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A Theory of Capitalist
Regulation
The US Experience
HALFTITLE PA GE -
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A Theory of Capitalist
Regulation
Th e US Experience
With a neu- postfa ce
blJ th e autho r
TITLE PA GE -
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A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
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CO PYRIGHT PAG E -
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A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
Cont ent s
Part Ou e
~.
Accumuiat ion
Part Two
Th.. T r a nsfo n n a t io n o f Int ..r _Ca p ita li s t Relat ions and t h .. Laws
of Com p ..tit io n
n.
~.
n.
1. PrincipIes ofTaylorism
nI. The Forms of Centralization of Capital: the Giant Corporation and the
Financial Group
n.
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CO NTENT5 -
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A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
~.
System
1. The General Attributes ofMoney : the Significance of the Monetary
Constraint
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Index
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Int roduction
Conv entional econo mic science pr esents itself as a set of co herent pr ecepts
th eory .
If thi s th eory has exerc ized such a dictator ship over economic th ou ght ,
it is because it supplies a reassuring vision of society and a justification fur
th e pr ofession of econo mist. Genera l eq uilibrium is seductive because it
suggests th e collective harmony of a co mmunity whose subjec ts pr eserve
th eir absolute auto no my yet where all co nflict is excl ud ed . The normati ve
character of thi s th eoreti cal proj ect doos not in any way diminish its
pr estige . Its pro tagonists claim to elabora te rules of efliciency which th e
econo mic sys te m must obey so th at all subjec ts can act ration ally and th eir
actions be mutually co mpatible . They co mpare existing econo mic sys tems
tim e lived by its subjec ts, in other words lo give a histor ieal account of
econo mic fael s; and sec ondly, its inability to express lh e social canten! of
economic r"la!io ns, and co nsequently to int er pret lh e forces and co nflicts
al work in th e economic process. These two aspec ts are certainly not
capitalism is both th e least bad alternative and th e only sys tem amenab le
to advance towards an optimal co nfiguration . It sho uld not be surprising
th at thi s dou ble achievement has bro ught th e pro fession of economist
hon our from th e established social order . 'Refurm without risks' is
independent of one ano ther or simply juxtaposed . But th eir essentia l un ity
Yet th e dissatisfaction th at we mention ed pers ists and eve n gro ws. This
is particularly so in period s of crisis, where th e sca le of th e 'disequilibria' of
see king rad ically to criticize . The greate r part of th e time th ey use th e
language of thi s th eory , which either vitia tes th eir co nclusions, or at bes t
mer ely ques tions th e cor respo ndence of th e orthod ox th eory to reality .
~'Ihat
which can be neither exte nded nor diminished; hence th e inflexi bilit y of
it can still exe rc ize tod ay is a funct ion of its tot alizing and tot alit ari an
tot alit ari an because it red uces and excludes from its amb it econo mic
phenomena identified from observation of real pr actices as 'imperfectio ns',
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co nfro nt one ano ther in sterile oppo sition, eac h simply excl ud ing th e
th eir Qwn redu cti ve pr oc edures, putting th e very noti on " f equilibrium
blate ntly int o ques tio n. A ha s! of macro -econ omi c moo els of developme nt
agents and ac tivities which display a pri ori types of specified rationality .
The failure of th ese co untless mod els, which di!fer amo ng th em selves
interdependen ce .
th eoreti callevel. Any treatment of gro wth th at evacua tes history leads to a
co neeption of tim e th at rend ers dy na mics a mer e va riant of sta tics - in
th at are reproduced in and thro ugh th e soc ial tran sform at ion , th e changing
forms in which th ese are repr od uced , and th e reasons why thi s
effect, a logical tim e whieh is not th e expre ssion of any real movem ent . A
va riab le called 'time' is int roduced int o the characteristic multi-
soc iety is rep rod uced . The object of th e pr esent work is th e regulation of
th e capitalist mod e of pr oduction . Our investi gat ion will base itself on a
long-r un hist orieal ana lysis of th e economy of th e United Sta tes of
America .
organized int o a sys tem. This raises two method ological pr oblems.
sys tem whose internal relationships are in co urse of tran sform ati on , not
every thing doos co ntinue to existo It is thus necessar y to study th e way in
which inn ovation appears in th e sys tem. There is no a pri ori reason why a
self-ev ide nt; econo mie relations are th en de fined as mod es of coordination
be tween th e pr ed etermined and un alter able be haviour of th ese subjects.
when ac tual soc ial sys tems are studied , historieal expe rience co nfirms that
Theore tieal debates revolve around th ese mod es of coordination and ten d
towar ds th e definition of an equilibrium configuration of an ever more
0-
gene ra l scope. Hen ce th e need th ese th eorists feel to len d th eir eq uilibrium
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economic th eory were th ose " f relationship and precess, incor po rating an
int ernal principIe " f transfurm at ion in th eir very definitio n, instead of
subjec t and sta te. Bu! in th a! case th e co rroep! of equilibrium itself would
lose its fuundation and make way fur th e co noep! of repr od uction .
orthod ox th eory , but rather in an ab ility to pose quite different th eoreti cal
Notio ns of tim e , as we have already said, are dosely depend ent on more
makes uni ver sal claims. Any human action is economic as long as it is
validity.
human behav iour detac hed from any social co nditions, th e dominant
idealism o This pr oced ure finds its logical fuund ations in dialectical
econo mic th eory canno t but be altoge ther fureign to histor y . It can only
mat eri alism oThe met hod elabora ted by Marx has impo rt ant co nsequences,
pr oceed norm ati vely . The appare ntly rigorous character of th e th eory
regulation of capitalism o
Marx's refusal to pos tulate an immutable essence unde rlying th e
ground. The final outco me is in no way paradoxical, but already impli cit at
free of any social tie , int rod uces an absolute opposition between th eory
and expe rience, necessit y and co ntingency , essence and phenomenon . The
relations). It fullows th at co ncepts are not int rod uced once and fur all at a
its po int of origin oFor th e co ncept of th e rational and sovere ign subjec t,
and enab les th e co ncrete to be absorbed within th eory . Theo ry , fur its part ,
sta te. Purity is finally atta ined in th e co ncept of pr ice , as th e suflicient and
exclusive bond between all rational subjec ts unde r th e uni furm co nstraint
of sca rc ity.
Econ omi sts co nfronted with th e transfurm ati on s and crises of
co ntempo rary
~'Iestern
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phases that are most impo rt ant , and make th eory something other th an th e
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struggle.
relations, to see why period s of crisis are period s of int ense social creation ,
and to unde rstand why th e resolution of a crisis always involves an
ruptu re only makes sense in a th eory th at takes qualita tive changes int o
account - an indispensable co ndition in th e social sciences, where th e
labou r), instead of a met aphysical problem (the existe nce of harmon y
between subjec ts who are oblivious of one another and are endowed with
pr e-existing resou rces and a pr e-established rationality).
This boo k is th er efore divided int o two major sec tions: th e first part
transform ati ons of th e wage relation ; the sec ond explores th e laws of
~'Ie
shall
~'Ie
~'Ihen
thi s
hap pens, th e sys te m reacts as a tot alit y to plug th e gap by modi fying th e
possible sta tes of th e sys te m are known in advance and its movement is
repr esented by co ntinuously differentiable funct ion s.
Both Parts One and Two co ntain three chapters. In Part One , th e first
chapter studies th e pr od uction of capital - th at is to say, it analyses in what
way capital is a fundamental social re lation de noting a mod e of division of
labour . The pro position th at capital arises from social labour finds its
precise expression in th e Marxist co ncept of surplus-va lue. The analysis of
surplus-va lue in its two mod alities, absolute and relative , leads to th e
shall use th e term stru ctur al fo rms for th e co mplex soc ial relations,
United Sta tes to be surveyed in a genera l overview. The sec ond and thi rd
~'Ie
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regulation . The nat ur e of th ese financial crises in turn pro vides an overall
relation over th e las! century . These chaplers also ena ble us to give a
th eoreti cal fuund ation ta th e period ization of capitalism int o success ive
stages " f histor ical evolution. The criterion fur lhi s period ization is
furni shed by th e changing canten! of relative surplus-va lue: in th e frs!
th e co nditions of existe nce " f th e wage-ea rn ing dass; in a sec ond stage, th e
simultaneous revolutionization of both th e abour pr ec ess and the
century capitalism oThe key th eor eti cal pr ocess rather lies in a radical
and hist orical analysis of th e econo my of th e United Sta tes since th e Civil
~Iar . The selection of thi s co ncrete field ofreference fur our analysis calls
as our sta rting po int , ra ther th an th at of the world, is moti vat ed by reason s
of co nvenience as well as pr incipIe . Precise co nd usions can be reached
only after assemb ling, dassifying and int er preti ng a vas t number of da ta. A
work on world econo mic histor y with a similar aim to our pr esent study
which social capital divides int o fract ion s and th e structura l furms (giant
an ada pta tion of th e mon et ar y sys tem. But thi s ada pta tion in no way
between mon ey and credit elucida tes th e co nditions of thi s ada pta tion , and
expanded repr oduction , and th at a gap is left ifthis is not studied in de ta il.
"
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essential, th er efare , to accord major impo rt ance to qualita tive changes, far
perspective has sense only in this co ntext oTo int er pret what is new, it is
~ oth
unificat ion of th e nat ion by its Qwn int ernal dynamic alorre. Capita lism
with arc haic social structures far eign to it , which elsewhere acte d as a
~'Ie
shall
wealth is pr od uced sta mps quite irrevocably th e lives of individu als, soc ial
aba ndon thi s task. For it involves an analysis th at deals with th e meaning of
as well as of mat eri al objects. To take th ese activ ities and relations as the
farms create d in th e United Sta tes, was a dec isive aspec t of th e global
~'Iorld ~'Iar ,
and of its
subjec ts , funct ion s and goods , has a decisive bea ring on th e field of thi s
discipline , its object and criteria of scientificity , and its connections with
In th e thi rd place , our study is a long-r un analysis. This doos not mean
genera lized it to encompass th e tot alit y of soc ial relations. The extension of
wage-labo ur has made society homogenaus as never befare , and yet th e
only to fall int o a pu rely empirical process of red uction of our own .
~'Ie
~ oth
century has
enor mou s gro wth of th e prod uctive far ces of collective labou r remains
dearly displayed , and affects eve ry phase of th e cyd e of daily life in which
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scienees. The very division of th ese sciences int o distinct dom ains, eac h
formalization " f th e law " f capital accumulation. This inevit ably involves a
high degree of abstraction. The results gained al lhi s degree " f abstractio n
hist orical evolutio n of capitalist accumulatio n in th e United Sta tes. Fa r th e
object for th eoret ieal analysis. As far as economists are co ncern ed, th eir
naivet y vis-a-vis any thing that involves th e sta te is a notor iou s fact . If
econo mists of th e dassical or neo-d assical tradit ion either ignore th e sta te
th e mar ket , writers daiming allegiance to th e Marxist tradit ion also display
a th eoreti cal incapacity that reveals major difliculties. Yet hist orical
possibilities of actio n. This sta rting po int , however , has not led to th e
de velop ment of a pos itive th eory of th e capitalist sta te , its hist orieal
transform at ions, nation al spec ificities or pr oliferation of economic
funct ion s. It is well known th at Marx's own wor k doos not co ntain a finished
th eory of th e sta te , but only sparse indicat ion s, critical analyses and texts
of po litieal int er vention . This is un doubt edly where th e main difliculty lies.
Marxism sees itself as a pr actiee whose aim is to transform society , and yet
nowher e more th an in co nnection with th e sta te is a divor ce between
scientific investi gati on and pr actical actio n more pr onou need . A
pr ocess of repr oduction of labour -po wer . The social revolutions th rough
co ntempo rary example is th e doc tr ine of sta te mon opol y capitalism, which
ass umes as a sta rting po int what might be pr oduced as the result of a
ensue. Keyn esianism , mean while , has exe rcised an influence on Marxist
econo mists in th e Anglo-Saxo n co untries. Her e th e analysis of th e sta te is
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pr oduction can also be liber at ed and a gra dual transiti on to socialism can
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cyd ical fluctuat ion s. In th e logic of th e doc trine of sta te mon opol y
capitalism , structura l aspec ts are certainly given far greater pro minence ,
but co nsideration of th e wage relation is tot ally lacking. The sta te is
a rder to ensure th eir repr od uction . Mor e fundamentally still, econo mic
to tell us what th e forces are th at dete rmine th e level of the genera l rate of
pr ivate and th e public o ~'Ie shall see th at th ese relations are th e mon et ar y
relation and th e wage relation . It is th en necessar y to show why and how
repr esented by James O'Connor in th e United Sta tes, Manuel Caste lls in
dispe nse in thi s boo k with a special chapter on the ro le of the sta te. The
logic , pushed to its extr eme by Baran and Sweezy, it is co rrectly held th at
esse ntial feature of capitalist social re lations is th er eby certainly gras ped.
But th e formation of mon ey wages is not related to th e develop ment of
arb itra rily slice social reality int o instances, can readily engage with those
analyses of th e po litical field such as th ose of Ralph Miliba nd, which study
forces that repr esent social gro ups, and th e relationships that form within
th em . The unificat ion of th ese valuab le descr iptive investigation s with
figur es mer ely in th e form of an auto no mous and un differ entiated tot al
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Gra msci. By developing th e Gra msc ian co ncept of the hegemon y of a social
'periphery' , in th eir des tructura tion and int egrati on into th e world market .
All th ese viewpoints can legitim at ely c1aim to account far one aspec t or
another of existing int ernati on al relations, and yet non e of th em can gras p
th e full significance of imp eri alism oLike th e po wer of which it is th e most
Work
explicit
definition
th at
originates
from
econo mic
co ncepts.
Im perialism can only be gras ped on the bas is of a fully developed th eory of
th e sta te, capable of study ing th e significance of int er -st at e relations in all
th ese mediati on s and showing that th ese express th e most co mplex far m of
capitalist socialization. Hen ri Lefebvr e's recent wor k goes furthest in thi s
th eoreti cal noti on . For her e again, dogmatism has long ste rilized
all econo mic int erpret ati on s of imp eri alism o For Marx, th e int ernati on al
solida rity of th e pro letariat was th e pr ocess by which a uni ver sal society
econo mistic per specti ve th at disto rts its significance. There is har dly a
domain in which unswer vin g fidelit y to Lenin has been more da maging. The
incapable of rising above co nflicts of privat e int er est . Marx's int er pret ati on
pro letariat th at would spill over nat ion al frontier s and break up sta te
institution s. Lefebvr e , on th e co ntrary , co ntends th at th e uni ver salizati on
institution alizat ion of social relations reinfarces existing antago nisms and
gives th em th e tremendou s violence of a co nflict of sta te po wers.
Conse quently a study of imp eri alism must involve analysis of th e net work
01 states.
~'Iorld
~'Iar has seen th e tot al triumph of the sta te, and th e weakening rather than
th e stre ngthening of pr oletarian int ernat ion alism . This was no accide nto
exc hange. For others again, distinct nati on al spaces no lon ger exist from an
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transact ion th a! can be int er pret ed in co rnmod ity terms. It deno tes th e
transnat ion al firms pr od uces th e econo mic eifects th at are now so well
known .
~'Ihen
~ oth
access to labou r and a co ndition of life whose co ntinuity goos far beyond
Bretton
~'Ioods
organization in other nati ons and pr oced ures fur settling int ernat ional
co nflicts th at would safeguard th e exp ansion of American capital. That is
why th e United Sta tes fuught so bitte rly in Vietnam . It fuught not just fur
value relations, makes use of th e tissue of solida rity and recipr ocal
Japan's econo mic influen ce . If thi s aspec t of American hist ory is ignored ,
must be centrally instituted , and th ese take on a sta te furm . The sta te thus
th at it deserves. Yet milit ari sm sho uld not be int er pret ed simply as a
co nvenient means of abso rb ing a surplus with which th e mar ket is unable
develop s by penetr ating civil society and profuund ly restructu ring it . This
penetr ation and restructuration show th at the state fo rms part of the very
sys te m of sta tes. ~'Ie can now catch a glimpse of the full meaning of
imperialism : a hegemon y diflicult to exhibit th rough which one sta te
manages to influen ce a series of other sta tes to ado pt a set of rules th at are
21 1 23
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2 3 123
Part One
The
Transformations of
the Wage Relation:
The Laws of Capital
Accumulation
PART
O ~ E,
1 I 1
political economy .
The Production
of Capital
l . T h e Creatlon and Accumulatlon of Surplus-Value
lba COllIuol1 COllc-epll'vmZ lbeoret>Cili expressiOll re C<>pll.ilist reL1tlons of
prodUCbOll , COllIuol1 bec.>11S'> '1 de/in"" Iha economic form m which lbe
labcur of K>ciM)' is appropnaled, IS lba ccacept of WrpllLS-.:alue. lbe
st.utmz pcint of ~y mv<lStlgat>on of Ih L1w of capllol1 accumw.t>on is
IherrilTe an uoliysis of lb... CN!<l11on of aurp1usvol1ue and lbe hmtts t:h.1
this enccunters. But surp1U5-va1ue it5elf depende on a mor... zen...ra1
ccncept, that of " a/llt , ..hich ...xpresses the relations by ..hich particular
labou r perfurm9d in di!ferent . ite...here productiva furces are zatherecl
together beco mes social labour . The. e relation. are tho.e of the
commodity economy. It is essential therefure to define precisely ho..
capital dependo on the commodity and how it introdu ces new
1. TH E PRODUCTION
or CAPITAL
_ 1 1 71
ut~ories,
2 I 71
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A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
VE~ =
meaning is co ntained in this particular relation , and not in any other . But
co nsidered . No
s..
~ q
VE
"
VA . q VE
"
"
where VE" VE" ... , VE" are th e values of co mmod ities. These values are
determinable because the space is rend ered hom ogeneous by th e abs tract
labour VA " VA" ..., VA. ,which fulfils thecondition :
VA , + VA , ~ . . . + VA V A,
esse ntial to bea r in min d that th ese quantities are homogeni zed by values
which th emselves f10w from a unifurmity resting on abs tract labou r .
repr esentation of abs tract labou r is fixed on one single co mmod ity th at
bec omes the genera l equivalent and is known as money .
mon ey is expelled from th e set of co mmod ities pro per . Ever y co mmod ity
always expr esses its exchange-value in mon ey . Money, fur its part , never
expresses its value relative to any other co mmod ity , since it never faces
mon ey co mmod ity A and fix a unit to which a name is given (fur example
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<l."
Exchange values are expressed by pos itive real number s which are
'quantities' of mon ey , because mon ey is th e hom ogeneou s co mmod ity
which is th e explicit form " f abs trae ! abour . This sta tus of mon ey has an
implicit coro llary ; it is the monetary expressi on of the U' orking hour th a!
indicat es of how many mon et ar y units th e quantum " f abs trae ! labour , th e
hom ogeneou s element of soc iety's overall labo ur , is th e equivalent. This
quantity is in sorne respects th e synthes is of th e relationships of
eq uivalence. It is only fixed fur certain give n co nditions of co mmod ity
pr od uction , a genera l co mmod ity equivalent determined by th e repeated
pract ice of exc hange, and a unit of thi s selecte d co mmod ity - in fact th e
sum tot al of equivalence relations which enab le th e realization of th e tot al
abs tract labour by th e uni ver sal alienation of stabilized co mmod ities. The
description of th ese co nditions is already suflicient to show th at mon ey is a
co nnections in space and doos involve th e moti ves behind th e jou rn eys.
~'Ihat we are co ncern ed with here is th e sys te m of exc hanges , and we
know th at th e pr incipIe of exc hange is a relationship of equivalence in
which value is pr eserved . Ever y agent of exc hange is equipped with a value
mat eri alized as a pr od uct of labou r , and must find in th e genera l
co mmod ity circ ulation, by means of th e exchange transacti on , a
co mmod ity (one or more) th at has sorne utility fur him . This utility has
nothing in co mmon with sorne mythical and generic ophelimity, th e
phantom of a human nat ur e . It is rather a social utility characteristic of th e
division oflabour . It indicat es th at eac h isolat ed pr ivate pr od ucer has to
find th e co nditions fur th e repr oduction of his activity in th e genera l
circ ulation . These co nditions are both person al, fur his labour -po wer must
be susta ined , and directly depend ent on th e pr od uction pr ocess th at he
sets in moti on .
unit fur measuring values which is variable over tim e . In th e tot al set of
the metam orphosis 01the commo dity. This met amorph osis is th e unity of a
sale and a purc hase. The exc hange agent , owner of cQmmodity C, sells thi s
co mmod ity, i.e. th er e is an exc hange against mon ey , which must th er efure
be a means of effective exc hange and not simply an ideal equivalent. This is
value has taken fur him th e furm of mon ey . In thi s furm he possesses an
element of abs tract labou r which is by nat ur e a value th at remains co nstant
(e) Moneta ry constraint and the definiti on 01 total income. Let us return
now to th e exc hange pr ocess and study th e mod alities of realization fur th e
th e utility he req uires, and thus realize th e sale M - C', th e sec ond phase of
th e met amorphosis. The co mplete met amorph osis C- M - C' thus involves a
value of a co mmod ity C, mon ey being co mmod ity M. This pro blem brings
us to th e organization of exc hange and int rod uces the not ion of utility ,
which has no place in th e definition of value. There sho uld be nothing
a sepa ration between sale and purchase. This separa tion is made possible
surprising in this. To unde rstand th e pos itio n bette r, let us take an example
from outside econo mics. The laws of mot ion in Eudidean space are
separa tion th at makes th e uni ver sal alienation of co mmod ities int elligible
owe nothing to th e reasons we might have fur movin g aro und. But if th e
neo-d assical view which would have us believe th at exc hange is a simple
5 I 71
6 I 71
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-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
Conce ptio ns of tim e are very d ose ly bound up with th ose of th e social
further explanation. Capita l sta nds on its own footing, because it fills th e
entir e social space. The irrever sibilit y of econo mic tim e is incon ceivable ,
amount in money VP, as thu s defined , is the total income 01soci e/y. This is
th er efore th e exc hange-va lue of th e net pr od uct created by social labour,
known as value added. If th e abstrae! labour is co mpletely realized in th e
exc hange, and if we cal! th e mon et ar y expression of th e wor king-ho ur m,
since eve ry thing is hom ogeneou s and no qualita tive change exists to create
"
m _ _
VA
But product ion and exchange are two separa te processes in th e social
division oflabour . If th e genera l co mmod ity circ ulation doos not succee d
equivalence. This labour th en doos nat form part of soc ial labour. Sorne
pr od ucts are not sold, th ey do not bec ome co mmod ities and th eir
~'Ihen
th eir met amorphoses and leave th e circ u lation sphere to be des troyed by
co nsumption , th ey are also annihilated as values. The social incom e thus
disappears as soo n as it is realized . There is no way exchange can pr eserve
incom es over tim e.' It is th e co ntinuity of product ion th at de te rmines a
new tot al incom e as th e realized mon et ar y form of a new expenditure of
co ntains a certain fract ion th at existe d in th e days of J ulius Caesar and has
been preser ved down to th e present oThis fantasti c nation de rives from an
~'Ie
7 I 71
8 I 71
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-'
(1
A THEOR\' OF CAPITALlST REGULAT ION
labour ther eby bec omes wage-labour . This relation has a da uble condition
of existence: on th e ,m e hand th e society in questio n mus! be co mmod itypr od ucing; on th e other hand a deavage mus! take place within th e
co mmunity " f independent producer s such as radically to change th eir
situation vis-a-vis pr od uction. New relations of pr od uction are th en
created , th ose capitalist relations of product ion th a! we shall sludy in more
detail in Chapler
~.
of society, and th e cor relative transfurm ati on of th e " ther sec tion int " a
wage-earn ing dass. The wage relation thus fully defines social capital, i.e.
th e found ation for th e solida rity between al! mem ber s of thi s dass, a
solida rity imposed as a co nstraint on th eir divisions as co mmod ity owners.
The rate of surplus-va lue e = SV/ V, a non -dim ension al number as it is a
ratio between two quantities defined in th e same homogeneous space, is
th e ratio of its division . Many reade rs of Marx have been asto nished to see
him implicitl y pr esuppose , witho ut eve n justifying his ass umption, th e
same rate of surplus-va lue in al! bra nches of pr oducti on . They sho uld not
be so surprised, for th e pro blem doos not eve n arise. The rate of surplusvalue is a global co ncept defined in a hom ogeneou s space. It precisely
makes dear that capital arises from social labour th rough th e mediati on of
th e wage relation . If it is legitim at e to spea k of th e rate of surplus-va lue for
an elementa ry prod uction precess, it is so only to th e exte nt th at thi s
precess is an element in th e valorizatio n of capital in genera l, not in so far
as it is spec ific and tied to an individu al capital. It can never be repeated
often enough th at not al! econo mic pro blems can be treat ed at th e same
level of abs traction. Value and th e co ncepts directly bound up with it do
not enab le one to preceed imm ediat ely to th e pro blems of co mpetition .
VA - V + SV
take place? Here we can only olfer th e most formal and most genera l
co mplex ; thi s bea rs on th eories of wages and pri ces. But it is essentia l to see
co mplex and will be investi gat ed in Chapter 3. Here we can only furni sh a
9 I 71
10 I 71
- ---(O r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
J
A THEOR\' OF C A ~ I TA lIS T RE GULATION
formal ,," pr_ion which will l uffice to indicate the prin cipIe o f
d il tri buti on, "ven if not itl co ncrete content oIn o rder to understand il , _
must He he.. wages forro
ti
hiJ: dupoNl in the fonn of lb.. commodtti.... produced; fur th.. wag........m..r ,
thts sum ~ 'PMt 00 th purchu. of commodl tl.... wlnch are d<lSlrOyoo ID
COO$IUllpl1On.
tr.ansfonn.d {roro C- M - C" ilIto M- C- M ""th mOlley appeMtIlg a' tb.. two
elltTem... n . puTC!lue pr'!Cedoes Ihe sale, .."d no!..,ce V<>rs.I , becoUH lb ..
J>b.o-of lb.. met.unorpbom .u.sepuate<! by product>on. 11 follows from
thts WI lbe wige cootr.tet does lIOt form ~ of lbe re.ilizab oll of v;llue in
lener.ol ooaunodIt)' ciJeuLtiolI. 1t is onIy Ib e expendltures of Ib e w~g'"
~"" Ilwl lQrm pe rt cl thll r N lWtiolI . Ilow Ib e mOlletary expresslOll cf
Ibe worblll bcur IUes s1wpe in Ib e l en er..J ctreU1aoon tbat realizes over..n
v.ol<HI in propcrttolllO 1!J prodllcttOlI. l is dn elopmen t over ll.me evolv...
S
V
_ ~_
m
VA V +S V
l ' +S V
l + t
Profit is deternuned by the differenct : p " VP ~ S . The resultant macro-
theory o f
v~lue
and te
qlUht~llve
..lb th. cr..ttoll 0 1 v.ol<HI whic h is at 1M lOuroe o f lbe lIew incom.. whKoh
tU. 1M pLtc. o f tlwt ~nnihiLl.tf wh..n commodJtles maLe lb..... eXlt frn m
funct>c n o f th. evoluttoll 0 1 tbe monetary ..xp rt!SSlo n o f Ibe wor bllg bour,
th.
...wys;t
becallM a more
eqlUv~nce
r~pid
(e) Ab, olll(C Illrplll$-i :III11C o"d .n hm.n . Le! us start by offenn
.lll
Ibe
number of WOTI:ers Ibann in tb.. form.ottotl. of th.. toul value VA. lbe
Y~lle sp.ac9
division in the
""rp]ll"v~]u" t"
S, an d tb
c~Jl
w~g"
v~]ue
r~t.
of
SV/V, with VA " V + SV. 1.<>t u. call the total wales p.ilid
1ft '
O,
SURPLUSVALUE -
11 / 7 1
t~l:e
2 , RATEA NO MASS
12 / 7 1
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
terms of abs tract labour-time . Two different int ensiti es are in fact two
different de nsities in the expe nditure of labour -po wer during eac h hour's
read ily appare n! tha! th e rate " f surplus-va lue is defined by a relation of
tim es of abs tract labour t,. and t,.' performed in th e same space of labour -
tim e T. The int ensificati on of labo ur can more th an make up for a mod er at e
sho rte ning of the working day.
- a dec rease in t.
- a rise in t,. by way of a rise in T
- a dec rease in T - t,. with T remaining co nstant : i.e. th e atte mpt to
make th e entire working-day actually prod uctive of value.
The set of pr eced ures leadin g to a dec rease in t. is known as th e
pr od uction of relatit'e surplus-va lue. The set of pr eced ures th at increase t,.
with t. remaining co nstant (whether by a rise in Tor a fall in T-U is known
as th e pr oduction of absolute surplus-va lue. Deta iled analysis of th ese two
types of surplus-va lue depe nds on an investi gati on of th e labour pr ecess
and th e co nditions of existe nce of th e wage-earn ing dass, which will be
treat ed in Cha pte rs ~ and 3. The pr esent th eoret ical pr eced ure is simply
designed to articulate th e necessar y co ncepts which will enab le us to
pr eceed to more co ncrete develop ments. The creation of absolute surplusvalue by th e exte nsion of th e working day is th e earliest method , and
played an essential ro le during th e first stage of capitalist indu st rial
expansiono But it still has a ro le to play in lat er stages too , in th e form of
resistance to a sho rte ning of th e working day despite th e imm ense gro wth
hom ogeni zat ion effected by exc hange involves a reduction of labour
capitalist relations of prod uction . This analysis raises new th eoreti cal
13 I 71
capital. The pro blem now is to take int o sys te matic account th e
14 I 71
- ---(O r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
'"
-'
A T HEOR\' OF CAPITALIST RE GU LAT I O ~
(o) D4illitioll o{ labOllr prodl/cti~' itlJ. In lhe product:lon process Labourpcwer appoNn u ..n elfln"lll of captt.ol, inumuch as il ""ts mat..rial m....ns
of Llbour in motion "'1hin work ooll"CtlVlt1es_ Thes<> coll<!ctlVltt"", aroo
sys\fllU of productrve ti:>rew whos<t ooh_on denv""" from th.. coopn-ation
of Ih. Labourpow invclved. But t1us caopeutlon. wlnch e XJSts m any
oranlN<i ecllectwe p~, \lI only v_o .. <ftr.ectIDn by th.. soc:iaI
d.. t~tion on wlnch it is buood. Under Clpttilism. tIus 15 th.. subJ'!!ct1on
of the work colltlVllWS to .. UIlOnn process of ."a/onzaholl tlw.t
produc. UId re produc. tM ~ r..u.tlo n o f product1on. This la tt er IS
lbe reore . dulecttc.&1 re latio n . On tM O"" b.md, lbe pn.n<.'lple compo M nt
o f the re lation , C p1t,J. ~ rom labour by wy o f ya.1ol"lL1tlon: lb e
inhen! . ntgoell. m bto~n Ul8 lWO iJ COl>C<!ptu.a.li:..d "" lh e rte of
surp!us-v,Jue . On the !ler h.lnd . lh e S9C0ncWy co mpo nent. labour
poooer. iJ incorporl e<! inlO COpll; 15 w.ge--labour m <'<!rtiltn d..finite
labour pl OC I'U' . N<:h ol whieh iJ dw~enzed by prn,cu1ar lechni ca.1
COIllpoJltiOll 01 COpll;. i.e . camhtn.otion of m<W>J of labour d....gnood for
specifi c UHJ IJld labOOJr-poooer lb.ol sellI lh ese in mollOn . f or lhe
neocl;us,c; K'ObOIlUJtJ, onl y lhis sec<>n<Ury campan""l ..xistJ, IJld IJ
refened lO IJ 'tedmolOlY'. Tbe probl<tlll lhen iJ lo d..fine lbe econODlle
cl egoneJ of mcame on lbe biJtJ of lbe heler<>g..neous lechnica.1
OOlIlhtn.ol1ObJ lb.ol lTe empu"ic;)ly o1>Hrnble. Tbe c..mbndg.. school b.ls
demotlJlTled lb.ol lhe attempt lO do JO l'UlIJ inlo lb.. obs\de of lbe
JIndud of m.uuremenl, lJl obstde tho.llJ lIllIlloybl.. 15 long 15 lhe
malhemiltlc.&1 1pIC't of meuuremenl d"'llLll to lb.. obj<Oct under
in veJlt tion b.ls not been defined t lhe Jlm. ~oJ c.an dd tho.l!bis d..tect
iJ itself the result o f In ideologiCli refusal, I r...fusal to Idmowloodg... th...
>CiI1n,ture o fCl pitll.
MuxiJt I nalrN has identified the .paC<! of mearur..men t IJ th...
homogeneoUl field o f vale. In this field, the quantiti... that are melJurable
and have .ignifieanC't are ndu.ively those that ha..e bee n made the o bject
15 I 71
orgollie compo.ilioll 01 cop ilo /. For any production pr oceso , lh ... org anie
composi lion of capilal iJ lbe awegale expression of lb... l<>chmeal
compoJllion reduced lO Ibstract labour_ttme. This ""Pr'>SSlon ha. a
m...ning bec:ause aD lhe elemenlJ enleriog inlo il ar ... commod!b..... Tb...
value of lhoM cammOChl.es lb.ol lTe mearlS and objects of labour IJ I:nown
IJ roMI,M I COpilO/. Tb_ commodin es form one ...ctIon of th... tot; "" of
C'OU'UllOd1beJ, d1Jtmguubed by lhe f.oet tho.t lbey IN! do!lStrOyood during lhe
pt'<XflI of C'OU'UllOd1ty produetlon. M this product1on IJ a pl'<>C<l55 of
valonu!:lOn, and ..alonu!:lOn IJ lbe form uun by lb... chVlSlOD oflabour
undet eapltalmn, Nc:h C'OU'UllOd1ty owner must be ab'" to pur<:h.a~ from
unong the lllIJI o f oommocht>es lb cu=latlo n th-e miMbl of production
tb..l.t e n,ble him to re pNt hiJ productlve iClIVlty . This IJ why constant
eaplt;J IJ va.1ue tr allJlll.ln ed to !he va.1ue o f lb.. produet in lb... course of
productioD . lt ilI tr anmuned in lUll _hen lb.. means o f product1on IS
ent>rely OOllJUmed alld lhus chJapp8M5 15 v;u.... This IJ b=a1lR lb e
~ chV1Jion ollabOOJr ilI . _ le PfOC"'S5 of y;onzabOll and r....hubon of
vlllue lb.ol ilI par!:I!JOIle<! mIo d1Jtmct oommod!ti.... As. this socW prtX'ES '
COlItlll\l8l, v;\le iJ destrayad by productly... OOllJUIIlpbOll. b\lt ,t
Jlmultaneously rNppeaT'J in chfferenl sector of lb ... socW prO<:'<I55 by lb ...
prod\letiOll of rommodlll81 d....gned lO r"Piace tJms" =ood . M
evoerythmg iJ homog~eoIIJ m lhe 6eld of Y;\le, lb ... fuct tbat prod\lctly...
actl Vlty tu.. plac:e m det erminale oonchl1ObJ of prod\lc!:lon tbat hoy... lo N
reproduce<! m oonfomuly Wllh lhe la_ of y;\le J>T"S"nts .ts..lf ... II J>l'OC""5
of tnuJIllinion of v;ue which iJ .added lo lbe n.,. cre.obon of Y;\I... by
~ labour-power,
~oJe are now in I poJItion to ve this 1Jlll1)'5IJ IIformal """PN5Slon . Le! U5
C'OtIJId." sociIl prcducticn ... an OVet" pl'<>C<l55 of y;onzation. ~oJ... I:now
thot this proc:eJ:l is the cr....ricn of II totahb'lnct labour VA oyer IIe<rrtain
giv...n penod . Lec UI ce ll e rhe consto nt eapital which IJ th.. valu...
crystallized in those m....ns o f production that tal<.. part in th... produclion
procesa and are ecnsumed in it in the cout"S<> of th i. p"'riod. The o .....rall
valoriution isexpreued as:
"
I 71
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
e + VA = VE, or alternative ly
COn.ta n\
cap it a l
SV
~ ari8 b l~
'" '1'lu;o-
csp i. a l
v a Jue
VE
tOC~ ) v ~ lue
lh~
of
pmduct
The struc ture " f th e soc ial pr oduct ion pr ecess is expre ssed by th e
following value relations:
~
sv
- -v-
rate of .urplus- value
k
k + l + ~
SV
C+ V
,1, +1
-- .-~ .
<1 1-q)
-l + eq
VE C + V(l + .)
labour productivity invol ves a continuous series off eedbacks fro m the set
of exchange equivalence classes onto itself. It defines an irreversible
tem po ral tran sform ati on . It is possible for th eory to co nceive thi s real
movem ent , rather th an simply virtual displaceme nts around a genera l
equilibrium, because th e va lue space is always a measurable homogeneous
space. The tran sform at ion of equiva lence relations in no way puts in
.
rate of retur n on
~ a p i l al
occurs. But throu gh gene ra l co mmod ity circ ulation thi s tran sform ati on
Al! th ese relat ion ships are defined in th e hom ogen eou s "pace of va lue, and
" ther words th e fact th a! labour-po wer is incorpo rat ed in th e tot al capital
as an ingred ient of va lorization according to th e struc ture expr essed by th e
va lue co mpo sition of capital.
overall pr od uction of surplus-va lue and can only be measured at thi s level.
bound
Labour
co mmod ities and forms th e dep artm ent pr od ucing mean s of co nsumption
together
by
th e
genera l
co mmod ity
circ ulation .
~'Ie
may say th at
17 I 71
18 I 71
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-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
exp ansion of free tim e and an increase in th e surplus co mmod ity pr od uct o
a simulta neous fall in t. and a rise in t,.. The return on labour -po wer thus
increases very co nsiderably , and with it th e mass of surplus-va lue. But
u.
are
not
co mpatible ,
since
th ey
are
shall see that thi s th eoreti cal mod el makes it possible to read th e
released
is
transform ed
int o
surplus
labou r-time .
This
19 I 71
variables by th e indices 1,
~,
~'Ie
shall sta rt by
~'Ie
shall co nsider a
20 I 71
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-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
and 3 are
only overall effect co nsists in red ucing C, in relation to G,. The rate of
e,
development of
Department I , moreover , is also restr ained by th e mar ket de mand for thi s
de partment. The difliculties encounte re d in realizing th e value of th e new
co mmod ities bra ke th e fall in th eir unit value. The outco me is th at , apart
from very spec ific histor ical periods when capitalist pr od uction is rapid ly
e,
e, -
e,
~'E
_I ..-
, C,. VA,
0,- -
- ,
q , + f (l -q, )
0,
th en certainly q, < q" but nevertheless q, > q,. In thi s case z dec reases. It
<,- C,SV,
+ V, -
"
. ,(l - q, )
k.,+l - l+ q,',
The develop ment of z" clea rly enough, can only be analytically known if
1 is
mathemat ical expressions for thi s funct ion . The pr oblem is rather to
th e functi on
~'Ie
21 1 71
22 I 7 1
-------<O~--------------------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
barrier, which is always lat ent , can only be raised if capitalist p roduction
lhi s gives us a th eoreti cal basis fur characterizing th e hist orical epoch th a!
~'Iorld ~'Iar
deriving from incr eased labour prod uctivity . These are superimposed on
th e gro wth in th e orga nic composition of capital which is at th e roo t of th e
gains in producti vit y of per iod t + 1. The relationship we have established
e,
(a) The temp oral dy namic ofcapital accu mula tio n as a wh ole. In order to
study accumulation as an on-going process, we need to add a further
hypothesis to th e results already established. This co ncern s th e division of
surplus-va lue int o a po rtion a SV which is accumulated and a po rtia n (1 -
q, .~l . ~,)
V, -
q"" , -
q,.,
q. ,
' ) .( I ~ q' ,1I
q" , + f
ftq.,
l + ~, + \ .
1 + ~,
h, (/,),
~'Ihen
th e co nditions of
producti on do not change ,f, = 1, and we th en get q3l+< = q" +,, since th er e is
pr esent level of abs traction, but it is not satisfacto ry as it sta nds. ~'Ihile it is
d ear enough that surplus-va lue is indeed divided in th e manner just
value bea rs on th e division int o fracti on s of the capitalist dass itself. It has
23 I 7 1
24 I 7 1
-----(o~-------------------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
(b) Rot e 01groU' th 01capital in value terms. The rat e of capital furmation
ev idently for ms par! " f th e tem po ral pattern of accumulation, once th e
hypothesis co ncern ing th e distr ibution of surplus-va lue is int roduced . Le!
us call 9',1 th e rate " f gro wth of capital in va lue terms be tween pe riod s t
and t + 1 . This is defined in th e fullowing way :
R', / A
1 +1/" , .
k, + 1+ 0<",
" , +
, and x".,
k ,- k, . , + 0,,",
k,., + 1
Now, 1;. , is genera lly greate r th an 1;. From th e relationship be tween 1; and
h C+ AV
_
V , ...,tht> C _ C,. , _ C" aml J\ V _V, . , _V,.
e-, +
k, . , _ ~, _ ~
k,
q,
_l - q,
'
1 - q",
(1
- al
S ~',.
~C +
t.V.
~'Ie
in q,. ~'Ie can th er efore co nd ude th at apa rt from certain tran sient ph ases in
V,
(}., ' ~,
a, ' . ~
C
- \ - 4.
., +V, ,- _. _,+
~,'
accumulation.
~'Ie
capital should remain co nstan! over tim e . The pro file of capitalist gro wth is
viab le rate of return on capital and set capital for mation in mot ion again.
In th e per specti ve of th e law of accumulation as for mulated up till now,
relative ly balanced gro wth, as a movin g av erage, for hist orical ph ases
where th e soc ial co nditions of pr od uction are tran sform ed in a way th at
k,1"
~'I e
have
th en :
...V
V, "
11"' V V, - I .
imm ediat ely from th e saving on livin g labour . This ten den cy cannot be
fully co mpe nsated by th e possibilities of expa nsion ope ned by increases in
~~V~'~'j',;;;::(~C:'~':':.~v:,:.:",--.
C,. , + V, ,,
1+1/" , -
'v
e" ,
(C, + ~',)
k, + 1
k,. , + 1
surplus-va lue.
(3) The rate of gro wth in tot al capital for ms an up per limit on th e
exte nsion of th e wage-earn ing dass.
25 I 7 1
26 I 7 1
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
These few met hod ological indicat ion s are int ended to avoid any
7 9 0. )
States
arises from th eir social determination . ~'Ie saw that th eir transform ati on
involved two different aspec ts: th e transform at ion of th e labou r pr ecess
and its co nditio ns, and th e transform ati on of th e co nditio ns of existe nce of
th e wage-earn ing dass. These two aspec ts are not br ou ght int o harmony by
chapter , we int roduced th e co ncepts needed for an overall pers pec tive on
its hist orical movement . These will now guide our investi gati on of 'stylized
justified . Resear ch of thi s kind doos not sta rt from raw fact s, bu t rather
tot alit y of soc ial relations at any given tim e , and it is th eir study th at forms
scientific pr eced ure , which can be int er pret ed as a passage from the
abstract to th e co ncrete . This is no royal road where th e most abstract
co ncepts magically co mmand th e movemen t of seciety. There is rather a
two-way pr ecess mar ked by frequ ent mishaps, often uncertain in its
hom ogeneous and separa te d by dates seen as marking events th at indu ced
irrever sible changes. Such a daim would be ridiculous co ming from a non-
hist orian . It co uld only lead , moreover , to unend ing co ntro versies amo ng
27 I 7 1
spec ialists lacking th eoreti cal criteria . History as actually lived is infinit ely
pr olific and het ero geneou s. Historians have developed a method of
scientifically investi gati ng thi s reality , but in no way any overall pr incipIes
28 I 7 1
------<O~-------------------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
final goals " f human societies. There can be littl e da ubt th a! a vision of such
accumulation.
a kind is contained in th e work " f Marx , fur whom capitalism inevit ably
doos no! keep fait h with lhi s philosophic visio no It simply accepts tha! th e
aspec t of surplus-va lue , th at absolute and relative surplus-va lue were two
alte rnative mod aliti es, forms th at co uld be subs tituted one for th e other in
th e pr oduction of a soc ial surplus. This is in no way th e case . The
distinction between th ese two forms of surplus-va lue denotes an
soc ial reg ulation, it is itself beyon d any 'law' . It can neither be assigned a
pr actices.
over th e means of pr oducing th eir conditions of existe nce. Ind ivid uals are
transform ed int o wage-earn ers, i.e. th ey are made indiffer ent and
engend ered by social separa tion , an abs traction which alone makes it
is qualita tively defined , access to which derives from particular pr eced ures
th at are ritualized and codified by craft organizations. Access to wage-
or what must happen in this creation , but rather to show how un der
wage relation : th ey are social pr actices that are partially co ntractual and
surplus-va lue. In Cha pte rs ~ and 3 we shall be study ing th e hist orical
evolution of th ese nor ms and th eir organization int o a wage sys te m. For th e
29 I 71
30 I 7 1
- - ----(O r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
~'Iith
c1assijicato ry and identiji catory logic, in other words abs tract institution al
codes fur social pos itions , partakes of th e very essence of capitalist soc ial
relations. It is th e pr incipIe of th e sys te matic institu tionalization of society.
It is radically opposed to th e unification of so man y tradition al societies by
way of myth, custom, and a tight network of interpersonal obligations, by a
solida rity of co mmunity and neighbou rhood . It is because capitalism doos
not simply utili ze in its pr od uction workers who still co ntinue to live
capitalist freedom to hire and fire ; and th e regulation of legitim ate tradeuni on practi ces.
