10 002 PDF

international journal on minority and group rights
21 (2014) 497-526
brill.com/ijgr
The Myth of the Ottoman Millet System: Its

Treatment of Kurds and a Discussion of Territorial
and Non-Territorial Autonomy
Latif Tas*
Researcher and Consultant, Oxford Diasporas Programme,

University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
latiftas@yahoo.com
Abstract
This article re-opens the discussion about the Ottoman millet practice. The best known
stereotypes claim that the so-called millet system only offered rights to non-Muslim
religious minorities. This article fundamentally challenges this approach. It focuses on
how the millet practice was applied to the treatment of Kurds under the early and late
Ottoman Empire, and discusses how millet practices were destroyed by the disease of
nationalism. The article then considers how practices like those applied by the
Ottomans might act as a useful example for modern nation states facing conflicts with
national, religious, ethnic or migrant minorities. It suggests that practices like the millet might be beneficial both if minorities gain territorial recognition and also for those
minorities who live in non-territorial communities.
Keywords
Ottoman millet Kurds law nationalism nation state Turkey autonomy
* In 2012, the author was awarded a Postdoctoral Fellowship by the prestigious Wissen
schaftskolleg zu Berlin (Berlin Institute of Advanced Studies) and participated in the
Rechtskulturen (Legal Cultures) Programme, Germany. Tass book, Legal Pluralism in Action:
Dispute Resolution and the Kurdish Peace Committee, was published by Ashgate in 2014. His
works have also appeared in the Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law; Onati SocioLegal Series. His research interests include: law and society and dispute resolution; the
philosophy of law, legal anthropology; ethnic conflict management; diaspora identity and
transnationalism; Kurdish, Turkish, Middle Eastern and Ottoman studies.
koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014|doi 10.1163/15718115-02104003
498
Tas
1 Introduction
Under the Ottoman Empire, different ethnic or religious groups were more or
less officially recognised. Each group was described as a millet. Millets living
in different parts of the Empire were granted autonomous powers of selfregulation: each with its own leader, responsible for ruling over their com
munity. This practice allowed different ethnic communities to live together
without the way of life of one community being destroyed or outlawed by any
others. Territorial autonomy was not the only element for the protection of a
minority population. The millet practice was an important way in which the
Ottomans were able to conquer, and then maintain control over, such a large
and multi-cultural empire. The millet practice actively promoted both intraethnic and inter-ethnic peace and security.
From the 19th century, many Westerners (Christians) and nationalist
Turks have described the practice as the millet system. However, the
approach was neither unitary nor static. It was also not a system, which
implies something structured to come top-down from the centre as part of a
representation of authority, but rather something that emerged bottom-up
in different ways from the various communities, representing their ways of
life. For these reasons I will mainly use the phrase millet practice in this
article.
This article charts how under the Ottoman Empire Kurds used the millet
practice to make space to exercise their cultural identity, and practice their
customary laws. The Kurds were one of the largest and most fearsome groups
during the Ottoman period. They had fiscal, judicial and administrative auton
omy over their region and applied their customary laws over disputes between
their members. However, as this article will demonstrate, from the middle of
the 19th century the power of local leaders was seized by the Ottoman central
authorities as part of the nationalistic movement.
In the later part of this article, I will argue that the millet practice can be
a potential source for plural modern nation-states to draw on in understand
ing how diversity in a plural society might peacefully be managed. Modern
nation states currently face real challenges in how to resolve conflicts
between minority and majority populations. The millet practice offered a
unique blend of territorial and non-territorial rights for different communi
ties, whilst maintaining overall state power, and may therefore be a source to
learn from.
The article first discusses the reality of how the millet practice worked and
how especially Kurds were represented under this practice.
international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526
The Myth of the Ottoman Millet System
499
The Operation of the Millet Practice
The millet practice facilitated the official and unofficial functioning of many
minority communities, including Kurds, for hundreds of years. The term millet
system was not used by the Ottomans, especially before the 19th century. It is
the name given to the Ottoman system by Western Europeans. Even the word
millet was hardly used before the tanzimat reforms in 1839.1 The most common
Ottoman term for a group or a community (cemaat), whether ethnic, political,
religious or military, was not millet at all, but taife.2 In the Koran (9:16), millet
refers to the people of Abraham or people of the state, and covers all members
of different ethnicities and religions, not only non-Muslims.3
There was not a well-structured or institutionalised administrative system
underpinning the millet practice. Local arrangements varied considerably over
time and place, and the approach was flexible, loose and hybrid.4 Under these
practices, different ethnic or religious groups, or millets, living in different parts
of the Empire, were granted powers of self-regulation. Every millet had its own
leader, or millet ba, responsible for ruling over their community.5
Different writers have propounded different definitions of the so-called
millet system. According to some researchers6 the practice was copied from
the agreement of Medina, which was used by the Prophet Muhammad when
arbitrating between Muslim and Jewish communities in the seventh century.
When the Prophet Muhammad took power in Medina many different ethnic
and religious groups were living there. The agreement of Medina allowed all
communities the freedom to maintain their religious practices and beliefs,
1 See for example R. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 18561876 (Princeton University
Press, Princeton N.J., 1963); B. Braude, Foundation Myths of the Millet System, in
B. Braude and B. Lewis (eds.), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a
Plural Society (Holmes & Meier Publishers, New York, London, 1982), pp. 6990.
D. Goffman, Ottoman millets in the early seventeenth century, 11 New Perspectives on Turkey
(1994), pp. 13558; L. Tas, One State, Plural Options: Kurds in the UK, 45:2 The Journal of Legal
Pluralism and Unofficial Law (2013) pp. 167189; L. Tas, Legal Pluralism in Action: Dispute
Resolution and the Kurdish Peace Committee (Ashgate, Farnham, 2014).
2 Goffman, ibid.
3 Braude, supra note 1.
4 Ibid., p. 74.
5 M. N. Hechter, T. Kuyucu and A. Sacks, Nationalism and Direct Rule, in G. Delanty and
K. Kumar (eds.), Handbook of Nations and Nationalism, (Sage Publications, London, 2006)
pp. 8493.
6 M.M. Kenanolu, Osmanl Millet Sistemi, Mit ve Gerek (Klasik yaynlar, Istanbul, 2007);
M. Belge, Osmanlda Kurumlar ve Kltr (Bilgi niversitesi Yaynlar, stanbul, 2008).
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along with their own practices of law, on condition of affirming their loyalty
to the state. In this way, diverse communities were generally able to live
peacefully alongside one another. However, other researchers have different
ideas about where the millet system was copied or inherited from. Accord
ingto Ortayl7 and Barkey,8 the Ottoman millet system was inherited from
traditions in the Roman and Byzantine Empires. Ortayl believes that the
Ottoman Empire was, on the one hand, a continuation of the Roman Empire
a third period after the Roman and Byzantine Empires and, on the other,
an Islamic ruler state.9 Barkey agrees that the Ottomans benefited from the
loose, fluid and hybrid types of strategies used to control different subject
populations in the Roman world, as well as in late Byzantine and post-Seljuk
times.10
Under the millet practice there was no significant challenge to the culture,
customs and religions of different groups. When the Ottomans expanded their
borders westwards and eastwards in the 15th and 16th centuries, the new
Empire included many different ethnic groups. A new type of regulation was
required and multiple practices of rule and regulation were adopted. This is
described today, although it was not named as such at the time, as a pluralistic
system. Different ethnic and religious groups could act independently in fam
ily, dower, marriage, divorce, inheritance and business cases and even in some
criminal matters and tax issues.11
For many years the Ottoman State did not limit, change or assimilate local
customs, traditions, identities or laws. On the contrary, differences and a
plural society were supported.12 Each community was free to legislate on its
own practices according to its own customs and traditions. According to
7
8
I. Ortayl, Osmanly Yeniden Kefetmek (Tima, Istanbul, 2006).

