
p r e p a r a t i o n for HUSKY, i n c l u d i n g bombing r e q u i r e d by
c over plans.
W
e have a g r e e d t h a t t h e h i t e d S t a t e s Heavy Bombardment U n i t s
i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom s h a l l o p e r a t e u n d e r t h e s t r a t e g i c a l
d i r e c t i o n o f t h e , B r i t i s h C h i e f of t h e Air S t a f f . Under t h i s
g e n e r a l d i r e c t i o n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Commanding General w i l l
d e c i d e upon t h e t e c h n i q u e and method t o he e w l o y e d (C.C.S.
6 5 t h Meeting, Item 2 ) .
We have agreed upon a d i r e c t i v e (C.C.S.
t o t h e B r i t i s h Commander-in-Chief
112
166/1/0) t o be i s s u e d
U. S . S E C R E T
BRITISH MOST S E C R E T
Commanding G e n e r a l U n i t e d S t a t e s A i r F o r c e s i n t h e U n i t e d
Kingdom.
(b) BOLERO:
(C.C.S.
6 8 t h M e e t i n g , I t e m 1.)
A s t u d y h a s b e e n made of t h e s h i p p i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r BOLERO
b u i l d - u p i n 1M3.
With t h e d a t a a v a i l a b l e a t t h e c o n f e r e n c e and making a number
of a s s u m p t i o n s w h i c h a r e s e t o u t i n f u l l i n C.C-S. 1 7 2 ,
E n c l o s u r e "C", we c a l c u l a t e t h a t t h e U. S . f o r c e s as shown
i n t h e f o l l o w i n g t a b l e w i l l be a v a i l a b l e f o r C o n t i n e n t a l
o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e U . K on t h e d a t e s shown. The f i g u r e s g i v e n
i n t h e l a s t column i n c l u d e t h e b u i l d - u p o f t h e a i r c o n t i n g e n t
t o 172,000.
T o t a l Numbers
Division
Equipped
384,000
September 15
509,000
October 15
634,000
November 15
12
759,000
December 31
15
938,000
By August 15
T h i s i s b a s e d on (1) t h e f i g u r e s of 50,000 t r o o p s p e r d i v i
sion w i t h supporting troops;
( 2 ) 45 d a y s a l l o w a n c e between
s a i l i n g d a t e and a v a i l a b i l i t y d a t e .
per
U " S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
(3) A r e t u r n t o t h e C o n t i n e n t t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e of German
disintegration.
P l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r
(1) above w i l l p r o c e e d a s a t
p r e s e n t . An a t t a c k on t h e Channel I s l a n d s i s an example
of t h e t y p e o f o p e r a t i o n which w e have i n mind,
W
e propose t o p r e p a r e f o r an o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t the
C o t e n t i n P e n i n s n l a w i t h r e s o u r c e s which w i l l be a v a i l
a b l e , t h e t a r g e t d a t e b e i n g set a t August 1, 1943- This
o p e r a t i o n comes under t y p e (2) aboveWe have a g r e e d t o e s t a b l i s h f o r t h w i t h a Combined S t a f f
155/1),:
and p a r l . i c u l a r l y i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e o p e r a t i o n s now
i n hand f o r t h e c a p t , u r e o f nabaul..
s c a l e t o c o u n t e r enemy c a p a b i l i t i e s a n d d i v e r t h i s
forces,
(5) I t i s n o t i n t e n d e d t o advance from t h e Rabaul a r e a t o
wards t h e Truk-Gum l i n e u n l e s s and u n t i l f o r c e s a r e i n
hand t o e n a b l e t h e a d v a n c e t o b e c a r r i e d t h r o u g h and
f o l l o w e d up.
114
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
(b) Xeconquest o f Burma:
We have approved November 1 5 , 1943, as t h e p r o v i s i o n a l d a t e
f o r t h e ANAKIM
assault^
I t w i l l be n e c e s s a r y t o d e c i d e i n
J u l y 1943 w h e t h e r t o u n d e r t a k e o r p o s t p o n e t h e o p e r a t i o n
fi5th Ueeting, Item 4 ) .
Be have p r e p a r e d a p r o v i s i o n a l s c h e d u l e of t h e f o r c e s r e
(C.C.S.
q u i r e d f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n and have i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
o f t h e i r p r o v i s i o n . T h e l a n d and a i r f o r c e s c a n be
pro
v i d e d . The p r o v i s i o n o f n a v a l f o r c e s , a s s a u l t s h i p p i n g ,
l a n d i n g c r a f t and s h i p p i n g c a n n o t be g u a r a n t e e d s o far i n
advance and must depend upon t h e s i t u a t i o n e x i s t i n g i n t h e
l a t e summer of 1943 ( C . C . S .
6
164).
on t h e A x i s o i l p o s i t i o n (C.C.S.
158). I t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t a d d i t i o n a l
s o u t h w a r d s h a l l b e a n a r e a under command o f a
B r i t i s h Naval O f f i c e r f o r n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s and of a B r i t i s h
t o enable
11 S S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
TURKEY:
W
e have agreed upon t h e administrative measures n e c e s s a P y t o g i v e
63rd Meeting
116
Item 2 j
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 23, 1 9 4 3
17O/Z
155/1)
t h e Combined C h i e f s o f
The p r e s
t a i n t h e sea c o m m u n i c a t i o n s of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s h a s b e e n c o m p l e t e d
(C.C.S.
160)
I n t h e c o u r s e of t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n we have l a i d down c e r
t a i n s c a l e s of ocean-going e s c o r t v e s s e l s a s t h e minimum a c c e p t a b l e
Our
broad c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t t h e minimum a c c e p t a b l e r e q u i r e m e n t s of e s c o r t
c r a f t w i l l n o t b e m e t u n t i l about August or September 1943 W e ought n o t
t o count on t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f U - b o a t s a t a r a t e i n e x c e s s o f t h e p r o
If i t is desired t o provide
e s c o r t s f o r o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s , t h e a c c e p t a n c e of i n c r e a s e d l o s s e s
d u c t i o n r a t e b e f o r e t h e end of t h e y e a r
must be b a l a n c e d a g a i n s t t h e importance of t h e o p e r a t i o n s i n q u e s t i o n
W
e have adopted c e r t a i n r e s o l u t i b n s on measures n e c e s s a r y t o i n t e n s i f y
the a n t i - U - b o a t war.
2"
(C.C.S.
6 5 t h hfeeting, Item 1 )
Our c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t , p r o v i d e d a s h i p p i n g l o s s r a t e of n o t more t h a n
2,4 p e r c e n t p e r month can b e r e l i e d on, i t w i l l be p o s s i b l e t o meet f u l l
commitments by t h e end of t h e c a l e n d a r y e a r 1943, and we have approved a
program o f shipments on t h i s b a s i s s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s o t h a t s u p p l i e s
t o R u s s i a s h a l l n o t b e c o n t i n u e d a t p r o h i b i t i v e c o s t t o t h e United Na
tions effort
An e s s e n t i a l p o i n t i s t h a t an agreed l o s s r a t e for 1943 s h a l l b e
117
SECRET
S R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
U
t h e same b a s i s
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Committee t o make an a g r e e d e s t i m a t , e
We a r e agreed t h a t i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h e n e x t P r o t o c o l w i t h
Russia
( C C - S
3
6 3 r d H e e t i n g , I t e m 1 , and C C . S .
162,)
(C C S
( 1 ) To a t t a c k S i c i l y i n 1943 w i t h t h e f a v o r a b l e J u l y moon
as t h e t a r g e t d a t e
( 2 ) To i n s t r u c t . General Eisenhower t o r e p o r t not l a t e r t h a n
March 1st. f i r s t l y , w h e t h e r a n y insurmountab7.e d i f f i ~ .
c u l t y a s t o r e s o u r c e s and t r a i n i n g w i l l c a u s e t h e d a t e
o f t h e a s s a u l t t o b e d e l a y e d beyond t h e f a v o r a b l e J u l y
moon, a n d , s e c o n d l y
( 3 ) T h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g s h o u l d b e t h e Command s e t u p f o r t h e
operation:
t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e a c t u a l o p e r a t i o n when launched
h A d m i r a l Cunningham t o h e Naval Commander,, and A i r
C h i e f V a r s h a l T e d d e r t h e A i r Commander
C-
We have a g r e e d t h a t w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c i n g t h e J u l y d a t e f o r t h e o p e r a
t i o n , a n j n t e n s e e f f o r t w i l l h e made d u r i n g t h e n e x t t h r e e weeks t o
a c h i e v e by c o n t r i v a n c e and i n g e n u i t y t h e f a v o r a b l e J m e moon p e r i o d as
t h e d a t e f o r the operation
I f a t t h e end o f t h e t h r e e weeks o u r e f
w i l l he modified a c c o r d i n g l y
118
c . Recommendations
f o r t h e o f f i c e r s t o b e a p p o i n t e d West
e r n and E a s t e r n Task Force Commanders t o be s u b m i t t e d
i n due c o u r s e by General Eisenhower.
(4) T h a t G e n e r a l Eisenhower s h o u l d h e i n s t r u c t e d t o s e t up
f o r t h w i t h , a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h General A l e x a n d e r , a
s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a f f , w i t h i t s
own Chief o f S t a f f , f o r p l a n n i n g and p r e p a r i n g t h e oper
ation.
The n e c e s s a r y d i r e c t i v e t o General Eisenhower conveying t h e
above d e c i s i o n s has been d r a f t e d .
(b) Cover P l a n s :
W
e i n t e n d t o i n s t r u c t , t h e a p p r o p r i a t e a g r n c i e s i n Washington
and London and t h e Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Expeditionary
f o r t h e Y e d i t e r r a n e a n . The p o s s i b i l i t y o f c a r r y i n g o u t
f e i n t s o r minor o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e E a s t e r n !:fediterranean w i l l
h e examined.
( c ) Command i n t h e Mediterranean T h e a t e r :
We have a g r e e d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g Command a r r a n g e m e n t s i n t h e
63rd f l e e t i n g , Item 1 and C.C.S.
\ f e d i t e r r a n e a r l : (C.C.S.
163).
(1) Sea:
F o r o p e r a t , i o n HUSKY t h e N a v a l Commander F o r c e X w i l l
assume t h e t i t l e of Commander-in-Chief,
The p r e s e n t Commander-i+Chief,
d e s i g n a t e d Commander-in-Chief,
Mediterranean.
Xediterranean, w i l l be
Levant. T h e boundary be
Wediterranean, w i l l
however, b e r e
s p o n s i b l e f o r n a v a l m a t t e r s which a f f e c t t h e W e d i t e r
ranean a s a whole.
(2) Land:
A t a moment t o h e d e t e r m i n e d a f t e r t h e B r i t i s h 8 t h Army
h a s c r o s s e d t h e T u n i s i a n b o r d e r , General Alexander w i l l
become Deputy Commander-in-Chief
t o General E i s e n h o w e r ,
w i l l b e t o command t h e A l l i e d f o r c e s on t h e T u n i s i a n
119
U S, S E C R E T
BRITISH <MlrOST SECRET
f r o n t w i t h a s m a l l Headquarters of h i s own provided from
t h e ?.fiddle E a s t and a f t , e r t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e s e opera-.
t i o n s t o t a k e c h a r g e of O p e r a t i o n HUSKY
The boundary
(3) A i r :
We h u e a g r e e d t h a t . A i r . Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder
(Gene]-a1 S p a a t z )
Commanding i n C h i e f
S h o l t o Douglas)
and t h e A i r O f f i c e r
Middle E a s t , ( A i r C h i e f Marshal S i r
W e have d e f i n e d t h e r e l a C i o n s h i p and
mutual r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of t h e A i r Commander i n . C h i e f ,
Mediterranean
t i o n a r y F o r c e s i n N o r t h w e s t A f r i c a . and we have l a i d
down c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s f o r t h e o r g w i z a r . l o n of t h e %fed-
i t , e r r a n e a n A i r Command sllbjec.t, t o any m i n o r c h a n g e s
w h i c h t h e A i r Commander i n C h J e f m a y f i n d n e c . e s s a r y
a f t e r his a p p o i n i m e n t
jd) The Bomber Offensive from Nort,h A f r i c a .
We have l a i d down 1.he f o l l o w i n g as t,he o b j e c t s o f t h e bomber
o f f e n s i v e from North A f r l c a i n o r d e r of t i m e (C C S
159,'l):
p o s s i b : l e l o s s e s on t h e A x i s A i r a n d Naval f o r ~ c e si n
p r e p a r a t , i o n f o r HUSKY., i n c l u d i n g bombing r e q u i r e d h y
cover p l a n s
( 3 ) The d i r e c t . f u r t h e r a n c e o f O p e r a t i o n HUSKY
(4) The d e s r , r u c i , i o n o f t h e o i l r e f i n e r i e s a t P l o e s i i
S o f a r a s i s p o s s i b l e without, p r e j u d i c e t o t h e achievement
of 0 b j e e t . s (1)
120
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH .YOST SEC7ET
4.
(C.C.S.
(C.C.S.
I t e m 1)
6 8 t h I'eeting,
t h e s h i p p i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s forBOIERO
b u i l d - u p i n 1913.
V i t h t h e d a t e a v a i l a b l e a t t h e c o n f e r e n c e and making a num
b e r o f assumptions which are s e t o u t i n f u l l i n C.C.S.
Enclosure 'C",
172,
we c a l c u l a t e t h a t t h e U. S . Forces a s s h o w n i n
t h e f o l l o w i n g t a b l e w i l l be a v a i l a b l e f o r C o n t i n e n t a l opera
t i o n s i n t h e U . I<. on t h e d a t e s shown. The f i g u r e s g i v e n i n
t h e l a s t column i n c l u d e t h e b u i l d - u p of t h e a i r c o n t i n g e n t
t o 1 7 2 , 0 0 0 . They may be r e g a r d e d a s t h e minimum, and e v e r y
e f f o r t w i l l be made t o i n c r e a s e t h e number of t r a i n e d and
equipped d i v i s i o n s i n t h e United Kingdom by August 1 5 t h .
Division
T o t a l Numbers
Equipped
By August 15
384,000
By September 15
509,000
By October 15
634,000
12
759,000
By November 15
By December 31
15
938,000
T h i s i s based on (1) t h e f i g u r e s o f 50,000 t r o o p s p e r d i v i s
ion w i t h supporting troops;
(2) 45 d a y s a l l o w a n c e between
s a i l i n g d a t e and a v a i l a b i l i t y d a t e .
6' S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
down t o 40,000 i n w h i c h c a s e t h e number o f d i v i s i o n s a v a i l a b l e
on December 31st may be 19 i n s t e a d o f 1 5 .
The number of d i v i
s i o n s e a r l i e r i n t h e y e a r i s u n l i k e l y t o be i n c r e a s e d
( c ) Amphibious O p e r a t i o n s i n 19.13 from t h e United Kingdom:
(C.C.S.
6 8 t h Meeting, Item 2 . )
and c a u s i n g enemy l o s s e s
(2) O
p e r a t i o n s w i t h t h e o b j e c t of s e i z i n g a n d h o l d i n g a
b r i d g e h e a d a n d , i f t h e s t a t e of German m o r a l e and r e
s o u r c e s p e r m i t , of v i g o r o u s l y e x p l o i t i n g s u c c e s s e s I
r3) A r e t u r n t o t h e C o n t i n e n t t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e of German
disintegration
P l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r (1) above w i l l proceed as a t p r e s
ent
An a t t a c k on t h e Channel I s l a n d s i s an example of t h e
t.0
T h i s o p e r a t i o n comes under
e s t a b l i s h f o r t h w i t h a Combined S t a f f under
a B r i t i s h C h i e f of S t a f f u n t i l s u c h t i m e as a B r i t i s h Su
A d i r e c t . i v e t o g o v e r n t h e p l a n n i n g i s i n c o u r s e of
preparat,ion
We i n t e n d t o i n c l u d e i n t h i s d i r e c t i v e p r o v i -
s i o n f o r a retur-n t o t h e C o n t i n e n t under
(3) above w i t h t h e
(a, O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c T h e a t e r :
( C . C S . 1 6 8 and C C S~ 6 7 t h M e e t i n g , I t e m 1 j
T h e f o l l o w i n g i s an o u t l i n e of t h e o p e r a t i o n s which it i s
intended t o c a r r y out i n t h e P a c i f i c i n conformity with the,
p r o v i s i o n s of our p r e v i o u s r e p o r t (C C S 155/1):
(1) Operat,ions to make t h e A l e u t i a n s as s e c u r e as may be
122
U. S . SECRET
s c a l e t o c o u n t e r enemy c a p a b i l i t i e s a n d d i v e r t h i s forces.
(5) I t is n o t intended to advance from t h e Rabaul a r e a to
i s intended to improve a i r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n i n t o C h i n a by
supplying a d d i t i o n a l transport a i r c r a f t , and t o b u i l d up
t h e U. S . A i r Forces now operating i n C h i n a t o the maxi
6 5 t h Meeting, Item 4 ) .
123
S SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
r e q u i r e d f o r t h e o p e ? a t i o n and have i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i r p r o v i s i o n
The l a n d and a i r f o r c e s
c a n h e p r o v i d e d . The p r o v i s i o n of n a v a l f o r c e s , a s s a u l t
s h i p p i n g , l a n d i n g c r a f t and s h i p p i n g cannot h e guarantesed
164).
W
e h a v e had l a i d b e f o r e u s c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n from B r i t i s h
s o u r c e s on t h e Axis o i l p o s i t i o n
(C.C.S.
1 5 8 ) . I t is b e l i e v e d t h a t addi
t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e i n F a s h i n g t o n may modify t h e c o n c l u s i o n s
which have b e e n drawn by t h e B r i t i s h , We have a c c o r d i n g l y d i r e c t e d t h e
Combined I r i t e l l i g e r i c e Committee t o submit as e a r l y as p o s s i b l e an agreed
a s s e s s m e n t of t h e Axis o i l s i t u a t i o n b a s e d on t,he l a t e s t i n f o r m a t i o n
a v a i l a b l e from b o t h E r i t i s h arid 1:niterl r t a t e s s o u r c e s ; I n t h e meanwhile,
we have t a k e n n o t e t h a t t h e Axis o i l s i t . i i a t , i o n i s s o r e s t r i c t e d t h a t i t
i s d e c i d e d l y a d v a n t a g e o u s t h a t bombing a t t a c k s on t h e s o u r c e s o f Axis
o i l , namely, t h e Rumanian o i l f i e l d s and o i l t r a f f i c v i a t h e Danube, and
t h e s y r i t h e t , i c and producer g a s p l a n t s i n Cermany, he u n d e r t a k e n a s soon
a s o t h e r commitments a l l o w
YAVBL AIW A I R C
( C . C ~ F . 62nd V e e t i n g ,
I t e m 1)
Ph'O IN 1WST A F P I C A :
(Ria d ' 0 r o )
s o u t h w a r d s h a l l h e an a r e a u n d e r command o f a
B r i t i s h Kaval O f f i c e r f o r n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s and of a B r i t i s h
A i r Officer f o r a i r o p e r a t i o n s i n cooperation with naval
force's
@ ) T h a t s u b j e c t t o ( a ) a sub a r e a e x t e n d i n g from Cape E o j a d o r
TLTIKEY:
We have agreed upon t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e measures n e c e s s a r y t o give
e f f e c t t o t h e d e c i s i o n t h a t a l l m a t t e r s c o n n e c t e d w i t h Turkey s h o u l d h e
handled b y t h e B r i t i s h (C.C.S.
124
U. S. S E C R E T
B t I T I S H M O S T SECRET
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 22, 1943
171
DIRECTIVE
OPEPATIOh HlJSKY
E n c l o s e d i s a d r a f t d i r e c t i v e t o G e n e r a l Eisenhower r e g a r d i n g
O p e r a t i o n HtSKY which is s u b m i t t e d t o t h e Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f for
approval
\7.
DYKES,
, J . R . DEANE,
Combined S , e c r e t a r i a t
LliC1,CST:rE
S i c i l y w i l l b e lsunched in 1943.
The Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f have f u r t h e r a g r e e 3 t h a t t h e follow
i n g command s e t - u p s h a l l be e s t a b l i s h e d f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n :
( a ) You a r e t o b e t h e Supreme Commander w i t h General Alexander
a s Deputy Commander-in-Chief,
t i o n s f o r t h e O f f i c e r s t o b e a p p o i n t e d h e s t e r n and E a s t e r n Task F o r c e
Commanders
s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a f f , w i t h i t s own C h i e f of
Staff,
f o r p l a n n i n g and p r e p a r i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n .
125
IT'. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
U. S . SECRET
S R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 23, 1943
171/2/~1
D I R E C T I V E TO COMMANIER I N CHIEF,
a s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n a l a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a f f , w i t h i t s own Chief o f
S t a f f , f o r p l a n n i n g and p r e p a r i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g cover p l a n s
The p r o v i s i o n of t h e n e c e s s a r y f o r c e s and t h e i r t r a i n i n g i n time
w i l l be m o d i f i e d a c c o r d i n g l y
NOTE: T h i s paper i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h C ~ C . S ,171/1/D
e x c e p t f o r a d d i t i o n o f above f o o t n o t e .
127
d a t e d J a n u a r y 23, 1943,
U,. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
128
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S. 172
J a n u a r y 22, 1943
1.
show t h e p o s s i b i l i
way c a p a c i t i e s under b l a c k o u t c o n d i t i o n s .
ConCinuing s t u d y w i l l b e g i v e n t o s e c u r i n g s u c h i n c r e a s e s a s may
3.
be p o s s i b l e
4.
I n terms o f d i v i s i o n s a v a i l a b l e f o r C o n t i n e n t a l o p e r a t i o n s , t h e
t h e a i r contin
By Aug. 15
S e p t , 15
O c t . 15
Nov. 15
Dec. 31
Equipped
384 000
7
9
12
15
509,000
634,000
759,000
938,000
T h i s i s b a s e d on (1) t h e f i g u r e of 50,000 t r o o p s p e r d i v i s i o n
with supportjng troops;
availability date.
129
!sKumFs "A"
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
SHIPPING CAPABILITIES ON BOLERO BUILD-UP
Present or &route
Dec.
31, 1942
I-
Grand T o t a l
1st Q
2d Q
3d Q
4th Q
1943
by 12/31/43
C a p a b i l i t y of U. S. Cargo Ships
491.000
1,056,000
C a p a b i l i t y of U. K. Cargo Ships
53,000
15,000
63.000
131,000
169,000 384,000
554,000
1.187,000
80,000
::
T o t a l for
C a p a b i l i t y o f U. S . Troop Ships
103.000
105.000
235,000
299,000
742,000
C a p a b i l i t y of U. K. Troop Ships
40,000
105,000
140.000
60,000
345,000
375,000
359,000
1,087.000
359,000'
143,000 210.000
Rate of h i l d - u p i n U. K.
Cunulated S t r e n g t h i n U
K.
135,000
80.000
169,000
375,000
215,000
384.000
759,000 1,118,000
983,000
1,118,000
SECRET
R R I T I S H MOST SECRET
S
ENCLOSURE
PROJECTED U
Present or
Elroute
Total for
Grand Total by
2nd Q
3rd (2
4th 0
1943
224,000
48,700
3 0 . son
24,500
7,S O 0
111.200
335,200
31 000
7,500
7 500
15 000
3 0 ,o m
6 1 , oon
216,000
58,000
116,0Cfl*
184.000
400,no0
Bases
454 000
4 on0
4,000
4,000
17,400
471 400
135.000
80,000
16Q,OOO
375.000
359.000
983,000
1,118,on0
208,200
327 no0
418.500
371,900
'heater
S.
ma
?'"
1st
0
F
K
Totals
1,060,000
5,400
1,32S1500
2,385,600
U., S I SECRET
B R I T I S K MOST SECRET
ENCLOSURE " C "
ASSUMPTIONS FOR CALCULATIONS OF
U. S . SHIPPING CAPABILITIES
1,.
Loss r a t e i n d r y c a r g o s h i p s t a k e n a t 2 . 6 $ p e r month.,
2,
October 1, 1942.
3,
October 1, 1942.
4.
U. S. c o n s t r u c t i o n program for 1343 a s reported i n Anfa No, 339,
i - e . , 15,440,000 DWT of dry cargo s h i p s , o f which 357,000 UiVT w i l l be
converted t o t a n k e r s . C o n s t r u c t i o n i s e s t i m a t e d to proceed a t t h e following r a t e :
Nov. 15 Program
Jan. 1 6 Program
Increase
1st Q t r .
2nd Qtr-
.1,2s5,000
3 519,000
254,000
3,222,000
4,106,000
aw,ooo
3rd Qtr..
2,214,000
3,745,000
531,000
4th Qtr,
3 ,1~1,000
3,717,000
526,000
T o t a l i ) r y Cargo
12,802,000
5.
2,19.5,000
118,ooo
:J ,475,000
357,000
16,(;i0,000
18,562,000
2,552,000
Tankers
Total
i~.o87,000
:{,
t i o n s Assignments Board.
6.
Excess o f B r i t i s h l o s s e s over c o n s t r u c t i o n i n U. K
and Canada
minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s .
7,
8.
November t o A p r i l , i n c l u s i v e . ,
9.
10.
11.
12.
of t o t a l d r y cargo fleet..
IT.
S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
13.
Navy employment o f d r y c a r g o tonnage i n 4 t h Q u a r t e r of 1942
averages 1,160,000 DWT a n d i s i n c r e a s e d by 300,000 DWT e a c h q u a r t e r of
1943 as assumed in J.P.S. 57/3.
14.
The t r a n s f e r o f v e s s e l s between oceans t o meet t h e a t e r r e q u i r e
ments.
15.
162/1.
1st 2
SHIPPING
Personnel ( l i f t )
40,000
2nd
(4
3rd Q
4th 3
TOTAL
105,000
140,000
60,000
345,000
500
no0
800
1,600
ivOTES:
( a ) The f i g u r e s a r e based on a very r a p i d e s t i m a t e and must, o f
c o u r s e , be s u b j e c t t o check a f t e r d e t a i l e d examination
(b) The a s s i s t a n c e shown i s dependent on t h e f o l l o w i n g assump.
tions:
(1) That no s h i p p i n g can be taken from t h e U. K.
Import P r o
gram.
(2) That
TORCH build-up c e a s e s with D l S l l a n d t h a t t h e r e a f t e r
t h e B r i t i s h s h i p p i n g r e l e a s e d ,from TORCH can be employed
on BOLERO a s s i s t a n c e e x c e p t f o r t h e demands of IIUSKY and
ANAKIM.
(3) That t h e K i n i s t r y o f W a r Transport a r e a b l e t o c o n t i n u e t o
provide shipping t o cover a l l o t h e r m i l i t a r y requirements
on t h e a g r e e d minimum l e v e l w i t h o u t e n c r o a c h i n g on t h e
TORCH p o o l o
(4) That i t i s p o s s i b l e t o f i n d e s c o r t s f o r t h e convoy p r o .
gram i n v o l v e d ,
18.
Idovements t o U . S. b a s e s w i l l be r e s t r i c t e d to 17,400 t o I r a n . .
19.
20.
161/1 ( P l a n A)
j,
C A S A B L A N C A
JANUARY
C O N F E R E N C E
19113
PAGE
ANFA
1st Meeting
A R F A 2nd Meeting
A N F A 3 r d Meeting
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
139
I112
I59
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
ANFA 1st kleeting
PRESENT
The R t . Hon. Winston S. C h u r c h i l l
[Prime h ! i n i s t e r and M i n i s t e r of
Defense)
The P r e s i d e n t
General G.
C. Marshall
Admiral E . J . King
L t . G e n e r a l D. D. Eisenhower
Admiral o f t h e F l e e t S i r Uudley
Pound
F i e l d Marshal S i r J o h n D i l l
hlr. H a r r y Hopkins
G e n e r a l S i r Alan F . Brooke
L t . Colonel E l l i o t R o o s e v e l t
A i r C h i e f Marshal S i r C. P o r t a l
L t . G e n e r a l H. H . Arnold
L t . F r a n k l i n D.
Roosevelt, Jr.,
USNFI
G e n e r a l t h e Hon. S i r Harold
Alexander
A i r C h i e f Marshal S i r A r t h u r
Tedder
Vice-Admiral t h e Lord L o u i s
Mountbatten
Lt., General S i r H a s t i n g s L . Ismay
SECRETARIAT
Brig
G e n e r a l J. R e Deane
B r i g a d i e r E,, I.. C. J a c o b
134
U. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
THE SITUATION I N NORTH AFRICA
GEWERAL EISENHOWER gave a review of t h e s i t u a t i o n on h i s f r o n t .
He e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h e A l l i e d f o r c e s which landed i n French Vorth A f r i c a
were e q u i p p e d t o c a u t u r e t h r e e p o r t s . They were n o t a mobile army and
had l i t t l e s t r e n g t h f o r o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s . T h i s arrangement had been
necessary s i n c e t h e a t t i t u d e of t h e French was an u n k m w q u a n t i t y . Gen
e r a l Anderson had advanced w i t h great boldness and r a p i d i t y t a k i n g e v e r y
k i n d of r i s k i n an a t t e m p t t o g e t i n t o T u n i s and R i z e r t e i n t h e f i r s t
r u s h , H e had f i n a l l y been s t o p p e d by d i v e bombing when he g o t i n t o t h e
open c o u n t r y n e a r Tunis, and by wet weather which hampered movement o f f
t h e r o a d s . E v e r y e f f o r t had t h e n b e e n made t o r e i n f o r c e t h e f o r w a r d
t r o o p s , u n i t s b e i n g moved from Oran and from C a s a b l a n c a . I t was hoped
t o launch an o f f e n s i v e on Gecember 22nd t o c a p t u r e T u n i s , making u s e of
s u p e r i o r gun Power. The weather had t u r n e d a g a i n s t us and i t had proved
necessary t o c a l l o f f t h e o f f e n s i v e . A means of c a r r y i n g o u t o p e r a t i o n s
i n t h e d r i e r c o u n t r y i n t h e s o u t h had then been sought and an o p e r a t i o n
h a d now been p l a n n e d f o r t h e c a p t u r e of S f a x which would b e g i n on Janu
ac
It
was i n t e n d e d t o u s e t h e American F i r s t Armored D i v i s i o n (less one l i g h t
I35
SECRE7'
BRITISH MOST
smefir
EI
desC~'iptiOll o f t h e v a r i o u s a i r
V a l t a a n d F r e n c h Worth
Africa
e f f ec t a g a i n s t , shi p p i rig
GENERbL NZXAh'Pl.11 their ga've an a c c o u n t of t h e operat,ioris of t h e
8 t h Army
and
and b y 1 0 I t a l i a n U i v i + i o r r s
6 ,000 y a r d s
I n f a n t r y advanced t h r o u g h d e e p m i n e f i e l d s f o r 4 , 0 0 0 t o
For t h e n e x t t e n d a y s t h e r e was s e v e r e f i g h t i n g d e s i g n e d
through
WRY
f o r t h e f i n a l break
They had
136
U. S , S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
must have t o t a l l e d between 60,000 a n d 70,000 a n d Rome1 must have l o s t
n e a r l y 5,000 v e h i c l e s . None of t h i s would have been p o s s i b l e had i t n o t
been f o r t h e a i r s u p e r i o r i t y gained by t h e A i r Forces who had throughout
done m a g n i f i c e n t work.
50 a d d i t i o n a l
t a n k s were be
1 5 t h Panzer D i v i s i o n w i t h 30 t a n k s
lieved t o be
ready i n T u n i s i a .
' 9 0 t h L i g h t D i v i s i o n ) b o t h weak i n s t r e n g t h
164th Division
) and s h o r t of a r t i l l e r y .
Ahout 9 I t a l i a n D i v i s i o n s .
The t o t a l s t r e n g t h might be assessedat50,OOO Germans and 30,000
I t a l i a n s , though o n l y a b o u t 20,000 of t h e former were s t r i c t l y f i g h t i n g
troops
s h o r t o f a r t i l l e r y . F u r t h e r m o r e , h i s army h a d r e t r e a t e d 1,000 m i l e s ,
which must have h a d i t s e f f e c t on m o r a l e . Our s u p e r i o r i t y r e s t e d i n
tanks and guns, of which w e had ample. General L e C l e r c ' s advance through
Fezzan had been a f i n e p i e c e o f work b u t would n o t e x e r c i s e a n i n f l u e n c e
on t h e p r e s e n t b a t t l e
137
11 S. S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
If we g o t t o T r i p o l i a c c o r d i n g t o p l a n t h e 8 t h Army would be
q u i t e i m m o b i l i z e d u n t i l t h e p o r t was o p e n , T h i s would t a k e p r o b a b l y
s e v e n o r t e n d a y s , though i n t h e w o r s t c a s e i t might t a k e t h r e e months.
I t s h o u l d be r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e d i s t a n c e s i n v o l v e d were v e r y
was 220 m i l e s
t u r e d T r i p o l i and if he c a p t u r e d Sfax
Could t h e 8 t h A r m y k e e p R o m e 1
e n g a g e d s o t h a t t h e f o r c e s a t S f a x c o u l d n e g l e c t i t s r i g h t f l a n k and
t u r n a l l i t s a t t e n t i o n towards t h e North?
GENERAL ALEXAbDER s a i d t h a t Rommel was l i v i n g v e r y much from
hand t o mouth f o r s u p p l i e s a n d i f he l o s t all h i s p o r t s he would c e r t a i n .
l y be t r a p p e d ; n e v e r t h e l e s s , i t would b e n e c e s s a r y t o g i v e v e r y c a r e f u l
s t u d y t o t h e Sfax o p e r a t i o n I t s h o u l d b e r e a l i z e d t h a t if a f o r c e ad
vanced on S f a x , Rommel would r e a c t l i k e l i g h t n i n g and h i s plan would b e
the best possible
G r e a t c a r e would b e n e c e s s a r y t o i n s u r e t h a t undue
r i s k s were n o t t a k e n
I t might be u n f o r t u n a t e i f t h e f o r c e a r r i v e d a t
t 38
U.
S . SECRET
BRITISH MOST S E C R E T
D i s c u s s i o n t h e n t u r n e d o n t h e s t r e n g t h r e q u i r e d t o h o l d t h e North
African s h o r e when i t had been c o m p l e t e l y c l e a r e d of t h e enemy. GENERAL
ALEXANDER s a i d t h a t he had c a l c u l a t e d t h a t two d i v i s i o n s w i t h a mobile
r e s e r v e would be s u f f i c i e n t f o r C y r e n a i c a and T r i p o l i t a n i a . GENERAL
EISENHOWER s a i d t h a t he c o n s i d e r e d f o u r d i v i s i o n s should be h e l d t o watch
Spanish Moroccoand t h a t one i n f a n t r y and one armored d i v i s i o n would c e r
t a i n l y b e n e c e s s a r y i n A l g e r i a a n d T u n i s i a . T h e r e were a t p r e s e n t s i x
139
li S SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
misuse t e c h n i c a l equipment a n d allow i t t o d e t e r i o r a t e
He d i d n o t t h i n k
t h e A i r Force i n t h e r e c e n t v i c t o r i e s i n t h e Kiddle E a s t
Since that
supplies
The a c t i o n o f an a i r f o r c e i n o p e r a t i o n s
o f t h i s k i n d was d i f f i c u l t t o e x p l a i n c o n c i s e l y , e x t e n d i n g as i t d i d over
g r e a t a r e a s and d i v e r s e t a s k s
The M i d d l e E a s t A i r F o r c e s had f i r s t
The c o o r d i n a t i o n o f t h e A i r F o r c e s o f the
A i r F o r c e s i n T u n i s i a were o p e r a t i n g i n s u p p o r t o f t h e A r m y
There were
from t h e f r o n t l i n e
a i r f i e l d s i n Tunis
a = u n i t s from t h e Western
S . f i g h t e r s would o p e r a t e i n t h e S o u t h u n d e r General
H i s own c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e l a y o u t on t h i s f r o n t w a s t h a t t h e B r i t
S. S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
t o s e r v e u n d e r B r i t i s h command. T h i s had meant t h a t he had had t o es
t a b l i s h a Command P o s t from which t o d i r e c t o p e r a t i o n s . H e hoped t o
overcome t h i s k i n d of d i f f i c u l t y i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e .
T h e PRIhlE MIKISTET i n y u i r e d whether t h e r e was any danger o f t h e
Germans s t r i k i n g t h r o u g h G e n e r a l A n d e r s o n ' s l e f t f l a n k r a t h e r i n t h e
manner a d o p t e d by t h e 8 t h Army a t E l Alameln. GEKEFAL EISZNHOWER s a i d
0. S .
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
ANFA 2nd Meeting
PRESENT
The F t . lion. Minston S . Churchil:
(Prime V i n i s t e r and V i n i s t e r of
Ce f e n s e )
The P r e s i d e n t
General G . C .
liarshall
Admiral E . J .
King
Admiral of t h e F l e e t S i r Dudlej
Pound
L t . G e n e r a l H . H . Arnol~d
\fr FIarry Ilopkins
F i e l d Marshal Sir J o h n D i l l
G e n e r a l S i r Alan F. Brooke
A i r C h i e f Marshal S i r C. P o r t a l
Vice Admiral t h e Lord L o u i s
Wountbat t e n
L t . G e n e r a l 5 i r H a s t i n g s L. Ismay
SECRETARIAT
Hrig. General J. R.
E r i g a d i e r h.
Deane
I. C . Jacob
142
il. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
The PRESIDENT and t h e PRIME MINISTER a s k e d t h e C h i e f s of S t a f f
f o r a r e p o r t of p r o g r e s s r e g a r d i n g t h e c u r r e n t c o n f e r e n c e s .
SIR ALAN BROOKE s t a t e d t h a t a f t e r seven days of argument h e f e l t
t h a t d e f i n i t e p r o g r e s s had been made. A document i s now b e i n g p r e p a r e d
s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e g e n e r a l s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y f o r 1943. T h i s w i l l b e gone
over i n d e t a i l a t t h e C . C . S . meeting on t h e morning of J a n u a r y 1 9 t h .
s u b m a r i n e menace a r e a f i r s t c h a r g e on t h e r e s o u r c e s of t h e
U n i t e d h a t i o n s and p r o v i d e s e c u r i t y f o r a l l o f our o p s a t i o n s .
2.
A s t a t e m e n t t h a t we s h a l l c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e d e f e a t of
A t t h e same time, we s h a l l go on w i t h p r e p a r i n g f o r c e s
and assembling l a n d i n g c r a f t i n England f o r a t h r u s t a c r o s s t h e
Channel i n t h e event t h a t t h e German s t r e n g t h i n France d e c r e a s e s ,
e i t h e r through withdrawal of her t r o o p s or because of an i n t e r n a l
collapse.
4.
O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c a r e t o be continued t o i n c l u d e
P l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s t o u n d e r t a k e O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM
143
P. S. C E C W T
9 0 T T I S Y 6fOCT SECOET
0.
E v e r y e f f o r t w i l l b e made, p o l i t i c a l and o t h e r w i s e , t o
i n d u c e Turkey t o e n t e r t h e w a r i n o r d e r t h a t we may e s t a b l i s h
a i r b a s e s t h e r e f o r o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t Rumania.
e.
O p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS w i l l be u n d e r t a k e n f o r t h e purpose of
e s t a b l i s h i n g b r i d g e h e a d s o v e r t h e Chindwin R i v e r , and a l s o t o
p r e p a r e r o a d s and a i r f i e l d s i n n o r t h e r n Burma which w i l l f a c i l i
t a t e t h e m o u n t i n g o f O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM toward t h e end of t h e year.
I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , O p e r a t i o n CANNIBAL i s now b e i n g u n d e r t a k e n
w i t h a view t o s e c u r i n g a i r b a s e s i n t h e Akyab area.
He s a i d RAVENOUS r e q u i r e s no Naval s u p p o r t .
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n e x p l a i n e d t h a t w h i l e t h a t p a r t of t h e
C h i n e s e o p e r a t i o n which was t o c o n s i s t of a n advance from Yunnan could
b e a d v a n t a g e o u s l y p o s t p o n e d , t h e advance from Ramgarh c o u l d w e l l be in
i t i a t e d a s p a r t of o p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS i n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e s e c u r i t y f o r
t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a r o a d southward from Ledo. However, t h i s w i l l have
t o have t h e a p p r o v a l of t h e G e n e r a l i s s i m o .
The PRIME UINISTER t h e n s t a t e d t h a t he wished i t made c l e a r t h a t
i f and when H i t l e r b r e a k s down, a l l of t h e B r i t i s h r e s o u r c e s and e f f o r t
w i l l b e t u r n e d toward t h e d e f e a t of J a p a n .
Iie s t a t e d t h a t n o t o n l y a r e
B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n v o l v e d , b u t h e r honor is engaged.
If i t were thought
w e l l f o r t h e e f f e c t on t h e p e o p l e of t h e United S t a t e s o f America, t h e
B r i t i s h Government would e n t e r i n t o a t r e a t y o r c o n v e n t i o n w i t h t h e U. S.
Government t o t h i s e f f e c t
The PRESIDENT s t a t e d t h a t a f o r m a l agreement r e g a r d i n g B r i t i s h
e f f o r t s a g a i n s t J a p a n was e n t i r e l y u n n e c e s s a r y . ile s a i d , however, t h a t
e f f o r t s s h o u l f i b e made t o o b t a i n an engagement from R u s s i a t o concen
t r a t e on t h e d e f e a t o f .Japan a f t e r Germany had b e e n e l i m i n a t e d from
144
SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
ll. S.
He c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e s e might be
developed e i t h e r as f e i n t s i n o r d e r t o c o n c e a l t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e main
e f f o r t a g a i n s t S i c i l y , or p e r h a p s a s a r e a l a t t a c k
message from t h e t h r e e Commanders-in-Chief
He had r e c e i v e d a
i n t h e Middle E a s t informing
He d e s i r e d t h a t t h e f i n a l
S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
The PRESIDENT s t a t e d t h a t r e i n f o r c i n g our a i r power i n China
would a l s o be a s e v e r e blow t o J a p a n . He s a i d t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e people
p a n i c e a s i l y . T h i s was e s p e c i a l l y t r u e a t t h e time o f t h e i r e a r t h q u a k e .
Mr Grew, t h o U n i t e d S t a t e s Ambassador, i n r e p o r t i n g t h i s i n c i d e n t ,
s t a t e d t h a t i t was n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e J a p a n e s e b r o a d c a s t t o a d o p t every
means p o s s i b l e t o q u i e t t h e p e o p l e .
The PRLCIDfNT c o n s i d e r e d t h a t we s h o u l d s e n d f r o m 200 t o 750
p l a n e s to China. T h i s s h o u l d i n c l u d e heavy b a n k e r s which, because of the
d i f f i c u l t i e s of s u p p l y , c o u l d be based i n I n d i a . They c o u l d b e used t o
o p e r a t e i n r a i d s over Japan proper by r e f u e l i n g i n China o n t h e i r way t o
a n d from s u c h m i s s i o n s .
He t h o u g h t t h a t t h e U n i t e d K a t i o n s s h o u l d commit themselves t o
t h i s l i n e of a c t i o n and t h a t whoever o f t h e C h i e f s of S t a f f was n e x t t o
see t h e G e n e r a l i s s i m o , s h o u l d i n f o r m him t o t h i s e f f e c t .
The PRESICEKT t h e n d i s c u s s e d o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n .
He s a i d w e had been extremely f o r t u n a t e in O p e r a t i o n TORCH. He was w o r r i e d ,
however, a b o u t news c o n c e r n i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t S i c i l y r e a c h i n g
Germany. To p r e v e n t t h i s , h e t h o u g h t t h a t w e s h o u l d g i v e t h e o p e r a t i o n s
i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n some s u c h name a s "UNDERBELLY" and c o n t i n u a l l y
t h i n k of them a s b e i n g aimed at any one of a number of o b j e c t i v e s , know
i n g s e c r e t l y a l l t h e w h i l e , t h a t t h e y were t o be toward S i c i l y .
ADMIRAL K I N G s t a t e d t h a t d e c e p t i o n c o u l d be w e l l achieved b y t h e
u s e of c o v e r p l a n s , , H e s a i d t h a t t h e document t h a t i s now i n p r e p a r a t i o n
and w i l l b e d i s c u s s e d o n J a n u a r y 1 9 t h goes a l o n g way toward e s t a b l i s h i n g
a p o l i c y o f how we a r e t o win t h e war. I t h a s t a k e n some d a y s f o r t h e
C h i e f s of S t a f f t o e x p r e s s t h e m s e l v e s b u t i n p r i n c i p l e t h e y a r e a l l
a g r e e d . He e x p r e s s e d t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e document b e i n g p r e p a r e d Would
b e approved a f t e r a s h o r t d i s c u s s i o n a n d w i t h minor amendments. H e s a i d
t h a t he p e r s o n a l l y would l i k e t o have had i t expanded t o p r e s e n t a com
p l e t e c o n c e p t f o r c o n c l u d i n g t h e war b u t t h a t h e was w e l l p l e a s e d w i t h
i t as i t i s ,
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t when t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f s of
S t a f f came t o t h e c o n f e r e n c e ,
146
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
troops a v a i l a b l e and because i t w i l l e f f e c t an economy of tonnage which
is t h e major c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I t i s e s t i m a t e d t h a t p o s s e s s i o n of t h e n o r t h
c o a s t of A f r i c a and S i c i l y w i l l r e l e a s e approximately 225 v e s s e l s which
w i l l f a c i l i t a t e o p e r a t i o n s i n Burma, t h e Middle E a s t , and t h e P a c i f i c . H e
f e l t t h a t t h e c a p t u t e of S i c i l y would do much t o imprdve t h e a i r cover
over t h e p r e s e n t commitments of t h e I t a l i a n s .
GENEHAL MARSHALL emphasized t h a t ROUNDUP would be a d i f f i c u l t if
not i m p o s s i b l e o p e r a t i o n t o u n d e r t a k e once w e have committed o u r s e l v e s
t o O p e r a t i o n HUSKY, He s a i d t h a t t h e United Kingdom m a i n t a i n s a s m a l l
spearhead of amphibious f o r c e s c o n s i h t i n g of a b o u t 20,000 t r o o p s which
are a v a i l a b l e a t a l l times for an o p e r a t i o n a c r o s s t h e Channel. T h i s
f o r c e c o u l d b e augmented by f o l l o w - u p t r o o p s c a r r i e d i n s m a l l c r a f t
which might be a v a i l a b l e i n England. Unless t h e r e i s a complete c r a c k i n
German m o r a l e , o p e r a t i o n s a c r o s s t h e Channel w i l l have t o be e x t r e m e l y
limited. I t w i l l be f u l l y a s d i f f i c u l t t o assemble l a n d i n g c r a f t follow
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S P NOST SECRET
t h e t r o o p s i n i t i a l l y h o l d i n g f a s t ; a n d , s e c o n d , by t h e withdrawal of
t r o o p s from F r a n c e . I n t h e l a t t e r c a s e , we s h o u l d make e v e r y e f f o r t t o
c r o s s t h e Channel and i n doing s o , u t i l i z e any means t h a t a r e a v a i l a b l e .