- ~'Iith regard to th e determination of wages: genera l procedures fur
negoti ation of th e basic hourly wage ; regulation of its applicatio n; and th e
job-cr eation or retr aining pro grammes; sta nda rdization of risks of
fullow in th e sec ond sec tion of thi s cha pte r. ~'Ie shall atte mpt to
characterize two regimes of accumulation which we call th e predominantly
th ese are co ncepts req uired fur th e develop ment of a th eory of social
spec trum of des ired differentiations th at are pu rely quant itatit'e : output
norm s fur th e work of spec ific collectives as divided up int o br anches of
pr od uction , sys te ms of gra ding fur skill and wage hier ar chies, rates of
relation that make it possible to use sta tistical tool s in th e socio-econo mic
analysis of capitalism oYet such analyses do not yield th e sec re t of its social
31 1 7 1
labour ; th e traditi on al way of life may persist or be des troyed , but it is not
radically recomposed by th e logic of utilitari an functi on alism . Only
agric ulture is affected , by th e furmation of th e agricultura l-foodstuffs
co mplex o The division of society effected by dassificatory and
identificator y logic operates on working tim e in pr oduction in th e strict
sense. Its materi al support is mechani zati on . The genera l movement of
accumulation that fullows from it is th e build-up of indu st ry in success ive
32 I 7 1
- - ----(O r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
recurren! obstacles.
not just arise from thin airo They de rive histor ically from th e formation of
th e wage-earn ing dass by the gra dual disso lutio n or des truction of
(a) The fr ont ier prin cipIe as a sp ecijic mode 01capitalist pen etra tion . All
forms of pr ecapitalist pr od uction have agriculture as th eir pr oductive
base. The fundamental econo mic co ndition for indu st rial capitalism to
develop is th e formation of a gro wing agric ultura l surplus pr oduct and its
realization in co mmod ity form o In th e United Sta tes thi s co ndition was
eno rmously favoured by th e existe nce of an imm ense reserve of
un ap pro priat ed agricultura l land. Yet it was made a reality ab ove all by th e
po litica l origins of th e American nation , which united petty prod ucers with
th e co mmercial and financial bourgeoisie in a co mmon struggle against
English colonial rule . This struggle, whose aim was freedom of ente rprise,
left a permanent mar k on th e ideological repr esentations of American
social relations and create d po litical institut ion s gove rned by th ose genera l
pr incipIes th at are th e legal formalization of relations of co mmod ity
exc hange.
direct analysis of th ese pr ocesses, mod els of gro wth are simply formal
exe rc ises in which techni cal pro gress has no co ncrete significance, soc ial
demand plays no ro le, and time itself has nothing in co mmon with th e
with initi ati ve , as po litical subjec ts electing th eir repr esentatives, and as
cultural subjec ts giving and receiving opinions. All social activities were
Prodnct ion
33 I 71
34 I 71
----~o~------------------
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
co nceived as exc hange relat ion ships form ed and un furm ed by th e will of
estate . Such spec ulatio n was fuelled by any major change in econo mic
pos itivism bea ring within it econo mic utilitari anism and pr agmati sm , al th e
other an idealism which in th e Unite d Sta tes took an essentially religiou s
war, th e per iod 1846- 48 saw th e incorpo rati on of Califurn ia into th e USA
and th e simulta neo us discovery of gold th er e . These events unl eashed an
form oThis representat ion of soc iety was ab le to impo se itself so uni forrnl y
in th e USA because it was no! mer ely a sta lio ideology , bu! was linked to th e
~'Iith
th e end of th e Mexican-American
th eir econo mic co mpetition did no! mer ely repr od uce a stable social
a rder , it actually created new social relations. The frontier pr incipIe was
shock frontier society. Land prices rose rapidly , and with th em th e sums
paid in settle ment of inh eritances. The more land prices increased , th e
more mon et ar y resour ces were needed by new would-be pr od ucers or old
producer s seeking to extend th eir holdin gs or move int o regions where th e
surplus pr od uct had more and more to take co mmod ity furm and to
capitalism absorbed int ellectuals or iginating from all social stra ta;
bourgeois representations of th e world were co nstructed witho ut
transpo rt o
These were th e ideal econo mic co nditions fur capitalism to take hold in
resistance ; th e juridical pr incip Ies of th e sta te tock on a sac red and ete rnal
character . Any questioning of free ente rpr ise was per ceived as a threat to
net work, was directed by th e financial po wers of th e East . The spea rhead of
most producti ve land lent extraordinary impo rt ance to spec ulation in real
35 I 71
railway and mining co mpanies, which were above all else capitalist
36 I 71
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-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
side of th eir lines. The railway companies were financed by vas! share
mer chants and bankers. This led to th e rapid spread of mort gages and
issues and sta te loans. The same ente rprise th a! owned th e railway thus
increased indebt edn ess because mort gage loans had to be repaid . By th e
typically also carne to own al! natural resources on th e soil gra nte d il .
These lands, obtained gra tis and now mon opoli zed , were now increased in
value by th e railway line , whose co nstruction cost th e co mpany's initi al
pro moters nothing. They were subse quently sold off in smal! plols al very
high pri ces, oc alternatively leased .
In th ose regions where land was already apportioned, th e co mpanies
pro vided its preconditi on was in full development , and th e mon opoli zati on
of mining resour ces was also well un der way . The Civil ~'Iar was at once to
accelera te and to modi fy th e process qualitatively .
The American Civil ~'I ar was th e final act of th e struggle against colonial
domination . This is why it is legitim at e to see it as th e origin of th e mod ern
railway would be dive rted elsewhere if local authorities did not gra nt th em
to its tot al int egrati on int o an English- dominat ed int ernat ion al trade . It
th e land th ey wanted on th eir own terms. The inh abit ants of th ese towns
indu strial gro wth in England after 1849, with its strong de mand fur
agric ultura l raw mat eri als, indudin g co tton , incited th e slave owners to
expand th eir ter rit ory . Hence slavery gained new fuotholds in th e lands
other financier s involved in mon opoli zing land , also had at th eir disposal
th e tru st y weapo n of water co ntrol. It was enough to seize th e watersheds
and pr evented th e exploita tion of imm ense mining resour ces. The
particularly pro fitable land , or land with a stra tegic impo rt ance , and to
hold th e rest to ransom . The western sta tes pa ssed very flexi ble legislat ion
th e textile indu stry and other indu st ries using sub-tropical raw mat eri als,
whole , fur th e pilot indu st ries of th e econo mic division of labour were
war elfort was thus simulta neo usly th e direct penetr ation of capitalism to
int ensified co mpetition to sell th eir agricultura l pr od uct oLocal co mmod ity
circulation rapid ly became insuflicient . The mechanism by which petty
th e entire ter rit ory of th e Union , th e establishment of tariff pro tection , and
co mmod ity pr od uction was sub ordinated to capitalism was now d inched
by severa l processes th at supplemented th e direct mon opoli zat ion of th e
land which we have just outlined . First1y th e need to expand th e circ ulation
sys tem to th e free lands of th e ~'Iest, and th e bloc king of th e sale of pub lic
land by a Congress dominated by th e slave owners ' repr esentatives. Finally ,
th ese fier cely individu alisti c petty producer s were also very strongly
discr iminator y tari ffs, an additional arm in th eir stra tegy of expansiono
Subsequent1y th e gro wth of taxes and rents, and th e need to take out loans
to finance th eir own subjugatio n to th e co mpanies as th e pr ice of land
purchase escalated , furced th e small producer s int o deb t vis-a-vis
37 I 71
himself.
The Civil ~'Iar gave a vigoro us imp etus to th e development of th e furces
38 I 71
----~o~------------------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
of prod uction in th e Unite d Sta tes. Econ omi c exchange between North and
South was disrupted , and imports from England red uced . The war elfor! in
th e North mobilized al! indu st rial resources and pro moted accumulation in
m utes. There was also major milit ar y demand fur th e artides of th e textile
indu st ry and fur food pr od ucts, while arrny recr uitment led to a great
sca rcity ofl abo ur-power . This circumsta nce favoured a very rapid advance
ofcapitalist method s of prod uction in th e department pr od ucing co nsumer
pr oduction ,
accumulation still pro gresses only in fits and sta rts. The regime of
imm ediat e pos t-war period saw expansion co ntinue at a rapid rate ,
heavy indu st ry sec tion by sec tion. The resultant jerkiness is a funct ion of
lasted until 1897 , did it bec ome evident th at th e artic ulation of mod es of
pr od uction in th e soc ial furmation had been profu und ly changed . Petty
without
reshaping
th e
mod e
of co nsumption ,
~'Ie
develop ment mu ch earlier and mor e th or oughly in the United Sta tes than
in th e major Euro pean capitalist nati on s. This int er act ion by way of
capitalist development has arrived. This stage bea rs with it quite new furms
foods tuffs reinfur ced th e radical separa tion between town and co untry
req uired fur th e exte nsion of co mmod ity circulation over a vas t econo mic
exc hange, and mod ifies th e mon et ar y sys te m. The pr ecise operation of th e
39 I 71
40 I 71
----~o~------------------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
Department
n , as
departments of pr od uction .
( ~) The sta ndpoint of th e prod uctive furces - in other words, th e
change sho uld oceur together . Capita lism can implant itself fur a lon g
histor ieal period witho ut destro ying traditi onal ways of life , indeed eve n
transfurm ati on s of the labou r pr ocess and th e hom ogeni zati on of the mod e
~'Ie
env iro nment in which it is still inserted . For th e latter makes it possible to
pay very low wages and impose very lon g wor king hour s. In thi s period ,
(3) The sta ndpoint of wage labour - in other words, th e prod uction of
tradit ion al social env iro nment is only acco mplished by th e develop ment of
enab le th e wage-earn ing dass to purchase all th e co nditions of its existe nce
existe nce. The mod e of life of th e wage-earn ing dass th en suffers a deep
by th e do mina tio n 01commodity re/a tio ns over non-comm odity re/a tio ns.
41 1 71
42 I 7 1
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-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
any pro letarian ideology . Conducted on a stric tly econo mic bas is, th ese
struggles gave a po werful impetus to th e transfurm ati on of working-d ass
century .
indu strial centres had to struggle against co nditions ofli fe entire ly imposed
by capitalism , in towns where no pr evious urban co mmunity had eve r
and th e very rapid disso lutio n of tradit ion al ways ofli fe in th e Rep ublic .
fact ory , it typically belonged to th e fact ory owners. The latter rented out
th ese dwellings at pro hibitive rents, and if dismissed , th e workers lost th eir
dass housing to th e fact ories bega n to imp ede freedom of indu st rial
location and tim e-savin g co ncentratio n of int er connect ed pr od uction
repr esentation fur all social gro ups in th e United Sta tes. This aspira tio n was
activities in single sites. There was also an acute need fur serv ices in th e
all th e more intense in th at th ese immi grants carne to a lar ge exte nt from
new indu st rial towns: sales outlets and ur ban transpo rt , impro vement of
districts.
Towards ' 90 0 , wor king-d ass struggles fur decent housing linked up
with th e po litical campaign of th e new bourgeois stra ta prod uced by th e
life , and monetary gain as th e mark of social success and th e spur to labour
discipline . But th ey also encounte re d extre mely har sh co nditions of
econo mic exploita tio n which materi ally negated th e pers pec tives offered
th em by po litical and religious liber alism o The resultant co ntradiction is
fundamental fur an un der st andin g of th e spec ific furms and objectives
ass umed by th e American labour movement . This movement too k root in a
co untry where po litica l democracy was far mor e advanced th en any where
necessitated building operations on a very large sca le. Four major waves of
43 I 71
44 I 71
----~o~------------------
~'Iorld
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
~'Iars,
th e ' 920S and th e enlire period after th e Second ~'Iorld ~'Iar saw a strong
demand fur business oflices due to th e gro wth in bureaucratic per sonnel
caused by the increasingly complex administra tive structure of big firms and in th e pos t-war period , th e gigantic expansion of th e Feder al
govern ment.
The exte nsion of cap italist pr oducti on of pri vat e co nsumer goods alsa
pose d other pro blems. The adva nce of th e economic division of labour in
lhis field certainly depended on th e transfurm ation of the housing situation
and on th e pro vision of ur ban infrast ru ctures. But th er e were more direct
co nstraints on it co nnected with th e product ion of surplus-va lue. The
the
co mmod ities resulting from a mass pr oducti on process and designed far
pur chase by individu als. Their incorpo rati on int o th e norm of working-
These co mmod ities can only farm part of th e co nsumption norm if th eir
unit exc hange value is on th e dedine and already suflicient1y low. The
to ena ble real wages to rise . Accumulation can thus pro gress at a rapid
th ose of th e sta nda rdized labour process o f mass product ion . For thi s to be
society; all social relations bec ome co mmod ity relations. The limit s to thi s
process of co ntradictions, with success ive advances and bloc kages. The
int ermediat e wage-earn ing stra ta (the famou s American middle dass int o
autonomous activities of th e serv ice, co mmerc ial and financial sec to rs.
These social funct ion s are th e basis far th e increase in th ose salaried social
categories who are paid in part from th e appropriation of centralized
45 I 71
~'Iorld ~Iars .
These milit ar y
4 6 I 71
----~o~------------------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
gro wing incom es int o sav ings, and herree int o po tential expe nd itu re fur
sta tistieal indieat ors th at are derived from our fundamental co neepts and
so able to repr esent th eir development. ~'Ie know th at th e rate of surplus-
indieat or? It should be borne in min d th at we are not see king to measure
th e absolute magnit ude of thi s variable , bu t simply its lon g-run trend .
To co ntinue with th e notation used in th e pr eviou s see tion , when we
investi gat ed th e formation of tot al ineom e and its division int o wages and
pro fits, let us take two periods separa te d in tim e whieh we will de note by
limit s to th e sav ing of living labour and th e exte nsion of surplus labour in
S~m
. V , where S is th e sum of
Ca p it a l
~'Ie
e ) . This
(S,Vi',)
(S.jVP. (
,_._,_V_,_lm
_ , _V_A_,) _ (_m_,I_m_"
(m . V.lln. VA . ) {m.JmJ
e is
47 I 7 1
48 I 71
-------(o~------------------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
rn.
VP,/VA ,
~'Ie
is the index of the net monetar y value added per hour of produ ctive
labour . Bu! al a constan! rate of surplus-va lue, th e soc ial product ivity of
labour is itself co nstant , as we have seen in study ing relative surplus-va lue.
Le! us th en co nsider th e fullowing sta tistical indices:
(a) The ev oluti on 01the real social w age costo The evolution of th e social
wage cost and its sta tistical components, ave rage hourly real wages and net
value added per man-hour in real terms, is given by Diagra m I for th e
s'"
1':
' 97 4. Moving bac kward, th e evo lution of value added per man-hour from
1850 can be sketc hed in from estimates made by Kendri ck; th ou gh th e two
kinds of calculation do not coincide.4Nevertheless, cutting th e evolution of
.,
1':.
c:..
S:. ,1 ~J
net value added per man-hour at th e points where th e gra ph shows a break,
~;'
PJ.
~'Iith
averaz e a n n ual
fr om 1 85 0 l o 1 8 8 9
fr om 1 8 8 9 l o ' 9 0 0
~. 5"
fr om ' 9 0 0 l o 1 91 8
1 .0 "
~. 5"
fr om ' 9 4 7 l o 1 95 8
3. 0"
fr om 1 95 8 l o 1 9 6 6
3.~"
fr om 1 9 6 6 l o ' 9 74
1 .6 ..
(S,/VP,)
(S"i VPJ -
Pi .
pI
-Si . _ C<
~J
o,,
. 1';.
PJ
~'Iith
49 I 71
r a t e of z r owt h
~'Iorld ~'Iar ,
1 .0 "
and after, gave rise to maja r disturbances with causes spec ifically linked to
th e war econo my and th e pro blem of reconversion. The per iod 1889 to
' 90 0 saw a temporar y accelera tion due to th e creation of th e foods tuffs
complex , which transform ed product ion methods in agriculture and in
particular swiftly expanded th e circulation space of its commod ities.
Setting th ese peri ods aside, th e essential brea k in th e pace of development
is located at th e end of th e First
~'Iorld ~Iar .
50 I 71
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-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
Diagra m
1.
Real hourly wages, value added per man-hour , and real social
.I
L .................. """. }
'
.............
~
.... -- M _
~--.
..I . . .. _ .
Englan d as his bas is. His co mparison is based on oflicial inqui ries int o
int ernat ional differe nces in co st of living. These were des igned to find out
what percentage more or less was needed in th e mon ey of a particu lar
.._''''''' -
1/ ,/
-: ..
"
!, ,
..
V
.- - ,
" ,"
S O" ",. .,
'v
('1;'"
- - - -
....
eq ual to 10 0 over th e period 1890 - 98. For thi s period , th er efure , what we
get is strictly th e relation be tween the level of th e indicat ors fur eac h
"
results , co mbining struc tura l discre pa ncies in th e va lue of labour -po wer
co untry , at th e oflicial exc ha nge rate , to purchase th e same bas ket of bas ic
artides fur th e repr od uction ofl abo ur-power which in Englan d co st El . The
th em selves , which were stable over this pe riod, lead to the de finition of
av erage coe flicients by which th e specific indices fur eac h co untry have to
1// '
has been und ertaken by E.H. Phelp s Bro wn' fur th e pe riod 1890 - 99, taking
The ten den cies in th e ev olution " f th e real soc ial wage co st , movin g
inver sely to relative surplus-va lue, were as fullows:
very rapid inerease during th e two
~'Iorld ~'Iars ,
ru n significance;
co nstan! between ' 9 0 and ' 9' 7 ;
mod er at e dec rease in th e int er -war yea rs (with sharp fluctuat ion s during
ln dex of a,erag e
added p er
pro<1ucb,e
ln dex ofr< al
lLorlee""
. 0clallLag e <o.t
0 90
Ger many
0 59
0 .66
Sw ed en
0 .69
0 76
0 .8 7
Un it ed stat e.
1.0 8
1 5 7
0 .6 8
En z land
1.0 0
1.0 0
1.0 0
* It " ..
n o' po",'l. fr om '1, . 01 '1;, p,,;o. ' o ..,., 1;, 1 "o;km, 1 0u," ;n . ll ' 1 .
The United Sta tes already appears as th e soc ial fur mation with by far th e
51 1 7 1
52 I 7 1
-------<O~------------------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
'9~a
'9~9
1~%
and tr ansfurms the so cial co nsumption norm . The tendency fur real wages
incom es received in th e for m a f indu strial prafit , inter est and rent
relative surplus-va lue. Once th e fal! in th e real social wage cos! slows clown,
and
fram
Le! us now l""ate lhi s result in th e co ntext of the tem po ral evolutio n of
real social wage costs in th e Unite d Sta tes, so as to test th e law of capital
th a se wha suffered th e full blast a f th e rad ical tran sform atian a f th e laba ur
be tween
Sta tes, summed up above, seems to us a legitim ate founda tion fur th e
hypo thesis th at th e ten dency ta decline a bserved in th e sacial wage cast a n
th e marraw a f th e First
~'Iarld ~'Iar,
'9~a
and
1 9 ~ 9) .
~%
4a and 45%a f all ha useha lds remained a utside th e mar ket for all cansumer
attenda nt on th e inst allat ian a f mass prod uctia n methads ran strictly
multiplies inter -indu strial co mmadity relatia ns; it creates la ng eca no mic
chains uniting the twa dep artm ents a f pr oductian , with th e result th at
19~6,
Depa rtme nt U
th er e was
~'Iarld ~'Iar
in labaur
int egrated machine sys tems and a subs ta ntial increase in applied energy.
But th e dispraportia n be tween expa nsia n in Department U
and
'9~9
lncr< au/rom
D<cr< au/rom
and
pr acesses
th e
These rigid and br uta l ba rriers were reached because th e warking class was
still large ly exclude d fra m th ese mar kets and th e link be tween method s a f
mass pr aductia n and methads a f mass co mmerc ializatia n was still unable
Depressia n, whase caurse we sha ll ana lyse in a ur final chapter, was a maja r
crisis a f accumulatia n because th e tran sform atian a f th e labaur pr acess
~'Iar,
carried a ut by th e Raosevelt administra tia n's In tern al Revenue Serv ice ,'
th e sha re a f dispo sable incom e apprapriated by th e ta p 1% a f incom e
53 I 71
class. This requ ired far -reachin g changes in wage for matia n and wark
54 I 71
-------<O~------------------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
other compo nents of unit value added, without fur all th at preventing a
capital.
Diagra m
~.
,....
'"
,ro
,~
V+--++-H
,ro
195 8 base of 10 0 fur th e costs in current do llars per unit of value added, in
order to dete rmine th e structura l variation of th e cost of product ion and
th e unit mar gin o Here we can observe th e modificat ion in th e value
co mposition of th e average soc ial product th at is an inevit able part of th e
""
'00
.
ro
product o ~'Ie may also not e how spec tac ularly relative surplus-va lue
amo rtization per unit pr od uced declined , thus releasing a very rapidly
gro wing profit per unit produced fur th e purposes of accumulation. In
,.-
,
,
ff
r#
ljU8 19.'00
,~,
1~7 0
costs. This break gave rise to a very severe co mpression of th e unit wage
55 I 7 1
56 I 7 1
--------<O~------------------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
accumulation.
I
1'rDdu<.. .-.;.
'
I"'..."..,. .. """" .
density of th eir exc ha nge relations as cha nnels fur th e lran smission of loc al
ten den cy to un even develop me nt of Department I was respo nsible for th e
approxima te ly regular gro wth of th e soc ial pr oduct in th e greate r part of
pi
th e pos t-war yea rs, by co ntrast with th e jerky accumulation cha racte ristic
Diagrams 3 and 4 illust rat e th e expa nsion of th e two depa rtme nts. The
pe riod ' 947 - 61 was on th e whole one of balance d and int en sive
accumulation. The two depa rtme nts expa nde d at th e same average pace
(fro m an index of 7 0 in ' 947 to one of 110 in 1961), th e co ntractions of
' 949, ' 954 and 195 8 co rrecting dispro portions in th e int ernal ev olution of
eac h dep artment . This was a period of slow average dedine in real soc ial
. ... ..
.-..'.
'O'
'.
/'
tran sform ati ons of th e pr od uctive forces. This partial neutr alization of th e
.. .... .........
"'.
,~
,~
1910 1972
wage costs. The watershed yea rs of 195 8- 61 saw an accelera tion in th e fall
in soc ial wage co sts pr oc eed ing from a sudde n change in th e forms of dass
57 I 7 1
58 I 7 1
-------<O~------------------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
I
I
I
.... -,-. - "n'''''''''''.... componon" .,. rel..... p""'u<"
--_. -- Clol.".... 1_.. .... ... funo'.'"ii;x ..,-: ..,...
,
.
<1
..
. .. 'j:;;f/
. , ..
'O'
'\.
!'Vr""'"
... '
. -...::,.--"
",
,"
(b) Trends of capital fo rma tion. One essential feature of relative surplusvalue is th e incorpo rati on ofl abo ur-power in th e pr oduction pr ocess as an
element of capital subjec t to th e valorization of th e means of pr od uction .
This is why th e furmation of fixed capital ind icates a reinfur cement in th e
mat eri al base of th e po wer th at th e capitalist dass exe rcises over soc iety.
The net accumulation of fixed capital can be see n from Diagra m S. which
shows th e long-r un trend of th e net stoc k of fixed capital. The period ization
th at emerged in our investi gat ion of relative surplus-va lue, via th e
indicat or of real social wage costs, dearly re-emerges on thi s gra ph.
may leave aside th e tw"
~'Iorld ~'Iars ,
~'Ie
century up to ' 9' 5, a period which we saw was do minated by exte nsive
accumulation.
(2) A rapid gro wth from ' 92' to ' 929- 30, fullowed by a massive
questio ns about th e trends " f th e las! ten yea rs. According to " ur ana lyses
so far , lhi s per iod has bee n a ne of a crisis in the regime 01 int enslt'
accumulation. It s originality by comparison with earlier historical
59 I 7 1
60 I 7 1
------<O~------------------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
.. .,
~"" _r"",,
ro .... up'..1"'O< ~
capital.
""".._,,.1
'f'
tp j\.V
law of value, th e met amorphosis of the value of fixed capital int o th e value
of pr od uced co mmod ities takes place over th e tot al period for which it is in
1\1
I, I' ~
use , with th e result that its value is des troyed at th e same mom ent th at it
becomes obsolete and ceases to be a means of valorization. Fixed capital
co nsequently loses its value gra dually with eac h pr oduction cyd e . A
gro wing fracti on of its tot al value is found in th e mon et ar y form as a
financial pro vision designed later on to pu rchase co mmod ities that are
'"
==
~'Ihat
".
191..
,~
'"O
""
y el observation " f a sta tistica l iner ease in th e value of th e stoc k " f fixed
capital and its ave rage turnover tim e as a multiple of th e bas ic cyd e . The
sum of th e amortization fund and tot al net pro fit forms th e total cashjloU'
or gross pro fit which th e capitalist dass has at its disposal.
Now we have sho wn how capitalist pr od uction is found ed on th e
transform ati on of co nditions of prod uction , whose origin is th e creation of
new means of pr od uction and th e lowering of th e value of th ose means th at
inerease of abs trae! labour . This cycle destcoys in " rder to produce and
pr od uces in order to des troy, since pr od uctive activity doos not bec ome
pr od ucts ofl abo ur have in turn to be des troyed all th e more quick1y so that
an ever greate r amo unt of soc ial labour can be expended eve r more
~'Ihen
61 1 7 1
62 I 7 1
-------<O~------------------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
tem po ral dy namic of capital formation . This int er venes in a decisive way in
social loss of value is borne and th e way thi s loss is made up in th e co urse of
accumulation. They are realized in pr actice th ro ugh th e met amor ph oses of
value. From this po int of view, th e devalor ization of capital co nforms
co mpletely to th e law of value. It is realized in pr actice in mon ey form , and
thi s is how it influences th e tem po ral evolution of gross fixed capital
formation .
The esse ntial differe nce can be summed up as follows.
(1) Inasmu ch as th e tendency towar ds th e un even develop ment of
n,
organic
accelera te
'9~9
pr ices)
th e
63 I 7 1
64 I
71
-------<O~------------------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
,.,
fI.
,.
'"
,.
r-
r-;
1111
-t1t
,
\,
I
I
,! ,
..
"
1 ,.. - - '
'-1-
'".,,
,,
I~,. I.
....
_ -formKl '
t'ol
,
.,
, \.,ri
"\ ,
,
, ,,
"
V
,
\ / , '-- ,
,
~- -
Iomuil
,,
-+JI- ,i
Prod"".. fO<><l.
lof,"""",I"ro.. .
,,
,
,,"
.'
lof..muet.....
, -----,
JH"'PD"I_
totoI= ~ 'od <llP""
,.
- 1M
--
v ~
j,
)\(
7'
,;
\
--,
" , -- ' -
.-
- -~
"
'-
..
\
"
''''JJ
,. Pu " h u h,.' .-. " n hol.",n. " ph" m. n t . 1p" -" u . , u, pm.n t
S ou",., Offl o/Busino ss ;.onomi
furmation of capital, but rather a phase " f slow gro wth fullowed by a phase
ofrapid incr ease . Yet the pr ofuu nd mod ilication of th e lon g-ru n cycle of
(2) ~'Ihe n th e transfurm at ion of th e co nditions of existe nce of th e wageearn ing dass pro vokes a po werful co unter-tendency lo th e un even
investment have th e upper hand " ver other mon etary f10ws repr esenting
th e pro visions fur replacing existing eq uipment. They also increase more
Diagra m 7. Gross fixed capital formation from ' 929-' 97 " by category of
65 I 7 1
66 I 7 1
- - - - - - - (O r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
exchange needed to realize th e sum " f gross profit (the cQmbination of net
pr ofit and depreciation allowances) cor respo nding ta th e depreciation and
soc ial conditions " f th e divi. ion " f labour th a! permit th e extension of
~'Ihen
incorporated a p riori int o cost pri ces. As a result , an intens ification in the
thus arises during a crisis of mar ket oullets and reinfor ces it . The norm al
depr eciation cycle of fixed capital is br utally interrupted . Fact ories are
closed, cluste rs of pr oductive forces abando ned, while means of
pr od uction are destro yed on a massive sca le right across society. This form
of capital devalorization is th er efore an essential component of a deep
depr ession in th e gross formation of fixed capital. The social losses
involved affect th e capitalist class by th e int erruption of depr eciation as
well as by th e sharp contraction of net pro fits. They affect th e wage-earn ers
by mass unemployment and its atte ndant miser y. But th e devalor ization of
capital at th e same tim e repr esents th e esca pe ro ute from th e crisis because
it drastically lowers th e value composition of capital. This mutati on in
value relations has as its materi al subs tra tum a genera lized obsolescence
within th e pr oduction pr ocess which tends to crystallize during a
depr ession . Accumulation piel,s up again with a qualita tive transform ation
devalor ization of capital in its new modalities thus bec omes th e force
which became genera l after th e Second ~'Iorld ~'Iar can be gras ped by
comparing and contrasting it with th e pr ocess just described. The contrast
pr oduction pr oduces in order to des troy and des troys in order to pr oduce.
The incessant increase in surplus labou r imposed on th e working class is
indissolu bly connected with th e sys te matic social waste by means of which
devalor ization are borne. ~'Ie shall show in Chapte r 6 th at thi s mod alit y is at
change is due to th e inter act ion of th e two departments of prod uction ; eac h
now pro vides th e other with its mar kets as th ey combine to lower th e value
67 I 7 1
~'Iorld ~Iar .
The capitalist
68 I 7 1
- - - - - - - {O t - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
obsolescence int o th e furmation of its overall cash f1ow, itself enfurces lhi s
genera lized obsolescence , while simulta neously shifting th e social losses
th a! fullow from it a nte th e wage-earn ers. This shift is bo th diffuse and
~'Ie
" O)
'00
\IJ~
shall thus be in a
j i'.
tff
serious contraction in th e gross far mation of fixed capital far thi rt y yea rs.
The features of thi s crisis are well and trul y such as to jeopard ize th e
P
i
1\1
'" 1<4>;l I r
Diagram 8. Financing ratios in non -financial corpo rations ('9 48- '9 7 ')
,
,,
"
"
-,
,
"
u
'.
,m
J9lJ
,~
,m
/
-,
,~,
,~
, . Qm, fi...
S O" ",""
r" '1 . m.o ,h'. 01 n..-d . " ."l '1"," " ' o " nfron' '1,,'l. m 01 ..lu... '1 .
" n, h u, Uon ol.n o.,.,u..l. m.., u,,' l" nom" "'" ,''' '1 . ",U.u. ' . J. r" . ,n, Los
..",d. ..."" 10" 0""' d. l. ,h'o,,-. "'0-<1. ' 0"' d. l'',h.",., PH " , ' 976.
- On '1', ,o' n' , ... '1. " .u. u. oft1. mulU. h" " B. S,1m.tt,L'. ".lyso " . " " "0"0"'0"'
dos ..., -. " ",, PH" , ' 97'.
u.
69 I 71
'ill
'1. cn WH m..' 'mm., ,,Uon1 ' ..n An, lo-S..on ' n " ',' n, . n u
70 I 71
- - - - - - - <0 > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
,,,' 1. m ; n ; m um . f mou , ,,, n " ..." . fo, 'b ..'U . m. n t. ARo; '1. Ci.n Wu '1"."h on . f
n on -An, l o-S
p".... m <
'1. 1> . n o " , m.nt> . f In <!u, ,,... l P,,<!u,h.; n o " ..1 W.... Int. m .honoll.
Com. u ', 111.!:,onom', J o" mol no. 3" ' , 1. 83, Mu, h , " 73. T1'ind l .hu,,;..1 . ., .
1 m u . t .n fr om . n ."1<,, "' ''' A Con..", o/ Pay , b. E.H. P1. 1p, B""n . n o M.H. B" " n . ,
Lon . on , ,. 68.
' Qu . t
b.
,"o,,"no m n. in
St u d,.f
'1.
G, .. t D m'i on . n o ;t,
- 71 1 71
- - - - - - - - - - {O > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
Transformations in
the Labour Process
Let us pr oduce as much as we can , and th en eve ry one can have more , is a
simple and pers uas ive slogan. An eve n more insidious noti on is th e ide a
th at th e capitalist character of pr od uction is dissolved simply by th e
application of science to it . Hence th e od es to auto mation in which mod ern
prophets de pict for us a society in which burde nso me work will have
disappeared . Id eological amalgamations of th e pro blem of onerous sorts of
co ncrete labou r with th at of capitalist exploita tion are typical of eleva ted
collective labou r-po wer a single force pr od ucing surplus-va lue. The
relation .
~'Ie
, I 37
2 I 37
- - - - ---j0 > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-,
A THEOR'f OF CAPITALlST REGUlATION
iabour can be t Th.. laps m Ihe worl:inl-day arise frem two bnds of lime
nrted SI..tes first o .n bec.uM ;1 is there lh.ol1he ...ole r"Lotion " .oS IDOIIt
pmod,
succtnetly surv"y.
1.b
prodllCUOO pr act1c<!s tbat pr....... nt the totahty of the YrOI"bng day from
beml mad.. ioto 0 0" SlDgle mus 0 1abstrac1 l.o.bour. Th"y ar e periods for
shofunl malen.al LO 1M OO\ItM of tr ansfo rmallo o , fur repalt an<:!
1- Prindpl..... o T.oylorisl1I
~'I'.
conlmued through to
~ptl.ilist
0U1
~ ..ms o productlV<!
(2) Ttm.. penods bound up ""'Ih th.. partial reconsttllll>on of iabourpo>o..r at lb" worl:plaC<! (various paUHlland b~ du.. lo fatigu..).
co mplelion oft he mech anical cyde of movemenls on Ihe job ' and lo fill Ihe
"ppro priate lransmission . y.te m. The relati onship betwee n workers and
o work organization th at reduce th e wor kers ' degree of auto nomy and
Iheir outpul nor m. In Ihe Unile<! Sla les, Taylorism came inlo force in Ihe
enginee ring induslries al Ihe end of Ihe 191h cenlury . II wao a ca pita li' l
a cyeJe of repetitive mov emen lSIhal is char aclerize<! solely by ilo dur alion ,
Ib<t ou lpu l norm . This is Ihe fuun dalion of Ihe homogenization of labour in
""fo""
~ill
e xfClSed by .ay of ruI<!s of.",.\: fixing the oulpul oorm fu each job ...
changa th.ot oc:cur iD lb.. LOt<!tKt>ofl between the df..r..nl periods of tune
th.ot mn. up lb.. ooorl:ing day. Let us t all th.ot lb.. return 00 socia.I Labout
lO Ib_ rul
ils<!lf loealed
punmg Ibem mIo appbcal>Oll and modymg Ibem . Th.. """ of Ihis
1, PRINCIPLES
os TAYLORI SM
_ 3 I 37
\lI
d~enl,
A further typo
ot ~ff,
or.l.Ol%ec1 ...
~em
could l....v.. lb" YrOI"I:<!tS. Detai1ad lime and mol>on analyns of jobs,
combined .....Ib rese.rrch inlo lh" psycho-phystolOgtc.al N!actions of
4 I 37
J
A THEOR\' OF CA ~ I TA lI ST RE GULATION
mov em eat mrc indusl ry o / tb e prolelu i",nizec! bl",ck po pul"'l ion of the
movement, pro vided informa tion lbat ..nabled specia list. to rerno"a tbi.
o bstad e . This informati on " U lh.. ba... far a r<M! sllnplification o f jobo .
Each prcductic n worker " as giV"h a sllnpl er cycl.. to perform. Tb..
il\<luguration o f ~u"rns of tbill:ind l&d to lb.. conceptio n of n" w m..thods
of prcducticn and Mw typoeI of nw.chin.....tools. 'T<!Chnical p rogr",..' wu
oom plerely deternuned by lhe int<msifiOltion of output norms. It sought lo
Sou th, fro m the beginn in 0 1 tb e Second 1'Jorld ~'l""'r o n..",rds . In 1'Jeste rn
Europe it especially invclved ru~v.. " ",v,,", 0 1 immigr",tion from tbe
lO
oper."
oo
I""duc. tb" tmI" tb..,. ....,,, kept in servwe .... .. moN! mti!l15!! utiliution oi
rhem. The mcr<OU9d r.pi<Uty ofc.. p1I.alturnover thus obtam-ed l'e<iuced Ibe
lb. produ=
OUt ......h...
fully botb lbis lriflSfonn.l twl:lll5elf.nd lb.. forms of g.. l'<!Liot1On '1 has
<T<Oi1-ed.
Th.
_ .blml-ed in lb . U" il-ed SU I... from Ibe 19"'05 on ...,ds, ~lly fi:>r
/niQ
both ccnst r. in<Od and resigned lOc. pil. list I.bour discipline . The migr.tion
of I.rge m. _ of ..orl:err, div orced fro m .ll socio-eultur",1 ties to th eir
prOCllSl .... . po.. erful furce fur th e ve rtic",l integr"'t ion of pr oduction
1 , PRINC IPLES
O, r An
ORI SM -
5 I 37
6 I 37
-'
(1
A THEOR\' OF CAPITALlST REGULAT ION
pr ecesses and a mat eri al support fur th e lransmission of local mutat ion s in
th e pr od ucti ve forces between th e two departments of pr oduct ion . It is fur
labour pr ecess fur relati ve surplus-va lue. The organic liaison it estab lishes
sys tem. The individu al wor ker thus lost all co ntro l over his wor k rhythm .
not ed in th e frs! chapler th a! relative and abso lute surplus-va lue are
movement of the machine sys te m. In thi s mod e ofo rganization workers are
norm , since job auto no my has bee n tot ally abolished. It thus became
possible to simplify tasks yet further by fragmenting cyd es of mot ion int o
turned scientific pro gress against th em as a po wer serv ing th e uni form
pos itions and job s, alte ring manufacturing and assemb ly plans.
Once established , th e assemb ly-line precess can be sys tematically
modified in accordance with th ese two pr incipIes to increase th e share of
surplus labour in th e working day . But thi s precess itself has its limit s, set
The first limit s are not exte rn al and absolute, but rather th e effect of th e
objects th at were often heavy and diflicult to move , or else co rrosive and
dangero us to hand le . The sys tem was similarly respo nsible for a major
sav ing oflabo ur-power and a not able increase in th e organic co mposition
co mmod ities at a rapid ly increasing rate oThis req uirement is all th e more
ur gent in th at assemb ly-line prod uct ion is subjec t to a spec ific co nstraint :
int ermediat e pr od ucts passing bac k and forth , and trial and error in th e
case of assemb ly, int o a stra ightforward linear flow of th e mat eri al un der
7 I 37
8 I 37
- - - - ----(0 ) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
an ever mor e colossal sca le, while markets mus! be expanded al whatever
cost , with incr easing rlgks " f devalorization of th e fixed capital thus
irnmobilized .
The int ernal limit s " f th e labour precess itself can be identified by
analysis " f th e tim e perlods making up th e working day. ~'Ihen th e
fragmentation " f la. ks is pushed to an extre me limit , severa l elements
co mbine to prevent a further decline in tim e wasted and even to reverse lts
directian . The chief fact ors al wa rk her e are:
(1) The inerease in th e 'ba lance delay tim e', i.e. th e delays caused by
also th e tim e taken to get th e assemb ly line going, as well as requ iring th e
employ ment of excess labour-po wer devote d to various ancillary tasks but
with sho rte r cycles. This tim e increases with th e further fragmentation of
differentiating th e reward s for jobs which have been rend ered subs ta ntially
tasks.
(2) The effects of int ensificat ion of labour on th e mental and physical
falsify analysis of cost pr ices, and co nsequently also of invest ment criteria .
They also upset th e balance of th e assemb ly line by impedin g th e transfer of
workers between different machines. If jobs are not ind ividu alized , th en
observation of the ideal psycho-ph ysical co nditions for human activ ity. On
when th ey sec ure trade-uni on collabo ration . ~'Ie shall see in Cha pter 3 what
and mod aliti es of such changes. Subjec tion to a uni form but ever increasing
co urse of th e 1960s, espec ially in th e most mechani zed indu st ries: a high
9 I 37
10 I 37
- - - - ----(0 ) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
~'Ie
have not yet been realized by scientific develop ment . Capita lism has
sha ped auto mation, just as it sha pes eve ry other sys te m of pr od uctive
Neo_Fordism
auto matic pr oduction co ntro l can canalize th e dass struggle int o forms
co mpatible with th e law of accumulation.
application ofl iving labour to th e flow of pr od uctive opera tions. It was thi s
impossible to tell her e whether this evolution will succeed, for it implies
in spatial organization and in tem po ral rhythm . ~'Ie have also seen th at th e
techni cal division of labou r un der thi s pr incipIe ended by colliding with
sceialization of th e mod e of life , with forms that are still hard to perceive .
Only at th e end of thi s work shall we attempt to make any overall
th ose pro blems which directly bea r on obstad es to gro wth in th e output of
human beings. Yet it remains depe nde nt on th e reaction tim es, faculti es of
sceial labour-po wer and arise on th e semi-auto matic assemb ly line , as well
percep tion , co ncentration and de tec tion of individu als, and on th e rapidity
with which th ey can coordinate th eir movements. ~'Ihen all th ese faculti es
are pushed to th eir limit by th e logic of assemb ly-line work und er th e spur
unit an output plan made up of distinct and success ive sho rt pr od uction
runs. The rigidity of th e assemb ly-line process is costly in terms of balance
delay tim e , sta rting tim e , as well as of mod ification of th e movin g parts,
spec ial tooling and skilled labou r able to adjust multiple functi oning
very long ru n , lead mer e operative work in prod uction to disappea r. But
one thing is sure her e and now. These possibilities will have no chance of
machine tool s.
The new pr incipIe of work organization is th at of a tot ally int egrat ed
"
I 37
' 2 I 37
-----~o)-------------------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
possible by th e sys tema tic applica tion of th e prin cipIe " f feedback ta th e
functionin g machine tools. The basis " f th e enlire system is thu s th e ability
to construct machines that control the ir oU' n operations.
This requirement presuppo ses a co nsiderable develop ment " f forces of
pr od uction , in three respects:
(1) A scientific and no longer merely empirical knowled ge of eac h phase
in th e prod uction pr oc ess. This is tru e ab ove all fur co ntinuous flow
po int of view if very high levels of output can be regularly maintain ed . This
is why auto ma tic prod uction co ntrol has only made its big leap fur ward
ve ry recently , with th e int rod ucti on of incorpo rat ed numeri cal co ntro l.
Here eac h machin e too l is equipped with its own mini-computer , of th e
and complete mathem ati cal repr esentation of th e mat eri al tran sfurm ati on s
kind which th e mini at uri zat ion of int egrat ed elec tronic circuits has made
is impro ved , pr od uction tim e sha rply r ed uced , and ab ove all, th e tim e
taken to pr epare th e machin e sys tem fur different co nditions of use can be
red uced from severa l hours to a few minutes , while co mpletely elimina ting
that have fur me rly been accomplished by different work co llectives. This
sec ond objective req uires a co mplete reconstr uction of th e pr oduction
most impo rt ant of th ese effects is a relative saving of labour -po wer in
co mplete red efinition of prod uction norm s, job pos itions and changes in
pr oduction . This saving results from a series of cha nges affecting th e work
(3) These changes in work organization have only been made possible
machines and test th eir co rrect funct ioning, it is possible fur eac h to
supe rv ise severa l at a tim e . One sec tion of production jobs is thus
elimina te d. Since th e work of th ese operatives has no direct effect on
inst ruments of measurem ent and co ntro l fur diverse prod uction pr oc esses
taken by thi s numeri cal co ntro l th at determines more than any thing else
13 I 37
14 I 37
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
to switc h workers around, adding sorne and taking away a lhers, and in lhi s
impo rt ant sav ings in transfer tim e , quality co ntro l and th e pr eparation of
also sharply red uced . The enginee ring department , on th e other hand , is
items of high value by electronic items ofl ow value. The capitalist dass can
benefit from thi s in two ways. On th e one hand , a far greate r flexi bility in
th e inst allation of pr od uction units allows it to break up large working-d ass
jobs is far from making up fur th e destruction of old s!:ills resulting from th e
co mpensation of thi s kind , since th e skills involved are hetero geneous and
~'Ihat
and tot al sub mission of th e highly skilled personnel respo nsible for th em . If
such a separa tion between th e work of co nception and th e work of
thus incommensurable .
15 I 37
labour which have mul tiplied since th e mid 1960s must be see n in th e
perspective of th e develop ment of auto matic pr oduction co ntro l, and th e
transform ati on of capitalist relations of pr oduction which has just bee n
explained. Their objective is to overcome th e crisis in th e reprod uction of
th e wage relation inh eri ted from Fordism by transforming th e labou r
pr ecess in accordance with th e flexi bilit y given by auto mation. At th e
pr esent tim e , no new dominant form of th e labour pr ecess has yet
emerged . All we can do th er efore is to elicit th e significance of th e
pr incipIes now being experimente d from th e bas ic sta ndpoint of th e
perpetuation of wage-labo ur .
The analysis of th e labour pr ecess we have already co nducted allows us
to assert th at th er e is a change in th e genera l pr incipIes of work
organization whenever th er e is a change in th e mod aliti es of capitalist
management of th e labou r pr ecess. Auto mation br ings with it th e
16 I 37
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
more flexible and more far -reachin g, base d on overall contro l by a genera l
inform ati on sys te m able to analyse and co rree! th e parameters of
product ion . The hier ar chical prin cipIe of capitalist co ntrol is thus
somewhat modified . Control via directives transmitted from a high
also strip th e tasks of preparation and reg ulation of any qua lita tive co ntent
co mmand is replaced by diree! co ntrol " ver th e prod uction precess . This
lies in th e suppress ion of categories of skilled workers , fitt er s and sette rs,
co ntrol is bo th more abs trae! and mor e rigorous. The U' orkers are no
who are no longer need ed , and th e devolution of all superv iso ry ope rations
literal sense of th e term oOn th e co ntrary , numer ically co ntro lled mach ines
req uiring specialization; the principIe of auto ma tic co ntrol co mpletely
remove s th e manufact uring proc ess from th e workers' vigilance or
influen ce . In co nditions of thi s kind , th e int er est of capitalist man agem ent
The va rious different experiments now be ing made in th e labour proc ess
responsible far manufact uri ng or ass emb ly pro grammes. Rigoro usly
relations in prod uction . In thi s respect , Job r ot ation and Job enrichment
int egrat ed int o th e overall infarmat ion sys tem of th e ente rp rise , and
jobs which appear on the ass emb ly lines when work is toa fragmented . A
de ta iled prod uction programme de fined far th em and by prescr ibed links
co mbat th ese losses of time and to secure a more effective fit be tween th e
its mem ber s. Freed from the necessit y of making sure th at th e labour
co nstraint is respected in each individu al case , capitalist man agem ent can
~'Iidened
work is
issu e of th e dass struggle in th e 19th century . A soc ial norm cod ified in
legislat ion , and thus gua ra nteed by th e sta te, was only de finitively obtained
after three-qu arter s of a century of dass struggle. It was only obtained ,
17 I 37
18 I 37
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
soc ial labour-po wer. The pro blem of th e determination of working hours,
which poses th e ques tio n of th e ro le of th e trade-uni on movement , is thus
actually bec oming th e most effective sta te institut ion s fur co mbating th e
workers' movement . J ud ges repeatedly upheld th e uncon stitution al
dass, which tcok an original co urse . Up till th e Civil ~'Iar , th e existe nce of
an open frontier gave wage workers th e hope of being able ta escape th eir
free exchange (the right to work being defined in law as individu al free
pro ved to be an extre mely len gth y hist orical pr ecess. In th e sixty yea rs up
till 1890 , th e trade un ion s managed to create a structure d nati on al
organization only in two sho rt period s, after th e Civil ~'Iar and th en again in
~'Ia gner
Act).
The struggle to red uce th e working day was mar ked by th ese
England in th e 1840S. This was th e most indu st rialized reg ion, and th e most
de nsely end owed with means of co mmunication . In Massac huse tts a
worse . Organized on a craft bas is, th ese unions only managed to organize
nar ro w fringes of th e working-d ass po pulation, genera lly among th e skilled
184~,
demands also ind uded aban on th e employ ment ofchildren unde r 1 ~ , and
th e pro hibition of night work fur women and children . But thi s movement
suitable fur th eir craft, th ey had no int er est in co nducting any co ntinuous
did not win much in th e way of results. Certa in city authorities did gra nt a
10-hou r day to public employees, but only rarely was thi s legislati on
unfavourable . The feder al characte r of th e USA gave eac h sta te almos t tot al
autonomy in labou r legislation , and as in eve ry other field , thi s pr ero gative
was fier cely defend ed . A particularist mentalit y , whose origins went bac k
to th e struggle against English colonialism , was particularly virulent in th e
newer sta tes, which were de te rmined not to fall int o po litical de pendence
~'Ihen
and New Jersey in ' 85' , legislati on restricting th e duration oflabo ur was
hedged with dauses allowing th e law to be eva ded if th e worker accepted
thi s in his co ntract of employ ment. This dause, designed to safeguard th e
'freedom of the labo ur co ntract' , gave employers a co nvenient and legal
escape ro ute. They had in fact a whole ars enal of weapo ns fur dissuad ing
from employ ment workers who refused to accept this 'free co ntract' . The
emp loyers' action was also greatly facilit a ted by th e weakness of wor king-
econo mic re lations sec re te d an extre mely strong individu alist ideology ,
and an identifi cat ion between th e idea of pr ivate property and th at of th e
nati on al int er est , any mass movement appeare d anti-American. There was
always a strong tendency , th er efure , fur th ose sta tes which had passed a
and located in th e most dy namic bra nches of th e econo my, rises in wages
19 1 37
20 1 37
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
th a! were gra nte d in period s of pro spe rity were suflicient to weaken th e will
crisis, on th e " ther hand , th e empl"yers had eve ry int er est in dismissing
whole sec tio ns of th eir workers and extracting th e maximum labour out of
upsurge of socialist ideas and movements in thi s period as a who le, eve n if
transform ed by th e particular po litical structures and ideas of North
The weakness of th e unions and th e nar ro wness of th eir base made it easy
fur th e boss es subsequently to cancel th e few gains th a! were won . If lacal
legislati on had bee n passed , it was either furmally repe aled or else
stre nuo us tasks; forty sta tes fixed maximum working hou rs for women . But
new stra ta of immi gran ts of disparate origins, al! left th eir sta mp on th e
to th e New Deal.