K. Barkey, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2009).
9 Ortayl, supra note 7.
10 Barkey, supra note 8.
11 E. Engelhard, Turkiye ve Tanzimat, Devlet-i Osmaniyenin Tarih-i Islahati (Istanbul, 1919); S.
Iksel, Istanbul Rum Patrikhanesi, 62 Belgelerle Turk Tarih Dergisi (1972); S.R. Sonyel,
Byk Devletlerin Osmanl Imparatorluunu Paralama abalarnda Hiristiyan
Aznlklarn Rol 49:195 Belleten, (1985) pp. 647664; Y. Benlisoy and E. Macar, Fener
Patrikhanesi (Ayra, Ankara, 1996).
12 D. Roderic, Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman Response, in W.W.
Haddah and W. Ochsenwald (eds.), Nationalism in a Non-National State: the Dissolution of
the Ottoman Empire (Ohio State University Press, Columbus, Ohio, 1977) pp. 2556; B.A.
Ergene, Local Court, Provincial Society and Justice in the Ottoman Empire: Legal Practise
and Dispute Resolution in ankr and Kastamonu (16521744) (Brill, Leiden, Boston, 2003).
501
Demira,13 different ethnic and religious groups were usually free to act as they
wished. Furthermore, according to Ercan14 and Demira15 there was Ottoman
pressure on different ethnic or religious groups of people who did not follow
their customs or if they did not wear their traditional and religious costume.
According to both researchers this has enabled many different groups of peo
ple to carry on with their own ways of life up to the present day.
The policy was one of non-assimilation. According to Vahapolu,16 mem
bers of different ethnic groups working in official positions were even allowed
to take their own religious holidays.
However, I do not wish to suggest that there was no group repression or
persecution under the Ottoman rules. The Ottoman State might intervene in
some elections for community or religious leaders. It also did not tolerate any
challenge to its overall power and could be ruthless to those who found it dif
ficult to fit into the Ottoman organisational system. Persecution was especially
likely for those religiously closest to the Ottomans, their brothers in arms.
Those who were Muslim but not orthodox Sunni Muslim, and who could thus
challenge dominant Sunni authority, including the Bektais, Kzlba (nowa
days Alevis), Celalis, Hurfis, Melmis, Bayramis, and the followers of the
Sheikh Bedrettin movement and the Jewish messiah Sabbatai Zevi,17 suffered
and were persecuted under the Ottomans.18 As this is not the primary focus of
this article, I am not going to detail these various rebellions and movements
and the Ottoman responses. It is, however, important to acknowledge that dur
ing the Ottoman Empire some official actions reduced minority rights. For
example, many churches were destroyed or converted into mosques, and
church bells were prohibited.19 During the 17th century, and especially around
13
Y. Demira, Osmanl Imparatorluunda Yaayan Aznlklarn Sosyal ve Ekonomik

Durumlar, 13 Ankara niversitesi Osmanl Tarihi Aratrma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi
(2003) pp. 1533.
14 Y. Ercan, Trkiyede XV. ve XVI. Yzyllarda Gayrimslimlerin Giyim, Mesken ve Davran
Hukuku, c.XLVII Osmanl Tarihi Aratirma Merkezi Dergisi (Ankara, 1983).
15 Demira, supra note 13.
16 H. Vahapoglu, Osmanlidan Gunnnumuze Azinlik ve Yabanci Okullari (Istanbul, 1992).
17 Also known as Sabbatai evi.
18 See, for example, Barkey, supra note 8; H. Inalck, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age,
13001600 (Aristide Caratzas, New Rochelle, New York, 1989); A.Y. Ocak, Osmanl
Toplumunda Zndklar ve Mlbidler (Tarih Vakf, Istanbul, 1998).
19 E. Dzda, Seyhulislam Ebussuud Efendi Fetvalar Inda 16. Asr Trk Hayat (Istanbul,
1972); R. Gradeva, Ottoman Policy Towards Chrisian Church Buildings, 4 Etudes Balkaniques
(1994); P. Mansel, Dunyanin arzuladigi sehir: Konstantinopolis 14531924 (Sabah, Istanbul,
1995).
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1630, according to the order of Grand Vezir Husrev Pasha, the power of some
Kurdish chiefs was taken away and some were even killed under the tyranni
cal hand of the provincial government.20 However, Sultan Murat IV reminded
his governors of the treaty agreements (ahidname, sozlesme) adopted by Sultan
Selim I and Suleyman I, which granted autonomy to Kurdistan.21
Groups and communities that did not challenge the Empire could find a
space for their millet practice. They could take part in a variety of alternative
cultural and legal practices, and their community leader could act as a media
tor with the Ottoman authorities as long as the community remained within
their own locality and avoided trying to influence other local communities or
usurping overall authority.
Ottoman millet practice reflected the multi-ethnic, multi-religious and
multi-linguistic social and economic realities of the Ottoman Empire. In modernday terms, it supported both territorial and non-territorial autonomy. As
Kasaba22 points out, as more and more different ethnic and religious communi
ties came under Ottoman rule, the weakness and selectivity of the centralised
system meant that each group was allowed to carry out their customs. When
contemporary researchers like Inalck,23 Demira24 and Kenanolu25 choose to
focus on only a few of the non-Muslim groups in the Ottoman Empire the
Jews, the Armenians and the Greeks they seem to see the Ottoman millet
practice as one limited in the same way in which Turkish leaders claimed dur
ing and after the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923). In this way, the groups that
were not accepted as worthy of notice by Turkish leaders in Lausanne includ
ing Kurds, Assyrians, Alevi and Yezidis are again airbrushed out of history.26
20
A. Ali Efendi, Kann-nme-i Sultni Li Aziz Efendi. Berlin Staatsbibliothek, Preussischer

Kulturbesitz, Orientabteilung, 227, 1209, 11 (1632/33).
21 Aziz Ali Efendi, a member of the Ottoman secretarial profession within the order of
Sultan Murat IV, prepared a report over a nine-month period between September 1632
and June 1633 on the Kurdish chiefs and the autonomy of Kurdistan along the Ottoman
Empires eastern border with Iran. Only one copy of this report exists today and it can be
found at Berlin State Library. The report was translated into English and modern Turkish
by Rhoads Murphey in 1985. I have referred to the original report, along with Murpheys
translation, during my research.
22 R. Kasaba, Do States Always Favor Stasis? Changing Status of Tribes in the Ottoman
Empire, in J. Migdal (ed.), Boundaries and Belonging (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2004) pp. 2748.
23 Inalck, supra note 18.
24 Demira, supra note 13.
25 Kenanolu, supra note 6.
26 The Lausanne Agreement does not specifically refer to Armenians, Jews and Greeks by
name. It simply writes non-Muslim.
503
Similar contradictions are presented by Kenanolu, who also describes only

the same three minority groups as being recognised by the central system. He
goes on to claim that minority rights were strictly limited by a centralised state,
although he does recognise that they had rights to make decisions about fam
ily law, including marriage, divorce and inheritance. He concludes by conced
ing that one of the Ottoman successes was its acceptance of different ways of
life and pluralistic law.27
However, according to Braude,28 there is no confirmation of the exis
tence of any agreement document which shows that only Christians or Jews
were given a special status or contract by the Ottoman Sultans. Braude
writes,29 for each story the only sources are those of the community itself.
The major Turkish chronicler, Asikpasazade (c. 14001480) ignores all patri
archs, rabbis, and millets. Claims made by Christian and Jewish communi
ties contradict when autonomy was granted to them and by which Ottoman
Sultan.30 For example, the Church claimed that its power was institution
ally recognized by Ottoman Sultan Mehmet Is ferman (written order).
However,
around 1519 when Sultan Selim I challenged this claim the then-reigning
patriarch, Theoleptos, was unable to produce such a document despite a
thorough search of the Churchs archives We should conclude that the
primary and secondary accounts of the founding of the millet system
[based on religion] are suspect.31
Braude agrees that the millet myth, that is that the practice was based on reli
gion, was a late invention from around the 19th century and not supported by
respected historians. He therefore regards it as fiction or an illusion, and claims
that this incorrect description has been copied down and repeated by subse
quent researchers until today. However, the practices of different ethnic and
religious communities show that, at least as far as the Ottoman governments
were concerned, the authority granted to them was determined on an ad hoc
27 Kenanolu, supra note 6.
29 Ibid., p. 75.
30 Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II, also called Mahomet, Mehmed the Conqueror or Fatih Sultan
Mehmet (14321481), was Ottoman Sultan twice: first for a short time from 1444 to
1446, and later from 1451 to 1481.
31 Braude, supra note 1, pp. 7679; D. Cantemir, The History of the Growth and Decay of the
Ottoman Empire (London, 1734).
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and informal basis. No consistent policy towards non-Muslims existed during