H e s a i d t h e g r e a t e s t d i f f i c u l t y i n s e t t i n g up s t r e n g t h f o r ROUNDUP i n
a i r f o r c e t o t h e e x t e n t t o which i t can be s u p p l i e d .
The i n c r e a s e will
He t h e n d i s c u s s e d t h e u s e of U n i t e d S t a t e s bombers i n England.
Ile t h o u g h t t h a t t h e y s h o u l d be under t h e o p e r a t i o n a l d i r e c t i o n of t h e
B r i t i s h , who s h o u l d p r e s c r i b e t h e t a r g e t s and t h e t i m i n g o f a t t a c k s .
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S Y I'OST S E C P T T
A n o t h e r v i t a l q u e s t i o n b e f o r e t h e Combined C h i e f s of s t a f f i s
how t o m a i n t a i n t h e R u s s i a n f o r c e s a t t h e i r maximum e f f o r t b o t h by
f o r c i n g a w i t h d r a w a l of German p r e s s u r e on t h e i r f r o n t and a l s o by i n
s u r i n g t h e flow of m u n i t i o n s t o them. I t i s q u e s t i o n a b l e t o what e x t e n t
t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s can t a k e t h e l o s s e s of tonnage i n c i d e n t a l t o e s c o r t
i n g t h e n o r t h e r n convoys. I t may b e p o s s i b l e t o d e c r e a s e t h e i n t e r v a l s
between convoys o r add t o t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e i r e s c o r t s . However, i t i s
e n t i r e l y w i t h i n t h e power of Germany t o a d m i n i s t e r s u c h l o s s e s as t o
make i t n e c e s s a r y t o d i s c o n t i n u e t h i s r o u t e t o R u s s i a .
GENERAL MARSIUL s a i d t h a t he does n o t b e l i e v e i t n e c e s s a r y t o
t a k e e x c e s s i v e punishment i n r u n n i n g t h e s e convoys s i m p l y t o k e e p Mr.
S t a l i n p l a c a t e d . I n any e v e n t , he f e e l s t h a t i t would b e n e c e s s a r y t o
inform Mr. S t a l i n t h a t t h e convoys would have t o be d i s c o n t i n u e d d u r i n g
O p e r a t i o n HUSKY.
GENERAL ARNOLD s a i d t h a t t h e agreements t e n t a t i v e l y a r r i v e d a t
would b e v e r y h e l p f u l from t h e a i r p o i n t o f view. They w i l l f a c i l i t a t e
the a l l o c a t i o n o f a i r c r a f t and t h e development of procedure and t e c h n i q u e .
T h e PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t s i n c e we have s u r v e y e d t h e whole
f i e l d of s t r a t e g y , it w i l l now be n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e C h i e f s of S t a f f t o
S. C h i e f s
of S t a f f , f o r a r r a n g i n g t o a t t e n d t h i s c o n f e r e n c e .
The PRESIDENT s a i d t h a t he p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p r e c i a t e d h a v i n g S i r
John D i l l a t t h e c o n f e r e n c e s s i n c e he would be t h e i n d i v i d u a l who would
c a r r y o n t h e l i a i s o n between t h e C h i e f s of S t a f f i n London and t h e C h i e f s
of S t a f f i n Washington between whom he c o n s t i t u t e d an i n d i s p e n s a b l e l i n k .
SIR DUDLEY POUND. t h e n s a i d t h a t w e must g o i n t o ways and means
Of
i m p l e m e n t i n g o u r a g r e e d d e c i s i o n s . Two p r o b l e m s i n v o l v e d a r e t h e
C S SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
H e s a i d t h a t i n c r e a s e d p r e s s u r e a g a i n s t t h e submarine menace must be
tle a g r e e d w i t h General M a r s h a l l t h a t i t w i l l be n e c e s s a r y
s t a t e d t h a t f i v e G r e a t Lakes s t e a m e r s had a l -
ready been s e n t
The PRESIDENT t o l d Admiral King t o s u r v e y t h e s i t u a t i o n and s e e
what c o u l d b e done i n t h i s r e s p e c t
SIR J O H N DILL e x p r e s s e d h i s s a t i s f a c t i o n over t h e p r o g r e s s of
t h e p r e s e n t conferences
The PRIYE MIKISTER t h e n d i s c u s s e d t h e s i t u a t i o n i n T u r k e y , He
s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h had some r i g h t t o e x p e c t Turkey t o e n t e r t h e war
when t h e Balkans were invaded, b u t i n view of our own weakness t o h e l p
Turkey t h e y d i d n o t p r e s s i t
Turkey w i l l be i n a weak p o s i t i o n a t t h e
peace t a b l e f o l l o w i n g t h e w a r i f s h e has n o t p a r t i c i p a t e d i n i t
I t was
p o s s i b l e t o g i v e them a g u a r a n t e e f o r e x i s t i n g t e r r i t o r y , and f o r t h e i r
r i g h t s o v e r passage through t h e D a r d a n e l l e s The United Nations s h o u l d
b e p r e p a r e d t o p r o v i d e Turkey w i t h a n t i a i r c r a f t , f l a k , t a n k s and o t h e r
mechanized v e h i c l e s and a l s o b e p r e p a r e d t o send some of t h i s equipment
manned with u n i t s , s i n c e T u r k i s h troops d o not handle machinery pWtiCU
l a r l y w e l l , He f e e l s t h a t Turkey might be i n f l u e n c e d t o e n t e r t h e war b y
t h e s u c c e s s e s o f R u s s i a n t r o o p s on t h e n o r t h and t h o s e of t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s - - U n i t e d Kingdom t r o o p s o n t h e s o u t h , A t p r e s e n t they a r e a n g r y with
t h e B u l g a r i a n s and i t would n o t b e s u r p r i s i n g if they d i d e n t e r t h e W a r . .
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S K MOST SECRET
The PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t s i n c e m o s t of t h e t r o o p s which
would be i n v o l v e d i n r e i n f o r c i n g Turkey would be B r i t i s h , h e asked t h a t
t h e B r i t i s h b e a l l o w e d t o p l a y t h e T u r k i s h h a n d , j u s t as t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s is now h a n d l i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o China. The B r i t
i s h would keep t h e United S t a t e s advised a t a l l times a s t o t h e p r o g r e s s
being made.
The PFESIDEPT c o n c u r r e d i n t h i s v i e w and a l s o s a i d t h a t i f
ROUKDUP s h o u l d be u n d e r t a k e n , he f e l t t h a t i t s h o u l d b e under B r i t i s h
c ommand
o f o p e r a t i o n s s h o u l d a s a g e n e r a l r u l e b e h e l d by an o f f i c e r of t h e
n a t i o n which f u r n i s h e s t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e f o r c e s .
He s a i d t h a t i n perhaps f i v e weeks s i x d i v i s i o n s of t h e 8 t h Army
would e n t e r T u n i s i a , and i t was u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h e y would, of c o u r s e ,
come under command of General Eisenhower. He t h o u g h t , however, i t would
be a d v i s a b l e f o r General Alexander t o b e d e s i g n a t e d as t h e Deputy Com
mander o f t h e A l l i e d F o r c e s
152
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
11
He s a i d t h a t a photograph s h o u l d be made of
He i n d i c a t e d t o General D e Gaulle t h a t if he r e
S. S E C R E T
B R I T I S B MOST S E C R E T
The PRESIDENT s t a t e d t h a t General Giraud had informed him t h a t
t h e r e were s u f f i c i e n t F r e n c h o f f i c e s s and noncommissioned o f f i c e r s i n
North A f r i c a t o e n a b l e t h e French t o raise an army of 250,000 meno H e
thought G e n e r a l Giraud s h o u l d be i n s t r u c t e d t o r a i s e such an army, and
t h a t we s h o u l d make e v e r y e f f o r t t o p r o v i d e him w i t h equipment. He s a i d
t h a t General Giraud was d e s i r o u s o f b e i n g r e l i e v e d of sme of his c i v i l
ian responsibilities.
The P5Ib:E MINISTEP s a i d t h a t he thought t h e p o l i t i c a l r e p r e s m t
a t i V e s of t h e United S t a t e s a n d t h e United Kingdom s h o u l d be a t a l l times
r e p r e s e n t e d i n whatever c o n t r o l l i n g machinery i s set up, and t h a t even
General Eisenhower s h o u l d p r e s e n t h i s demands t o t h e French Government
through c i v i l i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , e x c e p t i n t h o s e c a s e s where he wished
t o e x e r c i s e h i s p r e r o g a t i v e s as a m i l i t a r y commander of an o c c u p i e d
country.
SIR ALh\
from United S t a t e s r e s o u r c e s s u b j e c t t o s h i p p i n g l i m i t a t i o n s . H i s i d e a
was t h a t if we are t o e q u i p t h e French, we must make good u n i t s of them
The PRESIDENT t h o u g h t i t would b e d e s i r a b l e t o u t i l i z e some
F r e n c h u n i t s i n O p e r a t i o n HUSKY e v e n i f o n l y a s a r e s e r v e ,
The PRIhlE MINISTER t h e n e x p r e s s e d t h e hope t h a t t h e U n i t e d
153
ANFA 3rd ! e e t i n g
PRESENT
TIW IVesj~dent
itr:nerxl C . C. M a r s h a l l
,Admiral E. J . King
1.t
G e n e r a l 11.
fi. Arnold
L , Ccnrral R . R . Somervell
a f r , L a r r y Eopkins
F i e l d Varshal S i r John D i l l
G e n e r a l Sir Alan F. Brooke
Commander R . F. Libby
A i r Chief Marshal S i r C . P o r t a l
Vice Admiral t h e Lord L o u i s
Mountbat t e n
L t , G e n e r a l S i r H a s t i n g s L.
SECRETARIAT
brig^ G e n e r a l J .
n.
Deane
Brigadier 8 . I . C. Jacob
Ismay
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
The PRESIDENT s u g g e s t e d d i s c u s s i n g t h e r e p o r t s u b m i t t e d t o him
and t h e Prime M i n i s t e r i n C.C.S.
170/1, p a r a g r a p h b y p a r a g r a p h .
o f t h e war.
The PRESIDENT a g r e e d t o t h i s and r e c a l l e d an i n c i d e n t i n t h e
l a s t war when Marshal Foch, F i e l d Marshal Haig and General P e r s h i n g had
had a s i m i l a r c o n f e r e n c e which l a s t e d b u t 5 hours.
1.
2.
ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA.
A discussion regarding a s s i s t a n c e t o Russia i n r e l a t i o n t o
o t h e r commitments t h e n f o l l o w e d
The PRESIDENT s a i d t h a t i n March we w i l l b e f a c e d w i t h t h e
r e c e s s i t y of a r r a n g i n g t o e x t e n d t h e R u s s i a n P r o t o c o l . H e t h o u g h t t h e
MR
HOPKINS s a i d t h a t t h e p r e s e n t P r o t o c o l h a s s u c h a c l a u s e
b u t t h a t , o f c o u r s e , i t c a n n o t be e x e r c i s e d w i t h o u t r a i s i n g v i o l e n t
o b j e c t i o n s from P r e m i e r S t a l i n .
The PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t a i d t o R u s s i a must h e pushed, and
no i n v e s t m e n t c o u l d p a y a b e t t e r m i l i t a r y d i v i d e n d . The United N a t i o n s
cannot l e t R w s i a down. Ile s a i d t h a t t h e C h i e f s o f S t a f f had been con
s i d e r i n g whether o r n o t 16 d e s t r o y e r s c o u l d be made a v a i l a b l e from t h e
United S t a t e s i n o r d e r t o r e d u c e t h e l e n g t h of t h e convoy t u r n a r o u n d
from 40 t o 27 d a y s .
1.55
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t t h e d e s t r o y e r s simply were n o t a v a i l a b l e . ,
The e s c o r t v e s s e l s i t u a t i o n i s s o t i g h t a s t o make i t n e c e s s a r y t o
e l i m i n a t e t h e 5 u s s i a n convoys s t a r t i n g about J u n e 1 4 t h i n o r d e r t o take
c a r e of t h e n e e d s of O p e r a t i o n HUSXY
He p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e r e i s a l
r e a d y a s h o r t a g e of G 5 e s c o r t s t o p r o t e c t t h e convoys i n t h e A t , l a n t i c
s e r v i c e and t h a t t h e HUSKY o p e r a t i o n w j l l make t h i s s h o r t a g e more acute.
MR
HOPKINS s u g g e s t e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f s t o p p i n g t h e convoys
e n t i r e l y if w e c o u l d g i v e R u s s i a something t h a t s h e had n o t p r e v i o u s l y
e x p e c t e d and s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h i s b e a i r p l a n e s ,
The PRESIDENT asked what new e s c o r t c o n s t r u c t i o n would b e a v a i l
a b l e by June of 1943,
ADMIRAL K I N G r e p l i e d t h a t t h e r e would b e 100 e s c o r t ' v e s s e l s
c o m p l e t e d b u t t h a t , , i f t h e p r e s e n t l o s s r a t e s c o n t i n u e d , t h i s number
would r e p r e s e n t o n l y a s m a l l ne.t g a i n
SIR DUDIEY POUND s a i d t h e r e i s no s u b s t i t u t e f o r d e s t r o y e r s i n
p r o t e c t i n g convoys. A t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e we a r e u - i l i z i n g 16 d e s t r o y e r s
and 8 s h i p s of o t h e r t y p e s w i t h t h e convoys r u n n i n g on a 40-day c y c l e
If t h i s were t o be reduced t o 27 d a y s , i t would b e n e c e s s a r y t o double
t h i s f o r c e i n o r d e r t o have two convoys i n o p e r a t i o n
MH HOPKINS r e p e a t e d t h a t some c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h o u l d b e g i v e n by
t h e Chiefs of S t a f f r e g a r d i n g t h e e n t i r e e l i m i n a t i o n of t h e Russian con
'voys v i a t h e n o r t h e r n r o u t e
He s a i d t h a t i t m i g h t b e p o s s i b l e t o
i n c r e a s e t h e d e l f v e r y o f m u n i t i o n s t o R u s s i a Over t h e P e r s i a n r o u t e and
v i a Alaska a l t h o u g h t h e R u s s i a n s o b J e c t t o h a n d l i n g some types of muni
t i o n s Over t h e s e r o u t e s . . A t t h e same t i m e , we c o u l d i n c r e a s e t h e P r o t o
c o l i n c e r t a i n t y p e s of m u n i t i o n s s u c h as a i r c r a f t - , If t h i s were done,
t h e r e would b e a s a v i n g i n t h e u s e of t h e 500,000 t o n s of s h i p p i n g from
156
U, S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
This
157
ll S SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
been s u f f e r e d i n t h e Murmansk convoys, t h e y would h u r t H u s s i a a s much a s
t h e U . S. and U . K. S u c h l o s s e s make i t i m p o s s i b l e f o r u s t o a t t a c k on
o t h e r f r o n t s and t h u s e l i m i n a t e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f f o r c i n g t h e Germans
t o withdraw g r o u n d and a i r t r o o p s from t h e I u s s i a n f r o n t . Fie s a i d these
l o s s e s l a s t y e a r came j u s t a t t h e time t h a t we were l a b o r i n g t o b u i l d up
BOLERO. I t must b e made c e r t a i n t h a t we d o n o t h a z a r d t h e s u c c e s s of
O p e r a t i o n HUSKE,
The PRIME MINISTER a g r e e d t h a t i f p a s s a g e o f convoys on t h e
n o r t h e r n r o u t e were p r o h i b i t i v e i n c o s t , t h e y must b e s t o p p e d . M
e thought
i t would be r i g h t t o h a v e i n o u r minds t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n t i n u i n g
c o n v o y s t h r o u g h t h e HUSKY p e r i o d , b u t t o make no p r o m i s e s t o S t a l i n .
S I R DUDLEY POUND s a i d t h i s must b e t h e c a s e b e c a u s e i f we were
committed t o c o n t i n u i n g t h e s e convoys, t h e !ioyal Navy c o u l d n o t p l a y i t s
p a r t i n O p e r a t i o n HUSKY.
The PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t t h e d i s c u s s i o n s h o u l d rest on t h e
p o i n t t h a t t h e d i s c o n t i n u a n c e o f t h e s e - convoys w i l l d e p e n d upon t h e
l o s s e s t h a t a r e s u f f e r e d . He s a i d we must t e l l Mr. S t a l i n t h e f a c t s ,
t h a t he must r e l y on a 40-day s c h e d u l e . A l s o t h a t we c a n n o t promise t h e
continuance of t h e convoys while O p e r a t i o n HUSKY i s b e i n g undertaken, He
s a i d i t s h o u l d a l s o be made c l e a r t o h I r o S t a l i n t h a t t h e U. S. and U . K .
S t a f f a r e making p l a n s on t h e assumption t h a t t h e m u n i t i o n s c a l l e d f o r
i n t h e P r o t o c o l w i l l be a v a i l a b l e . I n j u s t i c e t o them, t h e y s h o u l d know
j u s t what i s i n t e n d e d . lie asked how a 2.4yL p e r month l o s s r a t e would
r e l a t e t o t h e 700,000 t o n s l o s s of s h i p p i n g p e r y e a r .
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d he t h o u g h t t h e l o s s r a t e o f 2.4% would reduce
t h e l o s s e s i n s h i p p i n g t o less t h a n 700,000 t o n s . He r e c a l l e d t h e Prime
: v ! i n i s t e r ' s h a v i n g s a i d b e f o r e t h e Eouse o f Commons t h a t i f o u r l o s s e s
c o u l d be r e d u c e d below 500,000 t o n s p e r y e a r , t h e s h i p p i n g s i t u a t i o n
would be s a t i s f a c t o r y .
The PRESIDENT s a i d t h a t t h e s h i p p i n g s i t u a t i o n i s bound t o
i m p r o v e d u r i n g t h e c o m i n g y e a r as a r e s u l t o f n e a r l y d o u b l i n g t h e
158
U~ S, SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
c o n s t r u c t i o n program a n d by r e a s o n o f t h e more e f f e c t i v e a n t i s u b m a r i n e
p e r i o d of t h e f a v o r a b l e J u n e moon r a t h e r t h a n t h a t o f J u l y .
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t h e m a t t e r o f t r a i n i n g must b e con
s i d e r e d as w e l l as o t h e r f e a t u r e s i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s
f o r O p e r a t i o n HUSKY. He s a i d t h a t a l l t r a i n i n g and p r e p a r a t i o n s must b e
scheduled, and t h a t i f an i m p o s s i b l e or improbable t a r g e t d a t e was set
and then l a t e r changed t o one t h a t was p r a c t i c a b l e , a l l of t h e schedules
would be o u t of a d j u s t m e n t
with r e g a r d t o e v e r y a s p e c t o f t h e o p e r a t i o n . The s u b j e c t of t h e t a r g e t
d a t e had been q u i t e e x h a u s t i v e l y s t u d i e d , a n d i t i s g o i n g t o be d i f f i c u l t
t o mount O p e r a t i o n HUSKY w i t h p r o p e r l y t r a i n e d f o r c e s even i n J u l y .
The PRESIDENT asked i f t h e f i x i n g o f t h e t a r g e t d a t e i n J u l y was
made on t h e assumption t h a t t h e Axis f o r c e s would be d r i v e n from T u n i s i a
by t h e end of A p r i l . He a s k e d what t h e e f f e c t would be i f t h e y were t o
be e l i m i n a t e d from A f r i c a by t h e end of hlarch.
GENERAL MARSHAIL r e p l i e d t h a t s u c c e s s i n T u n i s i a a t t h e end o f
March would improve t h e s i t u a t i o n somewhat b u t was n o t t h e l i m i t i n g f a c
t o r . The l i m i t i n g f a c t o r w a s o n t h e n a v a l s i d e w i t h r e s p e c t t o o r g a n i z i n g
159
SECRFT
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R F T
U
S.
S i c i l y s h o u l d be made by p a r t i a l l y or f u l l y t r a i n e d f o r c e s .
The PRLSIiXb'T s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n might be e a s i e r than
O p e r a t i o n TOFCH i n view of t h e b e t t e r weather f o u n d i n t h e Nediterranean.
e nemy s d e f e n s e s
a m p h i b i o u s t r a i n i n g , we d o n o t have t h e l a n d i n g c r a f t o r c r e w s - . The
c r a f t must b e b u i l t a n d t h e c r e w must be t r a i n e d
The PFIME MIKISTER a g r e e d t h a t r e n e r a l h ! a r s h a l l ' s p o i n t t h a t the
t a r g e t d a t e f o r HUSKY d i d n o t depend on t h e T u n i s i a n o p e r a t i o n s b u t
r a t h e r on the n e c e s s i t y o f t r a i n i n g was a good o n e .
He s a i d , however, t h a t t h e B r i t i s h a r e t o s e n d t h e i r overseas
a s s a u l t f o r c e which has a c a p a c i t y of 7 b r i g a d e groups t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n
O p e r a t i o n HUSKY- He had b e e n t o l d t h a t t h i s c o u l d n o t l e a v ? England
u n t i l March 1 4 t h and then must undergo some t r a i n i n g i n t h e e a s t e r n Medi
t e r r a n e a n . . He s a i d h e f e l t s u r e t h a t t h e f o r c e c o u l d be s e n t e a r l i e r . In
t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , LORE LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN s a i d t h a t he had b e e n informed
that i t c o u l d b e s e n t by t h e end of F e b r u a r y .
160
U. S. SECQET
SeITISi' MOST SECrlET
The PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t t h i s would he done. lie t h e n d i s
cussed t h e q u e s t i o n of n a v i g a t i o n . When o p e r a t i o n s of t h e importance of
HUSKY a r e t o he undertaken, no e f f o r t should be s p a r e d t o o b t a i n capable
n a v i g a t o r s . He s u g g e s t e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of combing t h e navy, p a r t i c u
l a r l y t h e "R"
c l a s s b a t t l e s h i p s , w i t h t h e purpose of s e t t i n g up a s p e
c i a l group of n a v i g a t o r s .
SIR DUDLEY POUND s a i d t h a t s k i l l e d n a v i g a t o r s could n o t he taken
from t h e navy without s e r i o u s e f f e c t s and, i n any e v e n t , t h e y would have
t o he supplemented by i n e x p e r i e n c e d men and t h e t r a i n i n g p e r i o d c o u l d
not t h e r e f o r e be s h o r t e n e d .
The PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t he f e a r e d t h e gap of perhaps f o u r
months d u r i n g t h e summer when no U . S. o r B r i t i s h troops would be i n
c o n t a c t w i t h t h e Germans.
The PRESIDENT agreed and s a i d t h a t t h i s gap might have a s e r i o u s
e f f e c t a l l over t h e world.
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f had e x
amined t h e t i m i n g of t h e o p e r a t i o n most c a r e f u l l y . September was t h e
U. S . SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
T h e PRESIDENT s a i d t h a t t h e p r e s e n t p r o p o s a l s were b a s e d on a
t h e Spanish s i t u a t i o n c l e a r e d s t i l l f u r t h e r d u r i n g t h e S p r i n g .
162
0 S SECRET
B R I T I S B ,MOST S E C R E T
GEFERAL MARSHAIL s a i d that i n any c a s e t h e t r o o p s s t a n d i n g ready
t o move i n t o S p a n i s h Morocco wouldbe s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t r a i n i n g for S i c i l y
ADMIRAL KIKG s a i d t h a t one o f t h e innimierable item; which had t o
b e considered
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s 1 i p ; h t e s t t,he c o u r s e of m i l i t a r j e v e n t s .
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i n t h e c o v ~ rp l a n s .
S . SECRET
B R I T I S R NOST S E C R E T
g o i n g on a l l o v e r t h e N o r t h A f r i c a n s h o r e . T h e s e would n o t o n l y d i s
g u i s e t h e o b j e c t i v e , b u t would c a u s e d i s p e r s i o n o f enemy f o r c e s .
The PR.ESIRENT t h o u g h t t h a t t h e c r e a t i o n of G e n e r a l C,iraud's
F r e n c h army might a l s o p l a y a p a r t i n making t h e enemy t h i n k t h a t the
s o u t h e r n c o a s t of F r a n c e was o u r o b j e c t i v e .
( c ) Command of
t h e Mediterranean Theater:
i n t h e command a r r a n g e m e n t s " He
OPERATIONS
I N A" FROM
'rm UKITZI?
KJFFTOM.
( b ) BOLERO:
The PRIME MINISTLE t h o u g h t t h a t i t was v e r y d i s a p p o i n t i n g t h a t
K. by August
1 5 t h . He i n q u i r e d whether by u s i n g the Queens, t h e number f o r September
t h e r e would o n l y b e 4 11. S. d i v i s i o n s e q u i p p e d i n t h e U.
c o u l d n o t b e achieved i n August.
GENERAL SOMER\'EI,I, s a i d t h a t t h e 1 , i m i t i n g f e c t o r i n t h e f i r s t
h a l f o f t h e y e a r was c a r g o s h i p s , and in t h e second h a l f of t h e year i t
a minimum, and t h e
U S SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
The PRIME MINISTER i n q u i r e d whether t h e i n i t i a l equipment of 8
t o n s p e r man, and t h e m a i n t e n a n c e c f 1 . 3 t o n s p e r man p e r month, c o u l d
not be reduced; s i m i l a r l y , c o u l d n o t s a v i n g s be made on r e s e r v e s and on
v e h i c l e s . For t h e t y p e of o p e r a t i o n s which would be u n d e r t a k e n i n F r a n c e
t h a t i t s h o u l d be r e c o r d e d t h a t t h e f i g u r e s shown i n t h e r e p o r t were a
minimum and t h a t e v e r y e f f o r t would be made t o i n c r e a s e them
( c ) Amphibious C p e r a t i o n s i n 1 % 3 from t h e U . K
The PRIME MINISTER s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e word " v i g o r o u s l y " s h o u l d
be i n s e r t e d b e f o r e t h e word " e x p l o i t i n g " i n s u b p a r a g r a p h ( 2 ) of t h i s
s e c t i o n o f t h e r e p o r t . T h i s was a g r e e d t o .
The PRESIDENT i n q u i r e d w h e t h e r a n o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e B r e s t
P e n i n s u l a c o u l d n o t be s t a g e d i n s t e a d of a g a i n s t C h e r b o u r g - The advan
t a g e s of t h e former were v e r y much g r e a t e r . He a l s o i n q u i r e d a b o u t t h e
d a t e proposed f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n s .
A dif
165
U: S
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B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
e n g i n e s were a l l o c a t e d t o t h e U., K., from t h e U % A ,
Ile u n d e r s t o o d t h i s
p o i n t was under i n v e s t i g a t i o n .
The PRESIDENT i n q u i r e d whether some Ford t a n k e n g i n e s could not
b e produced and t a k e n b y a i r t r a n s p o r t from t h e U , . S . A . t o t h e U . K , He
u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h e e n g i n e was much t h e same.
GENERAL SOMERVELL s a i d t h a t t h e r e was a d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e engines,
though t h e same f a c i l i t i e s were r e q u i r e d t o produce b o t h . Ile could not
selected
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d he u n d e r s t o o d i t was a q u e s t i o n o f the
a v a i l a b i l i t y of t h e r i g h t man
SIR ALAN BROOKE t h o u g h t t h a t t h e C h i e f o f S t a f f , i f a man w i t h
t h e r i g h t q u a l i t i e s were c h o s e n , c o u l d d o what w a s n e c e s s a r y i n the
early stages
Tne PRIME MINISTER s u g g e s t e d t h a t i n any c a s e an American Deputy
t o t h e Supreme Commander s h o u l d be a p p o i n t e d .
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
5.
t i o n c o n t a i n e d no r e f e r e n c e t o o p e r a t i o n s i n o r from China. O p e r a t i o n s
i n Burma, though d e s i r a b l e , would n o t have t h e d i r e c t e f f e c t upon t h e
Chinese which was n e c e s s a r y t o s u s t a i n and i n c r e a s e t h e i r war e f f o r t
Similarly, an island-to-island
advance a c r o s s t h e P a c i f i c would t a k e t o o
shipping s i t u a
time i n a t t a c k s on s h i p p i n g , b u t o c c a s i o n a l l y t h e y c o u l d make a s p e c i a l
r a i d on Japan. There seemed t o be two methods of a c h i e v i n g t h i s o b j e c t :
e i t h e r t h e p l a n e s c o u l d be b a s e d and m a i n t a i n e d i n China o r e l s e t h e y
could b e b a s e d i n I n d i a , moving t o China e a c h t i m e f o r a m i s s i o n , re
t u r n i n g t o t h e i r b a s e s i n I n d i a on c o m p l e t i o n An i n d i c a t i o n of t h e
shortage of J a p a n e s e s h i p p i n g was t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y were b u y i n g up
j u n k s t o r e p l a c e c o a s t a l s t e a m e r s , s o t h a t t h e y c o u l d employ t h e s e on
t h e i r maintenance r o u t e s .
GENERAL ARNOLD s a i d t h a t he was f u l l y aware o f t h e need f o r r e
i n f o r c i n g t h e U . S. A i r Force i n China. One g r o u p o f a i r c r a f t was j u s t
p r e p a r i n g t o l e a v e t h e U.S.A.;
India, t h e b e s t m e t h o d o f o p e r a t i n g t h e a i r c r a f t . He hoped t h a t e f f e c t i v e
o p e r a t i o n s would s t a r t b e f o r e A p r i l . I t s h o u l d be remembered, however,
t h a t t h e r e were l a r g e demands f o r t r a n s p o r t a i r c r a f t i n o t h e r t h e a t e r s ,
and t h e s e could n o t be n e g l e c t e d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , he hoped t o have 135-150
t r a n s p o r t p l a n e s o p e r a t i n g on t h e India-China r o u t e b y t h e e n d o f t h e F a l l .
167
0. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST. SECRET
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n o f t r a n s p o r t planes for
I n d i a competed w i t h u r g e n t r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r HUSKY, and for cross-channel
o p e r a t i o n s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , he f e l t i t was v i t a l t o s t e p up t h e e f f o r t in
China, and t h i s would be done.
The PRIME MINISTER e x p r e s s e d h i s agreement w i t h t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s
p r o p o s a l s . He s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e document s h o u l d now be r e c o n s i d e r e d by
t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f , and amendments a r i s i n g o u t of t h e present
d i s c u s s i o n s h o u l d b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n a f i n a l e d i t i o n . The docunent rould
t h e n f i t t i n g l y embody t h e r e s u l t s of a r e m e r k a b l e p e r i o d of s u s t a i n e d
work.
The PRESIDENT agreed w i t h t h i s p r o p o s a , and e x p r e s s e d h i s con
g r a t u l a t i o n s t o t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f on t h e r e s u l t s which they
had a c h i e v e d .
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C.C.S.
6 0 t h Meeting
C.C.S.
6 1 s t Meeting
C.C.S.
62nd Meeting
C.C.S.
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C.C.S.
5 5 t h Meeting
C . M a r s h a l l , USA
G e n e r a l S i r A l a n F. Brooke
Admiral of t h e F l e e t S i r Dudley
Pound
A i r C h i e f Marshal S i r C h a r l e s
P . A. P o r t a l
L t , General B. B. S o m e r v e l l , USA
Rear Admiral C. hl. Cooke, J r , USN
Brig. General A. C . Wedemeyer, USA
F i e l d hlarshal S i r John D i l l
Vice Admiral t h e Lord L o u i s
Mountbat t e n
L t , General S i r H a s t i n g s L
SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r V. D y k e s
169
Ismay
SECRET
B R I T I S B MOST SECRET
S
f a s t as t h e y c o u l d , He f e l t t h a t b e f o r e t h e Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f
turned t o t h e discussion o f p a r t i c u l a r operations they should f i r s t fix
t h e general p r o p o r t i o n of e f f o r t t o be a p p l i e d i n t h e two main t h e a t e r s .
SIR ALAN BnOOKE s u g g e s t e d t h a t i n f i x i n g t h i s balance o f e f f o r t
between t h e two t h e a t e r s , i t would be wise f i r s t t o t r y and weigh up the
enemy s i t u a t i o n a s b o t h t h e U. S. and B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f saw i t . The
U. S. Chiefs of S t a f f would n a t u r a l l y know m o r e o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Japan
t h a n t h e B r i t i s h . H e e x p r e s s e d t h e a d m i r a t i o n o f t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of
S t a f f on t h e m a g n i f i c e n t work o f t h e U. S. F o r c e s d u r i n g t h e l a s t twelve
months a f t e r t h e e a r l y d i s a s t e r s o f t h e war a g a i n s t J a p a n , A t one t i m e
170
U. S . SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
s h i p p i n g was a s t r a n g l e h o l d on a l l o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s and u n l e s s we
could e f f e c t i v e l y combat t h e U-boat menace, w e might n o t b e a b l e t o win
the war.
Germanys s i t u a t i o n was u n d o u b t e d l y d e v e l o p i n g f a v o r a b l y from
o u r p o i n t o f v i e w . She was s t a g g e r i n g u n d e r t h e f a i l u r e o f h e r s e c o n d
o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t i i u s s i a , a n d f k e l i n g must b e growing i n t h a t c o u n t r y t h a t
i t was i m p o s s i b l e f o r h e r t o d e f e a t i:ussia. Her s u c c e s s e s i n 1942 a g a i n s t
Russia had been v e r y much s m a l l e r i n s c a l e t h a n i n 1941. She had f a i l e d
i n h e r main o b j e c t o f t h e 1942 campaign, t h e c a p t u r e o f t h e Caucasus o i l .
By f a i l i n g t o c a p t u r e even t h e p o r t o f Tuapse, s h e had f a i l e d i n s e c u r ~ .
i n g t h e f a c i l i t i e s t o e x p o r t s u c h o i l a s s h e had c a p t u r e d a t Grozny,
Her n o r t h e r n f l a n k was i n danger as a l s o were t h e t r o o p s i n t h e Caucasus
salient.
The l t u s s i a n o f f e n s i v e had b e e n w e l l c a r r i e d o u t and had now
reached w i t h i n f i f t y m i l e s o f Llostov. Germany had o n l y two c o u r s e s open
t o h e r , e i t h e r t o push back t h e i l u s s i a n s i n t o S t a l i n g r a d , which would b e
almost i m p o s s i b l e d u r i n g t h e w i n t e r , o r t o s h o r t e n h e r l i n e . The l a t t e r ,
t h e r e f o r e , was t h e m o r e p r o b a b l e c o u r s e ; and t h a t would i n v o l v e r e v e r t i r g
t o t h e 1941 l i n e , The p s y c h o l o g i c a l e f f e c t o f t h i s w i t h d r a w a l would b e
v e r y s e r i o u s i n Germany.
Germany was t h u s on t h e d e f e n s i v e b o t h i n l i u s s i a a u d i n N o r t h
Africa.
North A f r i c a a f t e r t h e B r i t i s h d e f e a t a t Tohruk v e r y g r e a t a s s i s t a n c e
had been g i v e n by t h e t i m e l y a r r i v a l o f American Sherman t a n k s and S . P
guns..
Germany was a l r e a d y h a v i n g t r o u b l e among h e r a l l i e s . The Xuman
i a n s had s u f f e r e d s e v e r e l y i n t h e C r i m e a b u t had been f o r c e d t o c a r r y on,
although g r e a t l y weakened i n s t r e n g t h . The I t a l i a n t r o o p s on t h e lcussian
f r o n t had a l s o s u f f e r e d heavy l o s s e s and t h e Hungarian f o r c e s , which had
never had much stomach f o r t h e f i g h t , were a l s o i n bad s h a p e - I t a l y was
becoming more and more shaky; a n d i f s h e c o l l a p s e d , Germany w o u l d n o t o n l y
have t o b o l s t e r up I t a l y b y s e n d i n g t r o o p s i n t o t h e c o u n t r y b u t would
171
U S
SECRET
B R I T I S B MOST S E C R E T
A l l i n d i c a t i o n s showed t h a t Germany's manpower was f a i l i n g and
s i x months.
Taking a l l t h e s e f a c t o r s i n t o a c c o u n t , i t seemed a t l e a s t possi-
b l e t h a t t h e p r e c a r i o u s i n t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n o f Germany might make i t pos
s i b l e t o a c h i e v e a f i n a l v i c t o r y i n t h e European t h e a t e r b e f o r e t h e end
o f 1943. The immediate problem was how b e s t t o a p p l y o u r a v a i l a b l e r e
s o u r c e s i n o r d e r t o t a k e advantage of Germany's p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n .
The means we had a t o u r d i s p o s a l were b r o a d l y t h r e e i n number.
F i r s t t h e r e was R u s s i a , which c o n s t i t u t e d t h e l a r g e s t l a n d power; h e r
e f f i c i e n c y was r i s i n g and t h e work of moving !:ussian manufacturing p l a t s
t o t h e eastward away from t h e German i n v a s i o n had been v e r y w e l l c a r r i e d
o u t , . R u s s i a ' s o i l s i t u a t i o n was now more s a t i s f a c t o r y t h a n had seemed
l i k e l y e a r l i e r i n t h e y e a r , b u t she was s h o r t of g r a i n . I n o r d e r t o g e t
t h e b e s t v a l u e o u t of i t u s s i a , we must support h e r i n e v e r y way we could.
Our second main weapon was a i r bombardment, by U. S. and B r i t i s h f o r c e s -
172
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SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
were n o t n e a r l y s o good. Not more t h a n one d i v i s i o n a t a t i m e could be
moved from t h e N o r t h t o t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n f r o n t . The I t a l i a n r a i l w a y s
of s u c c e s s f u l c o o p e r a t i o n between U. S. end B r i t i s h f o r c e s , a n d t h e B r i t
i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f wished t o e x p r e s s t h e i r a d m i r a t i o n of t h e v e r y a b l e
manner i n which General Eisenhower had overcome t h e e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t
problems w i t h which he had been f a c e d . h o r t h A f r i c a would p r o v i d e a val
uable base from which e i t h e r t o t h r e a t e n S o u t h e r n Europe o r t o undertake
o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s . By t h i s u s e w e c o u l d compel t h e Germans t o d i s p e r s e
t h e i r f o r c e s i n o r d e r t o r e i n f o r c e t h r e a t e n e d p o i n t s . I n t h i s way w e
could p r o b a b l y g i v e g r e a t e r a s s i s t a n c e t o R u s s i a t h a n i f w e committed
o u r s e l v e s d e f i n i t e l y t o N o r t h e r n F r a n c e . Once w e had c a p t u r e d B i z e r t e ,
we could p a s s merchant s h i p convoys through t h e X e d i t e r r a n e a n . T h e i r v e r y
passage would compel t h e Germans t o f i g h t i n the a i r , s i n c e i f t h e y l e t
them p a s s through u n m o l e s t e d t h e e f f e c t o f t h e i r U-boat o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t
173
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
S
a t l e a s t j o i n i n on t h e s i d e o f t h e A l l i e s o n f y a t t h e e l e v e n t h h o u r .
There were, however,
as a n o t h e r means o f s t r i k i n g a t Germany.
Summing up p r o s p e c t s i n t h e European T h e a t e r , S I R ALAN BROOKE
s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f f e l t t h a t w e s h o u l d f i r s t expand
t h e bomber o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t t h e Axis t o t h e maximum and t h a t o p e r a t i o n s
i n t h e l e d i t e r r a n e a n o f f e r e d t h e b e s t chance o f c o m p e l l i n g Germany t o
d i s p e r s e h e r r e s o u r c e s , . K i t h t h i s end i n v i e w we s h o u l d t a k e as our immec.~.
i a t e o b j e c t i v e t h e knocking o u t o f I t a l y . A t t h e same t i m e , we should t r y
and b r i n g i n Turkey on our s i d e . . By t h i s means w e s h o u l d g i v e Germany no
r e s p i t e a t a l l i n 1943 a n d we s h o u l d g i v e t h e b e s t a i d t o H u s s i a , whom
we must c o n t i n u e t o s u p p l y w i t h a l l t h e equipment which we c o u l d send.,
The d i f f i c u l t y , o f c o u r s e , was t h a t many o f t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s were mutu..
a l l y exclusive
F o r example, t o s e n d l a r g e s u p p l i e s t o i t u s s i a u s e d up
g r e a t q u a n t i t i e s o f a v a i l a b l e e s c o r t v e s s e l s . . T h i s n a t u r a l l y c u t down
W
e must be i n a p o s i t i o n t o t a k e advantage of a c r a c k i n Germany
i n t h e l a t e summer. There were a l r e a d y i n d i c a t i o n s o f c o n s i d e r a b l e Ger.
man w i t h d r a w a l s from F r a n c e t o t h e e a s t w a r d . If Germany were compelled
t o withdraw c o n s i d e r a b l e numbers of t r o o p s from F r a n c e , t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s
if n o t i m p o s s i b l e ,
to
174
U . S. SECRET
BRITISB MOST SECRET
I n a l l amphibious o p e r a t i o n s t h e p r o v i s i o n o f l a n d i n g c r a f t w a s
the c r i t i c a l f a c t o r . Not o n l y had t h e crews t o be, provided b u t t h e n a v a l
crews t o man them h a d t o be t r a i n e d and t h e l a n d f o r c e s had t o b e t r a i n e d
t h a t once s t a r t e d o p e r a t i o m f o r t h e r e c a p t u r e of Burma
would d e v e l o p i n t o a f u l l - s c a l e campaign.
SIR DTJDLEY POUND s t a t e d t h a t i n t h e A t l a n t i c t h e g r e a t e s t con
c e r n s t o t h e Home F l e e t were: f i r s t , t o p r e v e n t a b r e a k - o u t of t h e Ger
man n a v a l f o r c e s ; a n d , s e c o r d , t o p r o v i d e p r o t e c t i o n for convoys t o N o r t h
Russia.
A t f i r s t , t h e W s s i a n convoys ditl n o t p r e s e n t any g r e a t d i f f i
c u l t y . T h e i r e a r l y s u c c e s s gave everyone a f a l s e s e n s e of s e c u r i t y . Ger
17.5
SECRET
B P I T I S H M O T d SECRET
Ll.
ECHAFA'HORSI',
and P R I N Z EUGEN, a l l of
However,
i n t o the
Atlantic
SIR DUDLEY POUKSC s t a t e d t h a t b e f o r e s u c h a b r e a k - o u t i n t o t h e
A t l a n t i c c o u l d be e f f e c t e d , t h e Germans must s e n d o u t o i l e r s which w i l l
e n a b l e them t o r e f u e l a t s e a , s i n c e h e d o u b t e d i f t h e Germans would
a g a i n a t t e m p t t o r e t i r e t o B r e s t i n view of t h e i r p r e v i o u s experience
there
E u r i n g t h e months o f l o n g d a y l i g h t , t h e d a n g e r o f a i r a t t a c k
p r e c l u d e d t h e u s e o f c r u i s e r s w i t h t h e P u s s i a n convoys; and t h e i r e s c o r t s
c o n s i s t e d o n l y o f a powerful d e s t r o y e r f o r c e . Convoys can t h e n only be
176
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
run e v e r y t h i r t y - s i x t o forty-two days. Twelve days are r e q u i r e d f o r t h e
j o u r n e y , t h r e e d a y s f o r r e f u e l i n g , twelve d a y s f o r t h e r e t u r n j o u r n e y ,
and t h e remainder f o r b o i l e r c l e a n i n g , e t c . The R o y a l Navy d o e s n o t httve
s u f f i c i e n t d e s t r o y e r s t o o p e r a t e two convoys s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . I f , t h e r e
f o r e , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o s e n d more t h a n t h i r t y s h i p s t o R u s s i a e v e r y
f o r t y d a y s , i t w i l l h e n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e United S t a t e s t o f u r n i s h some
assistance i n escort vessels.
I t was i m p o r t a n t t o s t o p t h i s t r a f f i c a t o n c e , T h e r e a r e two
For t h e l a t t e r a B r i t i s h t a s k f o r c e was b e i n g b u i l t up on t h e e a s t s i d e
and a U . S. t a s k f o r c e was o p e r a t i n g from t h e United S t a t e s on t h e west
side
f o r c e s had b e e n h e a v i l y engaged i n t h e s u p p l y of t h e 8 t h A r m y i n t h e
E a s t e r n North A f r i c a n p o r t s . What t h e f u t u r e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e Medi
t e r r a n e a n n a v a l f o r c e s w i l l h e must h e b a s e d on t h e f u t u r e s t r a t e g y t o
be adopted.
SIR DUDLEY POUND t h e n d i s c i i s s e d t h e German U-boat s i t u a t i o n ,
177
U. S . SECRET
B P I T I S H MOST SECRET
t h e A t l a n t i c i n a d d i t i o n t o t h o s e i n t h e Mediterranean and off t h e coast
of Norway. I t i s a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t new p r o d u c t i o n w i l l go t o t h e A t l a n t i c .
T h e Germans a r e a p p a r e n t l y c o n c e n t r a t i n g t h e i r submarines i n t o
l a r g e g r o u p s , e a c h o f which i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a c e r t a i n a r e a . One of
t h e s e has b e e n l o c a t e d o f f t h e c o a s t of hewfoundland, one i n t h e Central
A t l a n t i c , and one o f f Southwest I r e l a n d . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t a convoy may
is a t f a u l t .
R e c e n t l y t h e r e were two convoys from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , each
a t t a c k e d b y a c o n s i d e r a b l e number o f German submarines, one convoy l o s i n g
two v e s s e l s and t h e o t h e r l o s i n g none. T h i s w a s a c c o m p l i s h e d by pro
v i d i n g a i r c o v e r a g e f o r t h e convoys w i t h L i b e r a t o r a i r p l a n e s n h i c h r e
s u l t e d i n keeping t h e U-boats down d u r i n g t h e day. While t h e y were down,
t h e convoys were a b l e t o a l t e r t h e i - c o u r s e and, by n i g h t f a l l , l e a v e the
submar i n e s behind.
SIR DUDLEY F'OUND t h e n d e s c r i b e d an experiment which had been made
owing t o s h o r t a g e of e s c o r t s due t o TORCH,
i n sending cargo v e s s e l s
found i t
i n the
l a t t e r p a r t of t h e year.
SIR CHARLES PORTAL t h e n d i s c u s s e d t h e a i r s i t u a t i o n . He s t a t e d
t h a t our e x p e r i e n c e so f a r has been t h a t t h e German o p e r a t i o n s are d e f i
n i t e l y t i e d up w i t h t k e adequacy of t h e i r a i r power. H e f e l t t h a t t h i s
178
IT. S. SECQET
BRITISH VOST SKCPVT
w i l l be as t r u e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e German d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s as i t h a s
been i n t h e i r o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t ions
The p r e s e n t s t a t e o f t h e German a i r f o r c e is c r i t i c a l . The s t a m i n a
of t h e a i r p l a n e c r e w s is d e c r e a s i n g ; t h e c r e w s l a c k i n t e r e s t a n d a r e
l e s s d e t e r m i n e d , and t h e i r t r a i n i n g i s d e t e r i o r a t i n g . One e x p l a n a t i o n f o r
t h i s i s t h a t t r a i n i n g u n i t s and p e r s o n n e l a r e b e i n g used f o r c m b a t pur
poses b e c a u s e o f a s h o r t a g e of a i r c r a f t . Ke f e l t t h a t t h e r e i s no d e p t h
behind t h e German f r o n t l i n e of a i r c r a f t . The B r i t i s h I n t e l l i g e n c e Serv
i c e i s of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t i f the United Nations c a n keep Germany f i g h t
ing w i t h a i r c r a f t , they w i l l s u f f e r l o s s e s from whicfl they c a n n o t r e c o v e r .