~'Iith
~'Iar
were
movement , which had been weak in any case, was isolated and crushed in
late 19th century and th e first atte mpts at mass uni oni zati on , th e struggle
for th e 8-hour day and th e 6-day week culminated in th e bloody
Haym ar ket defeat spelt th e end of th e hope for a mass movement unifying
th e working dass for fifty yea rs. The trade un ioni sm th at gre w up on th e
was not expressed at thi s tim e in an exte nsion of average working hour s.
reform labou r co nditions which gained in stre ngth between ' 90 7 and ' 9' 7 .
2 1 I 37
22 I 37
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
Organization (e IO) in 1936. Its pos ilions were far more rad ical th an th ose
divided .
fao ting. For such an observe r , what exists sponta neo usly is an individu al
hourly wage as th e pr ice of an hour 's co ncrete labour in such and such a
and th e means to exerc ise th ese po wers without th eir legal existe nce being
enda ngered. It also requ ired negoti ati on s and arb itra tion pr oced ures to
take place within a legislati ve framework established at th e nat ion allevel.
This was th e spirit of th e ~'Iagner Act of ' 935 . This tim e th e organized
rebellion by emp loyers against th e new labou r legislati on was defeated ,
working week was set at 44 hours, with a dause stipulating its red uction to
40 hours within 3 yea rs. Additional hours had to be paid at tim e and a half.
The employment of children unde r , 6 was far bidden in almos t all sec to rs of
indu st ry . This law was genuinely enfarced. The 4a -hou r week was genera lly
types ofl abo ur ind uded . In thi s co nception , it is dear th at th e existe nce of
a nominal reference wage , which has a strictly sacial character and far ms
~'Iorld ~'Iar
ratios in which net excess de mands are all cancelled , th ose of different
th e pivot far differe nt ind ividual wages, ca nno t be ente rta ined. Nor can th e
diversity of far ms in which wages are paid , or th eir hist orical evolution, be
th eorized . These are relegated by nea -d assical th eory to institution al
co ntingency , and th er efare exd uded from econo mic th ought . The neo~'Ie
are capable of an imm ediat e int er pret at ion witho ut any pr ior need to
abs tract respect oAt thi s degree of abs traction, wages can evidently not be
directly eq uated with th e individual worker's pay slip. They are a mon etary
reference wage
j .
23 137
24 1 37
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J
A THmR'l' OF CAPITALIST REGULATIO,"
ph"'nom"~
tn.nsformatioll5 of the 1.o.bour process in lh.. ~oth century, but has also
CT"'Ited lb.. mos! mod..m _ in other ""OTds, tb.. mos! ooll<!ct::lve _ fonn of
th<!ID.. ~i"lIh this prob'"m. _ .ppro.iCh lb. unm<mse qu<!'Stlo n o th. ml<lTn<l1
In
bourly p.ilymenl . ~'fe m.oy note tllal 1M bourly .age actua.lly p.llid ee
w ff1!r..nt mWvidual woru.... l1ltctU.atel aroutid a ~ ra le ..Ilicb liorms!be
o bject ofl ..n..ral ni!gotu.tIollS ..hen tbe woru.... lIlOV..m..nt IS oraru:ed c e
a lUjar scaJ.. and lis nbts are recogni:ed in 1.0. Sutb ni!gotu.tIollS, ..lticb
...thm lb.. worbng d ass."" lb_ ID t1JJU u .. eha ng....ble smce th.. y ~1
from tboo d us struggle.OO " r<I I'lbj1 to lb.. umfYlllg force o the ".g..
, ..lItion t",,]f. Bul in the hoJnOll..n~ fio!ld of mOlle!uy qu.anllties, lb.
rev....1that .al "" ..xpress an overall relationship betw....n tbe cLasses. ~'1e
can also Ob""lV" that tbe d"'''I"min.lllion of tb.. baSlc bourly ..age iII
indissolubly tied to tbe over all duration of th" labour inscribe<! in ill
c. lculated . ~'flLat iII the relatiOnJhip bet......n th.. basle ho urly wage and the
''''Ot101!I'S .
Ibe total lOal " sum p.lId to Ibe ""OtUrs prodUC'ing oommoditles wvid.,f by
A first dfer"n"" appe.on; betw+en the baslc bourly lOage and Ihe
nomin.ol re fer en"" .age ..ben lhe dur atiOll of ..ffectlve labour IS higher th.on
relan .... to olb ero for tbose industriell twt und....enl changes in lbeir
Labour
imporlloIll lo note lhal !be ral ell p.ilid for o.... rtIm~ .ork. Me iJQC'ia.lly
de t..rmml . Th..y Me prod~ of !be cLo.a Itruggl.. , .hi<:h lbus enle.... into
lbe liorma.tIon of th-e nominal Nfe rence ..ag.. . If Ibis la lt er "as SIIlIply a
prt>co1!SS .
dLl"ect "a g~, as IS th.. bastc hotirly ra le , then tb.. number ofadditlotw1 hotus
irtev1!l'Slbl.. '!!VOlution from ",me Corn:IS 10 otb,," tbus has a gr;at histoncal
wou1d be lb" sol.. ",urce ofWv"!"ifilC9. But the nominal ""fu""n"" lOagelS
wbicb lOu hall """mine in Chapler 3. tbill indud... a purchasmg power 1h.>1
111 .
~ O RJo\ S O ~
26 I 37
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
is no! direc tly paid to the individual workers bu! which appea rs in the furm
of an indirect wage whose payment de pends on different mod aliti es from
those of th e diree! wage . Conse quently, if we are spea king of th e overall
repr od uction of th e wage-earn ing dass, which is necessar y in a rder to
phases of accumulation. The wor king dass bends its elfort to seizing a few
account is th e sum of diree! wages and soc ial benefits paid in th e sec to rs
th e repr od uction of th e wage-earn ing dass. The law of thi s division , even if
co mplex , still involves a series of socia l ru les which fix th e amount of
indir ect wages as a funct ion of th e sum of direct wages.
This doub le distinction between effective and nominal dura tion on th e
one hand , and between direct and indir ect wages on th e other , int rod uces
an impo rt ant flexi bility int o th e determination of individu al wages. Time
wages appea r as th e pr od uct of th e bas ic hou rly rate multiplied by th e
payment of overtime , and th e furmation and receipt of indir ect wages. This
is what makes up th e mon et ar y resou rces of eac h worker . Since th ese
work lon ger hour s, th e capitalists may be furced to co ncede spec ial
advantages. These co ncessions will be th e more inevit able , th e more th e
quantity ofl abo ur pro vided , rather th an th e labour -po wer . In reality , th ese
mar ginal fluctuati on s can in no way account fur th e genera l re lation of
trade unions have been able to impose a strict definition of th e not ion of
th e norm al working day on which th e bas ic hour ly wage is calculated . This
distr ibu tion which divides th e overall incom e create d by social labour -
normal dura tion doos not refer simply to th e len gth of th e working day , but
also to its pos ition in th e working week (fur example th e S-ho ur day and th e
thi s definition that additional hours and hou rs worked outside th e usual
limit s of th e day or week are paid at a higher rate oThe nominal daily or
individu al capitals gives rise to a modulat ion of individu al wages. The tot al
normal dura tion during a do wnswing in th e business cyd e . This hap pens to
of pr oduction that finds its unity only in th e blind reg ulation of equivalence
27 I 37
dedine in pro fits. In th e United Sta tes, where th e risks of co mpetition are
28 I 37
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
lhis mechanism . Bu! lhis flexibility has its limits, mar ked by th e existence
of a minimum wage compatible with a basic maintenance ofl abour-power .
~'Iorking-dass
overall organization are both already determined . The basic piecew ork
w ageean th en be defined in th e fullowing way :
Ba . ic piecewo r k waz e Nomin a l daily waz e fur n or m al wor kin z
ti m e/ Av era z e num ber of item . pro duced pe r day
Hence:
Ba . ic piecewo r k waz e Ba . ic h ourly waz e job ou tpu t n or m .
Yet tim e wages do not enab le a pr ecise ealculation ofreal eosts, since
applieatio n of th e pr incip Ies of Taylor ism . The two furms are genera lly
can pr ovide th e moti vati ons and means fur a transfurm at ion of th e
int o aceount th e variations in th e int ensit y ofl abo ur . This is why piecework
th eir dive rs ity; it makes it necessary to study very pr ecisely both partial
movements and th eir int egrat ion . Piecework thus makes it possible both to
The first th eoreti eal pro blem raised her e is the relationship existing
between piecework and th e bas ie hourly wage . Piecework payment is fixed
to a job with rigor ou sly spec ified eharacteristies. Its fuund ation is an
~'Ie
Av eraz e num ber of item. pro duced (fur a .peclfied job po.itio n ) Norma l
wor km z day/ Job ou tpu t n or m
dass of indu cing th e illusion th at wages as an econo mic eategory are tied to
29 I 37
30 I 37
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
The wage curve fur workers on th e same job shows two very sharp peaks
whose s\:ill and int ensit y are less th an th e norm do no! mee! th eir quo tas;
th ey no! only receive a wage lower than th e bas ic rate , bu! also risk being
lecat ed one on either side of th e bas ic wage . The existe nce of th ese two
American soc iologists have sho wn th at thi s int er pret at ion is tot ally false .'
mod es indicat es two different types of gro up behav iour. The gro up of
of th e bas ic piece rate o This means th a! social labou r-po wer receives its
fur increasing labou r int ensit y unl ess it pro mises a wage sorne ' 5 to
~o%
above th e bas ic rate oThe alte rnative respo nse is sys te matic and co ncerted
restr iction of prod uction on jobs recroned to be rated toa low to make it
th e output norm . The two peaks of th e curve are not genera lly th e same in
techni cal modi ficati on of th e job co ntent oIf th e norm is toa severe, th en
co mpetition between th e workers bec omes po int1ess; th e work collective
on th e loase side or on th e tight side. The shape of thi s curve indicat es both
th e po te ntial fur co mpetition between workers and th e existe nce of
decr ease in tem po . The mor e th e labo ur precess is int egrat ed and th e
workers' solida rity exte nds to associated operations, th e more pr oduction
~'Ihile
(1) The distr ibu tion of individu al wages aro und th e bas ic rate fur a give n
min orit y categories. The management's aim , above all else , will be to
pr event th e workers from acq uiring a collective co nsciousness of th eir
job doos not genera te th e full distribution curve that might be expec ted of
th e workers if th ey pu rsued th e individu alist ic behav iour of neo-classical
logic . This would in fact pr edict th at eac h worker , as a pro vide r of serv ices,
ste ered between th e un pleasant elfort and th e pleasant remuneration in
job pos itions th at results from th e dee pening of th e techni cal division by
lar ge number of output norm s pro viding a whole series of basic piecework
rates. It is no longer possible to say that eac h of th ese bas ic piecework rates
is equivalent to th e bas ic hou rly wage . But thi s eq uivalence is realized on
th en th e bas ic wage would be th e mid-point of thi s distr ibu tion , from which
31 I 37
32 I 37
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
within one and th e sa me prod uction unit , or were found in different units of
changes expr ess an ever gro wing rigidity in th e wage distr ibu tion and
a single ente rprise. Bu! th e existe nce of a spectrum of basic piecework rates
makes it possible to create a wage hier ar ch y by mar king out sorne job s as
a rder to sel up sca les of pro motion by seniority. The more acute labour
of the mod es of work orga nization th at coe xist in pr od uction . The tem po ral
Since, however , lhi s band of variations can only be mar ginal around th e
bas ic hourly rate , gra des bec ome so co mpressed th at differentiation loses
its eflicacy in dividing th e workers. But it still has th e serious
incon venience fur th e capitalists th at it obscures analysis of real costs by
int roducing norm s th at do not co rrespo nd to socially necessar y labour tim e . The red uction and simplification of wage sca les, if co nstantly
co untered by th e antago nism of th e wage relation th at obliges th e
capitalists to divide th e workers, is still imper ative fur th e rationalization of
pr oduction .
(3) The transfurm ation of th e labou r pr ""ess modifies th e co ntent of
job s and re quires a perp etual refixing of their output nor ms. In th e co urse
of this evolution of th e bas ic piecework rate , th e wage of th e overall group
of workers paid on thi s basis remains gove rned by th e nominal reference
wage . This means th at th er e is no link between th e increase in individu al
earn ings and th e increase in pr od uctive efliciency of a worker in a
particular job pos ition. If th e number of items pr oduced in th e working day
doubles, th en th e basic piecework rate is divided by two ; th e daily
reference wage is unchanged . But thi s red uction is not enfurced
inst antaneously . In a rder to weaken th e workers' resistance to job
modification s which may call int o question tradition al pattern s of
seniority, management can fix a loo se norm when a technical change is
int roduced , pr esenting it as a tria!. It can th en later move to a stricte r
determination , when th e new job has bec ome a well organized rou tine
pos ition. Since such modification s are incessant , th e existe nce of jobs in
thi s trial phase gives rise to an additional reason fur variation in individu al
wages.
33 I 37
(a) Collective outp ut bonus es. These bo nuses establish th e spec ific
co rrespo ndence between bas ic hour ly wage and th e nominal reference
wage which is characteristic of Fordism . Collective plans fur stimulating
output were developed in th e co urse of th e Second
~'Iorld ~'Iar
and
34 I 37
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
pr oductive forces. But like those we analysed earlier, thi s form doos not
change th e nat ur e of th e wage as th e expr ession of th e value of labou r-
th e overal1 gro up of hourly paid wor kers, or even th e tot alit y of nonmanageri al emplayees. The norm thus forms par! of th e tot al pr oduction
cost , and is measured in mon et ar y terms. It is th e w age oost p er dollar 01
sales fur a labour pr ecess with give n characte ristics when th e workers are
paid th e bas ic hourly wage . The lransilion from lhi s normal wage cos! to
th e overall wage cos! is made by multiplyin g it by th e volume of sales
cor respo nding to a norm al activity of th e workforc e (in duration and
int ensit y), and setting a reference pr ice for th ese sales. The wage cost per
da llar of sales is th en co mpared month by month with th e relation between
th e effective overall wage cost and th e exchange-va lue of sales effectively
realized . A planned co rrection can be made so as to take account of
variations in th e sales pr ice . If th e ratio between tot al real wage costs and
th e exc hange-va lue of sales is lower th an th e norm al wage cost per da llar of
sales, th en th er e is an output bonus. The tot al bo nus is determined by th e
(b) The gu arantee d monthly w age and the w age fun doThe forms of wage
involved her e do not repr esent a return to th e individu al mechanism of
tim e wages. They are on th e co ntrary forms th at push th e logic of Fordism
to its limit , and begin to bec ome socially significant with th e recent
develop ment of Neo-Fordism . These forms can make th eir appea ra nce only
when th e collectivization of labour has reached so high a degree th at
pr oductive efliciency bec omes a social po wer entire ly de te rmined by th e
integrated sys tem of th e pr oductive forces. The emergence of Neo-Fordism
mar ks th e onset of a histor ical tendency in th e development of th e forces of
pr oduction th at Marx already indicated as a possibility on th e horizon of
capitalism : th e evolution of pr oductivity towar ds an eve r greate r
independence from th e expenditure of livin g labou r , where pr oductive
po wer essentially resides in th e gro wing capacity of mod ern forces of
pr oduction to realize an organic integration of pr oductive pr ocesses. This
formula:
waz e
reference wage . The most recent forms of wages, th er efore , express more
and mor e dearly th e overall relation of distribution imposed on th e wage-
overall output bonus is based. J ust as th e pr ice of labo ur -po wer is not
[(Nor m al
waz e co.!
Act u a l ov eran
35 I 37
lose th eir flexi bility and tend to approximate eve r mor e to th e nominal
indu stries and reg ions th at derive from th e social stra tification within th e
working dass. On th e ave rage, howeve r, it expresses th e nominal reference
wage paid on a monthly bas is. It pr otects th e reconstitution of labou rpo wer from th e co nsequences of a red uction in working hours below th e
normallevel. It directly appears, th er efore , as th e mon et ar y counterpart of
36 I 37
- - - - - - - - - - - <0 > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
th e social consumption norm . The guaranteed wage may also present itself
in furm as a tim e wage, since it is eq ual to th e basic hourly wage multiplied
by th e number of hours of work, when working hours are eq ual to th e
norm al duratio n on which th e basic wage is defined.
The wage fund is a guara nteed wage allocated no! to each worker
separate ly bu! rather to a wor k collective . In dividu al modulati on s can lose
th eir capitalist character when th ey are defined in ways de te rmined by th e
work collective itself, fur example by a semi-autonomous work gro up .
A h;, ' ,,; .u, m" ,. fou no ;n ' 1 . " ll"u.. "" ,t b. An o'; Gm , 111. Di.....",.
ofLobour, H
T1; , ;no . l
;n' ' '. ' ''
, .., ' . " , puU<u lul. '1. m , y b. s . "",1m, 'Wh.t D. B..... Do"
' 1 . ;n' .n,'..h on on .oou " " h ;, h .. ". h... m n ;n Ch ,,, , ..n
n ;n" .... ;n ., " , ' h T'.;n , , ; n .
Th. m..' " l" , " h.m., " h ;, h " '. . . .. . m ol fo, ....,,1 mOu ,'m,;n 'h,,1.
' 950' , " .. kn o"n .. 'h. S..n lon . h n.
37 / 37
- - - - - - - - - - - <0 > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
3
The Transformation
of the Wase-Earners'
Conditions of Life
1. T ite Ca p it a li s t P r od u c ti o n o f t h e Mo d e o
Co n s u m p ti o n
Diagra m ~ . The 'Double Reel' oft he Repr oduction of Capita list Relations of
Production : repr od uction of th e tot al capital in eac h of th e two
th e nominal re fere nce wage , a pro blem to which we gave an exd usively
formal solutio n in th e frs! sec tion of Cha pler 1. ~'Ie shall also be dealing
with th e social stra tification of th e wage-e arn ing dass and th e way in which
capitalism aggravates it . Finally , we shall analyse th e creation by th e dass
struggle of new social relations organized int o institution s which yield th e
pr oced ures of collective barga ining, and assess th e e!fect of th ese
pr oced ures on th e long-r un evolution of th e ave rage wage .
In th e space of social activities, th e repr oduction of th e wage relation
involves a maintenance cyd e of social labour-po wer th at is de picted in
Diagram ~ . Two pheno mena at once sta nd out . On th e one hand , th e
maintenance cyd e of social labour-po wer is a cyd e of metamorphoses of
value which indudes th e co nsumption pr ocess, such th at th e latter is
dominated by co mmod ity relations. On th e other hand , th e cyd e has a
transver se relationship to th e expanded repr oduction of capital, via th e
co nnection between th e two departments of pr od uction which we studied
in Cha pte r 1. This relationship of th e maintenance cyd e of social labourpo wer to th e cyd es of accumulation in th e two de partments of pr oduction
, I 53
.
,-.---
_
_---
...
..... __,_o
. .. _ .--.. -----_._"
.. ..
m ...
-< --~
<-~<
- ~ - <._ ~
,-
"-
2 I 53
- - - - - - - - - <0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
'
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
liter ature never saw th e origin of thi s pro blem in th e inher ent antago nism
have seen th a! th e
Deprived of any cra ft content , wor k loses any qualita tively differentiated
character th a! could have an influence on th e working-d ass mode of life.
was no such thing as a labour mar ket and th at th e level of employment was
Because labour-po wer bec omes a co mmod ity , it is incorpo rat ed int " a
pr od uctive sys te m whose alpha and omega is surplus-va lue; th e
determined by th e pro spe ctive incomes distr ibuted by firms, when account
was taken of th e conditions of pr oouction in which th ese were operating.'
This dynamic approach was genera lly not followed by pos t-Keynes ian
writers like !Caldor , Pasinetti ' and Sweezy, who reduced th e pro blem of
th e int ernal prin cipIes of its evolutio n. The transfurm at ion of relations of
product ion crea tes a mass product ion of commoclities which tends by th e
reinfor ced when th ey are cut off from individual ties of family , or bonds of
of
pr oouction
it
forges
genera lize
certain
maJor
3 I 53
of th e First
~'Ie
~'Iorld ~Iar .
(a) The cha racteristic mode 01 cons ump tion 01 Fordism. In order to
under stand how th e transform at ions of th e relations of proo uction within
th e labou r pr ecess create impulses th at play a pr imordial ro le in th e
formation of a moo e of consumption , it is necessar y not to view
consumptio n empirically as a sum of expenditure funct ions, nor in terms of
th e th eor y of th e individual consumer as th e source of an axiomatic set of
well-organized and stab le choices, given certain resources and mar ket
conditions. The praxiological conception of th e th eory of th e individual
consumer forms part of a definitio n of th e object of economic science as a
logic of individual choices subjec t to th e constraint of sca rc ity and th e rule
4 I 53
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A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
is, a science of th e social laws govern ing th e product ion and distribution of
th e means of existe nce by men and women in organized collectivities.
as well as vis-a-vis other social gro ups with whom th ey maintain relations.
The bas is of thi s repr esentation is ev idently th e exe rcise of real ab ilities,
relations, i.e. th e role req uired by society. But thi s repr esentation IS
effected in th e form of a recognition which involves th e perception of
pro per . ~'Ihat we need her e , however , is something more bas ic - a th eory of
not int rin sic to th e individu al , but inh er ent in th e place eccupied in social
economic relations. Such relations, which issue from social stra tificatio n
recent , studies and co ntro versies.' Basing our argument on certain of th ese
studies, we shall co nfine ourselves to linking th e co ncepts which co ncern
and require spec ific repr eduction , actively differe ntiate th e precess of
labour-po wer int o a routine. These habits are transmitted from one
genera tion to the next . The learning of cultural sta tus cedes and th e
principIes of behav iour th at follow from th em is one of th e essential
ente r th e labour mar ket see king pos itions with a sta tus whose ideological
features th ey have already internalized . Only th e forces unl eashed by
capitalist accumulation can disso lve th ese habits, by genera lizing mobilit y
is a predominantly pri vate process; its co ncrete pract ices take place
pr incipally within th e hou sehold , a site where individu alit y is pr otected .
They are not directly un der th e sway of the relations of pr eduction . This is
why th ey can give rise to vary ing ideologies and are susceptible to
dass in an epoch of extre me po verty and tot al insecurity , which pro vided
5 I 53
6 I 53
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
th ese
co mmod ities fur pr ivate use , th ese are durable goods whose acq uisitio n
goes far beyond th e purchasing power of current wages. The furmation of
commod ities
and
not able
of
non- commodity
int erper son al relations. Once th e social co nditions th a! enab led thi s mod e
inscribed in th e genera lization of th e mechani zed labour precess with semiautomatic co ntrol. These co nditions were multiple in character and
int egrati on int o th e nati on , i.e. th e smal! famil y unit and househ old . Her e
th e working dass received a sta tute that funct ion ed as th e regulator of its
establishment of secial co ntro ls to guara n tee th e furmation of th e workingdass norm of co nsumption and to regularize its evolution.
The most imm ediat e of these co nditions relate to th e influence of
transfurm ati on s of th e labour precess on th e maintenance cyd e of labourpo wer. ~'Ie have seen how Taylor ism , and lat er Fordism , ada pte d to th e
restri ction of th e working day by sharply increasing th e int ensit y ofl abo ur
and sys te matica l!y compressing wasted tim e . The result was the
of a strict separa tion between wor king and non- working hours. Since thi s
was overlaid by th e further co nstraint of separa tion and increased dista nce
sub urban kind had multiple effects. Constructed according to certain bas ic
sta nda rds, th e new housing pu t an end to unhygenic and unsafe int eri ors,
prol on ged , with th e result that th e tim e co nstraint imposed by labour did
not fal! des pite th e limit ati on of wor king hours. In dividu al commod ity
and permitted th e inst al!at ion of hou sehold appliances th at saved domestic
recupe ration from physical and ner vou s fati gue in a co mpact space of tim e
pr efabr ication red uced its costs to a po int where , stre tc hed over th e
overal! term of payment , it was less of a burden on th e working-d ass wage
- 7 I 53
labour . Sta nda rd ized housing is also a symb ol of sta tus, once it can be
of th e ' 95 0Sth an were the rents extorte d by the landlords of th e int er- war
yea rs fur th e unhygenic hou sing of th at tim e . So far as th e auto mob ile was
8 I 53
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
semi-auto matic assembly line, in other words th e crea tio n " f th a! mooel of
wa rk organization th a! was later to be exte nd ed to th e lon g pr oduct ion
equipment. It was also susta ined by th e ques t fur a sta tus adequate to th is
norm . But in order fur th is logic of co nsumption to be co mpatible with a
~'Iorld ~'Iar ,
which we
values had to be ada pted to capitalist mass product ion .4 This meant th e
creation of a fim ctional aesthetic ('design'), which acq uired fundamental
secial importance .' This aesthetic had firstl y to respect th e co nstraints of
engineering, and co nsequently co nceive use-values as an assemb ly of
sta nda rdized co mpo nents capable of lon g product ion runs. It also had to
introd uce planned obsolescence , and establish a funct ion al link between
use-values to create th e need fur th eir co mplementarity . In th is way ,
co nsumption activ ity co uld be rende red un ifurm and fully subjec te d to th e
co nstraints of its items of equipment. Finally , th is funct ion al aesthetic
dup licated th e real relationship between individuals and objects with an
imaginary relationship . Not co ntent to create a space of objects of daily
life , as supports of a capitalist co mmod ity un iver se , it pro vided an image of
thi s space by adv ertising techniqu es. This image was presen ted as an
objectification of co nsumption sta tus which individu als co uld per ceive
outside th emselves. The pr ecess of social recognition was exte rnalized and
fetishized . In dividu als were not initially interpellat ed as subjec ts by one
another, in accorda nce with th eir social pos ition: th ey were inter pellated
by an exte rnal po wer, diffusing a ro bo t po rtra it of th e 'co nsumer' .
Consumption habits were thus already calculated and co ntro lled socially.
Yet it canno t be stressed too greatly th at th e role of th e image in
co nsumption , which man y seciologists have made int o a fundamental
explanato ry pr incip Ie of capitalist development, is strictly sub ordinate to
th e materi al and secial co nditions th at we have discussed .
9 I 53
(b) The crisis 01 Fordism and the perspectives 01 Neo -Fordism. The
ideologists of th e co nsumer society were har shly awakened to th e realities
of capitalism by th e deep crisis th at bega n to int ensify in th e latter half of
th e 1960s. As we showed in Chapter~ , th e crisis of Fordism is first of all th e
crisis of a mod e of labo ur organization . It is expressed above all in th e
intensification of dass struggles at th e po int of producti on . By challenging
co nditions of work bound up with th e fragmentati on of tasks and
intensification of elfort, th ese struggles sho wed th e limits to th e increase in
th e rate of surplus-va lue th at were inh er ent in th e relations of pr od uction
organized in thi s type oflabo ur precess. This was th e roo t of th e crisis. It
can be see n in th e halt to th e fall in real social wage costs th at eccurred
simulta neo usly with th e outbreak of spora dic co nflicts and ende mic
co nfrontations challenging work disciplines of th e kind Fordism had
established. But it is d ear enough th at th e crisis extends to th e sum tot al of
relations of prod uction and exc hange, and is upsetting th e regime of
intensive accumulation. It is possible to spea k of an organic crisis of
capitalism witho ut implyin g its inevit able disappearance . Let us examine
th e pro blem more dosely. The imp asse of relative surplus-va lue th at
originates in th e labour precess bra kes th e expansion of exc hange relations
between th e two departments of producti on . The development of th e
department producing means of pr od uction encounte rs a co nstraint , since
it no lon ger gives rise to technical mutat ion s leading to a further
, O I 53
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
mechanization " f abour , capable of genera ting a suflicient sav ing in diree!
labour tim e to co mpensate fur th e inerease in th e organic ca mpo. ilion of
capital. It is no! surprising, th er efure , tha! th e replacement of th e semiauto matic assembly line by th e sys te m of lran.fer lines, esta blishing
automatic co ntrol over mass pr od uction , has so far found only limit ed
applicatio n. Certa inly lhi s form of auto matic pr od uction co ntro l saves
diree! living labou r , bu! it doos so only by exte nding and pushing to its
ultimat e limit s th e form of work organization and th e working-d ass
co nsumption norm characteristic of Fordism . It canno t th er efore a lfer any
solution to th e mounting dass struggle in pr oduction . This has been sho wn
(p . 96 above).
~'Ihile
~'Iorld
th e unit cost of indirect wages has increased far more than any thing
else, with a real explosion in its gro wth since 1965 . This observation is
co nfirmed by Diagra m 10 , which shows th e long-term trend in nati on al
incom e distr ibu tion . This dearly shows th at th e overall aggrega te of wages
by th e int roducti on of transfer lines in th e auto mob ile indu st ry . The new
plus social benefits was sta ble only age rial, techni cal and co mmerc ial
fact ories esta blished on thi s basis have been mar ked by th e strongest
working-d ass challenge to labou r discipline .'
personnel) has been held stea dy since th e Second ~'Iorld ~'Iar , whereas th e
share in th e overall aggrega te of wages plus social benefits was only sta ble
upsurge of unemp loyment and gro wing job insecurity . At th e same tim e ,
, ,)
develop ment of th e working-d ass co nsumption nor m are thus affected. The
result has been a falling pr oportion of th ose able to bu y th eir own hom es in
th e younger age groups, and th e stagnation of auto mobile pr oduction . The
buoyancy of th e social co nsumption norm is thus structura lly threat ened
by those co mmod ities th at are th e very found ation of mass co nsumption
un der th e co nditions of Fordism. It is menaced eve n more seriously by th e
deterior ation in its social pr e-cond itions. ~'Ie have see n, in effect, how th e
co nsumption norm geared to pr ivate co mmod ities can only develop if
th er e exist social mod aliti es of finance , pr oced ures by which society
ass umes respo nsibility for th e risks and expenditures of a collective
infrast ruct ur e . The pr oduction of thi s env ironment of pr ivate co nsumption
ente rs int o th e repr oduction value of social labour-po wer. Its cost forms
part of th e nominal reference wage as defined in th e bro ad sense, where it
indudes both a direct and an indir ect co mpo nent . Now th e exclusive
nature of th e tie th at Fordism esta blishes between a mechani zed labour
pr ocess and a strictly pr ivate co nsumption of co mmod ities genera tes a
rap id increase in th e cost of so-called collective consumption as th e
co nsumption norm develop s. This phenomenon co unteracts a rise in
relative surplus-va lue to th e po int of reversing its develop mental trend ,
11 1 53
12 1 53
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-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
/
"t- tl-\SJ-".H--;;;b"i"'n
-j
/
I ,I/! 1\1 V
II
.
"
..
,"
.:
,,-.
-,
0"/
0'-"....
..
', ' .
. ....
I-~~r~~t
.... ....-
" .-
social
co nsumption
norm
of labour
accorda nce
with
th e
prin cipIe
of
& . ._
~,
".I...-ofl
_'
:<.. p""'"
...,.. .., ,. ",;,.t>rI_ ..... _no:! ~ .. ....... ,
,. ,,,.
""
~..
th e
~. ~
.._
th at
\{
' ..,_n
"
<01><,,"',_ '
showing
collectivization
by
~'Ie
:---1
'
socializa tio n 01 co nsump tio n bec omes a decisive ter rain and battle -ground
of th e dass struggle. For thi s soc ialization is ever more necessar y as
pr ecapitalist furms of eve ry day life are destro yed together with th e social
structures in which th ese co uld de velop .
~'Ihen
th e wage relation !S
,, A: ..
'.
"
"" 1
"
serv ices, and a good part of educa tion. This sho uld not be surprising, since
th er e are no use-values which are co mmod ities by nature , nor others
-.
'"
which are not oThe co mmod ity is a social relation of exchange , and its use-
.' -.
'.
value only th e support of thi s exc hange. It can well happen , th er efure , th at
certain use-values th at are not co mmod ities un der certain typ es oflabo ur
process and certain evolutionary logics of th e mod e of co nsumption
Fordism , collective co nsumption ded ines and its costs rapidly increase ,
until th ey eventually cancel th e genera l tendency towar ds a rise in th e rat e
1'14"
~'Ie
For dism as a regime of int ensive accumulation, and " f its pr esent crisis. ~'Ie
sta rte d with th e hypothesis th a! th e lalter was esse ntially a crisis in th e
repr od uction of th e wage relation . If th a! is in fae! th e case , th en it is
13 1 53
'4 I 53
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
are
produced by
capitalists with
pr ocess
tot al sum " f surplus-va lue. The social casI of repr od ucing labou r-po wer
th en rises, with various financial co nsequences. There are severa l ways in
incom e tax . Or else it is levied on pro fit in various different furms. In either
th e pr od uction of sta nda rdized co mmod ities and a cor respo nding upsurge
we
have
called
Neo-Fordism.
This
involves
maJ or
surplus-va lue co uld still be imposed . But th ese very furces th emselves
on th e other hand , co nfers a new and not able flexi bilit y on th e labour
pr ocess, which may be divided up int o semi-autonomous units. This
relation .
~'Ie can now define more clea rly th e overall socio-economic co nditions
15 1 53
16 1 53
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
dass struggle, of th e int ernal stra tification of eac h " f th e two po lar dasses
defined by th e wage relation , th a! it would be extre mely pr esumptuous to
make any jud gement on lhi s question al th e present stage of e ur analysis.
is known as 're de ploy rnent'. The lalter is still enc!ose d in th e th eoret ical
to assess th e due order of impo rt anee , stability and distor tion of these
faet ors. Two distinet pro blems must be examined her e: th e internal
stra tifieatio n of the pr oletariat and th e pro blem of manageri al sta ff.
(a) The stratijication 01the proletariat . The bas is of thi s stra tifieation is th e
organization of labou r . In its sys tematie applicatio n of th e pr incipIe of
meehani zati on , Fordism largely destro yed a11 ski11ed crafts and disso lved
th e sta tus th at was fuund ed on th em . In thi s way it create d th e co nditions
fur th e trade-uni on organization of th e working elass on an indu st rial bas is.
This organization bea rs witness to th e pro gressive unifieation of th e
working elass. To th e exte nt that meehani zati on has taken hold of non indu strial aetivities, th e workers in th ese aetiv ities toa have experienee d a
fragmentat ion of tasks making th em into int er changeable elements of a
co11eetive labour-po wer , i.e. pr oletarianizing th em . The existenee of th eir
old employ ment sta tus typiea11y co ntributed to maintaining certain
differentiations in wages fur a longer or sho rte r period , but th e ever more
pr essing need to red uce wage costs genera te d an irresisti ble pr essure to
align th ese categories of workers with th e sta nda rd working-elass
co nsumption norm . ~'Ihen American sociologists used to celebrate th e
enlargement of th e 'middle elass', what th ey were rea11y observing was th e
super-impositio n of two different phen omena: on th e one hand th e
extension of th e pr oletariat , in other words of th e fragmented ,
int er ehangeable and unski11ed worker ; on th e other hand th e rapid gro wth
in th e co nsumption norm to whieh a11 th ese workers were ada pted. These
The wage-earn ing elass is not stra tified according to a single or simple
17 I 53
18 I 53
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A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
cod ified by collective barga ining. In enshr ining th e prin cipIe of seniority
ideological relations inh eri ted from slavery, in other words racism oLike a
and certain limited " ppo rtunities of promoti on , th ese differentiations play
a da uble role. On the ,me hand they form par! of the meth ods of discipline
not white in th e strict sense. Capita lism has made far more effective use of
managements can make use of semi-auto no mous work gro ups as a weapo n
same simple labou r-po wer , empla yed at th e same type of fragmented
activities, was paid differently acca rding to race , since a ne sec tion af th e
working dass was ceded lesser rights af reconstitu tion th an th e other by
society. For this to be so, it was ev ide ntly necessar y for racism to have
taken deep hold on th e working dass itself, to a po int where trade-uni on
a rganizations a nly tcok account af th e int er ests af white workers.
pr ovoking a deep and lasting division within th e dass. They repr esent th e
th e co uple and its young children . It is th e recon stitu tion of labour -po wer
(1) Certa in categories of labour -po wer are oppressed ethnic min orities
subjec t to a sys te matic discrimination in all co nditions of work and life ;
(2) The organization of th e co nsumption pr ocess within th e famil y
househ old assigns certain categories of laoour-po wer (women and young
pr oouction . This form of pr oo uction assigns a spec ial place in soc iety to th e
soc iety is a single tot alit y in which supers tructura l forms can exert a
indirectl y pro vides th e capitalist moo e of pr oo uction with unp aid labour .
of surplus-va lue. They also play a large role in capitalist co mpetition . ~'Ie
shall see in particular how th e stra tification of th e pro letariat assists th e
19 1 53
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A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
~'Iomen's
labour with low pr od uctivity (the do mestic labour from which it pr ofits
sys te m of social co ntrol is a question to which we are tod ay still far from
being able to give an answer. But th e impo rt ant po int her e is to see dearly
which it pr ofits direct1y), while still paying fur female labou r-po wer as a
functi on of th e do mes tic labou r it saves. This is also why women move in
have to
pr oletariat .
co rnmoclities req uired ta ass ure th e co nsumption pr ecess with red uced
~'Iomen
- 21 1 53
(b) Managerial staff. " The pos ition of managerial sta ff in th e wage-earn ing
dass has always been not oriou sly amb iguo us. This amb iguity obviously
de rives from th e relation of th eir pos itio n in th e capitalist organization of
labour to th e bas ic deavage which defines th e capitalist dass and th e
pro letariat . Managers appear as an int ermediat e social category . The term
social category can only be justified by a pos ition in social relations
betokening a pr eponderant hom ogeneit y amidst a dive rs ity of situations.
Now thi s hom ogeneit y certainly has no funct ion al bas is. The social division
of labour doos allocate managerial sta ff skilled - i.e. dive rse, co mplex and
mobile -
22 1 53
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
do no! belong to th e prol et ari at , and do no! tend to dissa lve int o it as a
category , because th e social division ofl abo ur always renews co ntro l over
th e prol et ari at , eve n if its forms change. The individu al fat e " f certain
manager s, who may bec ome prol et ari ani zed in per iod s of large-scale
serious co nfusion between co mplex labour and labou r-po wer . Complex
change , when old hier ar chical funct ion s disappear , sho uld no! be co nfused
with th e social category itself. The lalter is th e agent " f capitalism in th e
econo mists outside th e neo-d assical sch",,!.' These errors derive from a
labour de no tes those spec ifie activities th at are organically determined by
th e collective worker and hom ogeni zed by th e social pr ocess of exchange .
co nditions " f exploita tio n subjec ted ta a movement of unification , sho uld
not be co nfused with th e distinction between th e pr oletariat and th e social
~'Ihat
T "n , h' ,, ~ n.'.. 'h. r "n,h ' "m , .dros ;, hm " ndmd .. "'''M<" h l , ' d I', ;n 'h.
" ..n" . f . n ,,' . qu;..l.n'. It , h.u ld ,. ' ' '.n, 'hm fo" , .. mdudm< ' "hn;, hn, . n d
. n<m.m.
autono my.
of
of certain qualifications can be seriously threat ened . The hier ar chy may
alte r, certain specialized qualifications bec ome worthless, other new ones
multiple tensions that erupt within it , due to its amb iguous relation to th e
career structures. These distinctive feat ur es, which dilfere ntiate th em from
all other gro ups, make co mpetition th e pr incipIe of th eir int ernal relation s
- a co mpetition incit ed by th e hierarchy of till es and salaries th at forms
co mpetition within it . For thi s to be so, th er e must exist oppo rtunities for
enterprise , which indudes a large number of hier ar chical levels and a
part of th e person nel po liey of any capitalist ente rprise. If sta tus
souree of tension , doos not jeop ard ize th e social d imate of th e firm and
determine sta tus are co ntro lled by th e ca pitalist dass, and form part of its
global po wer over society.
see k to identify the elements of thi s co mplexity by a funct ion al analysis and
involves not
- 2 3 1 53
24 1 53
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
soc ial sta bility. The US pattern is not ably distine! from th e congealed
lar gely unkn own and careers are petrified by form al qualificatio ns, and
enviro nment and falling sta nda rds of collective co nsumption . Politi cal
reflection on th ese th emes will not go so far as to yield an un der st andin g of
soc iety is strongly int ern alized in th e spec ific ideology " f lh is soc ial gro up,
which reinfurces capitalism by ada pting th em to th eir ro les in th e social
manager ial sta ff and th e commod ity characte r th at it ass umes un der
enterpr ise caused by th e int roduct ion of auto matic co ntro l sys tems, which
destro y th e rank attac hed to certain hierarchical funct ion s. These furm
part of th e reor ganization within th e category indu ced by th e rise of Neo-
Fordism .
independent opinions.
The individu alism of manageri al sta ff co nfurms co mpletely with
almos t tot al abs ence of trade-un ion organization amo ng th em . It sta mps all
inter- personal relations within thi s social gro up, in which eac h is jud ged
co ntro !.
ente red int o crisis do not see m seriously to th reaten th eir co hesion , nor to
modi fy significant1y th eir situation vis-a-vis th e capitalist dass on th e one
gove rn eve ryday life , has recent1y experience d certain reverses. Thr ee
distinct phenom ena can be noted her e .
The first is related to th e emergence of certain po litical th emes to which
- 2 5 1 53
26 1 53
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
involves more th an simply its physical rec onstitution from a ne pr odu ction
cycle to another. There is also th e renewal of th e wor king dass from
genera tio n to genera tion. The casts of lhi s repr oduction thus include the
expend iture fur th e maintenance and educa tio n of th e children who are to
replace th e existing labour force . They alsa include th e maintenance of
former workers during th e shar! int er val , as it is on average, th a! separa tes
retir ement and dea th. Final1y , th ey include insurance costs against
siekness, which puls labour-po wer out of serv ice fur a sha rter or lon ger
accumulation. The mon et ar y flows to which th ese sys te ms give rise do not
po rtian " f its tot al activity. The int egrat ion of th ese needs int o th e working-
co ncern ed . Still less are direct wages co mpensated far by indirect wages.
~'Ihen
Since th e end of th e Second ~'Iorld ~'Iar , th ey have developed spec tac ularly,
at an eve r accelera ting pace . These needs are indu ced by th e
transfarm ati on of th e co nditions of existence of th e wage-earn ing dass.
risks , at th e very mom ent when all risks are increased by th e gro wing
insecurity of employment . In po int of fact , th e th reat to relative surplusvalue raises th e level of un employm en t by slowing down the overall ra te of
In all th ese cases, th e co vering of th ese needs ente rs int o th e value of s ocial
labou r-po wer . But th e flows of income and th e institution al mechanisms by
which th ese needs are met vary greatly from one social far mation to
another. Differe nces arise according to whether taxes and other charges
can be fulfilled only if th e nominal direct wages of th ose wor kers with jo bs
Sta tes - during th e phase of its genera lization un der Fordism - to ensure
exhausted . The benefits from th ese funds create expend iture flows th at
administe red by a spec ial appara tus; it was highly selective and un certain
from th e daimants' po int of view. The right to assista nce was always in
jeop ard y , both in scope and in the degree of its co verage , as th e assista nce
sys tem was directly in th e hands of bourgeois po litical organs." Popular
- 27 1 53
28 1 53
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
whole prevailed over the principIe " f social solidarity in meeting risks. In
study ing th e American insurance sys te m, th er efore , it is pr eferable to
spea k of deferred wages rather th an indirect wages. These take th e form of
insurance funds sel up by wor kers pr ivately , prin cipally fur medical and
pension funds form very significant reservoirs of capital. They are bitterly
has bee n stea dily increasing. These pr ivate pension funds are a gro tes que
example of th e antago nism between social needs and th e exigencies of
centralization .
accumulation. The ave rage American worker , after co ntributing all his
collective barga ining in th e lat e ' 930S. The rate of gro wth of th eir asse ts
that were relatively bac kward. These wor kers, moreover , were orga nized in
po werful trade uni on s which co uld barga in with th e employers over plans
1960 and 136 billion in ' 97 0 . This gro wth accelera te d un der th e pressure
of separa te but co nvergent forces: th e rapid incr ease in nominal incom es,
~. 5
active. But th e forces pressing to accelera te th e gro wth in th ese funds were
funded half by deductions from wages, and half by th e employers. This very
moJest plan pro vided only an absolute ly minimal benefit, but it did
co mbine individu al insurance with a moJest redistr ibution of incom e .
sys tem of social insurance , in fact , th e benefits paid de rive from pr esent
minimal. Only in ' 97 3, in a situation of accelera ting inflat ion , and un der
pr essur e from social forces that had sec ure d a broad co nsensus, did
obtained by all individu als at th e end of th eir lives are a funct ion of th e
co ntractual sav ings schedule. But th ese benefits are in no way guara ntee d.
The ownership of th e assets involved , in fact , doos not lie with th e wage-
2 9 1 53
30 1 53
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
earn ers bu! rather with th e capitalist dass. The funds are sel up in th e
All th ese co nditions were reversed fr om 1966 onwards. The average ratio
of annual payments to accumulated asse ts, which had risen fr om 3.3 %in
earn ers in profits, whose proceeds are deferred int o th e future . In actual
value reached its limit s. But what th e rise in thi s ratio doos not reveal is th e
pr ivate pension fund sys tem erupted at a tim e when , as we have seen, th e
far ces pr essing far a genera lization of th e pension sys te m and a rise in th e
a po litical issue . The int egrati on of pension schemes int o a single nat ion al
process of exploita tion and accumulation takes care of itself. The more th e
his co ntributions.