the 15th and 16th centuries and perhaps even later.32
Some researchers ignore how the pluralistic Ottoman system actually
worked in practice. In contrast to the ideas of those researchers who place
such distinct limits on the millet practice, the Ottoman Empire did not simply
separate Jews and Christians from a homogenous group of Muslims.
The apparently unitary group of Muslims included Kurds themselves
divided into Shafi, Bektai, Kzlba and Yezidis as well as Gypsies (kpti),
Yrks, Trkmens, Albanians and Arabs. Each of these subgroups was linguisti
cally, culturally and legally different, and all were allowed to follow their differ
ent ways of life. Barkey33 correctly states that the Ottoman Empire did not have
a modern day constitutional type of centralised nation-state with a unitary con
cept of rights. Inalck et al.34 describe how in the 16th century more than a quar
ter of the population in Anatolia was semi-nomadic. According to Murphey35
this number was as high as 60 per cent in south-eastern Anatolia, where the
Kurdish populations lived. It was not possible for the Ottomans to take rigid
control of these different groups of people, with their different lives and living
conditions. Each group mostly followed their own ways to resolve any internal
conflicts. Ergene described how in the 17th and 18th centuries, and even within
cities that are very close to Istanbul such as Kastamonu and ankr, members
of many different ethnic groups, including Turks, avoided using state courts and
preferred to resolve conflicts using their local dispute resolution practices.36
Many different subgroups were therefore recognised, with many grey areas,
differences, tribes and nomads encompassed by each group. The Ottomans
negotiated with each of these subgroups differently. There was not a single set
of rules. There were specific mediators, peacemakers, chief and intermediate
bodies acting between each individual subgroup and the Ottoman authorities.
Barkey37 describes:
[how the] Ottomans negotiated between the contradictory, yet also com
plementary, visions and organizational forms of urban and rural; nomad
34 H. Inalck and D. Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300
1914 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994).
35 R. Murphey, Some Features of Nomadism in the Ottoman Empire, 8 Journal of Turkish
Studies (1984) pp. 18997.
36 Ergene, supra note 12.
505
and settled; Islamic and non-Muslim; Sunni Muslim, Shiites, Sufi sects;
scribes and poets; artisan and merchants; peasants and peddlers; and
bandits and bureaucrats.
Each different group in the Ottoman Empire had long established communal
boundaries from each other. According to Kasaba,38 natural or cultural bound
aries separated different ethnic and religious groups into their respective millets. Karpat39 emphasises that the millet system was not based only on religious
differences: it also encompassed social, cultural, ethnic and linguistic differ
ences. Many different laws and customs functioned differently at the same
time, and subgroups did not follow the same legal statutes under Ottoman
rule. In the late Ottoman period and under the new Turkish Republic, some
subgroups carried on with their own ways of life officially or unofficially,
with or without state protection. According to Akgndz,40 after a conquest
Ottoman rulers preferred to keep each community separate, rather than abol
ishing their separate ways of life. This contributed to good governance as well
as to gaining support for the Ottomans and preventing inter-communal con
flicts. Kasaba41 also says that the Ottomans noted the differences between
some of the conquered groups including Kurds, Alevis (Kzlba), Yezidis and
Gypsies (kpti) and did not want to mix them with other Muslims. According
to Ocak42 cited in Kasaba:43
The names of the individual gypsies were always qualified with kpti,
and after the sixteenth century, those who belonged to the Twelver
branch of the Shii Islam, known as Alevi (or Alawite), were identified as
Kzlba (red-head) in reference to their defection to and service under
the Shah of Iran in specially designated troops that were distinguished
with their red caps. If a person or a group of people belonged to a reli
gious order or ethnic group, such as the Kzlba, Yezidis, or the Kurds,
which had the potential of undermining Ottoman authority, the official
38 Kasaba, supra note 22.
39 K. Karpat, Millets and Nationality: the Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the
Post Ottoman Era, in B. Braude and B. Lewis (eds.), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman
Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society (Holmes & Meier Publishers, New York, 1982)
pp. 141167.
40 A. Akgndz, Osmanl Kanunnmeleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri (Fey Vakfi, Istanbul, 1994).
42 Ocak, supra note 18.
43 Kasaba, supra note 22, p. 32.
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documents took care to specify this fact when they mentioned that per
son or group, or even their village.
Various researchers agree that the millet practice was one of the main reasons
that the Ottoman Empire was so easily able to take over so much of Europe,
Asia and North Africa. From the beginning of the Empire until as late as the
18th century the Ottoman Empire offered different ethnic and religious groups
a haven of relative peace, security and tolerance.44 Ottoman rulers allowed
many local communities to continue their customary practices, recognising
and, importantly, securing the autonomous position of the leaders of commu
nities. In return for a tax, including a levy of soldiers, and recognition of their
place within the Empire, each community was protected and kept secure.45
Legal diversity, flexibility and toleration were important tactics supporting the
political stability, unity, coherence and longevity of the Ottoman Empire.
Recognition of differences and separation were important values that were
well understood by communities and the Ottoman authorities.46 For example,
some Balkan ethnic groups actually invited the Ottomans to take over power
from their feudal warlords because of the Ottomans plural and tolerant
approach. According to Belge,47 when the Ottoman army conquered Constan
tinople in 1453 some of the most orthodox Byzantines even celebrated because
they felt they would enjoy more freedom under the flexible and pluralistic
Ottoman administrative structure. Kenanolu48 reported how Jews living in
Istanbul at the time of the conquest also supported the Ottomans. When the
Jews and Muslims were driven out of Spain in 1492, many of them settled in
Ottoman territories under the protection of these tolerant practices. A cultural
bazaar or hybrid civilisation was recognised from North Africa to the Caucasus
and the Balkans. In support of plurality, the Ottoman authorities spent much
time learning to assess and to adapt to indigenous practices:
Fluidity is about crossing networks and establishing far-reaching ties,
whereas boundaries are about interrupting networks and closing
them in, making them more localized and cohesive that is, they
44
D. Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (Yale University Press, New Haven,
CT, 2001).
45 Kasaba, supra note 22; C. Orhonlu, Osmanl Imparatorluunda Airetlerin Iskn (Eren,
Istanbul, 1987).
46 Barkey, supra note 8, pp. 17, 151152.
47 Belge, supra note 6.
48 Kenanolu, supra note 6, p. 288.
507
create the restrictions, symbols, practices, and ways of identifying and

separating.49
The millet practice was not a codified system, and its implementation was not
comparable across communities.50 Eighteen different legal systems have been
described under the Ottoman millet practice, as was necessary in such a multiethnic and multi-faith society. However, in reality, as mentioned above, a much
greater number of different customary practices existed throughout the
Empire, both officially and secretly, since traditions varied from region to
region within the same ethnic group.51 According to the 17th century Ottoman
Turkish traveller Evliya Chelebi,52 a law book (qanunname) existed for every
region, along with a legal leader, chosen from the region and responsible for
mediating in family, business and some criminal conflicts. This practice made
every local authority responsible for its own local problems. Inalck et al.53
state that these local leaders acted as intermediaries and also took responsibil
ity for the implementation of the government reforms. They could, for exam
ple, negotiate with the central authorities over tax and other issues.54
Within the millet practice, localised conflicts could be resolved efficiently,
with the process also saving time and money for the Ottoman government
since members of the different communities did not have to resort to the
Ottoman Islamic Kadi courts.55 This was of particular benefit to the Ottomans,
noted Belge,56 since the Kadi court system was not sufficiently resourced to
respond to all the conflicts within and between all the ethnic groups across the
vast Empire.
49 Barkey, supra note 8, p. 20.
51 Ergene, supra note 12; J. Starr, Dispute and Settlement in Rural Turkey: An Ethnography of
Law (Brill, Leiden, 1978); . H. Bidlisi, erefname (Hasat Yaynlar, Istanbul, 1990); I. Metin,
Alevilerde Halk Mahkemeleri (Alev Yaynevi, Istanbul, 1995).
52 In M. van Bruinessen, From Adela Khanum to Leyla Zana: Women as Political Leaders in
Kurdish History, in S. Mojab (ed.), Women of a Non-State Nation: The Kurds (Mazda
Publishers, California, 2001) pp. 95112.
53 Inalck et al., supra note 34.
54 Barkey, supra note 8; E. Gara, In Search of Communities in Seventeenth Century Ottoman
Sources: The Case of Kara Ferye District, 30 Turcia, (1998) pp. 135162.
55 The Ottoman Sharia courts were responsible for city and town services, as well as offi
cially having jurisdiction over legal matters involving Muslims. Some non-Muslims also
took their cases to the Islamic Kadi Courts. See also for similar discussion Tas, supra
note 1.
56 Belge, supra note 6, pp. 221222.
508
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Kurds and the Millet Practice
Under the Ottoman Empire, Kurds were one of the largest groups. They were
frequently considered among the most fearsome. They habitually erected bar
riers between themselves and others in order not to lose their various cus
toms.57 According to Kasaba,58 the status of the Kurds was always a sensitive
issue. They usually insisted on being ruled by Kurds. For that reason, they usu
ally chose the side which allowed them this opportunity. When the Ottomans
moved eastwards between 1513 and 1517 to fight the Persians and later the
Mamluks during the Ottoman Sultan Selim Is reign,59 some Kurds, especially
those who were Sunni Shafi, took the side of the Ottomans against Shia Safavid
Iran and then after that against the Mamluks. In return for an acceptance of
Ottoman pluralistic authority, the autonomy of Kurdistan and the authority of
Kurdish chiefs were recognised. A treaty was signed between Ottoman Sultan
Selim I and Kurdish chiefs after the victory at the battle of aldran.60 This vic
tory was aided by the participation of 60,000 Kurdish soldiers.61 Permanent
autonomy was granted to Kurds over their ancestral heart lands (odjak or ocak)
and homes (yurt).62 This special status was recognized and extended by Sultan
Suleyman I.63 He issued grants of proprietorship (mlknme) which contained
57 Ali Efendi, supra note 20.