Ye f e l t c e r t a i n t h a t t h e y a r e i n c a p a b l e of conducting l a r g e s c a l e
o p e r a t i o n s on two f r o n t s and t h a t if t h e y a r e kept f i g h t i n g through t h e
w i n t e r and s p r i n g t h e y w i l l have i n t h e summer a s h o r t a g e of from s e v e n
hundred t o two tbousand f i r s t - l i n e a i r c r a f t below what w i l l b e necessary
for a l l fronts.
lie s t a t e d t h a t German prodiictiorr f o r n e x t y e a r w i l l b e a b o u t
twenty-three
A x i s powers.
S I R CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t o u r g r e a t e s t need i s t o f o r c e t h e
Germans t o e x t e n d t h e use of t h e i r a i r c r a f t t o as many a r e a s as p o s s i b l e
and t h u s d e s t r o y and b l e e d them. T h e b e s t ways t o a c c o m p l i s h t h i s a r e :
(1) t o engage t h e m w h i l e t h e y a r e i n s u p p o r t of l a n d o p e r a t i o n s
e v e r t h i s i s o n l y p o s s i b l e a t p r e s e n t on t h e Russian f r o n t . ) ;
(flow
(2) t o meet
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s bombers a r e t o be u s e d .
He i n d i c a t e d t h a t d a y l i g h t a t t a c k s b y U n i t e d S t a t e s bombers
s h o u l d be c o n t i n u e d , a s t h i s h a s a s e r i o u s e f f e c t on t h e German A i r F o r c e ,
179
(I.
S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
on t h e i r i n d u s t r i e s ~ ,a n d on t h e i r morale. The q u e s t i o n o f whether t o
s t r i k e I t a l y f r o m t h e U n i t e d Kingdom or from N o r t h A f r i c a i s s t i l l an
open q u e s t i o n ; b u t b e f o r e d e c i d i n g t o b u i l d up a s t r o n g bomber f o r c e i n
North A f r i c a , i t i s d e s i r a b l e t o be c e r t a i n t h a t t h i s a c t i o n i s more ad
vantageous t h a n c o n c e n t r a t i n g them i n t h e United Kingdom.
GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t i n s o f a r as t h e e s t i m a t e s presented
b y t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f c o n c e r n i n g Germany, R u s s i a , and t h e occu
p i e d c o u n t r i e s a r e concerned, t h e United S t a t e s Chiefs of S t a f f are i n
f u l l accord.
o u t o f p r o p o r t i o n t o the
r i s k s i n v o l v e d . I t would have an e f f e c t n o t o n l y i n t h e S o u t h P a c i f i c
A successful
pacific^
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n s t a t e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f s of
S t a f f are concerned as t o whether o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n a r e a
would b r i n g advantages commensurate w i t h the r i s k s i n v o l v e d , He s a i d t h a t
t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f are i n c l i n e d t o l o o k f a v o r a b l y on an o p e r a t i o n
from t h e U n i t e d Kingdom b e c a u s e of t h e s t r o n g a i r s u p p o r t t h a t c a n be
f u r n i s h e d from t h a t b a s e a s w e l l as t h e r e l a t i v e e a s e w i t h which i t can
b e s u p p l i e d from the U n i t e d S t a t e s .
180
U. S. S E C P E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R t T
H e r e p e a t e d t h a t our f i r s t c o n c e r n must b e t h e d e f e a t of Ger
manys s u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e .
S I R CHARLEF WET& t h e n s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f
a l s o f e l t t h a t t h e d e f e a t o f t h e submarine menace must b e g i v e n f i r s t
p r i o r i t > i n t h e u s e of a i r power, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f our
1i n e o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s .
F o r l o n g range a n t i s u b m a r i n e o p e r a t i o n s n o t o n l y t h e p r o v i s i o n
o f s u i t a b l e a i r c r a f t had t o be c o n s i d e r e d b u t s l s o t h e b a s e s from which
t h e y a r e t o be u s e d . The Elritiski a r e c o n s i d e r i n g t h e a d v i s a b i l i t y o f
e s t a b l i s h i n g a n a i r b a s e i n G r e e n l a n d f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . They were most
g r a t e f u l f o r t h e 21 L i b e r a t , o r s p r o v i d e d b y t h e t..S.A.
f o r t h e Ray of
B i s c a y . T h e r e a r e t h r e e p o s s i b l e met,!!ods o f a t t a c k on s u b m a r i n e s :
along the s e a lanes;
(1) a g a i n s t , b a s e s
i i i
(1)
a l l a i r a t t a c k s on t h e b u i l d i n g y a r d s had been c o n s i d e r e d .
S. S E C V E T
YQITISH VOST SECqGT
U.
i s s o h e c a u s e d i f f e r e n t t h e a t e r s r e q u i r e d i f f e r e n t equipment on a i r c r a f t .
GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s now i n t h e
p r o c e s s of r e c a s t i n g i t s t r o o p deployments. A s an example, he i n d i c a t e d
t h a t i t had become p o s s i b l e t o reduce t h e s i z e o f t h e Caribbean g a r r i s o n
c o n s i d e r a b l y . He s t a t e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s a l s o c o n s i d e r i n g r e
d u c i n g t h e s i z e of t h e I c e l a n d g a r r i s o n and i n t h a t c o n n e c t i o n he thought
182
II. S . SECRET
S R I T I S B MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
56th Meeting
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
MINUTES of Meeting h e l d a t Ahfa Camp
on Thursday, J a n u a r y 14, 1943, a t 1430.
PRESENT
General G. C. M a r s h a l l , USA
Admiral of t h e F l e e t S i r Dudley
Pound
A i r Chief Marshal S i r C h a r l e s
F . A. P o r t a l
THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT
L t . G e n e r a l B. B. S o m e r v e l l , USA
Rear Admiral C . M. Cooke, J r . , USN
F i e l d Marshal S i r John D i l l
Mountbat t e n
L t . General S i r H a s t i n g s L. Ismay
SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r 'V. Dykes
183
0. S . SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
COMBINED STRATEGY
These i n c l u d e the
He s a i d t h a t when h e t o o k o f f i c e a s Commander-in-Chief of t h e
United S t a t e s F l e e t on December 30, 1941, he immediately s e n t a d i s p a t c h
t o t h e Commander-in-Chief
of t h e P a c i f i c F l e e t s t a t i n g t h a t h i s mission
ADMIRAL KING s t a t e d t h a t he f e l t t h e P h i l i p p i n e s s h o u l d be o u r
o b j e c t i v e r a t h e r t h a n t h e N e t h e r l a n d s E a s t I n d i e s , The P h i l i p p i n e s could
be c a p t u r e d by a f l a n k a c t i o n whereas t h e c a p t u r e o f t h e N e t h e r l a n d s
East I n d i e s must of n e c e s s i t y b e t h e r e s u l t o f a f r o n t a l a t t a c k
The most
of i t s c o u r s e ; and t h i r d , t h e n o r t h e r n r o u t e t h r o u g h t h e A l e u t i a n s t o
185
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
t h e n o r t h e r n t i p o f t h e I s l a n d of Luzon. The n o r t h e r n r o u t e would include
establishing a base i n
t h e n o r t h w e s t e r n M a r s h a l l I s l a n d s and t h e n pro
ADMIRAL K I N G t h e n s a i d t h a t t h e i d e a o f u t i l i z i n g 30 p e r c e n t of
t h e United Nations war e f f o r t a g a i n s t Japan was a concept r a t h e r t h a n an
a r i t h m e t i c a l c o m p u t a t i o n . He had caused s t u d i e s t o b e made o f how much
shipping"
ADMIRAL K I N G p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e r o u t e f o r a na'rall
e f f o r t against Siberia is secure
H e s a i d t h a t he had r e c e n t l y had a
186
S SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
survey made of ParamushirOIsland, t h e n o r t h e r n m o s t of t h e K u r i l e I s l a n d s .
T h i s r e v e a l e d t h a t i t would be u n s a t i s f a c t o r y a s a b a s e f o r o p e r a t i n g
against Japan.
I t would be d e s i r a b l e t o have t h e c o o p e r a t i o n o f t h e R u s s i a n s
i n t h i s r e s p e c t b u t t h e r e has been d i f f i c u l t y i n o b t a i n i n g any informa
t i o n from them. The b e s t means of o b t a i n i n g i n f o r m a t i o n s o f a r h a s been
by d i r e c t correspondence between t h e P r e s i d e n t and M r . S t a l i n .
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n r e v i e w e d t h e d e p l o y m e n t o f t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s t r o o p s i n a l l of t h e i s l a n d s of t h e P a c i f i c , g i v i n g t h e s t r e n g t h
of e a c h i n g r o u n d and a i r t r o o p s and i n a i r c r a f t . H e p o i n t e d o u t t h e
l o g i s t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of supplying these forces.
ADMIRAL K I N G t h e n gave t n e d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e Marine f o r c e s
which amount t o a p p r o x i m a t e l y 60,000 men i n t h e area from Midway t o t h e
South P a c i f i c I s l a n d s .
GENEXAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e l o g i s t i c a l r e q u i r e
ments i n t h e P a c i f i c , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' i n t e r e s t i n u n d e r t a k i n g a n
o p e r a t i o n t o open t h e Burma Roau c o u l d b e w e l l u n d e r s t o o d . G e n e r a l
S t i l w e l l and F i e l d Uarshal Wave11 would have t o determine t,he l o g i s t i c a l
requirements of s u c h an o p e r a t i o n b u t , i n any e v e n t , t h e y would be minor
i n comparison t o the requirements i n t h e Operation TORCH
Any s u c c e s s i n
187
S SECRET
B R l T I S H MOST S E C R E T
GENERAL ARNOLD t,hen d i s c u s s e d t h e United S t a t e s e f f o r t s t o o b t a i n
information concerning Hussia
H e s t a t e d t h a t when theGermans t h r e a t e n e d
t o c a p t u r e t h e Caucasus, t h e R u s s i a n s began t o be f e a r f u l t h a t t h e s u p p l y
o f a i r p l a n e s from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s v i a t h e s o u t h e r n r o u t e would be
e l i m i n a t e d , They, t h e r e f o r e , r e q u e s t e d t h e United S t a t e s t o s t a r t d e l i v
e r y of a i r p l a n e s from A l a s k a a t o n c e , T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a g r e e d t o t h i s
p r o v i d i n g t h e R u s s i a n s would d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e r e were s u f f i c i e n t
f a c i l i t i e s a v a i l a b l e t o make p o s s i b l e t h e d e l i v e r y of one hundred and
f i f t y p l a n e s a month
The R u s s i a n s d i d n o t have t h e s e f a c i l i t i e s a t t h e
as p o s s i b l e inasmuch a s i t e l i m i n a t e s f i f t y h o u r s o f f l y i n g Lime on t h e
journey
GENERAL ARNOLD t h e n s t a t e d that t h e U . S.. C h i e f s o f S t a f f were
S t a l i n had f i n a l l y g i v e n General
Mr
S t a l i n had r e j e c t e d t h i s o f f e r
and s a i d h e would
188
U S SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n d e s c r i b e d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s which t h e u n i t e d
S t a t e s C n i e f s of S t a f f had had c o n c e r n i n g s e n d i n g a i r u n i t s t o t h e
C a u c a s u s , The H u s s i a n s had s t a t e d d e f i n i t e l y t h a t t h e y d i d n o t d e s i r e
u n i t s b u t a i r p l a n e s o n l y . T h e r e had b e e n some s e n t i m e n t a m o n g t h e u n i t
ed S t a t e s a u t h o r i t i e s t o f u r n i s h s u f f i c i e n t a i r p l a n e s f o r t n e purpose of
p l a c a t i n g Mr. S t a l i n , However, t o do s o , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e c a s e of heavy
bombers, would n e c e s s i t a t e i m m o b i l i z i n g t h e s e a i r p l a n e s f o r as much as
General Marshall s t a t e d t h a t
They i n v a r i a b l y s t a t e ; however,
t h a t t h e y have run o u t
189
He a d d e d t h a t u n i t e d S t a t e s
U S SECRET
B R I T I S E UOST SECRET
t r o o p s , b o t h i n t h i s and t h e l a s t war, appeared t o " v e t e r a n i z e " quickly
i n the f i e l d . The young o f f i c e r s andnon-commissioned o f f i c e r s had exhib
i t e d a remarkable f a c i l i t y f o r e l i m i n a t i n g e r r o r s r a p i d l y . We may expect
t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s t o i n c r e a s e enormously i n a s h o r t t i m e .
H e t h o u g h t w e were p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r t u n a t e i n t h e d e a d l y char
a c t e r of the P a c i f i c f i g h t , s i n c e our f o r c e s which have been engaged i n
t h e P a c i f i c have become imbued w i t h t h e i d e a t h a t i t i s " k i l l or be
k i l l e d " ; and t h i s a t t i t u d e g i v e s promise of tremendous power f o r f u t u r e
o p e r a t i o n s . T h e s t a f f s a r e sound and t h e e n g i n e e r s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y
U. S.,SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
was c l e a r t h a t t h e y had a l r e a d y been pushed back f u r t h e r t h a n t h e y c a r e d
t o go. R e a l s o i n q u i r e d whether t h e U. S . C h i e f s o f S t a f f t h o u g h t i t
would be p o s s i b l e t o g a i n a d e c i s i o n by a i r bombardment of J a p a n a l o n e .
GENERAL ARNOLD p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e A l l i e d f o r c e s i n t h e South
west P a c i f i c were now o p e r a t i n g from t h e t , i p s of two narrow s a l i e n t s .
T h e Japanese had g r e a t e r width i n t h e i r l i n e and could t h e r e f o r e o p e r a t e
on a larger s c a l e t h a n t h e f o r c e s which we could b r i n g t o b e a r .
ADMIRAL K I N G p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i n a d d i t i o n t o opening t h e s u p p l y
r o u t e t o China, RAVENOUS would g a i n t h e t e r r i t o r y n e c e s s a r y t o s e c u r e
t h e a i r s u p p l y r o u t e from I n d i a t o C h i n a ,
SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed t h a t i t would be w e l l worth w h i l e t a k i n g
a r i s k on RAVENOUS s i n c e i t would n o t c u t a c r o s s t h e main e f f o r t a g a i n s t
Germany, whereas ANAKIM would.
191
SECRET
B R I T I S B MOST SECRET
S
a s m a l l r e s i d u a l t o n n a g e f o r s u p p l i e s t o C h i n a would p r o b a b l y be f a r
g r e a t e r t h a n could be t r a n s p o r t e d by a i r . Twelve bombers i n China under
G e n e r a l Chennault had done wonderful work; and i f he had even 5 0 , the
r e s u l t s they might a c h i e v e w o u l d b e v e r y g r e a t . For t h i s r e a s o n t h e U . S.
C h i e f s of S t a f f
192
SECRET
BPI7 1 S r i MOST S E C Q E T
i l l - . f o r t u n e t h e r e v e r s e might have t a k e n p l a c e ; and i n t h a t c a s e , t h e
whole o f t h e w e s t c o a s t of America would have b e e n open t o J a p a n e s e
carrier-borne attack
T h e J a p a n e s e t e r r i t o r i e s were n o t n e a r l y so v u l
nerable i n t h i s r e s p e c t
K1F.i: s a i d t h a t t h e 2apanese might w e l l s t r i k e a g a i n a t
AT'JiIkBL
r.
?Cb.
wit11
Field
I t was c e r t a i n l y f o r t u n a t e t , h a t l o s s e s s u s t a i n e d i n
They were l e s s e f f i -
The q u i c k e s t way of r e c a p
t u r i n g t h e P h i l i p p i n e s would be t o d e f e a t Germany
193
I t seemed t o him t h a t
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
t h e c o r r e c t s t r a t e g y was t o e s t a b l i s h a l i n e where w e had b e t t e r a i r
f a c i l i t i e s t h a n t h e J a p a n e s e and t h e n t o a l l o w them t o wear o u t t h e i r
He f e l t i t
s u g g e s t e d would c e r t a i n l y s u f f i c e f o r t h e r e c a p t u r e of Rabaul.
A f t e r some f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n ,
THE COMMITTEE:
Agreed t o d i r e c t t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s to r e p o r t , on t h e
wish t o e s t a b l i s h i n t h e E a s t e r n T h e a t e r ( i - e - , t h e P a c i f i c and
that situation,
194
U. S. SECRET
BRITISK MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
57th Meeting
PRESENT
General G . C .
Marshall, USA
Admiral of t h e F l e e t S i r Dudley
Pound
A i r Chief Marshal S i r Charles
F. A. P o r t a l
L t . General H.
H,
Arnold, USA
F i e l d Marshal S i r John D i l l
Vice Admiral t h e Lord Louis
Mountbat t e n
Lt.. General S i r Hastings L
Captain C
Brigadier G
Lambe, RN
Stewart
A i r Commodore W . E l l i o t
SECRETARIAT
Brigadier V
Rrig
General J
Dyke-
i3
195
Deane,
USA
Ismay
U. S - S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
1 . AA'TISUEMAXIt!E WARFARE.
SIR DLDLEY Wm!D s a i d t h a t t h e four p o i n t s a t which t h e U-boats
c o u l d be a t t a c k e d were t h e f a c t o r i e s and b u i l d i n g y a r d s , t h e o p e r a t i n g
b a s e s , t h e r o u t e s t o t h e i r h u n t i n g g r o u n d s , a n d t h e h u n t i n g grounds
themselves. He had s e n t f o r ck t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n concerning the construe
t i o n b o t t l e n e c k s . As r e g a r d s t h e o p e r a t i n g b a s e s , t h e B r i t i s h Government
had a g r e e d t o i n t e n s i f y a i r a t t a c k s on F r e n c h p o r t s which were used as
b a s e s . The only q u e s t i o n now a t i s s u e was t h a t o f g i v i n g some warning t o
t h e French i n h a b i t a n t s .
At,tacks on t h e 11-boats on passage t o the h u n t i n g grounds had been
s u c c e s s f u l f o r a time and c o n s i d e r a b l e damage and d e l a y had been i n f l i c t e d
on them as l o n g a s t h e C-boats d i d not know when t h e a i r c r a f t , were d e t e c t
i n g them w i t h t h e i r A . S . V .
l i g h t , Ten-centimeter A . S . V ' s .
o u t s i d e t h e range of t h e
and t h e convoys b r i n g i n g 0 1 1
196
U S SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
f o r f o u r o r f i v e months, d u r i n g w h i c h a n a c u t e s h o r t a g e w a s f e l t . t h e o n l y
r e l i e f d u r i n g s u c h a p e r i o d would be t h e i n t a k e from new c o n s t r u c t i o n .
SIR CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t t h e a i r had proved t h e most e f f e c
t i v e weapon a g a i n s t t h e U-boat.
U-Boats damaged )
U-Boats sunk
8
by a i r c r a f t
24
U-Boats damaged )
December
by o t h e r means
A i r p a t r o l s over t h e U-boat
r o u t e s t o t h e h u n t i n g grounds were
A f u r t h e r method of a t t a c k
A.S.V.
A c o n s i d e r a b l e number of C a t a l i n a s were b e i n g u s e d i n s p i t e of
I t w a s e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r
t h e whole of t h e A t l a n t i c a n d B r i t i s h Home Waters was between 120 and 135
long range bombers N e w d e v i c e s were b e i n g d e v e l o p e d t o c o m b a t t h e German
l i s t e n i n g a p p a r a t u s which d e t e c t e d t h e presence of A , S . V . a i r c r a f t
these disadvantages
197
U. S. S E C R E T
B R I T I S K <YOST SECRET
r a n g e bombers f o r emergency c a l l s when convoys were a c t u a l l y attacked.
The C a t a l i n a had a v e r y l o n g endurance and c o u l d b e k e p t i n t h e air for
twenty-four
m a x i m u m u s e of f l y i n g b o a t s .
S I Z CHARLES F'OZTAL asked whether t h e a i r c r a f t i n t h e P a c i f i c , de
and i t wasg t h e r e f o r e ,
If t h e J a p a n e s e s u b m a r i n e s
t o t a l r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e , h o w e v e r , were i n s u f f i c i e n t
for security
a l l q u a r t e r s . The a c u t e s h o r t a g e of e s c o r t v e s s e l s was of c o u r s e f u l l y
recognized.
SIR DUDLEY POUND p o i n t e d o u t t h a t where l o n g r a n g e s h o r e based
a i r c r a f t c o u l d n o t b e employed t o cover t h e w h o l e p a s s a g e , a s f o r example
i n t h e d i r e c t convoys from t h e Dutch West I n d i e s t o t h e United Kingdom,
a u x i l i a r y a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s had t o be u s e d w i t h t h e convoys t h e m s e l v e s ,
On t h e n o r t h e r n r o u t e i t was hoped t o e s t a b l i s h b a s e s f o r l o n g r a n g e
SECRET
B R I T I S B MOYT SECRET
S
THE COMMIlTEE.'
Agreed t o d i r e c t t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s t o examine and r e
p o r t t h e minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s of e s c o r t s ( i n c l u d i n g a i r c r a f t
c a r r i e r s ) and a i r c r a f t which s h o u l d be devoted t o t h e s e c u r i t y
of t h e s e a communications o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s d u r i n g 1943.
(GENERAL EISENHOWER e n t e r e d t h e M e e t i n g a t t h i s p o i n t . )
2,.
a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e - . O p e r a t i o n s i n December had b e e n h e l d up by b a d
w e a t h e r and mud which r e s t r i c t e d t h e u s e o f v e h i c l e s e n t i r e l y t o t h e
r o a d s . , S i n c e t h i s c h e c k e v e r y e f f o r t had b e e n m a d e t o b u i l d up f o r an
a t t a c k i n t h e North b y i n c r e a s i n g our a i r power, improving t h e communi
c a t i o n s t o t h e f r o n t a n d r e . e q u i p p i n g t h e 6 t h Armored D i v i s i o n w i t h
Sherman Tanks. By t h e end o f December, however, i t was c l e a r t h a t t h e
weather c o n d i t i o n s would compel postponement o f a n y a t t a c k f o r a c o n s i d e r ,
a b l e t i m e , A t t e n t i o n had t h e n b e e n d i r e c t e d t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a n
a t t a c k f u r t h e r t o t h e s o u t h where ground c o n d i t i o n s were b e t t e r . . For t h i s
purpose f o r c e s composed o f t h e 1st U , S , Armored D i v i s i o n and two U.. S Regimental Combat teams w i t h A n t i - A i r c r a f t and A n t i ,Tank U n i t s were b e i n g
c o n c e n t r a t e d , A t f i r s t o p e r a t i o n s on t h e r i g h t f l a n k had been looked upon
p r i m a r i l y a s a d i v e r s i o n , b u t i t now seemed p r o b a b l e t h a t i t would be
p o s s i b l e t o advance on Sfax and h o l d i t with i n f a n t r y w h i l e withdrawing
199
3. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
11.
it
S. Armored D i v i s i o n was k e p t f o r
c o u n t e r a t t a c k , he f e l t t h a t he c o u l d d e a l w i t h any t h r e a t t o t h e Sfax
f o r c e . Ile hoped, however, t o h e a b l e t o d i s c u s s t h e whole problem w i t h
General Alexander and t o make any n e c e s s a r y a d j u s t m e n t s i n t h e p l a n on
the latter's arrival.
S I X a A N L1::OOKE
p o i n t e d o u t t h a t a f t e r twomonths o f "an a c t i v e
U. S. SECRET
in
The
201
U S. SECRET
SPITISK MOST SECFET
t o a b o u t 2,200 t o n s b u t w i t h a d d i t i o n a l r o l l i n g s t o c k and l o c o m o t i v e s
which were b e i n g s e n t from t h e l l n i t e d S t a t e s , i t w a s hoped t o i n c r e a s e
t h i s t o 4 , 4 0 0 . From Casablanca t o Oran the d a i l y tonnage was o n l y about
900. P o r t c l e a r a n c e was improving. A t Oran i t averaged 5,000 t o n s a day.
A i r d e f e n s e o f t h e p o r t s was b e i n g s t e a d i l y improved. A l l a v a i l a b l e
F r e n c h a n t i a i r c r a f t weapons h a d b e e n b r o u g h t i n t o a c t i o n and n i g h t
f i g h t e r s had been s e n t from t h e United Kingdom. Radar had been i n s t a l l e d
t o c o v e r t h e s t r e t c h from Bone t o A l g i e r s and some had a l s o been provided
Approximately 2,000 t o n s o f s t e e l m a t t i n g w e r e r e q u i r e d
U. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S H WOST S E C R E T
every e f f o r t t o b u i l d i n g up i n t h e United Kingdom f o r a n i n v a s i o n of t h e
North of France a t t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e moment. T h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of
S t a f f had examined t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s and c a l c u l a t e d t h a t 21 t o 23 d i v i
s i o n s c o u l d be made a v a i l a b l e for t h i s purpose by September 1 5 t h . I t had
a t f i r s t been thought t h a t p o r t a n d r a i l w a y c a p a c i t y wouldbe t h e l i m i t i n g
f a c t o r on t h e build-up of American t r o o p s ' expansion b u t i t looked as i f
t h e s e d i f f i c u l t i d s could be overcome i f t h e expansion o f r e c e i v i n g d e p o t s
f o r s u p p l i e s were pushed a h e a d . As a b a s i s o f c a l c u l a t i o n , a monthly
movement o f 120 merchant v e s s e l s from t h e U . K. t o t h e U.S.A. had been
t a k e n , t h e corresponding t r o o p l i f t b e i n g 120,000. T h i s would a l l o w 9 t o
12 U. S . d i v i s i o n s t o be t r a n s p o r t e d t o t h e U. K. by September 1st. T h e
would r e q u i r e a much l a r g e r f o r c e , s a y , a t l e a s t 1 5 d i v i s i o n s
t o hold t h e 150 k i l o m e t e r s of f r o n t .
One o f t h e o b j e c t i o n s t o o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e North o f France
was t h e e x c e l l e n t r a i l w a y c o n n e c t i o n s a c r o s s Europe which would e n a b l e
t h e Germans r a p i d l y t o r e i n f o r c e t h e invaded area. Moreover, i t would
n o t b e p o s s i b l e t o b e g i n t h e o p e r a t i o n u n t i l t h e e a r l y autumn and no
s u p p o r t would t h e r e f o r e be g i v e n t o R u s s i a throughout t h e summer. T h l s
l a s t f a c t o r seemed t o be t h e p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i o n . A l a n d i n v a s i o n on a
small s c a l e would have l i t t l e more t h a n a l o c a l e f f e c t e x c e p t f o r t h e
a i r f i g h t i n g which would i n e v i t a b l y ensue from i t .
The o t h e r b r o a d p o s s i b i l i t y was t o m a i n t a i n a c t i v i t y i n t h e
Mediterranean while building, up themaximum a i r o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t Germany
from t h e U . K. and p u t t i n g i n as many t r o o p s as c o u l d b e s p a r e d w i t h a
View
t o u n d e r t a k i n g a c o m p a r a t i v e l y small o p e r a t i o n s u c h a s s e i z i n g
Cherbourg P e n i n s u l a .
203
U. S. S E C F E T
BilITISH WOST S E C Y E T
The Mediterranean o f f e r e d many c h o i c e s : S a r d i n i a , S i c i l y , Crete,
and t h e Dodecanese. Our amphibious power enabled us t o t h r e a t e n a l l these
p o i n t s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y and t h e r e b y c a u s e t h e Germans t o d i s p e r s e t h e i r
f o r c e s . Unless t h e y were t o r i s k t h e l o s s of t h e s e i s l a n d s , t h e y would
be compelled t o r e i n f o r c e them a s w e l l as t h e c o a s t s of I t a l y , Greece,
and F r a n c e . If I t a l y c o u l d b e knocked o u t , Germany would be i n v o l v e d i n
l a r g e new commitments i n a n a t t e m p t t o b o l s t e r h e r up and r e p l a c i n g
I t a l i a n t r o o p s i n t h e Balkans. Other German s a t e l l i t e s might a l s o f a l l
o u t . The B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f c o n s i d e r e d t h a t our b e s t p o l i c y would
be t o t h r e a t e n Germany everywhere i n t h e Mediterranean, t o t r y t o knock
o u t I t a l y , and t o b r i n g i n Turkey on o u r s i d e . I t was n o t , of c o u r s e ,
c e r t a i n t h a t we could b r i n g Turkey i n b u t by a combination of inducements
and p r e s s u r e we might be s u c c e s s f u l . W i t h Turkey a s a b a s e , we c o u l d
a t t a c k t h e Rumanian o i l f i e l d s and open u p t h e B l a c k Sea Route t o Russia.
E a s t a g a i n s t t h e Dodecanese.
One of t h e g r e a t advantages of a d o p t i n g t h e J i e d i t e r r a n e a n p o l i c y
ADMIRAL K I N G p o i n t e d o u t t h a t themore t r o o p s t h a t w e c o n c e n t r a t e d
i n t h e Mediterranean, t h e more l i k e l y Germany was t o move i n t o Spain i n
o r d e r t o c u t our l i n e of communications through t h e s t r a i t s of G i b r a l t a r .
An i n v a s i o n of Northern France such a s t h e s e i z u r e of t h e Brest P e n i n s u l a
would n o t n e a r l y s o l i k e l y p r e c i p i t a t e s u c h an e v e n t . H e doubted whether
204
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
ll
on us f o r many of t h e n e c e s s i t i e s o f l i f e
Even i f t h e Germans d i d go i n ,
we should be b e t t e r a b l e t o a f f o r d a i r c r a f t f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f s h i p p i n g
through t h e S t r a i t s of G i b r a l t a r t h a n c o u l d t h e Germans f o r i t s a t t a c k
I t would be much more advantageous f o r the Germans i f w e b u i l t up a g a i n s t
France and l e f t t h e Mediterranean alone
They would t h e n he a b l e t o w i t h
U S SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
(b) The c a p t u r e of S a r d i n i a could be undertaken i n about May,
i.e
t h r e e months earlier t h a n S i c i l y A i r cover f o r t h e Sardinia
a h i g h e r p e r c e n t a g e of
loss,^
H e u n d e r s t o o d , however, t h a t t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s e s t i m a t e was 18.
206
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
U. S .
C.C.S.
5 8 t h Meeting
PRESENT
G e n e r a l S i r Alan F. Brooke
A d m i r a l o f t h e F l e e t S i r Dudlej
Pound
A i r Chief Marshal S i r C h a r l e s
F. A. P o r t a l
G e n e r a l C. C. h a r s h a l l , USA
Admiral E . J . King, USN
L t . lienera1 H.
H.
A r n o l d , USA
L t . G e n e r a l B . B. S o m e r v e l l , USA
Rear Admiral C. 111. Cooke, Jr.,USN
(For f i r s t h a l f of meeting)
B r i g . G e n e r a l A. C. Wedemeyer,USA
(For f i r s t h a l f o f m e e t i n g )
F i e l d Marshal S i r John D i l l
Vice Admiral t h e L o r d L o u i s
h!ountbat t e n
L t . G e n e r a l S i r H a s t i n g s L.
Major G e n e r a l J . N .
Jsrnay
Kennedy
A i r V i c e M a r s h a l J . C. S l e s s o r
Colonel J. E. S m a r t , USA
( F o r f i r s t h a l f of m e e t i n g )
Commander R . E . L i b b y , USN
SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r V. D y k e s
B r i g . G e n e r a l J . H . Deane, USA
207
U. S . S E C R E T
B e I T I S K MOST S E C R E T
1.
Of
f u e l f o r t h e i r v e h i c l e s and a c e r t a i n amount o f r e o r g a n i z i n g w i l l be
n e c e s s a r y . I t i s p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e 8 t h Army w i l l n o t be a b l e t o a t t a c k
Rommel's f o r c e s o n t h e Mareth l i n e p r i o r t o February 1 5 t h . Thus they
W i l l
be t o o l a t e t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e of t h e f a v o r a b l e s i t u a t i o n c r e a t e d by
General Eisenhower's a t t a c k on Sfax and consequently Rommel w i l l be free
c a r r y i n g o u t t h e BOLERO-ROUNDUP p l a n s . Aid t o R u s s i a i s r e g a r d e d as
being of paramount importance in order t o assist t h e Russian Army t o ab
s o r b t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e German ground and a i r f o r c e s .
H e s a i d w e must d e v i s e means t o e n a b l e R u s s i a t o c o n t i n u e aggres
s i v e l y through 1943 by p r o v i d i n g them w i t h s u p p l i e s . The amount of such
s u p p l i e s and t h e methods of d e l i v e r i n g them must be determined upon. The
208
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B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
U. S
( a ) W r e n o t t h e E a s t - b e s t canmunications i n n o r t h e r n Europe,
which t h e B r i t i s h c o n s i d e r c a p a b l e of moving s e v e n d i v i s i o n s
e v e r y t w e l v e days, s u b j e c t t o s e v e r e i n t e r f e r e n c e by heavy a i r
a t t a c k s from E n g l a n d ?
@) If t h e Mediterranean o p e r a t i o n s were undertaken and t h e r e
A f i f t y or s e v e n t y - f i v e p e r c e n t l o s s should be a n t i c i
G e n e r a l Eisenhower a l s o t h o u g h t t h a t o p e r a t i o n s on t h e
209
li S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S B MOST SECRET
a n d t o s e c u r e t h e u s e of h e r a i r f i e l d s f o r bombing o p e r a t i o n s by t h e
United Nations..
on seizing opportunities.
GENERAL &FOLD
U. S SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
i s s u e from t h e main p l o t a c t s as a " s u c t i o n pump." H e s t a t e d t h a t t h e
o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t S i c i l y appeared t o b e advantageous because of t h e
e x c e s s number of t r o o p s i n North A f r i c a b r o u g h t a b o u t by t h e s p l e n d i d
e f f o r t s of t h e B r i t i s h 8 t h Army. However, b e f o r e d e c i d i n g t o u n d e r t a k e
such an o p e r a s i o n , he t h o u g h t i t n e c e s s a r y t o d e t e r m i n e j u s t what p a r t
i t would p l a y i n t h e o v e r - a l l s t r a t e g i c p l a n .
S I E ALAK DEOOKE s a i d t h a t on t h e C o n t i n e n t R u s s i a is t h e o n l y
a l l y h a v i n g l a r g e l a n d f o r c e s i n a c t i o n . Any e f f o r t of t h e o t h e r a l l i e s
must n e c e s s a r i l y b e so small as t o br unimportant i n t h e o v e r - a l l p i c t u r e
He f e l t t h a t ground o p e r a t i o n s by t h e rlnited S t a t e s and t h e I h i t e d King
dom would n o t e x e r t any g r e a t i n f l u e n c e u n t i l t h e r e were d e f i n i t e s i g n s
t h a t Germany was weakening.
GENERAL MAPSHALL s t a t e d t h a t i t was d e s i r a b l e t o f o r c e t h e enemy
d i v i s i o n s i n France, son13
211
U S, SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
Our p o l i c y s h o u l d be t o f o r c e I t a l y o u t of t h e war a n d b r i n g
Turkey i n . I f I t a l y were o u t o f t h e war, Germany wouldbe f o r c e d t o occupy
t h a t c o u n t r y w i t h a c o n s i d e r a b l e number of d i v i s i o n s and a l s o would be
f o r c e d t o r e p l a c e I t a l i a n d i v i s i o n s i n o t h e r A x i s occupied c o u n t r i e s
SUCII
corn.^.
p l e t e l y , We s h o u l d b e v e r y c a r e f u l of a c c e p t i n g any i n v i t a t i o n t o s u p p o r t
an a n t i - F a s c i s t
i n s u r r e c t i o n . To do s o might o n l y immobilize a c o n s i d e r
a b l e f o r c e t o no u s e f u l p u r p o s e ,
SIR ALAN BROOKE d i d n o t f e e l t h a t a i r o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e
German and F r e n c h r a i l w a y s y s t e m s i n t h e n o r t h would be p a r t i c u l a r l y
212
U, S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
SIR CHARLES WRTAL referred t o t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t we m i g h t be
a b l e t o o f f s e t i n f e r i o r i t y i n l a n d f o r c e s i n N o r t h e r n F r a n c e by t h e
g r e a t l y s u p e r i o r a i r f o r c e s which c o u l d b e o p e r a t e d from t h e United King
dom. So f a r as t h e B r e s t P e n i n s u l a was c o n c e r n e d , no f i g h t e r s u p p o r t
could be g i v e n from t h e United Kingdom, s i n c e i t was o u t of range. The
Cherbourg P e n i n s u l a was b e t t e r from t h i s p o i n t of view and o f f e r e d some
p o s s i b i l i t i e s as a p r e l i m i n a r y o p e r a t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , w i t h t h e l i m i t e d
a i r f a c i l i t i e s i n t h e P e n i n s u l a we should probably f i n d o u r s e l v e s pinned
down a t t h e neck o f t h e P e n i n s u l a by ground f o r c e s whose s u p e r i o r i t y we
s h o u l d be u n a b l e t o o f f s e t by t h e use o f a i r . We s h o u l d c e r t a i n l y be
opposed by s t r o n g German a i r f o r c e s there. Once w e were committed i n
Northern France t h e Germans would q u i c k l y b r i n g up t h e i r a i r f o r c e s from
t h e Mediterranean, r e a l i z i n g t h a t w e c o u l d n o t u n d e r t a k e amphibious opera
t i o n s on a c o n s i d e r a b l e s c a l e b o t h a c r o s s t h e channel and i n t h e Medi
t e r r a n e a n . On t h e o t h e r hand, by t h r e a t e n i n g i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n we
s h o u l d c a u s e a f a r g r e a t e r d i s p e r s i o n of German a i r f o r c e s .
hypot h e s e s :
Case A
I t a l y f i g h t i n g and Germany c o n t i n u i n g t h e o f f e n s i v e i n
Case B
Case C
Caucasia
A s f o r A, b u t I t a l y knocked o u t .
I t a l y f i g h t i n g and Germany holding a s h o r t e n e d l i n e i n
Case D
R u s s i a by w i t h d r a w i n g t o Rostov.
A s for C, but I t a l y not fighting.
2 14
U S
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
German d e f i c i e n c i e s i n June 1943 were c a l c u l a t e d as follows:
Deficiencies i n
Deficiencies i n
F i r s t Line A i r c r a f t
Divisions
1700
2250
34
54
700
1250
30
Case
A
Germany's w i l l t o f i g h t depended l a r g e l y on h e r c o n f i d e n c e i n
u l t i m a t e s u c c e s s . I f we and t h e h u s s i a n s began t o s c o r e c o n t i n u a l suc
c e s s e s a g a i n s t Germany, which s h e c o u l d n o t d e f e a t owing t o h e r l a c k of
means, s h e would b e g i n t o r e a l i z e t h a t t h e p r o s p e c t s were h o p e l e s s . She
might be faced w i t h t h e dilemna of withdrawing a l l her t r o o p s from France
and c o n c e n t r a t i n g i n t h e E a s t a g a i n s t R u s s i a . The way t o d e f e a t Germany,
t h e r e f o r e , seemed t o be t o t a k e e v e r y chance o f a t t a c k i n g h e r o i l s u p
p l i e s ; t o i n c r e a s e t h e a i r bombardment of Germany i t s e l f w i t h i t s i n e v i
t a b l e r e s u l t s on German morale, a n d o n i n d u s t r i a l c a p a c i t y and i t s e f f e c t
i n producing heavy c a s u a l t i e s i n her p o p u l a t i o n and g r e a t m i s e r y by t h e
d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e i r d w e l l i n g s . If we c o u l d achieve as well a s e r i e s o f
s u c c e s s e s , even though t h e s e might b e c o m p a r a t i v e l y small i n e x t e n t , i t
seemed f a i r l y c e r t a i n t h a t a p o i n t would be r e a c h e d a t which Germany
would s u d d e n l y c r a c k . No one, however, c o u l d s a y p r e c i s e l y when o r how
t h e c o l l a p s e would come.
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d h e u n d e r s t o o d t h e g e n e r a l concept o f t h e B r i t i s h
C h i e f s o f S t a f f was t o make u s e o f R u s s i a ' s g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n and
h e r r e s e r v e s of manpower t o make t h e m a i n e f f o r t on l a n d a g a i n s t Germany
and t o s u p p o r t R u s s i a by d i v e r t i n g a s many German f o r c e s as p o s s i b l e
from t h e E a s t e r n f r o n t . T h i s r a i s e d t h e q u e s t i o n as t o whether w e s h o u l d
not g i v e R u s s i a l a r g e r s u p p l i e s of equipment
Once t h e North A f r i c a n c o a s t had been c l e a r e d i t seemed t h a t w e
s h o u l d have a s u r p l u s of t r o o p s i n North A f r i c a a n d t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n
whom we could n o t r e a d i l y move elsewhere
I t seemed t h e r e f o r e economical
'Phc
The c h i e f b o t t l e
21s
ti. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
seemed t o be worth examining though they would almost i n e v i t a b l y l e a d t o
t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f c a l c u l a t e d c o u l d b e made a v a i l a b l e by Sep
tember 1 5 t h f o r o p e r a t i o n s from t h e United Kingdom i n t o Northern France
were:
21-24 if t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n were c l o s e d down,
16-18 i f M e d i t e r r a n e a n o p e r a t i o n s were u n d e r t a k e n -
a i r d e f e n s e o f t h e p o r t s should p r e s e n t n o p a r t i c u l a r d i f f i c u l t y . W
e were
a b l e t o p u t large s h i p s i n t o Malta which was v e r y exposed t o air a t t a c k .
216
U,. S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
The number of enemy a i r f i e l d s i n t h e t o e of I t a l y was s m a l l , and f i g h t e r s
on t h e S i c i l i a n airdromes s h o u l d b e a b l e t o d e a l w i t h d i v e bombers.
f e w motor v e h i c l e s would b e t a k e n .
( b ) A g r o u p i n t h e Western M e d i t e r r a n e a n s u f f i c i e n t t o l i f t
1 b r i g a d e group complete.
( c ) A similar g r o u p i n t h e E a s t e r n M e d i t e r r a n e a n .
(d) A group i n I n d i a s u f f i c i e n t t o t r a i n 1 b r i g a d e g r o u p , b u t
n o t enough t o l i f t t h e b r i g a d e g r o u p i f i t had t o u n d e r t a k e
actual operations.
(e) A n o v e r s e a a s s a u l t f o r c e , a s a s t r a t e g i c r e s e r v e , s u f f i
c i e n t t o l i f t 6 b r i g a d e g r o u p s . The p e r s o n n e l would b e c a r r i e d
i n combat l o a d e r s b u t t h e y c o u l d n o t a l l be p u t a s h o r e i n t h e
f i r s t f l i g h t as t h e s h i p s c o u l d n o t c a r r y s u f f i c i e n t l a n d i n g
c r a f t f o r the purpose.
Every a t t e m p t was b e i n g made t o o r g a n i z e l a n d i n g c r a f t b a s e s i n
s o as t o g i v e t h e maximum f l e x i b i l i t y and t h u s a l l o w f o r a
change of p l a n . The s w i t c h o v e r from ROUNDUP t o TORCH had c a u s e d g r e a t
the U. K.
and
n e c e s s i t a t e d c o n s i d e r a b l e change i n our i d e a s a b o u t l a n d i n g
l a t t e r 250 i n f a n t r y . He c a l c u l a t e d t h a t i f a l l t h e a v a i l a h l e l a n d i n g c r a f t
were c o n c e n t r a t e d i n North A f r i c a we s h o u l d b e a b l e t o l i f t a t o t a l of
some 80,000 men by A p r i l . Allowing f o r t h e u s e of 105-foot and 50-foot
217
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
c r a f t as w e l l ,
of a c r a c k i n Germany.
218
0. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
In s d d i t i o n , f o r t h e follow-up t r o o p s , a g r e a t number o f l a n d i n g b a r g e s
and s m a l l c o a s t i n g v e s s e l s were b e i n g p r e p a r e d . The spearhead w o u l d n o t b e
a f f e c t e d a t a l l by o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n and would always b e
kept i n t a c t . Any l a n d i n g c r a f t r e c o v e r e d from t h e l l e d i t e r r a n e a n would
t h e r e f o r e be i n t h e n a t u r e of a bonus.
ADhlIBAL K I N G s a i d t h a t t h e i n t e n d e d u s e of combat l o a d e r s f o r an
and L . C . I . ' s
I n r e s p e c t t o m i l i t a r y manpower,
t h e :Inited S t a t e s C h i e f s o f S t a f f s e t g r e a t s t o r e by O p e r a t i o n
219
5'. 5. S E C R E T
BRITISH MOST C T C R S T
JAVENOUS.
ill
the :[editerranem
wrongly d e c i d e d .
313 ALAX fi11OOI<Ii: i:xpre.ssed
t,:ie v i e w t,,int. wr s i i o i i l cl i l c ? i ! i i t e l )
c o u n t on r e e i r t , e r i n g t h e C o n t i n e n t i n 1 1 J M oti a l a r ~ es c a l c .
war. ? h e b e s t t h a t c o u l d b e h o p e d f o r was t o t a k e b r o a d d e c i s i o n s on
inajor q u e s t i o n s and t h e s e would always b e i n tlie uat,ure of romprimises.
0. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
F u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n t h e n followed on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a German
crack i n 1943.
S I E JOHN TILL f e l t t h a t there was q u i t e a p o s s i b i l i t y of b e a t i n g
Germany t h i s y e a r . We should t h e r e f o r e s t r a i n every nerve t,o e f f e c t t,tiis
s i n c e t h e sooiler we b e a t Germany t h e sooner we c o u l d t u r n o n .Tapan. we
I f we conceiitrat.er! e v e r y t l i i n g we c o u l d
OU
Germany
SOII!~
?!:
this
d i v i s i o n s would g e t u s
In
t,he V , i t e d ? t a t , e s and E r i t i s h
S SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
A f t e r some f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n ,
THE COMMITTEE:
c a l c u l a t e t h e e a r l i e s t d a t e by which t h e O p e r a t i o n c o u l d b e
mounted.
3,
SIIFPLIES. TO EIIFEIA.
F o r t h i s p u r p o s e a b o u t 12
TI.
as l a y t year, i t w a s w i t h i n t h e i r
power t o s t o p t h e PQ convoys a l t o g e t h e r .
6LNERAL SOMERVLLL r e v i e w e d t,he g e n e r a l p r o b l e m o f s u p p l y i n g
H:r;sia
The n o r t h e r n r o u t e vas a t p r e s e n t t h e b e s t s i n c e t h e t u r w r o u n d
was s h o r t e s t
months
The t u r n - r o u n d on t h e P e r s i a n G u l f r o u t e was a b o u t f i v e
i n t e r f e r e n c e by t h e J a p a n e s e .
222
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
EwLoY\!n;?' OF FrLbcii N F C Z
I? W C T H GT,ICA.
t r o o p s i n ? o r t h A f r i c a t o t h e maximum, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r g a r r i s o n work..
W e s h o u l d have t o p r o v i d e them v i t h a c o n s i d e r a b l e q u a n t i t y o f a n t i a i r - .