The dynamic elfect of th ese funds far th e accumulation of capital is thus
pensions paid had bec ome stronger th an befare. The pro blem thus be came
(to tal tax exemption, co nstant new inject ion s, liqui dit y needs plannable in
advance ). ~'Ie can also und erstand , however , how th e co ntradictions of thi s
type of financial investment are now bec oming eve r more acute. For
retu rn s have to be obtained on eve r greate r investments; and thi s bec omes
impossible , as th e big banks cannot invest every thing in th ose sec to rs with
a high gro wth rate without th e return on share capital eve ntually co ming to
~'Iith
its trade-un ion leader s placing th eir fait h in indefinit e econo mic
gro wth, it was not only ro bbed to a lar ge exte nt of the real value of its
appea r artificially high in relation to real pro fitability . Up till about 1965 ,
th e establishment of new funds and th e relatively recent character of th ese
assets by inflati on , but very often even of th eir nominal value, since th e
pensions schemes kept th e ratio of benefits to th e value of th e funds low all th e more so because th e nomin al value of shares on th e stoc k-markets
had gro wn stea dily and far more rapidly th an th e rise in pr ices since ' 95 0 .
co ntract o The two antago nistic dasses are not social partners, as is
31 1 53
pension schemes did not olfer th e guara ntees th at any credito r is norm ally
32 1 53
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
co mplacently maintained . They are no! player s subjec t to th e same rul es,
a ne simply being stronger th an th e a lher . The wage relat ion determines
of imm ediat ely co nceiving th e unity of th e abs tract social space and th e
qualita tively different dass pos ilions. The two 'players' are no! playing th e
same game, th ey do nat have th e same goals, and th ey are no! subjec t to
int ermediar y theoreti cal space , that of social lo rms. This space has a
th e same rules."
topol ogical and not a met ric structure. Its elements are relations, social
int er acti on s, endowed with a law of repr oduction . ~'Ie know that in a
exc hange eq uivalence. This space of social furms exercises a very real
mediati on . The co ncrete space of activ ities and use-values is a supp ort
and co nceptual elabora tio n. ~'Ie mus! now deepen and apply th e co noep! of
~'Ie
co rroep! " f furm in th e th eory of exc hange. The co ncept owes th e pos itio n
th at it occupies in econo mic science to its mediati on between th e
expreSSlOn.
~'Ie
can thus see why it is necessar y fur econo mic science to co nstruct
th e space of social furms, in a two-way movement between observation of
accorda nce with particular project s, and create arte facts th rough which
th ey ente r int o social interaction . The co ncrete space of activ ities refers
~'Ihat
~'Ie
oltasks that doos not derive from th eir co ntent but which is imposed on
thi s co ntent oA particular mod e of distr ibu tion of tasks is articulated to a
spec ific and exd usively social de te rmination oflabo ur . ~'Ie know th at th e
co mmod ity econo my is a mod e of distr ibu tion of tasks characte rized by th e
existe nce of independent pr ocesses of pr ivate labour . Social co hesion is
obtained by a particular pr oced ure of social valida tion of th ese pr ivate
labours, effecte d ex p ost on th e pr od ucts of labour , which bec ome
co mmod ities. In thi s case , th e mod e of distr ibu tion of tasks can be
co nceptualized as a homogeneous abs tract space, th e space of value. The
co nstitutive relation of thi s space is th e social relation of exchange, and th e
spec ific de te rmination ofl abour is abs tract labour .
The fundamental episte mo logical problem is th at th er e is no possibility
33 153
34 1 53
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
~'Ie
befare al! else an analysis of th e mat eri al transfurm at ion s th a! are th e bas is
shall th en
th e lon g-run quantita tive develop ment of wages, and in th eir regulation in
th e differe nt phases of th e accumulation cyd e .
Bargaining
~'Ie
bas le social forms arising from th e development of one and th e same bas ic
social re lation.
In accordance with th e above th eoreti cal elabora tion, we shall now
(a) The tendencies in the trade-union movement afi er the Seco nd Wo rld
Wa r. The imm ediat e pos t-war period was dec isive far th e lat er
development of th e workers' movement . Massive strikes inspired by
grieva nces over wages and wor king co nditions that had built up during th e
war bro ught th e working dass a series of econo mic victories. But thi s was
structura l farms is thus a way of laying th e faunda tions far a th eory of the
capitalist sta te. "
(3) The laws of repr od uction of social far ms give rise to transfarm at ion s
in th e homogeneou s field of value. The structura l far m in which th e wage
relation is reproduced affects th e transfarmat ion of th e value of labour po wer int o wages. In vestigation of collective barga ining will enable us to
35 153
~'Iest
pro hibiting th e dosed shop. The 1946 elections, however , retu rn ing a
strong co nservative majorit y , were to give thi s ideological campaign a
36 1 53
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
~'Iagner
In its pr eam ble , th e Taft-Hartley Act asse rts th e need to restr ain trade-
govern ment a whole ars enal of weapo ns which fall sho rt of imposing
(1) The wor kers' right freely to choo se th eir trade-uni on repr esentatives
is co nfirmed .
~'Ihen
~'Ihite
repe aled soo n petered out . The po litical d imate quickly de te riora ted after
Truman solemnly launched th e doc trine of th e Cold ~Iar . The anti-wor king-
of the d osed shop , and of any strike see king to establish thi s, as well as any
(3) The act atte mpts to define th ose pro blems which should or sho uld
not form part of th e content of collective barga ining, and th e forms in
which thi s barga ining sho uld be pursued . Trade uni on s can be pro secu ted
for breach of contract , refusal to apply a co ntract , or a strike aimed against
th e terms of an agre ement before th at agre ement has expire d. Strikes
against th e unilat er al transform ati on of wor king co nditions by th e
~'Iar,
bro ught th e CIO into d ose alignment with th e AFL in th e same nar ro wly
co rpo ratist attitude , with very limit ed objectives. This co rpo ratism
pr ogressively impo veri shed th e co ntent of collective barga ining itself, and
cut off working-d ass trade unionism from th e po litica l forces of th e liber al
petty bourgeoisie. The result was that th e organized labo ur movement was
abs ent or tailist when th e po litical struggles of th e 1960s got und er way,
from th e campaign for th e civil rights of min oriti es, to th e fight against
output nor ms, and deskilling und er co ver of technical pro gress .
~Iar .
economy '. The definition of th e scope of thi s po wer reflects th e amb iguity
uni on mem ber s even fell from 36% of th e active non -farm po pulatio n in
of the employers ' pos ition. On th e one hand , th e employers were anxious to
37 I 53
No subs ta ntia l
pr ogress in mem ber ship was achieved after ' 950 , and th e proportion of
38 I 53
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
oflicials in pro blems of management , and limitin g th e horizon " f soc ial
class struggle in the United Sta tes since th e war has been to transfarm
co nflicts. The Taft-Hartley Act cod ified a co rpo rative un ioni sm , furmerly
practi sed only by cra ft workers, by creating th e po litico-legal relations ta
recession of ' 953- 54, with its surplus pr od uction capacities, financial
difliculties aggravate d by th e new Eisenhower administra tion's
mer ger between th e " Id co rpo rative union centre of th e AFL and th e new
centre resulting from th e d ass struggles oft he ' 930S, th e cro, in ' 95 4-55 .
assa ult to red uce direct wage costs, which is th e only meaning of a rise in
pr oductivity within capitalist relations of pr od uction . This a bjective
req uired th e rap id genera lization of those transfarmat ions of th e tech nical
division of labour th at had matured in th e ' 930S and th e Second
~'Iorld
~'Iar;
pr oductive opera tions, and th eir segmenta tion and localization ta utilize
new callective means a f pr oduction and new far ms of energy (oil and
reduced activity, sys tems far sharing work amo ng th e regular employees
were jointly operated by management and trade-un ion s; dismissals co uld
only be made after tasks had been reallocated over a red uced working
technical division oflabour, whose aim was ta increase the rate of surplus-
week. Trade-union oflicials often far ced employ ers to noti fy plans far lay-
make co unter-pro posals. Lay-offs were not to be used far a major shifting
of workers between jobs unil ater ally imposed by th e management to raise
output norms. Rights of seniority were in all circ umsta nces to be
pr otected . The uni on s also sought to win rights over th e allocation of
workers to jobs by int roducing pr omotion pr oced ures int o collective
bargaining. They tried to obtain pr ecise job descriptions in th e collective
co ntracts, with clauses far bidd ing th e management to change th ese
unilater ally during th e period far which th e co ntract was in far ce . Finally ,
th ey sought to esta blish a concerted regulation of work schedules and
overtime .
Collective bargaining can thus have a very rich co ntent , and faster an
active trade-uni on life , when it is applied to th e orga nization of th e labour
pr ocess. It is th en a weapo n far th e workers in th eir struggle far security
39 I 53
(3) The excl usion from collective bargaining of wor king co nditions, and
th e imposition of new rules gove rn ing th em by th e emplayers; th e strictes t
possible circumscription , in keep ing with th e Taft-Hartly Act, of trade-
40 I 53
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
(e) The role of collective bargaining in the det'e1op ment of U' ages .
According to Feder al figur es, '5 0 ,0 0 0 wage contraets were made in 1961
(1 far eve ry 10 0 unioni zed workers). In actual faet , however , th ese
barga ining of incentive and profit -shar ing schemes, insurance funds against
contraets were depende nt on moo els fixed by keynot e negoti ations, which
ret irement .
These objectives were imposed by th e emplayers after very acute
important contraets.
~'Ihatever
charaeteristic feature of Fordism . Not only did wage contraets bee ome
peri oos suflieiently lon g to confarm with th e planning hor izon of th e big
th e AFL and
th ese test confliets. The Taft-Hartley Aet gave th e Feder al govern ment a
genera lizatio n. This moo el and th e norm it contains only cover th e bas ic
wage and th e major sehemes far collective bonuses and pension funds.
At th e same tim e as it beeame centralized in far m and alte red in content ,
colleetive bargaining under went a further change th at contributed to th e
inflexibility of th e nominal wage whieh , as we have seen, was a
more and more unifarm and all-embrae ing, th ey were also exte nded to
corporations. The sum tot al of colleetive bargaining pr ocedures thus
whole spee trum of means of inter vention in social confliets, while leaving it
a bro ad lat itu de in th e exercise of its arb itra tion. Natura lly th is was
auto matically at certain fixed dates. By divor cing wage adjustments from
arb itra tion only in th e purely far mal sense of th e liter al procedu re
th e business cyd e , colleetive contraets exte nding far severa l yea rs made
ado pted. Effecti vely , sta te intervention meant suppo rt far th e employers, if
only because it broke th e trade unions' principIe weapon of aetio n at th e
outcome could not but set th e mooel far major see tors of th e economy .'<
pro babilit y , th e corporations sys tematieally int rooueed and exte nded th e
semi-auto matic labour pr ocess applied to lon g and sta ndardized
proouet ion runs. Henee th e accelera ted fall in real social wage costs in th e
far mation to sho rt-te rm fluetuat ions in output and th e reeipr ocal role of
capital far mation in th e evening out of th ese fluetuati ons.
From th e point of view of th e pr oletariat , th ese lon g-term contraets
were extremely powerful instruments of exploitation . They left th e field
41 I 53
42 I 53
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-'
A THEOR\' OF C A ~ I TA lIS T RE GULATION
lAUeod itl ind ex atio n ro lbe casI af livmg, so lbat real ...ages d eteriorate<!
tb" more nllatio n accelere ted. Finally. lb.. "Pread Df schernes ror higher
d.. f..rred wagfl, dfligned to cornpl'ftS di r:t wal" inCl'!lo1!re5, meant _ u ....
!u.ve _n - tlu.t worl:ers ..._
penJ1OflS .
. XprUI ed u
JPC'nUMowl ~fUI
Loel LU t.aU .. do..r Iook ..t tb. Sltu.atmn. Th. funct10n .. ri!presents tIwt
rhe fixllll
ot ".lelI.
sr'"
lI>C)A
proc.dur..
S<Onli.Ulonomous 1J'OIl~,
furt b.r
lb. ".g. ccntract, Th.. S<II'1~ d""""ds on Ibe "'r.mung procedure .md
preesure on ... g
det erminatjcn Of
of ill Democr. 1;C predecesscr , only co nfirms the de pth of th e cr isis. The
W\lhoul
Ih<lreby
blocbng
Ibe
4 3 I 53
44 I 53
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
of fixed capital, fur th e who le period between , 860 and ' 9' 4. But thi s
tem po ral simulta neity in no way impli es th at th e two rhythms were one
1:
Il1t.
~ ~ ~ ' I~
ave rage change in labour producti vit y and in th e genera l price level
between th e two da tes. The variation in th e rate " f surplus-va lue,
moreover , is given by th e inver se of th e variation in real social wage costs,
which involve nominal wages, pr ices and pr od uctivity . ~'Ie are th en led to
env isage a relationship in which th e variatio n in th e nominal reference
wage is a funct ion of th e staggered delays in th e variation of th e genera l
level of pri ces and average producti vit y . It is also possible to env isage an
auto-reg ressive relationship , with a delayed gro wth in th e ave rage
interpret ati on
of quantita tive
established in our first chapter . So long as capitalism has not restr uctu red
movements must be far more mod est in its numer ical precision . But its
th eoreti cal impo rt ance is mu ch greate r. Since we have shown th at th e
unprod ucti ve labour . The rate of unemp loyment varies as a direct result of
th e gro wth or decline in th e indu st rial res erve army. Falls in nominal wages
th e division between pro fits and wages was re-established . The mor e bruta l
th e falls in nominal wages, th e sho rte r were th e phases in which
furms. The evolution of th e nominal wage and its real purchasing po wer, as
accumulation was bloc ked , and th e more far -reaching th e transfurm ati ons
accumulatio n. In its wake, thi s phase in turn led to a rise in nominal wages
unst able de riva tive of th e value ofl aoour-power (the functi on ,u fluctuati ng
a great dea l), which expr essed th e bas ic co nditions of repr od uction of th e
wage-earn ing dass. In thi s way, eve n th ou gh relative surplus-va lue was not
(a) The dwelopment o/ nomin al w ages and real w ages be/ ore the Second
45 I 53
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
fluetuat ed sharply while real social wage costs gre w only very slowly.
Changes in th e value of labour-po wer were linked in particular to th e
accumulation
un der went
far -reaching
changes.
These
changes
turning and rising slowly up to ' 9' 4. The long-r un movement of th ese
pr ices depe nd ed very littl e on th e rhythm of accumulation by which heavy
indu st ry was built up in success ive waves. This is why th e real wage rate ,
unli ke th e nominal rate , had littl e co nnection with th e rh ythm of
accumulatio n. Its long-term tendency depend ed esse ntially on th at of th e
pr ices of consumer goods.
The following data trace th e annual rate of gro wth of real wages:
Phase ofl ong-term fall in pr ices (. 865-96) : ' .3%
At-<rag <annua l
groui th rate ( li!
Ba . ic n omina l h ourly waz e
o,
~. O
Real weekly wa z e
~.~
....
' 970
,.
,.
dech'n<
L'
o,
- ' 5
Phase ofl ong-term rise in pr ices (. 896 - '9 ' 5): 0 .8%
~'Iithin th ese lon g-ru n tendencies th er e was certainly a modulat ion in th e
The co nfiguration of the previous epoch was now co mpletely reversed . The
fluctuat ed closely together with it . But th e modulat ion in th e real wage rate
was greatly red uced due to th e fall in market pr ices below th e long-r un
those of high accumulation. The paradox here is only appare nt. The
situation of th e workers might appea r to impro ve when th e regular
functi oning of th e capitalist mod e of prod uction is jammed . But thi s illusion
is dispe lled when we remember th at th e wage relation affects th e entire
value.
~'Ie
~'Ihen
pr edom inant , real social wage costs were mor e stable. The active ro le in
rate of 4%. Thus th e purchasing po wer of tot al wages fell by 35%in 4 yea rs
by th e fluct uat ions in th e nom inal wage rate and th e rate of unemp loyment ,
(b) The tren ds in nomin al and real w ages since the Second Wo rld Wa r.
47 I 53
48 I
53
- - - - - - - - ----(o . - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
evo lution over tim e of the mon et ar y expression of the working hour . Given
constraint 01the injlexibility 01the nom inal relerence w age. From now on ,
th e co ntradictory furces th at both promot e th e un even development of
Department I and co unter thi s development int er act in such a way th at th e
overall value relations defined in Cha pter 1 develop in an un am biguou s
direction over tim e . The genera l characteristics of thi s pr ecess are as
fullows:
(1) The obsolescence of fixed capital investments bec omes genera lized
and permanent , as we have shown in Cha pter 1. Renewal of fixed capital is
th e bas is fur transfurm ati on s of the pr od uction pr ecess. Integrat ed int o
pr ed icted pro babilistically , it is incorpo rat ed int o th e tot al gross pro fit in
th e furm of a pro vision fur th e renewal of th e co nditions of pr od uction . The
capitalist appropriation, and beto ken th e exte nsion and reinfur cement of
costs slows down . '7 The value co mposition of capital thus tends to develop
th e wage-earn ing dass is exte nd ed and unified , and th e more irrever sible is
4 9 I 53
50 I 53
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - <0 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
cycles of expanded repr od uction, it would take the furm " f unsold
co rnmod ities. The mon et ar y co nstraint of exchange would be expressed in
a sharp fal! in pr ices, which would lead to th e contraction of accumulation
~'Ie
have see n th at
regime " f exte nsive accumulation. Bu! when th e devalorizatio n " f capital is
mod alit y of accumulation, cornmociities are actually soldo There seems no!
to be any mon et ar y sanction fur th e loss of value.
~'Ie
But th er e is a further task ahead th at has first to be acq uitted. To study thi s
part of th e boo k. The second part will th er efure be devote d to thi s study.
abso rbs and diffuses th e loss in value. The more th e devalor ization of
r o; . n ..' . n u l , . f . lfo,h
s,1m;!', L 'Ana ly ma,ro-',onom'ou. dos
In 1., mm ",. n ' "., 1 . " " , P,,'n.'h ' .n n" .,.m ,. " lfo,h.. ..m.n
. , ... " ' 1 . mh..l . h ' u. " , ' 1 , n ' 1 u m' , . f . ' ".u' " , ' u m. s .. 'T1 . E<on. m' " . f
Elfo, h .. D.m.n. ', 'n ,;",,.,,h an d I n,o... D'stn'bu"'on; Eays in E, onom', 111'0,," , C. m" ' .'"
' 97 0 .
s .. 'n ' H h,u lH 'B...m , ., <on..mm . h .n', " . 1 num' " . fL aP. n"" " . , n, ' 975; M.
Gu n J.u m., Lo ,apltal .. IDn doubl., PH" , ' 975; , . Bn., mH., Lo ", s"'" dos obj." , PH" ,
(3) At thi s po int we can gras p th e organic unity of mod ern capitalism oIn
order fur accumulation to co ntinue despite th e dete rior ation in its
co nditions, it is necessar y fur the genera l eifect of th e devalorization of
capital on th e declining value of mon ey to recur sponta neo usly. Her e th e
51 I 53
' On '1', ....nh. l m', ... " . Gu n.u, C"apltaU"". " mod. d. "", PH" , ' 97' .
L , du n. H. lfon ' " " L. ID"'" do< dos'g n, PH" , ' 976.
'Blu.-c.ll H Blu...n '1. " m m' l. Lm.', Po"",", , 'un. ' 970.
r o; '1. " l n l m.n' . f u <ism 'n '1. fo, m. h . n . f . 'J.,' . u' -." I" H " . n. '1.
52 I 53
---------~o)---------------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
Hm h
fu,"
Monop o/y Cap...Umo, N." Yo", , . 65. T1", u l>. m", ",.nt "".. b. ",j,,,1 . "nomi , t>.
Vu ;o u , " h , l.. in R.di,.1 P. ."'"'"...., 0" ,h. E,onom', Ch,'. of Mo" op o'" Capit.Usm, URPE,
' 975, ...1" , ' 1 '1fu d fth . ,,',;, on " . mo n , ,.u n, . ...1 n o m mon h ...
P ui' , ' 97 3.
,h.
, M , ,.,, .
,.m.. '1",.
... G. 'hu.k,
P" . <ffu. n ' Mum ' . i. " ,.n ,hi, . uo>" . n , ... N. P.uJ.n" ..,Poh.',.IPo... . .nJ
So,'.1
.h.
' 970; on . L. Lit " ..., 111.Am. "". nL . borMo,.m. n., En ,l. " ... Cli ff>, , . k
~
Th...
mdu
m ' u n".n.
m'.
" n flid,
mmm"
" ..1,
umom.nt>,
l. " m m uni " . n " . " .. on . m..' ,"""in " <!u' in , 'h. fi m u if ' 958 _60.
, 1h... o" . m. " . , . 01, , u , h o . , ,,.<!u,, , . Fu n " in m , u " d. 'l.' lu". n . o> ..J.i,.,
. n Fu n " ou " u n
.0> . m,' m , ' ' ' ' on n 'o>', R ..u , ono..,ou., Jon u u "
' 97 , .
53 153
---------~o)---------------
Part Two
The
Transformations of
Inter-capitalist
Relations:
The Laws of
Competition
1 I 1
---------~o)--------------
-'
(1
el
" THEOR'r OF CAPI TALIST REGULATION
by d~"lopmi an
aM lysir of lhe condi!ions of reproduction of Ih. "age relation . By
alhering togelher lhe threads of lhi. analr ris, we ha" e already arriv&<! al
Ch.lpler 5 111ld i... !h.. co rnpeti tion of oapil.Is n ~ Pl"<>OeSS. Ow- finl lUlo
wtll be .lII ">:pOSItlon of tbe m.uw'l!l" in whicb th.. g""",aI =~t oi
this ~ of lb. book wlJ de.l! Wllh lb.. lo. . of rom~t>oll. Up till l>OW
w"
.lCCUmuU.tlOD.
!h.. ba.JiI o f theM resul ll, "" sha.lI lh" n be ~ble lo ul: how tM r..Whioning
of tb.. bnb betw_ c~pruls IIlb]ectoed to c~p1t~bsr Ci!I1tr~bz.l1ion interlff...
..ith th.. la..s of pric.. formation. Tbis analyslS ..mopen th.. ..ay to an
und..rstanding o f lb.. actu al price syst"l1lI thal obtain in tb.. Unitoed St~l ...,
on whicb w" sha.lI v"nture ~ fuw teIllMb.
conNpl "" now h.ave lO constr\lCt. BlIl "" en J.l.y nghl ~w~y lh.al
~utonomous c~p1t~1s ~re in <:ompi!t1t1on b<.c~\lSOt th"y ~ll h~v .. th"
~ttributes of capital in general, i.e. tbe y are all constitut..d by tb.. wage
relation. 11 is correel tber" for.. to uy th.at il '" by way o f competitio n lha!
money funn.otion. N" sha.lI mvesttg.ole th.. dyu.omic of credtl on lbe ba.JiI oi
th" COIldttions for lh" wncmg ot Ciprt.ilis! .ccumuLooon. Ther...ut..r We
sh.a.ll prOC<!o'!d te ..xplor. lbe bnl: betw+en money ~nd credrt, and to
demonstrate that lh" d..m~t ..r;~hl.llion of money involvQ ~ structural
form necessary fot th.. preservation afth.. unity af the natia nal curr..ncy: a
centrali:e<i moni!toU)' syflern under th.. consl,..in l of ~ st~I"""IlQrced
panty. '.'fe sha.lI lb"" be preparad lOcon!ronl th" uy conchldmg prol>lem
of Oll1" study. ~'f" sh.all _ kc to show how 1M COlllndtct1ons oi tb.. Lo.. of
c~prl~1 ~ceumlll~lion id..nlifioed in lhe first pert of lhis boo k and embo(hoed
in th.. stt uctural conditia ns of infiation condens.. and explade m th.. fot m
I I 1
",
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
3I 3
- - - - - - - - - ---j0 > - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(1
Q.
A THEOR\' OF CA ~ I TA lIST RE GULATION
ccndrtions of . " i.t.nCll o f tb . ..age... armng elas. ..hich form the co ntent of
c.pital accumulanon. Tb. nu t . tep, o n the bui. o f the va loriz.otion o f
-l
confUJion
l . T bf' D... n tuc n o f Co nc... n lral ion a u d its D... t ... runu aut s
OVIlT
Ah
individu.al e..pitll1 is nllithllT" thing, nor peSSo Ion of. thing. SIn"" .my
individu.al Clpltll1 is WIdoer tb", d<>t<>rmilllltlon of lb" socwl Clpltll1 .md
d\lllvllS from the .... gil NLition, ,t follows th.ot It is ""ntr<> of dIsposal OVIlT
.. Cll"CU1.>tiOh flow ..hose form is th.ot of <:IT"CU1.u proc<!'SS of d",nga ID lbll
form of ..ll1u
prodUctlOD ID
lbe strict
dtspoM atibe producu oI.xi.l1 Libour. Th1s .. lbe cas<! .he" lbe products
ot Lobour MI IOId .u oommochtles. for lben, ID eff..ct, lb e forNos of
prndlXttOll .... !r..gmenled and productior:l prtX."<'SS'3S are not cocrdm.otecl,
"'lh lb. r.wt tb../.l 1M lOCi.lI c lluKter a f ilie procl ucts is expres:s..d onIy
n pOffmori, ID 1M r.. l,ttolll of nclw.nge. It fOlIows from thIs th.ot lb.
indIvidu.ol u pluis u. cw.n ct eru:ed by lb bsene-e u f" =mmon pl..o.n 10.
vdoru.ottoll, ch.! th~ slatld in mutual 0PposIt1011 masmuch "" NCh_b;
ofcolllll1Od>MlI.
!bis demncn of lhe U1<Lmu.alwtwn of th.. SOCLa1 capital Ius th.
.ldunug. of bemg NLitr... to tb ", C'Ondltlons of d"V""lopm"nt of tb.. lo,..,....
of prodw:tion. Il hu notbing in COmInOn Wltb tb.. '.tomictty' oftb.. tb<lOry
of g<mllul <!qu,bbrium. Tbll Li.. of c.plt.l . cC11nIllLotlon st.mps tb
individ""li1.ltion of ..utonomous e..pit .ls Wlth . g"h<>ul tendency towuds
ccncentr..tion, Tbll con/iguution of . ut on om ollS c. pit.ls ch.ong<lS
and in
CIlIUm
proc<lSS
prOClllld ""p by etep. Tbll /irst Itep is to . n. lyse the essenti. 1determiM nt .
of ccncentr..ticn by .tudy ing th. link be t......n the ind ividu .liz.otion of
ca pit all end th. major tu nsfor mation. of the labo ur pr oceso and
t i 53
2 I 53
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
th e mar ket shares fur eac h type of use-value in isolati on , eve n though th e
tot al number of firms in th e mar ket as a whole has dropped and th e vQ!ume
of turnover and number ofw orkers co ntro lled by eac h " f these has greatly
inereased . Has th er e no! th en been an inerease in th e po wer of auto no mo us
centres to dispose of social laoo ur? ~'Ie may not e th a! valorizatio n of capital
develop ment , thi s phenomenon is int rin sically not operative to a unifurm
~'Ihen
th e co ncrete
thi s mon et ar y furm th at ena bles one and th e same individu al capital to
~'Iorld ~'Iar) ,
In our view, sorne order must be esta blished in thi s pro fusion of partial
law of accumulation, it inevit ably involves a ques t fur relative sav ing on
3 I 53
4 I 53
- - - - - - - - - - - - - <0 > - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
produced and th e pr ices at which th ey are mar ket ed are similarly imposed
see below how mer ger s between capitals ""eur in waves, with a precise
on th em . The latter are not mar ket pri ces but simply transfer pri ces. Yet
th ese sub-contracting firms play an essential role in th e stra tification of th e
prolet ari at . ~'Ie have seen th at thi s stra tification is an important form for
obtaining higher rates of surplus-va lue un der co nditions of Fordism . The
labour mar ket . The establishment of sub-contracting net works enab les
centralized capitals to organize thi s segmenta tion while dispe rsing and
flow not tied by th e need to finance producti ve capital. Now thi s cash flow
co rpo ration and th e financial gro up, which we shall investigate at th e end
5 I 53
6 I 53
- - - - - - - - - - - - - <0 > - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
can de pla y a cash flow accruing from severa l different valorizatio n cycles,
th e more formidable its co mpetitive ability to exte nd its po wer " f disposal
only slightly,
over property .
Since what is al sta ke in th e centralization of capital is actual ownership
accumulation.
regular
and in the late 1960s. Each major wave is pr eceded by one or mor e min or
waves. By exte nd ing our earlier analyses, we can explain th e pos itio n of
maJOf red istr ibutions of di. pasable mon et ar y funds. The ma s! co rree!
th ese merger waves in th e traject ory of capital furm ation and establish th e
' 9 ~S
to 1968.
!..L _'..J...!.
,.
' 9 ~ os ,
fJ --c"
'
"
./
th<'00
th<200
nar
b'99 t./irm.
b'99 t./irm.
' 9 ~5
3 4 5
'9~9
38.~
45 8
' 933
4~5
4 9 5
' 939
4' 9
4 8 7
' 94 7
37 5
4 5 0
' 954
4' 9
4 6 .0
5 4
55 ~
196~
4 5 5
55 1
1 9 65
4 5 9
55 9
19 6 8
4 8 4
60 4
1 95 8
"\
J1
,.
SO""'., ,"o"'...
ma ga z' n.
~'Iaves
value, raising th e rate of surplus-va lue again, and thus setting in moti on a
gro wth in th e overall rate of retu rn on pr oductive capital. The
declines (as attes ted by a deceleration or halt in th e fall of real sacial wage
costs), and in periods when capital is being strongly devalor ized (attested
~'Iar
7 I 53
8 I 53
- - - - - - - - - ----{o ) - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
purchases and sales of various kinds of titl es to pro perty which stipulate
restr icted are opened up ; producti ve forces are shifted towar ds th ose
economic br anches where a gro wth po tential is beginning to sha w.
as capital, agrees to part with his asse ts , and th e rights he acq uires in
reverse (e .g. 1926 and 1967), as a result of the fal! in th e overall rate of
return on pr oducti ve capital. ~'Ie have seen in Cha ple r 1 th a! lhi s fal! occurs
as scon as th e inerease in th e rate of surplus-va lue is checked or sto pped
circ ulation has bee n th e stoc k mar ket , which registered a major surge
that are well situate d see k to stre ngthen th eir pos itions , and pro fit from
th eir high rate of return to exte nd th eir space for valorization. The upshot
is a wave of mer ger s pr oceed ing chiefly via th e absorption of sorne firm s by
This th eoreti cal inter pret ation of waves of mer ger s would be incomplete
spec ulative fever during th e high po int of a wave of mer ger s. Such a fever is
unl eashed when th e upswing of capital formation pete rs out, yet th e flow of
mon et ar y facilities remains ab unda nt while th e retu rn on th eir prod uctive
such co nditions.
(1) A n upswing offi nancial circulation. Such circulation is indu ced by
financial agencies , either loc ked int o th e circ uit of payments or linked to
holders of unused liquid resources , which capture mon ey already create d
and transform it int o money capital. Yet thi s transform ation , as well as th e
exclusively nor even chiefly techni cal operations. They are transfers of
~'Ihen
abs tract wealth of soc iety, mon ey capital as a hom ogeneou s mass doos not
life of differe nt categories of materi als and th e usual pers pec tives of
obsolescence . The gaps th at inter vene in th e renewal of fixed capital give
purchase individu al co mmod ities, but it acq uires disposal over th e means
of pr oduction in pro portion to its quantita tive impo rt ance and th e forms in
which it is invest ed . This is why transfer s of ownership take th e form of
9 I 53
circ ulato ry flow of valorization. Once capital formation sta rts to recover ,
10 I 53
- - - - - - - - - - - - - {o ) - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
fullowing increases:
Gro .. Na ti on a l Pr oduct
In du .tr ia l pro ductio n
Ba n k cr edil
limits fur th e cash flow ava ilable in tim es of merger waves. In th e pos t-war
470"
strikingly see n from Diagra m 8. The per iod s when mer ger s leapt furward
th e co ntext of a sharp gro wth in capital furmation , with a rapid incr ease in
th e share of net profit in value added and a dip in th e share of th e cash flow
set aside fur depr eciation allowances. There was certainly regular
(1954- 55 , ' 95 9, 1967 - 68) were three peri od s of rapid gro wth in
accelera te d amortization. The period 1960 - 66 , in which mer ger s were
sta ble, was one of great upsurge in relative surplus-va lue. This tcok place in
non -financial agents, but which passed by way of financial institutions. This
per centage has un der gon e th e fullowing changes:'
' 9 0' _' ~
' 9' 3 - ~ ~
'9~3-~9
' 934- 39
19 4 6 - 4 9
~'Ie
1 95 4 - 5 6
1 9 61 - 6 4
1 9 65 - 7 0
,,,
o"'
",
,"
6~"
,e,
""
""
rapi d than that 01the value 01the material e1ements 01pr oductive capital,
th e latter itself bein g more rapid th an th at of th e overall value of th e flow of
marketed goods and serv ices. Between ' 94 5 and 1965, th e characteristic
"
,5 3
' 2 I 53
-----------~o)-------------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
( 19 ~O -
of capital for mation sepa ra ted by relatively sha r! ph ases of decline (1915-
absorbed. The fallowing table gives th is distr ibution far th e yea r 1968:'
po inte d out th e th eoreti cal distinction , from th e sta ndpoint of fixed capital
for mation , th a! sepa ra tes th e regimes of accumulation on which th ese two
pe riod s dep end : regular succession of capital far mation and de str uction
Mu t u a l . a v in z . ban ks
Tot a l depo. it .
~ 4 0"
15 6 "
38"
3 4"
4 6 .8 "
great f1ex ibility in th eir choice of finan cin g inst rument s , and in access to
oppo sed to th e issue of sha res. The result is th e decline un iver sally noted in
th e ro le of th e stoc k mar ket in absorb ing savings des tined far pr oductive
The overall impo rtance of th e ba nking sys tem, moreover , co nceals a far -
invest ment s, and a stre ngthening of th e finan cial int ermediaries and
reaching hetero gen eity . The Ame rica n ba nking sys te m is supe rficially ve ry
particularly
oflices and establish bra nc hes. A very un even de velopme nt has resulted
the
ba nking
sys te m.
Private
finan cial
relationships
to the finan cing of intern ational trade . A ve ry sma ll number of finan cial
centres can thus po larize th e absorptio n of savings via a de nse net work of
producti vely . This is why finan cin g gives ev er greater roo m far th e
int er- bank relationships. This po larizatio n was co nsiderably increased after
incorpo ration into current ope rating co sts of va rio us write-off pro visions
and far indebtedn ess in th e far m of bank credit or new far ms of high-risk
credit th at are supporte d and gua ra nteed by th e ba nks. The fi nancing of
ba nks, particular ly th ose of New Yor k, which trem en dou sly accelera te d th e
"
FINA NCIAL CENT RALl ZAT ION TH ROUGH THE FINA NCING O
, 3 I 53
'4 I 53
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - <0 > - - - - - - - - - - - -
'"
-'
A T HEOR\' OF CAPITA LI ST R E GU LAT I O ~
co ncentration of uvingl , ccntraclua) Sd.... ings in pdrtic ular . By 1968, t" elve
l.....
Ne.. York banb held 7 5poT Cllnl of al) pension fund dsset. , Ihese being Ihe
' 9 0
' 912
' 9 22
Qjdol1.....
' 929
' 939
' 9. 5
' 9. 9
' 95 2
' 9 68
' 9 '1.
(p<, nt)
,a
,O
"'0
"
"'o
"
"
"
,,,
"
_' o
ee
"
"
"
"
,.
H1re purebue credr t onIy d....e1oped ..n er 1945 , bul '1 !hen expon'!!IlC<!d
utro!lOIIUC growth.
~ d.ov. lopm..nt o f bo th
hire pun::b.ue ~
risb and lbe ooIIectI.... n ptn<blUTes n9CflSaTY lo sl abih:e !he pn... ale
consumpti Oll of in<bvidu.ol OOIIUJlodl ties 1La.... led lo !he fonna!>OIl of an
mduect _ ag. _ bich;' '1Mlfallbe roo! of a double fto-: OIl!he OIle b.and a
Bow of COIltributioM levi e<:! 011 !h. nominal reerence _ age , 011 !he o!her
ILand a fto- of benfli,- _ bicb acqu. lo !he _ag<HMl'1ler5 m forms
indepoendflll of the l:UI'TeDl m.unlenance eyele of labour-po-er . Lel us
bn~y oelUlnun. the mfIUeD<'<l of Ibis dual chala"'er of!he norm of socW.
COIINIllption 011 fin.lncial centraJn.altOD.
(~ DomNtl crtdll a"d . at'i"gs d.-poSlrs. Oomestlc <.TOOt1 t.1kes 0Il !he
forro of bousing 10lns and 10lns or !h. pureh,m, on instalm<ml of
a utomobiles a nd ccnsumer dur..bIM . Tb. o...e u ll long-run m.nd of Io.o.ns
or bousing ccnst rucncn (farm.rs u el ud..d ), and !he s lLaN! of Ihem
provid..d by fiMnrnl inle rm..d id.riM, is s ummed up in the foUowmg ta ble o
' 97 4
~ibilst
~mpletely
,..._mm
upend, tures . M lhis tendency b.as bHn conOOuo 115 e ...e r ..n"" Ihe s..cond
Norld Na r, becon ung especially pronounced in the 19605 , which saw th..
ProporfrDn jir"".w i
rapid creation o f new households as .. rMu lt o f the ead ier rise in tbe birt h
by jinancl<l
ra t.., the gro wth in liqu id d ..posi t. h . bee n . barp . On top o f lbi. , as tb ..
mtermedlanr.
mOlleY Ihul depcsued w... not ..ll int ..nd ed to serve imm ediat e)y as lh e
l ' I 53
15 I 53
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
made it possible to for m lon g-term cleposits. The finan cial institution s, and
really did play a strictly int ermediar y role, th at of exec utors. In th e mid
account, eac h bea ring a slightly different rate of int er est and offering
differe nt co nditions of withdrawal, so as to mat ch as far as possible th e
~o%
'9~~- ~9,
and
The funds of th e public pension schemes are also managed by th e big banks,
funds are th er efure current expen ditures lo r fi rms which have a ll the
th ou gh th ese latter are her e only financial exec utors. The asse ts are
invest ed in th e purchase of stocks with a low rate of return issued by public
attributes 01an ideall orm 01savings lo r long -term fi nancial investmen ts.
They make th e financial sys tem int o th e principal agency in th e acq uisition
of share titl es and in th e operation of financial circ ulation .
The lon g-run change has been a rad ical one . In th e ' 9 ~ os , more th an
half of th e annual net gro wth in do mes tic financial asse ts was made up of
bodies
and
regulated
co rparations
'"
(airlines,
telecommunicati on s
between
debentures,
prefer ence
shares
indu st rial
co mpanies, and mort gages. The non -guar anteed privat e pension funds, on
behalf of th e personal tru sts of capitalist families, who used thi s procedure
th e other hand , managed by th e big New York banks, are th e spea rhea d in
changing th e structure of financial co ntro l over indu stry .
17 I 53
18 I 53
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - <0 > - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
develop ment .
This results in a profo und amb iguity in th e eeono mic relation of pu blic
expenditure to th e law of capital aecumulation. In th e co nditions of
Fordism , for inst anee , we have seen th at th e development of th e norm of
th e labour pr ecess based on meehani zat ion . The co ntinuous teehn ologieal
co nco mitan! po wer of disposal over indu st rial decisions, are co mpletely
beyond th e influence of th e wage-earn ers th emselves. The co mplexity of
another , form th e major part of th e public budget , and are th e esse ntia l
Pub lic exp end iture has risen sharply ever sinee th e New Deal, unde r th e
impulse of different forces. In eve ry hist orical period , budgeta ry
exp end iture serv es to finanee th ose aetivities , either eeono mic or non -
billion in
'97~
l O
~5 0
dass , however , the law of accumulatio n funet ions in eve ry hist ori c period
two de partments of pr oduetion . ~'Ihen taxat ion is a levy on overall pro fits,
it can still take differe nt forms according to th e manner in whieh th e pro fit
bas is of thi s co mmod ity pr oduetion . These overheads lie on th e mar gins of
19 I 53
20 I 53
- - - - - - - - - - ------{o ) - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
fur it can simply affect incom e which would otherwise have been wasted on
and benefit from an extre mely favourable regime of tax exemption, which
heavy , it can impede th e formation " f mon ey capital and stille financial
is a good example. Bu! a sharp inerease in pub lic expenditure cannot bu!
make a far -reaching difference to th e relations of cQmpetition between
capitals. Accumulation co ntinues, bu! the exponsion
is a po w erful fac tor in the centralizatio n ofcapital in industry and fin ance.
To take indu st ry first of all, it acts by selective and co ncentrated pu blic
contracts (an overall contract with a pr incipal firm which organizes its own
sub-contracting, thi s giving rise to chains of sub-contracting relationships)
surplus-va lue. From th e mid 1960s onwards, th e eve r more rapid advances
co mplex'. Thr ough th e effects it genera tes via exchange relations between
different indu st ries, pu blic expenditure exte nds its influence far beyond
stagnant and pr ofits began to diminish . ~'Ihile bud get expenditure had only
placed far obtaining pub lic co ntracts have been able to make use of th e
flows of surplus profit and th e techni co-econ omi c pos itions thus acq uire d
risen from 7 5 to
to set in mot ion a stra tegy of int egrati on and diversification th at further
accentuates centralization to th eir own advantage. The ensuing increase in
from
1 ~5
1 ~5
billion to
~oo
th e tax burden was highly selective in its impact , and greatly co ntributed
sav ing and th e direct atte mpt to make remunerative investments, and to
Mor e impo rt ant th an thi s change in th e actual rate of gro wth was th e
th e financing of pub lic serv ices. The acute social needs th at th ese
Feder al pub lic deb t has itself involved th e entire financial sys te m in its
management . This was th e chief fact or in th e reconstitution of th e financial
Second
~'Iorld ~Iar .
- 21 I 53
serVlces.
In th ese new co nditions th e capacity of th e trade cyd e to modulat e
pu blic expenditure lost sorne of its co ntro lled flexi bility , all th e more so
since th e slowing down in th e gro wth of producti vit y and th e harde ning of
22 I 53
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - {o ) - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
~'Ihite
Fu nchon.
Defence a n d Internahon a l
Alfa !r.
8 4 6 ' 7 7 4 3 0 4 8 9 54 7
L O
,., "."
,." ., ,.,
18 3
o."
o.,
Health
Educa h on
Tot a l Feder a l Expenditure
~'Ie
9~7
8~.8
90 9
9 5 1
~ 57
4 3 1 1 0 8 . 6 1 ~ 7 4
11 4
18 3
3 ' 0
3 4 6
,.,
~7 6
33 4
'5 ~
18.~
L '
' 3 '
~3
4 ~ 6 68 5 9 ~ . ~ 11 8 41 9 6 . 6 3~ 4 6 373. 5
can not e imm ediat ely th at th e ' 97 0S have see n a rapid decline in th e
relative impo rt ance of milit ar y and associate d expe nd itures. This decline
passive so far as th e co mmerc ial risks of techn ical inn ovati on are
co ncern ed . It would not be possible otherwise to explain how co rpo rations
capable of mob ilizing, th e most advance d pr od uctive forces in th e world
have aba ndo ned witho ut a struggle entire areas of electronics and
electrical enginee ring to th eir German and Japanese co mpetitors. These
relations of co mpetition expr ess th e co mmercial sanction of co mpletely
different structura l forms. German research and develop ment is far mor e
widely diffused : th e sta te pro vides indir ect support by nurturing initiati ves
un dertaken by firms of mod er ate size, but th e active ro le is played by
technological instit utes run by th e pro fessions th emselves. In Japan th e
has bee n un der way for more th an ~ o yea rs, but since ' 97 0 it has ass umed
an accelera te d pace , as sho wn in th e following table o
directions of techn ical development are far mor e sys te matically organized;
' 955
19 6 0
1 9 65
' 970
6 4 6
4 7 6
4 0 .8
3 9 0
~'Iorld ~'Iar
Atla ntic int egrati on and th e restor ation of mon et ar y and financial
multilateri alism is now one reason for th e exhaustion of th e dynamic of
centres ofl ocal war , a characteristic sign of th e genera lization of th e sys tem
accumulation in th e United Sta tes th at has set in since th e mid 1960s. Yet it
th ese outlays have lon g pro vided th e major directions of scientific research
in th e United Sta tes. Though th e mediation s involved are co mplex , th e
- 23 I 53
~'Iorld ~'Iar,
24 I 53
- - - - - - - - - - ------{o ) - - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
sys te matica lly imp ro ves th e co nditions of co mmod ity pr od uction by its
logic of social division and stra tification, creates genera lized exte rnal
have furmed social gro ups, but only co nstitute such in th e co ntext of
welfare pro grammes of one kind or ano ther. The proj ect of a 'Creat Society'
social effects which th e law " f value doos no! take int o account. As we have
seen, th ese are expressed in th e pro liferation " f sta te institut ion s fur th e
sta te with an eve r more co mplex and differe ntiate d sys tem.
sta nda rdizatio n of econo mic activity. Bu! lhi s sta nda rdization is eve r more
The irresisti ble gro wth of pu blic expenditure, des pite all th e warn ings
costly , to th e extent th a! th e pr escr iptive moo els of soc ial custom involve a
The relative pro gress of wage incom es is decr easingly relevant when a rigid
mosaic of int er ests attac hed to th e defence of one or other pro gramme .
Since th e sta te has reinserted th e individu als involved int o social gro ups,
nominal incom es fuels an inflat ion in which th e losers are more numerous
maintain th eir existe nce. The accelera ting mon et ar y cost of th ese
depends.
This impo veri shment of use-values caught in th e net work of funct ional
socialization spec ific to Fordism bec omes eve r more manifest . The number
million in ' 977, while th e average monthly benefit paid increased from 84
25 I 53
pro gramme .
In
exo rc lzmg
its
po litical
threat ,
th e
pr ocess
of
from a co verage of 4 million to 11 million peop le , and th eir ave rage annual
benefit from 621 to 948 dollars.
~'Ielfare
26 I 53
- - - - - - - - - - ------{o ) - - - - - - - - - - - -
A T HEOR\' OF
CA ~ I TA lI ST
Admini.tra tion in 197 ' , The F..der al zovern ment's tr ansfer to th e local
authorities o f a portien o f incom e tax revenue "as supposed lo lead lo a
zr....ter involve ment by the local aut horities in "elfare prozramm... and a
zr adual"ilhdra..al o f rhe F..detal zovernment . Bul this did nol in fact tal<e
place . As rhe local a urhoriries are In general very d""",ly tied lo financial
Ford i.m, and James O'Connor " terms a socio-induslrial complex, could
avoid an inte nsifica tio n o f the c ri... of public finan"". Ir " ould be q uile
illuso ry lo beheve rhat recourse te mar l<et mystique and privale iniliahv..
could magicaUy hmir the tal<eover by the sta le o f Ihe social c:osts
"ngendered by rhe e xpansion of commodity re iatiOIl5. ~"e are no " in a
poRtion te define rhe ch iefcha tacte ristia ofthe crut5 of pubhc finance ud
its connect ions wirh rhe general ctists offordtsm.
and property inte reets, rhey used these funds to N!piaoe loaal taJ<ation,
..luch "U reduced or held C'OtISIan t. t...ss than a le nth of the funds
rransterred from the federal budg'i!t .."", used for th" PIUJ'OS'" of pubhe
-~.
desptte everything , ,md ..t ..n ev..,. mor e rapid ral". This is partIcularly
evul ent ID the ClM of unemp\oym...,t bon"fits. In so far as these fall Wl.lhin
the com pet ence of the dl/ferent st..l..., th..,.e ar e v<>ry wid" dtspantles from
Olle st..te to anothotr , ID the I...el of paym...,ts, th" l<mgth of time for which
th ey are paid, ..nd the CODWtions of ehgtbihty for th"",. Tbe zt"OWI.DZ
num bef of unemploy ed ..ho ar e lDehgtble Oll grounds of not havtlll held
the same ;oo fw the r.cuislle period of time (e.l . wom"n , YOUllg people,
unsblled ""01"00 " 00 hav e ~lfered forced mobihty ). and th e exhaus1:lOtl
of available fundlI in etain sta tes , led lOf eder al government lIltervention
more in the 197 CW than in the enttre prevtous history o the Repubhc. fmm
1_ than ~ oo billiOll dollars in 197 0 , 11will. reach al leas! 850 billiOll by th e
end of the 197 9 financial ye.ar. Ev..., dunng the upswm g of the lrade cyele ,
th e aVotrage f edotral defiCtI ..u lOlIIe 50 billiOll pe! year. The fact \hal the
f ed....allovernment ilI be.anng .....,. more of th e w",ghl of the soci.aI COSIlI ot
ca pllahml ilI att est ed by lhe llv..,.age llIlIlual surplus ot JO billion dollars m
th. b~gets ot lh e local and sta le lluthonlles. The enormous f ederal debt
dunlrbs li.n.anciaI rireulation in several waY"'. In the fin! pillee, the
pt-..re e xe lted by the iau<l a lld ten_al o f government bonds u..p5
Iong re rm mterest t ates a t very high 1"",,1s,so pow;!rfuIly contnbutmg to
indallOn. Seco ndly, .eme of this pressure Oll natwna1 savtllgs is oifs.er by
th.. key poation enjoyed by 11_ 'iorkc iD iDternatwna1 fin.a=.e. At th..
in 197.0. and 19750 Congrea l>OW aIloeated f ederal funds to guarantee the
paymenr o f benefits fw six ~tion.al mon ths at times whe n 4'" o f the
pop uJation o f a sta te have been out of ooorkc ror three mon ths o r more. Ir
abo elCtended une mployment msuranc:e to workce... woo had not
prnlously been ccvered, a nd aut~ the rantmg o IDlerest-fr....