58 Kasaba, supra note 22, p. 32
59 Ottoman Sultan Selim I, also known Yavuz (14701520) reigned from 1512 to 1520.
60 aldran is a small town in the Kurdish region, northeast of Lake Van. This famous battle,
named after the town, took place in 1514 between Safavid Shah Ismail and Ottoman
Sultan Selim I.
61 Ali Efendi, supra note 20. See also for example I. Beiki, Dou Anadolunun Dzeni: Sosyo
Ekonomik ve Etnik Temeller (Yurt Yaynlar, Ankara, 1992); M. Belge, Trkler ve Krtler:
Nereden Nereye? (letiim, Istanbul, 1995); C. Belge, State Building and the Limits of
Legibility: Kinship Networks and Kurdish Resistance in Turkey, 43:1 International Journal
of Middle East Studies (2011) pp. 95114; H. zolu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman
State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries (State University of
New York Press, Albany, 2004).
62 Ali Efendi, supra note 20; R. Murphey, Kann-nme-i Sultni Li Aziz Efendi: Aziz Efendis
Book of Sultanic Laws and Regulations, an Agenda for Reform by a Seventeenth-Century
Ottoman Statesman (Harvard University Press, 1985). For a more detailed discussion of
the heart lands (Odjak or Ocak), homes (yurt), and Ottoman administrative units (hukumet, ekrad sancaks), see for example Akgndz, supra note 40; zolu, supra note 61;
D. Bayr, Minorities and Nationalism in Turkish Law (Ashgate, Farnham, 2013).
63 Ottoman Sultan Suleyman I, also known as Kanuni law maker (14951566) reigned
between 1520 and 1566.
509
clear terms of conferral and extended to them imperial protection. Sultan

Suleyman I (Kanuni) made the following statement:
Just as God, be He praised and exalted, vouchsafed to Alexander the two
horned to build the wall of Gog, so God made Kurdistan act in the pro
tection of my imperial kingdom like a strong barrier and an iron fortress
against the sedition of the demon Gog of Persia It is hoped that,
through neglect and carelessness, our descendants will never let slip the
rope of obedience [binding] the Kurdish commanders [to the Ottoman
state] and never be lacking in their attentions to this group.64
In the 16th and 17th centuries, when the Ottoman Empire was still strong,
the Kurdish regions enjoyed the status of semi-independent principalities.
Many other ethnic groups in the Empire had similar privileges of auton
omy. Each group enjoyed their own way of life under the millet practice,
and they were not forced to conform with the norms of centralised author
ity.65 According to Dankoff66 and Akgndz,67 Kurds were even able to
influence Ottoman policy. For example Ottoman legislation (Qanunname-i
Osmani) for the Kurdish region was drawn with the support and help of
Kurdish rulers. In 1632 and 1633, Sultan Murat IV, in response to some pro
vincial governors tyrannical oppression of Kurdish chiefs and their disre
spect for the treaty agreements (ahidname) with Kurds, issued several
orders. For example, Sultan Murat IVs order to the Governor General of
Diyarbekir68 stated:
the Kurdish commanders are loyal and faithful well-wishers of the Ottoman
state and have from the noble time of our great ancestors until the present
time performed a variety of praiseworthy services on behalf of the crown
and expended incalculable laudable efforts thus making it incumbent on
the imperial zeal that they be treated with respect and care.69
64 Ali Efendi, supra note 20; Murphey, supra note 62, p. 14.
65 Belge, supra note 6; S. Mojab (ed.), Women of A Non-State Nation The Kurds (Mazda
Publishers, California, 2001).
66 R. Dankoff, Evliya elebi in Bitlis (Brill, Leiden: E.J., 1990).
67 Akgndz, supra note 40.
68 Diyarbekir (spelt Diyarbakr in Turkish) is known also as Amed by Kurdish people. It is
one of the main Kurdish cities in Turkey and is regarded by Kurds as the unofficial capital
of Kurdistan.
510
Tas
Sultan Murat IV reminded his governors of the treaty on autonomy signed

between his ancestors and the Kurds, prohibiting the local military com
manders and governors from harassing and abusing the Kurdish tribes.70
Sultan Murat IV also sent a document of inducement (istimaletnme) to all
Kurdish chiefs and stated that:
You from grandfather to father for generations have been people of pure
characters and members of the Sunni sect falling in at the fore of my victo
rious armies in all the battles against the Iranian redheads with many
thousand armed and capable and famous Kurdish soldiers whose business
is victory, have fought with body and soul and have given rise to many
admirable victories. However, while you are thereby deserving of favour
able treatment and requiring protection, it has become truly impressed on
my imperial knowledge that through the neglect and negligence of the
advisors of the Sultanate, those ministers assigned to Diyarbekir as well as
other provincial governors have, some of them through greed for seizure
and procurement and others through [fear of] dismissal and appointment
or for other reasons, extended the hand of aggression over you and opened
the doors of oppression and tyranny thereby reducing your strength and
power and your endurance and capacity to a state of complete feebleness
and decline. Now, since concerning myself with and taking care of your
affairs and reviving and restoring you is a personal duty incumbent on my
imperial self, I have decreed that first of all in accordance with the treaty
agreements granted to each of you by my great forebears you should
inherit the jurisdiction of your governorships (hukumet) generation after
generation as is right whether son or brother Also, a strong injunction
has been sent to the governor-general of Diyarbekir instructing him that
henceforth he shall refrain from interfering in your reassignment and
replacement and free you from the hand of oppression and transgression
of the moneylenders.71
According to Evliya Chelebi, Kurdistan was described as a shahrizur (difficult
region, city) and was administered under a specially adapted set of rules. Van
Bruinessen paraphrases information from Evliya Chelebis Seyehatname:
Qanunnames were compiled for each Ottoman province upon conquest
and underwent relatively minor revisions in the course of time. They
511
contained all sorts of regulations on administrative and financial mat

ters. In the case of the Kurdish provinces, they also specified the nature
and degree of autonomy of traditional Kurdish rulers vis-a-vis the
Ottoman administration. Certain districts were administered directly by
centrally appointed governors, whereas in other districts, traditional
Kurdish rulers continued to hold sway. In such autonomous principali
ties, succession to rulership remained within the family, even when for
some reason the incumbent ruler was deposed by the central govern
ment. Government interference in such principalities took the form of
recognizing one member of the ruling family rather than another.72
Kurds had total fiscal, judicial and administrative autonomy over their region
and applied their customary laws over disputes between their members.
In return, Kurds had a duty to provide soldiers and military supplies to the
central government when the Ottomans entered any war.73 According to Van
Bruinessen,74 Kurdish customary laws were in use and the authority of the
Kurdish qanunname was maintained by Kurdish rulers, tribal and religious
leaders until the beginning of the 19th century. The role of Kurdish leaders lay
in mediation and the administration of justice, and they had sufficient legiti
macy and power to find solutions to disputes between the different families
and tribes in their area without any input from central government. Yeen75
agrees that the pluralistic Ottoman solutions and flexible legal system helped
Kurds to maintain their separate identity. Robert Curzon76 talked with some
Kurds during his travels around Kurdistan and Armenia and, according to him,
some of the Kurdish ruling families had maintained their tribal rule for as
many as seven generations.
As Belge77 agrees this respect for local autonomy in Kurdistan, following
various agreements between Kurdish chiefs and Ottoman Sultans, was one
important reason why the Kurds never asked for, or became, an independent
state when the Ottoman Empire collapsed.
72
73
74
In van Bruinessen, supra note 52, p. 98.