SECRET
R R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
U S SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
59th b:eeting
on Sunday
PRESENT
G e n e r a l C,. C . U a r s h a l l . IjSA
Admiral E
Lt
G e n e r a l S i r Alan 1.
K i n g , IJSN
G e n e r a l 11.
ti.
Brooke
Admiral o f t h e F l e e 1 S i r D i i d l e y
Pound
Air C h i e f h!arshal S j r C h a r l e s
F A ?orr,aP
A r n o l d , TjSA
Lt
C-?neral FJ1 R
Rear admiral^ C
Brig. General A .
Commander R . E.
Somervell
h:.
Cooke. J r
IJSA
P l e i d i : a r s h a l Sir -John D i l l
.VSN
C . Wedemeyer,:iSA
1.t
I , i h b y , CYg
Gerrrraj S i r i j a s t , i n g s 1 .
h l n j o r G e n e r a l .J
Kennedy
A i r Vlee Marsllal'l % J , C
SECRETARIAT
Brigadier V
Brig. General J
225
Dykes
FI
D e a n e , USA
Ismag
Sl.essor
S SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
1.
GENERAL MARSHALL p r o p o s e d d i s c u s s i n g a p a p e r p r e p a r e d by t h e
United S t a t e s J o i n t S t a f f P l a n n e r s r e g a r d i n g t h e f o r c e s needed i n t h e
P a c i f i c T h e a t e r i n 1943.
The H r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f s t a t e d t h a t t h e y would l i k e t o have
an o p p o r t u n i t y t o s t u d y t h e p a p e r b e f o r e d i s c u s s i n g i t i n d e t a i l .
w i t h r e g a r d t o o u r s t r a t e g y i n d e f e a t i n g Japan.,
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h e r e were two s t u m b l i n g b l o c k s t o
O p e r a t i o n A N A K I M i n 1943.. These a r e n a v a l c o v e r and t h e assemblage of
l a n d i n g c r a f t i n s u f f i c i e n t time t o p e r m i t adequate t r a i n i n g , He f e l t the
la.nd f o r c e s c o u l d b e found b u t t h a t i t , would b e d i f f i c u l t t o assemble
t ; i v l d n d i n g c r a f t , f o l l o w i n g O p e r a t i o n MISKY
it
Fle s a i d t h a t t h e r e wouldbe c o n s i d e r a b l e l a n d i n g c r a f t a v a i l a b l e
As
f o r t h e n a v a l f o r c e , he c o n s i d e r e d t h a t w e would o n l y n e e d c a r r i e r s ,
226
U. S . SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
Re d i d n o t f e e l t h a t b a t t l e s h i p s would b e
n e c e s s a r y if t h e J a p a n e s e were b e i n g c o n t a i n e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
d e s t r o y e r s , and c r u i s e r s .
F l e e t i n t h e P a c i f i c . T h e r e a l b o t t l e n e c k i s t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of s h i p p i n g
ADMIRAL X I N G s a i d t h a t he d e f i n i t e l y c o n s i d e r e d t h a t O p e r a t i o n
13y t h i s t i m e t h e d e s t r o y e r program
s h o u l d b e w e l l a l o n g , t h e s u b m a r i n e menace s h o u l d b e r e d u c e d , and t h e
s h i p p i n g s i t u a t i o n much improved t h r o u g h i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i o n and t h e
opening of t h e U e d i t e r r a n e a n
To p o s t p o n e t h e o p e r a t i o n i n 1943 would
r e s u l t i n n o t u n d e r t a k i n g i t f o r a l m o s t two y e a r s .
had s e n t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t i n which
h e r e g r e t t e d t h a t C h i n e s e t r o o p s would n o t b e a b l e t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t h e f e l t i t w a s a q u e s t i o n of c r e a t i n g
more t h a n p o s i t i o n s o f r e a d i n e s s a s f a r a s t h e J a p a n e s e a r e concerned.
227
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
W
e must m a i n t a i n t h e i n i t i a t i v e a g a i n s t them by o f f e n s i v e moves on our
p a r t . The p r e s e n t o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e S o u t h P a c i f i c a r e tremendously ex
p e n s i v e i n merchant v e s s e l s , n a v a l v e s s e l s , and e s c o r t s . The s i t u a t i o n
He s a i d t h a t he i s most a n x i o u s t o open t h e
In
t h i s c o n n e c t i o n he p o i n t e d t o t h e J a p a n e s e o p e r a t i o n i n t h e A l e u t i a n s
and t h e n e c e s s i t y of p r o t e c t i n g t h e Hawaiian-Midway
l i n e o f communica
because o f t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e s u l t s t o be achieved d e s p i t e t h e f a c t
t h a t i t i s a tremendously expensive operation.
ADMIRAL KING p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e demands i n t h e P a c i f i c a r e
enormous and c o n t i n u o u s . hiany o f t h e demands a r e made by A u s t r a l i a ,
228
U. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
a,Cominion of t h e B r i t i s h Commonwealth. A u s t r a l i a i s i n t h e a r e a of t h e
:;nited S t a t e s s t r a t e g i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and most o f o u r e f f o r t s have been
devoted t o p r o t e c t i n g i t s l i n e o f communications.
Re s a i d , i n this con
n e c t i o n , t h a t t h e p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n s a r e i n t e r l o c k e d and
t h e s e f a c t o r s must h e c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r when d e c i d i n g what o p e r a t i o n s
a r e t o h e u n d e r t a k e n . H e r e p e a t e d t h a t w e must p l a c e o u r s e l v e s i n p o s i
t i o n s of r e a d i n e s s f o r t h e t i m e when a l l t h e r e s o u r c e s o f t h e U n i t e d
Nations w i l l h e brought a g a i n s t Japan.
2.
ICELAND
GENERAL MARSHALL asked f o r t h e v i e w s of t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f
Our p o s s e s s i o n of i t made o u r
c o n t r o l of t h e Northern e x i t t o t h e A t l a n t i c more s e c u r e
I t seemed much
He p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e German s i t u a t i o n had g r e a t l y
changed d u r i n g t h e l a s t s i x months,
THE COMMITTEE:
Took n o t e t h a t t h e R r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f would p r e p a r e f o r t h e
i n f o r m a t i o n o f t h p U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f a memorandum
s e t t i n g o u t t h e i r v i e w s on t h e d e f e n s e o f I c e l a n d
229
U . S . SECRET
:Iiissians t o a t t a c k t h e 'erman
airdromes
Such a c t i o n , h o w e v e r , was o n l y of v e r y
a l t h o u g h asked t o do s o .
SIR CHAXES POSTAL s a i d t h a t t h e Zermans hadsome s e v e n a i r f i e l d s
bctween 3odo and Petsamo, a l l w e l l defended. The R u s s i a n s had t h r e e a i r
f i e l d s i n t h e :.!urmansk-Archangel
230
U.
S. SECRET
B R I T I S H nlOST SECRET
S I R ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f amphibious opera-.
t i o n s t o c a p t u r e tkie German a i r f i e l d s had been most e x h a u s t i v e l y examined
by t h e B r i t i s h S t a f f s , b u t t h e y h a d n o t b e e n f o u n d p r a c t i c a b l e , The
e f f e c t of TORCH, however, iiad been v e r y g r e a t i n ca.using w i t h d r a w a l s of
German a i r c r a f t from Sorway. T h e i r p r e s e n t s t r e n g t h was o n l y a b o u t 5 3
a i r c r a f t a l l t o l d , whereas t h e y had had up t o 300 p r e v i o u s l y .
S I R DUDLEY POUND p o i n t e d o u t t1:a.t one o f the g r e a t e s t , d i f f i c u l -
t i e s was t n a t t h e convoys were opeii t o a t t a c k f o r a b o u t t e n d a y s . T h i s
0. S.
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
60th Meeting
PRESENT
General G " C . V a r s h a l l , USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
F i e l d Marshal S i r John D i l l
L t , General S i r Hastings L
Major General J. N
Kennedy
A i r Vice Marshal J . C
Slessor
M. Stewart*
A i r Commodore W. E l l i o t t "
B r i g a d i e r 11- W. M . Macleode
L t . Colonel W. A. Howkins"
Brigadier G.
SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r V.
B r i g . General J . R.
Dykes
Deane, USA
**
,232
Ismay
U . S~ S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
1.
OPEFiATIONS I N BUFMA.
(C.C.S. 154)
A t t h e r e q u e s t of GENERAL MARSHAI
ADMIRAL COOKE d i s c u s s e
the
l a n d i n g c r a f t s i t u a t i o n i n r e g a r d t o O p e r a t i o n ANBXIM. He said the United
S t a t e s P l a n n e r s had e s t i m a t e d th? number of l a n d i n g c r a f t of t y p e s b u i l t
b y t h e United S t a t e s which would be r e q u i r e d f o r O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM would
be a v a i l a b l e i n Povember 1943. These r e q u i r e m e n t s can be made a v a i l a b l e
fpom United e t a t e s p r o d u c t i o n am! t h e y w i l l be i n a d d i t i o n t o a l l o c a t i o n s
of' l a n d i n g c r a f t a l r e a d y vade. There has been u n c e r t a i n t y a s t o what the
f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n . A s f a r as a i r power i s c o n c e r n e d , 18 s q u a d r o n s w i l l
be a v a i l a b l e and can be p r o v i d e d . The l a u d i n g c r a f t i.s tk' most t i c k l i s h
q u e s t i o n . Landing c r a f t t r a i n i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t s have now been p r o v i d e d
f o r two b r i g a d e g r o u p s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n and one i n I n d i a . T h e r e i s
a l s o a m o b i l e o v e r s e a s r e s e r v e b u t i t w i l l t a k e t h r e e months t o move
2 $3
U . S. S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
t h i s a f t e r i t c o m p l e t e s o p e r a t i o n s e i t h e r i n t h e Mediterranean o r oper
a t i o n s from t h e United Kingdom. He b e l i e v e d t h a t t h ? n e c e s s a r y shipping
c o u l d b e made a v a i l a b l e b u t t h a t t h e two main b o t t l e n e c k s were naval
c o v e r a g e and l a n d i n g c r a f t .
LDDMIRAL KIFG s t a t e d t h a t w e can c o u n t on s h i p p i n g some landing
o p e r a t i o n s c o u l d be c u r t a i l e d or lessened i n o r d e r to i n s u r e t h e success
o f ANAKIM i n view of i t s importance.
LOED LOUIS MOUNTEATTEN s a i d t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of s e c u r i n g
He d e s c r i b e d
Akyab as a l o c a l i t y i n no man's l a n d l i g h t l y g a r r i s o n e d by b o t h s i d e s .
He d e s c r i b e d O p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS as one t o improve t h e l i n e of
communications p r e p a r a t o r y t o O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM,
i n order t o drive i n
2 34
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
c o r p s i s t o s e c u r e b r i d g e h e a d s o v e r t h e Chindwin R i v e r and improve t h e
r o a d between Imphal and Kalewa, t o c o n n e c t i t w i t h the Chindwin R i v e r
f o r u s e as a s u p p l y l i n e t o t h e South., The Famgarh f o r c e was t o advance
on MyitKyna from Led0 which w i l l a l s o e n a b l e u s t o b u i l d a r o a d between
t h e s e two p o i n t s . T h i s road w i l l be of v a l u e i n s u p p l y i n g our f o r c e s i n
O p e r a t i o n AXAKIP and a l s o w i l l be used a s a c o n n e c t i n g road t o j o i n w i t h
t h e main Burma r o a d i n t o China.
the operation
would b e f e a s i b l e .
LORI) ILIUIC. %!OI~iFTELTE>:t,hen d i s c u s e d a g a i n t h e q u e s t i o n of land
i n g c r a f t w i t h p a r t i c u l a r reference t o paragraph
r e p l y t o a q u e s t i o n from 1:EY:EFAl. \:Ai:?liATL,
I)
(d) o f C.C.S.
154
In
he s t a t e d t h a t t h e a s s a u l t
pro^
If t h e y had
b e e n s o u s e d , t h e i r u s e i n Burma would be d e l a y e d f o r a p e r i o d of t h r e e
mont,hs f o l l o w i n g t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e o p e r a t i o n i n which they had been
e n g a g e d H e added, however,
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
(i
THE COMMITTEE:
(a) Agreed t h a t a l l p l a n s and n e c e s s a r y p r e p a r a t i o n s should be
made f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f mounting ANAKIM i n 194%
(b) Agreed t h a t t h e a c t u a l mounting of O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM would
b e d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f i n the summer
of 194.7 ( p r e f e r a b l y n o t l a t e r t h a n J u l y ) i n t h e l i g h t of the
s i t u a t i o n then existing.
( c ) Took n o t e t h a t
S t a t e s w i l l a s s i s t i r i making up d e f i c i e n c i p s i n t h e necessary
l a n d i n g c r a f t and naval f o r c e s by d i v e r s i o n from t h e P a c i f i c
T h e a t e r , and i n merchant s h i p p i n g , i f rrecessar-3;.
z,,
THE SITIYATION
To
EL C F L A T L ~18- YF
all;r.F:
T H L A T ~ .(THZ PACIFIC
153 and 1 5 ? / 1 )
15.1 i n t h a t i t d i d n o t p r o v i d e t h a t
i n h i s o p i n i o n , t h e B r i t i s h Chiefs
o f S t a f f w i s h e d t o b e c e r t a i n t h a t we k e e p t h e enemy engaged i n t h e
X e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d t h a t a t t h e same time m a i n t a i n a s u f f i c i e n t , f o r c e i n
t h e U n i t e d Kingdom t o t a k e advantage o f a r r a c k i n t,he German s t r e n g t h
e i t h e r from t h e withdrawal o f t h e i r f o r c e s i n F r a n c e o r because of low
e r e d morale
H e i n f e r r e d t h a t t h e E r i t i s h C h j e f s of S t a f f would p r e f e r
of f o r c e s i n t h e
U n i t e d Kingdom. The c o n f l i c t a r i s e s c h i e f l y i n t h e u s e o f l a n d i n g c r a f t
a n d s h i p p i n g . He s a i d t h a t t o a l a r g e measure t h e s h i p p i n g u s e d i n t h e
P a c i f i c i s a l r e a d y committed and, t h e r e f o r e , c o u l d n o t b e made a v a i l a b l e
f o r a b u i l d - u p of f o r c e s i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom and t h e n e c e s s i t y o f
236
17. S
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
Fie s a i d t h a t h a v i n g d e c i d e d t h a t i t i s n e c e s s a r y t,o d e f e a t
Germany f i r s t , t h e immediate q u e s t i o n i s whether t o a t t e m p t t o do so by
a n i r i v a s i o n o f F o r t h e r n F r a n c e o r t,o e x p l o i t o u r s u c c e s s e s i n N o r t h
Africa
T h e F r i L i s l i C h i e f s o f ' 5.taff c o n s i d e r t h a t an a l l - o u t h i e d i t e r r a m
t h e P a c i f i c and t h a t
t,tiey w i l l do e v e r y t h i n g t h e y c a n t o m e e t i t b u t
I n u n d e r t a k i r i g o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Filediterranean,
a s s i s t a n c e from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s n e c e s s a r y
He f e l t t h a t i f w e do n o t
m a i n t a i n c o n s t a n t p r e s s u r e on Germany, t h e y w i l l be g i v e n an o p p o r t u n i t y
t o recover and t h u s p r o l o n g t h e war
GTNNEFAI, VAT.SHALL s a i d t h e T h i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f do n o t
propose doing nothing i n t he Mediterranean o r i n France;
t h e y have no
i d e a t h a t w e , s h o u l d n o t c o n c e n t r a t e f i r s t on d e f e a t i n g Germany. The
q u e s t i o n t h a t i s t o b e d e c i d e d i s how t h i s c a n b e s t b e a c c o m p l i s h e d .
On t h e o t h e r hand, i t i s t h e view o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f
t h a t the war s h o u l d b e e n d e d a s q u i c k l y a s p o s s i b l e ,
which c a n n o t b e
a c c o m p l i s h e d i f w e n e g l e c t t h e P a c i f i c t h e a t e r e n t i r e l y and l e a v e t h e
J a p a n e s e t o c o n s o l i d a t e ' t h e i r g a i n s and u n n e c e s s a r i l y s t r e n g t h e n t h e i r
position.
237
S..S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
Kingdom, awaiting a n u n c e r t a i n p r o s p e c t , when t h e y might b e b e t t e r engaged
i n o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s which are p o s s i b l e
GEKEFBZ, MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t i t was a p p a r e n t l y a g r e e d by the
The
i o u s f o r c e s w h i l e c o n c e n t r a t i n g , so f a r a s t h e U n i t e d Kingdom was
238
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
i t e r r a n e a n a s w e 1 1 as t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of f o r c e s i n E n g l a n d f o r t h e
i n v a s i o n o f Korthern France might w e l l p r e v e n t
11s
from u n d e r t a k i n g opera.
d i s a s t e r i n t h e P a c i f i c . The r e a l p o i n t a t i s s u e was t o d e t e r m i n e t h e
b a l a n c e between t h e e f f o r t t o be put a g a i n s t Germany and a g a i n s t J a p a n ,
b u t we must have enough i n t h e P a c i f i c t o m e . i n t a i n t h e i n i t i a t i v e against
t h e J a p a n e s e . The U . S. i n t e n t i o n s were n o t t o p l a n f o r a n y t h i n g beyond
gaining p o s i t i o n s i n readiness f o r t h e f i n a l offensive against Japan
He
f o r t h e P a c i f i c t h e a t e r . He d i d n o t f e e l t h i s was a q u e s t i o n for a d e c i -
s i o n of t h e Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f . The U .
S , C h i e f s of S t a f f had n o t
U.
S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
t h e result of extended o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c might b e a n i n s t f f i c i e n t
c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f a c r a c k i n
Germany.
GEhEML UAFSHAIL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e whole concept of defeating
t . e f f o r t t o t h e P a c i f i c t h e a t e r . The U. S. had
n e a r l y been compelled t o p u l l o u t of TOFCH and t h e d e c i s i o n t o s p a r e t h e
a huge d i v e r s i o n of T!.
p o l i c y of t h i s n a t u r e was
153
d r a i n on
our resources
ADMIRAL K I N G p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e proposed o p e r a t i o n s would be
c a r r i e d o u t one a f t e r t h e o t h e r . A f t e r Rahaul had been c a p t u r e d , t h e
240
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
i t n o t b e a g r e e d t h a t o p e r a t i o n s s h o u l d he c o n t i n u e d a s f a r a s Truk i f
i t were p o s s i b l e w i t h t h e f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e a t t h a t time? There should be
no q u e s t i o n o f s a c r i f i c i n g AhAKIY f o r Truk
SIF; CHAPLEZ PORTAL s a i d he would n o t l i k e t o b e committed t o
ANAKIM, even w i t h f o r c e s r e l e a s e d a f t e r t h e c a p t u r e o f F a b a u l , w i t h o u t
f i r s t r e v i e w i n g whether some o t h e r o p e r a t i o n more p r o f i t a b l e t o t h e war
a s a whole might n o t b e d e s i r a b l e . F o r example,
t o t a k e a n extreme c a s e ?
S i m i l a r l y , any d e c i s i o n on Truk s h o u i d be d e f e r r e d
ADMIRAL K I N G p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e e f f e c t of t h i s wouidhe s t r i c t l y
t o l i m i t commitments i n t h e P a c i f i c ,
a l t h o u g h t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of
S t a f f a p p a r e n t l y c o n t e m p l a t e d a n u n l i m i t e d commitment i n t h e European
theater.
GXNEEAJ, MARSHALL a g r e e d t h a t a d e c i s i o n on AhAKIM a n d T r u k
c o u l d be l e f t u n t i l l a t e r
He p o i n t e d out, t h a t C C S
153 m e r e l y p r o
ALIMIPAL K I N G s a i d t h a t on l o g i s t i c g r o u n d s a l o n e i t would b e
i m p o s s i b l e t o b r i n g f o r c e s from t h e P a c i f i c t h e a t e r t o t h e E u r o p e a n
t h e a t e r . AYAKIM was n o t t h e r e f o r e an a l t e r n a t i v e t o o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e
European t h e a t e r
GENERAL SOMERVELL s u p p o r t e d t h i s v i e w , He p o i n t e d o u t t h a t , once
Rabaul had &,en s e i z e d , s h i p s would b e r e q u i r e d t o m a i n t a i n t h e g a r r i s o n
241
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
S
t h e r e and t h e s e c o u l d be m p l o y e d t o e x p l o i t s u c c e s s by minor o p e r a t i o n s
against other islands:,
As r e g a r d s l a n d i n g c r a f t , t h e U .
S . C h i e f s o f S t a f f had committed
t h e m s e l v e s t o s u p p l y a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of t h e c r a f t nceckd f o r LYAKIM.
O p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e P a c i f i c I s l a n d s r e q u i r e d combat, l o a d e r s and n o t
t h e tank-landing s h i p s and tank-landing c r a f t which were needed elsewhere
ADMIRaL COOKE s a i d t h a t a v e r y l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of t h e U.. S
s h i p p i n g i n t h e P a c i f i c w a s needed f o r t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of t h e F l e e t ,
which was o p e r a t i n g 7 , 0 0 0 m i l e s from i t s home b a s e s : T h i s requirement
would c o n t i n u e whether o r n o t o p e r a t j o n s a g a i n s t Truk were u n d e r t a k e n ,
U , S . p r o d u c t i o n of L.S.T.'s
month
would s h o r t l y amount, t o a b o u t f i f t e e n p e r
These c o u l d n o t b e r e a d y i n time f o r M e d i t e r r a n e a n o p e r a t i o n s i n
As r e g a r d s l a n d f o r c e s ,
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t f o r c e s s e t o u t i n C C . S
153 c o n s t i t u t e d
t h e minimum n e c e s s a r y t o m a i n t a i n p r e s s u r e on t h e J a p a n e s e
.Aithough the
f o r c e s i n t h e P a c i f i c were p r i m a r i l y f o r d e f e n s i v e p u r p o s e s . many of
t h e m c o u l d be m e d siml t a n e o u s l y f o r minor o f f e n s i - v e s . such
bardment of J a p a n e s e b a s e s
9s
a i r bom
F a v o r a b l e o p p o r t u n i t i e s might then b e s e i z e d
for exploitation
GENERAL MAKSHALZ. s u g g e s t e d t h a t p a r a g r a p h 11 ( c ) of C C S
153
c o u l d be r e v i s e d t o r e a d " s e i z u r e a n d o c c u p a t i o n of G i l . b e r t I s l a n d s ,
M a r s h a l l I s l a n d s , C a r o l i n e I s l a n d s up t o and i n c l u d i n g T r u k w t t h t h e re
s o u r c e s a v a z l a b l e in t h e t h e a t e r
242
IT
SECREI
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
After some f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n ,
THE C OMi!ITTEE:
( a ) I n v i t e d G e n e r a l I s m a y and General Hu
t o redraft t
t o i n c l u d e f u r t h e r p o i n t s which had been r a i s e d
n o .e
(b) I n s t r u c t e d t h e F e c r e t a r i e s t o c i r c u l a t e this d r a f t f o r d i s
ZSCORT V 3 CSEL!
SIR 01:I:TTY
ICUT
S t a f f h a v i n g b e f o r e them a m o p e r s u r v e y of t h e e s c o r t v e s s e l p o s i t i o n
b e f o r e t a k i n g any f i n a l d e c i s i o n o n o p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e coming year
He
r e c a p i t u l a t e d t h e 1 : r i t i s h needs f o r a d d l t i o r j a l e s c o r t s i n t h e A t l a n t i c and
pointed out that considerable
T.
C.
a s s i s t a n c e waul d b e r e y u i r e d n o t o n l y
i n t h e A t l a n t i c b u t a l s o f o r WSIWif t h a t o p e r a t , i o n w e r e u n d e r t a k e n
e s c o r t s were withdrawn f o r a n o p e r a t , i o n such as TORCH o r FIIICKY,
a b s e n t from t h e i r normal d u t i e s f o r a b o u t f o u r months
When
they were
243
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
c'
The d i s c u s s i o n t h e n t u r n e d on t h e r e l a t i o n of P s Q sconvoys to
M e d i t e r r a n e a n o p e r a t i o n s ,,
SIR DUDLEY POTIN! s a i d t h a t one problem w a s whether a 30--ship
convoy e v e r y f o r t y d a y s would b e c o n s i d e r e d s u f f i c i e n t f o r R u s s i a o r
w h e t h e r we s h o u l d be p r e s s e d , as we had been i n t h e p a s t , t o i n c r e a s e
R u s s i a n d e l i v e r i e s . The w o r s t t h r e e mont.hs were from F e b r u a r y t o the
m i d d l e o f Yay when d a y l i g h t h o u r s were i n c r e a s i n g and t h e c h a n n e l was
r e s t r i c t e d by i c e
a r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s e f f e c t i n t h e n o t e which was b e i n g d r a f t e d
One
had made i t c l e a r
convoys if t h e s c a l e of
This meant e i t h e r i n c r e a s i n g
t h e s i z e o f t h e convoys o r r e d u c i n g t h e c y c l e T h e dangers which w e were
l i k e l y t o f a c e this y e a r were much g r e e t e r than l a s t year
4
As regards
t h e f i r s t , t h e r e was a d e f i n i t e o r g a n i z a t i o n of d e t e r m i n e d men; w i t h
l e a d e r s , though t h e y were a l m o s t e n t i r e l y unarmed
Their intelligence
244
U.
SECRET
BRITISH MOST S E C R E T
S.
t h i s s e c r e t army would p l a y a v a l u a b l e p a r t i n t h e f i n a l r i s i n g a g a i n s t
RAIDS ON BERLIN.
S I R CHARLES PORTAL g a v e d e t a i l s o f t h e r e c e n t r a i d s on B e r l i n ,
and e s t i m a t e d t h a t , making a l l a l l o w a n c e f o r t h e c o m p a r a t i v e s i z e s of
London a n d B e r l i n a n d t h e t i m e i n t e r v a l ,
t h e two r a i d s on B e r l i n on
ADMIRAL C U N N I N G H A M s a i d t h a t t h e Germans m i g h t t h r e a t e n o u r
s h i p p i n g p a s s i n g t h r o u g h t h e S t r a i t s of G i b r a l t a r b y U - b o a t s and b y
a i r c r a f t and c o a s t d e f e n s e g u n s from S o u t h e r n S p a i n . He c o n s i d e r e d t h e
r i s k from U-boats
245
li
S. S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
a b l e t o m a i n t a i n many U-boats
we s h o u l d he a b l e t o
d e a l w i t h t h i s t h r e a t . Coast, d e f e n s e g u n s c o n s t i t u t e d t h e g r e a t e s t
d a n g e r , biv.t o n l j e x p e r i e n c e rwuJd show liow bad t,l-.is would b e . The guns
were sunposeri t o h a v e I a d a r rar!g,e-findjrig
1~?
even w i t h t h e Germans i n
S o u t h e r n S p a i n p r o v i d r d we h e l d L p a n i s h ::orocco.
Even w i t h o u t i t , we
jf
we s e i z e d L a j o r c a we s h o u l d he a b l e t o p r e v e n t the
Germans b u i l d i n g up a l a r g e a i r s t , r e n g t h i n S o u t h e r n S p a i n .
SIP EI,PL?Y PGUbJ? s a i d t h a t i n s p i t e of t h e German c o a s t defense
guns on t h e French s h o r e of t h e S t r a i t s of Dover,we had n o t l o s t a s h i p
from them
t a n c e a c r o s s the S t r a i t s o f G i b r a l t a r w a s o n l y a b o u t h a l f t h a t -
I t would n o t he pos
I t must he remem
S i c i l y , s a i d t h a t he d i d n o t a n t i c i p a t e , v e r y heavy s h i p p i n g l o s s e s i n
the o p e r a t i o n b u t t h e a c t u a l a - s a u l t o f t h e beaches would he a v e r y ex
p e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n . He d i d not c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e i s l a n d
would v e r y g r e a t l y add t o t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e sea r o u t e t h r o u g h t h e Med
i t e r r a n e a n . If w e were i n C i c i l y , he would e s t i m a t e t h i s r o u t e as b e i n g
90 p e r c e n t o r more s e c u r e ; w i t h o u t S i c i l y , i t would h e a b o u t 85 p e r c e n t
s e c u r e , once we h e l d t h e whole of t h e North A f r i c a n c o a s t .
U. S. S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
S I F CHBRLPS PORTAL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t from t h e a i r p o i n t of view
t h e p o s s e s s i o n of S i c i l y would make a v e r y c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f e r e n c e . If
t h e Germans were n o t i n t h e i s l a n d , i t would be d i f f i c u l t f o r them t o
o p e r a t e a g a i n s t o u r s h i p p i n g a t a l l ; t h e y would hav?
to use bases i n
24 7
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
61st M e e t i n g
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
MINUTES of h!eeting h e l d a t Anfa Camp
on T u e s d a y , J a n u a r y 1 9 , 1943, a t 1000.
PRESENT
G e n e r a l G. C,, M a r s h a l l , USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
L t . General H .
H.
G e n e r a l S i r Alan F. Brooke
Admiral o f t h e F l e e t S i r Dudley
Pound
A i r Chief Marshal S i r C h a r l e s
F. A. P o r t a l
A r n o l d , USA
General B. B
S o m e r v e l l , USA
F i e l d Marshal S i r John D i l l
Moun t b a t t e n
B r i g . General J. E . H u l l , USA
Brig.
L t . G e n e r a l S i r H a s t i n g s L. Ismay
G e n e r a l A . C. Wedemeyer,USA
Kennedy
Major G e n e r a l J. N
Commander R. E. L i b b y , USN
A i r Vice Marshal J~ C - S l e s s o r
SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r V.
Brig. General J. R.
B r i g a d i e r E.
Dykes
Deane, USA
I. C. Jacob
L t . C o l o n e l L. T. Grove, USA
24 8
U. S SECRET
BRITISH MOST S E C R E T
CONDUCT OF THE WAR I N 1943.
1..
(C.C.S.
155)
The Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f c o n s i d e r e d a n o t e , p r e p a r e d b y t h e
Combined S t a f f s s u g g e s t i n g the procedure t o be followed f o r d e a l i n g w i t h
t h e major q u e s t i o n s on t h e agreed Agenda of t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f
(C.C.S
THE COMMITTEE:
Approved t h e s u g g e s t e d p r o c e d u r e s u b j e c t t o t h e Annex b e i n g
r e v i s e d a s a g r e e d a t t h e i r meeting.:::::
3,
i n West A f r i c a . , A d m i r a l G l a s s f o r d h a d p r o p o s e d t h a t t h e West A f r i c a n
Coast from Cape B o j a d o r t o t h e Western boundary of S i e r r a Leone s h o u l d
b e p l a c e d under F r e n c h n a v a l command
The F r e n c h n a v a l f o r c e s s h o u l d b e
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r s u c h o p e r a t i o n s o f f s h o r e as m i g h t b e n e c e s s a r y i n t h a t
area. He u n d e r s t o o d t h a t M , B o i s s o n a n d A d m i r a l C o l l i n e t were b o t h a g r e e
able t o t h i s suggestion,,
The propos.ed a r r a n g e m e n t would i n c l u d e t h e a i r c o v e r f o r o f f
s h o r e o p e r a t i o n s . The d i f f i c u l t y would be t h e l a c k o f e q u i p m e n t of t h e
French a i r f o r c e s
He s u g g e s t e d t h a t toovercome t h i s d i f f i c u l t y w e s h o u l d
s e t o u t t o f a m i l i a r i z e t h e F r e n c h w i t h modern a i r c r a f t , To d o t h i s i t
w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y t o g i v e tnem u p t o - d a t e e q u i p m e n t a n d a d e q u a t e
::
:CV
S u b s e q u e n t l y i s s u e d as C C S
Annex
249
155,l
U S SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
t r a i n i n g and t o i n c l u d e them, s o f a r as p o s s i b l e , i n a c t u a l o p e r a t i o n s
He s a i d t h a t t h e Mest A f r i c a n c o a s t from Cape Bojador southwards was a
B r i t i s h s p h e r e , and h i s p r o p o s a l w a s t h a t the French i n t h e i r a r e a s h o u l d
work under Admiral Pegram. M
e should have t o d e c i d e whether t o d e a l w i t h
t h e F r e n c h as f u l l a l l i e s o r whether i t would be n e c e s s a r y t o e x e r c i s e
some d e g r e e o f c o n t r o l over them.
S I R DUDLEY POUND s a i d t h a t he had formed t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t
Admiral C o l l i n e t was a l l o u t t o h e l p and t h a t t h e a r r a n g e m e n t which
A d m i r a l G l a s s f o r d proposed was based on t h e assumption t h a t t h e French
would f u l l y c o o p e r a t e .
S I R CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t he w a s i n g e n e r a l agreement w i t h
t h e s u g g e s t i o n s p u t f o r w a r d by Admiral King.
I t was e s s e n t i a l t h a t a l l c o a s t a l a i r o p e r a t i o n s i n Mest A f r i c a
Be was f u l l y a l i v e t o
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
U
B r i t i s h Naval O f f i c e r f o r n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d o f a B r i t i s h
forces.
T h a t s u b j e c t t o ( a ) , a s u b , - a r e a e x t e n d i n g from Cape B o j a - .
d o r t o t h e w e s t e r n boundary of S i e r r a Leone and a l l f o r c e s
o p e r a t i n g t h e r e i n s h a l l be under F r e n c h Command.
(c)
251
17 S
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
4
1943.
(b) A communique s h o u l d be p r e p a r e d f o r i s s u e t o t h e P r e s s
when t h e c o n f e r e n c e i s f i n i s h e d . .
SIR ALAN BROOKE s u g g e s t e d t h a t a s m a l l subcommittee s h o u l d be
a p p o i n t e d t o d r a f t a s u i t a b l e document f o r a p p r o v a l b y t h e Conunittee a t
t h e end of t h e c o n f e r e n c e .
THE COMMITTEE 2
Agreed:
To a p p o i n t a s u b c o m m i t t e e f o r t h i s p u r p o s e c o n s i s t i n g o f :
United S t a t e s Representatives:
B r i g a d i e r General Hull
C o l o n e l Smart
Commander L i b b y
B r i t i s h Representatives :
L t . G e n e r a l Ismay
Major G e n e r a l Kennedy
A i r Vice Marshal S l e s s o r
252
17 S SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
ANNEX TO MINUTES 6 1 S T MEETING
R E V I S E D PROGRAM OF MEETINGS
TUESDAY, 1 9 t h :
Liscussion o f f u t u r e procedure.
S y s t e m o f command i n F r e n c h Nest A f r i c a .
T u r k e y and A y i s o i l .
WEDNESDAY, 2 0 t h :
O r g a n i z a t i o n of command and a l l o c a t i o n of s p h e r e s o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
in t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n .
A s s i s t a n c e t o R u s s i a i n r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r commitments.
HUSKY
B o m b e r O f f e n s i v e from N o r t h A f r i c a .
THIJH.&IAY, 2 1 s t :
U Boat R a r ~
Landing C r a f t .
FRIDAY, 22nd:
somber O f f e n s i v e from U . K
BOLERO B u i l d - u p
1913 L i m i t e d O p e r a t i o n s from U .
K.
SATURDAY, 2 3 r d :
ANAKIM.
SOUTHWE3T P A C I F I C .
253
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
82nd Meeting
PRESENT
G e n e r a l G. C . M a r s h a l l , USA
Admiral of t h e F l e e t S i r Dudley
Pound
A i r Chief Marshal Sir C h a r l e s
F. A . P o r t a l
B r i g . General J . E. I i u l l , USA
Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
L t - General S i r H a s t i n g s L
C o l o n e l J . E . S m a r t , USA
A i r Vice Marshal , J .
Major C
R . Codman, USA
:%:%
Ismay
C. Slessor
A i r Vice Marshal F. F . I n g l i s ::
L t . Colonel C . E . R . H i r s c h
G e n e r a l Henri Giraud ++
SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r V. Dykes
B r i g . G e n e r a l J . R. Deane, USA
B r i g a d i e r E . I. C . Jacob
,: For Item 1
a* For I t e m 3
251
:
:
U.. S . SECRET
B R I T I S F MO.CT SECRET
1.
158)
A s s i s t a n t C h i e f of B r i t i s h $ir S t a f f
( I n t e l l i g e n c e ) summarizing t h e l a b
e s t B r i t i s h views on t h e Axis o i l p o s i t i o n ( C . C . 3 .
158).
t i m e , i t m i g h t b e p o s s i b l e t o resume
a t t a c k s on t h e s e t a r g e t s more e f f e c t i v e l y , p r o v i d e d of c o u r s e t h a t t h i s
c o u l d be a c h i e v e d w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e li-boat
warfare.
GENERAL ARNOLD p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e P l o e s t i f i e l d s - - w h i c h
r o u g h l y e q u i d i s t a n t from S i c i l y , Benghazi, C d i r o , andAleppo--were
range o f t h e 6-24 w i t h a l o a d o f 4,000 pounds of bombs
OT
were
within
under.
11. S.
SECR5T
Y P I T I S Y YOST SECilET
o p t i m i s t i c about t h e s h o r t a g e of o i l i n \Germany t h a n the B r i t i s h . I t was
b e l i e v e d t h a t Germany would have a s u r p l u s o f ahoirt 40,000,000 b a r r e l s
a t t h e e n d o f 1943 i n s t e a d of t h e 1 0 , 0 0 0 , O U O b a r r e l s which s h e had a t
t h e end o f 1 9 1 2 , owing t o t h e opening up o f new s o u r c e s i n Ilungary and
e l s e w h e r e . I t was, t h e r e f o r e , c a l c u l a t e d t h a t even i f t h e whole of the
Rumanian p r o d u c t i o n were knocked o u t e a r l y i n t h e y e a r , s h e would s t i l l
h a v e e n o u g h f o r o p e r a t i o n s i n 1 9 1 4 . T h e r e w e r e two t e t r a e t h y l l e a d
f a c t o r i e s h o w e v e r , t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f w h i c h would h a m s t r i n g l i e nro
d u c t i o n of German a v i a t i o n f u e l .
SIR CHARLES WRTAL s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h i s l a t e s t 4merican information
s h o u l d be i m m e d i a t e l y g i v e n t o t h e B r i t i s h i n t e l l i g e n c e S t a f f s w i t h a
view t o t h e p r o d u c t i o n of a n agreeii e s t i m a t e .
GENERAL MARSHALL e m p h a s i z e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e of making g r e a t
e f f o r t s a g a i n s t German o i l if we c o u l d b e s u r e t h a t i t formed a r e a l l y
c r i t i c a l t a r g e t . U . S. a i r c r a f t i n t h e S o u t h w e s t P a c i f i c were bombing
t a r g e t s a t a g r e a t e r d i s t a n c e from t h e i r b a s e t h a n Humania from t h e
p r e s e n t b a s e s a v a i l a b l e . We might have t o w a i t a l o n g time b e f o r e t h e
T u r k i s h b a s e s c o u l d be u s e d .
s u p e r i o r i t y on which depended t h e s u c c e s s o f t h e o p e r a t i o n
A f t e r some d i s c u s s i o n ,
THE COMMITTEE:
the A x i s o i l
U. S. S E C R E T
J R I T I S Y MOST SECIIET
s i t u a t i o n based on t h e l a t e s t i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e from b o t h
B r i t i s h and U . S. s o u r c e s .
2.
I n d i s c u s s i n g C.C.S.
i n t h e Middle E a s t . They w i l l n o t d i v e r t
much e q u i p m e n t t o o t h e r u s e s e x c e p t f o r u r g e n t o p e r a t i o n a l
r e a s o n s , and w i l l r e p o r t s u c h d i v e r s i o n s t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
%{unit
i o n s Assignment Board."
GENERAL SOMERVELL s t a t e d t h a t j u s t p r i o r t o h i s d e p a r t u r e from
257
ll. S . SECRET
BRITISH 'IOST SGCRET
S I R ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h i s agreement was n o t a c c e p t a b l e i n
London. He p o i n t e d o u t t h a t any agreements p r e v i o u s l y made were super
s e d e d by t h e a g r e e m e n t a r r i v e d a t on J a n u a r y 1 8 t h b e t w e e n t h e Prime
M i n i s t e r and t h e P r e s i d e n t which p r o v i d e d t h a t a l l m a t t e r s connected
w i t h Turkey s h o u l d be handled by t h e B r i t i s h i n t h e same way t h a t a l l
m a t t e r s connected w i t h China a r e handled by t h e United S t a t e s .
i t be postponed u n t i l t h e meeting of J a n u a r y 2 0 t h . He s a i d t h a t t h e r e
was some c o n f u s i o n i n h i s mind as t o j u s t what was i n t e n d e d w i t h regard
t o Turkey. The P r e s i d e n t had s a i d t h a t he had hoped t o a r r a n g e f o r Tur
k e y ' s p e r m i s s i o n f o r t h e passage of munitions en r o u t e t o Russia through
T u r k i s h t e r r i t o r y . C.C.S.
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
US.
He added t h a t t h e r e i s no p o s s i b i l i t y
THE COMMITTEE:
(a) Agreed t o c o n s i d e r t h e proposed r e s o l u t i o n on Turkey, quoted
above, a t t h e meeting on January 2 0 t h .
(b) Took n o t e of t h e paper under c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
3.
A s a n e x a m p l e , he m i g h t m e n t i o n a message
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
S.
The a c t i o n showed t h e q u a l i t y of
I t would a l s o b e p o s s i b l e
200 t r a n s p o r t a i r c r a f t
Such a f o r c e w a s an i n d i s p e n s a b l e accompaniment f o r a modern army
French p i l o t s had a l r e a d y g i v e n proof of what t h e y c o u l d do
The
One squad.
Some o f
i t were p r o p e y l y e q u i p p e d , He e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e r a m p a i g n i n N o r t h A f r i c a
would be over i n two monthss t i m e , and i n t h i s campaign he i n c l u d e d t h e
c a p t u r e of S i c i l y , S a r d i n i a and C o r s i c a , which h e r e g a r d e d as forming a
d i r e c t p r o l o n g a t i o n of A f r i c a and a s b a s e s f o r f u r t h e r a c t i o n
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
equipment c o u l d be p r o v i d e d f o r t h e French Army. He k n e w t h a t t h e s h i p
ping q u e s t i o n was under d e t a i l e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n byAdmiral King and I'rench
Naval o f f i c e r s . !;enera1 S o n i e r v e l l , t h e Head of t h e S e r v i c e s of' Supply,
had a l r e a d y c a l l e d on G e n e r a l " r r a u d t o d i s c u s s t h e s e matters and ha11
r e p o r t e d t h e r e o n t o h i m . The q u e s t i o n of p r i o r i t y of d e l i v e r y of i t e m s
and t h e method t o be adopted i n e q u i p p i n g French [ J n i t s would be taken up
w i t h .General G i r a u d . G e n e r a l A r n o l d had been c o n f e r r i n g w i t h F r e n c h
t o b r i n g t h e French f o r c e s t o a h i g h s t a t e
261
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S K YOST SECRET
f i g h t once more a l o n g s i d e t h e A l l i e s . W i t h i n t h e l i m i t of B r i t i s h r e
s o u r c e s , which were c o n s i d e r a b l y s t r a i n e d , e v e r y t h i n g would b e done t o
h a s t e n t h e day of t h i s c o l l a b o r a t i o n .
GENERAL ARNOLD s a i d t h a t he had b e e n t r y i n g f o r some time t o
f i n d t h e most e f f e c t i v e u s e f o r the F r e n c h p i l o t s , who had proved t h e i r
a b i l i t y t o t a k e over and o p e r a t e s k i l l f u l l y American equipment. !le hoped
:rot p r o p h e s y how long the war would l a s t , Germany c o u l d never win. Sooner
or ii.Ler t h e 'J. S. would come t o t h e h e l p of G r e a t R r i t a i n . The Germans
nail asked him t o s i g n a papor t o s a y t h a t he would n o t e s c a p e d u r i n g the
I t i s your d u t y t o g u a r d me; i t i s my d u t y t o e s c a p e . L e t us
2 62
U.
SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
S.
C.C.S.
6 3 r d Meeting
PRESENT
General G.
C . M a r s h a l l , USA
G e n e r a l S i r Alan F. Brooke
Admiral of t h e F l e e t S i r Dudley
Pound
L t . G e n e r a l H. H. Arnold,USA
A i r C h i e f Marshal S i r C h a r l e s
F. A. P o r t a l
L t . G e n e r a l B. B . S o m e r v e l l , USA
Rear Admiral C . M. Cooke, J r . , U S d
F i e l d Marshal S i r J o h n Dill
Brig. G e n e r a l J . E. H u l l , USA
B r i g . General A. C . Wedemeyer, USA
Mountbatten
C o l o n e l J . E. S m a r t , USA
L t . G e n e r a l S i r H a s t i n g s L . Ismay
Commander R . E . L i b b y , USN
SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r V . Dykes
B r i g a d i e r E . I. C . J a c o b
L t . C o l o n e l L. T . Grove, USA
263
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S K MOST SECRET
1.
U.
S. A I D TO XUSSIA.
(C.C.S.
162)
162.
LORD LEATHERS s t a t e d t h a t t h e b u l k o f t h e m u n i t i o n s s e n t t o
S u s s i a under t h e P r o t o c o l a r e f r o m t h e United S t a t e s . ?Ie s a i d t h a t C.C.S.
162 does n o t c o n s t i t u t e a p a p e r w i t h which he i s i n f u l l agreement a s is
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H XOST SECRET
would d e c r e a s e . , Xe s a i d t h a t it, was r e a s o n a b l y c e r t a i n t,hat tile l o s s r a t e
would d r o p as low as2.4% p e r month.. I n t h i s c a s e , a l l of t h e coirmitmerrts
under t h e ::ussian P r o t o c o l c o u l d b e f u l f i l l e d . If' the r a t e improves i
an a d d i t i o n a l t r o o p l i f t f o r BOLE110 w i l l become a v a i i i d l e .
2.4$,
1.0i:D
l i s h an a g r e e d esti.mated l o s s r a t e f o r p l a n n i n g p u r p o s e s .
s u r e t h a t a l l t h o s e concerned w i . t i i s l l i p p i n g proht~w:.s w
;.I
!!,is w i i l in..
I b.! .,,,i.aki:~~!,6
x 1
,~,mt:itts.
rniiuni t.;nents
t,o
w i l l o n l y be f u l f i l l e d p i - o u j ~ d f d tliey w i l l n o t e n t a i ~ l$ ) r o h i b i t
losses i n shipping.
GENERAL SOMEZVELL s a i d t h a t s t o p p i n g t,he northcrrr convoys
dtipipg
June
dropped o f f .ill
r e q u i r e t h e t o t a l c a p a c i t y o f a l l r o u t e s and t i n t , t i t o r e f o r e , a reduced
r a t , e had hceii a p p l i e d t.o t h e P e r s i a n r o u t e which had t h e l o n g e s t t u r r i
a r o u n d - T h i s w i l l p r o v i d e a s a f e t y m a r K i r i t o t a k e c a r e of c o n t i n g e n c i e s
s u c h as s t o p p i n g t h e n o r t h e r n r o u t e d u r i n g Operat,ion HUSKY.