Federal loans ro stares ..hOM funds had been exhausted. f ede ral asstStance
..u abo extended 10 sociaJ. Me'Unty, ID an attempt to me;1 the explostve
riM in costo of collect1ve consumption. The WV'!!l'S1ty of systems of
retu"ement and S1nea benefit (on1y five stal... had legslatlon mohng
such insunnct obhg.u ory) led 10 .. recasttng ofthe OASO!. This system, ...t
up in the In a., financ:ed old ..ge ..nd dlSabihty penstons fur employees oul
of ccntrib utions levied on ....ges. The ben efits paid ros<> from , 6 billiOll
dollars in 1965 to z9 billion in ' 97 0 and 69 bilhon in ' 975. The Medicar e
prozr..mme, ror inst ..nce , in..uguraled ID ' 965, finan""", medi cal car e for
old people ..nd those in need , ..hile Ihe Medicaid programme pr ovides lhe
dilferent st..t" ..ith subsi dies ror people already r""etving assista nce .
Thi. ana ly":. confirmo our cond uslon that only the tr ansfurmation of
Ihe r9lime of inten .ive a<'C umulalion mIo " hal " e have called leo-
~ I NA N C I A L
budget has been in de/iCtt for sev...,leen of the past ",ghle;n years. 110
rmprovement ID tm. S1tua1:lO:ll1S ...,vwged, ID fact qwle the reYe"",. If 11
con tlDUa. Oll lts pr.....,t ccurse, U extrapo\a led by the lIlOSt hLtly
fi::>r"ec.tsts for" the end of th e dKade, Ihe fed..,.al debl will. hav e IDcreas<>d
J.
RE GULATI ON
27 I 53
2 8 I 53
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
expe nditure, bu! th e very weak toleran ce of tax ati on th a! America n society
exhibits depr ives th e Feder al gove rn ment of any room fur manoeu vre. The
recen! referend um on Pro posili on ' 3 in Californ ia, eve n if it only affects
local taxati on , indicat es th e fiscal borrier th a! is imposed by th e pr esent
mentalit y of man y st ra ta of wage-earn ers, to which co mpeting po liticians
acq uired over thi s co mmod ity pr od uct by th e fraction of th e tot al incom e
th at results from non -mar ket ed activ ities. An incr ease in thi s share may
result from public exp end itures, but it can also result from pr operty
speculatio n or from a disproportionate gro wth in co mmerc ial and financial
are keenly attuned. Yet th e tax pr essure in th e United Sta tes is very light
when compared to th e levels th a! th e Social-Democ ra tic gove rn ments of
int ermediari es. All th ese red uce th e fraction of incom e th at mar ket ed
activities can keep fur th eir own expansion, i.e. accumulable surplus-va lue.
gro wing number of taxpayer s int o th e higher fiscal brackets. On top of thi s,
th e multiple cecasions fur tax relief pro vided by th e thi cket of an over-
reduction of taxes and fur th e exte nsion of social rights has co nstantly
frustrated th e experts in th eir furecasts of a balanced full-employm ent
budget, which has now bec ome a real myth . On top of the deficit due to th e
direct result has been a quas istagnation of private per capita co nsumption
of co mmod ities in the same period 1965- 74 (a gro wth rate of 0 .4% as
(b) Pl.l. blic expen diture and the stijling 01 p rivate investment. A
co mparative macro -econ om ic analysis of th e increase in pu blic
expenditure, or more pr ecisely th e soc ial costs of Fordism , has been
un dertaken fur th e th ree major Anglo-Saxo n co untries (United Sta tes,
United Kingdom , Canada ) by Bacon and Eltis." This analysis uses a
terminology other th an our own , but it is gove rned by th e same
perspective . In th e logic of th e capitalist econo my, only what is pr od uced
as a co mmod ity can be th e object of an auto no mous pr ceess of
valorization. Ever y other social activ ity, whether pu blic or pr ivate , must
be financed by a deduction from th e mon et ar y surplus de riving from th e
excess of th e sale pr ice of th e co mmod ity pr od ucts over th eir costs of
pr od uction . This deductio n reduces th e funds ava ilable to finance th e
expansion of co mmod ity relations by accumulatio n. In th e co nceptual
framework we have adopted here , thi s magnitude appears as accumula ble
surplus-value. Bacon and Eltis argue th e same case . They sho w th at th e
3.
29 I 53
~3.8 %
oft he
expend itu re and tax burden. The result has been an ada ptive capacity
within American capitalism which is not ava ilable to other countries. There
was an int ense migrati on of pr od uctive activities (investment and skilled
workers) into regions with low social costs and a reverse migration of th e
mar ginal po pulation in searc h of pu blic assista nce to regions of high social
costs. It was the mobility of US capital, th er efure , expressed in a
geogra phical redistr ibu tion of co mmod ity pr oduction , th at made possible
30 I 53
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - {o ) - - - - - - - - - - - -
o
A THEORY
os OPlTAlIST
REGULATION
a ralative maintenan C'e of accumu lation . Bu! lhis for<:'ed mobility involved a
te rrible soci al ..aste . The pr ocesll of destabilizing migra tio n led lo a naw
\lfImploy.d.,;as ....U U
(e) Thr urhern <TUi.: cm acu re form al tite antagoni>"m h It""'" rUing
IOcial C'OsN and cap;talist ae<:<lrnlllotlon. Th.. ctVll n ghts mO"'f ln"nt of the
early 19601 found i n institutional "xpt $llsion mOl! e sily in lhe lar ge
industrial d lies ..here Democratic . mini. lta lians "'ere . olidly
ontablished. Political coohtions W<ilI"e formotd lo ext..ud public usistance, 10
Th.. mdlgence of toonanlS, and tb. spr....d of r..nt stribs, 11. liond1o:rds to
..b.ondon th.. upk....p of d....lhngs, """,bng ",th..,- to ewm ,nsurancoo fo:r
d..mage , or else el(pecting to profit from .. possibl.. renov ation finance<! out
of municip.ol funds. A chain r ction th en Mt in: degr..da tion of ho using in
v.ory widSpl"Nd IlThan zo
, detericration of col\ol!ctiv.. cilitm ,
.. thnie
.oo..mic
public s",rW:M. Munici p.ol authontt.... had 10 moot a v"I'Y rapid in~ In
lb .. opera ting oost. 01lh e.e . er viCfl , and in social ben e ts. In lb e eupho ric
,,1(Ireme bruuhty. Tb. eU<!of ll.... York i$ .. ump\.ary in Ibis regH<!. In th..
19'0<>5 th .. eity Iost 20" of itl tndustri.ll ;obs dIId NW ever more ....l r
_ to r<>SlTiet lh.. growth in toutio n . Th.. " n m<lu.l.. solutlon to th.. fmo.noo
th.. high"'l l..vel of social be nefits in th....hol.. Uniled Stal"', th.. mosl
...idespre ad net...ork of public hospita ls and the only major free unive rsity .
..hieh th .. most
Muniei""l officillls "on ,."I." i"" ..nd condilions of .. ork which ..blJOrbed th ..
gllUlS m producti....ty denvl. from th" .. fforts 10 rUIOnali%e the public
..ere propooUed
8 bilhon
inrc struetur..1 chang... tlLat m..d.. th.. debr burd..n intol"rabl. Th.. rapid
' 97 0 , and 12.6 billion in ' 97 S. Dunng the ' ,?6OS , the banl:s and o ther
gro ..th nf suburbs d ter th.. Second Norld Nu brought ..bo ut major
I\lbscnbe to th
th.. Clty of ll
Yor\: WllS m th ..... hands.
From ' 97 4 on...ards , the COI! of further e re<!it lIlcrease<! significantly. In
by .. soci ..l re lation in the are n.. o f b nde<! propert y . ["egisl..tion tlLat .....
elctr"m"ly f..vo urable to r"al est..t" o..nen , th" po litical inl1uence nf the
spring >97 S the banl:s un leashe<! a financial crisis. Rejec ting th ll issue of
n.... mun icip.al bonds, they imposed .. n.... incr _
in shOM-t..rm debt
..b.i\.. th. f ed-eral gov.rnm..nt r.. fused to Vant any uCption.olllid. In JUM
Alnencan ah...... veril..ble p.lI".. <hs<> for property specul.1ti01l. The resull
"lIS .. constant prccess of IlThan uph..v" ..hich Locl:ed any plann.d.
direction ..nd ..... fu more far-r....ching ..nd rapid llLan an ything that has
of
An ..ust<m!y
th the tm
n i 51
11 I 51
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
th e financial gro ups. Municipal emp loyees, tax-payer s with mod est
resources and user s of pu blic serv ices were al! affecte d together : dosure of
municipal hospitals and fire sta tions, red uction of uni ver sit y activities,
expr essed . The enterprise is transform ed int o th e giant corpo ration. The
sta ndpoint:
(1) The orga nization that is th e structure's characteristic moo e of
capital. Analysis of thi s structure must be unde rtaken from a dou ble
lead to th e abs tract and purely logical analysis of its int ernal relation s dea r
The int er -connect ion and coordination between th e different phases in the
met amor phoses of value req uire spec ific practices of management . The
organization of th ese pr actices forms a de nse network of econo mic
develop ment .
(2) The planning and co ntro l th at repre sent th e principIe by which th e
ente rprise pr otects th ose practices th at are vita l for th e int egrit y of th e
capitalist po wer of disposal within its bounda ries. This is why relation s of
co mpetition are expressed as extern al relations between ente rprises. All
th e illusions symb olized in th e hypo thesis of pure and perfect co mpetition
derive from thi s. The existe nce of th e enterprise, readily appare nt to all, is
idealized int o a subjec t, an ato mic unit witho ut any significant metabolism
of its own . This subjec t is equipped with certain ad hoc behavioural
orientations, so th at relation s of co mpetition can be expressed as an
ano ny mous coordination of decentr alized decisions genera ting a uni ver sal
pro perty .
In order to dispel th ese illusion s, we must study how th e different
~'Ie
relation .
111 . THE FORMS OF CENT RALl ZAT ION OF CAPITA L : THE GIA N
33 / 53
34 1 53
- - - - - - - - - - - ----<0 1 - - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
sav ings int " mon ey capital, ownership is form ally partition ed int o rights
repr esented by share till es, and its unity takes th e legal form " f th e joint -
exec utive organs tied to it in strictly hierarchical depende nce . The result
was a product ion d epartment fur eac h category of co mmod ity . If an
ente rprise involves severa l typ es of prod uction precess, th en th e
funct ion al structure cuts across it . The functi on al product ion department
co ncrete furm in fi naneial groups, which are sys tems of inter relation
per furm ance fur th e different uni ts in relation to thi s norm , notes
divergences, analyses th eir causes and spec ifies th e co rrections needed .
th e str uctura l furm of th e giant co rpo ration in such a way as to fix its
hierarchical relations and respe ctive co mpetences, are strictly spec ified by
th e vertical functi on al structure. This makes it possible to spec ialize plants,
departments. In actual fact , once th e prod uction units are spec ialized as
segments of an int egrated precess, th ey bec ome incapable of realizing th e
value of th eir output by sale. A functi on al sales department , organized
vertically int o sales uni ts and a centre fur th e coordination and co ntrol of
th ese units, manages those operations th at ada pt th e ente rprise to th e
co nstraint of realizing value. The sales uni ts receive directives th at set th e
(a) The emergen ee 01 eonst raints on valorizati on. The first great wave
essentially co nsisted of th e horizontal and vertical type of mer ger . It saw
prices of differe nt co mmod ities, method s of pro motion and sales quo tas fur
th em . There is no hor izontal co mmunication between lecal producti on and
one and th e same category of co mmod ities. A pur ely furmal centralization
of ownership was un able to ensure effective exercise of thi s single
35 I 53
centralized funct ion al structure thus involves a circ ulation of infurm ation
(3) The creation of a head offiee th at effects th e coordination of
36 I 53
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-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
capital (the criterion of th e rat e of profit ), and lon g-term planning of future
activities. The head a flice takes sole charge of th e activity of th e ente rprise
different departments co nfused different pro blems and no lon ger gave any
dear inform at ion . The ccordination of exc hange flows between th e
are: personnel , respo nsible fur co l1ective bargaining, dealing with co nflicts
and organizing th e manageri al career structure; and fi nancial, responsible
product ion norm s nor variations from th em co uld be registe red any
financial po licies. The head a flice itself, which may be organized int o
lon ger . In such co nditions, activ ity by th e ente rprise as a who le became
impossible . In every case in which th e pro blems thus encountere d were
exec utive and financial boa rds, decides on th e use " f liqui d asse ls and
autho rizes expenditures as th e sole centre of po wer in th e enterprise .
'9~9,
~'Iorld
and th en by th e
*f"'u. ...
~ "n.m"
particular case , unleashing int ernal co nflicts th at were more or less acute,
un der th e co ntro l of gro ups th at often changed. This was so because th e
decentr alized , flexi ble and open-ended . The ente rprise can expand int o
new spaces of valorization by adding on new divisions, without th e
structure being called int o ques tion.
37 I 53
38 I 53
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-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
" flice int o a general office, responsible fur th e planning and contro l of th e
ente rpr ise as a whole. The profit abilit y of th e divisions is th e criterion fur
jud ging th eir management . The dominance of th e genera l " flice over the
divisions rests on th e centralization of th e cash f10 w engende red by th e
divisions and its alloca tion according to th eir pro fitability and th e
objectives of overal1 finance pa liey.
operational agent an exec utive autonomy. These agents can int er vene in
th e overal! manageri al pr ocess on th e bas is of th e infurm at ion with which
(e) Perspectit'es 01change in the orga nization: the corpo ration as a global
system . Al th e pr esent tim e co rpo ratio ns are in th e pr ecess of unde rgoing
an organizational transform ati on just as radical, if no! more so, as th a! from
th e centralized funct ion al structure to th e decentra lized division al
structure. This transfurm ati on leads back in th e direction of centralization ,
but on a co mpletely new pr incip Ie . ~'Ie have see n how th e pr incipIe behind
centralization on a funct ion al basis was vertical hierarchical depend ence .
and initi ati ve oflocal agents, th e firm can greatly imp ro ve its sensitivity to
its env iro nment. The structure is co nceived so as to react to a mod ification
is effected from th e sta rt, with eac h element of th e ente rprise int er acting
with al! others.
This structure cor respo nds to th e new mod e of organizatio n oflabo ur
39 I 53
hier archicallevels will be abolished , and th ose that remain will be far less
req uire abilities of genera l knowled ge and synthes is of th e firm's activities.
A higher po rtion of work will be devoted to analysis of th e cor po ration's
economic activity. But th e mat eri al infrast ruct ur e of management will also
bec ome co nsiderably heavier . The sys tem can only be established if th e
40 I 53
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - <0 > - - - - - - - - - - -
J
A THE OR'f OF CAPITALlST RE GUlATIO N
IlWd.. d.otIy for capi t;o! lO be " ..IorUed. ThilI J>J"OC"'SS ,....,b lo Muole
pr. ctiNls "er.orchic;o]]y aud 10 fix lhe ~on Di d<>emons. As "
prospectl.... ;oct, .1 has lo pl"oep.ilr. lb st nlCtW"" lo I....ct to unfur~
ch.ong<lS m ,,,<I<!'l'IW1 constTllmtl and 1m mIo " CCOUDI lb_
simply ..rrang". th.. d..pioyrn.. nt o f th.. m....ns to th..m . Th.. <>lis resuh
rhe ne xt, are fixed by the general offiCfl fur the enterprise as a whole. The y
furm the principal direc tive for fixing profitability no rms by division ,
fa. hie no lh.. stra tegy of lh.. corporation and lead. lo lhe evolution o f itl
organi:ation . Suc h str ategy ...illlie in antic ipa ting lhe trans for malion of lh..
co nditions of product ion ..ud "xc ha nge the be tte r to adapt it. To th e exte nt
that this is achieved, th e co rpora tion is that mu ch less blind in th e
co mpetitive pr ocess. The normS of planning are the basis on which th e
functioning of the organiution un ifies managerial pr acticas. It astablishes
pri orilies fur re alloc atin g resourcell al a funclion of th e anticip.lted
developmenl of conditions of producticn and exchange. The mOre
numerous Ihe el..menls lhal can be progranun<KI., lhe less mvestmenl p1Ins
<U"<ll'Onsthv.. lo mort-I..rm <!uturb.incell, and lhe mor.. regu1rr IS lb.. !oDg.
tertn g:rawth of lb.. firmo 11 is m Ibis I'OnI'O t/u.l lb.. UD1ly of th gu,nl
corporat1O.ll's SlrUctur'<! nd, strat~ is ..ff..:t <KI. by pla nnlDg nd, lOrms p.ut
al
pro..ides a summary measure of pe rforma nce . But the overall rate of return
must be d ose ly linked to th e firm's financial po licy . For th e capita list , the
sale aim of a firm is to make l ure that money br ings mon ey back to its
owneu . The true objective is net earnings pe r sha re . It is th e evoluti on of
Ihis ..ar iable th at pr incipally determinel Ihe markel va lue of Ihe firm by
dirllCtly infiuenci ng Ihe pri ce-earningl ratio, and which Iherefur.
cond;lions ils entire finanClal policy. BUI lhe el ....rrungs figure depends on
lhe ov er all cyde of productlve C..pilal for lhe fum as a whole. 11 ves riM,
lh"""fore, to a dtrecti.v.. as to lhe n t. of return on ;15productIve capllal.
(b) Pfa nnmg is a p rocedure inl'oh-ing all ItI:tls 01 the organl%<ltion .
~endmg from lbe
lea
(Q) Tht 9tntral rtrattgy 01 ('olo rizotion .. impOSN on plann'"9 '" tht
.. a whol... It is ela boraled ...Ihin lhe g..neral offiCfl ;ond appTOYed by lhe
from .oxplOltation and specula tton, and th.. de.6.mhon of g..n",,"a1 dtr tw.
2.
P LA ~ ~ I ~GA ~O M A ~ A G E R I A L CO ~ T R O L
42 I 53
_ 41 1 5 3
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
different mod aliti es of valorizatio n bea ring on related activities. This is why
a full analysis of th e int erconnect ion s of co mpany activities is a binding
co ntro ls fur th ose very spec ialized units th at do not have suflicient
levels of co mpetence betwee n planned nor ms and real res ults, th e selection
of th ose deviations th at need cor rective action because th ey are not simply
action req uired , and th e observation of its results. If th e results are not
investment proj ects are: a rise in costs above th e nor ms laid down or a fall
The furm in which th e f10w of infurm ati on circ ulates, its period icity, and
its content at eac h hier ar chicallevel are all of pr imordial impo rt ance fur
descr ibed is emba rked on again and bec omes a recu rrent pr ocess .
beyond pr od uction capacities. The means fur de tec ting and analysing
deviations from th e proj ected norms bring int o play th e plasticity of th e
of th eir int er pret at ion . It sees to it th at th e detailed sys tem of norms is such
(d) Manag erial control. Managerial contro l is an esse ntial pr ocess in the
~'Ie
ro utine invest ment proj ects arise, hence one of th e elements fur pr eparing
th e fullowing budget. There is th er efure an indispensable chain of
co ntinuo us planning. The overall results of manageri al co ntro l fur th e
pr ofitability of th e firm , moreover , influence and modi fy its stra tegy. The
quality of thi s co ntro l depends entire ly on the pertinence of th e norm s laid
down in th e budget. The exercise of strict co ntro l on th e bas is of
inadequat e norms leads irrevocably to a disor ganization of the labour
pr ocess , a deteriora tion in its atmos phere, vexatious frustrations and
bitte r rivalries amo ng managerial sta lf, and a genera l sce pticism as to th e
top management's capacity fur overall direction.
Budgetary co ntro l is th e furm of contro l bes t ada pted to a division al
pr oced ures, met hod s of co nsolidation , definitions of results and pro blems
norms
and
levels
structure, by virtue of its f1exi bilit y , its capacity fur int egrat ion , and its
4 5 I 53
of
4 6 I 53
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-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
owners , very numerous and eac h wielding only infinit esimal fract ion s of
Administra tion had charged with a far -reach ing investi gation into th e
sha res with vo ting rights at th at tim e , an av erage of sorne 35, 0 0 0 sha res for
eac h co mpany , th e average distributio n too k th e following for m : 20 ve ry
lar ge sha re holde rs held 32 % of th e voting rights , 980 major sha re ho lders
held 18%, and 34,0 0 0 sma ll sha re ho lde rs divided th e remaining 50 %
be tween th em . This de gree of inequ ality in th e co mpo sition of ownership
disdosed
dass.
~'Ie
th e existe nce
which in
certain
mu st now study how th e finan cial gro ups, as struc tura l forms into
finan cial gro ups restructure th eir investment s in industry , see king to
reconcile co ntro lling po wer and immediat e req uireme nts of profitability .
The co nd usions of th e TNEC study showed th at eight finan cial gro ups
(1) Given th at ownership titles are nom inally distr ibuted to a large
number of sha re -holde rs, who really co ntro ls property?
~'Ih o
lays do wn
finan cial po licy and co ntro ls its execution? A proper respo nse to th is
ques tion requires investigati on of th e struc ture of ownership in th e
sha re ho lders serve simply as a reserve for man ipu lat ion , not by th e
'managers' , but rathe r by centralized finan cial capital.
More recently , J .M. Chevalier has scrutinized finan cial inter connect ion s
in an atte mpt to upd ate th e TNEC study ." In th e same work, he has put
forward a th eory of propriet ar y co ntrol which is directly linked to th e
finan cial po licy mu st ut ilize and mod ify th e struc ture of th e co mpany to
ensure th at it is man aged in accordance with its own objectives. Complex
' 933 saw th e pub lication of Berle and Means' fam ou s work." ~'Ihile th e
whole world was stunned by th e recent finan cial co llapse in th e USA, and
(3) The institutional invest ors , in so far as th ese are not instruments of
either of th e two preceding gro ups (gro up UI). These investors wield large
bloc ks of sha res, but th ey genera lly vote together with th e co ntrolling
gro up, except when th ey co nsider th e corpo ration's pe rformance
- 47 I 53
(2) A gro up po te ntially host ile to th e directo rs, un rep resen ted on th e
48 I 53
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-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
th e financial gains ens uing from mer ger s. ~'Ie may thus co nclude th at th e
weakening of gro up IV and th e stre ngthening of group nI as a result of
co ntractual over individu al sav ings, are phenomena with an impo rt ant
elfect on th e co mpetition between financial gro ups far th e co ntrol of sites
percentages " f share capital PI PII , PIII, P1V held by eac h of th e gro ups, and
on th e behav iQura l coe fficients expressing th e probability th a! eac h of
th ey are not th emselves po tential co ntro lling gro ups, and an active one , in
th at th e increased mobility which th ey inject int o financial circ ulation
Cr Cr1> Crv.
th e
predominance
of
of valorization. The institution al invest ors play both a passive role , since
pro vides eas ier and more frequ ent cecasio ns far financial groups to change
th eir co nstellations. In thi s pers pec tive, th e purely co nglomerate mer ger s
of the late 1960s can be seen in part as th e attempt to create new financial
gro ups which co uld free th emselves from th e grip of th e do minant groups
and pursue an independent stra tegy.
It re mains to be seen how th e co ntro lling gro up fits int o th e str ucture of
th e co rpo ration , and how it exerc ises its po wer over planning and ro utine
management .
by
Cr = o .
(which may fall to sorne 1%of th e share capital) as lon g as gro ups nI and IV
hom ogeneou s in its recr uitment and closely lmit around th e co ntro lling
gro up (the 'inside boa rd '). This clos e co nnection can be elfecte d in two
The co ntro lling gro up can stay in po wer eve n with a weak shareholding
return . Even so, in th ese co nditions th e co ntro lling group might be very
vulnera ble to th e ac tion of a financial group th at sought not so mu ch
directly to ev ict th e existing boa rd of director s as to have th e firm taken
over by another firm already un der its co ntrol. This is how th e institution al
invest ors have played a role in th e last maja r wave of co nglomerate
mer ger s. The very rap id growth in th e funds at th eir disposal, and th e need
far higher profit ability on which th eir own profit s depend , far ce th e
institution al investor s to turn th eir funds over rapidly . Since th ey wield
great blceks of shares and can pursue co ncentrated po licies of purchase
ways. Either th e financial group, which may be mer ely a single famil y and is
th e real owner of th e enterprise, itself heads th e boa rd of director s and th e
main co mmittees un der it . Those exec utive personnel th at it lacks it finds
amo ng th e manageri al sta lf. This is th e case far example with th e chemical
ente rprise E.I. Du Pont de Nemours, which is closely co ntro lled by th e Du
Pont famil y ; it is also th e case with th e Mella n gro up, which enjoys almos t
sale co ntrol of Alcoa (Aluminium Company of America) and has placed
severa l top administra to rs of th e Mellon bank in th e co rpo ration's leadin g
and sale, and since th ese funds are managed by pr ofessionals with a good
ente rpr ise doos not have a major presence on th e boa rd of director s; in thi s
4 9 I 53
50 I 53
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-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
overheads int o serv ice or financial companies set up fur thi s pu rpose . If
th er e is one headin g in th e balance shee t th at is gro wing with met eoric
schemes, amo rtization rules and furmation of reserves, ratios of divide nds,
grip of finance capital. Costs of legal co unsel, auditing, advertising and tax
adv ice are transfer red to spec ially set up companies which charge very
acq uisitio n of new firms and tax evasion, etc. ), th en th e contro lling gro up
high rates fur th eir serv ices. These co mpanies, genera lly havin g only a very
sold off its investments, either vo lunta rily or otherwise . The reorganization
agencies, furming a net work of int ertwined financial gro ups. In thi s case ,
th e boa rd of director s and its sub ordinate agencies must be carefully mix ed
in co mposition (an 'outside boa rd'). This is what hap pened with the
(2) The sec ond type of operation fur capturing surplus pro fits co mes
Genera l Elect ric at th e insti gat ion of th e Marga n gro up. The co mposition of
from th e financial activity of gro ups exploiting th eir co ntro lling pos itio ns
in gro ups of firms that are linked . Her e we cannot list in any detail th ese
high funct ion ari es invit ed to sit on th e boa rd to give thi s a broade r base of
mention ed : free acq uisition of lar ge amo unts of shares as pro motion
benefits when new co mpanies are fuunded, and when mer ger s and
support.
The co ntro lling gro up inserts itself int o th e structure of th e corpo ration
transfer of shares; spec ulatio n in indu st rial land , mines and other sites
personnel po licy, th e hier ar chical relationships and centres of pro fit are
financial gro ups and sold off at high pr ices to th e indu st rial firm s th ey
co ntro l; share transact ion s making use of th e oppo rtunity to buy stocks at
rates lower than th e oflicial market pr ice and exploiting inside infurm ati on
valor izatio n of capital th at is its raiso n d'i:tre and th e sole source of its
pos ition in soc iety. ~'Iithin th e co rpo ration , th e contro lling gro up must
make sure of a tot al hegemony over th e work furce . It co nsequently utilizes
51 I 53
52 I 53
-------------~o)-----------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
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" 55- 6 (th m
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a'n'.E' onom" proM. .., TooF... Pro dt<<<.., Lon. on, ' 978.
o f H n f" . m,~
th" ,; ,,;on oh n . " ,h,. " "h " " . ; h h , m, ... fo"..m . l. s . B, u n h off, Lo Poh.io u.
mon . 'a '"", PUl' , " 73,
" A , . n o.h , .",.nhh on , ..... on .ou n nt h;, t";,,l . " u m.n toh on on . , tu.", of
... m . lu . " "', ;' . ',., " A. ,. Ch . n . l", S""'...y ond srru,,,,,,,,, M.I.T.,
,.60-
A. A. B. d. on . G. C. Mun., n.oModo", C0'1' 0""o'on on d p,,"'a" Propo"", N. " Yo", ' 933.
,- TNEC,
n..
53 153
- - - - - - - - - - - - ----<0 1 - - - - - - - - - -
(1
Q.
A THEOR\' OF C A ~ I TA lIS T RE GULATI ON
into monet ary .um., tot al social mCOme and its divisio n int o ..ages and
profitJ:, is not a prc bl..m in ..hieh t..o differe nl thooretieal fields ar ..
5
General Rate of Profit
and Competition
Among Capitals
arti~lation
lIS
ar.. rhe monetery ..){pressio n of rhe >rorbng hour and th.. nomilU1
r.. f..r..ncoe ..a g N. hav.. hoeld cver a study oflbe concr<>t.. furmation of lb..
fir7I of lh_
section of Cb.Ipl 3 .... h.ovoe .wwdy studled lb.. -.-ond m d"lm .md
olUll
of
1m. ch.ilpter
OOllCf-,,, tonn. ,..I:en by lb. -=o::W 1ink J)etw""" ",ut Ollomous c;pit~. '."e
W , lbe 00b~ th<lt will en<ible lIS lo oh.,.. bow lb.. lo. . ot
oompetltiOll den.... norousI y ftom Ibe la.. ef ~ulat)On . Tbe sum lot;o!
of tb_ ...... oonItItulell lbe met..bo/ism o lb .. lIl><.'iaI formation.s su b}i:8c1
to Ule p1IM mod. o/ productKln.
To ,,~in thilI obttcti"',
~ysIS
e f Ul. <lI'ticuWtioll be~lI lb.. prod uctx>n a.nd Clr'CUI..otlon e fcommodJ t1es
under c.tpltl1ism.. This is lIOt , n
th<!Ot'l!tioaI prob'"m. Fro m tM
b<>gmnmgof :twpt ' . lb ct, _ h.o. deli.n<!d th.. homog,m"""", ~ o
...;oI"I.os rh.. ~ of ~uiul~ cWsses d'!!t<mnm<!d by .. soc:i.alr<>Lo.t1on,
"Xc hlnge, which ..tcts lb.. socW. ....hdatwn of pnv.at.. Labours tlu.t ......
indp&ndell t from Ih. IU ndpoint of production. This point ofd",p.rrture Ius
"41bl.d lIS 10 show th.lt lllOMY .os tboo support of Ih.. socwl ",Lanon of
,">reh.ionge is in llinJic..lly dIlJer"",' fro m .ny indtvidual commodtty. This
~
m.il\:es
lo
Protit
lb.
U5
~flY
OUT
mor.
secondly, ... shaIl dfl1lO1lStt.re rhe e uct form th.ot s..n..r.J. commodtty
U5
to .m
otXp"ndotd to produce thoem. Mon ey " the plvot oft hose exc""nges th.ot u ..
lhe c1u:sic. 1 doctrine, This d,fferencoe wiU ""ve it. effect. on OUT
organiud int o s.neral commod ity ciTCUlation , bec allS':> it is the expre5510n
t I 51
2 I 51
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
The unifurmity of the rate of pro fit her e furms th e very definitio n " f profit .
infinit e series oflabour quantities, eae h co mpo unded by th e rate of pro fit .'
pro blem .
The pri or ity of th e co neept of pro fit over th at of th e rate of pro fit follows on
The Marxis! procedure, on th e other hand , poses a dual pro blem : tha! of
th e one hand from th e faet th at capital is not see n as a natu ral entity but as
~'Ie
~'Ie
shall see in th e
formation of tot al ineom e and its maero -eeon omi c distr ibu tion . This is why
be realized . Accord ingly, th e genera l rate of pro fit may not in faet exist,
whereas th e wage relation always doos define capitalism oThe formation of
pr od uet in use-values. The uni form rate of pr ofit is th e distr ibu tive ru le
gove rn ing th e pr iee of th e surplus prod uet , which enab les th e pr iee sys te m
ineor po rating th e mod alit y of its distribution. The rate of pr ofit for th e
dassieal writers is thus th e repr esentation of capitalism as a natural
of past labour .
imm anent entity filling th e entire social spaee. Marx asse rted th e
tim e . The faet th at th e surplus prod uet is give n in use-values pr esup poses
th at th e co nditions of pr od uetion have an exd usively teehnieal charaeter
and are independent from th e rule of distr ibu tion . Repr oduetion is th en th e
aflirmation of th e ete rnal charaeter of thi s ru le . It is no lon ger possible to
distinguish between th e unit period of pr od uetion and perpetuity. This is
expressed in th e formal possibility of red ueing th e pr iee sys te m to amo unts
oflabour with definite da tes, in sueh a way th at eae h pr ice appears as an
3 I 51
~'Ie
saw th at co ntrary to
appea ra nees, this equation is not an eq ualization of two values but rather a
po lar relationship expressing th e value of a co mmod ity in relation to an
4 I 51
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - <0 > - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
purchase and sale; certain co mmod ities do not bec ome use-values,
because th ey remain unsold . Thus th er e is always a pro blem of th e soc ial
mon et ar y co nstraint .
th e purchase are separa te d and fullow a rre another. This is no! fur sorne
co mmod ities, in other words th eir exc hange against de te rminate sums of
mon ey . Al! pri ces are th er efore necessaril y mon et ar y pri ces. Relative
prices are simply results of th e sum tot al of mon et ar y exc hanges, and in no
way can th ey be determined directly .
it is not yet realized , only po te ntia l. The product s of pri vate labours are not
what causes pri ces to move . Social mar ket pri ces are th er efore first of al!,
co unterparts. Thus co mmod ity producti on forms social value. But it can
th e different varieties of co mmod ity . Unit prices are simply th e quo tients
obtained when th e social prices of th ese different varieties of co mmod ity
This co nception of mon et ar y exc hange has impo rt ant impli cat ion s for
th e th eoreti cal sta tus of prices.
(1) Form al!y , pr ices are th e exc hange-va lues of co mmod ities as
tot al exc hange-va lue by social dema nd, i.e. by mon et ar y sums bea ring on
are divided by th e quantities soldo Since prices are give n in unit terms,
what imp resses itself on th e obserber is th e relative sta bility of th e pos te d
~'Ihen
easy to believe, th er efore , th at in pract ice th e unit pri ces are int rin sical!y
destr uction simulta neo usly abolishes th e value, which however is create d
anew by th e co ntinuity of the act of producti on . ~'Ihen th e sum tot al of th e
tot al sales and purchases are th e pr oduct s of th ese unit prices multiplied by
th e quantities soldo This actual!y is th e way in which th e social co nstraint is
bas is of th e division of to tal incom e , and th e flows of exc hange indu ced by
The characteristics we have just descr ibed affect eve ry co mmod ity
pri ori reason why tot al mon et ar y incom e should facilitate th e exac t
purchase of al! co mmod ities of al! kinds. The genera l co mmod ity
5 I 51
6 I 51
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - <0 > - - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
flow lla ves in a circle , with mon ey figuring al both sta r! and finish of th e
th e exp and ed repr oduction of th e wage relation , req uires dete rminate
exc hanges of value between the two departments of pr od uction . On th e
absorbs laoo ur-po wer in return fur a wage expressed as a sum of mon ey ,
tot al pro fit . The mann er in which eac h individual capitalist experiences th e
mon et ar y co nstraint follows from lhi s. Al! th a! appea rs in th e sphere of
circ ulatio n is th e relation between two mon et ar y magnitudes, one of th ese
delinition of th e departm ents of prod uction and the relation ships obtaining
between th em owes nothing to th e fragmentation of capital int o
autono mous units. These are rather concepts directly deduced from th e
wage relation and th e formation of surplus-va lue as a continua us pr ecess.
accumulatio n.
In order to express th e formal conditions for the existe nce of the genera l
rate of pr olit , it is necessar y to ass ume th at relationships between th e two
(a) The general rate 01profit and the realization 01total exchange -value.
Let us express th e exc hange-va lue composition of th e departments
pr ooucing means of proo uction (Department I) and means ofconsumption
(Department Ir) as folla ws:
U, + S , + P, _ VI:' ,
(; , +S, + f', _ VE ,
realize a certain rate of pr olit . ~'Ihat rate of pr olit doos thi s involve? It
canna t be deduced from th e individu al rates. If it were nothing more th an
The tot al amo unt of wages S th en = SI + SIl; th e tot al pro lit P = PI + PII ,
and th e tot al incom e VP = S + P.
~'Ie
7 I 51
8 I 51
- - - - - - - - - - - - - ---{O) - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
First step
From lhis it follows th a!
1',
VI' -S
.'i-------,- -
P
1', + 1',
S S J +S,
'"
m (l H) - l
1', SJ
- t -'--
S, S, ,
5,-- _ _,
-----81 + ....
S,
The amount of wages and th e tot al income are divided between th e two
departments of producti on in accorda nce with th e division of society's
homogeneous labour : VA = VA , + VA,.
~'Ie
VA ,
. . VA , -
-S - (1 +
/'
-~ (l H ) - I - (I +
s -(I+ k'J)r
U'
.'
, ),
VA ,
V A,
,.-_--''''
Second step . In order far th e tot al exc hange-va lue to be realized in such a
way as to renew th e co nditions of pr od uction and expand accumulation, it
is necessar y far a determinate fracti on of th e incom e far med in Department
I to pu rchase a determinate fract ion of th e exchange-value of th e prod uct
necessar y to amplify th ese basic magnit udes. ~'Ie must lastly not e th at th e
schema as written here applies to a single turnover tim e far th e capitals in
th e two de partments.
The fract ion G, of th e exc hange-va lue of Department I , mor eover , renews
1',
~-
- -
G, +S ,
1',
-- ~
G, + S,
Let us now define k', = G,/S and k', = G,S,; we th en have P'/S, =(1 + k
',, and P,S, = (1 + k' ,)r; k' , and k', are transfarmed functi on s of the
organic co mpositions of capital in th e two de partments of pr oduction ,
functi on s th er efare of r.
~'Ie can call th e allocation of th e soc ial labour VA between th e two
departm ents of pr od uction th e ma cr os tru cture 01 p roduction. This is
defined by th e relation VA,/VA,. The farmal co ndition far th e existe nce of
th e genera l rate of pro fit involves two ste ps: we first express th e link
~'Ie
9 I 51
th en
10 I 51
- - - - - - - - - - - - - ---{o ) - - - - - - - - -
J
A THEOR\' OF C A ~ I TA lIS T RE GULATION
SJ . P, -&G , ~G . + "'G ,
S , 1', S ,
...
S. S, S,
- - -- Mie,,
,,
o f accu mulanon from which new condit ions o f pr oo llction drise dfter d
'"
"' ----'..!
G, '
VA ,
VA
'\" , C! '"
loO , )
".
-'~
IvA.. ..""
obtoin th..
condrnon OT the fonn.iotion of lb. I<mOOT.J. ral .. of prolit. Its SlgmfiOlllC<l IS
d NT fiIOIlgh . By .xpr"";0l tboo toct tlu! lb.. l'Nhzation Df th.. tot.I
eJtch.ong......alu.
produCh OO , 1m. COllmtio:lllll4lUs expli cit lb .. ..xchang .... of v.J.ue betw een
lb two departmen ts of productlOD which lleu tr.wz", th.. tend en cy lO
un.... 811 d....lopm9llt . Tb
Ih.. gffl#f'1I1 raf e 01profir arrd rhr co" tr a d,mo.... ni lIC'C'U mu/a tio... Tbe
con wtton.
<1
absurd. Ir
r...Uy do. u ist <In '"'juilihrium u t.. of prolit . This would be a sur.. way of
Al a l"ftllil , <1 rupture in th. coh oesion of tb.. regtm .. of dccumulatton iJ <In
cver <lUphenomenon ..hich h.ls nothing to do Wlth tb.. flexibility or rigidity
In aClu al fact , the condition IOr th e full r....IiZdtion of totdl exchang4value ;' an ..lWctive lOCial const u int reldtoed to th e cohesion of th.. r"llim..
st rict senH in ..hich " e have und..rstood thi. , ~nd puts in quest ion the
formatjcn of a g..nen l rat.. of pr otit. ~'e h~v .. .....n th~t ~ mut~tion in th..
~ ~'tIOn
<l5
mNnlI
r<lrhet rb.ar
u...
11 I 51
12 I 51
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
~'Ie
prod uction takes place by a saving of labou r-po wer without a saving of
1960s and which we illust rated by a who le series of diagrams in th e sec ond
half of Chapter 1.
tot al exc hange-va lue rises. If thi s is not th e case , th en th e tot al costs of
pr oduction increase , and th e rate of accumulation slows down until a major
transform ati on of th e labou r pr ocess devalor izes a po rtion of co nstant
capital and brings abo ut a techni cal revolution th at econo mizes means of
th e 1960s. ~'Ie have seen th at th e first half of thi s decade was th e period of a
Diagram
1~.
~'Iorld ~'Iar ,
distributed und ergoes a relative decline , whilst pr ofits build up more and
more , particularly in Department 1. A mom ent is necessaril y reached when
th e rate of pr ofit in Department I increases relative to th e capital advanced,
by virtue of th e accelera ted develop ment of thi s department, whereas
"
-,
.-.
...
,,,.
na>
.'
"" orpofOl
13 I 51
"
14 I 51
- - - - - - - - - - - - - ---{o ) - - - - - - - - -
it is
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
oc
in pro portion to th eir respective sizes. Defined in this way, comp etition is a
genera l rate of pr ofit . This will lead us to int roduce new co ncepts to
int er pr et ati on of what are genera lly kno wn as pr ices of pr od uction very
~'Ie
capitals, th e indu strial bra nch is a co mmo n are na of capitals which, while
15 151
econo mic space. The pr ceed ure s of collective barga ining over wages, in
16 1 51
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - <0 > - - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
effect , ""eur within th ese bra nc hes, and it is al lhis level th a! firm s organize
int o th e typical institution s of dass struggle tha! are emplayers'
The fact th a! al! ente rprises in an indu st rial bran ch can co unt on ide ntical
rules as far as th e fur mation and ev olutio n of th e basic wage is co ncerned is
Theor etical cost of prod uction xC ' + r) = pri ce of prod uction , where r is
th e genera l rate of pro fit , dete rmined in adva nce together with wage costs.
lhi s sta ndpo int, a bra nch may well pr esent itself simply as a diverse variety
of lines of pr oduction . This sho uld in no way be surprising. The
industrial bra nch. The branch is the economi c space for med by capitals
bra nch yields a ra te of pro fit equal to th e genera l rate oThere th en exists a
of the genera l rate of pro fit , in which social labour-po wer is redu ced to th e
commod ity , so th at th e rates of pro fit realized on ave rage in eac h bra nch
determination of thi s social demand, eac h indust rial bra nch operates on
17 I 51
18 I 51
--------------~o)----------
'"
-'
A T HEOR\' OF CAPITALIST R E GU LAT I O ~
govern th e
soci~I
ptodUClion and
:l . The SINgle Betw_n
exch~nge
by lhe 1JOCi~1 demand , expteued in money le rm" thal purch ases th e ma""
of co mmodili... in lhi,
~veuge, ~nd
C~IeOty. lbe
The concep" ... J.,... just d9V"loped will en,oble llS lo dIldlyse Ihe pr oceslr
price Itill
ot thui
;Jw~ ys
detenrunate. Tbe
lhe ....oIution
lJl
~lw~ys define<!
J>TOC'tSS llul
tr~nsfomu
lhe
f.ovour~ble lJl
ptev~i1s. During.
jf
~dopt
U.e ne w con<lttio ns
_he beoome more ollld more numerowt . recluNl U.err pnces below U.e
former .xi.itl pr;e.. To lhe eXl",,1 Wl U.e n.... COIIdltions of productlon
hecome gen er al . ~n ever V"'ler porllon of social de =d purchases
oommodtti... producecl in lb .. n.... w~y. lb.. social prire changes lo Ibe
eXlen l llul
lhe new oon dttiOlls. ~ih.." lh_ Laner hecom.. lJOCiaIly domin.ml . Ibe Deprice of productson ;.
~CCOTditnce "'lb
est~b\isbecl,
COI1I'5<!
of Ihe
prev~iling
1 ~
~ It~tic
It.til tical oblerv~tionl o f the prices of produc tion mu.t be co nce iveci as an
20 I 51
I 51
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
th e rate of pro fit fur th e indu st rial br anch in question tends to fal! into line
with th e genera l rate of pro fit .
They make pro fits belQw th e genera l rate , or eve n experience losses. This
established, thi s pr oced ure doos not have to impose any artificial
valorizatio n and ga int o massive debts to acq uire th e new and very
result , fluct uati on s in mar ket price may exist independent of th e pr ocess of
transfarmati on of th e norm s of pr oduction and exc hange we descr ibed
social labour. They can only reinsert themselves int o social capital at th e
cost of a far -reachin g reor ganization of th eir pr actices of valorizatio n. In al!
in ques tion has bee n antic ipated, making it possible to pr ofit from new
cases, th ough , th er e is always the sanctio n of lack of social valida tio n far
pr ivate labours.
co mpetition has already been established. Al! pr ices are exchange values.
2 1 I 51
errors of pr ed iction , which genera l!y cancel out and cor rect th emselves in
th e co urse of structura l changes. But th ey nevertheless have th eir effect on
th e flows of receipts and expenditures far th e firms in questio n, affecting
th eir gross pr ofits in th e sho rt ter m o Price fluct uati on s are far from
22 I 51
--------------~o)---------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
absorbing al! of th ese disturb ances. They are abso rbed rather by buffer
flows which are relatively flexible within the ayd e of metamorphoses th a!
forms the valorization of the individual capital. These buffer f10ws involve
co mpetition and mar ket relations are sub ordinate to th e dass struggle.
on a new pr oduct ion ayd e ta be initi ated without having to wait fur
Centralization of Capita l
~'Ie
nothing to do with th e evolution of product ion pri ces, and have no serious
The sec ond kind of phenom enon relates to a far more impo rt ant and
funct ion as forces giving co mpetition its bea rings over tim e . They are
dy namic co nstraints which reflect the social interdependence between
antago nism of th e wage relation , which forces eac h auto no mous centre of
antago nistic forces which may give rise to genera l crises, initially th rou gh
thi s kind , th e co nditions for th e existe nce of a genera l rate of pr ofit do not
co mpetition are th en rad ically modified . From exte rnal relations of co nflict
on th e market , waged by capitals whose auto no my is still preser ved , th ey
bec ome a force restr ucturing property in an open struggle for co ntro l,
th rou gh waves of mer ger s in which ava ilable mon et ar y resources are
individu al capitals is not actually realized at any give n po int in tim e . The
devalor ization of capital. The genera l pr ice level first rises and th en falls,
pro fit .