Ali Efendi, supra note 20.
M. van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State. The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan
(Zed Books, London and New Jersey, 1992).
75 M. Yeen, Mtakbel Trkten Szde Vatandaa: Cumhuriyet ve Krtler (letiim Yaynlar,
stanbul, 2006) p. 13.
76 R. Curzon, Armenia, A Year at Erzurum and on the Russian Frontiers of Russia, Turkey, and
Persia (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1854).
77 Belge, supra note 61.
512
4
Tas
Centralisation and Kurds: The End of the Millet Practice
From the middle of the 19th century the power of local leaders was seized by
the Ottoman central authorities as part of the nationalistic movement.78
According to George Curzon79 and Tanr,80 the Ottomans tried to limit the use
of Kurdish customary practices and sought to replace these with a single codi
fied legal system. Only specified religious groups were allowed to carry on using
their own customary laws. Kurds were not included in this limited tolerance.
In the later part of the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire, like the other
then-current multi-ethnic empires, was affected by the homogenising princi
ples and nationalistic ideologies associated with the construction of nationstates.81 This type of nationalism is described as a modern phenomenon by
many researchers.82 This new global environment of nationalism and nationstate ideology significantly affected the traditional millet practice, with its reli
ance on negotiation and self-regulation in diverse and autonomous societies.
From the first half of the 19th century, and in parallel with the 1839 Tanzimat
Edict, the 1856 Islahat Edict, the 1869 nationality law and the first Ottoman
Constitution (Kanun-i Esasi in 1876), the Ottoman Empire began to centralise
and tighten its legal system, introducing more uniform regulations. The ethni
cally and religiously heterogeneous millets were increasingly disturbed by
this movement towards a unitary legal system.83 Even though, according to
Makdisi,84 the Ottomans did not identify themselves as purely Turks, a single
78
See for example Tas, supra note 1; Hechter at al., supra note 5; G. Augustinos, The Greeks of
Asia Minor: Confession, Community and Ethnicity in the Nineteenth Century (Kent State
University Press, Kent, 1992); A. Rodrigue, From Millet to Minority: Turkish Jewry, in I.
Katznelson and P. Birnbaum (eds.), Path of Emancipation: Jews, States and Citizenship
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995).
79 G. N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian question (Longmans, Green & Co, London, 1892).
80 B. Tanr, Osmanli Turk anayasal gelismeleri (YKY, Istanbul, 2008).
81 Hechter at al., supra note 5; E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Cornell U.P., Ithaca,
1983).
82 See for example Gellner, supra note 81; B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on
the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Verso, London, New York, 1991); J. Hobsbawm,
Nation and Nationalism since 1789: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge University
Press, New York, 1992); R. Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National
Question in the New Europe (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1996).
83 N. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (McGill U.P., Montreal, 1964)
pp. 9099.
84 U. Makdisi, Ottoman Orientalism, 107 The American Historical Review (2002) pp. 768796,
at p. 774.
513
Turkish ethnic identity was introduced for the reshaping of the Empire. The
Young Turks or, more formally, the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP, or
Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti), and their successors, continued this nationalistic
policy in the second Ottoman Constitution (1908) and, intermittently, until the
establishment in 1923 of the Turkish Republic.85
Under pressure from the Young Turks, differences between ethnic groups
were ignored. A Turkish nationalistic concept of citizenry was imposed and
became an important component in the law as practiced in the new Republic.
The later Ottoman governments tried to maintain their huge borders and
population under a core nationalist identity using an ideology of Turkification.
Only a limited proportion of the imperial population the Turks were ini
tially in favour of centralisation under a banner of Turkish core values.86 By
implementing a core identity with a single Turkish religion, language, history,
tradition, culture and set of customs the nationalists tried to recreate the
power of the Ottomans in a Turkish guise.87 This mind-set of Turkification
rejected what Brubaker88 described as the very fruitful early Ottoman policy of
unmixing of people. The Ottomans did not see the multiple ethnicities and
multiple religions in their Empire as a problem89 and instead developed ways
round it. In contrast, the nationalist Turks used assimilation to create a homo
geneous nation with homogenous core values. They therefore purposely mixed
some population groups into other communities. Since, according to national
ist claims, the Turkish race was the only loyal element in the state,90 the
nationalists rejected any alternative solutions, such as federalism, territorial
or non-territorial autonomy. Cemal Pasha, one of the main ideologues and
85
86
87
88
89
90
The era of the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) officially ended in 1918; but CUP
members, leaders and policies continued to be part of and influence the governments
and policies of the new Turkish Republic.
D. Bender, Post-Ottomanism: Islamism, Nationalism, and Political Possibilities at the End of
Empire (Unpublished MA thesis, 2004); . Haniolu, Preparation for a Revolution: The
Young Turks (19021908) (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001).
T. Y. Sancar, Alenen Tahkir ve Tezyif Sular (Eski TCK M.159/1 Yeni TCK m.301/12) (Sekin
Yaynlar, Ankara, 2006) p. 86.
R. Brubaker, Aftermath of the Empire and the Unmixing of People, in K. Barkey and M.
von Hagen (eds.), After Empire (Westview, Boulder, 1997).
S. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume II:
Reform, Revaluation and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey (18081975) (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1997).
D. Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism (18761908) (Cass, London, 1977); S. P. Ladas,
The Balkan Exchanges of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey (MacMillan, New York,
1932).
514
Tas
practitioners of Turkification and described by Makdisi91 as an unremitting

medieval butcher said:
Young Turkey realized that among the various Ottoman elements which
were struggling for the advancement of their respective nationalities, the
Turks alone were isolated so they, too, began to work for a great national
revival in knowledge, education and virtue I am primarily an Ottoman,
but I do not forget that I am a Turk, and nothing can shake my belief that
the Turkish race is the foundation stone of the Ottoman Empire in its
origin the Ottoman Empire is a Turkish creation.
The initial idea, especially within the first Ottoman Constitution in 1876, was
simply to achieve Turkification. The heartland of Anatolia was naturally a key
area for the creation of a new nation-state imbued with Turkish values, and
assimilation policies were applied to the large populations of Kurds, with an
appeal to Islamism to achieve a Turkish civilisation.92 Ottomanism and
Islamism were considered to be necessary tactics in the creation of a nationstate,93 and were applied, respectively, to non-Muslims in the Balkans and nonTurkish Muslims in Anatolia and the Arabic regions. The official nationalism94
of Turkification was hidden behind these two ideas until the second Ottoman
Constitution in 1908. Benedict Anderson95 graphically portrays this ideology of
official nationalism as stretching the short, tight skin of the nation over the
gigantic body of the empire. In other words, the body of an elephant was
shoved into the skin of a mouse. Sunny96 also describes:
[how] imperial elites promoted a transition from ancien [sic] regime
empires to modern empires, from a more polycentric and differentiated
polity in which regions maintained quite different legal, economic, and
even political structures to a more centralized, bureaucratized state in
91 Makdisi, supra note 84, p. 794; J. M. Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism
(C. Hurst, London, 1981) p. 48.
92 S. Deringil, The Well Protected Domains (I.B. Tauris, London, 1998).
93 Ibid.
94 H. Seaton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the
Politics of Nationalism (Westview Press, Boulder, 1977).
95 Anderson, supra note 82, p. 86.
96 R. G. Sunny, The Empires Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, National Identity, and Theories
of Empire, in R. G. Sunny and T. Martin (eds.), A State of Nation Making in the Age of
Lenin and Stalin (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001) pp. 2366, at p. 30.
515
which laws, economic practices, and even customs and dialects were
homogenized by state elites.
According to Quataert97 these Tanzimat, or Young Turk, ideologies were used
until the end of the Ottoman Empire.
With a single Turkish identity, administrative centralisation and loyalty
became underpinning principles.98 The bureaucratic and absolutist ideologies
of Turkification caused unrest and agitation in many communities. Kasaba99
points out how border groups became especially vulnerable and hence more
likely to agitate for the maintenance of their survival. He continues:
Serbia, Montenegro, Albania in the Balkans Kurdish areas on the
Iranian border and Tripoli and Algeria on the Mediterranean in short,
all the territories that used to define the frontier regions of the empire
all became sites of such unrest and agitation in the eighteenth and nine
teenth centuries.
As Lewis100 states, not just non-Muslims, but also non-Turkish Muslims, were
targeted by the new policies. Haniolu101 explains:
[how] ironically, although the state endeavoured to Ottomanize its sub
jects, the symbols used to evoke a supranational culture were Turkish.
Thus, even non-Turkish Muslim Ottomans who had acquired important
state posts and who admired Tanzimat statesmen decried this policy as a
Turkification process.
Direct nationalist rule from the centre paradoxically created a range of periph
eral nationalisms as different ethnic groups tried to preserve their own privi
leged positions.
97
98
D. Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 17001922 (CUP, Cambridge, 2000).

K. Karpat, The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 17891908, 3 Internal Journal of
Middle East Studies (1972) pp. 243281; M. . Alkan, Modernization from Empire to
Republic and Education in the Process of Nationalism, in K. Karpat (ed.), Ottoman Past
and Todays Turkey (Brill, Leiden, 2000) pp. 47132.
100 B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford,
2002).
101 . Haniolu, Turkish Nationalism and the Young Turks, 18891908, in F. M. Gek (ed.),
Social Constructions of Nationalism in the Middle East (State University of New York Press,
New York, 2002) pp. 8597, at p. 86.
516
Tas
Like many other groups, Kurds initially resisted attempts to force them to
use a centralised legal system. Immediately following the 1839 Tanzimat
reforms a Kurdish uprising started under the leadership of Bedirhan between
1840 and 1847.102 Many Kurds were unhappy with the centralistic ideology
and with the Turkification of Anatolia being attempted by the new Ottoman
government, and resisted the new Ottoman rules. In 1863 the Ottomans intro
duced Fikra-i Islahiye (a new military force) in an attempt to control
non-Turkish, non-Muslim tribes, including the nomads. This new Ottoman
military force mainly functioned in the Kurdish regions and, according to van
Bruinessen,103 tried to take Kurds who had had a semi-independent status
since 1514 under Ottoman central rule. The Ottoman policy of forced popula
tion movement was supported: Kurdish communities and even families were
broken up into small groups. For example, the Kurds of Mihmadlu, who refused
to follow the decisions of the central authority, were forced to move to western
Anatolia.104 Space was opened up for others as a more diverse and sedentary
society was created and assimilation was promoted.105 According to Karpat106
and McCarthy,107 between 1800 and 1920 and as the Ottoman territories shrunk
millions of Muslims and Turks moved into Anatolia as refugees. Between 1856
and 1876 only, coinciding with the start of the forced movements of Kurds,
around three million Turkish and Muslim immigrants moved to Anatolia from
the Caucasus.108 Dndar109 and Akam110 agree that the later Ottoman govern
ments wanted to clear non-Turkish elements from Anatolia and replace them
102 On 15 August 1847 Kurds lost a battle against the Ottoman forces in Eruh, emdinli prov
ince (part of the Kurdish region today). On 15 August 1984, 137 years later, the Kurdistan
Workers Partys (Partiya Krkeran Kurdistan PKK) movement was founded in the very
same province. It is not clear whether the decision to form the PKK on the same date was
a coincidence or not.
103 van Bruinessen, supra note 74.
104 A. Refik, Anadoluda Trk airetleri (Devlet Matbaas, Istanbul, 1930).
106 K. Karpat, Osmanl Modernlemesi. Toplumsal, Kuramsal Deiim ve Nfus (Imge Kitabevi,
Ankara, 2002).
107 J. McCarthy, Forced Migration and Mortality in the Ottoman Empire (Turkish Coalition of
America, Washington, DC, 2010).
108 Barkey, supra note 8; K. Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State,
Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State (Oxford University Press, Oxford, New
York, 2001).
109 F. Dndar, Ittihat ve Terakkinin Mslmanlar Iskan Politikas (19131918) (Iletisim Yaynlar,
Istanbul, 2001).
110 T. Akam, Ermeni Meselesi Hallolmutur: Osmanl Belgelerine Gre Sava Yllarnda
Ermenilere Ynelik Politikalar (letiim Yaynlar, Istanbul, 2008).
517
with a Turkish and Muslim population. Alongside Kurds, the Armenians,