LOXD LEATHERS p o i n t e d o u t t h a t C . . C . S , 162 a p p l i e s o n l y t o a i d
from t h e I l n i t e d S t a t e s
Xe s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h c a n o v e r t a k e t , h e i r back
l o g of d e l i v e r i e s a b o u t t h e end o f J u n e ; a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l number of
B r i t i s h shipments i s involved
Assuming a convoy e v e r y 27 d a y s , t h e r e
w i l l b e 11 or 12 s h i p s i n e a c h , whereas if t h e y were t o b e r u n e v e r y 43
d a y s , e a c h convoy must i n c l u d e 15 B r i t i s h s h i p s .
GENERAL SOMERVELL proposed an amendment t o c l a r i f y p a r a g r a p h 14
of C . C . S .
162,;: He t h e n a s k e d f o r a c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e con-.
c l u s i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n P a r a g r a p h 15 o f t h e p a p e r
:: C o r r e c t e d v e r s i o n c i r c u l a t e d as C . C , S , 162/1
255
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST S E C R E T
LORD LEATHERS s u g g e s t e d t h a t i n t h e l a s t s e n t e n c e t h e p h r a s e
" a s s i g n e d t o U n i t e d S t a t e s t r o o p movements" be changed t o " a s s i g n e d t o
combined t r o o p movements."
SIR CHLTLES PORTAL a s k e d if i t would b e p o s s i b l e t o frame our
commitment t o R u s s i a so as t o make i t c l e a r t h a t some c u r t a i l m e n t i n the
d e l i v e r y o f m u n i t i o n s might b e r e q u i r e d because o f o p e r a t i o n a l n e c e s s i t i e s .
He f e l t t h a t thecombined C h i e f s o f s t a f f were t a k i n g a b i g s t e p i n making
a f i r m commitment r e g a r d i n g t h e d e l i v e r y of m u n i t i o n s t o R u s s i a a t the
expense of a l l o p e r a t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s .
LOIU) LEATHERS s t a t e d t h a t we have r e 4 e r v e d t h e r i g h t i n t h e p a s t
t o c u r t a i l shipments of munitions t o X u s s i a b u t t h a t R u s s i a d i d n o t l i k e
t o have such r e s e r v a t i o n s made andalways o b j e c t e d when a n a c t u a l c u r t a i l
ment became n e c e s s a r y . A n o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s was t h a t t h e y agreed
t h a t t h e n o r t h e r n convoys b e d i s r o n t i n u e d d u r i n g O p e r a t i o n TORCH.
GENERAL SOMERVELL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e c u r r e n t P r o t o c o l which
e x p i r e s i n ,June of 1943 does i n c l u d e such a r e s o l u t i o n . T h e new P r o t o c o l
w i l l be framed b y t h e S t a t e Department a n d t h e F o r e i g n O f f i c e , b u t a c t u a l l y
b a s i c document.
THE COkBfITTEE:
152. s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s o t h a t s u p p l i e s t o R u s s i a
s h a l l n o t be c o n t i n u e d a t p r o h i b i t i v e c o s t t o t h e United
Nations' e f f o r t .
(b) Took n o t e t h a t t h e P e r s i a n Gulf r o u t e c o u l d make good t h e
l o s s of 64 North R u s s i a n s a i l i n g s i f t h e s e had t o be e l i m i
n a t e d i n t h e l a t t e r p a r t of t h e y e a r owing t o o t h e r o p e r a
tions.
U. S. S E C e E T
R q I T I S I ! WOST SECRET
( c ) Agreed t o d i r e c t t h e Combined ! . l i l i t a r y T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Com
m i t t e e t o make a n a g r e e d e s t i m a t e o f t h e r a t e of U n i t e d
Nations'
s h i p p i n g l o s s e s i n 1913 which c a n b e u s e d b y a l l
162
SO
as t o d e l e t e
-.
3
62nd X e e t i n g , Item 2 )
BRIGADIER JACOB e x p l a i n e d t h e p r o c e d u r e f o r t h e s u b m i s s i o n of
T u r k i s h b i d s t o t h e 'dunitions Assignments Boards i n London and Washington.
T n r k i s h r e q u i r e m e n t s were, i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e , s c r u t , i n i z e d and c o o r d i
n a t e d by a Committee i n Ankara c o n t a i n i n g U .
S . , B r i t i s h and T u r k i s h
16211.
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S H #YOST SECRET
Washington. For example, any demands made by t h e C h i n e s e i n London were
r e f u s e d , and t h e Chinese were t o l d t o p r e s e n t them d i r e c t t o Washington.
He f e a r e d t h a t i f a l l b i d s had t o be p a s s e d through t h e Combined Chiefs
of S t a f f , t h e y would be smothered i n a mass of d e t a i l .
i n the
E i d d l e E a s t . They w i l l n o t d i v e r t s u c h e q u i p m e n t t o o t h e r
u s e s e x c e p t f o r u r g e n t o p e r a t i o n a l r e a s o n s , and w i l l r e p o r t
s u c h d i v e r s i o n s t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e Munitions Assignments
Board
3.
of S t a f f s e t t i n g o u t i n order of time t h e p r o p o s e d o b j e c t i v e s f o r t h e
bomber o f f e n s i v e from North A f r i c a .
THE COMMITTEE:
the discussion.:?
S u b s e q u e n t l y c i r c u l a t e d as C.C.S.
2 68
1531
S. S E C R E T
YI1ITISh' MOST SECPET
c'.
4.
(C.C.S. 163)
The Committee had b e f o r e them a mePorandm by t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s
o f S t a f f g i v i n g t h e i r recommendations f o r t h e s e t - u p o f a i r command i n
t h e \!editerranean.
in
su
on t h e T u n i s i a n f r o n t .
Army must s t i l l b e s u p p l i e d f r o m t h e E a s t . T h i s c o u l d , h o w e v e r , b e a r r a n g e d
and t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e Middle E a s t was q u i t e adequate f o r t h e t a s k .
SIR ALAN BROOKE t h e n p o i n t e d o u t t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p l a n n i n g
If t h a t were
2 69
S SECRET
B R I T I S H MCST S E C R E T
SIR CHARLES PORTAL a g r e e d and s a i d t h a t s u c h changes c o u l d most
e a s i l y be made by t h e A i r Commander-in-Chief
THE COKMITTEE :
(a) A ccepted t h e p r o p o s a l s c o n t a i n e d i n C . C . S .
163, s u b j e c t t o
a f t e r h i s appointment ,,
L' S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
(d) Took n o t e of t h e p r o p o s a l s o f t h e F i r s t Sea Lord a s s e t o u t
above f o r Naval command i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n d u r i n g HUSKY!
i . e . , Western and E a s t e r n Commands under Commander-.in~
C hici'
:.!edi t e r r a n e a r ] arid Commande r - i n - C h i e f L e v a n t , r e s p e c t i v e l y ,
w i t h Commander-in-Chief ?ledit e r r a n e a n r e s p o n s i b l e f o r gener a 1
coordination.
( e ) Agreed t , h a t G e n e r a l E i s e n h o w e r s h o u l d be i n f o r m e d o f t h e
above d e c i s i o n s .
271
II
S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S. C 5 t h Meeting
PRESENT
General F . C . M a r s h a l l , USA
Admiral E . J , King, U S N
A i r Ctriel' M a r s h a l S i r C h a r l e s
F A Por1,a.l
L t , . General B , R
Hear Admiral C.
S o m r r v e l l , USA
!I.
Cooke, J r
LISN
\ i c e Ailmiral
t IP
\loi!!it,l~att c i i
1,t
?fa,jor GPricraI .I
J.ord Louis
A i r 17ii:v V a r s h a l J
SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r IT
I:>krs
L t , C o l o n e l I,, T , Grove, I S A
272
Kerrnedy
C
Slessor
U S
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
1
HUSKY.
( C . C , S , 161)
The Committee had b e f o r e them a memorandum by t h e B r i t i s h J o i n t
Planning S t a f f .
In
He t h o u g h t , however, t h a t w e c o u l d n o t a c c e p t t h e end
o f S e p t e m b e r as t h e e a r l i e s t d a t e f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n
Various devices
were b e i n g examined, s u c h a s t h e s e t t i n g up of a d d i t i o n a l t r a i n i n g e s t a b
lishmerits and making use o f a wider range of p o r t s i n t h e Middle E a s t ;
273
U. S SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
n o t a c t i v e l y engaged i n t h e p r e s e n t b a t t l e , t h e y would a l l be r e q u i r e d
f o r o p e r a t i o n s a f t e r t h e c a p t u r e of T r i p o l i . .
BRIGADIER GENERAL WEDEMEYER s a i d t h a t no d i f f i c u l t y was f o r e s e e n
i n f i n d i n g t h e l a n d f o r c e s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e U. S. p o r t i o n o f t h e o p e r a
A l l could
c e r t a i n l y b e p r o v i d e d . He f e l t t h a t some d a t e a t t h e end o f J u l y o r t h e
b e g i n n i n g o f August s h o u l d be p o s s i b l e .
On t h e q u e s t i o n o f timing,
He a g r e e d t h a t i t m i g h t be pos-.
s i b l e t o s t a r t t h e o p e r a t i o n i n .July
SIR CHARLES PORTAL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n must depend on
when t h e B r i t i s h c o u l d be r e a d y and when t h e Americans c o u l d be ready
and t h e l a t e r d a t e s e t a s D . d a y . He s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e s e s h o u l d be worked
o u t s e p a r a t e l y , , I t might be found t h a t the l a t e r d a t e was t o o l a t e t o be
a c c e p t a b l e , I-Ie thought t h a t if T u n i s i a were c l e a r e d by t h e end o f A p r i l ,
a f u r t h e r two months s h o u l d be s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f a i r
f i e l d s i n the Tunisian t i p
GENERAL MARSHALL r e f e r r e d
t o t h e t r a n s p o r t b y a i r o f 20,000
of t h e Northwest A f r i c a n p o r t s might be b a r e l y s u f f i c i e n t , i t s h o u l d b e
p o s s i b l e t o f i n d room f o r t r a i n i n g B r i t i s h a s w e l l as American f o r m a t i o n s
274
S SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
i n t h i s a r e a . He a s k e d w h e t h e r t h e T u n i s i a n p o r t s were b e i n g u s e d f o r
the assault,
BRIGADIER GENERAL WEDEMEYER s a i d t h a t i t was i n t e n d e d t o make
u s e o f B i z e r t e , T u n i s , and Sousse f o r t h e U . S . p o r t i o n of t h e a s s a u l t .
F o r t r a i n i n g he a g r e e d t h a t i t m i g h t be p o s s i b l e t o s q u e e z e u p fyirther
west a n d s o l e a v e some of t h e s e p o r t s f o r t r a i n i n g B r i t i s h format^:1 011.5
if r e q u i r e d .
S I R ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t e v e r y p o s s i b l e p e r m u t a t . i o n must b e
examined and t h a t we s h o u l d a i m a t a r r i v i n g a t a s t a r t i n g d a t e i n J u l y
Two p o i n t s c a l l e d f o r e a r l y d e c i s i o n - . - f i r s t , the s e t . up of ar? o r g a n i z a
t i o n t o p l a n t h e whole o p e r a t i o n ; and, second, t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o ? a c o v e r
p l a n which would need t o be i n t e g r a t e d between t h e U . S . A . ,
C - K , , North
THE COMMITTEE:
(A) D i r e c t e d t h e U. S. and B r i t i s h P l a n n i n g S t a f f s to:
(1)E x a m i n e a l l p o s s i b l e e x p e d i e n t s f o r s p e e d i n g up t h e
p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r HUSKY a n d t o r e p o r t o n t h e e a r l i e s t
p o s s i b l e d a t e b y which t h e o p e r a t i o n c o u l d be mounted
(2)Recommend how t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n for p l a n n i n g HUSKY s h o u l d
b e s e t up
FUTURE BUSINESS
S I R A L A N BROOKE s u g g e s t e d t h a t i t m i g h t be p o s s i b l e t o b r i n g
~
Agreed on t h e f o l l o w i n g program:
THURSDAY
FRIDAY
U b o a t War
Bomber O f f e n s i v e from
HUSKY
Great B r i t a i n .
ANAKIM
BOLERO ( i f t i m e p e r m i t s ) .
Limited Operations
S . W , ~P a c i f i c .
Landing C r a f t
2 75
,,
U . S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
6 5 t h Meeting
PRESENT
G e n e r a l S i r Alan F . Brooke
Admiral o f t h e F l e e t S i r Dudley
Pound
G e n e r a l G . C . M a r s h a l l , USA
Admiral E . J . King, USN
L t . G e n e r a l H.H. A r n o l d , U S A
A i r Chief Marshal S i r C h a r l e s
F. A. P o r t a l
F i e l d Marshal S i r John D i l l
S o m e r v e l l , USA
Cooke, J r . , USN
Wedemeyer, USA
Major G e n e r a l J . N. Kennedy
A i r Vice Marshal J . C . S l e s s o r
'SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r V.
Dykes
B r i g . G e n e r a l J. R . Deane, USA
B r i g a d i e r E . I . C. J a c o b
276
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
il
160).
t h i s Schedule were a s f o l l o w s :
V.L.R.
L.H.
h! R .
A i r c r a f t w i t h a r a n g e b e t w e e n 600 and 1 , 2 0 0 m i l e s .
He i n q u i r e d whether i t c o u l d b e t a k e n t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f
S e c t i o n 2 i n S c h e d u l e V (North A t l a n t i c , E a s t Coast U. S o and Canada) in
~jill-ved no commitments f o r t h e United Kingdom.
S.
f i g u r e s were n o t a v a i l a b l e a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e , b u t h e sug
gest.ed t h a t t h e r e p o r t s h o u l d b e a c c e p t e d as a working b a s i s .
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t t h e r e p o r t of t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s
277
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
SIR DUDLEY POUND p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i n t h e i r agreed p o l i c y f or t h e
conduct of t h e war i n 1943 (C.C.S. 155/1), t h e Combined Chiefs o f S t a f f
had s a i d t h a t t h e d e f e a t of t h e U-boat must remain t h e f i r s t charge on
t h e r e s o u r c e s o f t h e IJnited N a t i o n s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t had been decided
t h a t t h e Rabaul and HUSKY o p e r a t i o n s were t o be c a r r i e d o u t , and t h e s e
would i n e v i t a b l y d e t r a c t from t h e a n t i - s u b m a r i n e e f f o r t . H e f e l t t h a t
t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f s h o u l d c l e a r l y r e c o r d t h e i r r e a s o n s f o r
t h u s d i v e r g i n g from t h e anti-submarine e f f o r t as a f i r s t o b j e c t i v e . ' H e
p a s s e d around d r a f t c o n c l u s i o n s on t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s ' r e p o r t ,
which he had d i s c u s s e d w i t h Admiral King, b u t s u g g e s t e d t h a t s i n c e t h e
S.
a n d B r i t i s h Naval S t a f f s s h o u l d :
and e s c o r t c r a f t ;
b.
A l l o c a t e a s much new c o r ~ s t r u c t i o n ,o r v e s s e l s r e l e a s e d
by new c o n s t r u c t i o n , as p o s s i b l e toconvoy p r o t e c t i o n ,
e s c o r t s f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of Atlantic
convoys
(4) U .
S. and B r i t i s h Naval S t a f f s s h o u l d p r o v i d e a u x i l i a r y
U.. S S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
b.
D.W.I.
K,,
or V . L . R . a i r c r a f t ,
(7) Non-ocean-going e s c o r t s s h o u l d b e used f o r HUSKY t o t h e
maximum p o s s i b l e e x t e n t .
2.
(C.C.S. 156)
on t h e p r e c i s e i m p l i c a t i o n s of p a r a g r a p h 5, s a i d t h a t p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d
e r a t i o n s o f t e n o v e r r i d e m i l i t a r y expediency i n t h e c a s e of o b j e c t i v e s
i n t h e o c c u p i e d c o u n t r i e s . The B r i t i s h Government, on r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s
from one o f t h e e x i l e d Governments, sometimes p l a c e d a p o l i t i c a l embargo
on some e x c e l l e n t m i l i t a r y t a r g e t . I n such c a s e s d e c i s i o n s had o f t e n t o
be t a k e n v e r y q u i c k l y , and i t would n o t be p r a c t i c a b l e t o d e a l w i t h t h e
m a t t e r t h r o u g h t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f i n Washington.
GENERAL MARSHALL s u g g e s t e d , and t h e Committee a g r e e d , t h a t t h e
words "for p o l i t i c a l r e a s o n s " s h o u l d be i n s e r t e d i n p a r a g r a p h 6 i n o r d e r
t o make t h i s c l e a r
I n d i s c u s s i o n i t w a s a l s o a g r e e d t h a t t h e word " s y n t h e t i c '
s h o u l d be d e l e t e d from p a r a g r a p h 2 ( d ) .
SIR CHARLES PORTAL r e f e r r e d t o t h e d i f f i c u l t y which always a r o s e
i n s u c h d i r e c t i v e s over t h e p r e c i s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p l a c i n g t h e German
submarine b a s e s and c o n s t r u c t i o n y a r d s f i r s t i n o r d e r of p r i o r i t y . T h i s
might be h e l d t o p r e c l u d e a t t a c k s on any o t h e r t a r g e t s ~A t t h e p r e s e n t
time t h e U
t a r g e t s a t t h e t o p of t h e i r
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
t a r g e t s i n Germany, t h e r e would b e v e r y s e r i o u s c r i t i c i s m i n d e e d . H i s
own view was t h a t o t h e r t a r g e t s b e s i d e s t h e s u b m a r i n e b a s e s and y a r d s
s h o u l d n o t b e e x c l u d e d and t h a t p a r a g r a p h 2 o f t h e p a p e r r e q u i r e d some
r e d r a f t i n g t o make i t c l e a r t h a t t h e r e was no i n t e n t i o n t o c o n c e n t r a t e
on what were s t r a t e g i c a l l y d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f t h e
offensive.
GENERAL MAITSHALL s a i d t h a t he f u l l y a p p r e c i a t e d t h i s d i f f i c u l t y .
SIR DUDLEY POUND p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e a c c e p t a n c e of l a r g e - s c a l e
amphibious o p e r a t i o n s f o r 1943 must i n e v i t a b l y d e t r a c t from t h e a n t i
submarine e f f o r t and e v e r y endeavor s h o u l d , t h e r e f o r e , he made t o o f f s e t
t h i s by a h i g h e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n of t h e a i r e f f o r t a g a i n s t &boat t a r g e t s .
He b e l i e v e d t h a t i f we p u t t h e maximum e f f o r t o n t o t h e Biscny b a s e s now,
and d e s t r o y e d a l l t h e f a c i l i t i e s and accommodations i n t h e towns, we
s h o u l d v i t a l l y s f f e c t , German c a p a c i t y t o c a r r y on t h e IT--boat campaign.
I t was no good making s p o r a d i c a t t a c k s ; t h e p r e s s u r e had t o be c o n t i n u e d
He c o u l d n o t s e e t h a t t h e r e was any r e a l d i f f e r e n c e
s o - c a l l e d o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e bombing
between
Both were d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t
h a d h a d i n two r a i d s t w i c e t h e w e i g h t o f bombs d r o p p e d on L o r i e n t
recently.
no
i n f o r m a t i o n o f t h e r e s u l t o f t h e r e c e n t c o n c e n t r a t e d bombardments, I t
had had a greater weight of bombs dropped on i t t h a n Plymouth. I n com
p a r i n g t h i s w i t h t h e weight on D e r l i n , r e g a r d must b e p a i d t o the com
p a r a t i v e s i z e o f t h e s e two t a r g e t s . Weight i n r e l a t i o n t o a r e a was much
greater a t Lorient than Berlin,
280
U. S . SECRET
BRITISH illOST SECRET
SIR ALAN BHOOKE d i d n o t t h i n k t h a t we c o u l d win by d e f e a t i n g t h e
U-boat
a l o n e . 'Ye s h o u l d be c a r e f u l , t h e r e f o r e , n o t t o a l l o t more e f f o r t
of Europe.
SIR CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t t h i s p o i n t was covered by paragraph
5 of t h e d r a f t d i r e c t i v e . T a r g e t s would be s e l e c t e d i n accordance w i t h
t h e p l a n of t h e Commander-in-Chief,
so as t o g i v e t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e sup
Germany t h a n t h e IJ.
been d i r e c t e d on t o U-boat
t a r g e t s by G e n e r a l Eisenhower as a d i r e c t
THE COMMITTEE:
Approved, s u b j e c t t o minor amendments, a r e v i s e d d r a f t d i r e c t i v e
p r e p a r e d by t h e B r i t i s h Chiefs of S t a f f ( c i r c u l a t e d subsequently
as C.C.S.
166/1/D)
.
28 1
U S
SECRET
B R I T I S B MOST SECRET
S I R CHARIES PORTAL s u g g e s t e d t h a t p a r a g r a p h 8 s h o u l d b e s t r e n g t h
ened i n view of t h e much g r e a t e r A l l i e d bomber o f f e n s i v e which w i l l be
undertaken a g a i n s t Germany as t h e r e s u l t o f t h e i n c r e a s e d bomber s t r e n g t h
which i s i n v i e w , The B r i t i s h w i l l i n c r e a s e t h e i r heavy bomber s t r e n g t h
S t a l i n should be glad
t o learn
ADMIRAL K I N G s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e l a s t two s e n t e n c e s o f p a r a g r a p h
5 b e d e l e t e d from t h a t p a r a g r a p h and amalgamated w i t h t h e r e d r a f t of
p a r a g r a p h 8, s u g g e s t e d above b y S i r C h a r l e s P o r t a l .
282
t.
ANAKIM.
(C.C.S.
Ifid)
East,
I'
stit,iited tiieref'or.
A i l.i s
nl
s t , a t e d t i i a t iie b e l i e v e d t l i e t a r g e t d a t e o f
164 a s amended':
and agreed:
f o r t h e ANAKIM a s s a u l t .
(2) To approve t h e p r o v i s i o n a l s c h e d u l e of f o r c e s l a i d o u t
i n p a r a g r a p h 3 o f C.C.S.
161, r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t t h e
BOLERO BUILD-UP.
The Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f were informed t h a t a p a p e r on t h e
s u b j e c t , b e i n g p r e p a r e d by t h e B r i t i s h J o i n t P l a n n i n g S t a f f , was n o t
ready f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
up t o d a t e on a month-by-month
operation
b a s i s i n o r d e r t o be r e a d y a t any time
t o i i i i t i a t e such o p e r a t i o n s .
SIR ALAK BROOKE a g r e e d w i t h t h i s s t a t e m e n t .
::: T o be s u b s e q u e n t l y p u b l i s h e d a s C.C.S.
164/1.
U. S. SECRET
RYlTISN MOST S E C e E T
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n s a i d he wished t o d i s c u s s t h e q u e s t i o n of
o r g a n i z a t i o n . iie a s k e d what i s t o be done i n England and a l s o how the
p l a n s r e g a r d i n g BOLERO a r e t o c r y s t a l l i z e
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h e S r i t i s h can a b s o r b American troops
a t t h e r a t e of 120,000 p e r month. I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , GENERAL SOMERVELL
s a i d t h a t t h e number t o a r r i v e would be somewhat l e s s t h a n 120,000 per
month up t o J u l y b u t c o n s i d e r a b l y more t h e r e a f t e r .
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t one of t h e g r e a t e s t d i f f i c u l t i e s r e
g a r d i n g t h e r e c e p t i o n of American t r o o p s i n England is t h e l a c k of s u f
f i c i e n t r e c e i v i n g d e p o t s f o r equipment. I t would b e n e c e s s a r y t o con
s t r u c t a d d i t i o n a l d e p o t s . The B r i t i s h have s t o p p e d s u c h c o n s t r u c t i o n
b e c a u s e of t h e manpower s i t u a t i o n and b e c a u s e t h e y have o n l y b e e n com
m i t t e d t o r e c e i v e f i v e a d d i t i o n a l American d i v i s i o n s , or a t o t a l of
427,000 t r o o p s . The c o n s t r u c t i o n which must be u n d e r t a k e n and t h e oper
a t i n g f o r c e r e q u i r e d f o r new r e c e p t i o n d e p o t s w i l l r e q u i r e p e r s o n n e l
from t h e United S t a t e s . These should be i n c l u d e d i n t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e
t r o o p convoys t o t h e U. K.
An a r e a has been r e s e r v e d i n s o u t h w e s t e r n England for t h e United
S t a t e s t r o o p s which w i l l be n e x t t o t h e a r e a r e s e r v e d f o r B r i t i s h t r o o p s
w i l l b e u n d e r a s e p a r a t e commander. The B r i t i s h o f f e n s i v e f o r c e s ,
t o g e t h e r w i t h t h o s e b e i n g b u i l t up b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , i n c l u d i n g a i r
f o r c e s , s h o u l d come under a supreme commander who s h o u l d be a p p o i n t e d i n
the near f u t u r e .
GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t G e n e r a l Andrews is now g o i n g t o
2 a4
U. S. S E C R E T
B,?ITISH MOST S.TC'1ET
E n g l a n d t o r e p l a c e G e n e r a l H a r t l e and u n d e r t a k e t h e same d u t i e s t h a t
General Eisenhower performed p r i o r t o O p e r a t i o n TORCH. ile w i l l have t h e
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of r e c e i v i n g American d i v i s i o n s i n England; a n d , a s soon
a s t h e s e d i v i s i o n s a r e r e a d y , General Andrews w i l l t u r n them over t o t h e
Supreme Commander f o r a s s i g n m e n t t o t h e c r o s s - c h a n n e l t a s k f o r c e . He
assumed t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e B r i t i s h c o n t e m p l a t e d s e t t i n g up a s e p a r a t e
Home Defense f o r c e , t h e c r o s s - c h a n n e l
t a s k f o r c e would a l s o have t o be
on an a l e r t s t a t u s and c o n s i d e r e d a s a v a i l a b l e t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e
defense of the B r i t i s h Isles.
SIR A I A N BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h e r e were two t y p e s of p l a n n i n g i n
v o l v e d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e cross-channel
o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n which m i g h t be e x p e c t e d i n 1 9 4 3 , and t n e o t h e r w a s
f o r t h e l a r g e r t a s k of an a l l - o u t i n v a s i o n of t h e C o n t i n e n t . I n t h e l a t
t e r c a s e , t h e d e c i s i o n must be made a s t o t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e a t t a c k
once t h e l a n d i n g was e f f e c t e d . I t must be decided whether such an a t t a c k
would be aimed a t Germany o r a t o c c u p i e d F r a n c e . P l a n s m i g h t w e l l b e
made t o meet b o t h c o n t i n g e n c i e s .
H e s a i d t h a t p l a n s must e n v i s a g e making t h e maximum u s e o f
S.O.E.
a c t i v i t i e s a n d . t h a t t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s mustbe c a r e f u l l y c o o r d i n a t e d
2 85
0 S SUCRET
B R I l I S H MOST SECRET
menace. H e u r g e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s c o n c e n t r a t e t h e i r e f f o r t s i n
t h i s respect.
GENERAL SOMERVFLL s a i d t h a t t h e l o c a t i o n o f United S t a t e s troops
i n England must b e made w i t h an eye t o t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s . The t r o o p s
w i l l need amphibious t r a i n i n g f o r which few facilities a r e a v a i l a b l e i n
U. S SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
I n r e p l y t o a q u e s t i o n from Lord L o u i s M o u n t b a t t e n , he s t a t e d
t h a t i n s o f a r as p o s s i b l e , all u n i t s would have had amphibious t r a i n i n g
p r i o r t o t h e i r d e p a r t u r e from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h had s e t u p a n
one i n
n o r t h e r n I r e l a n d which h a s b e e n s t a r t e d by A d m i r a l B e n n e t t
GENERAL \IATSHALL s a i d t h a t he assumed t h a t t h e American t r o o p s
i n c l u d e d i n t h e a s s a u l t waves of a c r o s s - c h a n n e l a t t a c k would have t o be
r e h e a r s e d i n amphibious o p e r a t i o n s , b u t t h a t t h e great b u l k of American
t r o o p s would n o t need s u c h r e h e a r s a l s
LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN t h e n p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i t would b e w e l l
t o a r r a n g e t o have American f o r c e s u s e l a n d i n g c r a f t manned by American
c r e w s , w i t h which General M a r s h a l l a g r e e d
GENERAL SOMEnVELL s t a t e d t h a t t h e movement of American f o r c e s t o
England must be c o n s i d e r e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e e s c o r t v e s s e l s a v a i l
a b l e f o r convoys,
ADMIRAL K I N G a g r e e d t h a t t h e BOLERO t r o o p movements would con
s t i t u t e an a d d i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t f o r e s c o r t v e s s e l s
S I R CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t a i r f o r c e s m u s t b e r e o r g a n i z e d
w i t h BOLERO i n view. A t p r e s e n t t h e R , A , F
o p e r a t e s from s t a t i c b a s e s .
Mobile a i r u n i t s must be o r g a n i z e d t o s u p p o r t c r o s s - c h a n n e l o p e r a t i o n s
He s u g g e s t e d t h a t American f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t s h o u l d b e under t h e o p e r a
t i o n a l d i r e c t i o n o f t h e B r i t i s h i n t h e same manner as had a l r e a d y been
d e c i d e d f o r heavy bombardment a i r c r a f t
S I R CHAI&ES PORTAL c a l l e d a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t a d e c i s i o n
c a p a c i t y from t h e United
S t a t e s t o G r e a t B r i t a i n f o r ground t r o o p s or f o r t h e ground e c h e l o n s o f
the air force.
Ile a l s o s t a t e d t h a t a d e c i s i o n m i g h t b e f o r c e d on t h e
287
ii S S E C R E T
H R I T I S H YOST S E C R E T
Combined W i e f s o f S t a f f w i t h r e g a r d t o u t i l i z i n g some of t h e shipping
erigaged in t h e d e l i v e r y o f m u n i t i o n s t o R u s s i a i n t h e b u i l d - u p of a
I! 01,FPO f o r c e
r:,
K.
?ile
CWI
f ' i g u r e ? which i t w o u l d c o n t a i n c o u l d n o t b e c o r r s i d e r e d as a r e l i a b l e
ions
f r o m I . r i t i s h i m p o r t s , t h e number c o u l d b e r a i s e d from s e v e n t o n i n e
d iv is ions
o b e mounted u n t i l September 1 5 t h , f o u r a d d i t , i o n a l d i v i s i o n s c o u l d be
i , r a n s p o r t e d from t,he U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h r e e i n American, and one i n B r i t
i s h s t i i p p i n g ~ The r a t e o f f o u r d i v i s i o n s p e r month c o u l d b e m a i n t a i n e d
t h e r e a f t e r inasmuch a s most of t h e overhead p e r s o n n e l would be i n c l u d e d
i II the e a r l i e r sliipmei. ts
Would one
d i v i s i o n p e r month b e t h e maximum?
?:l?SPI~tAI,FO.IEPVEL1. rep1 i e d t h a t t h e f i g u r e would g r e a t l y exceed
f a c i 1i t i e s
U S
SECRET
B R I T I S H .MOST S E C R E T
ADMIRAL X I N G a g r e e d t h a t t h i s should b e g i v e n careful c o n s i d e r a
i t would p r o b a b l y b e n e c e s s a r y t o c o n d u c t s e p a r a t e o p e r a t i o n s t o g a i n
a d d i t i o n a l port, f a c i I i t i e s
SIP A L N r!'OOIiL
b u i l t up f o r a d i r e c t a t , t a c k , t h e Germans, b e c a u s e of t h e i r s u p e r i o r
communications, c o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e a g a i n s t our f o r c e s i n s u p e r i o r numbers
T h i s w i l l b e t r u e u n l e s s German d i v i s i o n s a r e f o r c e d t o withdraw from
t u n i t i e s f o r h o s t i l e l a n d i n g s because of t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s of a i r c o v e r - ,
a g e and a l s o because o f t h e l a c k of p o r t s on h e r w e s t e r n c o a s t . Holland
a c c u r a t e l y w h a t flow o f r e i n f o r c e m e n t s from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d
b e exaected
GEiWML SOMEDVELL s t a t e d t h a t he would b e p r e p a r e d t o p r e s e n t
s u c h d a t a w i t h i n from 8 t o 10 h o u r s a f t e r a d e c i s i o n c o n c e r n i n g Opera..
t i o n HUSKY had k e n made
789
U. S .
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
ADMIRAL K I N G t h e n s u g g e s t e d t h a t l i m i t e d o p e r a t i o n s p r o p o s e d
from England i n 1943 b e d i s c u s s e d .
The B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f
s t a t e d t h a t t h e y had a p a p e r on
t h i s s u b j e c t i n t h e p r o c e s s of p r e p a r a t i o n and would b e p r e p a r e d t o
d i s c u s s i t d u r i n g t h e m e e t i n g o f J a n u a r y 22nd.
SIR A L A N BROOKE b r o u g h t up t h e q u e s t i o n of what o r g a n i z a t i o n a l
s e t - u p f o r BOLERO would be.
Both t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f a g r e e d t h a t
t h e y had n o t d i s c u s s e d t h i s m a t t e r among themselves and had n o t come t o
a d e f i n i t e conclusion.
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t h e r e were two methods of o r g a n i z a
t i o n t h a t m i g h t b e f o l l o w e d : e i t h e r a Deputy Commander o r a Chief'
of
S t a f f c o u l d be s e t up w i t h an a p p r o p r i a t e s t a f f ; or a Commanding General
c o u l d b e s e l e c t e d a t once and o r g a n i z e his own s t a f f . . I n e i t h e r c a s e ,
t h e p l a n n i n g and t r a i n i n g f o r t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s s h o u l d b e u n d e r t a k e n a t
once and c a r r i e d o u t on a m o n t h - t o - m o n t h b a s i s , r e a d y a t any t i m e t o
undertake a cross-channel
o p e r a t i o n i f t h e o p p o r t u n i t y was p r e s e n t e d .
i n v a $ i o n of t h e C o n t i n e n t and d e s i g n e d t o f u r t h e r t h o s e
o p e r a t i o n s i n some way.
THE COMMITTEE:
Agreed t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e Combined S t a f f s s h o u l d p r e
t o b e r e a d y n o t l a t e r t h a n t h e a f t e r n o o n of J a n u a r y 22, r e l a t i v e
t o t h e command, o r g a n i z a t i o n , p l a n n i n g a n d t r a i n i n g s e t - u p
n e c e s s a r y f o r e n t r y o f C o n t i n e n t a l E u r o p e from t h e U. X
290
in
S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
6-
D i r e c t e d t h e S e c r e t a r i a t t o prepare a d r a f t report of d e c i
s i o n s reached subsequent t o t h e s u b m i s s i o n o f C . C . S .
291
153/1.
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
6 6 t h Meeting
PRESENT
General G. C . M a r s h a l l , U S A
Admiral o f t h r F l e e t S i r Dudley
Pound
A i r C h i e f Marshal S i r C h a r l e s
F. A. P o r t a l
F i e l d Marshal S i r John D i l l
Vice A d m i r a l t h e Lord Louis
Mountbatten
Lt.
Sir
L * Ismay
Major General J . N . Kennedy *
A i r Vice Marshal J . C. S l e s s o r
A i r Vice Marshal F. F. I n g l i s
L t . Colonel C. E . R. H i r s c h
SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r V. Dykes
B r i g a d i e r E. I. C. J a c o b
For P a r t o f Meeting
:>:>
292
For I t e m
**
*
**
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
1.
165/1)
A f t e r s e v e r a l m i n o r amendments h a d b e e n a g r e e d upon,
THE COIvIMITT%E:
D i r e c t e d t h a t t h e d ~ r a f t t e l e g r a m as amended b e s u b m i t t e d t o the
P r e s i d e n t and t h e Prime h i i n i s t e r f o r t h e i r a p p r o v a l .
2 . HUSKY.
(C.C.S.
Ifil/l.)
F . I F A L f i : f!'(!OKi
s a j d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h F l a n r i e r s had examined
v a r i o u s p e r m u t a t i o n s and c o m b i n a t i o n s w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o a s s e m b l i n g and
t r a i n i n g t h e r e q u i s i t e f o r c e s f o r C p e r a t i o n HU>KY and concluded t h a t i t
c o u l d be. mounted by August I O t h ,
Lnclosure "A",
2.61,'1,
paragraph 5 . H e s a i d
t h a t August 2 m d would b e t h e b e s t d a t e b e c a u s e of t h e f a v o r a b l e s t a t e
o f t h e moon. The d a t e c o u l d b e s e t s t i l l e a r l i ~ e r i f t h e T u n i s i a n p o r t s
were made a v a i l a b l e t o t h e B r i t i s h f o r l o a d i n g .
The R r i t i s h w i l l r e y u i r e 5 d i v i s i o n s i n a l l f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n , ,
T h e s e would p r o b a b l y b e t h e 5 t h , M t h , 7 8 t h f o r t h e f i r s t a s s a u l t ; one
d i v i s i o n i n from U .
1'.
f o r t h e C a t e n i a a s s a u l t on
Zealand d i v i . s i o n f o r t h e follow-up.
r: +
3; and t h e New
I t w i l l be n e c e s s a r y t o move t h e o v e r - .
S. Planning Staff d i d
C.C.S.
to
p o r t s i n o r d e r t o be r e a d y by August I s t , t h e American s h a r e of t h e
a s s a u l t might be d e l a y e d beyond August 31sto The United S t a t e s C h i e f s of
S t a f f were of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e B r i t i s h c o u l d u t i l i z e a l l t h e p o r t s
f r o m B i z e r t e e a s t w a r d and t h e United S t a t e s f o r c e s c o u l d s t i l l b e made
S u b s e q u e n t l y p u b l i s h e d a s C.C.E..
165/3.
2 93
ll. S. S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
r e a d y by August 1 s t . The o n l y u s e r e q u i r e d by t h e American f o r c e s of
R i z e r t e a n d p o r t s t o t h e e a s t w a r d would be f o r r e f u e l i n g p u r p o s e s , He
s t a t e d t h a t a s f a r as l a n d i n g c r a f t is concerned, l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y would
b e e n c o u n t e r e d . The l i m i t i n g f a c t o r would b e t h e " d e g r e e of
finished
planning.
SIR ALAF BPOOKE s a i d t h a t t h e F r i t i s h P l a n n e r s t h o u g h t t h a t i t
t h e i r l o a d i n g i n t h e T u n i s a r e a . :!e c o u l d s e e no r e a s o n why a l l t h e
f o r c e s c o u l d n o t meet a t a r g e t d a t e of August 1st. Xe r e a l i z e d t h a t the
Germans might do c o n s i d e r a b l e damage t o the p o r t s of B i z e r t e and Tunis,
b u t he e s t . i m a t e d t h a t b y h l a s t i n g p r o c e s s e s t h e p o r t s c o u l d b e c l e a r e d
for use by the time t h e a i r f o r c e s were ready t o o p e r a t e
S I R ALAb EROORZ p o i n t e d o n t t h a t t h e E r i t i s h p r o g n o s t i c a t i o n s
OII
an e s t i m a t e t h a t t h e A x i s f o r c e s would
b e d r i v e n from T u n i s i a by k p r j l 7Otti. I f t h i s i s a c c o m p l i s h e d s o o n e r ,
i h e target d a t e c o u l d be moved forward a c c o r d i n g 1y ,
ADMIRAL COOKE p o i n t e d oirt t h a t t h e r e i s s t i l l u n c e r t a i n t y r e g a r d
i n g t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e b e a c h e s i n $ . i c i l y . They might n o t b e s u i t a b l e
f o r t h e new t y p e s o f l a n d i n g c r a f t , and t h i s would i n v o l v e a change of
plans
s a i d t h e E r i t i s h a r e b u i l d i n g 30
LCA
U. S. SECRET
3 7 I T I S H MOST SECRET
type l a n d i n g c r a f t p e r m o n t h i n E n g l a n d . The number needed by t h e American
f o r c e s c o u l d e i t h e r b e s e n t t o America from England or t h e b l u e p r i n t s
c o u l d be s e n t t o America and t h e c r a f t c o u l d be c o n s t r u c t e d t h e r e . The
d e s i g n i s c o m p a r a t i v e l y s i m p l e , and he thought t h a t t h e y could e a s i l y be
manufactured i n t h e United S t a t e s . If t h e c r a f t were t o be manufactured
i n E n g l a n d , i t would b e n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e United S t a t e s t,o f u r n i s h the
e n g i n e s r e q u i r e d . The s h i p p i n g of some 60 LCA t o t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n , how
e v e r , would n o t be an e a s y problem.
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d i t was a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e whole p l a n might
r e q u i r e some changes; t h e r e might b e some u n f o r e s e e n and insurmountable
d i f f i c u l t i e s which would n e c e s s i t a t e t h e p o s t p o n i n g of t h e t a r g e t dat,e
t o o l o n g . He t h o u g h t t h a t , i n t h i s c a s e , we s h o u l d be p r e p a r e d w i t k r an
alternative.
GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t .he u n d e r s t o o d t h e o n l y p o s s i b l t
t o u n d e r t a k e ; and i t c o u l d be a c c o m p l i s h e d e a r l i e r . I t d o e s n o t a s s i s t
i n c l e a r i n g t h e Mediterranean f o r s h i p p i n g , and i t would n o t be a s g r e a t ,
a blow t o I t a l y . However, he f e l t i t e s s e n t i a l t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f
O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE, as a p o s s i b i l i t y , b e n o t d e l a y e d s o l o n g a s t o
l e a v e u s w i t h no a l t e r n a t i v e f o r 1913 if i t were found that, HUSKY c o u l d
n o t be accomplished.
GENERAL SIARSHALL s a i d i t was t h e o p i n i o n of t h e U . S. C h i e f s of'
S t a f f t h a t w h i l e O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE would produce a n a d v a n t a g e as f a r
lle
t a r y r e s t r i c t i o n s . E i t h e r HUSKY o r c r o s s - c h a n n e l o p e r a t i o n s w i l l p r o
d u c e g r e a t r e s u l t s , whereas BRIMSTONE m e r e l y g i v e s an a i r a d v a n t a g e .
A t t h e same time, i t j e o p a r d i z e s t h e p r o s p e c t s of e i t h e r HUSKY or c r o s s
channel operations.
GENERAL MARSHALL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t German r e s i s t a n c e t o O p e r a t i o n
BRIMSTONE c o u l d n o t b e d i s c o u n t e d . I n e s t i m a t i n g t h e c a p a b i l i t j e s of t h e
295
S. SECRET
BRITISY M9ST SECRET
U.
United Nations,
S i c i l y e n t i r e l y and
IIe s a i d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f a r e more c o n c e r n e d
w i t h a d d i n g t o t h e s e c u r i t y of s h i p p i n g t h r o u g h t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n and
w i t h t h e immediate e f f e c t s
of o u r o p e r a t i o n s on Germany's s t r e n g t h
AtE4I:UL K I N G p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e a i r f i e l d s i n S a r d i n i a have a
r e l a t i v e l y small c a p a c i t y and t h a t t h e y would have t o be d e v e l o p e d .
lVhile t h e p o s i t i o n o f S a r d i n i a d o e s b r i n g n o r t h e r n I t a l y and s o u t h e r n
F r a n c e w i t h i n r a n g e o f o u r f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t , i t i s , by t h e same t o k e n ,
w i t h i n range o f A x i s a i r c r a f t based i n those a r e a s .
AD!,IIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t t h e i d e a l would be t o a t t a c k S i c i l y a t
tkle same t i m e t h e <Germans were e v a c u a t i n g T u n i s . The l o n g e r t h e a t t a c k
a g a i n s t S i c i l y i s d e l a y e d beyond t h a t d a t e , t h e s t r o n g e r w i l l b e tire
d e f e n s e s of S i c i l y . He t h o u g h t i t i m p o r t a n t ,
therefore,
that every
e f f o r t b e made t o r e d u c e t h i s l a p s e o f t i m e t o t h e minimum.
L0I:D
U. S. SECRET
BRITISB MOST SECRET
be t o t a k e S a r d i n i a d u r i n g t h e time t h a t T u n i s was b e i n g e v a c u a t e d by
t h e Axis f o r c e s . I!e f e l t t h a t t h e A x i s powers would t h e n b e g i v i n g l i t t l e
a t t e n t i o n t o t h e d e f e n s e s of S a r d i n i a . He t h o u g h t t h a t t h e e a r l i e r d a t e
upon which t h e O p e r a t i o n BRElSTONE c o u l d b e a c c o m p l i s h e d , t h e s e c u r i n g
of a i r bases from which t o a t t a c k n o r t h e r n I t a l y , and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of
c o n d u c t i n g Commando r a i d s a l l a l o n g t h e c o a s t of I t a l y , combined t o make
O p e r a t i o n BXIhlSTONE v e r y a t t r a c t i v e .
GENEXAL !?IIAnSHALL a s k e d Lord L o u i s : . f o u n t b a t t e n i f t h e t r a i n i n g
d i f f i c u l t i e s would b e r e d u c e d i f we were a b l e t o a t t a c k S i c i l y a t t h e
same time t h a t T u n i s w a s b e i n g e v a c u a t e d by t h e A x i s f o r c e s .
LOXD LOUIS MOIJNTBATTEN s a i d he d i d n o t t h i n k so inasmuch as t h e
e v a c u a t i o n would have s m a l l e f f e c t on t h e f i x e d d e f e n s e s of S i c i l y .
SI:( DIJDLEY POUND p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i f t h e o p e r a t i o n were t o be
mounted b e f o r e August ?2nd, i t s h o u l d be moved f o r w a r d t o J u l y 2 5 t h i n
o r d e r t o t a k e f u l l a d v a n t a g e of t h e f a v o r a b l e s t a g e of t h e moon.
ADMIRAL K I N G s u g g e s t e d t h a t f o r p u r p o s e s of s u r p r i s e i t might
be w e l l t o mount t h e o p e r a t i o n a t a time o t h e r t h a n when t h e moon was i n
pointed out t h a t
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
t h e t a r g e t d a t e f o r HUSKY had t o be postponed beyond September, i t would
be of l i t t l e v a l u e , H e c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e c o l l a p s e of I t a l y would have
t h e most f a v o r a b l e e f f e c t on t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t . S i n c e t h i s m i g h t b e
a c c o m p l i s h e d b y O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE, he thought t h a t w e s h o u l d b e p r e p a r e d
t o u n d e r t a k e t h i s o p e r a t i o n ifHUSKY had t o b e d e l a y e d t o o long., BRIMSTONE
i n .June w o u l d b e b e t t e r t h a n HUSKY i n September; but a d e c i s i o n t o under
t a k e BXIhfSTONE must b e made b y March 1 s t ; o t h e r w i s e the l a n d i n g c r a f t
would be a t t h e wrong end of t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n .
GENERAL. MARSHALL s a i d he thought t h e r e s h o u l d b e no l o o s e n e s s i n
our d e t , e r m i n a t i o n t o u n d e r t a k e O p e r a t i o n HUSKY. He r e c o u n t e d t h e d i f f i .
c u l t i e s r e g a r d i n g t h e changes and d e l a y s i n BOLERO i n 1942.