23 I 51
24 I 51
--------------~o)---------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
co rroep! enables us to give a th eor eti cal int erpret at ion of th e division of
tot al exchange-va lue th a! is eifected in capitalist co mmod ity circ ulation .
Its significance as an expr ession of th e socially prevailing co nditions of
pr od uction remains int act when th e centralization of capital creates new
relations " f co mpetition . The norm s of product ion and exchange still define
of co ntempo rary capitalism o ~'Ie have begun thi s th eoret ical analysis of
possible without th e separa te econo mic units being de prived of any social
refere nce for regulating th eir behav iour. The elements of thi s problem are,
as we have see n, the monetary form of pr ice and surplus pr ofit . The
questio n now is to disdose th eir th eoreti cal significance. ~'Ie should not e
th at thi s pro blem canno t be raised in either dassical or neo-d assical
The co ndition for pri ce sys tems of thi s kind to bec ome solidly established is
or thodoxy. Even th ough th e price sys tem ass umes a very differe nt sense
ev ide ntly th at the social demand for different categories of co mmod ity is
co ngruent with th e asy mmetrical relationships of co mpetition . This is why
co nsumer sta tuses for differe nt incom e gro ups and different social
co nditions of existe nce for exc hange relations, can go beyond th e noti on of
Comp..tition
a co herent sys tem of relative pri ces. The permanence over tim e of
econo mic agents caught up in it . Surplus pro fits and mon et ar y losses reveal
th ese incoh er ences via-a-vis any und erlying sys te m of norm s of
pr oduction and exc hange, and are at th e same tim e th e imm ediat e forces
25 I 51
26 I 51
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----{o ) - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
W; - C + V +S~'
S~
abando n th e bra nch in question. This is why th e mar ket price is gra dually
1+ O . ~+ O _ 2
red uced to $ 1.5, which bec omes th e new social mar ket value. The pr oo f
th at th e new pr od uction norm has really been esta blished is th e
disappearance of surplus pro fits, which coincides with a new distr ibu tion of
mar ket shares.
This pr ecess as a whole has th e following th eoreti cal significance.
VE' _C +VA
11 5 .
\< 0 .5
This applies to a particular and still virtual exchange-va lue, since th e new
co nditions of product ion remain exce ptio nal in th e br anch . The prevailing
exchange-va lue, i.e. th e secial mar ket value, is still determined by th e
former pr oduction co nditions. Since th e social norm remains un changed ,
th e innovating capitalists can in pr incipIe sell th eir co mmod ities at any
po int in th e range between th e particular value and th e social value,
realizing a greate r or lesser surplus pro fit . If th ey are to realize th e
maximum surplus pr ofit , th ey must be able to sell twice th e number of
units repr esented by th eir current share of th e mar ket in pr evalent selling
co nditions. To th e extent th at th e social demand for thi s category of
co mmod ity is unchanged - a hypo thesis retained by Marx , which ass umes
th at effective mon et ar y de mand remains co nstant - th en th e sale of th e
inn ovating capitalists' output req uires an expansion of th eir share of th e
mar ket by a red uction of their mar ket pri ce below th e soc ial value, but still
above th e individu al value. The fixing of this mar ket pr ice (say $ 1.8, for
example) is a stra tegic decision th at cannot be repr esented by any
27 I 51
28 I 51
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----{o ) - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
commerc e and finance d ose ly together . Thus th e size and means of action
of innovating firms are now in many fields such as to allow th em to plan th e
th ese firms no longer have to take th e demand for th e bra nch as a constant,
once pri ces are given. They may on th e contrary consider th at an output
increased by new and mor e eflicient methods can be sold at a mar ket pr ice
bec omes poss ible. It denotes a new form of competition inserted within a
but discr ete o Social mar ket value is a means of distr ibu ting individu al
values corresponding to th e different pr oduction pr ocesses th at coexist in
mon opolistic reg ulation. There is still th e formation of a surplus pr ofit , but
th e conversion of th e surplus pro fit int o relative surplus-va lue follows a
different course.
~'Ie
spec trum of techni cal conditions, but also on th e tot al effective monet ar y
mar ket shares. ~'Ihen th e effective demand for th e branch doos not have a
dynamic of its own , th en th e tot al size of th e mar ket is given. This is why th e
mar ket pr ices diverge fr om socia l mar ket values. The result is th at th e
concrete formation of relative surplus-va lue th ro ugh th e pivoting of value
Price wars derive from thi s situation. If, on th e contrary, a regular gro wth
adva nce and is far less beset with obstad es. There is no need at all to invent
effective demand is assumed not to have any genera tive force independent
value in mot ion . It redistr ibutes mar ket shares and makes poss ible th e
emergence of a new social value.
But th er e is no reason to believe th at competition can be reduced to thi s
partial pr ocess.
~'Ie
2 9 I 51
30 I 51
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----{o ) - - - - - - - -
o
A THEORY
os OPlTAlIST REGULATION
Total Sale P.. CiI
exc hange , then everyt bing hap pens as if lhe innovati ng firm o ereatOO th eir
own market.
The pivotllll ofv.uu.. may tben W:e ptae. wtthout a tall ID price. ln the
1.1_ example, the forme r IIOCWJ marbt ....Ju.. o 2 dollan renrns lb.
b.uJs from which th. introduetion of ..xcepttona! pro<!uctiOll condltiOM
dep.o.rts . The rurplus proti.t is far largar tha n in Ihe contelCt of full
competition. It givel lhe ian cvators a e..oh 110" which lhey can use to
exp.ond their productiva cap.ocili.... The Ilr ategic decision i. lhe one lhat
fil.lbl"", them lo ch<xlM the optun.ol fal.. of incrw5e in s.ol...... ThilI invoh...
i ll incre.aH in _age c:oJU denYUlI both from a prtl-ll redlJtribul>on o
.urplus pro6ts to lb. ..age-earn...... by "ay of compens.otioll for the.r
a~ptanc. of tech nical changH, and from an inc:NUe in lhe co mrn..r<:i.l
overheads necessa ry to se11 lhe inerease<! oulput . The unified for mation of
~-
11.... ' _
ao d.llar.
n.
2 0WUU
ad.Ua"
8 d. llar.
18 dollar.
2doU,,"
12 dellar.
32 dollar<
d.!!a"
1 0 WUU
40
n i 51
11 I 51
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
capital is not abs tract (hence essentially mobile) value. These firms are tied
to particular techni cal co nditions and have no way of transfer rin g th eir
of indu st rial br anch . ~'Ie have see n how br anches divide up market s by
differentiating between categories of co rnmod ity . No w th e structura l
pr oduction and exc hange is established fur th e int egrat ed econo mic line as
a whole . It imposes on partial segments of valorization certain techni co-
(a) In tegr ation 01 branches and transf orm ation 01 commodities. The
specializatio n of pr od uction precesses, th e creation of zones of int egrati on
in th e division ofl abo ur , and th e diversification and transfurm ati on of usevalues are infrast ructural pr ecesses of th e development of norm s of
product ion and exc hange un der th e regime of int ensive accumulation th at
we have labelled Fordism . Spec ialization and vertical int egrat ion of
product ion destr oy br anches th at previou sly existed without involvin g th e
disappearance of th e cor respo nding labour precesses. These bra nches
bec ome technico-econ omi c lines in a larger and reor ganized bra nch. The
pr od ucts th at leave th ese lines are no more th an pseudo-commodities,
ente ring int o th e pr oducti on of co mplex co mmod ities as int ermediat e
pr od ucts. They are pseud o-commod ities in th e sense th at th ey are not
product s of labour th at have directly to seek secial valida tion in genera l
circulation . The labo ur spent on th eir producti on be comes th e object of
coordination within a genera l plan fur th e int egrat ed enterprise . ~'Ihen th e
relations between ente rprises take th e furm of sub-contracting, th en
economic dependence in ways other th an th e exte rnal relations of
co mpetition is read ily appare nt. But thi s depende nce exists eve n where
th er e is no sub-contracting in th e strict sense. There are genera lly a swarm
of small-sca le firm s operating on int ermediat e segments of valorization in
int egrat ed econo mic lines, and supplying th eir product s to a small number
of giant co rpo rations who hold th at link in th e chain towar ds which
eve ry thing upst ream must necessaril y co nverge , and on which eve ry thing
downstr eam must be exclusively depende nt. This is why th ese small firm s
can co ntro l th e techni cal characteristics of th eir labour precess
independently witho ut having th at economic auto no my which would make
it legitim at e to spea k of centres of capitalist appropriation. For th em ,
33 I 51
econo mic norm s that de te rmine transfer pri ces fur th ese pseudoco mmod ities. There can be no genera l rule fur th e distribution of profit
within th e int egrat ed line oIn vesti gat ion s must be made case by case . The
rates of profit fur th e captive firms are not necessaril y low in period s of
normal activity, if th ese firms manage to benefit from the superexploitation of a sub-proleta riat made up of categories of disad vantaged
wage-earn ers trapped in secluded reservoirs of labou r . But th ese firms
operate in a situation of tot al econo mic insecurity , witho ut any possibility
of reacting to delete rious changes in genera l econo mic co nditions.
J ust as th er e exist zones of int egrati on in co mmod ity producti on , so
th er e exist zones of dive rs ificatio n, where th e obsolescence of use-values is
very pronounced and th e norm s of product ion and exchange do not
stabilize sufliciently fur distinct indu st rial bra nches to separa te out ,
encompassing different gro ups of firms. Compe tition between capitals her e
bec omes a stra tegic co mbat fur th e elimination of adversa ries. 4 The
objective of eac h capital is not simply to make sure of a do minant pos ition
in a particular econo mic line , as a bas tion of valorization with a particular
variety ofcommod ity as its support. It is to co ntrol th e means and rhythm
of diversification itself. As lon g as thi s struggle co ntinues, th e relations of
co mpetition are th ose of absorption, mer ger , and association of firms. The
impo rt ance of stra tegic investments, th e tim e th ey take to mature , th e
great variation in lecal co nditions of valorization, all make it impossible to
spea k of a co mpetition gove rned by an imm anent social norm . But th e
outco me of th e stra tegic struggle is always th e emergence of a new bra nch
or gro up of bra nches in which norms of pr od uction and exchange are
established . At th e same tim e , a few giant co rpo rations co nsolidate th eir
pos itions and stabilize their exte rnal relations by int er connecting th eir
investments in th e different econo mlC lines within th e field of
diversification . The resulting furm of co mpetition is th at of str atified
34 I 51
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - <0 > - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
~'Ie
management of pr od uction.
sales cost oIt is unde rstood th at all th ese costs are determined on th e bas is
consumption . ~'Ihen th e new sphere has come fully int o mass consumption ,
and th e social demand fur it is sta bilized and largely a response to th e need
pr evailing sys tem of nor ms. These are th er efure manet ar y magnitudes.
The tot al cost of pr oduction per unit pr od uced (i.e. th e th ea reti cal lon g-
mor e rigid and mor e predict able. This is th e period of stra tified oligopoly ,
cor responding to sta ble exte rnal relations between centralized capitals.
is: K/Q. + V.
p _ ( _ .V )(l )
up under th e concept of barriers to entry . Barr iers exist to entry int o a field
Q,
(K/Q.
V). is structura lly grea te r fur new capitals see king to estab lish th emselves
(K/Q.
involved her e , th er efure , is not just a simple distr ibution of individual costs
of pr oduction around th e nor m. In th e conditions under investigat ion , in
fact , th e very ma vement of capital is fundamentally affected, since nane of
th e capitals see king entry is able to realize th e genera l rate of pro fit at th e
pr ice under full competition . The upshot is th at th ey do not invest in this
bra nch. But if thi s is th e case , th en th e same pr od uction Q. can be realized
at a pr ice higher th an th at unde r full competition , and can yield a ra te of
pro fit higher than th e genera l rate , up to th e esta blishment of a limit pri ce:
K
P, . ( - + V lr( I + I', )
Q,
such th at capitals newly ente ring exac tly realize th e genera l rate of pro fit :
35 I 51
36 I 51
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - <0 > - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
el
.. THEOR'r OF CA PITAL IST REGULATION
K
p, C -
Q.
~ V ).O ~ r)
p, - p
K
1-
Q.
\ '),
nu.
!he st.bihry of this price is lbe st.bthry of th.. hiom"rs to ""'try. TbIS
stability LS not .. medunical OM, but involv"" eh.. pel"SlStellC<l of ..
m..t_.ble swe Ib.t m.y be of long dur.llOD , m which the fonn.otwn of
stratified oligopo ly is alre ady the resulta nt of the conl olidation of
competition in a :IOne of diversific.ltion.'
The effect of rhese n" lO ge n..rai modaliti.. o f d evalo riz:atio n o n th.. la... o f
compenrion IS onIy mlelhgthle if"e bear in mmd Ihe SJ"IC1fic mod e of
COheholl o f tM ~ o ( rnt"hJI~ a=
ulatIon. This regt.l1l.. can only
d..velop by CT<Nlmg Ihe I1ructlll"allOrms n+edoo lo confronl lb.. n.... gui""
lb lOhich the con ttadictio ns of the lalO of acc umulatio n pres ent the mselves.
The ce ntralizatio n o f ca pital, c hietly in ils financia! aspecl, and Ih..
transttion from
lOrmatlQtl of M"
18 I SI
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
mon opolist ic co mpe tition . The result is a gigantic waste of soc ial resources ,
pr oced ures of monopo listic co mpetition thus actually operate ta pro voke a
dissociation in th e develop ment of the twa departments of prod uction . The
appea r as a loss. The loss " f subsla nce is no! borne by th e firm s involved ,
bu! by soc iety as a whole , in th e furm of the erosion of money va lue and th e
diseq uilibr ia .
stra tegies. The type of planning descr ibed ab ove is possible only if th e
Seeking
ta
disengage
th emselves
from
th e
local
relations of competition are sta blized under th e furm " f stra tified
oligopo ly . If lhi s stability is to be pr od uced right across th e econo my, with
th e exce ption of new zones of diversification in th e pr ocess of furmation , it
favourable .
~'Ihether
~'Ie
rate of pro fit is not threat ened by th e uneven develop ment genera te d by
th e incom pati bility between th e evolution of th e macro st ruct ur e of
Administe red pr ices may be unde rstaod from two po ints of view. First of
pr od uction and th e distr ibu tion of tot al incom e . But th e mod aliti es of
all th er e are th ose pr ivate pr actices that emerge in th e co ntent of stra tified
oligopo lies with a relative stability. These can be seen as co ncerted
and agre ement. This is particularly true in th e United Sta tes , where a very
th at are th e pr incipal co mpo nent of a rapidly gro wing cash flow, th e giant
ques tion th at is disto rted to give eve r more weight to recent fixed
mon opolisti c co mpetition itself. Administered pri ces are alsa matter s of
pu blic ruling in spec ific fields of co mmodity pr oduction . Qur a bjective her e
investment th at is eve r more rapid . The pr oced ures set u nd er way by eac h
co ncretely empla yed. A study of thi s kind should certainly furm part of any
descr iption of th e furms of capitalist regulation . However , it alone would
giant firm so as to pro tect itself from local risks of devalor ization thus
create an eve r stro nger demand fur investments that favour s th e
39 151
40 1 51
---------------~o)---------
-'
A THEOR\' OF C A ~ I TA lIS T RE GULATION
.ignifican~
T.. ~",
lo , ..
__ ~ "".l
...-
~ , . ,,~
"" L_ . ~
'R ,~ ffi.
_ .. _ ,
,d
....,~.
".,rt
_Ir
,....1
_
os
..-1
lo
{~
w.
COIlcef1&d price falls in tb. band "'PMatmg tb e production pnN! under full
compolllbOll /rom lh.. prodllC1>Oll price under monopolisl>e com pelltion.
!he coocert&d pnc. may be equal to !he Iotler or below il , bulll dces not
nano:! lOir in rile relaltOD ot temporal ....n.able to ,ts avera ge.
Lee UlI rboon collftder an e xample which will ..lueidale tbe collcrele
pr~
firm.s '" ttus branch, protected as they are by tb.. b.rrn"ts to ..ntry, hav.
th. s.ame long-term coats of product:lon. In tlus c....., tb.. firms in tb.
ohlopoly al! have a commou mr..,.est m max::u:ll1ZUlg tb.. total surplus profil
by fOOnllhe ccncerted price as Deir as poss1ble to tb.. !uIIlt pne& Wlthoul
lh&l"&by altraetmln_ capltals. Tbey Can do so bocaUS':! the homoz..n....ty
of prcduct and ee.t. means that tb. maXIJIUZoOt:lon oftb.. total surplus profil
is compatible Wllh a d'VlSton of the market m propomon to the stze of tb.
produetiv.. eapitalr . The division of th e mar ket m....ns the dlvision of tb.
surplus profil in such a way th at ....eh firm involved in the ohgopoly
receiv a rat.. of prct &qual to th.. avera ge rate of profil in th e braneh. In
thi, ca , lb.. price of production of monopolistie competition can b&
unambiguoull y achi..ved. Conce rted pr aetiee invo lving lh e division of a
homogen&Oul mar ul il a simple mallero n , IOlidily is dependenl simply
41 I 51
42 I 51
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
~'Ihen
accorda nce with th eir costs, ta red istr ibute th e tot al surplus profit of th e
bra nch. Complex cartels of thi s kind , while furbidd en in th e United Sta tes
int er penet rati on guara ntees an attitude of mutual respo nsibility of eac h
firm towar ds its co mpetitors. An unfavou rable pos ition in one line can be
inh er ent to int ensive accumulation. They can only surv ive in particular
co mmod ity whose different use-values are varieties issuing from eac h
co mpo nent econo mic line oThis illust rat es very well th e th eoreti cal remark
limit ed co mplexity of techn iqu es, imm obility of pr od ucers, small number
of sellers and buy ers linked by lon g-st andin g ties o
its support yet is not defined by use-value , but rather by exc hange-va lue.
The develop ment of furms of co mpetition disseciates th ese two aspec ts
co ncretely . The stra tification int o varieties is essential to th e furmation of
pr ices of monopo listic co mpetition . But th e relationships between varieties
th e
4 3 I 51
limit pr ices, by co ntro lling th e develop ment of mar ket shares fur firms in
th e different pr ecesses. One pr actice current in American indu st ry is th at
of pri ce leadersh ip . The pro blem of knowing who leads and who fullows is
not very impo rt ant , since th e latitud e in fixing pr ices is genera lly not very
great: th e aim of th e pr actice is approximate sta bility of mar ket shares in a
restr icted int er val of pr ice fixing, such th at - taking account of th e
spec trum of pr oduction costs within a line and th e distr ibu tion of mar ket
shares in th e overall set of lines - th e co hesion of the oligopo ly is ass ure d.
44 I 51
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---<0 > - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
It thus see ms logical to adapt a proced ure in which price is fixed within th e
ava ilable int er val by th a! firm whose cos! of producti on is lowest , al a level
to maximize its Qwn surplus pro fit . The other firm s th en co nfurm to lhi s
fictitiou s transpo rt costs and thus surplus pro fits. The co hesion of th e
oligopo ly leads to a maximum of soc ial waste by pr od ucing cross-cutting
flows of goods and co mpletely bloc king any advantage that might result
method s of prod uction remain lar gely unchanged , oosts are suflicient1y
inflexi ble fur it to malter littl e which firm seIs th e pr ice . The custom is fur
from changes in plant locat ion . The exo rb ita nt characte r of such pr actices
sta te, which may make it compulsory to rede fine and increase th e number
of base po ints as changes occur in th e sites of stee l-works, sources of
stra tification. This is geogra phical stra tification acco rding to lranspo r!
(b) Regulat ed prices. Her e we shall not investi gat e th e co ntrol pr actices of
and remaining in place while th e sources of raw mat eri als, and espec ially of
th e Feder al Tra de Commission. These essentia lly co nfer social valida tion
on pr ivate pr actices of mon opolist ic co mpetition when stable oligopo lies
supplies, change . Fixed costs are enor mou s and absolute ly rigid , with th e
result that th e break-even po int, or th e degree of utilization of pr oduction
capacity th at just co vers th em , is an essential da tum fur th e valorization of
pr oductive capital. Each tonne pr oduced over and above thi s limit yields
additional pr ofit , whatever th e distance to which it has to be delivered ,
since th e direct variable cost of an additional tonne is insignificant . This is
why th e tendency is fur eac h stee l-works to sell at as great a distance as
possible so as to expand its pr oduction capacity . Flows of co mmod ities cut
across one ano ther, with th e co nsumers bea ring th e expense by absorb ing
th e transpo rt costs. There is a co nsequent risk, th er efure , that co mpetition
between firms to expand th eir respective shares in th e mar ket will return
un der th e guise of differentiated costs of pr od uction , with certain firms
being able to absorb a po rtion of transpo rt costs and thus co nduct an
emb ryonic pr ice war . The pr imordial necessity of selling above th e breakeven po int makes th e moti ve behind thi s highly co mprehensible . In such
co nditions, pr ice leader ship is enda ngered, or at all eve nts must be further
spec ified. The solution adopted after ' 9" , once furmal and tot al
cartelization became impossible due to th e new anti-trust law, was th e
sys te m of base-po int pr ices. One or more base po ints are fixed fur different
geogra phical zones. ~'Iithin eac h zone, th e co ncerted pr ice of mon opolisti c
co mpetition is fixed at th e base po int. The customer pays th e base-po int
pr ice supplemented by th e cost of transpo rt between th e base po int and his
own destination, irrespecti ve of th e locati on of th e works from which th e
goods are supplied. The economic abs urdity of thi s sys te m lies in th e fact
45 I 51
The
decisive
impo rt ance
of exte rnal
econo mles
or
4 6 I 51
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---<0 > - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
firms. On the contrary, the lalter have fuund in the regulator y commissions
th e means fur stre ngthening and giving oflicial sanction to irrever sible
mon opol y structures. This is why al a ne of th e Congressional hearings th a!
has investi gat ed th e actions of th e regulator y co rnmissions without being
able to modify th em in any way, Professor ~.1. Adams oCluId declare: 'The
regulator y co rnmissions do no! pro teo! society against th e po wer and
appare nt pr ofit , related to th e nominal value of net fixed asse ts, is not
lower th an th e average rate of profit in indu st ry . The co hesion of th e
possible sanction of devalorization . Yet th ese firms have pro ved very
vulnerable to th e accelera tion of inflati on in recent yea rs. They have got far
deeper int o debt th an any others, and th e quo ta tion of th eir shares on th e
stoc k market has sometimes actually fallen below th e value of th eir asse ts.
serv ices was organized along th e same lines. This principIe is simple
~'Ie
have shown th at
47 I 51
devalorization
of capital diffused
th rou ghout
the
economy , th e
co ntradiction suddenly bec omes explosive. The rapid rise in th e pri ces of
th eir suppliers has a multiplier eifect o n th e public utilities due to th e
procedure by which th eir fixed assets are valorized. The increases in tariffs
4 8 I 51
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---<0 > - - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
necessar y to maintain th eir rat e of pr ofit bec ome int oler able , while th e
quality of th e serv ices th ey pro vide de te riora tes swiftly. The regulator y
rivals, once all int ernal co mpetition had been eliminated, were th e inland
waterway co mpanies. Since water transpo rt was highly co mpetitive for th e
co mmissions thus have to restr ain inereases in tari !fs and indu ce firms to
transport of heavy goods with a low unit value, th e railway co mpanies set
un dertake eno rmous loans th a! stra in the financial mar ket s. Bu! since th eir
pro spe ctive lender s are reticent and th eir debt burd en bec omes heavier .
transpo rt o This str ucture co nsisted in a very high tariff on indu st rial
co mmod ities with a high unit value so as to be able to practise dump ing for
goods with a low unit value and th us capture traflic from th e waterways. It
th er eby maximized th e pr ofits of th e railway co mpanies. It was accepted
because of th e support it received at thi s time from major po litical forces.
~'Ie can say th en th at th e tariff regulation was dominated by th e
organized gro up of railway co mpanies, who established th emselves solidly
in th e key pos itio ns within th e Inte rstate Commerce Commission. The next
of ro ad tr ansport oDuring th e int er -war period it was all th e eas ier for thi s
objectives are not all atta ined to th e same degree, since th ey are not
entire ly co mpatible . The overall effect of th e administra tion of tari ffs is to
suppress all co mpetition within a particular form of transpo rt and maintain
~'Iorld ~Iar .
co mpanies, because of th e very costly tari ffs the latter charged on goods
with a high unit value. Now th e inflexi bilit y of th ese tari ffs was co nditioned
by th e monopol y str ucture, with its allocatio n of traflic between th e
a collective monopo ly pro fit by fixing minimum and maximum tari ffs. It
fragile or had a high unit value. The tariff sys te m in force did not permit
traflic to be allocate d in a way th at reflected th e movement of costs. Road
transpo rt thus captured a far lar ger share of th e tot al traflic th an its
int rinsic advantages would have autho rized. This eruption of r oad
transpo rt ed .
transpo rt int o a frozen mon opol y structure did not break up thi s structure
transpo rt , sta rting with th e Inte rstate Commerce Act of 1888, carne int "
4 9 I 51
~oo
ro ad transpo rt
50 I 51
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - <0 > - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
~'Iorld ~'Iar
th an freeze th e sta tus qua . The pr ice sys tem thus became more and more
rigid , as its mon opoly structure was exte nded to road transpo rt o This
certainly did no! imp ro ve th e po.ilion of th e railways, th reatened by
surplus capac ity, ossified management and an ever greater burden of deb!.
Th. fo, m, " . n . f . ffo," m.n , hu." ,,',", . " ol.m . f ...;, .H. m
n. a H" . " mm ,' " n.m . Ao..n' .. ;, n. a n . " .. fr.m th m'Mn' 01
.m.'" .,
.
1
m. ..t. n' O. ... lt hu n. S'.m.n. ', ;' " ' ' 'H. h... m ' . m
Th. " n". t . f m.nH.", " m,," ".n 'n". du" . hm ' ' ''.ud . .., ,ffo" n' fr.m
'h., , u. '.mu H fin O. " f" . n" ,n. a l . qu,Ho,'um 'n . ....." . n ,u" . n "lo"
" m,," ".n. r " 'h" J.tt", ... E. H. eh.mo.d .,n, I1I. I1I.o", of lfo.opoUst" Comp . . .o.,
e.mo" .", ... ..., ' 93 5, . n. J. R.om ..n, I1I. ",o. om' of ' mp. >1<''' Comp . . .o., L.n n,
'95'
.S.. A. e.tt., Los , hoix ' ,o. om'o uos d. l . .... d ""p ,'''', P U" , ' "'0.
S. l.. L,,'n', OU.o p oljd To'h." aI Pro . ...ss, Hu . u . ,
,.k
, Am.n. 'h. " " .. ".m n. 'h. " h.l. fi. l f mm"t.,.. ,.'" " " . uJ.t " '''', ".
m m.n" .n E. "'hu.", , P H a. ds, p. H..n, , . 65; P. W "
, I1I. Chs's of ,h.
R ularo", Comm's,"". s, N. " Y, ,,, , ",o; U.S. S'M t. Suo"mm. tt
n An" " u,' . n.
" . nl fth. e.mm, tt...n 'h. J u. "'u , , A drn,.,,,,,,,..d Pri<os, Compdi.m o. PubU, PoU,y,
88th e.n." .., , n. ...",n, ,. 63,
An ,,.,m, " .n ,. th' .......n o. foun. ' n 'h. m. jo';' fOa n, h.. ' no. l" .'n 'h.
' an<fo,m , " .n . fn. n-lom u, m. " !> 'n'u" m. " !> . n. 'ndu,,, l . n . Th. m. th f
. " du,".n m 'h... oan, h.. . u nl. Httl . ; u. ,"..m " ...1 'nta " . n " ..t..." .n.
h u ' ", ,n" n. 'h. muk. t ".n kn. " n . n. fo, m o m. n numo" .f , u.t.m",.
Th... oan, h.. " n'''tut..., . , " 01HH.. 'n " h.,h th. fm. ' no. l m,'n"'n 01...
mu tuol "J." . n.
R. r .nm.th, I1I. , . ...sta .. Comm. ",. Comm's,""., N. " Y,,,, ' "'0.
51 I 51
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - <0 > - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
6
Monetary System,
Credit and Crises
The abs tract solutio n th at we gave to this nexus of logical re quire ments
was to int roduce th e co ncept of th e monetary system, at th e beginning of
Cha pter 1.
~'Ie
~'Ie
act which effectively lla ves commoclities, and th a! lhi s act is no! simply a
relations of pr od uction .
~'Ie
sta tus of pri ces and th e co nditions for th e overall realization of value, as
th e formatio n of a genera l ra te of pro fit . The laws of co mpetitio n follow
from thi s.
far given only an abs tract and formal solutio n, th at we must now try to
make more co ncrete . Since mon ey is the genera l equivalent in exc hange
relations which are po lar, it doos not itself co nfront any equivalent. It is
dassical and
, 1 48
subsequently
~'Ie
2 I 48
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - <0 > - - - - - - -
thi s
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
~'Iorld ~'I ar ,
banking sys tem, but acq uires its attributes of genera l equivalent outside
thi s sys te m, when th ese tokens of credit are utilized within co mmod ity
holding. It is th er efure a good demanded fur its subjec tive utility , eve n
th ou gh it is not a use-value produced in th e real econo my. The result is th at
transfurm ed when mon ey co mes to ass ume its full capitalist attributes, by
balances. Money thus acts on th e sys tem of relative pri ces when th e real
~'Ie
th ey are experienced in th e econo my; but it is not in its po wer to subs titute
3 I 48
be de tac hed from th e genera l circ ulation of co mmod ities and bec ome
capital by way of a financial circ ulation involvin g operations ofl ending and
4 I 48
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - {o - - - - - - - -
o
A THEORY
os OPlTAlIST REGULATION
(a) le stat~. (lfba1lk mc>n'1l ;,. ,he commodillJ eCOllomlJ Lel us ltu t from
S1mp\.e u ch.lng.. C- M- e . n.. mon~MY consttnnt m....ns that each
p.ll'ticIp;mt in ex cha nge h.os lo to!U bis commodlty . in OIber wordlI preve by
obummg =<ty that Ibis p.rrtlC'U1H commodtty vv. Jum d1SpO$oll ovooT ..
fract ion 01 total sociallaoour . Ha...ing satisfiod. lhi. obligation , he di.poI"
of .. social purchasmg po...er cver lhe . um lotal 01eommoditiel lhanks to
..hich he Cllnpurd",Sot uy I1S'!O-value lha! h ch~ within Ih. hmit af the
reLo.uonsh,poI o equiviln<>e, ID o tb-er words <lnY USe-V"Ui! th.I.l NprilSenlS
,In idenl>u1 &.ctloII of fOcial Liobour. If purc~ "lid sales aa reguLorly
llIu,rconn1od., th.m mon")' _015 10 b. a pUN ly l<lChnic.} m....ns of
circulation. !ls role al general equivalent i. expr ...."" abstractly in lhe
pos ting of pric es of commodities . Bu! mona y dces nol ha..... to be pre. en! in
cireuLotiou au. matfl'i.ll commodity. lt can be repu.:.d by .. token of ...alu. ,
contraclo. The need for settlement, ho...ever , doos not . l...ayo ari58fur eaeh
p..rlieular eredil . The deve lopmenl 01 eredil eonlraels leads lo their
eoncentr.tion, and .n.obles p..ym..nts to hUonce ..eh oth..r to an ext-enl
,,,,,lf
tha r credtt
t-ends <:onstantly ro "nlu... Chatos o f credJt tr ansactKlnS
mse, m which mOtley ap~ onIy abstractly as money of acooun t. BUI
...hn CNd,ts a nd debts no longer hUone-t, ...hen g. pI m th.. duration of
contracls lend lo inlerrupllhe ehain 01compensalions, lhen il is neceso. ry
te ""l!le eredilo in money , lhe real commodily. For lhis lO be possible,
",,"TVe funds of moNnS of p;lyment mUS! have bMn furmed . lbus ...ben
mon" y be<:omes a mH nsel pe!lmentfot sertl.rng credtts, '15 roI..;as. sto1'.
of valu.. is no longoer an aceidfillal hoardmg, but ralb.". a nec<tSSll)' of
co mmoolty circulattorr.. ~oJh.. n instttutions ar" created fur C'!I\tr.lm ng th~r
eUl lomen' eredils and organizing lhe ir mut ual balancing, lhey . 110 rec..ive
. nd rean.nge the monelary depos ils thal temporarily f. n oul of
~tion.
5 I 48
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
normal profit . Bu! th e sca le of ind ustr ial capital formation , its turnover
pr oductively . What the banker creat es by his issue ofbank money is a debt
aga inst hims elf. He hands th e indu st rialist a pro mise to pay which he doos
not have to honou r simply to thi s particular indu strialist . The indust rialist
rather makes use of his credit with th e bank just as if thi s really were th e
pr od uction . The result is a relatively stable spread of int er est rates fur
co nstraint .
Let us not e right away that th e banks are not subjec t to thi s co nstraint as
creditors who will see th eir pr ivate co ntracts valida ted or not according to
value, can issue from the crea tion ofbank money ex nihilo. It is essential to
moni es int o th e mon ey co mmod ity . This general and p erma nent
com'ertibility at p ar value is the proof that bank money has the attributes
of the general equiv alent . It is only possible if th e banks are dosely
int egrat ed int o a banking sys tem subjec t to a spec ific regulation .
The above exposition enab les us to und erstand why th e banking sys te m
econo mic acto As against circ ulation credit , it is not a pr ivate agreement
between two exchanging parties, co nd uded to remove th e need fur th e
delivery da te of a co mmod ity to coincide with the payment fur it . As
against financial int ermediati on , th e creation of bank mon ey is not th e
assignment of a mon ey capital pr eviously accumulate d by way of sav ings
cyd es of capitals and circ uits of pr ivate expend itu re s so as to pr ofit from
th e retu rn of tem po raril y idle money and furm mon ey capitals. They
subsequently acq uires a social character , as distinct from any other pr ivate
7 I 48
co mmod ity circ ulation . To th e extent th at th eir accepta nce co rrespo nds to
th e genera l co nditions these co mmerc ial bills have to respect , and to th e
exte nt th at th ese co nditions can be cod ified , th e banks pr ocure fur th ese
8 I 48
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---(0 ) - - - - - - -
o
A THEORY
os O
PlTA lI ST RE GULATION
croo.its a far larger . paC1!l of circ ulation Ihan if these bills had la circ ulare
exdusively b4tween private producen reciprocal1y ad:nowledging Iheir
d..hts to en e MlOth.....
b) Th r nprts$io" of rhr mo"tfa~ conft.crint. eredll lends permanendy
la ..nUre the curr<ml hmtts of commod,ty product1On, by anticip.o.tml ti
furt her development . Nith lhe i. sue ofbanltmoney, er""i! Ir_ itselffrom
Iha limito imposed by Ihe gather ing of saving . Bu! eradi! doel not modify
lb. fundam~tal cw r.lct..r of commodi ty prod uction, .. hose soci.Il
MC<lSSIty annot bt tilin fot lfo.nted In "Valle-t. Credlt C.lrr. de f.". tM
lKlCW vahdilion of pnn le Iaboun. bul bOl ~ppr_ l. lb. cr e<bt system
1S a n tmm~ sourot of insIabihty fur lh. rWtz,otlOn of excha nge-value,
becauoe ban\: money maltes credits 1iquid and tendl te unify Ihe spac<l of
circ ulation. Thi. i. why Ihe validat;on of ban k money a. general equivalent ,
i .e. th.. solvency of lh. b.mbng syst ..m, becom.... Ihe l::nol ..h""e all the
co nlr adlct>ollll of ea pitilist KO.lItlulatl<m an tloo. loge th" r . Every <:nSIS iIl
Ih r....IwotlOn of n ch.mge--..alue;osswn .. a glob.il cwact.... and appNTI
U i fin DnciDI ens;s. It iff<!ctS fiMnCli.1 circulatlon U i ..hole, bul ,lS
epicentre is n<!Cessarily the banking system as the site where private
credits are given liquidily.
~.,,, have _n lba l the rwli%.llion oftotl.1 exch.mge-vl.1u" Iu.. pLace vil.
Ihe form.ittCIn o f a l ener.J rate o f profil. The Lalt er IOverns lhe
ALattonshi~ of ",!wv.Jence between th.. dFerenl eal llion....of commodlly
u the founda tion of i sy Jtem o f norms o f productio n and exdlAnge. An
ever greater porlion of individual commo dily exchanges lake place in bank
money as Ihe croo.il oysl..m develo~ relali..e te Ihe exp.onsion of
commodtty productton. It is euy thoen lO falI inlo the iIlusion, ..hen
everythrng iI l omg ...11, lbal Ibe r....Iwotion of t otoll va1ue iI ipsa ta cto
NllSlioo.. But rt is nO! 10 il all. lbe t"<!i.I. exch.mg.. of commodtl,es mIo Ih..
general ",!u ivalenl is simply d isplacood te a specific poinl wh" .... th..
validalion of bank money as general ",!uivalenl is elfecled . This point is the
mQnoy mDrb t , Ihe areM ..here Ihe croo.il syJt em i nd the moneli.ry
syst" m l.I"e connecloo..md ..hoorelina1 seIIMm"nls i.re pude . lbe mannoor in
..hjch th..... 5"ItIements occur iI ct'UCli.lly dependen l 011 the Ili.ture of Ibe
monet.rry syst "m.
Nhen Ihe monetary system is based ultimately o n the production o f a
commodity Ihal is used as money, Ihe mc netary expr eosion of Ihe wor king
lD I 48
, I 48
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
banking sys te m.' The liqui dati on of th e colonial pas! and th e strong
hostility of th e frontier po pulations ta war ds th e financial po wers of th e
Northeast pr evented any success ful atte mpt to sel up a central bank. The
basic result as to th e relation ship between mon ey and cre dit. All pr ivate
Free Banking Act of 1838 pul th e banks in th e same pos ilio n as any " ther
commerc ial unde rtaking, removing any spec ific obligations on how banks
co uld be esta blished and managed . The pro liferation of smal! banks was
witho ut limit o This is why p rivate bank money bears the weight 01
commod ity realization crises in th e furm of insolvency when co nfronted
with demands fur settle ment in gold. But th e relationship between mon ey
and cre dit is not akin to inflat ion . This is not to say th at th er e may not be
period s when th e genera l pr ice level rises. Rises of thi s kind can co me
mon ey and discount credits on extre mely dubi ous business ventures. The
co nvertibility of bank mon ey was thus co mpletely insecur e . Money from
certain banks was not accepted at face value eve n in tim es of norm al
business. Ever y financial crisis was imm ediat ely transfurm ed int o a panic ,
fall in th e value of gold means a rise in th e exc hange-va lue ofcommod ities,
other things being equal. A price rise of thi s kind may stimulate a new
~'Iar
banks had to fulfil in order to qualify fur th e sta tus of national banks. A
anticipations to which credit gives rise . The expansion, imbricat ion and
accelera tion of th e circ ulation of credits leads to a swelling of demand
effects, which int er act dynamically : on th e one hand , a rise in all costs, on
increasing demand fur bank credit which fuels th e accelera tion in th e pr ice
mon et ar y sys tem gove rned by met allic mon ey , thi s can have only one
result : th e financial crisis which has already bee n discussed . Prod uction
capacity fur absorption. The indebt ed pr oducers can no lon ger meet th eir
"
1 48
rise , particularly by way of a rise in int er est rates. The credit sys te m thus
' 2 I 48
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---(0 ) - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
payment da tes, al th e very mamen! when costs are al th eir highest . Their
demand fur cre dit gro ws, while receipts from sales decline. This
anticipations of output and sales th at are incom pati ble with th e objective
credits. Since eve ryone needs liqui dit y , settlement demands flow in from
al! sides. The debt chain breaks al severa l po ints where th e banks are no
lon ger able la mee! th eir co rnmitments. A financial crisis breaks out and
credit co ntraets, while mon ey appea rs in its funct ion as a sto re " f value.
co nfrontation of bank mon ey , and via thi s th e entire pyr amid of cre dit ,
with a universal co mmod ity which by its very nat ur e is not a credit . This is
The sudde n devalor ization of credits gives rise to bankruptc ies and
is a social relation th at may ass ume differe nt forms. Like all other social
met als has a hist ory moted in th e original form of mon ey , th e sale
co mpatible with a rud imentary co mmodity circ ulation . Cre dit developed
Nationai Mone y
sys te m to co mmod ity circ ulation, but witho ut changing th e actual form of
gave rise to credit and its sys te matic organization . Cre dit takes hold of
co mmod ity circ ulation, which is no longer direct1y subjec t at eac h of its
links to th e mon et ar y co nstraint . But we co nstant1y st ressed th e fact that
structura l form which is now a lyn chpin of its co hesion, dosely linked to
th e law of exc hange eq uivalence was a social law govern ing th e realization
drives met allic mon ey out of the nati on al econo mic space once and for all;
of tot al exc hange-va lue. ~'Iith credit, the po larization inh er ent in the
genera l equivalent between co mmod ity and mon ey is expr essed in th e
funct ion s, it is necessar y to un der st and how and within what limit s th e
~'Ihen
' 3 I 48
'4 I 4 8
-----------------~o)--------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
(a) In tegr ation and disinteg ratio n ofba nk money . It is important to gra sp
th a! in mod ern capitalism bank mo ney is more th an simply th e support fur
~'Ie
mus!
freq uently slressed th a! labou r-po wer is no! a commod ity like any " ther . It
~'Ie
to incorpo rat e it int o pr od uctive capital unde r th eir excl usive direction .
Bu! it is no! a realized or realizable exc hange-va lue. It is impossible to
possess labour -po wer so as to sell it on th e mar ket and extraet a mon et ar y
co nsiderable th eoreti cal diflieulty now appea rs. Bank money is created , as
we have pr eviou sly shown, in a private relationship between th e banker
eq uivalent. Labou r-po wer is bought only beeause its use is the creation of
value, abs traet labour itself. This is why th e maintenanee cycle of labour -
But it mu st bee ome nati onal money as soo n as it leaves thi s pr ivate
relationship when wages are paid . It must now imm ediat ely aeq uire a social
fuI/y as general equivalent in the hands 01the U' orkers. This co ndition is all
th e mor e fundamental in th at th e far mation and regular development of th e
social norm of co nsumption , involvin g th e inflexi bilit y of th e nominal
referenee wage , is th e cor e element in th e co hesion of th e regime of
pr edominant1y int ensive aecumulation. Now th er e is no close link between
th e rh ythm at whieh th e wage-earn ers repe at th eir expe nditures, and th e
purchasing po wer. No one can say what this will be quantita tively, if wages
are not spent. But it must exist qualita tively, in sueh a way as to permit th e
maintenanee cycle of social labour-po wer to co ntinue .
The co ntradietion we have just noted will later lead us to define mod ern
inflat ion as a phenomenon spee ific to th e regime of int ensive aecumulation,
whose co nditions of possibility lie in th e transfarm ati on of th e mon et ar y
sys te m peculiar to th e latter . But it is neeessar y first of all to investi gat e th e
met amorph oses un der gon e by bank mon ey in th e genera l circuit of
payments. ~'Ie shall th en exam ine the way in which th e monetary
co nstraint is transfarmed to rende r th ese met amor phoses possible.
The pr od uetion pr ocess gives bank money a social pu rchasing po wer
beeause it is a net creation of value, th e far mation of a new abs traet labour .
turnover tim es of capitals, whieh are th emselves very dilferent from one
another. There is thus a do ub le advance between capitalists and workers:
~'Ihen
po U' er.' This fallows from th e very meaning of abs traet labou r . The social
purchasing po wer is not aeq uired beeause th e banker's advanee is used to
~'Ie
can und erstand th en how bank money must be endo wed with new
' 5 I 48
, 6 I 48
-----------------~o)--------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
~'Ihen
havin g lost its social purchasing po wer. It bec omes once more a mer e
After havin g disintegra ted, bank mon ey is des troyed. It has accomplished
bank mon ey int egrat ed al th e opening of th e act of product ion can continue
to bea r a social pur chasing po wer. It doos no! lose lhi s when it leaves th e
th e full cycle of its circular co urse , mar ked by success ive acts of creation ,
int egrati on , disintegration and des tr uctio n. A new cycle can then get un der
way by a new creation ex nihilo of bank mon ey fullowed by th e furmation of
sum tot al " f acts " f co rnmod ity circ ulation which realize abstrae! labour in
~'Ihen
th e
abs tract labour has been co mpletely realized , th e tokens of bank mon ey
have f10wed bac k to th e firm and are de tac hed from any element of inco me .
In pro po rt ion to th e expend iture , in fact , th e incom e element th at
occasioned th e expenditure is des troyed in th e course of exchange, since
th e co rrespo nding exchange-value has been socially valida te d and th e
co mmod ity is now going to be used as a use-value . But thi s expenditure
realizes another fract ion of incom e , and th e tokens of bank mon ey are
transfer red to this, occasioning a new expenditure, and so on .
~'Ihen ,
however , th e tot al abs tract labour fur th e whole per iod is realized , th e
entire incom e is spent and th er efure des tr oyed.' The bank money has then
disint egrat ed. It has f10wed bac k entirely int o th e hands of th e capitalists,
17 I 4 8
(b) The co nd itions 01p ossibility lo r infl ati on. The distinction between bank
mon ey and mon et ar y incom e , which are linked by a process of integration
and disintegration of th e social purchasing po wer conferred by abs tract
labour , is one of the fundamental capitalist attributes of money . It gives
co ncrete expression to th e transfurm ati on of abs tract labour (VA) int o
incom e (VP), inasmuch as m = VP/ VA. But th e fact th at bank mon ey is th e
bea re r of incom e and is thus radically distinguished from a simple privat e
credit , is an insuflicient condition fur th e furmation of a nat ion al mon ey .
The relationship recalled ab ove can be spelled out only if we can give a
meaning to th e mon et ar y expression of th e working hour , despite th e fact
th at thi s is no longer directly de te rmined by th e social co nditions of
producti on of a co mmod ity taken as genera l equivalent. Bank mon ey must
th er efure be tot ally unified , so th at eac h econo mic agent is permanently
certain of th e fullowing co ndition :
1 dollar from bankX = 1 do llar from bank Y = 1 do llar from bankZ = ", _
ldollar .
Now thi s condition is not imm ediat ely impli ed by th e analysis of th e
int egrati on and disintegration of bank mon ey as incom e . ~'Ihat is needed fur
thi s is a far -reachin g transfurm ati on of th e mon et ar y sys te m, centred on
th e establishment of a central mon ey with enfurced currency .
The unificat ion of bank mon ey bec omes, in effect, th e furm of th e
mon et ar y co nstraint in th e space of th e nat ion . This is so because th e
different bank moni es bec ome th e means fur a co nfrontation between two
different tim e dimensions, a social dimension and a privat e dimension ,
which th e very nature of co mmodity prod ucti on pr events from co inciding.