Greeks, Jews, Nestorians, Assyrians and Chaldeans were all subject to forced
population movements. Some of these movements turned into ethnic cleans
ing.111 In 19151916, while the Armenians were suffering from ethnic cleansing,
millions of Kurds were forced southwards into todays Syria and Iraq or into the
west of Anatolia.112
As part of the assimilation and ethnic cleansing policies, the Ottoman rulers
also created a new set of Kurdish puppet rulers aas and sheikhs who
replaced the traditional tribal leaders. Some Kurds, mainly Sunni, chose to ally
themselves with these leaders and so with the Ottomans. In 1891 some of these
Kurds became part of the Hamidiye Regiment. This new army was given a free
hand and strong government backing in Eastern Anatolia to go after and pacify
the Alevi (Kzlba or Red-heads) Kurds, to push out other ethnic groups, par
ticularly the Armenians, to seize their land, and to settle on them.113 In this
way, many dissident Kurds were forced to move away from their tribal areas
and religious groups and leaders, and the loss of their language, way of life and
customs was promoted.114
The new Ottoman policies of assimilation and centralisation were not car
ried out using military force alone. In the first Ottoman Constitution, Turkish
became the official language for education, administration and the judiciary.115
As Yeen116 states, Kurds in Anatolia were always seen as prospective Turks
(mstakbel Trk), and were an especial focus for the new Turkish education
system. In 1892 a School for Tribes (Airet Mektebi) was set up in Istanbul to
educate the sons of the leading Kurdish tribal chiefs alongside some Arabs and
Albanians. The Schools curriculum exposed the boys to the new centralistic
111 Dndar, supra note 109; V. N. Dadrian, The Documentation of the World War I Armenian
Massacres in the Proceedings of the Turkish Military Tribunal, 23:4 International Journal
of Middle East Studies (1991) pp. 549576; B. Ayata, The Politics of Displacement: A
Transnational Analysis of the Forced Migration of Kurds in Turkey and Europe (unpub
lished PhD thesis, the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, 2011).
112 McCarthy, supra note 107.
113 Kasaba, supra note 22, p. 39; F. Adanr, Armenian Deportations and Massacres in 1915, in
D. Chirot and M. E. P. Seligman (eds.), Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences,
and Possible Solutions (American Psychological Association, Washington, DC, 2001) pp.
7181; D. McDowall, A Modern History of The Kurds (I.B. Tauris, London, 2005) pp. 5963.
114 Dndar, supra note 109.
115 Hechter at al., supra note 5; E. Ulker, Empires and Nation Building: Russification and
Turkification Compared (Unpublished MA thesis, Central European University Nation
alism Studies Program, Budapest, 2004).
116 Yeen, supra note 75.
518
Tas
ideologies of Turkification and Islamism, as well as the Turkish language and

way of life, and Koranic theology, especially that of the Hanefi Sunnis. After
this training selected graduates were appointed as governors in their home
provinces.117 According to the nationalist ideologies of Turkification; the wild
and uncivilised face of Kurds118 could and must be assimilated and trans
formed into civilised, modern, westward-facing Turks.119
These Ottoman rulers described Turkish nationalism as equating to civilisa
tion. If individuals accepted assimilation under Turkish identity they could
correct their wrong beliefs, modernise together with the Turks and become
part of the West. To show that the Turks were a dominant and modern nation,
systematic propaganda was needed. Ortayl120 joins in this propagandising by
saying that the Turkish ethnic element had been a dominant element in the
Empire since the 17th century. According to Alkan121 in late Ottoman times the
word Turk started to be used with pride. The new Turkish school history books
made connections with the military conquests and world empires of the
ancient Central Asia nomads. Newspapers were another key element in this
propaganda mission showing how the Turks were modernising. The journal
ist Hseyin Cahit Yaln wrote in 1898:122
We are bound, whether we like it or not, to Europeanize Ibn Khalduns
philosophy of history belongs to the infantile age of the science of his
tory. Since then, the child has grown; he became a boy in Germany; he
even grew to old age The modern science of history is to come from
Europe not from the Arabs.
For fast and effective assimilation and modernisation the Istanbul Tribe School
was not thought to be adequate and was shut down in 1907. New schools and
mosques were established in Kurdish regions.123 The governments of the Young
Turks started to force Kurds and other ethnic minorities to call themselves
117 Makdisi, supra note 84; Kasaba, supra note 22; Deringil, supra note 92; E. Rogan, Airet
Mektebi: Abdulhamid IIs School for Tribes (18921907), 28:1 International Journal of
Middle East Studies (1996) pp. 83107; A. Akpnar, Osmanl Devletinde Airet Mektebi
(Gke, Istanbul, 1997).
118 Rogan, supra note 117.
119 Makdisi, supra note 84.
120 Ortayl, supra note 7.
121 Alkan, supra note 98.
122 Makdisi, supra note 84; Berkes, supra note 83.
123 Ulker, supra note 115.
519
Turks and the Turkish national character was seen to be important.124