S I R ALAN B!IOOKE
it^ He d i d n o t a g r e e w i t h S i r C h a r l e s P o r t a l
H e s a i d t h a t i n BRIMSTONE we s h o u l d b e a d v a n c i n g i n t o a s a l i e n t w i t h
l i m i t e d a i r s u p p o r t where w e might b e s h o t a t from t h r e e d i r e c t i o n s , The
s u p p l y of S a r d i n i a e n t a i l s an i n c r e a s e i n our l i n e of communications and
adds a t h r e a t t o our l i m i t e d s h i p p i n g .
SIR DUDLEY POUND s a i d t h a t i f O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE i s u n d e r t a k e n ,
HUSKY would have t o be d e l a y e d u n t i l t h e p e r i o d o f b a d weather i n October
or l a t e r ,
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE would n o t b e an
e a s y o p e r a t i o n . F i g h t e r s u p p o r t would b e i n a d e q u a t e , and i t would be
n e c e s s a r y t o f i g h t o u r way n o r t h w a r d t h r o u g h t h e e n t i r e i s l a n d , He
b e l i e v e d t h a t we s h o u l d g o b a l d - h e a d e d f o r S i c i l y . H e f e l t t h a t t h e
c a p t u r e of S i c i l y would have more e f f e c t on t h e war.. He added, however,
t h a t if by March 1st i t d e v e l o p s t h a t O p e r a t i o n HUSKY c a n n o t be mounted
u n t i l t o o l a t e , i t was i m p o r t a n t f o r u s t o have a n a l t e r n a t i v e t o t u r n
t o i n o r d e r t h a t w e do n o t remain i d l e f o r t h e e n t i r e y e a r "
238
K S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
The d i s c u s s i o n t h e n turned on t h e Command and S t a f f o r g a n i z a t i o n
which would be r e q u i r e d f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n .
ADMIRAL COOKE s a i d t h a t thecombined S t a f f P l a n n e r s f e l t s t r o n g l y
t h a t one man should be made r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e w h o l e o f t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s ;
o t h e r w i s e , i t was v e r y u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e n e c e s s a r y p r e p a r a t i o n s could b e
c o m p l e t e d w i t h i n t h e s h o r t t i m e a v a i l a b l e . A s p e c i a l s t a f f would b e
required f o r the purpose
I n t h e d i s c u s s i o n t h i s need was f u l l y a c c e p t e d , and i t was
r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e Chief o f S t a f f must b e c a r e f u l l y s e l e c t e d ,
THE COMMITTEE:
(a) R e s o l v e d t o a t t a c k S i c i l y i n 1943 w i t h t h e f a v o r a b l e J u l y
moon as t h e t a r g e t d a t e
@) Agreed t o i n s t r u c t G e n e r a l Eisenhower t o r e p o r t n o t l a t e r
(2) i n
t h a t e v e n t , t o confirm t h a t t h e d a t e w i l l n o t b e l a t e r t h a n
t h e f a v o r a b l e August moon
(c) Agreed t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g s h o u l d h e t h e Command s e t - u p for
the operation:
(1) General Eisenhower t o be i n Supreme Command w i t h General
r e s p o n s i b l e for
(e) I n s t r u c t e d t h e S e c r e t a r i e s t o d r a f t f o r t h e i r a p p r o v a l t h e
n e c e s s a r y d i r e c t i v e t o General Eisenhower conveying t h e
above d e c i s i o n s .
299
U.. S. SECRET
B R I T I S R MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
6 7 t h Meeting
PRESENT
General G. C. M a r s h a l l , USA
G e n e r a l S i r Alan F. Brooke
A d m i r a l E . J . King, USN
A d m i r a l of t h e F l e e t S i r Dudley
Pound
B r i g . General J . E. H u l l , USA
B r i g . General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
F i e l d Marshal S i r John D i l l
Vice A d m i r a l t h e Lord Louis
Mountbatten
Lt*
Sir
Ismay
Major General J . N . Kennedy
SECRETMIAT
B r i g a d i e r V.
Dykes
B r i g a d i e r E.
I. C. Jacob
300
u. s.
smEr
168)
S . C h i e f s of S t a f f
f o r t h e c o n d u c t of t h e war i n t h e P a c i f i c t h e a t e r i n 1 9 1 3 , a s
s e t o u t i n C.C.S.
2.
168.
PRESS COMMUNIQUEo
( P r e v i o u s r e f e r e n c e C.C.S.
6 1 s t V e e t i n g , Item I )
167)
house
3 01
U. S . SECRET
BRITISH YOST SECPET
The p r o v i s i o n of a d d i t i o n a l a i r b o r n e f o r c e s from t h e U. S. would
b e e s s e n t i a l s i n c e HUSKY would u s e up a l l B r i t i s h r e s o u r c e s i n t h i s
respect.
THE COMMITTEE:
Agreed t o d e f e r f i n a l acceptance of t h e p r o p o s a l s of t h e B r i t i s h
Chiefs of S t a f f pending f u r t h e r s t u d y .
4.
169)
169.
f o r c r o s s - c h a n n e l o p e r a t i o n s and s h o u l d , he t h o u g h t , be s e t up without
delay.
GENERAL MARSHALL a g r e e d t h a t a Supreme Commander would make a
top-heavy o r g a n i z a t i o n a t p r e s e n t , b u t thought t h a t i t was d e s i r a b l e t o
p u t a s p e c i a l s t a f f under a s e l e c t e d Chief of S t a f f of s u f f i c i e n t stand
i n g ; such an o f f i c e r would perhaps s u f f i c e f o r t h e cmmand of limitedcp
e r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e summer. T h i s s p e c i a l s t a f f c o u l d work o u t t h e i r
p l a n s on t h e b a s i s of c e r t a i n f o r c e s b e i n g a v a i l a b l e , even though t h e y
were n o t i n a c t u a l c o n t r o l of t h e t r o o p s themselves.
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h e s t a f f which was a t p r e s e n t working
on cross-channel o p e r a t i o n s belonged t o v a r i o u s Commanders i n t h e United
Kingdom. I t would be n e c e s s a r y t o t a k e them away from t h e i r p r e s e n t
Commanders and s e t them up independently.
302
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
THE COMMITTEE:
(a) Accepted t h e p r o p o s a l s c o n t a i n e d i n C.C.S.
169, except f o r
(c) A g r e e d t h a t a B r i t i s h C h i e f of S t a f f , t o g e t h e r w i t h a n
i n d e p e n d e n t U. S . - B r i t i s h s t a f f s h o u l d b e a p p o i n t e d a t once
f o r t h e c o n t r o l , p l a n n i n g and t r a i n i n g o f c r o s s - c h a n n e l
o p e r a t i o n s i n 1943.
(d) I n v i t e d t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f t o p r e p a r e f o r t h e i r
a p p r o v a l a d r a f t d i r e c t i v e t o g o v e r n t h e p l a n n i n g and conduct
of c r o s s - c h a n n e l o p e r a t i o n s i n 1943 i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e
d e c i s i o n s t o b e reached on C.C.S.
167.
LANDING CRAFT,
LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN gave an account o f t h e B r i t i s h e x p e r i e n c e s
i n b u i l d i n g up a n A s s a u l t F l e e t . H e d e s c r i b e d how t h e L.C.I.
B r o a d l y s p e a k i n g , t h e r e were l o c a l f o r c e s o r g a n i z e d f o r o p e r a t i o n s i n
home waters, w e s t e r n and e a s t e r n Mediterranean, and I n d i a . B e s i d e s t h e s e
l o c a l f o r c e s , t h e r e was an o v e r s e a s A s s a u l t Force w i t h a l i f t o f 30,000
303
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
p e r s o n n e l , 3,300 v e h i c l e s and 200 t a n k s . The purpose o f t h i s F o r c e was t o
r e i n f o r c e t h e l o c a l A s s a u l t F l e e t i n whichever t h e a t e r might be t h e cen
t e r of a c t i v e o p e r a t i o n s .
T h i s F o r c e would b e r e a d y t o s a i l f o r t h e
M e d i t e r r a n e a n by March 1 5 t h , t o t a k e p a r t i n HUSKY.
IIe d e s c r i b e d t h r e e i m p o r t a n t l e s s o n s of amphibious o p e r a t i o n s
which had s o f a r emerged:
(a) For any amphibious campaign i n v o l v i n g a s s a u l t s o n s t r o n g l y
defended c o a s t s h e l d by a determined enemy, i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t
t h e l a n d i n g s h i p s and c r a f t s h a l l b e o r g a n i z e d w e l l i n advance
i n t o p r o p e r a s s a u l t f l e e t s . T h e s e m u s t h a v e a coherence anddegree
as n e c e s s a r y f o r a s s a u l t f l e e t s as f o r n a v a l , m i l i t a r y and a i r
combat f o r m a t i o n s . T h i s was t h e o v e r r i d i n g l e s s o n o f Dieppe.
(b) No combined o p e r a t i o n c a n be c a r r i e d o u t w i t h r e a s o n a b l e
hope o f s u c c e s s w i t h o u t adequate beach r e c o n n a i s s a n c e beforehand.
He had now o r g a n i z e d s p e c i a l l y t r a i n e d beach r e c o n n a i s s a n c e par
L.C.G.)
a r o u n d d r a w i n g s o f a t y p e of a m p h i b i o u s c l o s e s u p p o r t v e s s e l
which had been d e s i g n e d f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . These s p e c i a l assault
c r a f t were p r i m a r i l y i n t e n d e d f o r R O U N D W , and none c o u l d b e r e a d y
i n time f o r HUSKY.
IIe t h e n handed around a t a b l e * showing t h e e s t i m a t e d a v a i l a b i l i t y
and L . C . I . ( L j .
He urged most s t r o n g l y t h a t a l l o c a t i o n s
t o t h e B r i t i s h of b o t h t h e s e t y p e s should be i n c r e a s e d t o make up t h e s e
deficiencies
H e c o n f i r m e d t h a t p r o v i s i o n s h a d a l r e a d y been made f o r
U.
S.
SECRET
S I I T I S H !?OST SECrlET
GENERAL SOMERVEU confirmed t h a t , s o f a r a s c o u l d be f o r e s e e n ,
s u f f i c i e n t l a n d i n g c r a f t c o u l d be made a v a i l a b l e f o r b o t h t h e
U. S. and
ADMIRAL K I N G drew a t t e n t i o n t o t h e g r e a t d i v e r s i t y of t y p e s of
B r i t i s h b u i l t s h i p s a n d c r a f t . He asked whether a g r e a t e r degree o f s t a n d
a r d i z a t i o n would n o t he p o s s i b l e . I n r e p l y LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN ex
p l a i n e d t h a t d i f f e r e n t types had been developed independently by t h e two
n a v i e s ; improvements had been made a s a r e s u l t of e x p e r i e n c e . Some
Of
f o r ROUNDUP, as
U. S . p o r t i o n as w e l l .
LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN s a i d t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n of t h e s e c r a f t
would need c a r e f u l e x a m i n a t i o n . I t m i g h t h e found b e s t t o s e n d t h e
drawings t o America s o t h a t they could be b u i l t i n U. S . yards.
THE COMNITTEE:
t o he a l l o c a t e d t o t h e
305
S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
(b) Took n o t e t h a t t h e U
can b e r e s t o r e d
and h a l f of t h i s p r o d u c t i o n a l l o c a t e d t o t h e B r i t i s h
(C) Took n o t e t h a t t h e g r e a t e s t n e e d s o f t h e B r i t i s h Combined
O p e r a t i o n s Naval Command were f o r :
(1) L.C.M. (3)
o f which a
were
a s a m a t t e r of g r e a t u r g e n c y , f o r l a n d i n g
c r a f t i n t h e United Kingdom, t o b e s u p p l i e d i n t h e f i r s t
i n s t a n c e on t h e r e q u i s i t i o n s a l r e a d y s u b m i t t e d t o t h e
U.
6.
75/3)
( P r e v i o u s r e f e r e n c e : C.C.S.
4 5 t h Meeting, I t e m 1)
S i m i l a r cases might o c c u r i n t h e f u t u r e ,
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
T a s k F o r c e C o m a n d e r t o t h e n a v a l component. of t h e t a s k f o r c e . He would
b e an o f f i c e r of e x p e r i e n c e a.nd d i s c r e t i o n and would avoid i s s u i n g o r d e r s
which would e n c r o a c h upon t h e a u t h o r i t y o f Task F o r c e Commanders. T l i e
c h a n n e l s were n o t r i g i d . Taking t h e example of' I ~ I ~ S l ~ he
Y , explained t h a t
t h e A i r Comnander w i t h Geueral I-isenhower woul(1 have t,wo main f u n c t i o n s
a p a r t from a d v i s i n g t h e Supreme Commander. He v o u l d a r r a n g e f o r t h e a i r
bombardment r e y u i r e d t o s o f t e n t h e d e f e n s e s o f tile i s l a n d , and command
t h e a i r forces a l l o t t e d t o t h i s task.
He ir'oulr! a l s o answer c a l l s f o r
a s s i s t a n c e f r m t h e t a s k f o r r e s . There would be
110
o b j e c t i o n t o such
B r i t i s h o p e r a t i o n s a s set o u t i n C.C.S.
207
75/.1.
SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
S
ANNEX
LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT
E s t i m a t e d A v a i l a b i l i t y o f B r i t i s h Types
Numbers
Estimated T o t a l A v a i l s b l e ,
existing
a l l o w i n g for a t t r i t i o n , on
December
1, 1942.
Landing Ships
A p r i l 1, 1943
Aug. l i 1943
Infantry (Large)
White E n s i g n
4 (a)
In f a n t ry (Large )
Red h s i g n
10
15
15
I n f a n t r y (Medium)
13
15
22
"
"
"
"
"
Landing C r a f t
I
(Small)
(IJand h o i s t i n g :
Headquarter
Tank, Class I
Stern
Gantry
15.
55
13
38
Tank, Mark I
"
n
"
"
"
"
I1
"
I11
102
109
119
"
IV
44
142
233
125
161
201
15
32
Mechanized, Mark I
I n f a n t r y (Small)
274
Assault
402 ( b )
624 ( c )
195
195
55
55
F l a k (Large)
16
26
s u p p o r t (L8 r ge )
12
24
49
69
380
380
380
P e r s o n n e l (Small)
(Medium)
(Medium)
Landina Barges
( c ) I n c l u d e s 150 b u i l d i n g i n I n d i a .
308
U.
S , SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
ANNEX
LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT ( C o n t ' d )
April
sked
for
"
Dock
Craft
Tank
"
11
"
*
105
P
--
1, 1' 1
A1 location
proposed
by USN
Dept.
68
Short
ksked
for
37
150
ust 1. 1
A1loca
tion
proposed
by VSN
Dept.
Short
84
66
5
Mark V
150
150
646
150
194
150
762
762
832
Vehicles
293
299
299
299
150
150
501
I n f a n t r y (Large)
150
P e r s o n n e l (LargeFSRarnped)
?
44
?
160
-
t h e remainder running.
309
L. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
6 6 t h Meeting
COMBINED CHXEFS OF STAFF
MINUTES of Meeting h e l d a t Anfa Camp
on Sat.urday, J a n u a r y 23, 1943, a t 1000.
PRESENT
General G . C. b l a r s h a l l , USA
Admiral E . J. King, USN
L t . G e n e r a l H. H . Arnold, IJSA
G e n e r a l S i r Alan F. Brooke
Admiral o f t h e F l e e t S i r Dudley
Pound
A i r Chief Marshal S i r C h a r l e s
F. A. P o r t a l
SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r V . Dykes
3 10
U S SECRET
B R I T I S H M O S T SFCRET
ixmro
UIJ I LO-UP
(C.C.S.
172)
GEKERAL SOjiEP\'i:LL
s a i ~ dt h a t h i s p a p e r h a d b e e n p r e p a r e d i n
c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t t i Lord L . e a t h e r s , and t h e f i g u r e s o f I i .
9 . troops to
The f i g u r e s
the y e a r
In t h i s
i v c r h virar!s w o i r l d b e u s e d o f i n c r e a s i n g the
nunllier o f
d u r i n g the
suiiiiwr
ships
c n r r y i rig
TlIL CCi'. ',iI'j-TLL:
Took n o t e of ?lamer
(.~.('.!.t ~ T ; > .
(C
.c
5..
lf7)
(Previous rpference C . C , . F .
C 7 t h Ileeting, I t e m 3 )
I t a p p e a r e d t , l , a t t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of tiie i - r i t , i s l i a i r b o r n e d i v i
s i o n referred t o
n f HI?,IiY
j ~ p
i aragravi!
WBC
7'1:e d i s n a t c i i of a n b . n : ~ r i r a i s airborr:e d i v i s i o n t o t h e I h i t e d
< , v e r s e a s n o n l d b e r e q u i r e d f o r !II:?KY
The c h i e f d i f f i c u l t y l a y i n t h e
p r o v i s i o n of t h e n e c e s s a r y a i r t r a n s p o r t s , b u t t h e s e c o u l d b e moved
a c r o s s t,o t h e U . R
g o by sea
The I J . S
C h i e f s of S t a f f c o n s i d e r e d it m o s t d e s i r a b l e t h a t any
o p e r a t i o n of t h e t y p e mentioned i n p a r a g r a p h 2 (a) o f t h e p a p e r ; e g
,,
a g a i n s t t h e Channel I s l a n d s , s h o u l d b e c o o r d i n a t e d i n t i m e w i t h HUSKY
A s r e g a r d s t h e l a r g e r o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t the C o t e n t i n P e n i n s u l a ,
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H KOST SECRET
must b e made c l e a r t h a t t h e p l a n was o n l y t o b e b a s e d on t h e U.
S.
r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e a t t h a t t i m e i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom. F i r s t p r i o r i t y
167 s u b j e c t t o the
r e s e r v a t i o n s of t h e T J ~ S . C h i e f s o f S t a f f r e c o r d e d above.
3.
170)
THE COX+IIIITTEE:
(a) ~4pprovedt h e d r a f t s u b m i t t e d by t h e S e c r e t a r i e s , s u b j e c t t o
minor amendments a g r e e d i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n , and t h e i n c l u s i o n
of a p a r a g r a p h on t h e BOLERO b u i l d - - u p b a s e d on C.C.S.
(b)
172.
I n s t r u c t e d t h e S e c r e t a r i e s t o p r e p a r e and s u b m i t a f i n a l
d r a f t forthwith.
OPEXATION HUSKY--DIRECTIVE
TO GENERAL EISENHOWER.
(c.c.s.
171)
GENEIlAL. MAXSHALL proposed c e r t a i n amendments t o t h e t e x t of t h e
d r a f t d i r e c t i v e , which were a c c e p t e d
Q::
THE COMMITTEE:
t o t r a n s m i t i t t o General Eisenhower
5.
LANDING CRAFT.
d u r i n g t h e n e x t f o u r months t o p r o v i d e
B r i t i s h L.C.A.
*::
He m i g h t have t o s e n d
from F o r c e J ( t h e Channel A s s a u l t F o r c e ) f o r t h e U .
S u b s e q u e n t l y p u b l i s h e d a s C.C.S.
S u b s e q u e n t l y p u b l i s h e d a s C.C.S.
3 12
172/1.
171/1.
s.
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
b u t i t w a s e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e s e s h o u l d be r e p l a c e d i n
s h a r e of HUSKY,
t i m e t o e n a b l e c r o s s - c h a n n e l o p e r a t i o n s t o be u n d e r t a k e n t h i s summer.
A l l L C.A.
400 S c r i p p s - F o r d
c o n v e r s i o n e n g i n e s a t t h e r a t e of 100 a month f o r t h e
t o make
up U. S . r e q u i r e m e n t s . Otherwise, t h e r e would be no f o r c e a v a i l a b l e f o r
cross-channel
o p e r a t i o n s . Once b r o k e n u p , t h i s f o r c e would b e v e r y
d i f f i c u l t t o re-form
again.
ADXIRAT, K I N G s a i d t h a t no f i r m promise c o u l d b e g i v e n t h a t t h i s
where produc
1:e u n d e r t o o k t o s e e what c o u l d be
done
THE COMMITTEE:
(a) Agreed t h a t i t was most d e s i r a b l e f o r t h e Channel A s s a u l t
Force t o be k e p t i n b e i n g f o r c r o s s - c h a n n e l o p e r a t i o n s t h i s
summer.
(b) Took n o t e t h a t t h e U. S. would endeavor t o p r o v i d e t h e nec
e s s a r y e n g i n e s f o r any L.C.A.
a i n d u r i n g t h e coming months..
3 13
h u l l s produced i n G r e a t B r i t
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
5 3 t h Meeting
FI1ESENT
General G C M a r s h a l l , U S A
Admiral E. J . King, IJSN
L t . General H. H. Arnold, U S A
A i r Cnief i l a r s h a l S i r C h a r l e s
F. A. P o r t a l
F i e l d ?darshal S i r John D i l l
B r i g . General J . E. H u l l , USA
~
L t . General S i r H a s t i n g s L. Ismay
~cenera1
i
A~
. C . .wedemeyer, USA
SECRET An I AT
B r i g a d i e r V. D y k e s
B r i g . G e n e r a l J . 3. Deane, USA
3 14
T!IE C03NITTEE:
(a) AArePd, a f t e r d i s c u s s i o n ,
C.C.S.
t o a number o f a.mendments t o
170j'l.
(b) I n s t r u c t e d t h e S e c r e t a r i e s t o i n c o r p o r a t e t h e s e amendments
i n a f i n a l r e p o r t : : : t o be submitted t o t h e P r e s i d e n t and
prime V i n i s t e r .
2.
( C . C .S
. 1 7 1 / 1 /C)
T I E COMMITTEE:
(a) Agreed t o an amendment t o t h e d i r e c t i v e t o General Eisenhower
(C .C.S.
in C.C.S.
171il/D)
c o n s e q u e n t upon t h e amendments a g r e e d t o
17012.
ASSAULT SHIPPING.
as far a s p o s s i b l e i n t h e l a r g e r type of l a n d i n g c r a f t a n d n o t in a s s a u l t
shipping.
THE COMMITTEE:
Took n o t e :
(a) O f t h e n o t e by Lord L e a t h e r s .
(b) That the B r i t i s h Chiefs o f S t a f f would submit p r o p o s a l s f o r
r e d u c i n g t o t h e minimum t h e u s e of l a r g e p a s s e n g e r s h i p s as
assault ships.
4.
*
%::
Subsequently c i r c u l a t e d a s C.C.S.
l';u;2.
Yubsequently c i r c u l a t e d as C . C . S .
T7FlXI
315
U.. S. SECRET
B R I T I S K MOST SECRET
C h i e f s of S t a f f t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e U .
S. p o i n t o f v i e w and o f t h e f i n e
and B r i t i s h S t a f f s .
S . C h i e f s of S t a f f . A g r e a t s t e p f o r w a r d had been
t a k e n i n a g r e e i n g upon a b a s i c s t r a t e g y f o r t h e f u t u r e p r o s e c u t i o n of
t h e war.
S I R CHARLES PORTAL s a i d he was s u r e he was s p e a k i n g on b e h a l f of
a l l t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f i n e x p r e s s i n g h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e
317
U. S. S E C P E T
B t I T I S H NOST SECPET
ANNEX
I and my a d v i s e r s a r e much c o n c e r n e d b y t h e p r e s e n t p o l i c y of
u s i n g l a r g e passenger s h i p s as L.S.I.
I know t h a t L . S . I . ( L ) ' s
(L) Is.
a r e e s s e n t i a l t o t h e s u c c e s s of l a r g e
i n TORCH, we a l s o l o s t 5
o t h e r l a r g e t r o o p s h i p s i n t h e o p e r a t i o n ; t h e t o t a l t r o o p i n g c a p a c i t y of
t h e 8 s h i p s was over 21,000.
The l o s s e s t o b e e x p e c t e d i n f u t u r e a s s a u l t o p e r a t i o n s on a l a r g e
s c a l e a g a i n s t determined o p p o s i t i o n a r e bound t o be much h i g h e r . W
e must
r e a l i z e t h a t f u r t h e r heavy l o s s e s o f t h i s t y p e of s h i p would have a
c r i p p l i n g e f f e c t on our s t r a t e g y by d e s t r o y i n g our a b i l i t y t o c a r r y out
large-scale
t r o o p i n g movements, a s r e p l a c e m e n t of t h i s t y p e of s h i p is
impossible.
t o help
We c o u l d , o f c o u r s e , make up t o t h e Americans t h e l o s s i n t h e i r
t r o o p i n g c a p a c i t y by l e n d i n g them some of our t r o o p s h i p s .
(Signed) LEBTHERS
J a n u a r y 23, 1913.
318
17 S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
INDEX
A
Aegean, Opening t h e , 28
Agend~a of t h e C,onference
S u g g e s t e d p r o c e d u r e for d e a l i n g
w i t h t h e , 2 0 , 2.19
Agreements on N o r t h A f r i c a c o a s t
command, 251
Agreements r e a c h e d a s t o c o n d u c t of
w a r i n 1943, 16, 18
Aid t o R u s s i a , V.S.,
17, 22, 72, 75,
1492
255, 264
A i r Command
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , System o f , i n , 78
124
Aircraft
c r a f t f a r t h e d e f e n s e of Trade Com
A i r F o r c e s i n T u n i s i a , 140
t i o n , 136
Allied
Yanpower, 219
P l a n s r e l a t i n g t o T u r k e y , 23, 257
P a c i f i c , 17, i g
A l l o c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s o u t l i n e d by
General M a r s h a l l , 170
Amphibious o p e r a t i o n s f r o m t h e
U n i t e d Kingdom, 122
A N A K I M , 21, 283
Burma, R e c o n q u e s t o f , 12
ANFA C o n f e r e n c e
M e e t i n g , M i n u t e s o f , 134
Annex
M i n u t e s 6 1 a t M e e t i n g , 253
M i n u t e s 6 7 t h M e e t i n g , 308
M i n u t e s 6 9 t h M e e t i n g , 317
A n t i s u b m a r i n e W a r f a r e , 196
A s s a u l t s h i p p i n g , 315
Assistance t o Russia i n r e l a t i o n t o
A t l a n t i c , 45
n
B e r l i n , P a i d s on, 245
S h i p p i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r , 129
E n c l o s u r e I'AI',
130
F , a c l o s u r e "B", 1 3 1
E n c l o s u r e IICII, A s s u m p t i o n s f o r
c a l c u l a t i o n s o f 11. S . s h i p p i n g
c a p a b i l i t i e s u n d e r plan a d o p t e d
f o r 1943, 132
by C.C.S.
Bomber o f f e n s i v e from N o r t h A f r i c a ,
Bomber o f f e n s i v e f r o m t h e I!nited
Bombing A x i s o i l s o u r c e % , 124
B r i t i s h agreement f o r B r i t i s h
e f f o r t s a g a i n s t Japan u n n e c e s s a r y ,
244
B r i t i s h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Turkey,
267
B r i t i s h w i l l handle Turkish m a t t e r s ,
124
Burma, O p e r a t i o n s i n ,
Reconquest o f , 12
B u s i n e s s , F u t u r e , 275
II
C
C a l c o l a t i o n s of T u r k i s h equipment
and n e e d s , 139
C a p t u r e of D o d e c a n e s e , 2 8 , 145
Cxang X a i - s h e k d e s i r e s p o s t p o n e
China
Communications, O v e r l a n d , w i t h , l a
Improvement of a i r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n
into,
123
U . S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
Imm
Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f
F i n a l r e p o r t t o The P r e s i d e n t a n d
s i o n s b y t h e , 117
Memorandum by t h e , 109
M i n u t e s o f m e e t i . n g s , 269
Papers, I
C o m b i n e d S t r a t e g y , 184
Command
D a k a r , F r e n c h Vest A f r i c a , s t r a
t e g i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and s e t u p f o r ,
24 9
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , i n t h e , 269, i i g
249
P a c i f i c T h e a t e r , i n t h e 9 5 , ?a1
Conference
C o n c l u s i o n o f t h e , 315
D r a f t r e p o r t on t h e w o r k o f t h e ,
10 2
P u b l i c a t i o n o f r e s u l t s of t h e , 252
C o n t i n e n t a l o p e r a t i o n s i n 1943, g o ,
301, 311
Convoy, 46
m a t e o f , 50
23 0
124
System o f
A i r , i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n , 78
Combined l : . S . - B r i t i s h
Operations
for, 1, 3 0 6
V n i f i e d command f o r combined o p e r
ations, I
Command, c o n t r o l , p l a n n i n g a n d
t r a i n i n g f o r o p e r a t i o n s f o r a re
C h a n n e l , b e g i n n i n g i n 1943, P r o
posed o r g a n i z a t i o n o f , 9 9 , 302
Commanders
Land, n a v a l and a i r , 2
Supreme, 2
Task f a r c e , 2
Commitments
T u r k e y , Our m i l i t a r y , t o , 35
Communications
C h i n a , O v e r l a n d , w i t h , 12
D e f e n s e of t r a d e , U n i t e d N a t i o n s '
r e q u i r e m e n t s of s h a r e - b a s e d air
craft f o r the, 54
J a p a n e s e , II
S e a , o f t h e r l n i t e d N a t i o n s , Minimum
t h e , 45, 5 7 , log
E n c l o s u r e IfA", 50
Enclosure "B", 5 1
Enclosure "C", 5 2
E n c l o s u r e " D I f , 53
E n c l o s u r e IfEI', 5 4
C o m m u n i q u e , P r e s s , 301
Conclusion o f t h e Conference,
C o n d u c t o f t h e War i n 1943, 1 6 , ~ b ,
C r a f t , L a n d i n g , 303, 3 1 2
D e f e a t of t h e ['Boat,
16, 18
D e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e O f f e n s i v e , a7
Directive
A l l i e d F x p e d i t i o n a r y Force i n North
A f r i c a , To C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f ,
G e n e r a l E i s e n h o w e r , t o 312, 31.5
O p e r a t i o n HUSKY, 125, 127
P o d e c a n e s e , C a p t n r e o f , 28, 145
Draft--Operation
HUSKY, 125
D r a f t r e p o r t O n t h e work o f t h e
C o n f e r e n c e , 102
of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d t h e P r i m e
M i n i s t e r of Great B r i t a i n t o P r e
315
Eastern Theater,
226
LT. S. S E C R E T
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
S i t u a t i o n t o be c r e a t e d i n , 4,
Enclosure "A", 4
INDEX
236
Enclosure %",
7
Eisenhower, G e n e r a l , D i r e c t i v e t o ,
3122315
D e s c r i p t i o n of a i r f i e l d s u s e d by
A l l i e d F o r c e s , 136
Proposal f o r c o n d u c t i o n of f o r t h
coming o p e r a t i o n , 135
Review of s i t u a t i o n on h i s f r o n t ,
135
A f r i c a , 223
Enemyls f i g h t i n g v a l u e , 137
E n t r y of Turkey i n t o t h e War on t h e
s i d e o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , 23
E q u i p m e n t , S u p p l y of ( T u r k e y ) , 38
Escort
C a r r i e r s , United Nations I r e q u i r e
ments o f , 53
Convoy, r e q u i r e m e n t s , D e t a i l e d e s
timate of, 50
Requirements t o m a i n t a i n t h e sea
c o m m u n i c a t i o n 8 of t h e Unit&
N a t i o n s , Xinimam, 45
E n c l o s u r e "A", so
E n c l o s u r e "Bit; $1
E n c l o s u r e FIG", $2
E n c l o s u r e "D", 53
E n c l o s a r e 'lE"; 54
R e q u i r e m e n t s , World-wide e s t i m a t e
o f , of F l e e t D e s t r o y e r s and ocean-.
g o i n g e s c o r t vessels, 5 1
V e s s e l s , 243
Enropean T h e a t e r
S t r a t e g i c c o n c e p t f o r 1943 i n t h e ,
F l e e t Destroyers
R e q u i r e r e n t s o f , and o c e a n - g o i n g
e s c o r t vessels, World-wide e s t i m a t e
o f , 51
F r e n c h F o r c e s i n N o r t h A f r i c a , Em
ployment o f , 223
F n t u r e b u s i n e s s , 275
G
G i r a n d , G e n e r a l , Meeting w i t h , 259
H
E a r t l e y Committee, The, 40, 43
70
D i r e c t i v e , IZS
G e n e r a l E i s e n h o w e r , t o , 312 315
Draft? rag
E n c l o s u r e " A " , 64
E n c l o s u r e "B", F o r c e s R e q u i r e d , 68
I c e l a n d , 229
I n d i a n Ocean S i t u a t i o n ,
177
208
S t r a t e g y i n t h e , 202
J
F
F i n a l R e p o r t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t and
Prime M i n i s t e r summarizing d e c i
s i o n s by t h e Combined C h i e f s of
S t a f f , 117
F i n a n c i a l and economic a s s i s t a n c e
f o r T u r k e y , 34
F i ~ emain l i n e s o f a c t i o n i n Enro
Japanese
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s , 11
S t r a t e g y , 184
J o i n t I n t e l l i g e n c e Subcommittee
R e p o r t , E x t r a c t s f r o m , 41
L
Landing C r a f t ,
303>
312
S SECRET
INDEX
!1
Operation
Meeting
P'FP,
'34
Annex t o 5 1 s t , X i n u t e s , 25.7
Annex t o 6 7 t h , M i n u t e s , ,308
Annex t o 6 9 t h , M i n u t e s , 317
c.c.s., 1 S q
G e n e r a l G i r a u d , w i t h , 250
SYYHOL, 117
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , 20
A i r command, S y s t e m o f , in t h e , 7 8
Command i n t h e , 260
N a v a l s i t u a t i o n in t h e W e s t e r n , 215
O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e , 110, 118, 159
Y e o p e n i n g t h e , 47
Memorandum by t h e Combined Chiefs of
S t a f f , 109
Military
A s s i s t a n c e t o T u r k e y , I n i t i a l , 25
r o m m i t m e n t s t o T u r k e y , Our, 35
l i i n u t e s of M e e t i n g s ,
Annex t o , 6 1 s t , 257
Annex t o , h 7 t h , 308
Pnnex t o , O g t h , 317
114
A N A K T M , 12, 14, 2 1 , h o , b a ,
BOLPFO, 1 1 3 , L Z L , 24'1, 911
Shipping c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r , build-~
129
F n c l o s u r e IIAII,
mlclosnre "B",
'~30
13,
~
~ for ~
c a l c u l a t i o n s o f 11. S. s h i p p i n g
c a p a b i l i t i e s under p l a n adopted
f o r ~ 9 4 ~ 31, 3 2
by C . C . S
HUSKY, 58, 0 3 , 27;
A l t e r n a t i v e jCA'l, s g
A l t e r n a t i v e IIHII, s y
D i r e c t i v e , 12s
A l l i e d P x p e d i t i o n a r y Force in
N o r t h A f r i c a , t.o Commaocler- i n
Chief, 127
E I I C I O ~ ~ Titril,
~
D r a f t , 125
? n c l o s u r e "AtI, 6 4
~~~h~~~~
lwti,
i w p i w a h,,
E n c l o s u r e "Ctl, I'xamina.tion o f l a r ~
l i e s t Date o f A s s a u l t , 7 0
T a r g e t d a t e , 1i;S
SLEDGEtlkWTQ, 1.: '1
UNDERBFILY, 14 6
Operations
R u r m a , J a n u a r y - P p r l l , , 9 4 3 , in, 1 1 ,
~
213
A f r i c a , 1x5, 1 2 4
Naval s i t u a t i o n i n t h e W e s t e r n
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , 24~5
North Africa
Bomber o f f e n s i v e f r o m , T h e , 44,
C o n t i n e n t a l , i n 1 n . 1 ~go,
~ :lol. ~ ( 1 1
C o t e n t i n P e n i n s u l a . 722
E a s t e r n T h e a t e r , 6 , 8, ~xg
E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r , i n t h e , 18
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , i n t h e , 'LIO, 118,
268
rmployment of F r e n c h F o r c e s i n , 223
S i t n a t i o n i n , T h e , 135 199; 208
Offensive
Bomber, f r o m N o r t h Africa,
2
me, 44,
68
B o m b e r , f r o m t h e l i n i t e d Kingdom,
21, 8 6 , 8 8 , 279
P e v e l o p m e n t of t h e ( T n r k e y ) ,
O i l
h i s , p o s i t i o n , 40, 115, 124,
27
';9
S o u t h w e s t P a c i f i c , ~n t h e , 2 2
S y s t e m o f command f o r c o m b i n e d
S y s t e m o f u o t f i e d command f o r
combined, 1
T n r k e y , s u b s e q u e n t , ag
U n i t e d Kingdom, i n a n d f r o m t h e ,
112, 121.
164
O r g a n i z a t i o n o f command, c o n t r o l ,
p l a n n i n g a n d t r a i n i n g f o r cross-
c h a n n e l , 9 9 , 302
O v e r l a n d communications w i t h China,
12
255
S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
INDEX
P
P a c i f i c , The, 47
P a c i f i c Theater
Conduct of t h e W a r i n t h e , g S r 114,
1.22~
301
F a r E a s t and, 167
Plans
T u r k e y , A l l i e d , r e l a t i n g t o , 23?
Russia-continned
R e l a t i o n t o o t h e r commitments, i n ,
109, 1x7
Russian air a s s i s t a n o e f o r P.Q.
c o n v o y s , 230
Sea eoimnnicatians,
257
1x7, 155
Shipging
A s s a u l t , 315
BOLERO build-up,
P o l i s h F o r c e s , p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of,
24 4
P r e s s Communique, 301
Prime M i n i s t e r t s a p p r a i s a l o f Tnrk
i s h s i t u a t i o n , 150
P r o g r a m of M e e t i n g s , r e v i s e d , 253
P r o p o s e d o r g a n i z a t i o n o f command,
c o n t r o l , p l a n n i n g and t r a i n i n g f o r
operations for a reentry t o the
C o n t i n e n t a c r o s a t h e C h a n n e l , be
g i n n i n g i n 1 9 4 3 ~g g l 302
P r o v i s i o n a l d a t e f o r ANAKIM a s s a u l t ,
123
P u b l i c a t i o n of r e s u l t s
c o n f e r e n c e , 252
of t h e
R
R a i d s on B a p l i n , 245
R e c a p t u r e of P h i l i p p i n e s , d i s c u s s i o n
o f , 93
Reconquest of Burma, l a
R e e n t r y t o t h e C o n t i n e n t across
t h e C h a n n e l , b e g i n n i n g i n 1943?
P r o p o s e d o r g a n i z a t i o n of command,
c o n t r o l , p l a n n i n g and t r a i n i n g f o r
o p e r a t i o n s for ai 9gr 302
R e p o r t t o The P r e s i d e n t and P r i m e
M i n i s t e r , loap 109, 291 312. 315
E n c l o s u t e , Draft R e p o r t on thework
of t h e Conference, 102
F i n a l , summarizing d e c i s i o n s by t h e
Combined Chiefs of S t a f f , 117
Russia
A s s i s t a n c e t o , 17, 2er 72, 7 S 1 155
s e c u r i t y of
capabilities for,
129
E n c l o s u r e A, 130
E n c l o s u r e B, 131
E n c l o s a r e C, 132
C a p a b i l i t i e s u n d e r p l a n a d o p t e d by
C . C . S . for 1 9 4 3 ~ A s s u m p t i o n s f o r
c a l c u l a t i o n s of U ; S.,
132
HUSKY, p r o v i s i o n o f , 6 1
1997 208
S i t u a t i o n t o be c r e a t e d i n E a s t e r n
Theater, 4
Enclosure A, 4
Enclosure B, 7
SLEDGEHAMMER, O p e r a t i o n , 145
S t a l i n , Premier
Draft t e l e g r a m from t h e P r e s i d e n t
of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d P r i m e
M i n i s t e r of G r e a t B r i t a i n t o , 84,
282,
293
S t a t e of German A i r F o r c e , 179
S t r a t e g i c c o n c e p t for 1943 i n t h e
E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r , T h e , 208
S t r a t e g i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and command
s e t - u p f o r D a k a r , F r e n c h West
A f r i c a , 249
Strategy
C o m b i n e d , 184
E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r , i n t h e , 202
264
U S SECRET
B R I T I S K MOST SECRET
INDEX
Summarizing d e c i s i o n s by t h e Com
bined C h i e f s of S t a f f , F i n a l r e p o r t
i s t e r , 117
Summary of c u r r e n t c o n f e r e n c e s by
S i r Alan Brooke, 143
S u p p l i e s t o R u s s i a , 222
S u p p l y of e q u i p m e n t ( T u r k e y ) , 38
Turkey--continned
Offensive, Development o f t h e , 27
P h a s e 11--Subsequent o p e r a t i o n s
29
System of
Command, a i r , i n t h e Mediterranean,
78
o p e r a t i o n s , I> 306
[ J n i f i e d command f o r c o m b i n e d
operations, 1
Recommendations, 34
damped i n t o , 37
Slrbaeqnent o p e r a t i o n s
P h a s e I , a8
P h a s e 11, ag
Summary, 31
E n c l o s u r e "A", 34
E n c l o s u r e " B " , 35
E n c l o s u r e " C " , 37
E n c l o s n r e "D", 38
SYMROL,
1.17
Telegram f r o m The P r e s i d e n t of t h e
t e r of G r e a t B r i t a i n t o P r e m i e r
S t a l i n , 8 4 9 282, 293
Theater
E a s t e r n , s i t n a t i o n t o be c r e a t e d
i n , 4, 226 236
E n c l o s u r e "A", 4
Enclosure "B", 7
European
S t r a t e g i c concept f o r 1943 i n t h e ,
208
S t r a t e g y i n t h e , 202
P a c i f i c , conduct of t h e War i n t h e ,
9Sj 301
A l l i e d p l a n s r e l a t i n g t o , 23r 257
B r i t i s h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r , 267
Commitments, Onr m i l i t a r y , t o , 35
Conclusions, 32
E n t r y o f , i n t o t h e W a r on t h e s i d e
o f t h e United Nations,, 23
F i n a n c i a l and e c o n o m i c a s s i s t a n c e
for, 34
M i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e t o , I n i t i a l , 25
M i l i t a r y commitments t o , Oar; 35
U-.Boat
T h r e a t , T h e , 47
Warfare, ao , 277
U n i t e d Kingdom
Bomber o f f e n s i v e from t h e ,
21, 8 6
8 8 , 279
Dry c a r g o import s i t u a t i o n . 4 5
O p e r a t i o n s i n and f r o m t h e : I 12
1
164
1 ~
United Nations
A i r c r a f t f o r t h e d e f e n s e of 1 r a . d
c ommnnications, r e q u i r e m e n t s rrf
shore--based, 54
U n i t e d S t a t e s , a i d t o R u s s i a , 17,
155
264
United S t a t e s Forces f o r C o n t i n e n t a l
o p e r a t i o n s , IZL
United S t a t e s t r o o p s t o U K . , 284
Iv
War
Conduct o f ,
301
W a r f a r e , A n t i s n b m a r i n e , 196
West A f r i c a
Naval and a i r command i n , x i s 9 1.24
Dakar, S t r a t e g i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
a n d command s e t - u p f o r , 249
C A S A B L A N C A
C O N F E R E N C E
JANUARY
19U3
MINUTES OF MEETINGS
Offrce, U. S. Secretary
1w3
SECRET
TABLE OF CONTENTS
MINUTES
PAGE
J.C.S.
5 0 t h Meeting (Casablanca)
President's V i s i t
Agenda f o r Coming Conferences
F u r t h e r Conferences
A d m i r a l G l a s s f o r d ' s Report
J.C.S.
J.C.S.
13
P r i o r i t y Rombing Program
Command i n England
O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Mediterranean
Landing C r a f t
General S t r a t e g i c P o l i c i e s
J.C.S.
5 3 r d M eeting (Casablanca)
22
P a c i f i c and F a r E a s t T h e a t e r
A t t i t u d e of S t a l i n towards U . S.
Landing C r a f t
Continental Operations
Operations i n S i c i l y
U. S. Aid t o R u s s i a
S y n t h e t i c Rubber Program
Report of Conversation between t h e Prime M i n i s t e r
and Admiral King
General Somervell on Tonnage, V i s i t t o R u s s i a , and
Command of Eisenhower
O p e r a t i o n i n Far E a s t and Mediterranean
O b j e c t i o n s t o B r i t i s h Concern i n our S t r a t e g i c T h e a t e r
S t r a t e g i c P o l i c y Considered i n Mediterranean & Far E a s t
iii
27
SECRET
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
J.C.S.
5 5 t h Meeting
(Casablanca)
Conduct o f War i n 1943
32
S y n t h e t i c Rubber Program
Command Set-up f o r Dakar-French
North-West A f r i c a
Required P r e s i d e n t i a l Action
P l a n n i n g S t a f f f o r HUSKY
5 6 t h M eeting (Casablanca) .
Commitments t o Turkey
37
Dodecanese O p e r a t i o n
U.
S. Aid t o R u s s i a
General S t r a t e g i c P l a n f o r 1943
Shipping f o r 0 p e r a . t i o n i n t h e P a c i f i c
5 7 t h Meeting (Casablanca)
Despatches from' Eisenhower and Hurley
A n t i suhmar i n e :car f a r e
41
ANAKIM
D r a f t Telegram t o M. Sta1i:i
A s s a u l t Date f o r O p e r a t i o n HUSKY
E v i c t i o n of Axis from T u n i s i a
T r a i n i n g of French P i l o t s
J.C.S.
5 8 t h X eeting
(Casablanca)
45
D r a f t Ileply t o M. S t a l i n
O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Southwest P a c i f i c
HUSW
J.C.S.
5 9 t h M eeting (Casablanca)
C o n t i n e n t a l O p e r a t i o n s i n 1943
Shipping C a p a b i l i t i e s f o r BOLERO Build-up
O p e r a t i o n HUSW
47
SECRET
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
51
58
Antisubmarine Warfare
Operation RAVENOUS
Operations in Tunisia
. .
. 67
SECRET
J.C.S.
5 0 t h Meeting
(Casablanca)
J O I N T CHIEFS OF STAFF
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held on Wednesday, J a n u a r y 13, 1943, a t 1500
MEMBERS PRESENT
G e n e r a l G.
C . M a r s h a l l , USA
SECRETARY
B r i g . General J . R . Deane, IJSA
L t . General M. W.
C l a r k , USA
and
Mr.
Reilly
SECrlET
1.
P!ESIDENT'S VISIT.
REILLY
V i s i t
in
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t h e f e l t t h e P r e s i d e n t , on t h e r e t u r n
t r i p , s h o u l d r e t u r n t o Marrakech and remain t h e r e long enough t o change
p l a n e s and t h e n have a n i g h t f l i g h t t o L i b e r i a .
MR. REILLY a s k e d i f t h e L i b e r i a n t r i p was n e c e s s a r y , and a l l
a g r e e d t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t would i n s i s t upon i t .
A l l a g r e e d t h a t i t would be d e s i r a b l e if t h e P r e s i d e n t and t h e
b u s i n e s s of t h e coming c o n f e r e n c e s .
ADVIRAL K I N G i m p l i e d t h a t he thought t h e y s h o u l d f i r s t d i s c u s s
world-wide s t r a t e g y , our b a s i c s t r a t e g i c concept.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Manpower.
hfunitions and equipment.