New abs tract labour is co ntinually create d by product ion . It is possible
th er efure to spea k of th e furmation of incom e fur a certain period which
int egrat es bank mon ey int o soc ial purchasing po wer. But th e expenditure
18 I 4 8
-----------------~o)--------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
necessar y to safeguard th e sys te m's solve ncy no matter what th e cost oThis
sharte r oc lon ger int er val , and th e bank mon ey can be annihilated only
lender oflast resort. But th e central bank mon ey is itself nothing more th an
a cre dit which thi s bank issues against itself. To be accepte d in all
circumstances as th e means of settlement in th e econo mic space of th e
nat ion , particularly in a crisis situation, thi s central mon ey must be ves ted
with a legal po wer, th e enforced currency imposed by th e sta te.
varied int er vals and are subjec t to al! th e hazar ds of co mpetition . Yet only
th en bec omes a new structura l form o In th e Unite d Sta tes thi s emerged
are attac hed, on th e other , are reflected within th e banking sys te m itself.
uni ver sal genera l eq uivalent. This management involves a who le series of
The circulation of pr ivate bank mon ey , in effect , when thi s serves to bea r
pr actices
canno t be red uced to an organized set of techni ques. In effect, the state
co mprising
th e
regulation
of banking
operations,
th e
becomes the bearer of the monetary co ns tra int, with th e result th at its
management is permanently subjec ted to a po litical sanction which is more
a spec ific circ ulation of credits between banks, so as to make th ese dates
social purchasing po wer which th ese all susta in. The central bank must
' 9 I 48
20 I 4 8
-----------------~o)--------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
forces th e central bank to settle gov ern ment deb ts on a more massive sca le
and to play its ro le ofl ender a f Ias! resor l as a priorit y , it can seem th a! its
mon et ar y laxity is th e cause of th e crisis.
Bu! th e real re latio nship between th e credit and monetary sys te ms has
nothing ta do with any quantity th eory of money . The furm ass umed by th e
relation s existo Such a crisis always has a more or less sharp effect on
econo mic relations, but it doos not necessarily change po litical relations.
The co nfrontation between dasses doos not explicit1y challenge the sta te
po wer of capitalist society, in other wor ds threat en th e ability of th e
capitalist dass to manage society from its unified vantage po int in th e sta te.
A crisis of thi s sort, which has occurred in th e past , is now again unde r way
in th e United Sta tes. The genera l ideological principIes th at legitimi ze
capitalism in th e po pular co nsciousness, pr incipIes which exp loit th e
peculiar feat ures of American nat ion al hist ory and are diffused in a variety
of forms by an extr emely de nse net work of cultural and religiou s
capitalist dass. The American bourgeoisie had and still has th e necessar y
room for manoeuvre to abso rb new social transform ati ons and yet
sanction for co mmod ities within th e nati onal circ ulation space. In period s
of financial crisis, when th e credit sys tem tends to cut loo se from th e
social crises can only be a major transform ati on of th e labour pr ocess and
th e co nditions of existence of th e wage-earn ing dass which are indissolu bly
Regu lation
11 . FINA NCIAL CRISES AS NECESSA RI' A SPECTS OF CAPITA LlS
21 1 48
22 1 4 8
-----------------~Of-------
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
met ast able balance of forces. The dynamic of th e evolution, break-up and
reconstitu tion of met ast able sta tes has nothing in co mmon with th e
itself.
~'Ihat
l . T h e Ov e r _Accu m u la t io ll of Ca p it a l
seciety. Two objections are customarily made to thi s. The first , empirical
The term 'over-ac cumulation' of capital may see m paradoxica1. Since
objection , co mes from th ose who define an ave rage rate of pro fit , work out
a chro no logical series for thi s ave rage over a century or so, plot thi s on a
curve , and without bothering th emselves with any more detailed analysis,
co nditions have deterior ated and th e rates of pro fit to be realized are
lowered? From th e sta ndpoint of th e individu al capitalist , which th e
co nd ude th at thi s curve doos not display any significant ded ine. The
one ano ther or exist simulta neo usly according to th e econo mic sec to r
co ncern ed , extrapolations from micro- economi c indicati ons to macro-
economic evolution can only lead to co nfusion . The financial crisis re veals
in a negative way th e organic unity of the capitalist moo e of pr oouction . It
th ese pro portion s. At bes t, th ese trends form part of th eories of cyd es
rend ers directly visible th e fact th at mar ket adjustments are moo aliti es of
regulation sub ordinate to th e law of accumulation. This secial law involv es
such a
disequilibr ium arises, no market mechanism can get rid of it . The financial
crisis is a pr ecess of pu rgation of th e disequilibr ium th ro ugh which entire ly
~'Ihen
23 I 4 8
24 I 4 8
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---<o . - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
pro fit to fal! be int er preted? Le! us recal! her e certain of " ur earlier
independent . The forces do no! int er act in th eir actual furmation . This is
why a pr ocess of adjustment th at is exte rnal to th e parameters on which
independence .
The law of th e tendency fur th e rate of pro fit to fall thus has th e fullowing
pr ofit are co mpletely different in kind . They are polarized by one and the
sa me social p rocess." This process is th e prod uction of relative surplusvalue. It involves a transfurm ation of th e co nditions of pr od uction th at
radically alte rs th e relations of exc hange between th e two de partments of
pr od uction but can nevertheless lead to a rise in th e rate of surplus-va lue
only if striet pro portion s are respected in th e macro -econ omi e exchanges
between th em . This is why we have said th at th e genera l rate of pro fit is
associated with th e realization of tot al income by th e social expenditure
deriving from organic exc hanges between th e two departments of
pr oduction .
~'Ie
25 I 4 8
(b) The dw elopment 01 the fi nancial crisis. It is very dear that in thi s
rearrangement qualita tive phenomena do minate quantita tive trends, since
th er e is no longer a co ntinuity in th e re production of re lations capable of
giving th em direction.
All financial crises have certain co mmon features. Yet th e fundamental
changes in th e mon et ar y sys te m th at arose from th e Creat Depression have
26 I 4 8
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---<o . - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
better results in th e future , and speed up th eir investment pro grammes all
' 929. ~'Ie shall th en deal with th e essential differences between th ese old-
sty le erises and th e contemporary crisis th a! takes th e form " f th e inflat ion
precess. In th e genera l spirit of lhi s work, we shall no! be able to ga int o
co nstraint .
detailed descr iption . ~'Ie shall simply see k to cierna nstra te th e essential
dete rminants th a! follow from th e concepts we have int roduced earlier and
~'Ihen
mon ey , thi s still re mains possible on credit . The cre dit sys tem thus escapes
accelera tion of social expend iture in thi s phase of business eupho ria, even
th ou gh th e pro portions between th e two departments of pr od uction th at
are needed to make final settle ments no longer existo Hence th e habitual
signs of degeneration towards a spec ulative boo m.
~'Ihen
th e genera l equivalent is
' 9 ~ os .
furm of pro fit , int er est and rent increased by 45%, wage incom es only by
co mmod ity . It doos so th rough th e cre dit sys tem th at is articulated to bank
rate of int er est th at gove rns th e mon ey mar ket . Transgression of th e full
19~6- ~7,
int ermediat e goods of circ ulating capital, abso rbs excess pr od uction
capacity . Relati ve prices fur th ese product s rise , and delivery date s are
pushed back. These co nditions of exc hange pr ecipitate stra ins on th ese
mar ket s, since all capitalists, fearing a lack of supplies, create an additional
pr od uction . The fi nancial crisis begins with a business euph oria." The
demand by see king to build up stoc ks. These stoc ks have to be financed on
27 I
48
Thro ughout
and
'9~9,
19~6.
'9~3
to
19~6
th e output of producer
producing
28 I 4 8
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---<o . - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
in . Debt th er efor e iner eases and bec omes ever sharter in term oIt swells al!
co urse of ' 9 ~ 9 .
mon ey market , with dealers see king to gel sho rt-te rm co mmercial credits
discounted or guara nteed in bank mon ey . Sho rt-term inter est rates rapidly
its height . The initi al imbalance was imm ensely augmented , and became a
rise , pr eceded by th e red iscount rate of th e central bank, which atte mpts to
restr ain bank refinancing. Al th e same tim e un even indu strial de velopment
creates artificial differe nces in th e appare n t financial results of firms, which
are realized only on credit . These differences favour spec ulative gains on
th e financial mar ket . One sec tion of disposable mon et ar y resour ces is
distr acted frem producti ve employment and fuels spec ulation in stoc ks.
bec ome impossible to settle. The turn from spec ulative boo m to financial
panic was th er efore necessaril y bruta l. It was pr ecipitated by th e genera l
sca rc ity of liqui dit y , give n th e requirements of settling on-sight credits,
which th e banks were un able to exte nd further forward as th e impossibilit y
own , and pr oves ever more attractive to mon ey capital, which only
of co nverting credits int o mon ey crystallized over bank mon ey . The final
weeks of th e spec ulative boo m th at pr eceded th e financial panic had
increases the lack ofmon ey for th e financing of prod uction . The movement
of stoc k prices e n th e financial mar ket loses any ce ntact with th e
valorizatio n of pr oductive capital. It gives rise to pur ely spec ulative gains
' 9 ~S .
th e spec ulative boo m were thus mar ked by a plateau in econo mic activity.
But debtors , feeling themselves caught in a trap , tried in eve ry way to get
'9~9.
Spec ulation thus reached its pea k. In thi s situation , any chance eve nt , eve n
The pr omote rs of th ese co mpanies launched int o all kinds of mani pulation
indu st rial firm s. Financial circ ulation acq uired a dy namic all of its own ,
losing any relationship with th e valorization of pr od uctive capital. The Dow
Jones index for shares quoted on th e New York Stoc k Exchange doub led
and bank insolvency spreads in a chain reaction . Even if th e sta te decr ees
between th e beginning of
'9~7
and th e beginning of
'9~9,
outstanding debts. The first bank failures cast suspicion on all bank mon ey ,
rising by a
bank to exert its funct ion oflender oflast resor t on th e sca le required , all
'9~9.
~.S
'9~7
to
~o%
29 I 48
30 I 4 8
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
credits, a callapse of stoc k quo ta tio ns, more or less widespread bankruptcy
of financial institutions, the ruin of a significant num ber of spec ulato rs and
th e bruta l co ntraction of incom es de rived from sav ings. The subs equent
result is a decline in eifective demand on th e consumer mar kets, on la p of a
financial situatio n th a! has already very mu ch de teriora ted fur th e firms
involved . This fal! in demand seIs un der way a chain reaction of
cancellations of a rders and atte mpts to dispose of stocks which spreads
of costs and red uction of activ ity firms co uld achieve a co mbination of
expend iture flows and current receipts capable of genera ting a gross cash
index had fallen from 3~7 to ' 99. Shares in financial co ncern s became
unsaleable . More th an half th ese co mpanies disappear ed within a few
weeks, with sav ers losing sorne 90% of the nominal value of their supposed
asse ts. The financial crisis had fuur imm ediat e co nsequences whose chain
inst ance , co uld not sta nd up to th e incon vertibilit y of sterling, which was
8~.S
pro visional resistance to be unst able . The th reshold reached in ' 93', fur
itself a respo nse to th e int ensificat ion of th e int ernati on al financial crisis
th at fullowed th e bankruptcy of th e major credit institution of Centra l
Euro pe . The financial crisis in th e United Sta tes increased in severity to a
po int where th e most solid banks in th e major financial centres were
th reat ened by th e massive withdrawal of th e reserves deposited with them
by th e weaker banks. The situatio n deteriora te d so dangero usly from
'9~9
th ose banks th at furmed part of th e Feder al Reser ve sys tem in exc hange fur
a vas t spec tr um of stocks. The banks were authorized to open th eir
'93~
co unters again after th eir assets had been scrutinized. In J une ' 933, public
withdraw th eir assets in mon ey . Since th e banks were very greatly indebt ed
co nfidence in the ba nking sys te m bega n to build up again, once all banks
who were mem ber s of th e Feder al Reser ve sys tem had th eir deposits
co mpulsorily insured .
31 1 4 8
32 I 4 8
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
refurm of the mon et ar y sys tem and finan cial int ermediari es. The two major
no! socially va lida ted and firms had to absorb th eir pri vat e oosts, leadin g
to operating losses. One way in which th ese losses were finan ced was by
which regulated finan cial circ ulation , and th e Banking Act of ' 935, which
1~.8%
canalizing the dass s tr uggle int o furms capable of creating a new regime of
' 930 , th en to 3.5%and 1.3%in th e two fullowing yea rs. Cash flow was only
resumed al a level of activ ity co mpatible with the maintenance of th e
regular accumulation. They were not as suc h pr oofs th at suc h a regime was
already established. In fact , th e depr ession had pr ofuu nd ly alte red th e
of de d ine and after th e de finitive des truc tion of one sec tio n of th e mean s of
pr od uction . The co rrespo nding flow of gross investment was so low th at
upsurge of th e labour movement had co nsolidated thi s shift. Between ' 933
in ' 9 3 ~ , sorne ~3 0 % in ' 933 and 160 % in ' 934. The adjustment in
nomin al pr ices and wages was co mpatible with the table give n at th e end of
Cha pter 3. A fan in prices at an annual rate of 6% be tween ' 9 ~ 9 and ' 9 3 ~
was accompa nied by a fan in nomin al wages at a so me wha t slower rate ,
and ' 937 th e bas ic nominal wage ro se by 41%, with th e result th at tot al net
pro fits after tax es were still 43 %lower in ' 937 th an in ' 9 ~ 9 . New str uc tura l
furms had to be instituted to regularize th e expansion of a new long-te rm
social de ma nd which would support new relation s of exc ha nge in place of
th ose th at th e Creat Depression had dislodged. Now suc h an expa nsion was
pe r yea r. But th e
th e rate of surplus-va lue. This is why th e sec ond half of the ' 930S was a
pe riod of tran sfurm at ion in th e organization ofl abo ur far more th an one of
~%
'9~9
th e New Dea!' Suc h dass str uggles can th en gene ra te, in a po litical and
Second
~'Iorld ~'Iar
regime of accumulation.
The proc ess of inflat ion is th e fur m taken by th e finan cial crisis under th e
regime of pr ed ominant1y int en sive accumulation established after th e New
33 I 48
34 I 4 8
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---<o . - - - - -
-,
A THEOR'f OF CAPITALlST REGUlATION
IlOrm
.ms<oI
o f soci.al consumption
Colll
~l .... tion
profil _hen !he orgolIllC exchang.. betw..." Ih.. ,,"o departmenl' are
determmed by !he proodOlDlll.lnl Importolllce of ",L1l1ve surpius-v.alu....nd ..
.AS
which enforces lhe currency of lhe central mon ey. The arliculalion of lhi s
permissive co ndilion wilh slructural ccnditions is whal pr od uces cre eping
pr oject into prod uction by adv ances rhey make to the capitalist pr oducers .
This mon ey is inte grat ed into po tential pur chas ing po..er as soo n as ..ages
struclural forms lhal regulate the reg ime of pre<!ominant!y int ensive
which Ihe integrate<! mon ey succenively circ ulat... the di/feren l fracti on s
accumulalion .
Conlrary lo Ihe customarily accepred opinion, il is nol lhe process of
of soci al inco me . ~'hen aHIhis income;' spent, Ih.. purcha sing JlO""er of lhe
_ how !h.. ove r-.a=ulal1OU of c"p1'~ ubs !h.. lOrm o .an mflation.ary
finns Colll Ihen cancel lhelT cr ed'll by returning lhe lokens of banl: IDon")',
now d..pn ved of purchasing power, 10 Ihe so.m" poIllI al _hich Ihese were
isfued. Th.. g"n"r~ "'{Ulv.o.lenl ;' rhereror. consIItuted m a lempor~ CU'I:'II11
of form.o.tton and t'i!<1hu1Km of socW rncom". Tbis =cuil is!he unity of
p~.
fOT<hsm. FOl .1 IS
Ih.ol . "
h.ove ,..,f.,.".oed lO
m th .. ILlture
"JO$I..n"" of
olll ....demic ns<! III pnces despit... m.arl:ed growth in !he "pPMelIl
prodUCllVlty o L1bour. Bul IhlS 11M;' nellher ge" er .al nor cumulall".
Tolbn by !hemselves, howev'" , If\lch ObMrv"lions Colll onIy bemisl...dmg.
U mflatton IS identtfiood ..,Ih lIS IUlIsllc.al '""r"<ISSl.OII, ollld ..lIenllOll IS
2. THE P ~OCESS
os INFl ATION
_ 35 I 48
1Il
money bears lhe sum tot al of the soc iol inco me . Ne rnow that mon ey is
mon")' iu bolishe<!. 11 ISIhen disllllegu led wilh il. relurn lo Ihe firms. The
producl>on is soci.ally va1Klated . Thll vWd.o.tion i.s integral, and the socW
p<lT'Chnrng JlO""er o!he mOlle)' ;. pr _rve<! _ben !h.. flow e f meney tb.it ;.
inlegr<lted ;os !he bearer of newl)' crNIe<! incom" ,,:uctly purchases _hal in
ocnuno<bty crr=lation eorrespolldl lO lbe v.al"" <ldde<! by !he new socW
L1bour. In tlus case Ibe reL1lwnllllP 111 = W /VA IS ...tis:6e<! ..,lbouI <lD)'
~"'"'"ttc
incr.....,.. m 111.
Sborr-Ierm fluctuallons milY MtH from I..mpor~ gaps in !he oeffecIIve
J6 I 4 8
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
value of money . This adapta tion is only poss ible owing to th e unificati on of
th e different bank monies int o a single nat ion al mon ey which th e central
threat ened , th ese fluctuat ions will balance out and have no implicat ions fur
th e value of mon ey . They are expressed in th e oscillations of th e genera l
pr lee level over th e "ourse of th e yea r th a! can always be not ed . In th e
same way , if a paliey of discontinuous revision of th e nominal wage is
~'Ie
sudden change eccurs in th e mon et ar y f10w int egrat ed int o income , while
inflat ion . ~'Ie sho wed th at relative surplus-va lue depends on an int egrati on
mon et ar y expression of th e working hour rises discr etely , and after sorne
f1uctuati on it stab ilizes at a new level.
pr oduction .
In nati on al accounting, matter s can be pr esented in th e fullowing way .
The money int egrat ed into social purchasing power by th e furmation of
newly created can be compatible with a sys te matic and permanent erosion
income is such th at m = VP / VA. But thi s social purcha sing power must be
confirmed by expenditure. Now a f10w of deprec iation allowances F is
of th e nat ion al mon ey only if one sec tion of th e monet ar y f10w which
added on fur purchasing th e pr oduct of the same living labour VA. The
sustain th e expenditure of tot al income. The money that buys the products
ofsociety's new labour is thus p erp etually gre ater than that integrat ed in
the fo rmation of income. Since th e f10w of int egrat ed money must
necessaril y equal th e reflux of disintegra ted money , given that both derive
from th e same bank cre dit which must be cancelled after th e income is
is repe ated on thi s bas is, leading to m" > m' and so on. The slippage in th e
pr oduct of labour and has to realize th e same value. The solution to this
37 I 4 8
38 I 4 8
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - <0 ) - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
more hazar dou s, th e central bank effects a pseud o-social valida tion of
incom e . This is why th e cumulative debt tot al th at develops in thi s phase of
nati on al ter rit ory . The clase depende nce of th e accelera te d erosion of
mon ey on th e accelera te d devalorization of capital, not ed earlier in th e
co mbination of a rise in th e genera l price level and an inerease of
amo rtization pro vision s within cash flow, follows directly from th e
tot al pr od uct and bec oming eve r mor e unst able , is expressed in an
The co ncept of an unstable debt stru cture is central to th e inflat ion ar y
precess. It is impo rt ant to un der st and how thi s arises. Contra ry to th e
situation in th e ' 9 ~ os , the first sympto ms of th e new organic crisis of
capitalism were not th e re sult of a limit on th e expansion of co nsumer
mar ket s. They showed th emselves in th e furm of a lon g-term falt ering in th e
rate of gro wth of appare nt labour producti vit y , and a halt in th e fall in real
social wage costs. As our investi gati on of th e structura l co nditions of
latter depend ing on th e pace at which real social wage costs decline, in
inflat ion has shown , th ese indicat ors were th e sympto ms of a crisis of
(b) Cumulative infl ation and its limits . The transiti on from creeping to
cumulative inflat ion doos not present any th eoreti cal difliculty after our
~'Ie
do not
int end her e to give a detailed descr iption of th e pr ocess of inflati on . ~'Ie
shall simply not e th e differences between thi s type of financial crisis and
th e 'classical' financial crisis presented above, by co mparing th e
characteristic features of th e Creat Depression and th e co ntempo rary crisis
in th e Unite d Sta tes.
The financial crisis opens in th e same way , with a phase of business
eupho ria exte nded int o a spec ulative boo m when un even development
eccurs in th e exc hanges between th e two de partments of production , to th e
po int of making th e effective realization of th e tot al pr oduct no lon ger
possible. This realization takes place on credit . But in th e case we are
co ncern ed with her e , th e precess of inflat ion is more advance d and more
pro longed because bank mon ey never breaks free from th e mon et ar y
co nstraint to be transfurm ed int o mer e credits which will later be bruta lly
demonetized . On th e co ntrary, it is th e mon et ar y co nstraint th at weakens,
because th e central bank can in all circ umstances ensure th e unity of th e
bank mo nies by issuing its own mon ey . By do ing so in a situation in which
bank mon ey is th e bea re r of assignments of future values th at are eve r
39 I 4 8
'9~S- ~9
period , th e
1~ .
The red uction of profit mar gins and net rates of profit , in a situation in
which any bruta l co ntractio n of the wage bill is ruled out, tends to pro long
th e initi al phase of th e crisis, th at of business eupho ria , because th e
capitalist reaction to th e situation involves th e furmation of new capital as
th e decisive inst rument of co mpetition in th e regime of int ensive
accumulation. The furmation of new capital see ks to re-establish th e rate of
surplus-va lue by genera ting changes in th e co nditions of pr od uction of
which one essential co mpo nent is th e int ensificat ion of technological
obsolescence . This means th at th e furmation of new capital must involve a
co nsiderable transfer of one po rtio n of tot al pro fit th rough th e mod aliti es
of co mpetition . This transfer is all th e more diflicult to effect inasmuch as
th e increase in tot al pro fit is sharply restr ained by th e crisis of pr od uctivity
in th ose sec to rs which were pr eviou sly th e mot or s of gro wth. In th ese
40 I 4 8
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - <0 ) - - - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
th e new organization " f labour . The inert mass " f pas! labour to be
inflat ion . ~'Ie have seen, moreover , how th e share of th ese depr eciation
allowances in cash flow increases at tim es when th e conflict is exacerbated.
Even if th e fall in th e rate of cash flow can be restr ained in thi s way , th e
th e living labou r-tim e " f th e society, which crea tes th e new conditions of
investm ents. But thi s increases the demand fur th e furmation of new
of the financing of capital furmation has to abso rb price rises fur plant and
accumulation of capital.
~'Ie have seen how inflat ion is defined as a decline in th e monet ar y
equipment, and thi s share must be cover ed by credit . The gro wth in cash
flow on th e bas is of th e devalor ization of capital thus genera tes a
of cash flow, firms' net annual deb t carne to 0 .65 dollars in 1965. In 1969,
under the first push of cumulative inflat ion , it rose to 0 .95 dollars. After
' 97 4. These stee p increases, as soo n as new capital furmation is on the rise ,
inflation .
The anarc hic pr oliferation of monet ar y funds which are not th e result of
expr ess th e end uring lack of ava ilable mon ey capital fur investm ent , given
future uncertainties. An eifect of th e discr epancy between th e
eno rmo us mass of capital alrea dy invested . This sca rcity seriously alte rs
of pr ofit but rather of an incor porat ion int o the costs of current
41 1 4 8
42 I 4 8
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - <0 ) - - - - - - -
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
relationship between tot al incom e and tot al expend itu re . The more acute
in pro fit mar gins. The result is a distor tion of th e range of int er est rates
away from th e hierar ch y of real return s th a! guara ntees a balance d gro wth
expend itu re of abs tract labour to yield a gro wing rate of surplus-va lue, and
savers in relation to their liquidit y pr eference and the individual risks they
agree to run o This distor tion and inst abilit y leads to contradictory
movements of pr ecaution ary and spec ulative behav iour which sweep
rapid ly gro wing in mon et ar y value, th e more int ense th e need fur bank
mon ey . The credit pyr amid th en rests eve r mor e on th e indebt edn ess of the
and indu st rial firms. Shifting furward int o th e future th e co nflict between
th e valorization of past labou r and th e creation of new pr oductive furces by
society 's livin g labour , credit reinfur ces thi s co nflict by modi fying th e
co mposition of asse ts held by pr ivate agents. Cre dit renewed on a rapidly
gro wing sca le and susta ined ever more by th e issue of bank mon ey
co nstrains balance -shee ts eve r mor e severe ly. Between 1964 and ' 974 , th e
non -financial co mpanies as a whole saw th eir ratios of fixed capital to debts
This indebt edn ess of th e banks on th e mon ey mar ket has increased far
more rap idly than th eir asse ts, th e ratio gro wing from
inflati on gets un der way , th e de mand fur bank credit is necessaril y met ,
structure is not th e result of an abs tract nor m th at repr esents th e exte rnal
anticipating its futur e increase when bank mon ey is int egrat ed int o th e
distr ibu tion of incom e in a situation of strong de mand oIt is also so fur th e
banks, who see th e opening up of a field of loans favoured by th e
dysfunctioning of th e stoc k mar ket s. The stra ins on th ese mar ket s lead
th em to anticipate a future rise in sho rt-te rm int er est rates, indu cing th em
to offer sho rt-term cr edits th at will rapid ly be repaid . Bank credit fuels th e
inflati on pr ocess in th e two ways we isolated th eoret ically . On th e one
hand , it ratifies th e pr evious dedine in th e mon et ar y expr ession of th e
working hour , by taking into account th e nomin al gro wth in income and
term deb t. The banks now needed to bo rro w ever more liquid funds in
~.3 %
in 1967 to
44 I 48
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (O r - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
bank cre dit, th e banks suffer losses on th e mar ginal reserves which th ey
borrow. They must necessarily then co ntract their creation of money .
It is thus clea r why th e pr ocess of inflati on doos not just subs titute a
~'Ihile
~'Ihen
regular rate of inflati on fur financial crisis. It leads to financial crisis by its
~'Ihen
bo rro wing, and th e expansion of sho rt-te rm credit bro ught int er est rates
panic . This canno t hap pen witho ut an int erruption of th e deflation pr ocess
lon ger any room fur expansionist anticipations. The increase in credit and
mon et ar y f10ws can now only absorb th e gro wing cost of th ose co mmod ity
exc hanges necessar y fur th e co ntinuance of pr od uction cycles. Emer gent
liqui d asse ts are already abso rbed by th e renewal of pr eviou s
co mmitments, which places th e who le econo my in a po te ntial liqui dit y
c n Sl S .
~'Ihat
is
deflation of certain indu st rial pri ces which had taken off in th e spec ulative
boo m , but no genera l deflation. The genera l price level , which had bee n
rising at an annual rate of ' 4%, stabilized after a few oscillations at a new
th e past of credits with a fixed rate of retu rn and repayment da te, and
liabiliti es, now bu rdened with th e need to borrow from day to day gro wing
liqui d sums on the money market if their credit is to be susta ined. ~'Ihen the
banks have de velop ed th eir activities to a po int where assets with a fixed
rate of retu rn can no longer be entire ly financed by low int er est deposits,
th ey begin to finance assets th at are less sensitive to mon ey mar ket
co nditions by resources which are highly sensitive. In th ese co nditions
int er est rates on th e money market , and are vulnerable to a possible crisis
rise in th e ave rage level of unemp loyment from its low po int in 1969, and
an accelera tion in th e average rate of pr ice increases. The central bank's
46 I 48
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - {o ) - - - - -
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
whether lh is recurren! econo mic crisis will genera te new social co nditions
fur ano ther epoch of enduring accumulatio n, or whether , as in th e ' 930S,
th e inter acti on be tween internal imbalan ces and internat ion al disturb an ces
t" . In " mn
tu " l" . u , . n . u .
" no."'. 'ntn n . th " 'n " m. l.t. "" '" fo, th "n" . l fo.u ,..l. n " . Th. mulU. H"
, . n " ...u n u l t. un,t . T1" th . " n " u . , . t. m... ' M l ,f ..lu" h,U. n
'm",' ln . t. " " .t th.t 'n"m...n . un' . . ... . n . ' tu". w h.t th. , ,u , t.f 'n"m n
... . n . ' tu " 'n.,..t.. , . n.t . mulU. H" Out th . mn Hu fth . m.n. tu . ... ",. ' . n . ft h.
regime " f cre eping inflation certainly shift th e divi. ion be tween wages and
""km. h.u,.
Thu . H , . ' ' ' 'u " th m ' n ,., U.. m.n. tu . " n.tm n t th . t m.n. tu H, . , . 'n
",h ' n . Hu U. n. " '''' , u ... It , . n.t . ",''' ' u m.n. tu H, fin u ," , f th .
."n.m" t.m th.t " ..t.. th . m.n. tu . " n.tm n t. If m u U,ulu ..t . f , ,u m.h nm
th h t. ,. . .l. t. m , fy th . 'nt. n<H fth . m. n . tu. " n<tm n t, H . u ll . .., n.t . u " '. H,
Out . ' m.l h ,ft. H ' n Um. , ...tn'n. t...m. fu tu " t. , u m n t .,,'l.m. ' n th . , ..HuU. n
. f .. lu .
s .. s. D. B,un h . ff . n O. Cu t.H" , 'Un HM1. .. m u ...t I\ n fl. U. n ', C1Iron',u. ", , 'al.
d. fum,", n 4, " 74 .
, Thm ,. . . . ." l,..l .,ffo" n " t" ..n . n )u ,tm.nt 'n t" . fo, m fin ,'" t. th
)u ,tm.nt .""h " , . n ' .'.'.n t" m,n m n h n,.t" 1.. th.t " n<Utu tn n .
th . ..m. "bU. n . In th . fi nt ...., H ,.....' . 1. t. " n",. . .f h tf' mm. ' , Ht. ; ' n th .
a soc iety of dass struggle, capitalism has once again to impo se its own
",.n . th "
. ,ffo"n" 'n th 1 .
" A.F. Bu m n . W.C. M' t,h.ll ,...asu ..... Busin. " CjoI. s; J. Lm u", Los "',,,S n. ...I..
G, ..t D",
1 "
tu " " ,u"
s,h m , tt h n . t. t'" mt. " "u n t th... " n . , U. nf " m m , t. .., h.n th.t ' no . l
" n k m.n
nt.noou<1. un,fi , . n
n . t ' no ..Ut. th . " 'n " h ',h th , . ' . ' . n . f . , ff" . n t " n k m.n" . ,....,..m .
N. h .H..U. n ..n .." t 'n th . "bU.n<h ,t" ..n t. h l 'n"m n . t. h l ... . n . 'tu".
M. n , . m tu tn l. t. th
... . n . ' tu". Th'. b tt" . ",
,'nd . lf . ffo, u m.n . w h.n th . m. n h.. fi Mn" . th. m ' ...f .u h.....n . ..1..
47 I 4 8
48 I 48
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----{o ) - - - - -
(1
Q.
A THEOR\' OF CA ~ I TA lI ST RE GULATION
General Conclusion
<ir...
..nd of
out
0Il
1M hms of
~1I1lons
of eompellllOD.
~'ie
11... of eom P"!,tion M.. determine<! by lhe 11.. of Clpll" accumula1lOn, .."d
nO' vice VI!I"N . Tb.. propet" con cep1ual ord"" moreov"" ,. no m",..
inl"Uec1Ilol1..m... JI it very importanl lhal no1 aU concepto Me of th.. sam..
I",,", but <lIlIM inlo .. oompIu PJ"OC'!'S'I of produc1lon of collCTete
blowl.dg... f or ,t it ttus lhal ena blEs U! lo iden 1lfy th OSi! aspectlI of the
inh<tr..nllOcioll COIltndlCttOlUlotcapltahsm lhat Me prmap.ai , i.e. unlvers.ol
and permanent,and tboM lhat Me HCODdary,i.e. tr ansfo rmable , even if in
eotrum conjUllC1\lres tM 1Itt er u n becom.. th.. most acu te .
It it leog1lmatt to spe.alto fSIal.. lIIOnopolyClpltahsm if the o rganic unity
So far w.. hav.. refr aine<! from uomg th.. te rm 'ot..te monopoly c..pit..liom'.
G E ~ E AA L CO ~C L US I O ~
t i 7
,,,
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(1
A THEOR\' OF CAPITALlST REGULAT ION
But thi s simulta nous operation is in no way something inh er ent in th e logic
forms can be ass ured, permanently jeop ard ized and as permanently
th e wage-earn ing dass, while at th e same tim e miti gating th e des tructive
GENERA L CO NCLUSION -
3I 7
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(1
A THEOR\' OF CAPITALlST REGULAT ION
over! inflation .
The erises of capitalism furm par! of th e laws of its regulation , as
mom ents " f a genera l transform at ion of th e co nditions of pr oduction and
exchange th a! are necessar y fur th e law of accumulation to perpetuate
sub ord ina ted to th e pr incipIe of infurm ati on , with fragmented work giving
initi ati ve in th e prod uction of collective goods and serv ices and a
pr od uction and th e distr ibu tion of tot al incom e . This is why th e financial
aspec ts of th e social crisis ass ume a different guise tod ay . The traditi on al
crises exhibited a sequence of over-accumulation fullowed by a massive
devalor ization of capital. The co ntempo rary crisis of sta te mon opol y
co mmod ities but bec ome a major field in th eir own right fur th e expansion
of co mmod ity
of
relations within th e sta te is, in effect , th e only respo nse co mpatible with
safeguarding th e wage relation when th e socialization of th e co nditions of
departments of pr od uction .
Capita lism can escape from its co ntempo rary organic crisis only by
genera ting a new co hesion, a Neo-Fordism. This co hesion must be
may spea k of a transfurm ati on of sta te mon opol y capitalism int o sta te
~'Ie
GENERA L CO NC LUSION -
division of th e pro letariat was pr eviou sly ensured . The future will tell
capitalism o But if thi s latter term has any meaning, it canno t denote a
withering away of co mmod itity relations, but on th e co ntrary th eir greates t
possible exte nsion , obtained at th e cost of a new pro gress in th e unification
5I 7
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(1
A THEOR\' OF CAPITALlST REGULAT ION
the ideological cover ofl iberalism. The socialization of the conditions ofl ife
can be a support fur accumulation only if th e leadin g fract ion of th e
capitalist dass succee ds in imposing an overall management of labourpo wer by binding th e co nditions of its repr od uction in a tight net wor k of
social co ntrols. One impo rt ant element of th ese co ntro l. would be th e
recasting of th e various institution al sys te ms of insurance and soc ial
sec urity in th e direction of a guara ntee d minimum incom e with uniform
applieation to all social situations. A further essentia l element would be a
coordinated expansion of both collective and private means of
co nsumption ; th e social dimensions inh er ent in th e former will necessitate
a sys te m of minimal norm s - both quantita tive and qualita tive - in th eir
proouct ion . Finally , th e direct influence of th e sca le, duration and
collective risks involved in th e financing of individu alized investments on
th e sta bility of th e moo e of co nsumption , will call int o being sta te
guara ntees and a reinfor eed financial centralization with tighter co ntro ls
on th e stoc k market.
The tendeneies summarized above will give th e structura l forms a welldefined direction of development . Collective barga ining, even if it keeps its
legal autonomy, will be eve r more subjec t to an overall wages po licy
imposed by sta te autho rity. The development of auto matic sys te ms of
pr oo uction and management co ntrol is th e decisive weapo n of finance
capital in centralizing propriet ar y co ntro l at a level and in forms th at
permit it to co nfront th e tendeney towar ds a unification of th e wageearn ers. The co nsiderable gro wth in mon et ar y flows at th e free disposition
of th e pr ivate economy th at will result from th e red uction of transfer
payments in favour of a guara ntee d minimum incom e and from th e decline
in bud getary expenditure will give sta te managem ent of th e mon ey supply
an eve r greate r impo rt ance . The predominance of mon et ar y over fiscal
po liey, whieh can already be discern ed in bro ad outline , will be definitively
esta blished. This predominance expresses th e domination of th e sta te by
finance capital. It will bec ome more th an eve r befor e th e dec isive
instrument in th e articulation of th e structura l forms.
GENERA L CO NCLUSION -
7 I 7
-------------------~o)----
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
eq uilibrium, stre tc hes th e pos tulate of hom ogeneit y to its very limit s. Not
only dces th e axiom of rationality assign th e same identity to all
individu als in pursuit of th eir goals by defining an econo mic behav iour
pattern th at can be applied to any do main of social pr actice , but th e
characterization of th e who le sys tem as an eq uilibrium created by perfect
co mpetition implies th at eac h player is tot ally aware of th e web of th eir
relations with all other players, and th at thi s web presents itself to th e
A Theory ofCapitalist Reg ulatio n was written mor e th an twenty yea rs ago.
Marxism , as an econo mic th eory , is built upon a rad ical separa tion
which explains capitalism by rejecting th e pos tulate of hom ogeneit y . Not
development of co ntempo rary societies. Her e , I sho uld like to say how th e
ideas co ntained in th e boo k have stood lhi s test , and how th ey can be
modified oc exte nded so th a! we can try to un der st and th e dramas we are
witnessing and th e hapes of renewal we cherish as lhi s twentieth century
planning.
has
gained accepta nce is not a body of fully refined co ncepts, but a research
Oskar Lange th at perfeet co mpetition and perfeet planning were ide ntical.
pr ogramme .
~'Ihen
appea ling as int erpret at ion s of th e econo mic sys tem. They were
th e min ds of all individu als, who aet like a single repr esentative individu al
- th e hypothesis of rati on al expectations - or beeause th e coordination of
~'Ihat
th e
1 I 61
2 I 61
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
econo mic playe rs, th e co herence " f th e enlire sys te m becomes a pu zzle
micro -econ omi cs and macro -econ omi cs become estra nged because it is no
longer possible to pos tulate a unifurm sys te m " f coordination . This sta te of
alfairs is no! uni qu e to econo mics. In th e ph ysical sciences and life
sciences, it is known tha! micro scopie and macro scopie phenomena canno t
be descr ibed with th e same for mal tool s. Macro scopie regularities have
th eir Qwn auto no my. However , it is in economics th a! th e philosophy of
be tte r
In a world in which infurm ati on is an issue and in which exte rnalities are
laden with significance, th er e is na suc h thing as a genera l equilibrium of
perfect co mpetition . Nor is th er e any reason why maximum co mpetition
sho uld be th e bes t possible furm of relationship be tween econo mic agents,
stra teg ies, th e effects of which co uld be sacially and ev en individu ally
disad vantageou s. This is th e env iranme nt in which th e prablems of
pe rpetua te th e pos tulate a f homa geneity against all empirical ev ide nce.
Thus, th e macra-ecanom y is na more th an a micra-econ om y enlarged ta
regulation arise. Regulati on th eory is co ncern ed with het ero gen eous
are perceived . But thi s progress has furever tainted th e pu rity of th e great
A maJe of regulati on is a set of mediat ion s which ensure th at th e
parad igms.
In fact , fur a qua rte r of a century , explora tion of thi s co mplexity has
pr aJuced a splinte re d image of econo mic science. A key dime nsion of th e
heterageneity of econo mic phenomena relates ta infurm ati on . Costly,
incom plet e , un balan ced and organized int a struc tures th at are far from
mom ents. The salient test fur any ana lysis of th e changes th at capitalism
being exd usive ly market s, infurm ati on creates asy mme tries in terms of
has und ergone is to describe thi s cahesion in its lacal manifest at ions. It
alsa involves understand ing why suc h co hesion lS a sho rt-lived
econo my.
Here I sha ll begin by return ing to certain fundam ental co ncepts used in
th e rale played in econo mics by exte rnalities, in other word , of any type of
int er dependen ce th at is not incorpo rat ed int a pr ices. The greate r th e role
played by exte rnalities, th at is, th e less mar ket s th em selves are th e sole ca ordinators, th e more amb iguo us and fallible will be th e use of a mar ket
eq uilibrium ta repr esent th e sys te m in its entire ty. Externaliti es have
3 I 61
of~'lestern
4 I 61
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
asy mmetric
sca ree resources. These co nstraints include lack " f knowledge , moral
int er ests, because th e success ful pu rsuit of th ese int er ests depends on
society 's accepta nce or rejection of the result of the actions to which th ey
give rise . The social fabric appea rs first and fure most as a pro blem of
collective belonging, in th e furm of a sys te m or sys te ms in which individu al
int er ests are valida ted by th e results th ey pr od uce .
economic re lations. The goals th emselves, and not only th e means used in
logically and hist orically , mon ey pr ecedes exc hange. There can be no
sta rker sta tement of th e co ntrast between thi s hypo thesis and th at of th e
individu alism in th e figur e of th e entre pre neur. Entrep ren eurs are far from
being pr ofit-maximizing auto mata. They are inn ovat or s. By venturing int o
5 I 61
6 I 61
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
co mmod ities. They may express th eir int er ests independent1y and perhaps
th ese int er ests will co nflict , fur th e individu als' actio ns mus! respeot ,m e
social co nstraint , namely th e need to settle th eir pri or deb ts in mon ey .
jud gement passed by th e mar ket society - all other individu als - on th e
economic act of eac h individu al. This jud gement is ratified by th e sys te m of
paym ents. It is th e furm in which societies with auto no mous econo mies
reward th e co ntribution of eac h ind ividual to th e reconstitution of th e
Money is thus th e key to mem ber ship of th e mar ket society of individu als
who are free to pursue th eir own ends without havin g to coordinate th eir
th en , is not pure , because its very fuund ation , th e mon et ar y sta nda rd, is an
How do mon ey and debt relate to capital and th e labour furce? There is no
th eir goals int o an auto nomous activity, econo mic agents mu st invest , in
other words, take resour ces from society. They are thus indebt ed to th e
co mmunity and respo nsible fur th e resources borrowed. But society, fur its
part , owes a debt to individu als insofar as th e use th ey make of th ese
resources helps to reconstitute th e division ofl abo ur .
~'Ihat
institution in any mar ket econo my. ~'Ihen individu als pay off th eir debt ,
th ey are pro ving th at th ey have helped to renew th e division ofl abo ur . But
th ey can only do thi s because of th e incom e earned th rough th eir activity.
By transfer rin g mon ey th rough someo ne buying th e fruit s of a particular
individu al's labour , society has given th e individu al what it believes he or
she has give n it . But th e appare nt recipr oci ty of thi s relationship is illusory ,
since individu als' valuation of th eir input will not necessaril y mat ch
debts, th e deferment of which can cause pro blems. Society may th er efure
th e social fabric oThe accumulation of po wer, however , is a limitl ess des ire.
This is what makes capitalism a furce th at cuts across soc iety, a dy namic
co nstraints.
As th e pr imordial institution
of market
exchange,
mon ey 1S
- 7 I 61
8 I 61
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
mar ket to hon our th eir financial obligations and realize th eir mon et ar y
dynamism of capital also impro ves th e living conditions Qf the labour force
drastically alte rs th e division ofl abour . As it takes sorne tim e fur society to
~'Iestern
mom ent ind udes a spec ific pr ocess of bu ying and selling de bts and rights
to capitalist property . The capital owned by individu al capitalists is
eva luate d in financial mar ket s. This eva luation itself amounts to
spec ulation on th e future . It co mprises wagers placed by th e financial
W ageri ng on t h e Fu tu ro
of capital accumulation.
co ntrol. Enter pri ses are th er efure spec ific kinds of organizations, since
hierarchical po wer is exercised th er e to pr oduce goods with a view to
accumulating mon ey .
It fullows that th e dichotomy of th e individu al and society is not see n in
th e same way by employees and capitalists. Collectively, employees have a
co mmo n sta tus; th e key to th eir subsiste nce is work unde r th e autho rity of
th ose who own th e means of production.
capitalism has th e inh er ent ability to mobilize hum an energy and transfurm
capitalist . They are also free to spend th eir pay as th ey see fit. There is
th er efure a twofuld mobility that can act as a regulator on th e
it int o gro wth, but it doos not have th e capacity to co nvert th e dash of
9 I 61
10 I 61
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
represen ted by th e buye r-seller relat ion ship itself depends on th e bas ic
which is th e guara nto r and exec uto r " f th a! sys tem. The same no lon ger
between individu als and society plays a part oMed iation mechanisms are
pr esent in th e co ntext of pr ivate actions. For inst ance , an indu st rialist will
credit lines his banker is prepar ed to open and any tax incentives ava ilable.
But th er e are other matter s for co nsideration : th e imp act of th e investm ent
on th e social hierar ch y in th e co mpany and of th e changes which new
of which may be violent, debates th at find th eir way int o th e po litical are na,
have th eir own inertia , th ey perp etuate behav ioura l routines, but th ey also
develop at different rates - th e mar kets' opinion of the value of th e capital
being affected by th e int ention s of an indu st rialist and develop ing more
~'Iithin
actual th e not ion of th e wage society. Thanks to thi s mediat ion , pr ocesses
of capital accumulation can also imp rove employees' livin g co nditions.
Tech nical progress can be co nverted into social pr ogress . That is no more ,
of co urse , th an a possibility; every thing depends on th e creation of
mediat ory mechanisms and th eir effective ness as regulator s.'
From another po int of view, thi s mediat ion creates global pr ocesses th at
are types of macro-econ omi c sequences. A Theory 01 Cap italist
11 1 61
12 1 61
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
economic players and th eir behav iour pattern s are het ero geneou s. The
unsati sfact ory nature " f th e conoep! " f utility maximizati on as th e sole
uni ver sal goal within th e framework of limit ed resources makes it
per ception th at institution s are th e product s of behav ioura l int er act ion s
repr esentative individu al. Even if lhi s view per sists in macro -econ omi cs
and daims to repr esen! th e sys te m on th e basis of prim ar y micro economic pr incipIes, it is incompati ble with th e new micro -econ orny .
institution s are linked , doveta iled , hier ar chica11y organized , and so forth ,
to form subsyste ms are not dea lt with sys te matica11y. This institution al
approach doos shed sorne very impo rt ant light on th e co11ective fact ors
In th e face of thi s insurmountable obstad e in th e present sta te of
players tryin g to loo sen co nstraints. But it cannot explain th e existe nce ,
co herence or incoh er ence of macro-econ omi c patte rns by thi s method .
th eoreti cal pro positi on s applicab le to individu al players are not regard ed
as relevant to th e study of economic sys te ms. ~'Ie should sta te th at thi s
approach is very familiar to experimenta l scientists. Ever yon e knows th at
The o ry o Co n v e n t io n s
bounded rationality . The co11ective entities have an existe nce of th eir own ,
th e analysis of which is roo ted in th e cognitive sciences. The th eory of
tot a11y abs ent. It is this transiti on that regulation th eory seeks to establish
above. There is, however , sorne co mmon gro und between regulation and
convention th eories which reconciles th ese viewpoints with regard to
mer ely as co ntracts between econo mic players. Conve ntion th eory and
13 I 61
14 I 61
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(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
conceptual division of th e ente rpr ise int o product markets, labour , and
creato r and a des troyer , capitalism can only achieve pr ogress for society if
schaol inspired by Friedri ch vo n Hayek, tends to see th ese as spo nta neo us
processes emerging from th e dynamic int er act ion of individu als pursuin g
th eir int er ests. Regulat ion th eory , by contrast , emphas izes th e organized
individu alized pursuit . Gov ern ment int er vention , industrial disputes and
pr ocess has been norm alized by th e acq uisition of soc ial rights giving
employees access to th e wealth th ey pr oduce. This histor ie transform ati on
gives rise to th e following pro position: the modes 01regulation in the w age
society are legitim ate to the exten t that they permit social progress .
organizations repr esenting int er ests th at are both mutually opposed and
~'I hether
th ey invoke th e curse
social pro tection are institution alized compro mises. They do not derive
from
15 1 61
pr ogress
of
capitalism
but
from
16 1 61
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an
J
A THmR'l' OF CAPITALIST REGULATIO,"
e..regont'S, ..... th" driving forot behind rh9 rowth tlLat followed Norld
~"ar
n.