Individuals who followed this assimilation policy were awarded with medals
and money.125 The homogenisation of education, language and culture was
promoted strongly in the second Ottoman Constitution (1908). According to
the ideologues of the late Ottoman rulers, the Young Turks, decentralisation
was seen a betrayal of the unity of the Empire.126 Anatolia was seen as the
homeland of the Turks, so Greeks and Bulgarians were deported or expelled in
population exchanges;127 Armenians were expelled or ethnically cleansed;128
and Kurds were assimilated, expelled or forced to move from where they
lived.129
The long-lasting millet practice had given every ethnic group the right to
follow their customary practices and to implement at least their own family
law. On 25 October 1917, however, all differences in family practices, including
marriage, divorce, custody of children and inheritance rights, were officially
centralised, homogenised and taken under the control of the secular Hukuk-u
Aile Kararnamesi (the Ottoman Family Law Ordinance). In opposition to the
Ottoman millet practice, this new legal code was based on a single set of values
for all, predicated on the new concept of Turkishness. A unitary law was
enforced via new and centralised institutions under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Justice. The aim, as ever, was to assimilate every individual and
family in Turkish society.130 According to Ortayl131 this law was one of the
important steps towards the 1926 Civil Code of the Turkish Republic.
124 Makdisi, supra note 84; Deringil, supra note 92.
125 Ulker, supra note 115.
126 Ibid.
127 S. P. Ladas, The Balkan Exchanges of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey (MacMillan,
New York, 1932); Y.G. Mourelos, The 1914 Persecutions and the First Attempt at
an Exchange of Minorities between Greece and Turkey, 26:2 Balkan Studies (1985)
pp. 389413.
128 Dndar, supra note 109; Hechter at al., supra note 5; J. McCharty, Muslim and Minorities:
The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and End of the Empire (New York University Press,
New York and London, 1983); A. Akgndz, Migration to and from Turkey, 17831960:
Types, Numbers and Ethno-Religious Dimensions, 24:1 Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies, (1998) pp. 97131.
129 Dndar, supra note 109; Hechter at al., supra note 5.
130 C. L. Ostrorog, The Angora Reform (University of London Press, London, 1927); B. Toprak,
Islam and political development in Turkey (Brill, Leiden, E.J, 1981); J. Starr, Law as metaphor: From Islamic courts to the palace of justice (State University of New York Press,
Albany, 1992); G. Bozkurt, The reception of Western European Law in Turkey (From the
Tanzimat to the Turkish Republic, 19391939), 75 Der Islam (1998) pp. 283295.
131 I. Ortayl, Studies of Ottoman Transformation (Isis Press, Istanbul, 1994).
520
Tas
Nevertheless, central power and the new laws did not stop either Kurdish
lawlessness or the unofficial use of customary dispute processes. Towards the
end of the Ottoman Empire and the beginning of the Turkish Republic, Kurds
made various efforts to be ruled by themselves, rather than by imposed rulers.
There were several rebellious Kurdish movements against the later Ottomans
and the new Turkish Republic, including those of Sheikh Obeidullah in the
Nehri rebellion in Hakkari (1880), the Kogiri rebellion (1920), Sheikh Saids
rebellion (1925), the rebellion of Ararat Mountain (1927), and the Dersim rebel
lions (19371938), all of which aimed at preserving Kurdish autonomy and
gaining freedom for Kurdish ways of life. However, all of these movements
were defeated by the central power, whether Ottoman or Turkish.132
Saving the Empire by becoming a modern nation was a major contradic
tion that actually lost the Ottomans their very fruitful Empire.133 Cultural
assimilation under the nationalist and centralising tendencies of the later
Ottomans, paired with a refusal to share power with others, has been shown by
many writers to signal the end of the Ottoman Empire and the beginning of
the much smaller Turkish nation-state.134 According to Bernard Lewis135 this
nationalist virus ended forever the Ottomanist dream of a free, equal, and
peaceful association of peoples in a common loyalty to the dynastic sovereign
of a multi-national, multi-denominational empire. The project that aimed at
Turkification became a process which actively destroyed a multicultural
Empire. From the 19th century, the body of an imperial elephant was shoved
into the skin of a nationalistic mouse. The Kurds were one of the many ethnic
groups who paid the price for this short-sighted policy. After all the centralist
132 See for example McDowall, supra note 113; Mojab, supra note 65; S. S. Gavan, Kurdistan:
Divided Nation of the Middle East (Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1958); M. van Bruinessen,
Mullas, Sufis and Heretics: The Role of Religion in Kurdish Society, collected articles (Isis
Press, Istanbul, 2000); M. van Bruinessen, Kurdish Ethno-nationalism Versus NationBuilding States: Collected Articles (Isis Press, Istanbul, 2000); S. McDonald, Kurdish
Women and Self-Determination: A Feminist Approach to International Law, in S. Mojab
(ed.), Women of a Non-State Nation: The Kurds (Mazda Publishers, California, 2001)
pp. 135157.
134 Belge, supra note 6; Tanr, supra note 80; M. I. Kunt, The Later Muslim Empires: Ottomans,
Safavids, Mughals, in M. Kelly (ed.), Islam: The Religious and Political Life of a World
Community (Praeger Scientific, New York, 1984) pp. 113136; J. Klein, En-Gendering
Nationalism: The Woman Question in Kurdish Nationalist Discourse of the Late
Ottoman Period, in S. Mojab (ed.), Women of a Non-State Nation: The Kurds (Mazda
Publishers, California, 2001) pp. 2551.
135 Lewis, supra note 100, p. 218.
521
initiatives from different state governments, the Kurdish people lost all faith in
the late Ottoman and new Turkish state and their governments. Kurdish cul
ture, language, identity and customary law only survive today because it was
passed orally and secretly from generation to generation. Many Kurdish com
munities still carry these memories with them, and this is likely to be a major
determinant of their settlement strategies in their present day life.
5
Millet Practice, Territorial and Non-Territorial Autonomy in the

Present Day
As discussed above, the birth of nationalism and the nation-state underpinned

the death of millet practices. Unfortunately, monistic nation-states espe
cially those which have adopted the unitary sort of assimilation policies devel
oped by the later Ottomans now appear paralyzed in the face of the increasing
demands of ethnic and religious minorities. There has been much criticism
that it is not possible for a unitary nation-state to respect the freedom of all of
the members in its population: in their own interests, the state agents tend to
primarily support the majority or dominant groups identity, religion and lan
guage.136 When there is no recognition of, or respect for, legal, cultural, politi
cal, economic and personal differences then deep divisions and even active
conflict arises between different population groups. Parekh has described the
monistic approach to dealing with a diverse society as the view that only one
way of life is fully human, true, or the best, and that all others are defective to
the extent that they fall short of it.137 Eric Hobsbawm has contrasted how
nations and nationalism are constructed from above, [but] can only be fully
understood from below, in terms of the needs and expectations of ordinary
people, which are often not national.138 Beck and Sznaider have argued that
we should move from a nation-state centred perspective and from method
ological nationalism, to the discovery and understanding of the contemporary
136 J. S. Mill, Considerations of representative government, in H. B. Acton (ed.), Utilitarism,
On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd.,
London, 1862/1976) pp. 360365, at p. 361; W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) pp. 110113.
137 B. Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000) p. 16; E. Nimni, National-Cultural Autonomy as
an Alternative to Minority Territorial Nationalism, 6:3 Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global
Review of Ethnopolitics (2007) pp. 345364, at p. 358.
138 E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1990) p. 10.
522
Tas
cosmopolitan condition.139 As far back as 1966, even the pre-eminent organ

isation of nation states, the United Nations (UN), recognised the limits of a
monistic or unitary treatment of minorities. Article 27 of the UNs International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that:
[i]n those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own
language.
This article even covers migrants and visitors within a country.140
Many nation states do not, however, seem to have understood the problem,
or implemented any effective solutions. The recent increase in minority
nationalism, with its separatist demands for cultural autonomy or secession,
has further underlined the limitations to the top-down type of constructed
unitary nation-states. Multicultural states with unitary, centralistic or liberal
democratic values seem to have focused on two simplistic solutions: either to
split the state along national lines or to support the majority group to assimi
late the weaker ones.141
Solutions drawing on the Ottoman millet practice present an alternative
way forward. Millet practices were used to support non-territorial autonomy
(NTA) for example for the Jews or the Gypsies (Kipti) as well as geographi
cal or territorial autonomy (TA) as in the examples of Kurds and Albanians.
Discussions about territorial and non-territorial autonomy have engrossed
many academics and policy makers.142
139 U. Beck, and N. Sznaider, Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences: A Research
Agenda, 57:1 The British Journal of Sociology (2006) pp. 123; in F. Prina, Introduction
National Cultural Autonomy in Theory and Practice, 12:1 Journal of Ethnopolitics and
Minority Issues in Europe (2013) pp. 16, at p. 2
140 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 23, Rights of Minorities (Article 27),
adopted 8 April 1994, paras. 5.1 and 5.2; see also W. Kymlicka, National-Cultural
Autonomy and International Minority Rights Norms, 6:3 Ethnopolitics (2007) pp. 379
393, at p. 382.
141 W. Kymlicka and C. Straehle Cosmopolitanism, nation-states, and minority nationalism:
a critical review of recent literature, 7:1 European Journal of Philosophy (1999) pp. 6588,
at p. 76; in Nimni, supra note 134, p. 349.
142 See for example Kymlicka, supra note 141; Nimni, supra note 137; E. Nimni (ed.), National
Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics (Routledge, London, 2005); A. Lijphart,
Democracy in Plural Societies (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1977); A. Lijphart,
523
Something similar to the pluralistic Ottoman millet practice is already been

used today in some diverse states. For example, Israel continues to use a per
sonal status system for non-Jewish or non-Israeli identities, as inherited from
Ottoman millet practice.143 There are similar examples in Lebanon,144 Iraq
(where the Parliament passed the Provincial Assemblies Law in 2008), and in
the Greek sub-system of personal autonomy in Thrace. More generally, the
European Union itself is a combination of TA and NTA. These examples show
that millet-style practices can successfully be used today. As Quer points out:
[T]he millet system as a model of diversity management offers available
solutions to contemporary multicultural Europe in terms of both collec
tive rights accommodation and formulation of minority and majority
groups interests [T]his system is a model that could be adapted in
Europe for the systematic accommodation of [especially] non-territorial
claims for communal contemporary adaptations of the millet system in
Middle Eastern countries, which can represent a potential source of
inspiration for European legislators [M]ultiple identities (group/
nation/state/Europe) can be institutionalized through the adaptation of

Consociation: the model and its applications in divided societies, in D. Rea (ed.), Political
Cooperation in Divided Societies: A Series of Papers Relevant to the Conflict in Northern
Ireland (Gill and McMillan, Dublin, 1982) pp. 166186; M. Van der Stoel, Peace and Stability
through Human and Minority Rights: Speeches by the OSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden Baden, 1999); D. J. Smith, The Revival of
Cultural Autonomy in Certain Countries of Eastern Europe: Were Lessons Drawn from
the Inter-War Period?, in Venice Commission (ed.), The Participation of Minorities in
Public Life (Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 2008) pp. 7788; D. J. Smith, NonTerritorial Cultural Autonomy in Contemporary Europe: Reflections on the Revival of an
Idea, in K. Breen and S. ONeill (eds.), After the Nation? Critical Reflections on PostNationalism (Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke and New York, 2010) pp. 84102; D. J. Smith
and J. Hiden, Ethnic Diversity and the Nation State: Cultural Autonomy Revisited (Routledge,
London, 2012); D. J. Smith, Non-Territorial Autonomy and Political Community in
Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 12:1 Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority
Issues in Europe (2013) pp. 2755; A. Lyon, Between the Integration and Accommodation
of Ethnic Difference: Decentralization in the Republic of Macedonia, 11:3 Journal on
Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, (2013) pp. 80103.
143 M. Edelman, Courts, Politics and Culture in Israel (University of Virginia Press,
Charlottesville, 1994); Y. Sezgin, The Israeli Millet System: Examining Legal Pluralism
through Lenses of Nation-Building and Human Rights, 43:3 Israel Law Review (2010)
pp. 631654.
144 G. M. Dib, Law and Population in Lebanon (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Medford, 1975).
524
Tas
the millet system by creating a multi-level identification system (commu

nal/national/supranational) in which majority and minority groups
interests ultimately converge.145
Any effective model should involve a combination of territorial and nonterritorial autonomy. Both of these have to be carefully balanced to avoid yet
more conflicts. Specific ethnic or religious groups may historically be domi
nant in a specific geographical area, but globalization, with population
movements from rural to urban areas, international migration, and especially
the creation of large metropolitan cities, means that minorities are now dis
persed between and within several nation-states. For example, while a large
number of Kurds have historically lived in the eastern and south-eastern
parts of Turkey, now the largest numbers of Kurds live in Istanbul. Many
other Kurds have moved to other areas of Turkey, as well as leaving the country
altogether and now live both internally and externally in the diaspora. In this
sort of situation, a pure system of territorial autonomy does not meet the needs
of either majorities or minorities.
For example, Kurds are still the majority in their traditional areas, but the
minorities who also live in these areas also have specific ethnic, linguistic and
religious needs. In other parts of Turkey, including Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir,
Bodrum, Mersin and Antalya, Kurds live in increasing numbers but are still a
minority. In this way, simple territorial autonomy can lead to discrimination, as
well acting as a barrier to real democratic autonomy and equal citizenship. As
is being experienced by nation-states today, this easily creates divisions
between different territories and fosters claims for new, ever smaller, unitary
nation-states.
This is not a new issue. In the late 19th century, the Austro-Hungarian
Empire was collapsing almost simultaneously with the Ottoman decline.
Renner, in his article State and Nation,146 strongly criticized arrangements
whereby if you live in my territory you are subjected to my domination, my
law and my language.147 Renner was one of the first thinkers to develop and
support the concept of non-territorial autonomy.
With a combination of TA and NTA, which I would like to call TANTA,
groups living as a majority in their traditional territory can manage their
145 G. M. Quer, De-Territorializing Minority Rights in Europe: A Look Eastward, 12:1 Journal
of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (2013) pp. 7698, at pp. 7980.
146 K. Renner, State and Nation, in E. Nimni (ed.), National-Cultural Autonomy and its
Contemporary Critics (Routledge, London, 1899/2005) pp. 1548.
147 Ibid.; Nimni, supra note 137.
525
internal affairs by applying some legal autonomy. This allows the protection of
their cultural identity, economic and political autonomy, religion and lan
guage. Quebecois or Quebecers in Canada, Swedes in Finland, and Tatars in
Russia all have some level of autonomy, and these examples show how a
combination of TA and NTA can be successful.148 The combined TA and NTA
(TANTA) model offers a real opportunity to resolve deep-seated national, eth
nic, and religious conflicts and represents an attractive model [to] accom
modat[e] national minorities.149
The NTA element within the combination can act as an alternative to
minority territorial nationalism.150 Otherwise, territorial segregation may cre
ate parallel communities or systems, which may lead to confrontational rela
tions between minority groups and majorities.151 TANTA is an important way
to accommodate cultural, personal and political differences and the tolera
tion of these differences helps prevent the isolation of one community from
others. The combination of territorial and non-territorial autonomy creates an
environment for different groups to interact and mix with each other. It may
even promote the creation of hybrid identities as in the millet system in the
Ottoman Empire, [when] peoples of different ethnic identities co-exist[ed]
in a single polity without straining the principle of national autonomy.152
Many nation states today are currently experiencing active conflicts with resi
dent minorities, including Ukraine, Estonia and Latvia with their ethnic
Russian minorities; Romania and Hungary with their Roma community; and
Turkey, Iran, Syria, Iraq with their Kurdish minority. Non-discriminatory milletstyle practices could allow the development of new types of state systems,
which would promote peaceful coexistence, even if it did place some limits on
the sovereignty of the nation-state.
6 Conclusion
To conclude, the millet practice has in general, previously been discussed
through the lens of the nation-state and associated nation building projects.
This article has aimed to contribute with a fuller understanding of the millet
148 Kymlicka, supra note 140; B. Bowring, The Tatars of the Russian Federation and nationalcultural autonomy: a contradiction in terms?, 6:3 Ethnopolitics, (2007) pp. 417435.
149 Kymlicka, supra note 140, p. 386.
150 Nimni, supra note 137.
151 Quer, supra note 145, p. 88.
152 Nimni, supra note 137, p. 346.
526
Tas
practice. In a time when many nation-states are struggling with their minori
ties, and are threatened by minority nationalism, separation and secession,
new approaches to territorial and non-territorial autonomy like those encap
sulated in the millet practice may have much to offer.
I have tried to show how societal and legal pluralism was managed under
the Ottomans. Kurds practiced their culture and alternative legal systems offi
cially under the Ottoman millet practice. In the later Ottoman period, and then
as the Turkish nation building project was implemented, the autonomy and
even the existence of Kurds was challenged. These repressive policies and
practices affected the daily lives of Kurdish people and communities: it is sug
gested that classic assimilation methods based on ignorance and fear not only
do not work but themselves may actually open the door to radicalised nation
alistic resistance. Good and bad memories of autonomy and its suppression
are likely to be a major determinant of current Kurdish settlement strategies.
In classical ideas about monistic nation-states, the survival of national,
religious or ethnic minority groups depends on toleration from the group in
power, usually the majority. The discussion above suggests that this approach
has not worked well in many diverse societies either for the minorities or for
the majority. In practice, minorities develop unofficial practices. The nationstate does not recognize the minorities and their practices, while, de facto, the
minorities do not recognize the nation-state, its institutions and its symbols. A
combination of territorial and non-territorial autonomy (TANTA), as already
used in the EU and in other areas, may provide a better way to deal with the
challenge of diverse societies.

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international journal on minority and group rights

The Myth of the Ottoman Millet System: Its

Researcher and Consultant, Oxford Diasporas Programme,

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014|doi 10.1163/15718115-02104003

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

The Myth of the Ottoman Millet System

The Operation of the Millet Practice

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

I. Ortayl, Osmanly Yeniden Kefetmek (Tima, Istanbul, 2006).

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

The Myth of the Ottoman Millet System

Y. Demira, Osmanl Imparatorluunda Yaayan Aznlklarn Sosyal ve Ekonomik

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

A. Ali Efendi, Kann-nme-i Sultni Li Aziz Efendi. Berlin Staatsbibliothek, Preussischer

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

The Myth of the Ottoman Millet System

Similar contradictions are presented by Kenanolu, who also describes only

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

and informal basis. No consistent policy towards non-Muslims existed during

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

The Myth of the Ottoman Millet System

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

The Myth of the Ottoman Millet System

create the restrictions, symbols, practices, and ways of identifying and

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

Kurds and the Millet Practice

57 Ali Efendi, supra note 20.

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

The Myth of the Ottoman Millet System

clear terms of conferral and extended to them imperial protection. Sultan

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

Sultan Murat IV reminded his governors of the treaty on autonomy signed

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

The Myth of the Ottoman Millet System

contained all sorts of regulations on administrative and financial mat

In van Bruinessen, supra note 52, p. 98.

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

Centralisation and Kurds: The End of the Millet Practice

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

The Myth of the Ottoman Millet System

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

practitioners of Turkification and described by Makdisi91 as an unremitting

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

The Myth of the Ottoman Millet System

D. Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 17001922 (CUP, Cambridge, 2000).

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

The Myth of the Ottoman Millet System

with a Turkish and Muslim population. Alongside Kurds, the Armenians,

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

ideologies of Turkification and Islamism, as well as the Turkish language and

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

The Myth of the Ottoman Millet System

Turks and the Turkish national character was seen to be important.124

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

The Myth of the Ottoman Millet System

Millet Practice, Territorial and Non-Territorial Autonomy in the

As discussed above, the birth of nationalism and the nation-state underpinned

international journal on minority and group rights 21 (2014) 497-526

cosmopolitan condition.139 As far back as 1966, even the pre-eminent organ