Manpower v s . munitions and equipment.
T h a t p a r t of t h e t o t a l e f f o r t t h a t s h o u l d b e d i r e c t e d
a g a i n s t Germany and a g a i n s t J a p a n .
ADMIRAL K I N G s t a t e d t h a t h e b e l i e v e d w e s h o u l d d i s c u s s world-wide
s t r a t e g y f i r s t b e f o r e g e t t i n g t o s p e c i f k c o p e r a t i o n s and t h a t w e should
r e s i s t any e f f o r t on t h e p a r t of t h e D r i t i s h t o d e v i a t e from t h i s .
GENERAL MARSHALL r e p e a t e d t h a t h e b e l i e v e d t h a t even i n t h e c a s e
of world-wide
s t r a t e g y , t h e B r i t i s h t h o u g h t would be a t a l l times d i
t i on BRIMSTONE.
GENERAL SOXERVELL s a i d t h a t i f we can c l e a r t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n ,
he e s t i m a t e d t h a t we could save i n f i v e months 1,825,000 t o n s o f s h i p p i n g ;
H e s a i d t h a t , f i g u r i n g t h e l o s s e s o n t h e same ra t e t h a t t h e y were
s u s t a i n e d i n t h e TORCH O p e r a t i o n , O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE c o u l d b e accom
p l i s h e d w i t h t h e l o s s of 45 s h i p s . He a l s o thought t h a t s e c u r i n g S i c i l y
would be e s s e n t i a l t o opening t r a f f i c i n t h e Mediterranean.
3
SECRET
GENERAL CLARK q u e s t i o n e d t h i s , s t a t i n g t h a t he f e l t w e c o u l d
p r o t e c t t r a f f i c through t h e Mediterranean by a i r coverage from T u n i s i a .
GENERAL ARNOLD a s k e d what t h e B r i t i s h l o s s e s had b e e n i n t h e
M a 1t a o p e r a t i o n .
w e have employed n i g h t f i g h t e r s t o p r o t e c t i t .
ADMIRAL COOKE s a i d t h a t a t p r e s e n t it looked as though w e would
n o t e x p e l t h e Germans from T u n i s i a u n t i l s p r i n g by which time w e would
have some 500,000 t r o o p s i n A f r i c a . The q u e s t i o n would t h e n a r i s e as t o
whether we s h o u l d u s e s h i p p i n g t o send some t r o o p s e l s e w h e r e o r t o u s e
them d i r e c t l y from North A f r i c a . I n any e v e n t , we must make our plans a t
SECRET
t h a t t h e o c c u p a t i o n of S a r d i n i a o r S i c i l y would be a m c h more d i f f i c u l t
o p e r a t i o n t h a n T O K H had been
o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t T u n i s i a was l f a r c h 1 5 t h and, i n
view o f t h i s , a n o p e r a t i o n a g a i n F t e i t h e r S a r d i n i a o r S i c i l y c o u l d
s c a r c e l y b e u n d e r t a k e n b e f o r e slimmer.
i n g n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e O p e r a t i o n BPIMSTONE,
GEfiG?EBT. CLAEX r e p l i e d t h a t h e thought i t should be accomplished
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n a s k e d i f t h e s u p p l y o f t h e t r o o p s i n
S a r d i n i a would p r e s e n t any g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y .
SECRET
GENERAL CLARK t h o u g h t i t c o u l d b e accomplished a l m o s t e n t i r e l y
b y a i r and l a n d i n g c r a f t .
GENERAL ARNOLD p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t b a s e d i n
North A f r i c a c o u l d o n l y o p e r a t e f o r a b o u t o n e - h a l f hour o v e r S a r d i n i a
even w i t h t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of b e l l y t a n k s .
GENERAL MARSHALL asked General C l a r k i f he thought i t was neces
s a r y f o r t h e 4 t h D i v i s i o n t o come t o North A f r i c a i n view o f t h e e x c e s s
number of t r o o p s t h a t would be a v a i l a b l e h e r e ,
GENERAL CLARK r e p l i e d t h a t i f no f u r t h e r o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s
were contemplated after t h e c a p t u r e of T u n i s i a , i t would n o t b e n e c e s s a r y
lg
British
a doubtful
q u a n t i t y - . They a r e w a i t i n g t o s e e t h e r e s u l t s o f o u r T u n i s i a n o p e r a t i o n s .
S p a i n would b e c r i t i c a l . S p a i n i s , a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e ,
w i l l be decreased
GENERAL SOMERVELL a s k e d General C l a r k if any German t r o o p s had
come from S i c i l y , t o which GENERAL CLARK r e p l i e d t h a t he t h o u g h t n o t
ADMIRAL COOKE p o i n t e d o u t t h a t r e g a r d l e s s of t h e d e c i s i o n ,
whether i t be t o u n d e r t a k e O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE o r some o t h e r o p e r a t i o n ,
i t s h o u l d b e f i r m and t h a t w e s h o u l d n o t p e r m i t o u r s e l v e s t o b e f o r c e d
i n t o an operation without s u f f i c i e n t t i m e f o r preparation
FURTHER CONFEFU3NCES
!, E C R E T
4.
A I X X P A L GLASSFORDsS FEPORT.
AEMIRAL K I N G s t a t e d t h a t the Glassford Commission had j u s t about
or i n Washington.
Be s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e was one p o i n t upon which t h e e n t i r e Corn-.
mission a g r e e d ;
He s a i d t h a t tkie E r i t i s i f had a g r e e d t o p e r m i t t b e F r e n c h t o
u n d e r t a k e t h e i n s h o r e n a v a l d e f e n s e s o f ;'ambia
a s p a r t o f F r e n c h West
A f r i c a , but t h a t the)- were riot irfclirred t.o p e r m i t t,Iie 1~'rencIi t,o under..
t a k e t h e a i r p r o t e c t i o n of
t.his a r e a .
SOIT'P
the R r i t ish.
o ~ i ! o s i t , i o i i i i i t l i i s r e s p e c t from
SECRET
J.C.S.
51st Meeting
(Casablanca)
J O I N T CHIEFS OF STAFF
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held on Thursday, January 14, 1943, a t 1030
MEMBERS PRESENT
General G.
C. Marshall, USA
L t . General H.
H.
Arnold, USA
SECRETARY
L t . General M. W .
Clark, USA
SECRET
ADMIRAL K I N G r e p l i e d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h E a s t e r n F l e e t s h o u l d be
s u f f i c i e n t , p a r t i c u l a r l y a s we a r e k e e p i n g t,he :Japanese w e l l o c c u p i e d
elsewhere. He f e l t t h a t t h e B r i t i s h s h o u l d move as nraiiy e l e m e n t s o f t h i s
F l e e t as t h e y c o u l d c o v e r w i t h t h e i r a v a i l a b l e d e s t r o y e r s .
H e l f r i c h had t o l d
Admiral
110
information,
SECRET
ADMIRAL K I N G f u r t h e r remarked t h a t t h e B r i t i s h E a s t e r n F l e e t
s e r v e d no purpose, s o f a r as he could see, b a s i n g a t K i l i n d i n i , b u t t h a t
t h e B r i t i s h would p r o b a b l y i n s i s t t h a t t h e y c o u l d n o t b e moved because
of a l a c k o f d e s t r o y e r s . He f e l t t h a t p r e s s u r e s h o u l d be brought on them
t o cover t h e s h i p p i n g l i n e s t o C a l c u t t a n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e p r o j e c t e d
operation.
With r e g a r d t o s u b m a r i n e s i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean and t h e Bay o f
Bengal, t h e B r i t i s h and Dutch t o g e t h e r have a l i m i t e d number--less t h a n
10. I n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f a B r i t i s h demand f o r a d d i t i o n a l s u b m a r i n e s ,
S. submarines b a s i n g at
j t
J a p a n e s e s h i p p i n g i n o c c u p i e d Chinese p o r t s .
In d i s c u s s i n g t h e b e s t l i n e of p r o c e d u r e t o adopt a t t h e f o r t h
coming c o n f e r e n c e , ADMIRAL K I N G s t r e s s e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f m a i n t a i n i n g
t h e i n i t i a t i v e i n our hands. H e b e l i e v e s t h a t i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o a g r e e
upon Anglo-American world-wide s t r a t e g y , t h e b a s i c c o n c e p t , b e f o r e per
m i t t i n g any d i s c u s s i o n of d e t a i l s . The United Nations a r e now i n a p o s i
t i o n t o t a k e t h e i n i t i a t i v e i n t h e war; i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o f i x i n t h e
minds of t h e B r i t i s h t h e f a c t t h a t t h e b a s i c i s s u e must be d e t e r m i n e d
b e f o r e going i n t o d e t a i l s . The United S t a t e s now h a s t h e p r i n c i p a l power;
therefore, w e should take the lead.
i n h i s opinion t h i s d i d
SECRET
He
f o r p r o j e c t e d o p e r a t i o n s on t h e C o n t i n e n t .
GENEXAI. CLARK s a i d t h a t i t w a s h i s b e l i e f t h a t o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t
t h e B r e s t P e n i n s u l a would be v e r y hazardous, would r e q u i r e overwhelming
t h e German A i r F o r c e w i l l b e p r a c t i c a l l y e l i m i n a t e d
within a year.
GENERAL SOSIERVELL s t a t e d t h a t i t p r o b a b l y would h e p o s s i b l e t o
t r a n s p o r t 300,900 U. S. t r o o p s t o t h e IJ. K. by September p r o v i d e d move
ments t o A f r i c a were suspended. He b e l i e v e s t h i s a more a c c u r a t e f i g u r e
t h a n t h e 150,000 e s t i m a t e d b y t h e B r i t i s h .
He s t a t e d t h a t based
on
SECRET
t h a n w e c a n i n 1943 d e s p i t e the s h i p b u i l d i n g program, and t h a t u n l e s s
e v e r y p o s s i b l e means--including an e f f e c t i v e a i r o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t sub
marine bases, b u i l d i n g yards and assembly p o i n t s , and e f f e c t i v e commando
raids i n f o r c e a g a i n s t t h e b a s e s - - i s u s e d , w e s h a l l be f a c e d w i t h a
d i m i n i s h i n g e f f o r t . If w e succeed i n opening t h e Mediterranean, w e can
probably i n c r e a s e p r e s e n t e s t i m a t e s of 1,000,000 t r o o p s moved t h i s year
by 150,000. H e p o i n t e d out t h a t s t a b i l i z a t i o n o f t h e North African s i t u a
t i o n would n o t g r e a t l y r e d u c e s h i p p i n g commitments i n the Middle E a s t
area because of forthcoming commitments i n s u p p o r t o f Turkey, movement
of U. S. t r o o p s i n t o Bum+ and supply o f e x i s t i n g p o s i t i o n s . H e j u s t i f i e d
h i s average turn-around of 2& months on t h e b a s i s t h a t i n 1943 P a c i f i c
t r o o p movements w i l l r e q u i r e approximately t h e same tonnage as those i n
the Atlantic.
GENERAT, ARNOLD s a i d that he d i d n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e B r i t i s h had
U . K. ( a l l u n d e r h i s command) u n d e r a d i r e c t i v e from t h e
Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f s e t t i n g f o r t h o b j e c t i v e s and
technique;
(c) T h a t upon t h e s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n of the T u n i s i a n opera
t i o n , i t w i l l p r o b a b l y b e d e s i r a b l e t o e s t a b l i s h two s e p a r a t e
t h e a t e r s i n Europe ( t h e M e d i t e r i a n e a n and t h e U . K.-French
theaters) ;
(d) T h a t any o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e C o n t i n e n t must be a combined
o p e r a t i o n which must r e c e i v e t h e f u l l cooperation and support
of the B r i t i s h .
12
SECRET
J.C.S.
52nd Meeting
( Casab 1anca)
J O I N T CHIEFS O F STAFF
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held a t Anfa Camp on Saturday,
January 16, 1913, a t 0915.
MEMBERS PRESENT
General G . C . Marshall, USA
SECRETARY
B r i g . General J. R. Deane, USA
13
SECRET
GENERAZ, ARNOLD s t a t e d t h a t p r i o r i t y o f b o m b i n g t a r g e t s was d e t e r
14
s u f f i c i e n t f o r the contemplated
o p e r a t i o n . T h e s e t r o o p s s h o u l d n o t s i t i d l e . Timing o f t h e p r o p o s e d
o p e r a t i o n i s of g r e a t importance. lie b e l i e v e d t h a t t r o o p s i n i i o r t h A f r i c a
now n o t a c t i v e l y engaged i n T u n i s i a c o u l d be t r a i n e d i n amphibious war
fare,
t h e o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t S a r d i n i a o r t h e o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t S i c i l y , wtiich
e v e r m i g h t b e d e c i d e d upon. O f t h e two, he f e l t S i c i l y was much more
d e c i s i v e a n d more c o m p l e t e i n i t s e l f , i n a s m u c h as l i t t l e was t o b e
g a i n e d by t h e S a r d i n i a n o p e r a t i o n .
If t h e p r e m i s e t h a t t h e S i c i l i a n
On t h i s b a s i s , we c o u l d b o t h advance t h e d a t e of t h e S i c i l j a n o p e r a t i o n
and c o n t i n u e our p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r a C o n t i n e n t a l o p e r a t i o n , c o n t i n u i n g t o
send t r o o p s and l a n d i n g c r a f t t o the United Kingdom.
He now
( J i e
110
b e f o r e . The f a c L i i i a t t h e s e c a n be u r r i i a d e d o v e r r h i Ue
m a t e r i a l l y changes tkie t y p e of' t h e o p e r a t i o n iriasmncli a s p o r ~f a c i l i t , i e s
a r e n o t r e q u i r e d . lie f e l t tkrat b y June i t s h o u l d be p o s s i b l t t o
90,000 t r o o p s i n t h e i n i t i a l a s s a u l t . These c r a f t . roiil8l theii
North A f r i c a f o r r e l o a d i n g . Allowing f o r l o s s e s , t h e se(:ond
j; I '
reiiirii
IVYII:'~
..
bli(
tiif:
(i
where and t o r e d u c e l o s s e s of c a r g o .
He agreed w i t h Admiral Cooke r e g a r d i n g the t r a i n i u g p o s s i h i l i t i e s .
w i t h General C l a r k r e g a r d i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f t r a i n i n g i n t h e Casab1anr:n
16
SECRET
a r e a , and w i t h G e n e r a l P a t t o n as t o t h e e x p e c t e d r e a c t i o n of S p a n i s h
Morocco, H e f e l t t h a t t h e t r o o p s now i n t h e Casablanca a r e a were r e t r o
grading and s h o u l d be a c t i v e l y employed by t r a i n i n g themfor t h e s e opera
t i o n s i n o r d e r t o keep them f i t .
Once t h e l a n d i n g was accomplished, t h e l a n d i n g c r a f t s h o u l d be
removed from t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n t o t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, which movement
should r e q u i r e about one month. I t i s e s s e n t i a l t o keep enough l a n d i n g
c r a f t i n t h e United Kingdom s o t h a t t r a i n i n g can c o n t i n u e . If w e send
only f i f t y LSTs t o t h e P a c i f i c , we s h o u l d be a b l e t o a c c o m p l i s h the
f o r e g o i n g ; however,
o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e C o n t i n e n t , he f e l t t h a t t h e y s h o u l d n o t h e
undertaken
ADMIRAL COOKE s a i d t h a t t h e LST program should f u r n i s h 198 LST s
by March 15 and 15 a month t h e r e a f t e r , One hundred were now a l l o c a t e d
t o t h e P a c i f i c and 107 t o t h e A t l a n t i c , i n c l u d i n g B r i t i s h a l l o c a t i o n s
More t h a n 50 w i l l be r e q u i r e d i n t h e P a c i f i c . A t least two months were
r e q u i r e d a f t e r completion t o make t h e s e c r a f t ready f o r o p e r a t i o n s
The
in t r a i n i n g
a month t o h e u s e d
He f e l t t h a t a s many l a n d i n g c r a f t a s t h e p o r t s would
accommodate c o u l d b e g o t t e n h e r e
ADMIRAL COOKE c a u t i o n e d a g a i n s t t h e t e n d e n c y t o l o o k b a c k
accelerated
p r a c t i c a b l e , b u t he f e l t it would be d i s a s t r o u s t o a t t e m p t t o do s o i n
the case of combat-loaded t r a n s p o r t s , which would undoubtedly be sunk by
submarines o r by a i r before t h e y could be unloaded.
GENERAL WEDEMEYER s a i d t h a t he b e l i e v e d t h a t , i f w e s u b s c r i b e d
t o t h e B r i t i s h c o n c e p t , we s h o u l d d i s p e r s e our f o r c e s i n an a r e a which
e s h o u l d examine a p r o p o s i t i o n t o d e t e r
was n e i t h e r v i t a l nor f i n a l , W
mine how s u c c e s s i n t h e proposed o p e r a t i o n would improve our p o s i t i o n
The e f f o r t c o u l d b e j u s t i f i e d i f i t r e s u l t e d i n a m a t e r i a l s a v i n g i n
s h i p p i n g . Admiral Cunningham had s t a t e d t h a t he would r u n Mediterranean
convoys as soon as T u n i s i a had been c l e a r e d - - t h a t S i c i l y w a s n o t e s s e n
tial
He f e l t t h e S i c i l i a n o p e r a t i o n would r e q u i r e up t o 12 d i v i s i o n s
17
SECRET
The B r i t i s h arguments a s t o A x i s c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r moving r e i n f o r c e m e n t s
s o u t h w e r e , he f e l t , s p e c i o u s . He b e l i e v e d a r a t i o of t h r e e t o s e v e n
more n e a r l y a c c u r a t e t h a n t h e one t o s e v e n r a t i o which t h e y advanced
Should t h e Germans move f i v e t o t e n d i v i s i o n s i n t o I t a l y , o p e r a t i o n s i n
c h a t p a r t of t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n w o u l d , he b e l i e v e d , r e q u i r e a m a j o r
e f f o r t on our p a r t which would ' v i t i a t e a C o n t i n e n t a l o p e r a t i o n lie f e l t
our b e s t p r o c e d u r e was t o c o n t i n u e a heavy bombing o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t
l a r l y on e i g h t m a r s h a l l i n g y a r d s . A f t e r t h a t , we s h o u l d proceed w i t h an
operation against the Brest Peninsula.
ADhlIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a . t he u n d e r s t o o d t h a t Admiral Cunningham
Perhaps the
B r e s t , perhaps e l s e w h e r e i n n o r t h e r n Europe
The
S i c i l i a n o p e r a t i o n i s opportune b u t n o t d e f i n i t i v e , I t i s a l s o e s s e n t i a l
t h a t we work o u t a " G e n e r a l P l a n " f o r t h e d e f e a t of J a p a n
ALMIR4L COOKE s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h view was t h a t Germany c o u l d
be d e f e a t e d on l a n d o n l y on t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t and t h a t , t h e r e f o r e ,
it
was e s s e n t i a l t h a t we a s s i s t t h e R u s s i a n s by o p e r a t i o n s t h i s summer
t o Japan,
As
t h e y s a y t h e y w i l l u s e t h e B r i t i s h F l e e t a f t e r t h e d e f e a t of
Can w e d o t h a t i n t i m e t o s u p p o r t R u s s i a t h i s summer? W i l l
we
d e t e r m i n e where
IT
15
Everythingnon.
18
SECRET
from t h e A t l a n t i c t o T u n i s i a . The B r i t i s h r e y u i r e a b o u t the sanie f r o n i
T r i p o l i t a n i a t o C a i r o . They m u s t i n a d d i t i o n move t r o o p s
beliiitil
i i i
assure%
sii~:ccss
He e s t i m a t e d t h a t a l m o s t a m i l l i o n t r o o p s would be r e q i r i r e i l
i l l
tli,,
African t h e a t e r .
?lit.
or
t nkirip
riiiiii,
l!aiiiih~
?IP
t a k e n t o o s e r i o u s l y . inasmuch a s t h e t . y w o f skijnpiirg w a s n i a t e r i i i ! I )
different.
loaded t r a n s p o r t s i n e i t h e r o p e r a t i o n .
timing--the b a l a n c e is d e l i c a t e - - b u t
I!SP
l?he main q u e s t i o n
ol' ronibat.
js o i i e
01'
he t h i n k s t h e o p e r a t i o n c a n b e riurit~
and we s h o u l d be a b l e t o u t i l i z e Frerich t r n o p s
I t is
e s s e r , t i a l t h a t we c o n v i n c e t h e R r i t i s h t h a t t h e y must f u l l y t , r n s t t,tie
French t r o o p s .
GENERAL WEDEMEYER s a i d t h a t we would have seven d i v i 7 i i i b s a i i d
t h e B r i t i s h a b o u t f o u r d i v i s i o n s b e t w e e n T u n i s i a and t h e A t l a n t i c
S , arid p o s s i b l y f o u r B r i t i s h d i v i s i o n s . General
ADMIRAL K I N G p r o p o s e d t h a t
t h e r e f o r e , a V e d i t e r r a n e a n o p e r a t i o n of some s o r t was a
n e c e s s i t y i n o r d e r t o keep t h e R u s s i a n s encouraged
ADMIRAL K I N G , a g r e e i n g , s a i d t h a t t h i s emphasized t h e n e c e s s i t y
of o b t a i n i n g from t h e B r i t i s h t h e i r genera.1 p l a n . i e
what t h e y proposf
t o d o , when t h e y p r o p o s e t o d o i t , . . . i n p a r t i c u l a r a s t o C o n t i n e n t a l
ope c a t i 011s
GENERAL SOHERVEIL s a i d t h a t , i r i o r d e r t o i n c c e a s e m a t e r i a l a i d t o
Eussia
The B r i t i s h
there, 52
Ve must a l s o p r e s e n t t o them o u r
g e n e r a l p l a n f o r t h e P a c i f i c , a l a r g e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of which must be t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y of war between R u s s i a and Japan
A s t o t h a t , Russia w i l l not
20
T h e key t o our s u c c e s s f u l
SECRET
a t t a c k on t h e J a p a n e s e homeland i s t h e g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n and t h e
manpower o f China; i f w e a t t e m p t t o b e a t our way up through t h e Nether
l a n d s E a s t I n d i e s , we s h a l l make e x t r e m e l y slow p r o g r e s s . England c a n
b e s t o p e r a t e a g a i n s t J a p a n in Burma, T h a i l a n d , andIndo-China,
and should
S. a n d
21
SECRET
J,C.S.
53rd Meeting
(Casablanca)
J O I N T CHIEFS OF STAFF
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held a t Anfa Camp on Sunday,
January 17, 1943, a t 0930.
hEMBERS PRESENT
General G . C. Marshall, USA
SECRETARY
B r i g . General J . R. Deane, USA
L t . General B.
Rear Admiral C.
B r i g . General A.
Commander R.
B . Somervell, USA
M.
Cooke, J r . , U S N
C . Wedemeyer, USA
E . Libby, USN
22
SECRET
ADMIRAL K I N G r e a d a d e s p a t c h , summarizing t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e
A l e u t i a n I s l a n d s a n d i n t h e S o u t h P a c i f i c , which s a i d , among o t h e r
t h i n g s , t h a t 30 Japanese a i r c r a f t had been s h o t down.
GENERAL ARNOLD remarked t h a t B r i t i s h estimates p l a c e d t h e c u r
r e n t J a p a n e s e a i r p l a n e s t r e n g t h a t 2,500 f i r s t - l i n e a i r c r a f t , about 500
below t h e number e s t i m a t e d by our I n t e l l i g e n c e S e r v i c e s . Both B r i t i s h
and our e s t i m a t e s of c u r r e n t Japanese s t r e n g t h i n d i c a t e a r a p i d d e c l i n e
i n t h e i r a i r s t r e n g t h . Continued a t t r i t i o n a t p r e s e n t r a t e s w i l l ser
i o u s l y a f f k c t f u t u r e Japanese o p e r a t i o n s .
opera
t i o n might b e i n i t i a t e d d u r i n g t h e p r o g r e s s of t h e Rabaul o p e r a t i o n ,
which i s e s t i m a t e d t o r e q u i r e from two t o f i v e months. The B r i t i s h
P l a n n e r s proposed t o f u r n i s h s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n a s t o what t h e y pro
posed i n Burma, b o t h now and i n t h e f u t u r e , f o r t h e i n f o r m a t i o n o f t h e
Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f . The B r i t i s h c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t s u f f i c i e n t ,
naval f o r c e s and l a n d i n g c r a f t cannot be made a v a i l a b l e . Admiral Cooke
d i s a g r e e d and .had t o l d t h e B r i t i s h P l a n n e r s t h a t by t h e t i m e t h e opera
t i o n was t o be mounted, .he f e l t t h a t s u f f i c i e n t l a n d i n g c r a f t would be
available.
I n answer t o General M a r s h a l l ' s q u e s t i o n as t o t h e e f f e c t f a i l
ure t o do O p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS would have on O p e r a t i o n A N A K I M , ADMIRAL
ANAKIM i n t h e P a c i f i c p l a n . Whether or n o t i t is c a r r i e d o u t f u l l y w i l l
23
SECRET
depend upon t h e s i t u a t i o n t h e n e x i s t i n g , b u t a t any r a t e it s h o u l d be
p l a n n e d . General Brooke had s a i d t h a t two A f r i c a n d i v i s i o n s were being
s h i f t e d Lo t h e I n d i a n T h e a t e r and p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r t h e u t i l i z a t i O n of
t h e I n d i a n t r o o p s were i n hand; Vice Admiral Mountbatten .had s a i d t h a t
l a n d i n g c r a f t were b e i n g provided i n I n d i a ; t h e r e must be some o b j e c t i v e
f o r t h e s e moves. ile proposed t o a s k Admiral Pound Lo b a s e p a r t of t h e
E a s t e r n F l e e t a t Ceylon and would r e l e a s e t h e Dutch c r u i s e r s and d e s t r o y
e r s now o p e r a t i n g t h r o u g h S i c i l y t o s u p p o r t t h e E a s t e r n Fleet. i f t h e y
moved there; he would a l s o a r r a n g e t h a t s i x U . S. submarines now operat
i n g from Fremantle cover t h e n o r t h e r n end of t h e S t r a i t s of hlalacca. He
f e e l s it e s s e n t i a l t o g e t some B r i t i s h naval a c t i v i t y under w a y I n t h e
Bay of Bengal. S i n c e t h e Japanese F l e e t i s now l a r g e l y conta.ined in the
P a c i f i c , i t is u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e y can d e t a c h much n a v a l s t r e n g t h f o r
o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Bay of Bengal. He suggested t h a t t h e P a c i f i c s i t u a t i o n
s h o u l d be d i s c u s s e d w i t h t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f a t t h i s morning's
meeting when t h e United S t a t e s Chiefs of S t a f f should i n s i s t t h a t Opera
t i o n RAVENOUS be c a r r i e d o u t and t h a t Operation ANAKIM be i n i t i a t e d n o t
S. p e r s o n n e l i n R u s s i a .
The r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and s u r v e y c o n t e m p l a t e d by General B r a d l e y c o u l d n o t
had informed t h e P r e s i d e n t t h a t he d e s i r e d no U .
The p r i n c i p a l c o n t r i b u t i o n by G r e a t B r i t a i n t o t h e l a n d i n g
(armored c r a f t ) . Mountbatten c o n c l u d e d
t h a t 150 of t h e s e would b e r e q u i r e d f o r t h e S i c i l i a n , o p e r a t i o n , l e a v i n g
450 i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom f o r t r a i n i n g and o t h e r p u r p o s e s . Lord Mount
b a t t e n had n o t f u l l y understood t h e d e c i s i o n o f t i m e r e q u i r e d t o r e h a b i l
i t a t e landing craft--he
B r i t i s h t r a i n i n g and
O p e r a t i o n and were now
t h e t a c t i c s b e i n g t o s e e k o u t a " s o f t s p o t " by a r e c o n n a i s
b a t t e n c e r t a i n p l a n s f o r o p e r a t i o n s on t h e C o n t i n e n t . P l a n n i n g f o r t h e
B r e s t P e n i n s u l a h a d b e e n i n v e s t i g a t e d by c o n s i d e r i n g f o u r l i n e s o f
o p p o s i t i o n which might be r e a c h e d , i . e . ,
i n i t i a l and expanded p o s i t i o n s .
SECRET
i m p r a c t i c a b l e from a s u p p l y s t a n d p o i n t . The s i t u a t i o n i s becoming abso
l u t e l y i m p o s s i b l e i f t h e r e p o r t t h a t t h e Germans had mined a l l t h e docks
i n t h e proposed a r e a i s t r u e . On t h e o t h e r hand, o p e r a t i o n s a t Cherbourg
would be p o s s i b l e ; t h e same f a c t o r s which would make i t r e l a t i v e l y easy
t o h o l d , once c a p t u r e d , would make e x p l o i t a t i o n and expansion v e r y d i f
f i c u l t . Lord Mountbatten w a s i n f a v o r o f c a p t u r i n g t h e Channel I s l a n d s
b o t h as s t e p p i n g s t o n e s toward a p r o s p e c t i v e c o n t i n u a l o p e r a t i o n and as
a base from which t o o p e r a t e a g a i n s t sea-borne s u p p l y t o German submarine
b a s e s 011 t h e French c o a s t . Lord Mountbatten s t a t e d h e c o u l d c a p t u r e the
Channel I s l a n d s w i t h o u t h e l p from t h e United S t a t e s .
With respect t o Sicily.. discussion revealed t h a t the b a t t e r i e s
A D X I I U K I N G , p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t t h e key t o t h e European s i t u a
t i o n was R u s s i a , s u g g e s t e d c o o r d i n a t i n g a l l s u p p l y t o R u s s i a under one
head and u n d e r one c o d e name, p l a c i n g one o f f i c e r i n g e n e r a l c h a r g e , .
T h i s o f f i c e r would t h e n have t h e t a s k o f e m p h a s i z i n g the n e c e s s i t y f o r
a i r a c t i o n a g a i n s t German a i r f i e l d s i n n o r t h e r n Norway.
A f t e r some d i s c u s s i o n , i t w a s . a g r e e d t h a t t h e R u s s i a n s would
SECRET
J.C.S.
5 4 t h Meeting
(Casablanca)
J O I N T CHIEFS O F STAFF
MINUTES O F MEETING
Held a t Anfa Camp on Monday,
J a n u a r y 18, 1943, a t 0930.
MEMBERS PRESENT
G e n e r a l G. C . Marshall, USA
L t . G e n e r a l H.
H.
A r n o l d , USA
SECRETARY
B r i g . G e n e r a l J . R. Deane, USA
B r i g . G e n e r a l A. C . Wedemeyer, USA
C o l o n e l J. E. Smart, USA
Commander R . E. Libby, USN
27
SECRET
GENERAL MARSHALL r e a d a d e s p a t c h which s a i d t h a t t h e proposed
f r e e z e on 55 p e r c e n t of t h e s y n t h e t i c r u b b e r program would r e d u c e the
h i g h o c t a n e g a s o l i n e program by 5,000,000 b a r r e l s , t h e a i r p l a n e program
by 10,000 a i r p l a n e s , and would d e l a y t h e e s c o r t v e s s e l program from two
t o t h r e e months. H e recomnended t h a t t h e J o i n t Chiefs of S t a f f p r e s e n t a
memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t and a s k him t o i n s t r u c t Mr. Nelson n o t t o
a u t h o r i z e Alr. J e f f e r s ' proposed p r o c e d u r e .
C h u r c h i l l had committed h i m s e l f t o
f o r t h e period of the
28
ADMIRAL COOKE p o i n t e d o u t t h e n e c e s s i t y of d i s c u s s i n g w i t h t h e
B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f , p o i n t s i n which t h e P r e s i d e n t i s i n t i m a t e l y
concerned, i n o r d e r t h a t h i s s t a y here need n o t be prolonged. He o b j e c t e d
t o t h e B r i t i s h tendency t o go i n t o d e t a i l and t o concern themselves w i t h
o p e r a t i o n s i n our s t r a t e g i c t h e a t e r which were r e a l l y n o t t h e i r concern.
The Kiska o p e r a t i o n i s a n example. They argue t h a t a f t e r w e have s e i z e d
Kabaul, t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f s h o u l d t h e n d i c t a t e f u t u r e opera
t i o n s arid t h e i r timing. Admiral Cooke o b j e c t s t o t h i s . They have r i g h t l y
k e p t us i n t h e d a r k a s t o c e r t a i n of t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e i r own
t h e a t e r , and s h o u l d a c c o r d us t h e same p r i v i l e g e . T h e y i n s i s t t h a t we
s e t f o r t h i n d e t a i l t h e f o r c e s we propose t o employ, a n d , y e t , do n o t
u s e t h e same s y s t e m i n l i s t i n g t h e i r f o r c e s as we d o . A s f a r a s t h e
P l a n n e r s a r e concerned, t h e main p o i n t a t i s s u e seems t o b e : " S h a l l w e
d e f e a t Germany f i r s t ? " or: " S h a l l we b r i n g t h e war t o a s u c c e s s f u l con
c l u s i o n e x p e d i t i o u s l y ? " T h e B r i t i s h d e s i r e t o assemble i n t h e U n i t e d
Kingdom s u f f i c i e n t l a n d i n g c r a f t t o move on t o t h e C o n t i n e n t s h o u l d
Germany c r a c k . Admiral Cooke o b j e c t s t o h a v i n g f o r c e s s t a t i c i n t h e
United Xingdom i n s t e a d of employing them a c t i v e l y a g a i n s t Japan, and has
29
SECRET
made l a n d i n g c r a f t a l l o c a t i o n s on t h a t b a s i s . T h e s e c r a f t a r e badly
needed i n t h e P a c i f i c f o r General MacArthur and f o r o u r p l a n n e d opera
t i o n s . Because of s h o r t a g e i n n a v a l s h i p s and l a n d i n g c r a f t , t h e B r i t i s h
demur a t t h e Burma o p e r a t i o n . Admiral Cooke t h i n k s t h a t w e c a n make
l a n d i n g c r a f t a v a i l a b l e by t h a t t i m e and t h a t some a u x i l i a r y a i r c r a f t
c a r r i e r s w i l l a l s o b e a v a i l a b l e . We have a l l o c a t e d n o t h i n g i n l a n d i n g
c r a f t n o t s c h e d u l e d t o b e completed b e f o r e t h e 1 5 t h of March. I t i s d i f
f i c u l t t o s p e c i f i c a l l y a l l o c a t e f o r c e s i n advance f o r each s e p a r a t e
operatipn i n the Pacific.
A l l t h a t c a n b e done p r a c t i c a l l y i s t o a l l o
combined c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
ADMI"&
w e would b e a s k e d t o do t h e
S i c i l i a n o p e r a t i o n l a t e r . A s t o o u r P a c i f i c s t r a t e g y , we s h o u l d stanti on
t h e paper we have s u b m i t t e d . The B r i t i s h have always been opposed t o o u r
P a c i f i c p r o p o s a l s ; n e v e r t h e l e s s , i n s p i t e o f o u r P a c i f i c o p e r a t i o n s : we
can b r i n g a g a i n s t Germany, e i t h e r i n S i c i l y o r on t h e Brest P e n i n s u l a ,
e v e r y t h i n g t h a t t h e B r i t i s h a r e w i l l i n g t o do. They have n o t y e t c l a r i
f i e d t h e i r own p o s i t i o n a s t o what t h e y p r o p o s e on t h e C o n t i n e n t . The
Burma o p e r a t i o n i s a t p r e s e n t a long-range c o n c e p t . He e x p e c t s t h e B r i t - .
i s h t o make an i s s u e o f t h e s h i p p i n g t o t h e P a c i f i c and t o attempt, t o
c o n t i n u e t o s i t i n r e v i e w on o u r o p e r a t i o n s .
Inasmuch a s t h e P r i m e
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The P r e s i d e n t and t h e Prime M i n i s t e r s h o u l d i n f o r m t h e G e n e r a l i s s i m o
t h a t RAVENOUS i s n o t t h e a l l - o u t Burma campaign, t h a t t h i s w i l l b e s e t
up a t a l a t e r d a t e , and t h a t b y t h i s t i m e n a v a l f o r c e s w i l l bemade a v a i l
a b l e . With r e s p e c t t o t h e Mediterranean, Admiral King i s u t t e r l y opposed
t o t h e S a r d i n i a n o p e r a t i o n , b u t f e e l s t h a t t h e S i c i l i a n o p e r a t i o n should
be undertaken s i n c e t r o o p s and means w i l l be a v a i l a b l e , s i n c e S i c i l y i s
t h e s t r a t e g i c l o c a t i o n , and s i n c e t h e a l t e r n a t i v e - - s e n d i n g excess t r o o p s
from t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n T h e a t e r t o t h e U n i t e d Kingdom--accomplishes
real r e s u l t .
31
no
SECRET
J.C.S.
5 5 t h Meeting
(Casablanca)
J O I N T CHIEFS OF STAFF
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held a t Anfa Camp on Tuesday,
January 1 9 , 1943, at 0930.
MEMBERS PRESENT
General G . C.
Marshall, USA
L t . General H .
H.
Arnold, USA
SECRETARY
Somervell, USA
Cooke, J r . ,
B r i g . General J.E.
Brig. General A.
USN
Hull, USA
C. Wedemeyer, USA
32
SECRET
ADMIRAL K I N G informed t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f t h a t 11 d e s t r o y e r s
had been t r a n s f e r r e d from e s c o r t d u t y i n t h e S e a F r o n t i e r s f o r use a s
ocean e s c o r t s , i n o r d e r t o improve t h e p o s i t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o o c e a n
escorts.
The . J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f d i s c u s s e d C.C.S.
155, t h e d r a f t memo
ADMIRAL K I N G o u t l i n e d h i s p r o p o s a l s as t o t h e command s e t - - u p i n
West A f r i c a which he f a v o r e d as a r e s u l t o f h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h
Admiral G l a s s f o r d . He would propose t o t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f t h a t
Vice Admiral C o l l i n e t , now i n command o f t h e n a v a l f o r c e s a t D a k a r ,
assume t h e s t a t u s o f a Naval D i s t r i c t Commander and t h a t t h e limits o f
h i s command e x t e n d from t.he n o r t h e r n boundary o f S i e r r a Leone t o Cape
B o j a d o r . \'ice
n d m i r a l C o l l i n e t , i n h i s s t a t u s o f Yaval D i s t r i c t Corn
and A i r F o r c e s and i n e q u i p p i n g t t i e s e f o r c e s as r a p i d l y as
may be^
GENERAL MARSHALL a g r e e d , s a y i n g t h a t he thought i t i m p r a c t i c a b l e
33
command,
SECRET
During a d i s c u s s i o n as t o when t h e P r e s i d e n t would b e able t o
l e a v e , i t was concluded t h a t P r e s i d e n t i a l a c t i o n would be r e q u i r e d upon
t h e f o l l o w i n g four items:
(a) Approved s t r a t e g y .
(b) A t t i t u d e toward t h e French.
156, "Suggested
H e s a i d t h a t i t e m 2 c o u l d p r o d u c e no more t h a n a s t u d y which
would r e s u l t i n an approximation o f what a d d i t i o n a l l o s s e s w i l l r e s u l t
34
i ~ nc o n v o y s c a u s e d by e s c o r t r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r HUSKY.
With r e s p e c t t o
t h e T u n i s i a r i a r e a , arid s a i d t h a t i t was h i g h l y d e s i r a b l e t h a t , a f t e r
completion o f t h e T r i p o l i op e r a t i o n ,
t h e F r e n c h occupy t h a t c o u n t r y .
t h e 8 t h Army w i l l p r o b a b l y move
t o t h e r e a r o f Turkey. He a g r e e d t h a t i t w a s n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h a
p l a n n i n g s t a f f f o r HUSKY, and t o d e t e r m i n e where and when t r a i n i n g f o r
t , h i s o p e r a t i o n s h o u l d be s e t up.
"ANNEX A"
J a n u a r y 18, 1943
M~MORAXDUM F O R THE PRESIDENT:
1.
The U.
S . J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f have r e c e i v e d i n f o r m a t i o n tkiat
equipment, n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f 55 p e r c e n t o f t h e e n t i r e
syiit,lietic r u b b e r program and t h a t J u s t i c e Byrnes i s a b o u t t o r e n d e r
decision i n the matter. In the f a l l M r .
Nelson made s u c h an a l l o t m e n t
f o r 20 p e r c e n t o f m a t e r i a l s and equipment n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e r u b b e r
pro^
2.
J u s t p r i o r t o o u r d e p a r t u r e from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a memorandum
35
SECRET
beyond 20 p e r c e n t would b r i n g a b o u t a l o s s i n d e l i v e r y i n 1943 of
approximately 5,000,000 b a r r e l s o f h i g h o c t a n e g a s , o v e r 10,000 a i r c r a f t ,
and two t o t h r e e months d e l a y i n t h e completion of t h e e s c o r t v e s s e l pro
e a r e convinced t h a t t h e r e s u l t would
gram, a l l v i t a l t o t h e war e f f o r t . W
v e r y s e r i o u s l y j e o p a r d i z e t h e e f f e c t i v e p r o s e c u t i o n o f t h e war.
For
( 2 ) t o e n a b l e t h e HUSKY (S)
recommend t h a t J u s t i c e Byrnes b e i s s u e d i n s t r u c
t i o n s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e t e l e g r a m s u g g e s t e d below:
TELEGRAM TO BYRNES, WASHINGTON:
"Proposed e x t e n s i o n of f r e e z e i n
f o r t h e e f f e c t i v e p r o s e c u t i o n of t h e w a r . Over-riding p r i o r i t i e s
w i l l n o t b e g r a n t e d t o more t h a n 20 p e r c e n t o f t h e r u b b e r pro
gram above e s c o r t v e s s e l s , a i r c r a f t , h i g h o c t a n e g a s , and o t h e r
i t e m s i n t h e number one g r o u p o f t h e m i l i t a r y program o f t h e
Chiefs of S t a f f . "
For t h e J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f :
( S i g n e d ) G.
C.
MARSHALL,
Chief of S t a f f ,
36
U . S . Army.
SECRET
J.C.S. 5 6 t h Meeting
(Casablanca)
J O I N T CHIEFS OF STAFF
MINUTFS OF MEETING
Held a t Anfa Camp on Wednesday,
J a n u a r y 2 0 , 1943, a t 0900.
MEMBERS PRESENT
G e n e r a l G . C . Marshall, USA
L t . G e n e r a l H. H. Arnold, USA
SECRETARY
B r i g . General J . R. Deane, USA
S o m e r v e l l , USA
B r i g . G e n e r a l J.E. H u l l , USA
B r i g . G e n e r a l A.
C. Hedemeyer, USA
C o l o n e l J. E. S m a r t , USA
Commander R. E. L i b b y , USN
37
SECRET
T h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f d i s c u s s e d c e r t a i n p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n
B r i t i s h , i n o r d e r t h a t a f t e r General Brooke
c o u l d i n f o r m t h e Combined C h i e f s of
S t a f f as t o t h e p r a c t i c a b i l i t y of t h e s e p r o p o s a l s .
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t i n a d d i t i o n t o our p r e s e n t commitments t o
I n Admiral K i n g ' s o p i n i o n ,
t h e s e r e q u e s t s s h o u l d go t h r o u g h t h e Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f . He i s
opposed t o p e r m i t t i n g t h e B r i t i s h t o go d i r e c t t o t h e Combined Munitions
Assignments Board, o b t a i n a d e c i s i o n from t h a t Board, and t h e n inform
t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f what had been d o n e . H i s main c o n c e r n i s t o
i n s u r e t h a t a l l m a t e r i a l a l l o c a t e d f o r t h i s purpose i s p u t t o use a g a i n s t
t h e enemy.
ADMIRAL COOKE was of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t i f r e q u e s t s from Turkey
were t o c o n t i n u e , t h e y s h o u l d p r o c e s s t h e i r own. H e f e l t , however, t h a t
f o r i n i t i a l b a r g a i n i n g t h e proposed arrangement was s a t i s f a c t o r y .
38
t a k e o p e r a t i o n s i n t.he Dodecanese c o n c u r r e n t l y w i t h o u r o p e r a t i o n s
a g a i n s t S i c i l y , u t i l i z i n g l a n d i n g c r a f t a s s i g n e d t o t h e Middle East, f o r
t h i s purpose.
E a s t a t p r e s e n t h a s l a n d i n g c r a f t s u f f i c i e n t o n l y t o t r a i n one b r i g a d e
t r o o p , and t h a t t h e U .
s.
Ilodecariese o p e r a t i o n s w h i l e t h e S i c i l i a n o p e r a t i o n w a s i n p r o g r e s s . I f
tile D o d e c m e s e o p e r a t i o n i s u n d e r t a k e n as a f o l l o w - u p t o S i c i l y , one
r e s u l t would be that, t h e r e s i d u a l l a n d i n & c r a f t earmarked f o r t h e U . K.
rvonld never r e a c h t l l e r e .
GEKERAL SOYERVJ~I,L,d i s c u s s i n g C . C . S .
lfi2, "U.
S. Aid t o R u s s i a , "
S. p r o d u c t i o n b a c k - l o g .
General S o m e r v e l l ' s f i g u r e s . U.
He d i d , however, a c c e p t
S. c a l c u l a t i o n s of l o s s r a t e f o r dry
c a r g o s h i p p i f i g a r e 2 . 6 p e r c e n t . T h i s f i g u r e i s b a s e d upon t h e a c t u a l
l o s s r a t e d u r i n g 1342. The B r i t i s h f i g u r e o f 1 . 9 p e r c e n t i s an a t t e m p t
S. a u t h o r i t i e s b e l i e v e
S . ~ ~ B r i t i sagreement
h
o f November 1 3 , 1 9 4 2 . " He b e l i e v e s t h a t , the
39
SECRET
GENERAL SOMERVELL and ADMIRAL COOKE informed t h e J o i n t C h i e f s
o f S t a f f t h a t n e c e s s a r y s h i p p i n g f o r o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c had
a l r e a d y been a l l o c a t e d . They a g r e e d t h a t n o a c c u r a t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of
t h e e f f e c t on l o s s r a t e produced by t h e new A i r and E s c o r t program could
b e d e t e r m i n e d b e f o r e J u n e b e c a u s e of t h e n e c e s s i t y o f i n t e g r a t i n g t h e
e f f e c t over an a p p r e c i a b l e t i m e .
GENERAL MARSHALL, d i s a u s s i n g t h e proposed Army and A i r Command
s e t - u p i n t h e U e d i t e r r a n e a n , informed t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f t h a t he
had r e c e i v e d a d r a f t p l a n f o r s u b d i v i d i n g the North A f r i c a n and European
T h e a t e r s , and t h a t General Andrews was working on t h e p r o p o s a l .
General
M a r s h a l l s a i d he had d i s c u s s e d w i t h S i r J o h n D i l l t h e q u e s t i o n of
Britain's
c o n t r o l o v e r U . S. h e a v y bombers i n E n g l a n d i n o p e r a t i o n s
SECRET
J.C.S.
5 7 t h Meeting
(Ca sab 1a n c a )
J O I N T CHIEFS OF STAFF
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held a t Anfa Camp on T h u r s d a y ,
MEMBERS PRESENT
G e n e r a l G.
C. M a r s h a l l , USA
L t . G e n e r a l H.
H.
A r n o l d , USA
SECRETARY
B r i g . G e n e r a l J . R. Deane, USA
B r i g . G e n e r a l J.E. H u l l , USA
B r i g . G e n e r a l A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
Commander R. E. L i b b y , USN
41
SECRET
GENERAL MARSBALL r e a d a despatch from General Eisenhower r e p o r t
ing an enemy a t t a c k i n T u n i s i a which r e s u l t e d i n some d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n of
t h e French d e f e n s e l i n e s , and s a i d t h a t Eisenhower was proceeding t o h i s
advance command p o s t ; Admiral Cunningham would be s e n i o r o f f i c e r a t
A l g i e r s u n t i l h i s r e t u r n . General Marshall a l s o r e a d a d e s p a t c h c o n t a i n
i n g a r e p o r t by G e n e r a l Hurley which emphasized t h e absence o f German
a i r from t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t .
ADMIRAL K I N G informed t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f t h a t t h e y c o u l d
e x p e c t A d m i r a l Pound t o propose a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e p h r a s i n g of t h e
paper on "Conduct of t h e Mar i n 1943" concerning a n t i s u h m a r i n e w a r f a r e .
Admiral King s a i d t h a t Admiral Pound had d i s c u s s e d w i t h him recommenda
t i o n s he f e l t s h o u l d b e made t o t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f r e g a r d i n g
t h i s s u b j e c t , b u t t h a t t h e s e recommendations were l a r g e l y a summary of
160, "Minimum
E s c o r t R e q u i r e m e n t s t o M a i n t a i n t h e Sea Communications o f t h e U n i t e d
K a t i o n s . " I t w a s a g r e e d t h a t t h e p a p e r c o u l d b e a c c e p t e d a s a premise
f o r v e r i f i c a t i o n a t a f u t u r e d a t e , n o t i n g t h a t t h i s was o n l y one p h a s e
of a p a r a l l e l s t u d y of t h e o v e r - a l l antisubmarine p o s i t i o n which w a s now
b e i n g completed i n t h e United S t a t e s ,
The J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f n e x t c o n s i d e r e d C.C.S.
166, "The
Bomber O f f e n s i v e f r o m t h e U n i t e d Kingdom."
GENERAL MARSHALL d i d n o t c l e a r l y u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g of
paragraph 6 and suggested t h a t we g e t t h e B r i t i s h t o e x p l a i n t h e meaning
of t h i s paragraph.
It a p p e a r e d t o G e n e r a 1 Illarshall t h a t t h e p r i m e M i n i s t e r
had probably i n s t i g a t e d t h e p a p e r .
42
SECRET
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t he understood t h e p a r a g r a p h t o imply t h a t
before l a y i n g waste t o whole c i t i e s i n o c c u p i e d t e r r i t o r y , i t would h e
necessary t o o b t a i n t h e a p p r o v a l o f t h e B r i t i s h C a b i n e t b e c a u s e o f t h e
p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of s u c h a n a c t .
GENERAL SOMERVELL s u g g e s t e d e l i m i n a t i o n of t h e word " s y n t h e t i c "
i n p a r a g r a p h 2 (d) of t h e p a p e r , p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t t h e two t e t r a e t h y l
p l a n t s i n Germany were v i t a l o b j e c t i v e s .
Discussing C.C.S.
164, ANAKIM,
i t was a g r e e d t h a t i t p r o b a b l y
would b e n e c e s s a r y t o s u p p l y s u p p l e m e n t a r y f o r c e s r e q u i r e d f r o m t h e
Pacific.
I t was f u r t h e r a g r e e d t h a t i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t i t a p p e a r i n
t o M. S t a l i n , " b u t t o o k no a c t i o n "
ADMIRAL K I N G remarked t h a t he was d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e l a t e
d a t e p r o p o s e d f o r o p e r a t i o n HUSKY
He f e l t i t i n d i c a t i v e t h a t n o t h i n g
t h a t e v e n i f BRIMSTONE i s a c c o m p l i s h e d , HUSKY w i l l
have t o f o l l o w , t h u s f u r t h e r d e f e r r i n g C o n t i n e n t a l o p e r a t i o n s .
43
SECRET
w i l l g i v e u s f o r t h e a s s a u l t . The d i s a d v a n t a g e i s t h a t t h e y c a n b e
c a r r i e d o n l y by B r i t i s h combat-loaded
t r a n s p o r t s , inasmuch a s our d a v i t s
He
A l l r o u t e s r e q u i r e a l a r g e number o f h e a v y
t r u c k s and r o l l i n g s t o c k . He s a i d t h a t t h e r o u t e v i a t h e P e r s i a n G u l f ,
e x p e c t e d t o have a c a p a c i t y of 10,000 t o n s p e r month b u t s o f a r o n l y
a b l e t o handle from 4,000 t o 5,000 t o n s p e r month, would improve as soon
a s t h e n e c e s s a r y p e r s o n n e l (due a t t h e end of J a n u a r y ) a r r i v e d .
is an adequate number o f f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t a l r e a d y i n A f r i c a ; t h e q u e s t i o n
is one of d e p l o y i n g them i n t h e c o r r e c t s p o t s ,
44
SECRET
J.C.S.
58th Meeting
( Casab1anc a )
J O I N T CHIEFS OF STAFF
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held a t Anfa Camp on F r i d a y ,
January 2 2 , 1943, a t 0900.
MEMBERS PRESENT
General ti.
C. Marshall, USA
L t . General H.
Arnold, USA
H.
SECRETARY
Lt.
General B . B.
Rear Admiral C.
M.
Somervell, USA
Cooke, J r . , USN
Brig. General J . E .
B r i g . General A.
Hull, USA
C. Wedemeyer, USA
Colonel J . E.
Smart, USA
45
SECRET
1.
CoCsSo 165/1--DRAFT
REFLY TO
M a
STALIN.
T h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f a g r e e d upon c e r t a i n m o d i f i c a t i o n s t o
2.
GENERAL MARSHALL q u e s t i o n e d t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y of d e c l a r i n g o u r
i n t e n t i o n t o c l e a r t h e A l e u t i a n s of t h e enemy. H e s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h
have been i n f o r m e d of t h e magnitude o f t h e Kiska o p e r a t i o n , a n d t h a t
t h i s gave them a y a r d s t i c k by which t h e y m i g h t attempt t o j u d g e t h e
magnitude of o t h e r o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c Theater. H e f e l t i t essen
t i a l t h a t t h e y u n d e r s t a n d t h a t we w i l l n o t commit o u r s e l v e s t o become
involved i n any l a r g e - s c a l e o p e r a t i o n i n Alaska.
A f t e r some d i s c u s s i o n , i t w a s a g r e e d :
T o change t h e p a p e r t o r e a d , make t h e A l e u t i a n s as s e c u r e a s
168.
C C S.. 161/1--HUSKY.
The J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f disciussed t h i s p a p e r by t h e Combined
t r a n s p o r t s i n t h e United King
necessary documents a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e h e r e t o s u s t a i n t h i s b e l i e f .
ADMIRAL K I N G remarked t h a t we should meet t h i s d a t e and s h o u l d do what
ever h a s t o be done t o accomplish i t .
I.(
.S.
5 9 t h Meeting
i(n~at11anca)
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held a t Anfa Camp on S a t u r d a y ,
January 2 3 , 1 9 1 3 , at,
own.
MEMBERS PRESENT
G e n e r a l i.f
C , M a r s h a l l , IlSA
Admiral E
J - King, U S N
L t . General H .
SECRETARY
B r i g . General J
R . Deane, USA
Cooke, J r . , USN
C o l o n e l J. E~ S m a r t , IJSA
Commander R~ I?.
47
L i b b y , T!SK
SECRET
1.
C.C.S.
with respect t o a i r .
i n t o what we were a b l e t o f u r n i s h i n t h e P a c i f i c .
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t we must, i n a c c e p t i n g t h e p a p e r , note
t h e r e s e r v a t i o n t h a t w e would f u r n i s h o n l y the r e s o u r c e s remaining a f t e r
m o u n t i n g HUSKY and f i l l i n g P a c i f i c r e q u i r e m e n t s , and t h a t w e s e e no
p r o s p e c t of p r o v i d i n g U . S . crews or t h e t o t a l s of a s s a u l t s h i p p i n g and
l a n d i n g c r a f t s e t f o r t h i n t h i s paper by August 1 s t .
I t was a g r e e d :
(a) T h a t i n r e g a r d t o p a r a g r a p h 4,
o t h e r commitments must be
f i r s t met;
(b) That on o u r b a s i s of c a l c u l a t i o n , t h e number of U. S . d i v i
s i o n s would be f i v e i n l i e u of f o u r ;
(c) T h a t of t h e s e f i v e U . S . d i v i s i o n s , one w i l l p r o b a b l y be
airborne.
2.
C.C.S.
C.C.S.
171--OPERATION HUSKY.
A f t e r d i s c u s s i o n , i t was agreed:
(a) T h a t t h e f i r s t p a r a g r a p h s h o u l d i n c l u d e , " w i t h t h e t a r g e t
d a t e as t h e p e r i o d of t h e f a v o r a b l e J u l y moon. Code d e s i g
n a t i o n , HUSKY";
48
SECRET
(b) Under paragraph 1 of t h e command s e t - u p , t h e words, "respon
s i b l e f o r , " should be r e p l a c e d by "charged with";
(c) The d i r e c t i v e s h o u l d p r o v i d e f o r immediate p r e p a r a t i o n o f
cover plans;
(d) An o v e r a l l code d e s i g n a t i o n f o r a l l Mediterranean o p e r a t i o n s
should be made.
4.
C.C.S.
D u r i n g t h e d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s p a p r , t h e q u e s t i o n a r o s e a s t o
what d u t i e s General Eisenhower would perform d u r i n g t h e c a r r y i n g o u t o f
Operation HUSKY. GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t he would be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r
a l l o f A f r i c a , f o r i s s u i n g d i r e c t i v e s t o A i r Marshal Tedder h a v i n g no
immediate a p p l i c a t i o n t o HUSKY, e t c . He f e l t t h e command r e l a t i o n s h i p t o
be a formal one i n view of t h e preponderance of B r i t i s h f o r c e s .
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t t h i s was i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e g e n e r a l
p r i n c i p l e t h a t immediate command v e s t e d i n t h e n a t i o n having a prepon
derance o f f o r c e s ; but t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e s h o u l d n o t be r i g i d l y a p p l i e d
and, i n f a c t , C.C.S.
7513 s h o u l d b e r e v i s e d b y i n s e r t i n g t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n
49
C A S A B L A N C A
C O N F E R E N C E
JANUARY
1943
( P r e s i d e d Over B y The P r e s i d e n t )
PAGE
ECinutes o f C o n f e r e n c e , J a n a u r y 15,
Minutes o f Conference,
January
16,
1943
19113
. . . .
. . . .
5i
58
SECRET
MINUTES OF CONFERENCE
Held a t Anfa Camp, January 15, 1943, at, 1000
PRESENT
The P r e s i d e n t
General Marshall
Admiral King
L t . General Arnold
M r . Harry Hopkins
Hr. A v e r i l l Harriman
B r i g . General Ueane
51
SECRET
1.
P r e s i d e n t would s t a y h e r e f o r a b o u t f o u r or f i v e d a y s ; t h e n l e a v e b y
motor f o r Rabst and P o r t Lyautey, where he would v i s i t t h r e e d i v i s i o n s
and i n t e r v i e w c e r t a i n s e l e c t e d o f f i c e r s and men; t h e n p r o c e e d by a i r t o
Oran, o b s e r v e t h e t r o o p s t h e r e and a l s o v i s i t a h o s p i t a l . From Oran, i t
was p l a n n e d t h a t he s h o u l d go t o h f a r r a k e c h , change p l a n e s a t t h e a i r f i e l d
t h e r e and t h e n r e t u r n t o t h e Unit,ed S t a t e s . He s t a t e d t h a t , i n view of
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e c o n f e r e n c e would p r o b a b l y l a s t a b o u t t e n d a y s , t h e s e
p l a n s would of n e c e s s i t y have t o undergo some change. He s a i d that, i t i s
n o t d e s i r a b l e f o r t h e P r e s i d e n t t o v i s i t Marrakech and he s h o u l d refuse
any i n v i t a t i o n of t h e Prime M i n i s t e r t o d o s o .
GENERAL MARSHALL e x p l a i n e d t h a t hlarrakech i s i n l a n d , t h a t i t s
a i r f i e l d i s e n t i r e l y o p e n . No one knows how many A x i . s a g e n t s may b e
i n c l u d e d i n t h e c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n s . He a l s o s a i d t h a t i t would b e
unwise t o have t h e P r e s i d e n t of t h e United S t a t e s i n a c i t y t h a t con
t a i n e d a b o u t one and one-half French d i v i s i o n s which have r e c e n t l y been
h o s t i l e t o u s and o n l y one r e g i m e n t o f American t r o o p s .
up s u c h b u s i n e s s as might he n e c e s s a r y i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e conference
I n d i s c t u s s i n g t h e p r o t e c t i o n a v a i l a b l e a t Anfa Camp, GEWRAL
ARNOLD b r o u g h t o u t t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e was a F r e n c h s q u a d r o n e q u i p p e d
w i t h our P-40 a i r p l a n e s ; a n d , a t t h e r e q u e s t of t h e P r e s i d e n t , h e ex
p l a i n e d s o m e t h i n g of our program f o r e o u i p p i n g F r e n c h a i r w i t s .
3.
R r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f concept r e g a r d i n g t h e p r o s p e c t s i n t h e European
t h e a t e r . They b e l i e v e t h a t w e s h o u l d f i r s t e x p a n d t h e bombing c t ' f o r t
a g a i n s t the Axis and t h a t o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Mediterranean o f f e r t h e b e s t
chance of compelling Germany t o d i s p e r s e h e r a i r r e s o u r c e s . He e x ~ : l a i n e d
t h a t t h e B r i t i s h a r e now i n f a v o r o f a n a t t a c k a g a i n s t S i c i l y rn?,Iinr
t h a n S a r d i n i a and t h a t t h i s change of' a t t i t u d e was p r o b a b l y i n s p i r e d t,y
t h e Prime M i n i s t e r .
a r e mutually c o n f l i c t i n g .
T h ey a l s o f e e l t h a t we must be i n a p o s i t i o n t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e
a s u r p r i s e b e c a u s e of t h e n e c e s s i t y of l o c a t i n g l a n d i n g c r a f t a l o n g t h e
n o r t h e r n c o a s t o f A f r i c a p r i o r t o i n i t i a t i n g o p e r a t i o n s . General M a r s h a l l
s t a t e d t h a t G e n e r a l C l a r k f e l t t h a t , w h i l e t h i s p r e s e n t e d some d i f f i - .
c u l t i e s , t h e y c o u l d b e overcome.
GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h a r e e x t r e m e l y f e a r f u l
of any d i r e c t a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e C o n t i n e n t u n t i l a d e c i d e d c r a c k i n t h e
German e f f i c i e n c y and morale h a s become a p p a r e n t . The B r i t i s h p o i n t o u t
53
':i.eii
GENERAL hZAHsHALI. s a i d t h a t t h e
m u n i c a t i o n s and ( 2 ) t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e w i l l b e an e x c e s s o f v e t e r a n
s o l d i e r s a v a i l a b l e i n N o r t h A f r i c a t o mount a n o p e r a t i o n .
I n d i s c u s s i n g T u r k e y , GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t,he B r i t i s h
8 t h Army would
be^ p r e p a r e d t o s e n d a c o n s i d e r a b l e f o r c e t h e r e or n e a r
t h e r e . The a i m o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s s h o u l d b e t o have T u r k e y r e s i s t
SECRET
want t o b e i n t h e p o s i t i o n of o v e r p r o m i s i n g a n y t h i n g t o t h e T u r k i s h
Government.
war on t h e s i d e o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , w e s h o u l d a s s e m b l e s u f f i c i e n t
f o r c e t o t h e e a s t of t h e T u r k i s h boundary t o e n a b l e t h e U n i t e d K a t i o m
t o r e i n f o r c e Turkey a s soon a s s h e d i d become i n v o l v e d i n t h e war. T h i s
can p r o b a b l y be accomplished by u s i n g p a r t o f t h e R r i t i s h 8 t h Army.
4 .
ANTISUBhlARINE WARFARE.
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n p o i n t e d out t h a t b o t h t h e American and t h e
B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f a g r e e d t h a t e f f e c t i v e measures must b e t a k e n
OPERATION RAVENOUS.
GENERAL MARSIIAIL informed t h e P r e s i d e n t of t h e B r i t . i s h a t t i t u d e
c o n c e r n i n g t h e O p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS.
ADMIRAL K I N G s t a t e d t h a t he had t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e B r i t i s h
were coming around t o t h e i d e a t h a t i t would be a p r o f i t a b l e gamhle.
GENERAL MARSHALL e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h e r e were h a z a r d s , p a r t i c u l a r l y
by f o r c i n g t h e J a p a n e s e t o d i v e r t t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e Burma t h e a t e r ;
and, even i n t h e e v e n t of f a i l u r e , i t would almost c e r t a i n l y r e s u l t i n a
j u n c t i o n of t h e Chinese f o r c e s now i n Burma w i t h t h o s e from Yunnan; a n d ,
i f a r e t i r e m e n t became n e c e s s a r y , a t r a i n e d Chinese army would withdraw
i n t o China.
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n spoke of t h e G e n e r a l i s s i m o ' s r e f u s a l t o
mount t h e o p e r a t i o n . One r e a s o n g i v e n b y t h e G e n e r a l i s s i m o i s t h e f a i l u r e
55
SECRET
t o s e c u r e B r i t i s h c o o p e r a t i o n i n assembling n a v a l f o r c e s i n t h e B a y of
Bengal, which he f e l t was a d e f i n i t e B r i t i s h commitment.
I t was a g r e e d t h a t a n e f f o r t s h o u l d b e made t o o b t a i n f i r m
B r i t i s h support f o r the operation before requesting the President t o
d i s c u s s t h e matter f u r t h e r w i t h t h e G e n e r a l i s s i m o .
The PRESIDENT added t h a t f o r p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a s o n s he thought i t
w h a t he thought t h e prospeczs
RAVENOUS were.
lie s a i d t h e B r i t i s h p r e s e n t e d a l l s o r t s of' d i f f i c u l t i e s
H e s t a t e d t h a t t h e y a r e o p e r a t i n g on i n t e r i o r
OPERATIONS I N TUNISIA.
GENERAL MARSHALL i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e r e m a y b e a change i n t h e
B r i t i s h command i n t h e o p e r a t i o n s i n T u n i s i a . He s a i d t h a t . A d m i r a l
Cunningham a g r e e d t h a t t h e command had n o t been w e l l h a n d l e d . I n s t a n c e s
o c c u r r e d i n w h i c h t r a i n e d U n i t e d S t a t e s c o m l ~ a tt e a m s l o a n e d t,o t h e
B r i t i s h were b r o k e n u p , t h u s r e d u c i n g t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s . T h e r e had
a l s o b e e n i n s t a n c e s of' t h e m i s u s e of B r i t i s h p a r a c h u t e t r o o p s . T h i s
s i t u a t i o n i s now b e i n g c o r r e c t e d .
57
SECRET
MINUTES OF CONFERENCE
Held a t Anfa Camp, January 16, 1943, a t 1700.
PRESENT
The P r e s i d e n t
General Marshall
Admiral King
L t . General Arnold
L t . General Somervell
B r i g . General Wedemeyer
Vr. A v e r i l l Harriman
B r i g . General Deane
58
ADMIRAL K I N G informed t h e P r e s i d e n t t h a t t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of
S t a f f have been a t t e m p t i n g t o o b t a i n t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f ' s con
c e p t as t o how t h e war s h o u l d be won. He s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h have
d e f i n i t e i d e a s as t o what t h e n e x t o p e r a t i o n s h o u l d b e b u t do n o t seem
t o have a n o v e r - a l l p l a n f o r t h e conduct of t h e war.
H e s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e w i l l be e x c e s s t r o o p s a v a i l a b l e i n North
A f r i c a when t h e A x i s powers have b e e n e x p e l l e d from K o r t h A f r i c a and
t h a t t h i s is one of t h e c h i e f r e a s o n s why Operation HUSKY a p p e a r s t o be
attractive.
The B r i t i s h have e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t S i c i l y
cannot be mounted p r i o r t o August, b u t f e e l t h a t t h e r e is a p o s s i b i l i t y
59
SECRET
The PRESIDENT asked how many t r o o p s were i n E n g l a n d a t t h i s t i m e ,
t o which GENERAL MARSHALL r e p l i e d t h a t t h e r e were one t r a i n e d d i v i s i o n
and a b o u t 140,000 t o 150,000 men. H e s a i d t h a t by n e x t summer w e c a n
have s i x t o n i n e d i v i s i o n s i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, and t h e B r i t i s h w i l l
have t h i r t e e n .
t r o o p s who w i l l d e s i r e t o
In t h i s c a s e , a n o c c u p a t i o n o f t h e C o n t i n e n t
would b e c o m p a r a t i v e l y s i m p l e .
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t r a i n i n g f o r amphibious o p e r a t i o n s i s
t h e most c r i t i c a l f a c t o r which we have t o f a c e . The t r a i n i n g must be of
much h i g h e r q u a l i t y t h a n t h a t g i v e n f o r TORCH. H e quoted Generel E i s e n
hower a s s a y i n g t h a t he b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e r e must b e a n i n v a s j ~ o non t h e
C o n t i n e n t b u t t h a t i t would r e q u i r e a minimum of 12 d i v i s i o n s , which i s
double p r e v i o u s e s t i m a t e s . General Eisenhower a l ~ s of e e l s t h a t t h e r e i s a
need f o r more t r a i n i n g . Other l i m i t i n g f a c t o r s t o any proposed. o p e r a t i o n
a r e t h e n e c e s s i t i e s of combating t h e s u b m a r i n e menace a n d f o r t h e de
l i v e r y of s u p p l i e s t o R u s s i a .
An o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t S a r d i n i a c a n b e a c c o m p l i s h e d a b o u t six
weeks e a r l i e r t h a n one a g a i n s t S i c i l y , b u t t,he r e s u l t s w i l l have l i t t l e
e f f e c t i n improving t h e s h i p p i n g s i t u a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n
The o n l y p o s i t i v e r e s u l t t o b e r e c e i v e d from t h e c a p t u r e o f S a r d i n i a
would b e t h e a b i l i t y t o bomb I t a l y a n d p e r h a p s t h e s o u t h e r n c o a s t of
France.
GENERAL ARNOLD p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e r e would be much b e t t e r a i r
coverage f o r O p e r a t i o n HUSKY t h a n c o u l d b e g i v e n t o O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE.
The PRESIDENT asked where t h e Germans had t h e b e s t d e f e n s e .
60
SECRET
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t ,
i n our endeavors t o o b t a i n a d e f i n i t e
i n v o l v e s a c e r t a i n d e l i v e r y o f m u n i t i o n s t o them arid t h a t t , h i s s h a l l
p r o b a b l y be c o n t i n u e d on t h e same s c a l e when t h e p r e s e n t P r o t o c o l e x p i r e i .
ADMIRAL K I N G s t a t e d t h a t B r i t i s h convoys hy t h e n o r t h e r n r m t e
a r e s e t up f o r 30 s h i p s e v e r y 42 d a y s . W i t h an a d d i t i o n a l 12 d e s t r o y e r s
this c o u l d be improved t o a r a t e of 30 s h i p s e a c h 27 d a y s . H e st,al,ed
t h a t he d i d n o t b e l i e v e we s h o u l d b a s e our p l a n s t o c l a r g e l y on a con
t e m p l a t e d German c r a c k - u p .
t i o n i s n o t f e a s i b l e b e f o r e A p r i l 19-24 b e c a n s e of U r j t i s h l a c k of
enthusiasm.
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t . t , h e B r i t i s h would u n d e r t a k e a n Opera-.
t i o n SLEDGEHAMMER if t h e y saw s i g n s o f a b r e a k i n German m o r a l e . T h i s
would b e followed by a m a k e s h i f t ROUNDW o p e r a t i o n . He s a i d t h e B r i t i s h
61
SECRET
t h r e e p l a n s and making a l l p r e p a r a t i o n s t o c a r r y t h e m o u t , b u t l e a v i n g
the decision a s t o the objective u n t i l a l a t e r date.
Crete, or S a r d i n i a .
The PNBIDENT s a i d he would l i k e t o have some f l e x i b i l i t y t o t h e
p l a n s i n c a s e i t became a p p a r e n t t h a t Turkey might e n t e r t h e war. I n
t h a t case w e could t h e n adopt t h e o b j e c t i v e which would f i t i n b e s t w i t h
t h i s development.
62
SECRET
The PRESIDENT t h e n d i r e c t e d t h e d i s c u s s i o n t o R u s s i a . He s a i d
that he had r e c e i v e d information t h a t t h e Russians d i d n o t d e s i r e any of
are l i m i t e d by t h e a v a i . l a b i l i t y of t r u c k t r a n s p o r t , a t , l o n .
The PRESIDENT asked what might. happen i f Turkey remained n e u t r a l
b u t p e r m i t t e d our t r a n s p o r t i n g mwiit.ions and bombs through h e r t e r r i t o r y ,
GENERAL SOMERVELL r e p l i e d t h a t c e r t a i ~ nr o u t e s c o u l d be made
a v a i l a b l e by t h i s means; b u t , i f t h e y wei'e u s e d , it. wou16 be necessflrg
t o e s t a b l i s h a t r u c k a s s e m b l y p l a n t i n t h a t , areii.., He a d d e d t h a t h e
thought t h i s s h o u l d be done and that a l l a v a i l a b l e r o u t e s i n t o R u s s i a
s h o u l d be used.
The PRESIDENT asked General Somervell i f t r u c k b o d i e s could be
manufactured i n t h e Near E a s t , t o which GENERAL SOKERVELL r e p l i e d t h a t
lumber would have t o lie obt.ained from I n d i a
H e a d q u a r t e r s , a s k i n g f o r a r e p o r t as t o t h e amount of i n t e l l i g e n c e r e
c e i v e d o u t of s o u t h e r n Europe by U. S., I n t e l l i g e n c e a g e n c i e s and how our
e f f o r t s i n t h i s r e g a r d compared w i t h those of t h e B r i t i s h . )
SECREl
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n informed t h e P r e s i d e n t t h a t t h e B r i t i s h
had a g r e e d t o t r a n s f e r t h e i r V a l e n t i n e t a n k s from t h e 6 t h Armored Divi
s i o n t o t h e French as soon as t h e B r i t i s h had r e c e t v e d o u r S h e r m a n tanks.
He a l s o s t a t e d he t h o u g h t i t n e c e s s a r y t o e q u i p t h e b e s t French d i v i
sions rapidly.
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n informed t h e P r e s i d e n t r e g a r d i n g a d e c i
s i o n which had been made by General Eisenhower c o n c e r n i n g t h e T u n i s i a n
o p e r a t i o n s . A d r i v e towards Sfax, whichhadbeen p l a n n e d f o r J a n u a r y 24th,
h a s been c a l l e d o f f .
a g a i n s t Sfax w i l l be made by i n f a n t r y u n i t s a t a l a t e r d a t e , t o be co
o r d i n a t e d by General Eisenhower and General Alexander
I
satisfactorily,
e x c e p t t h a t v a l u a b l e c a r g o s p a c e was b e i n g u t i l i z e d b y some of t h e
c i v i l i a n a g e n c i e s i n t h e United S t a t e s i n s e n d i n g u n n e c e s s a r y and r i
diculous i t e m s .
The PRESIDENT t h e n informed t h e C h i e f s of S t a f f t h a t Admiral
Robert i n Martinique had r e c e i v e d a message from Laval t o s i n k h i s s h i p s
i m m e d i a t e l y upon r e c e i v i n g e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t e n d e d
a c t i o n a g a i n s t M a r t i n i q u e . Lava1 r e q u i r e d Robert t o g i v e him an answer
t o h a n d l e t h e P a c i f i c s i t u a t i o n . H e s t a t e d , however, t h a t he d i d n o t
f e e l t h a t t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f were a s y e t c o n v i n c e d of t h i s
n e c e s s i t y . The C h i e f s of S t a f f f e e l t h a t w e s h o u l d m a i n t a i n t h e s t a t u s
quo and s i m p l y h o l d , w h e r e a s t h e P l a n n e r s r e c o g n i z e t h a t a c o n s t a n t
p r e s s u r e must be kept on t h e Japanese and t h a t e v e r y e f f o r t must be made
t o keep China i n t h e war. The P l a n n e r s a d m i t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e
C h i n e s e d r o p p i n g o u t o f t h e war.
The PRESIDENT t h e n d i s c u s s e d t h e proposed o p e r a t i o n s j n Burma.
GENERAL MARSHALL informed h i m t h a t j u s t as he f e l t t h a t we had convinced
t h e B r i t i s h t h a t O p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS s h o u l d be u n d e r t a k e n , t h e General
issimo had d e c l i n e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e . The reason g i v e n by t h e Generalissimo
is t h a t t h e B r i t i s h r e f u s e t o p l a c e a n a v a l f o r c e i n t h e B a y of Berigal
t o i n t e r r u p t t h e J a p a n e s e l i n e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . The G e n e r a l i s s i m o
f e e l s t h a t a d e f i n i t e commitment t o t h i s e f f e c t had b e e n made by t h e
Prime M i n i s t e r i n a t a l k l a s t y e a r b e f o r e t h e P a c i f i c C o u n c i l , GENERAL
MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t h e Prime M i n i s t e r probably had t h e ANAKIM o p e r a t i o n
i n mind.
65
SECRET
INDEX
Brest Peninsula
Operations a g a i n s t , 26
BRIMSTONE, 3, 6
C o m p a r i s o n o f , w i t h r e s u l t s of
B r e s t P e n i n s u l a o p e r a t i o n , 11
Deception of l a n d craft, 11
Training, 5
British
Convoys, 6 1
Eastern Fleet, 9
A t Ceylon, a4
Possession of T r i p o l i , 6
S t r a t e g i c c o n c e p t o f c o n d u c t of
A
Admiral G l a s s f o r d l a r e p o r t , 7
Agenda
For coming conferences, a
Saggested procedure f o r d e a l i n g w i t h
t h e , 34
Aid t o Russia
Coordination o f supply, a6
General S o n e r v e l l ' e d i s c u s s i o n 0% 39
Througb C o n t i n e n t a l landing, 18
Aid t o Turkey, 5 5
A i r f o r c e s i n China, 56, 6 2
Aircraft o v e r T u n i s i a , 6
Aleutian I s l a n d s , 23
Operations i n , 46
Algiers, A i r s i t u a t i o n at, 4
Allocation f o r shipping i n t h e
P a c i f i c , 40
A l l o c a t i o n o f f o r c e s and p r o d u c t i o n ,
Discussion of, 30
Amphibious weapons, 17
A f f e c t o f RAVENOUS on, 23
I n i t i a t i o n o f , 24
Anfa Camp, P r o t e c t i o n a v a i l a b l e , 53
Pntisnbmarine w a r f a r e s u r v e y , 41, 55
Approach t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n
Admiral King's, 3
General M a r s h a l l ' s , 3
w a r , 39, 53, 6 1
Burma
Byrnes, Telegram t o , 36
B
BOIERO build-up
Shipping c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r , 48
Bombing i n o c c u p i e d t e r r i t o r y and
p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s , 43
Bombers t o G e n e r a l S t i l w e l l , 10
Bone, A i r s i t n a t i o n a t , 4
Channel I s l a n d s
Lord M o n n t b a t t e n l s p l a n f o r
c a p t u r e , 16
Chennanlt G e n e r a l , A i r f o r c e s
u n d e r , 56
China
A i r f o r c e s i n , 56
T r a n s p o r t p l s n e s t o , 6a
Chinese r e l u c t a n c e t o begin
RAVENOUS, a4. 28
C i v i L i a n supply s i t n a t i o n , 64
C l e a r i n g t h e Mediterranean, 3
Combined Staff P l a n n e r s
P a c i f i c concept f o r 1943, 23
Requirements i n P a c i f i c , 59
S t r a t e g i c concept o f war i n
P a c i f i c , 59
Command
67
I2
England, i n , 14
set-up i n m n i s i a proposed by
General M a r s h d l , 35
SECRET
INDEX
Command-continued
S e t - u p i n West A f r i c a p r o p o s e d by
A d m i r a l K i n g , 33
o p e r a t i o n , 35
Command s i t u a t i o n i n E u r o p e , 5 6
Communications, Mediterranean, 54
s i o n o f , 33
Conferences
Agenda f o r coming, 2
Further, 6
Suggested p r o c e d u r e f a r d e a l i n g w i t h
t h e Agenda of t h e , 34
C o n t i n e n t a l i n v a s i o n , Forces f o r , 6 0
C o n t i n e n t a l l e n d i n g , 18
A s a i d t o R u s s i a , 18
O p e r a t i o n s i n 1943, 48
convoys
British, 61
C o n t i n u i n g , i n M e d i t e r r a n e a n , ~n
C o o k e , n d m i r a l , C. M . , J r .
Date suggested' f o r Operation
34
C r a f t , l a n d i n g , 17
Assembly i n U . K . , p g
C o n t r i b u t i o n by B r i t i s h , 2 5
D i s c u s s i o n o f , by G e n e r a l M a r s h a l l
a n d Lord M o u n t b a t t e n , 25
For I n d i a , 24
Europe
Bombing o p e r a t i o n s e f f e c t i v e n e s s
i n , 56
Command s i t u a t i o n i n , 56
European t h e a t e r
D e c i s i o n s as t o command set-up, 12
E x p e l l i n g theGermans from T n n i s i a , 4
F
F i g h t e r a i r c r a f t over T a n i s i a , 6
Forces
A l l o c a t i o n of
D i s c u v s i o n o f 30
C o n t i n e n t a l o p e r a t i o n s , for, 6n
L i s t i n g o f , by U. K. and U . s., 1g
Fourth D i v i s i o n t o Yorth A f r i c a . 6
French
P i l o t s , T r a i n i n g o f , 44
S h i p s a t M a r t i n i q u e t o be s u n k , 64
Fxrther conferences, 6
BUSKY,
D
D e c i s i o n s r e a c h e d c o n c e r n i n g command
set-up i n Europeaa t h e a t e r , 12
D e f e a t of
Germany, Key t o , 24
Jhpan, Key t o , 24
Destroyers t r a n s f e r r e d
escorts, 33
Discussion
Admiral K i n g l a
Approach, Method o f ,
P r o c e d u r e , Method o f ,
General Marshall I s
Approach, Method o f ,
P r o c e d u r e , Method o f ,
Dodecanese, p l a n s f o r ,
t o ocean
German t h r e a t t o Spain, 6
G l a s s f o r d , Admiral, r e p o r t , 7
I1
Iligh o c t a n e g a s p r o d u c t i o n a f f e c t e d
by s y n t h e t i c r u b b e r program, 36
HUSKY, O p e r a t i o n
Agreement f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n , 48
C a l c u l a t i o n s f o r , 44
Date proposed o b j e c t i o n a b l e t o
Admiral King, 43
D i s q u s s i o n of mounting, 46
T a r g e t d a t e s u g g e s t e d by P'dmiral
Coake, 34
Japan
Operations a g a i n s t , 56
Supplies to, 56
J a p a n e s e a i r s t r e n g t h , 23
J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f
Opposition t o s h i p p i n g v i a
67
E
Eastern Fleet, British, 9
A t Ceylon, 2 4
Murmansk, 34
68
INDEX
SECRET
J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f - - c o n t i n u e d
P r e s i d e n t i a l movements, P i s c u s s i o n
o f p r o p o s a l s o f , 38
Pecommendatians f o r i n s t r u c t i o n s t o
J u s t i c e Byrnes regarding s y n t h e t i c
r u b b e r f r e e z e , 36
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of M r . Nielson a p
p r o v e d by,
35
I(
Approach t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n , H i s , 3
A t t i t u d e t o w a r d S a r d i n i a n and S i c i l . . ~
i a n o p e r h t i o n s , 31
N e d i t e r r a n e a n command proposal, 35
Summary o f g c e e r a l s t r a t e g i c plan
b y , 38
West A f r i c a command s e t - u p p r o
posals, 33
K i s k a o p e r a t i o n , P r e s i d e n t l s objec
t i o n t o R r i t i s h i n t e r e s t i n , 29
ing, r7
?or I n d i a , 2 4
L a n d i n g on t h e European C o n t i n e n t , 18
As a i d t o D u s s i a , 18
Lend-Lease t o Torkey, 38
L e v a n t , C a p a c i t y of r o u t e s t h r o a g h ,
and U . S . ,
Marrakech,
Conditions in,
52
35
?\elson r e c o n m e n d a , t i o n f o r s y n t h e t i c
r u b b e r material a j l o t n e n t s , 3s
Fogues, G e n e r a l , V i s i t w i t h t h e
President, 52
North Africa
Supply s i t u a t i o n : 6q
T r a i n i n g i n , f o r l a n d i n g s , g:j
T r o o p s i n , :sg
Norway, Bombing of a i r f i e l d s , 26
Landing craft
A s s e m b l y in U - K . , 29
C o n t r i b u t i o n b y B r i t i s h , 25
C i s c u s s i o n of, by G e n e r a l M a r s h a l l
and L o r d M o u n t b a t t e n , 25
n i a p o s i t i o n f o l l ~ o w i n gS i c i l i a n l a n d
29
18
Memorandom f o r t h e P r e s i d e n t , Annex
"AN' t o J.C.S.
5 5 t h Meeting Minutes,
44
35
Commnnicaticns, 54
C o n t i n u a t i o n o f c o n v o y s by i i r i t i s b ,
X i n n t e s of M e e t i n g s , I
M o d i f i c a t i o n s t o C - C . S . 155, 3 3
M o r a l e o f t h e Axis, 6 0
for 2 9 4 3 , 39
I!. S . r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o a c c o m p a n y
L i s t i n g of forces by U. K.
M a r s h a l l , G e n e r a l G . C.
p o s a l f o r f u l l t r u s t i n F r e n c h , 33
Approach t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n , :j
T u n i s i a n command s e t - u p f o l l o w i n g
t h e T r i p o l i Operation, 35
T u r k i s h L e n d - L e a s e s i t u a t i o n re
vealed b y , 3 6
Y a r t i n i q u e , Lava1 1s message t o Ad
miral Pobert, 64
M ed it e r r an e an
Army a n d A i r command i n , no
C l e a . r i n g a n d opening, 3
Command p r o p o s a l by A d m i r a l K i n g ,
O b j e c t i o n s t o B r i t i s h c o n c e r n i n our
s t r a t e g i c t h e a t e r , zg
Operation
Aleutians, 46
ANAKIM
P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s a g r e e m e n t , 28
R e l a t i o n t o RAVENOUS, a3
BOLERO b u i l d - u p ,
S h i p p i n g capa
b i l i t i e s f o r , 48
B r e s t P e n i n s a l a , 26
BPIMSTONE, 3, 6
C o m p a r i s o n o f , w i t h r e s u l t s of
B r e s t P e n i n s u l a o p e r a t i o n , II
69
SECRET
INDEX
Operation-continued
BRIMSTONE--continned
D e c e p t i o n o f l a n d i n g c r a f t , 11
Training, 5
Burma, 1 3
t o Prime M i n i s t e r , 28
B r i t i s h can o p e r a t e a g a i n s t r e g a r d
less o f C h i n e s e , 8 9
C o n t i n e n t a l , i n 1943, 28
HUSKY
Agreement f a l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n , 4 8
C a l c u l a t i o n s f o r , 44
Date p r o p o s a l o b j e c t i o n a b l e t o
A d m i r a l Xing, 43
D i s c u s s i o n of m o u n t i n g o p e r a t i o n ,
46
T a r g e t d a t e s u g g e s t e d by Admiral
Cooke, 14
Xiska
i n r e r e s t i n , r9
t h e , 46
Korway
Bombing o f a i r f i e l d s , 2 6
Pacific
c o n c e p t f o r 1943, 2 3
P r i m e M i n i s t e r f s o b j e c t i o n t o op
e r a t i o n , 28
S h i p p i n g , 40
RAVENOUS
C h i n e s e r e l u c t a n c e t o b e g i n , 24, 6 5
P r i m e X i n i s t e r ' s a g r e e m e n t , -28
P r o s p e c t s f o r success, 56
P u r p o s e o f , 28
R e l a t i o n t o ANPXIM, 23
ROUNDUP
nate f e a s i b l e , 6 1
F o r c e s n e e d e d , 1s
Sicilian
Date for, 5 9
H e c h a n i c s and key t o , 16
SLEXFXA?fMER
B r i t i s h w i l l undertake, 6 1
TORCI3
Available troops following
c o m p l e t i o n , 18
u n i t e d Kingdom, i n a n d f r o m t h e , 1 3
Operations
C o n t i n e n t a l a n d HUSKY c o m b i n e d , 5s
L a n d i n g b a r g e s f o r , 59
J a p a n , A g a i n s t , 56
S a r d i n i a n , A d v a n t a g e s o f s u c c e s s , 60
T u n i s i a , I n , $9
P
Pacific
A l l o c a t i o n f o r s h i p p i n g , 40
B r i t i s h recognizance of necessary
A l l i e d a c t i o n , 65
C o n c e p t f o r 1943, 1 3
Prime X i n i s t e r l s o b j e c t i o n t o
o p e r a t i o n , 28
P e a c e t a b l e , Domination o f , 21
P o s s e s s i o n of T r i p o l i by B r i t i s h , 6
P r e s i d e n t , The
k t i o n required p r i o r t o departure,
34
5 5 t h Meeting Minutes, 32
Ob j e c t i . o n . t o B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t
i o
U S s t r a t e g i ~ rt h e a t e r , 2 g
R e p o r t t o , a n d P r i m e M i n i s t e r ,
4~
Visit( 2
V i s i t of G e n e r a l K-ogurs air6
t h e
S u l t a n of Morocco w i t h , 52
P r e s i d e n t ' s P r o g r a m , The, 5 2
Prime M i n i s t e r ' s
i i g r e e m e n t t o O p e r a t i o n s ANAXIM
a n d
RAVENOTIS, 28
O b j e c t i o n t o P a c i f i c o p e r a t i o n , 28
R e p o r t t o P r e s i d e n t and, 49
P r i o r i t y bombing p r o g r a m , IY
P r o t e c t i o n a v a i l a b l e a t Anfa Camp, 53
RAVFNOUS, O p e r a t i o n
B r z t i s h a t t i t u d e c o n c e r n i n g , 55
C h i n e s e r e l u c t a n c e t o b e g i n , 2h1 65
E f f e c t on AhuKLM, 23
I n t t i a t i o n o f , 24
P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s a g r e e m e n t , 28
P r o s p e c t s o f Success, 56
P u r p o s e o f , 28
M i n i s t e r , 49
Resources t u be f u r n i s h e d f o l l o w i n g
m o u n t i n g IIUSKY, 48
R o b e r t , A d m i r a l , Message r e g a r d i n g
s h i p s from Laval, 64
ROWDUP O p e r a t i o n
F e a s i b l e d a t e f o r , 61
F o r c e s n e e d e d f o r , 15
Russia
Aj.d t o
C o n t i n e n t a l l a n d i n g , 18
C o o r d i n a t i o n o f , 26
O p p o s i t i o n of J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f
t o s h i p p i n g v i a Murmansk, 34
70
INDEX
SECRET
Russia-continued
A i d to--continued
P a c i f i c p l a n , zo
R e j e c t i o n of U. S . and B r i t i s h per
s o n n e l , 2 5 , 63
Supply t o , 6 3
S
Sardinia
Advantages of c a p t u r e , 60
Mounting and o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t , 5
O p e r a t i o n f a v o r e d o v e r S i c i l y , 29
Sfax, B r i t i s h d r i v e on, c a n c e l e d , 64
S h i p p i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r BOLERO
build-up, 48
Shipping f o r o p e r a t i o n s i n P a c i f i c , 40
Sicily
D a t e f o r o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t , 59
Means of r e d u c i n g f o r t i f i c a , t i a n s , 26
One o f p u r p o s e s o f c a p t u r e , 19
S t r e n g t h i n , 26
S i t u a t i o n i n t h e a i r a t A l g i e r s and
Bone, 4
SLEDGEF'P?!MER, O p e r a t i o n
B r i t i s h t o undertake, 6 1
Somervell, General B. R
P i d t o R u s s i a d i s c u s s e d hy--C.C,,S,.
162, 39
O n t i i n e of m e c h a n i c s o f S i c i l i a n
operation, 16
Southwest P a c i f i c , O p e r a t i o n s i n , 46
S p a i n , German t h r e a t t o , 6
S t a l i n r e j e c t s U . S. a n d B r i t i s h
p e r s o n n e l , 25
S t r a t e g i c p o l i c i e s , General, 17
Submarines
Bombing o f , 2 8
I n d i a n O c e a n , I n , 10
1J. S. l o a n o f s i x , 10
S u l t a n of Morocco, V i s i t w i t h t h e
President, 52
S u m m a r i z i n g of g e n e r a l s t r a t e g i c
S u p p l i e s t o General S t i l w e l l , 29
Supply s i t u a t i o n
C i v i l i a n , 64
I n North A f r i c a , 64
To Russia, 63
S y n t h e t i c r u h h e r program, 28
E f f e c t s on m i l i t a r y p r o g r a m s i n
c l u d i n g h i g h o c t a n e g a s and p l a n e
p r o d u c t i o n , 36
M a t e r i a l a l l o t m e n t recommended by
M r . Nelson, 35
Tanks of B r i t i s h t o French, 64
T e l e g r a m t o B y r n e s , Washington, 3 6
T h e a t e r , European
D e c i s i o n s r e a c h e d a t d i s c u s s i o n of
command s e t - u p i n , 12
TORCH, O p e r a t i o n , A v a i l a b l e t r o o p s
f o l l o w i n g c o m p l e t i o n o f , 18
Training
I n N o r t h A f r i c a f o r l a n d i n g s , 53
Of F r e n c h p i l o t s , 44
T r a n s p o r t p l a n e s f o r China, 6 2
T r i p o l i , B r i t i s h possession of, 6
Troops
Movement o f , 12
North A f r i c a , f o r m a i n t a i n i n g , S r 19
To General S t i l w e l l , 29
To United Kingdom,
11,
60
Truck assembly p l a n t , 6 3
Tnnisia
E x p e l l i n g t h e Germans from, 4
O p e r a t i o n s i n , 57
Turkey
Aid t o , 5 5
B r i t i s h 8 t h Army Force f o r , 54
Lend-.-Lease s i t u a t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t
t o , 38
Passive b e l l i g e r e n c y , 34
U S r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o accompany
Prime M i n i s t e r t o Turkey proposed,
38
U
United Kingdom, O p e r a t i o n s i n and
f r o m t h e , 11
V i s i t o f G e n e r a l Nogoes a n d t h e S u l t a n
of Morocco w i t h t h e P r e s i d e n t , 5%
West A f r i c a ,
Command s e t - u p a s p r o
71