COtls tu ints impos;>d on oopl1.a1 COl reepcuded to lb.. d"U""" o m1"iT" tton
r.Lotions.
f rom lb.. capttalist poinl of VI.... lbe twentleth century h.u bHn lb.
c:.ntury of orzanlUtion. CoPll;Wsm b.lMd 011 org=oon in lb. ind\lStfi.ll
lD.UI<lIS
emp!oy4<i
10
Tbe larg.. org.ontzabOll nOl only da ... newllOCial m ..t.. mto ,!self. JI .olso
provided them ...th .. fr;om8W'Ol"k ;md .. code of membership : .. st.... dy "'..g. ,
;ob IleCUnty, the pi OSl*'t o f elunbmg ........ble promollOn ladde r ;md ru.les
g~rnrn g up.. an:I mobiliry. n.. emploY""" mtegratoo. mIo
the
org.ontzat1on .....r" thus ..ble ro gv.. me.uu.ng lo th"", <1Splu .t1ons by
pursw.ng the gOOofsocial mobihry." Tbis is ...hy C<!Ttain soc:iologtsts were
..ble to soy that th" ....g9 soct.. ty"'as rurnmg d .."" struggl" mto .. muggl..
ov.... st..tus. Thes<> aspir..nons extended ..cross ge""r..tional boundanes
..nd ..ddr<'SSed .. powerful d..mand to schools. which bec..me the prod llCWS
o hum..n c..pit..l, striv;ng for equ..lity o opportunity. In fact , sdooling
Wl! " selectio n process , ..nd schoo ll h..d to ..d..pt to the limit..tions on
soci..l mobility th..t the hierarehy impeled to ensure that the large
org..niz..tions oper..ted in the intereltl of e..pit..l ..ccumul..tion. This is what
medi..tion mech..nisms do effectively: find ..ccept..ble compro mil el
between forces th..t are diametrieally opposed but ineKtri cably linu d.
Another conclusion dr awn from this connection between the maja r
enterpn se or administr ative app.oratUI and the ""hoa l is that the vari oUJ
medialion rnechanisrns ar.. dc v..tailed ro furrn Ihe frarnework of a rnode o f
~ul. tion . Tbis dov"t.oiling does nor hapren ..uromatioo.l.ly bec.ause ...eh of
t h_ org.uuza.tiOllShu its own TltionIl.., rhe mregrity of its 0WlI muctures
tbat m.ll:t'S .t pers<>V"N m ils percerved lIOCial rol... Tbat 11 ...hy th..
agricul ture, sm.ill tT~..rs, Thu"d ~"orld co untries, ;md "'" forth. In this ...ay,
rhe larg.. org.ontzation \eltttnued ,IS growrh by suchng into the labc ur
forot llOlI-....g~g po puLotions ce the poonphery of Olpluhs:m. and
gJvmg th<'lll th.. chan~ of mll!lf"non mto Ih.. malIlS1rwm <!COnomy. Tbe
tT..nsformabon o th....mpioymenl structure, mvolvmg IIIIgr..bon mIo p.oid
employrn..nt ..nd str..ttfic..tion of Ihe labour fote<' mto socio-professional
In this cab" rellC<' th.at ulttm.ately turns mIO rn.aifu.lIcttoll.1llg , ," rnust
"""..r be forgon"n th.al medW.tioll rn~barusrns at'! chorged ...th the
retlS10ll tlLat .. K1StS betw...en rhe IlIdtvidUll ;md soci<'ty. Tb" compa.ttbihry
betw
mobthty ;md HC\1Oty provided by the larg.. org.uuza.b on _ as ioDg
.as th II .. cah"rent mod.. of NguLol1Oll - roelllforct's mdtVldu.ths:rn, for th..
hi..ruchic..l prrnciple is ..t worl: rhere. Tbi. is how .. coU<>etion o functiolls
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is articulate d th rough a sel " f rules. Autho rity can no longer be legitimi zed
stea dy aecumulation of capital. This set of sty lized faet s depicts th e maero -
identity cards, nati on al insurance cards, credit cards. ~'Ie are able to join al!
eeono mic pr ecess whereby th e labou r force was int egrat ed int o capitalism o
sorts " f associations. In sho rt, we belong to man y things. Bu! narre of th ese
member ships implies any particular emotio nal commitment . Scope fur
auto no mo us action, unthinkable only a few decades aga, has bec ome
~'Ie
rapid and very stea dy rate of technieal pro gre ss . The steeper th e lon g-term
pr od uetion precess but thi s power comes int o confliet with th e inereasing
consumer demand and teehnical pro gress stea dily exte nded th e limits of
autonomy of individu als. The ques t for an ente rprise culture aims to
rediseover emotional commitment in order to cement emplayees' sense of
absorb th e labour force th at pr oduetivity gro wth had made superfluo us.
Along with self-sustaining long-term gro wth - which lasted for almos t
th ree deeade s - ano ther remarkable property of Fordism was th e way in
which the gro wth regime could cushion th e fluet uat ions of the business
19 1 61
expee ta tion of futur e demand gro wth ahead of th e pr esent sho rtfa11, thus
sustaining globa l demando
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The financial sys tem and its clase links with monet ar y paliey form ed a
sec ond line of defence to guara ntee th e dur ability of gro wth.
~'Iithin
buye r'. mar ket , with rigid interest rates and high elasticity of supply. This
enabled companies to invest in gro wth and techni cal pro gre.. al minimum
financial cost , which created a high lever age " f borrowed funds over
companies' Qwn capital. This credit supply funct ion certainly tended to fuel
France after ~'Iorld ~'Iar Ir was led by a central administra tion, which
succee ded in co nverting th e mer cantilist traditi on established by Jean-
movement and th e arc haic attitudes of employ ers. The renewal elfort in
of Fordism .
Monetary po licy was th er efare mainl y directed towar ds th e avoida nce
of inflat ion ar y excesses. Its chief problem was to limit th e liqui dit y of banks
The use of med iator y instit uti ons th er efare taok on a nat ion al hue ,
allowing th e de velop ment of nation al varieties of th e Fordist gro wth
internation al monetary sys tem, which left scope far nation al auto no my in
mild and shortlived, far th e reasons given above. The dynamics of inco me ,
demand and investment ensured th at sales always picked up again.
th e choice oft heir mod e of regulation . In fact , th e moo est share of GDP th at
integration resulting from th e restr iction s on internation al capital
movemen ts and th e ability to devalue th e currency in a sys tem of fixed bu t
Relation s between gove rn ments and nati on al economies have always been
salaries in its dual ro le as pr od uction cost far firms and co nsumer spending
po wer. That is why it was possible to spea k of a nation al wage sta nda rd to
~'Ie
have
descr ibe thi s moo e of regulation in a nu tshell . The sta te asserte d its
It was attac ked in th e ' 97 0S by th e ultra-liber als, who did not see any
th at way , it create d a chro no logical perspective far all econo mic agents
and increased th e pr edictability of th e climate in which pr ivate agents
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compall1es.
It was indicat ed above that the financial sys te m was a sys te m of
future pr ofits, red istr ibu ting risks in a rder to spread th em more widely,
and acq uiring and investing funds drawn from th e sav ings of th e genera l
product ion bases; stimulating techn ical pro gress , overc ommg th e
already been indicat ed . The same applies to energy, transpo rt and ur ban
planning. A11 th ese investments are far more pro fitable to society th an to a
co11ective capital are eno rmo us, and th e amo rtization period s are very
long. These infrast ructural amenities are th e social faunda tions of
Unde r th e Fordist regulation sys te m, nati on al gove rn ments have genera 11y
pr od uctivity .
Techn ological inn ovati on also depends on co11ective fact ors - bas ic
been str ongly int er ventioni st in financial matter s. They have established
research , scientific knowled ge and ski11s - which yield fewer return s far a
pr ivate invest or th an far soc iety as a whole. ~'Ihe n th e sta te withdraws from
banks in tem po rar y difliculties have enough liquid asse ts to guara ntee bank
ava ilable th ese fact ors are, th e more beneficial exte rnal elfects th ey have
on th e pr od uction of mar ket goods and serv ices, encourag ing greate r
financial risks . These transfer s, in fact , are inspired by solida rity and th e
int er vention can take various far ms. ~'Ihere pu rely co11ective fact or s are
co ncern ed , fact ors which canno t be pr ivately appropriated - genera l
need to co ver social risks that cannot be spread. They are not th er efare
hazard lies in th e fact that th e sys te m of social pro tection has no co ntro l
over th e soc ial costs far which it is liable . It administe rs a farm of passive
labor ator ies. ~'Ihere th e fact or s of inn ovat ion can be pr oduced pr ivately records of indu strial research - because th eir use is a source of revenue to
solida rity in which respo nsibilities are diluted. The ways in which sta tes
those who pr od uce th em , th e sta te may restr ict itself to encourag ing
invention . It may olfer tax incentives, relax th e rules govern ing patents or
involve itself directly in associations of public labor ator ies and pr ivate
must be a co mmon bas is of solida rity. This co mmon bas is co mprises first
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deprived and which mus! th er efure be pro vided by pu blic or pub licly
guara nteed sys te ms. It also implies social justice in th e furm of a sys te m of
taxati on which red istributes wealth while maintaining th e hier ar ch y of
it reinfor ces citizenship and henee identifi cati on with th e econo mic sys tem.
By pr eser vin g homogeneity in th e distr ibu tion " f incom e , it encourages th e
widespread adoption of mod ern lifest yles and henee th e development of
mar ket s fur mass co nsumer goods, th e very development th at served as
What is Glo b a li za t io n?
The term 'globalization' has bec ome a catch-all word fur jou rn alists,
po liticians and th e business co mmunity . It is th e horizon fur all our hopes
~'Ihen
mcom e gap.
These co ncern s are dismissed by th e liber al economists who emphas ize
suggest an und erstand ing fur th e man y changes, jolts and co nvulsions that
but rather an engine of gro wth. The accelera tion of global gro wth in th e
have mar ked th e crises of thi s period oTo th at end , we must reconsider th e
two co ntradicta ry faces of employer-employee relations which brought
' 990S, after th e pr eviou s decade had been one of decline and stagnation in
man y developing co untries, has int roduced hundreds of millions of pea ple
olfers th e pro spe ct of pro fit . Ma st impo rt antly , th e cost of transferring upto-dat e techn ical knowled ge is falling sharply. An increasingly wide range
non-~'Iestern
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serv ices. The int ensification of th e int ernational division " f labour is
th er efore equivalent to an inerease in pr od uctivity .
There is another dimension of th e international division ofl abour which
instituti ons. Nation-sta tes are required to rede fine which social rights are
more serious pro blems in Euro pe th an in th e United Sta tes. There has not
bee n a long-ter m slackening of gro wth or increase in unemp loyment , and
results from thi s really did take offduring th e ' 990S. It is a key fact or in th e
mu ch farther bac k.
This transform ati on of th e division of labour on a planetary sca le is a
source of capital accumulation which is fuelling a new gro wth regime .
However , as has always bee n th e case in th e hist ory of capitalism , thi s
int er ests has remained unchanged . The ramp ant gro wth of social inequality
in th e British mod el , which mat ches similar American develop ments, and
th e relentless rise of unemp loym ent in th e Germanic mod el both und erline
th e difliculties facing wage societies th at have experienced Fordism when
techn ological revolution is not self-reg ulating. The po licies, mentaliti es and
instituti ons which int erfer e with th e determinant fact ors of capital
mar ket . Altho ugh economic po licy has shifted towar ds liber alism , it has
with vary ing degrees of int ensit y , th ese pr ocesses are far from co herent .
lar gely inadequ at e . This doos not , however , alte r th e fact th at th e twentiet h
1960s. The most obvious measure of its develop ment is th e fact th at world
trade has bee n gro wing at a co nsistently fast er rate th an world GDP. This
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tr end has pro ved ro bust enough to withstand th e financial erises and
stability during th e Fordist era. The more techn ical ski11s bec ome ava ilable
to co mpanies th roughout th e world, th e greater is th e exte nt to which th e
Econ om ic int egrat ion genera te d by trade has no! been hom ogeneou s. The
establishment of regional econo mic areas, where th e greates t inereases
have occurred in foreign trade , has b een a particularly co nspicuous
development in Euro pe , bu! th e trend has no! left Asia or America
untouched . However , spec tac ular th ou gh th e development of trade may
be, it doos no! account fur th e pr ecesses th a! are transforming th e
co nditions govern ing th e accumulation of capital. It doos no! satisfacto rily
explain why such severe and lasting da mage has bee n done to th e macre-
Weai<ened Co ll e c t iv e Bargaining
given rise and which feature in th e int ernati on al division ofl abo ur .
Internat ion al co mpetition has bee n exte nded to bread areas th at were
shielded from it un der th e Fordist sys tem. These include pub lic transpo rt ,
sys te ms,
television
distr ibution and financial serv ices. This amounts to a decisive shift in th e
dividing line between mar ket s and public serv ices. The social shoc k has
success fu11y supplied by nat ion al pub lic mon opolies in which th e
been a11 th e more dee ply felt in co untries where public serv ices were
where a high percentage of th e labour force had th e sta tus of civil servants,
th e labour co ntract in th e public serv ices used to have a strong influence
on wages and pr ices in th e who le economy. That is why th e impact of
co mpetition is causing co nsiderable upheaval in those co untries.
This upheaval is amplified by th e effect of th e exchange between ski11ed
Labou r sta nda rds linked to fu11-em ploym ent equilibria , determined
th emselves by multi-year co11ective barga ining, were th e economic
of mar ket s for mass co nsumer goods and serv ices in the newly
indu st rialized co untries is establishing a product ion base with low wage
econo mic po licies , discre tionary devaluations and exc hange co ntro ls were
suflicient to reconcile th e nat ion al autono my of th ese regulations with
req uired to pr od uce goods and serv ices with a high added value , and
downward pressure on th e cost of labour in indu st ries where th er e is
req uirements. Financial int egrat ion has bec ome th e leadin g force of
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organize f10ws " f goods, producti on fact ors, enginee ring and finance
th roughout th e world . The producti on and distr ibution of econo mic value
by corporations are bec oming detached from th eir ter rit ory of or igin o
beliefs.
are in disarray. In deed , real wages and prod uctivity inereases have been
disconnected , weakening uni on s and empty ing th e cantent of collective
barga ining.
int er ests, th roughout th e entire soc ial fabric of eac h nat ion . '~'Ihatever
moves in th e world econo my puts co mpetitive pressure on fact ors that do
balance between privat e int er ests and social co hesion has bee n bro ken,
which has enabled pri vate multinati on al int er ests to break out of
Since th ese three functi ons of finance are not independent of eac h other,
it is th e type of co mbination between th em th at defines th e financial regime
Unlike econo mic integrati on , which has been pr oceeding at a stea dy pace
inn ovation . Finance , after all, is a key mediat ion mechanism in the
endea vours of entre pre neurs. The logic of finance co nfronts uncertainty to
establish th e economic hor izon in which capitalist proj ects can be
sys te m descr ibed above. The crisis of Fordism resulted in an econo mic
slowdo wn , th e severity of which varied between develop ed co untries,
implemen ted and to ass ume liabilit y fur spec ific risks arising from th e great
diversity of co mpany wagers. This mediation has three funct ion s. The first
31 I 61
between sav ings and investm ent shifted. The Unite d Sta tes , fur example ,
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A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
eve r sharper as tim e went a n . Even so, th e globalization of ente rprises led
finance are divided int o elementa ry co mpo nents. These are formalized by
financial instruments which make th em negoti able - in other words,
redistr ibu table to anyone who is able to take th em over with pro fit . A large
disconnection between do mes tic sav ings and do mes tic investments.
number of int er dependent mar ket segments have co mbined to pro vide th e
elements of a wholesale mar ket in global liqui dit y . Curre ncies are
currency spec ulation and int ernat ion al cre ditor and debtor pos itions. This
financial co nfiguration is spreading gra dual!y across th e whole world as th e
new capitalist countries make th eir currencies co nvertible and dereg ulate
th eir financial sys tems. This is th e dominant mediati on mechanism in th e
establishment of th e new gro wth regime .
The sys te m of mar ket finance , with its pr edom inance of instituti onal
invest ors, has th er efore replaced th e financial sys tem administere d by th e
banking oligopo lies. The new sys te m has decisively changed the
The globalization of economies is far from being th e only profo und change
th at wage societies have un der gon e . They are also subjec t to th e forces of
social bond is money . It is only un der capitalism that this fact or can
bec ome a drive th at determines individu al goals as wel! as a genera lized
division ofl abo ur is judged . Money bec omes a form of wealth that is sought
co nstant threat of hostile mergers and lever aged buy outs. This form of
co mpany management breeds an obsession with cutting wage costs and
for its own sake, not out of sorne pathological craving, but as ev idence of
th e social recognition accorded to individu als. By int egrati ng th e wage-
earn ing and salaried po pulation int o th e circ ulation of wealth, because
develop ment .
existing lifest yles, th e wage society has given individu alism a massive
boast.
sec urities and th e extraordinary boom in de riva tives are entire ly th e fruits
~'Ie
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-<0 >--
informatton , co=unicatioc>.
!he oonNquellc. .lI' dr.utK: for tboo hi arcby of qua.hficatlons inhented
from 1M It ag' uf mus product>oD. !he producttve eap.actty o f coU<tct:tve
worl: pelixmed throogh co--opet at>on by highly sblled tearn.s cannot be
lMasUIed by a c:om.moll. ya.rdstK:I: mth th.. c:ontnbut1on o f ,,",chindividual
gII ,
'"Ilwied ... parat~ly. Y"" one rtllgl.. Lapse on th.. part o f a l""-"l m"m!>et
can hav.. tM gravelt uf eonseq u..nca for productton proc;!SS'OS tba t ......
highly vu!nfl"abl.. 10 bred:doorns OT acad... nts. This m<!.allS tbal th..
of une mploymenl.
profemOllaI r"111:. Thi. w". r..l\oected in an mcom.. structur.. lbal dev ..loped
s1owly , op'millg up unlil th....rly 19605 and closing Iherealter . Th..
illlegr alioll of individu..l., th.. prOC<lSS" wilhin which Ihes<! hiera rchical
35 I 61
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A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
extensive and abrupt fluctuations in the demand fur labour . The result is an
individu alizat ion of career pattern s. Empla yees who have un der gon e
identical initial trainin g may have entire ly different pay levels and careers,
depending on the companies or collective activities int o which fortune or
social helplessn ess is reflected in th e feeling th at th ese anarc hic inequ alities
T h e Uncertainty o t h e Employ ee
Unde r th e impact of technological change , th e economic gro und rules
are no longer stra tified by common sta ndards and to collective demands
fur which th e political process can no lon ger assume responsibility. It also
rate based on very small labour pr od uctivity gains has estab lished itself.
Sta ndards ofliving have deteriora ted fur many social stra ta. Two or th ree
sources of income are necessar y fur families to sustain a lifest yle th at was
among trade unions and political parties, which can no lon ger clea rly
portray th e socia l fabric as one within which conflicts can be managed and
pr eviously financed by one wage. The gro wth pro vided by small
other words a net gain of 40 million jobs, between ' 97' and 1993!
socio-
recognized
pos itions in
organizations. A
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unskilled and non-unionized abour force in dece ntra lized labour markets
has led to th e crea tio n " f a huge num ber of precari ous and low-paid jobs in
th e non -indu st rial sec to rs. The result of lhi s dr amatic reshaping of th e
employ rnent structure is th e anarc hic patchwork of disparities, with
extre me individu alizat ion " f pay structures and differences in pay and
co nditions between employees with th e same qualifications in th e same
occupation .
In Europe, th e gro wth regime has been far more seriously undermined .
There seem to be t W Q main reasons which explain lhi s difference . First ,
indu st rial relations in Euro pe are more rigidly structure d by co ntractual
mediat ion mechanisms, and diree! mar ket influence in th e regulation of
wages is weaker . In particular , th e sys tem of soc ial protecti on is
co nsiderably stronger. For severa l yea rs after gro wth had been slowing
down , th ese mediati on mechanisms defend ed th e sacial benefits of th ose to
whom th ey had pr eviou sly bee n gra nted. A dichotomy develop ed within
th e labour force . In th e ' 97 0s, an 'inte rnal labour mar ket ' pr eserved th e
tar get s and th e persistence of former pr oced ures of wage bargaining has
employ ment , businesses had recourse to th e 'exte rnal mar ket ', passing on
th eir problem to a workfurce th at was not pro tected by co11ective
un em ploym ent .
agreements. From th e ' 980s onwards, and at different tim es, depend ing on
th e sta te of th eir respe ctive econo mies, a11 countries experience d th e
repe rcussions of th e stra tegies whereby co mpanies sought to free
pr od uced th e wor st possible result : pr essure on wages and chro nic mass
In th e absence of po litical management , th e pr ob lem posed by th e need
for wage flexi bility has been exacerbate d by th e partial dismantling of
esta blished instituti on s in th e wake of macro -econ omi c difliculties without
th emselves of obligations de riving from past pay agre ements, which had
co mpetition . The more bitterly thi s assa ult on labour costs was co ntested ,
th e more serious was th e impact on employ ment.
sys te m of unemp loyment benefits increasingly restr ictive . The remod e11ing
of wage structures is th er efore part of th e hidden agenda of th e Euro pean
int egrat ion (the EMU proj ect). Conse quent1y, th e mod e of regulation bas ed
The other main dime nsion of th e susta ined crises within wage societies is a
on strong nation al auto no my which had guara nteed pos t-war pro sperity ,
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A THEOR\' OF C A ~ I TA lIS T RE GULATION
l"te 197 01 which rllile<:! widespr elld doub t llhaUt the llbility of mon et llry
the valu. added on which social tra nsfers "ere leviad has increa""" mor..
slowly sin~ lhe 197OS. Al lhe S.l.rn.. tirn... lb.. trann ers nooessi tated by the
J<><:UI rules in fo~ hava rilen far mor<! s h.arp ly as une mploym..nt h.u
" gene r"l flCll pe into inll.lltio n, these llntllgomsms imperilled. the mon etllry
foundarions of cllpitlllism . l he time blld come to re-<!S1:11blish mo ne t.lry
discipline.
increased. This rneant 1M! .tU countri.........eh al its own p,l0!!, incurrd
blldget d..fia!1 and increued lh. utio botw<><m public debt ud COP. Th..
qU$! OT rnNM of fundmg IbIS d"lit , .long Wlth th.. gloNhutlon of
..nlfl'PriMs and the UpboNv.l! iD th .. mt<mW.tional """"",ney IIlHUts
from lb. o.:J CJUU, ".os 011.. of lb<> mam I'MSODS for th..
tr.onsfonn.11Of\ of lb.. 6n.loncW ~""",", Deh! Iws once agam becom.. lb.
JIO'Slble , lb. mOIlelny ll\llhont>oos "ft II gre.ill deal ml......lly for bank CTechl
otIIfa, rNorcl mOIlel olf)' restr. ml h.id succeecl ed in COll'l uerm g inillltiocl
by !he mid 198<le.Bul '1Illld done much more Iban lbat. It blld t,""llsforme<!
~tulg
lb. NlaI otlbe fuwtcW rystem by opemng Ibe door to hbe rilized. fin.anci.a.I
nurhU.
lb. !WO orher li:m:es for cbing.. m lb.. fin.anci.a.I structure .....N lb.. Med.
prospec!ll of high sOOrHerm return. Arr.d so, Ibe fIow of credtl mto
prodUet1v.. mvestmtlU ,nvolYUlg mdustnal nsl:s vtrtu.ally dned up m
favour of specuLahOll 011 Ibe pnces: of Ihe eXtsttng mstrumen!ll of pnvue
-..Jlb - sh.ires, lb.. property IM r\:et, bwldmg Lmd ;md so on. lbe
C. pila.list .conomies, r.dlSCOVenng m Ibis Ihe ch.or. ct..risttcs of Ihe
. nd S1.bl.. inll.lion Idle , v. ri.llions in mIeles! Idl.... ""'1 Ihe IOlle for m.ocro-
economic . djllS!m.ntl. lb. lensions Ihdl hdve emerged wilb reg.rd lo Ih..
POSHACE TO THE
~ E W ED I T IO ~'
CAPITALISM AT THE T U R ~
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A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
of financial mar ket s and central bankers has pared away means of fundin g
Parliamentar y majoriti es ado pte d an int ransigent econo mic liber alism
th at erooed th e econo mic pos ition of employees who had farmerly enjoyed
th e pub lic serv ices . The impotence of po litica l actio n has co mbined with
United Sta tes and th e headlon g rush int o pri vati zati on s in th e United
Kingdom wro ught rad ical changes to th e structure of indu st rial relations.
serious th rea! .
United Sta tes, th e de mand far labour varied greatly with cyclical changes.
The wage soc ieties of th e de veloped world are tryin g to co pe with th e tripl e
challenge of th e globalizatio n of capitalism , th e disinte gration of social
identity and th e shrinkage of th e sta te . I have tried ta sho w how th ese three
ills are d osely int erlinked . The same applies to th e encouraging trends, th e
initi ati ves and aspira tions th at might br ing farth new mediat ion
co herent sets of mediat ion mechanisms, not a sta nda rd uni ver sal tuning
sys tem far a11 mar ket s. The type of re gulation sys tem de pends on th e
far greate r part in th e functi oning of market s. Social rights strongly affect
organized and social co mpro mises were negoti at ed and capable of making
proouct ion , and th e prolifer ati on of individu alism had differe nt effects on
th e different types of wage society . In th e Anglo-Saxon vers ions, th e
incom pati bilit y of th ese trends with Fordi sm manifested itself sconer in th e
th e 'extern al' mar ket . This segmenta tion is an int egral part of th e organized
Serv ing as th e basis of a virtuo us circle as lon g as gro wth was strong and
United Sta tes and Margaret Thatcher in th e United Kingdom in ' 97 9. The
decline of manufacturing indu st ry and th e rise of th e serv ice sec to r were
so-ca11ed Rhenish-type
changes
outside
th e
do main
inflati on and
- 4 3 I 61
44 I 61
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
--<0 >--
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
~'Iage
~'Iithout
solida rity. A few pro positions can be advanced , pro positions which have
labour mar ket , th e od ds against findin g another job within th ree months
are four to five tim es greate r th an in th e Unite d Sta tes. As period s of
unem ploym ent len gth en , with th e accompany ing deterior ation of working
Given th e pro blem pr esented above , th e viable mediat ion mechanisms are
institution al invest ors can sure ly be ide ntified as th e most impo rt ant
mediat ors in th e new gro wth regime . The po litical imp lication s attac hing to
share holders and th e place of pro fit and market value as th e key criteria of
success. But thi s type of capitalism is no less depe nde nt on wage societies
in th eir entire ty , eve n th ough co mpanies and financial institution s are less
These bodies pr ivately administe r a fund made up of ind ividu al sav ings.
In vestment funds are numerous and co mpetition between th em is fier ce .
attac hed to any particular nati on . But , in wage societies , th e legitim acy of
Per form ance criteria are relative , th e aim of eac h being to pr oduce a bette r
capitalism lies in th e social pr ogress th at its dynamism susta ins. The crisis
sav ings have been advancing more rapidly th an any other form of sav ing,
th ese int ermediari es acq uire sta kes in co mpanies, which indu ce th em to
gro wth regime will be made and th at a mod e of regulation will emerge
dealing. They do not hesitate to sell blocks of shares and reinvest in rival
solida rity?
45 I 61
4 6 I 61
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - <0>--
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
individu al sav ing, th e institutional investo rs are also th e pote ntial agents of
supra national, multi-prod uct co mpany has superse ded the bra nch or
indu strial sec to r in th e nat ion al econo my as th e unit within which th e rules
lhi s develop ment is given po litical bac king, it may lead la a wage soc iety
tha! is very different from Anglo-Saxo n-sty le mar ket capitalism while also
nat ion al sta nda rds govern ing increases in real wages.
aba ndo ning th e Euro pean mod els of cor po rate capitalism th at mar ked th e
In thi s mod e of regulation , cor po rate gove rnance is decisive . The rise of
a share holding labour force to ass ume co ntrol of th e pension funds could
alte r th e balance between th e int er ests of savers and th ose of th e wor kers.
That would suit th e trade uni on s of co ntinental Euro pe . Their histor y ca11s
T h e Primac y o Pension Fu n d s
a greater
pro spect of economic stability, co mpanies co uld regain the room for
In fact th e co nversion of co ntractual sav ings int o pro perty rights in respect
of co mpanies implies a decisive change in th e way co mpanies are run o
increases and adjustments in wor king hou rs. The opening of thi s window of
- 47 I 61
4 8 I 61
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -----cr-
-'
A THEOR\' OF CA ~ I TA lI ST RE GULATION
lh.. fruits o f . " pensive hbour is lh.. o nly lCC<!ptabl.. solutio n ror di!v eloped
"'Age societifl. Il is lhe o nly way 10 ..ntic<! comp.onies cone-ernoo. with
glo~
value. BUI , sine. lhe co1lttve ~ ofproductiVlty ..... ..xploited lor th..
accumulanon of Ci plt.u by ~tfl"Prues that ha",! p1o.y<!d httl.. part in thar
of Ihe
~".,
mv-estoc
In
ncLum lts plice.AS lb. cr..d1e of common ,...Jn""" of SOCLl1 coh<!'51on. In tlus
T8SJ"K1
tbotre is no
..,lhm lb.
&1ob.ll
bVUlg ~."dmD .
Ift bot ~ ..tion between work., unemploym.... t and mact>Vlty .. lo be
POSHACE TO THE ~ E W
ED I T IO ~'
CAPITALISM AT THE T U R~
- 49 I 61
50 I 61
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
mean , however , th a! gove rn ments have to invest with a view to impro vin g
po licies remain neutr al or restr ictive , th e increased mobility ofl abo ur only
spec ific co mpetitive sec to rs. In form ati on technology , after al!, has ta ken
th e mar ket econo my int o areas hitherto regard ed as non -cornm er cial. And
serves
so the sta te is no lon ger called upo n to pro vide , either directly or th rough
to
co nvert
structura l
un em ploym ent
int o
Keyn esian
improve
A sec ond reason fur an active anti-cyd ical po licy relates to deflation in
po licies genera lly co nsisted in restr icting th e liqui dit y of banks by curbing
th e supply of mon ey from th e central banks. This line of approach was
of monetary po licy to respo nd to real shocks , so employ ment did not have
to be treat ed as a po licy aim.
The error made by govern ments in Euro pe , by co ntrast with th e United
Sta tes , was to treat thi s doc trine as axiomatic , whereas th e exte nt to which
it was true de pended on a very spec ific set of financial circ umstances. Let
us recall th at A. ~I . Phillips demon str ated a long-term inver se relation ship
between increases in mon ey wages and unemp loyment ." This relationship
educa tion must be pro tected from th e vaga ries of th e business cyd e by
means ofl aws establishing lon g-term pro grammes.
Sta te respo nsibility fur maintaining th e rate of techn ical pro gress is th e
way to influence lon g-term gro wth. But th e stea dy -sta te gro wth is also
impo rt ant . It implies po litical respo nsibility fur anti-cyd ical measures,
which mon et ari sm had denied . The first reason fur thi s ste ms from th e
growth fact ors th emselves. ~'Ihere techni cal pro gress is chiefly linked to th e
experience of wor kers who gra dually raise th e prod uctivity of th eir teams
as th ey wor k together in th e prod uction pr ocess, recessions have adverse
effects on growth pattern s, because th ey diminish th e employability of
red und ant workers, espec ially if th ey are length y and recovery is slow, as
has been th e case in Euro pe . Consequently, structura l po licies designed to
impro ve th e quality and flexi bility of jobs canno t functi on independently of
51 I 61
~'Iorld ~'Iar
1. From
52 I 61
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
----<(r-
J
A THE OR'f OF CAPITALlST REGUlATION
resu!l IDKfre m lbe ";denrng disp,i n tiel and d,mj"j.h j" Ksolidanty th<il h,ye
n . llet rw
z..
to evcid tlus typ<> of m..ffi.ci...., whbnum olnd ""lIee lo .....k lb.. tW.DCe
~Il mLab on and UD<mIp\oym<m1 th.1t wtl1 bost promot.. st...dy roottb
<l spontaneous
~ ,.
Tb_ pnnC'Iples , haw eve t ,eannot of lhe mse ly"," resol ye lbe problems
been expenenced smce Ih.. stut aftbe 1 ~. So1idanty is not gu.oranleed
by commercial msuru ce poIicies . l t ;. a MI of rul es throub..hich a natl.OD
assuma lhe nsl:s th<il Ibreat..., bN In .aciety. Accordm&lo Ibis sobdansttc
r<lttonale . Ibe ultunale foundation of .aJidanty is lb.. IlDposs1bihty of a
purely indt...duahsttc soci..ty. Dernocncy cannol be ...tal ud active unlen
in Ih.long runo
A t"ir<! r.. a5<>n for c10sely involving rb.. mon..tary authorities in
econo mic regulatio n is co llC<'rll ror rbe It abilit y o f rhe fina ncial sys tern s. In
uni yer lal mem bership of saciety . That i...hy real freed om ..ithin a saciety
te..ard. tot alita rianism. The totalitarian tempt ation de rives from endemic
un. table and the busines s cycle is sub.la ntial. Fragile banl:s ..ill, m turo ,
dr ift can be an insidiou. developmen t and may nol lead a11 lhe ..ay to Ihe
reflecttn&Ihe cul m Ih....r ownloendtn& rales. Tbey may o{&"I Ihe effKt
u IDm&d..mocncy.
no!
people. This imp lies a qualit y and Yarie ly o f social int"ractio n th rough
grou~,
ma.rUtl do I>Ot assume dangel'OWl proportioM , ........ lbe case ID !he Lue
In th9 m.ojor ~iffiern countries lbese ailme ntl developecl "'l lb lb e de<:lllIe
aflbe Ford1S! mode of regula tiOll. Tbe dtsinlegr~UOD of lb e coh....ve lOCial
f.,bric OCCUI'Ted al lb .. lam.. ttme.as eapll.w.m".as be'lDg free<! from ev..ry
CODstr.unI. JI 15 hib tl.me thlt poIitical dtxusston r<!COV<!1"ed sorne of ItS
1~.
fono.... V1&0Ill lo ""1 ~bout redefinrnl th e stan<Urds of socW. jl15ttce. ~ft ....
y.m< of apen host::thty or indtff<!1"9DC9 to such 5Wld.rrds m Ibe Dame of
economic liber.lltsm. To est .blish <l sbMed con""pl of socio! justicettd 10
system a nd <lffect lb.. loN I economic ~uilibrium. BefeN! lb" pn"" system
53 /61
Sol /M
A THEOR\' OF CA ~ I TA lI ST RE GULATION
ensUfe that it is mccrporated into the n ghts " hich it is the duty ofthe state
to enfor~, i.lI ro give mean ing once agam to the notion o f citizenship.
for a 100<1 qlU1ly ot hfe. !hal ilI bow lOCiaI progress can be r..n.... ed in
hannocl y "'lb a regularory p!U>C1.ples wlUch mus! slrengthen lb.. na!>on so
tha r ,r "an ub advollltag. o / the o pporturnttoos o ffered by glob.a.l ca pttallSm.
The r.aprocal comm,t'menr of lb.. LDdiVKIual and ,,,,,c,,'ty cannot be
re~ llnIess thera ilI a mora! unpentl.......hicb c\e.arly chst:mguishes
W'tlbour ..luch the ind,vid ual Cll nnOldi!V"Iop. Tbat is the only ..ay to maht
lhe imperattve of lOCiaI cob <!SlO1l compattbl.. W'ttb the op<!nmg of th....age
societift to globalwt>on. Sucb an approacb avoids the type of idenllty
MaTCh ..hich, tbougb tTe.ilttng coll<!C1>v" valuoos, IS also suscepttbl.. to the
snaNS of popuhsm and natioD.ahsm .
lf lbe pohttc:a1 bluepnnt iNcceeds m restattng lb.. need for sohdanty lbe
IlC01lOIllic r~ reqU>1~ for 'u Impl..mentatian willlead, especiaIly in
Frolllce, lO Ihe mst>t1Itton of a proeess- of radical tu r~form and to a
red efintlioll of lOCiaI rigbu. By lb.. end of this process, lb~ welfare Slale will
hav.. ~ oomp\et..ly over hauled .
Toda y's ..age societi... ar.. char act erued by a loos<!ning of lbe link
bet>o"n pay aOO lhe per Cllplta margrnal produl."1tV1ty of labour , but also
by COllttnu.:! r"l.ml k>r work as the paramount entenon of mt"llntion mIo
SOC'I"ry. ConNquenrly, the ligbt agamst social u clusto n means increasmg
rhe demand k>r t.bour ..hile a nde.ivo unng to ..nhan<>e lbe employabihty o f
rhe labour Sllpply. It also m....ns d..fming and g =g ..=eptan<>e fur rhe
of the diVlSion into ..ases alld profiu depoends on the bnsl:nHS of demand
and rhe pace of investmen t. GovernrnenU can act on th""", two aspecIS of
NVen"e dutnbu non rbrougb tb. tax structur.. and redtsrnbutlon.
Nhen a companson .. made for ...cb country betwe<!n tbe srructure of
bu<lgetary expendr ture aud the tax srst..m W'ttb tbe aid of OECD Slat>s1lcs,
two chancteristics emerge. Fraoe<o aod Gi!rmany devote f.lr small..r
amounts than the United Sta toos aod Japao to public investmeot but
allocale larer percentag... to social tr aorlers aod operating ~llpenditure.
Th_ t..o Europe.ln eountri... d..riv.. a partiCiJlarly small amount of th";r
fiscal revenu.. from capital duties, ..hich accouot fur 1~ per c~nt and ' 3 per
cent r...pectively of all talleslevi<!d compar<!d to almost 30per cent in the
United SIal... and Japan. In mOte geoeral t~rm. , in al! the Anglo-Saxon
55 I 61
56 I 61
o-
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
th e mod ern wage societies have developed . The po litical philosop hy which
These great disparities un derline th e fae! th a! taxat ion sys tems are no!
carved in tablets of sto ne. Ambitio us refurms are possible if th ey are
guided by a dear focus on solida rity. As far as France and Germany are
co ncern ed , th e ur gent pri orit y is to seek red uctions in th e welfare charges
levied on th e wages of unskilled workers. The mod est sta rt th at has been
made over th e past few yea rs ought to be developed a good deal further .
But whatever else happens, we must not fall into th e demagogues' snare by
red ucing th e overall tax burden. As we saw above, govern ments have a
crucial ro le to play in th e new regime of gro wth. They need substa ntial
resources to recover sorne roo m far man oeuvre , whilst getting to grips
with th e excessively high levels of pub lic de bt.
There is no miracle remed y th at will remod el th e tax structure in such a
way as to turn activities with lower mar ginal revenue pr oducts int o
pr ofitable ventures. It will no doubt be necessar y to increase th e tax
burden on capital in co untries such as France where it is und uly light . The
French Govern ment must scra p th e arra ngement whereby incom e tax is
sub ordina ted to demograp hic co nsiderations th ro ugh a sys te m of child
allowances. All individu al incom e , whatever its origin , must be made
~'Ihat
is more
serious is its blind adhere nce to thi s pr actice in th e co urse of the ' 990S. Its
illusions, however , have now been dispelled. The employ ment and poverty
traps th at thi s array of assista nce schemes creates are being de nou nced
from all sides. The tim e has co me far a po litical blueprint far a rad ical
stra ta. In cidentally , th e transpar ency resulting from a sensible tax refa rm
would be part of a national po licy of solida rity which would rede fine th e
Econ omi sts have often made thi s type of pr oposal." The advantage of a
uni ver sal welfare levy and VAT taxes far social sec urity co ntributions on
wages, a mom entum can be created in favour of solida rity and th e fight
against exclusion. If taxes on wages are replaced by higher taxes on
57 I 61
Because thi s income is gra nted to eve ryone of wor king age, it avoids any
58 I 61
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - <0-
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
discr imination between th ose who are on benefits and th ose who are not o
Th; , " n", ".n . f m.n, " h " h ;, n.t ....nt fr .m th . "".. . f Kad Mu x . n . " h ;, h ;,
. 1> n fth. fou n . , " . n , . f "'.n..;. n ."n.m;", " .. ox. Hd t1. m.n".n. . . . . u t . ft h.
. " finH "n .f . mu t ."n.m. o. C. B. n . t" . n . J. Cu t.H", Ma", hand<, <010"0"
,ap"aU<t, Pu;, , . 80. A " m" " ol. fo, m uJ." . n m o. fou n. ;n M. A.H. " n . A. Od ' . n ,
La Vid . n .. l. mo"na..,Pa,
work, it doos no! create a poverty trap . Finally , lhi s incom e is an aid to
individu als, no! ta co mpanies. It cor reets th e disparities th a! result from
huge pay differentials and makes it po ssible to employ low-skilled workers
,.S.
In A I1I. o"" of e ap" aUrt R ula"o", " , W . n . t "m. " h . n th . t" m 'm J." . n ' " .. n.t
rate is sel and is deducted al source from eve ry type of income . Final1y , an
element of pro gressive taxati on is int rod uced in th e furm " f a surtax on
On
~"uduul
m. lfth; , " " h m o. fou n. ;n A. S,h." ", I1I. E, o" om'" I1I. o"" of
S.mfth . toxt> .n " h ;, h th " n.m;" .f " nT.n".n , ;, o.... . pp.u ;n J. P. Du.ut
. 1., ' ." 'l.'E" n . m;. ... " nT.n".n ,', ;n R ..u. E, o" om'o u., , d . l ;u. , Mu, h , . 8 . S...1>.
large incom es. The averag e rate of taxati on is assessed in such a manner as
to ensure a net balance between receipts and expenditures. The minimum
th . " n"" .. "" ,t o. A. Od ' . n , An.ly", . , o" om'o u. d.on,. n"o"<, Pu;, ' ... .
S" t
d . t l ;n th . UnH
th
ofw hatever type being subjec t to th e same amo unt of tax , thi s mechanism
can be linked with th e universal soc ial levies, health msurance
contributions and th e remaining vestiges of child benefit.
The stage is th er efare set far a po litical debate . The real challenge 1S
certa inly not to dismantle th e welfare sta te or even to erooe its benefits. On
o. Kad p . J.n.;. w h '. p . J.n.; . ". ,... . n m " lu l. , ;, . f th . " ' ;n " h ;, h
... H.H, m ...t" . , th . fo, m, . f ..d . l Hfo ;nh" H fr . m th " -;nOu,,,;. 1 . u, h .
un u " l. u n m " m. t.. th . . ...d t. t. " "..t. th. . .d . l f",;, n . u t o. . .d . l
th e co ntra ry, th er e is a particularly pr essing need far soc ial cohesion . The
Th. . . .n on . u H" . , " , th . u ;, " . n , t. " fl.d , d fi, u " . ul , ,u m , " n m . Su,h
. u J." . n " h . " " , ..nn.t .., t u " .n th . fun m.n" l hd th .t . n W..t. m " u n " ;..
o. n . fi t fr . m " m m.n . " " th " . , m .
,. <I>.
r " fin H"n . f th . fi un, J.l ,., t.m, . n . .....,;, " . n . H h. , h u . d ,,;, ", fo. tu m . f
th u ;. u, ,,;m , ... M. A.H. "., Ma,,,,.,o" om'. fi na n,'
~
J. P. m . u ; . n . P. R...n..n . n "fo, t
n " . ,
Tun>l,".n n . t.. w . . . ..d . t. ' ;, tun>l,".n . H h. t" m ~ ...d'" ..lu ;.l. ' o. " h ;, h ;,
m..nt '...."t. " h ;, h 1 , un. " th . ;m.ul> f ... H. H,m . n . ;n " h ;, h " _ l" . u , _
O. fu th " n u n t fo, m . f . m. lm.nt _ ;, . 1>. th " mm.nt ..u,,, . H.t.l m.n.
It fon .", fr . m th;, th . t th . " m" o,H t. o. t"..n " " ''' . n . ;n"m. h.. t. o. " . uJ.t
59 I 61
R. B" , "''u n . " no N, " . ul L" 'u, S" n . u . ," u n Eu " . ..n M. n . tu. S" n . u .',
Rh.",h''',o" om' oudoLou,.'", 1. 59, n... '-' , ', 93" Ph ' H . , ~ ",. m . l , tu , .."'. th . "J." .n>h , . o. t"..n " mfl,".n . n .
u n . m. lm.nt " . lm..t . " n tu , . 'Th . R.J." . n , h ;. B. t" ..n Un.m. lm.nt . n . th . Ro t.
. fCh.n f M.n W R. t.. ;n th. UK, , 86,_,. ,,', E, 0" om', a, Nm o" ' 958.
, It ; , m", h ,...u , t. , , "u. th . ,;.ht-"m" n.m;, t M't. n r , ; m.n .. th . ;nT.nt" . f
60 I 61
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
----<0-
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
'1., . ".... 1. It " .. pu t fon.",! in Pun" b. L. St.!i , u in '1. ..m ' in , in . ' 1 " ""." fr .m <
m , u l .",."U.. in ,,1,,1 , ,,;,'n1>uh ,n .1. ,,;,tI. Hm,' " l. T1. , . .. " ..
m ",. , ,,'
<n'O ,
"'. n,,". n " hool fo, ,,1 0m ' 1 l m.nt .f " ll " u . . .,,<!u, h . It. <om. l. t. l. ".u. t..
in"m. fr .m ".
1; 1<on d u m n . h 1 ...' 1 ,,;, " ",<1m, t. ,,1 ;, 1 ""k ;, n . lon, ,, d "m . f>" j, ,,Uon
. H n ,h .,. u b . W. , on '1. con " "" 1" th.t "". l, , h U '1 nn" p. l m..n h ",.l
int. , ,,Uon, . n o ,. . .u ' m H.. t. '1 " ,moU, o.." ..h ",.nU. .. t fod h b. F. Bou , <u " n on
. n o P . A. e h ;.P''';, f"' oh" .. ...dom'b uoo", N . to> d. 1<F. n ,! .h on S.in ' -S;mon , P" l' ' . .,.
61 I 61
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
---.0-
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
Om, A., " 3n
Gum,d, A., " .
Gun ou , A., , bon
Index
Hm , h , F., ".' . n o n
Hm , h , J., o8
" ,hm., W., 3'3
",1;.".,M., 201m
B,;'u, E., , Sn
4n
B. u ,, m",, '., , , 6n
B.n. tU e., , Sn
B. d . , A.A., , 67 . non
B..,,,. , P," 3n
L";n;, s ., 3,on
Bo', D.C., , . .n
B.v.., s ., " n
L. ,,,lu. , , bon
e h . . . h " , J." ., ,8
.n.n
...HH , P, ' 37 n
" ..n . , G.L., , 6o . n . n
Dunl , J.T., , . ,m
Elh. , W., o," . n . n
Em m . n u .l, A., 30
N ,;, A., , 8
P. d . , v."
INDEX- ' , 3
'"
---------------------~O-
-'
(1
A THE OR\' OF CAPITA LlST REGULAT ION
Pmou x, F., '3n
INDEX- 3 1 3
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - <0