Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
VOL. LXVII
Cappadocian Writers
The Second Half of the Fourth Century
PEETERS
LEUVEN PARIS WALPOLE, MA
2013
Table of Contents
CAPPADOCIAN WRITERS
Giulio MASPERO, Rome, Italy
The Spirit Manifested by the Son in Cappadocian Thought .............
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ABSTRACT
In spite of the obvious sympathies Gregory of Nazianzus feels towards Platonic language concerning status of the human soul, it is impossible to understand his concept
of free will without considering the role the body plays in the formation of will. Furthermore, the Theologians view on human freedom in face of God is significantly
shaped by his Pro-Nicene commitments. Defending the absolute divine sovereignty of
the humble and suffering Christ and his equality with the Father Gregory questioned
the view on the divine sovereignty, which presupposed the image of the impassible God
acting in the human world from the distance of a detached observer. Instead, he proposed the idea of divine sovereignty exercised in the act of a loving self-sacrifice and
self-denial revealed in the salvific activity of Christ. Consequently, Gregorys theology
of human freedom is represented by the paradoxical interplay between human autonomy
and divine heteronomy. The article analyses the logic of this interplay and states, that
the Theologians vision of human free will can make a significant contribution to the
contemporary debates on the relationship between faith and reason.
Although the importance of free will in Gregorys theology has been well
noticed and even praised, the complex nature of his concept of freedom has not
hitherto been accorded deep exploration. Indeed, as Plagnieux points out, he
was a champion of human liberty in the face of God.1 But does Gregory offer
us any articulated theological concept of this human liberty in the face of
God? Or is this his personal disposition silently operating on the background
of his theological vision?
It seems that the answer would more likely support the second suggestion,
insofar as Gregory did not give us any systematic account on the matter. Yet,
the numerous precise formulations of the conceptual character concerning
human free will here and there found in his writings should make us careful to
dismiss easily the Theologians possible contribution to the issue raised.
So the question I want to address here then is what place could be assigned
to these formulations concerning human free will in the broader context of
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Gregorys theological thought, and what kind of logic is operating in the Theologians construction of the notion of free will, if it exists at all.
It is my contention that Gregory offers us highly elaborated concept of free
will, which does not oppose the revelation of a transcendental God to the autonomy of reason, but rather considers the former a necessary condition for the
formation of the latter. In order to substantiate my thesis, I will start with the
analysis of Gregorys notion of freedom and the role soul-body constitution
plays in it in his accounts on the creation of man. Then I will proceed with the
exploration of how the assumption of the human fallen will by Christ corresponds to the primordial state of human freedom and sheds light both on the
logic of the proper functioning of the free will and on its dark side, what we
might designate in Kantian terms as a radical evil. Finally, I will point towards
implications of Gregorys vision of free will that might contribute to the modern debates on reason and faith.
Gregory unfolds his story about the primordial state of man and the fall
around his complex notion of free will. He does not envisage the Paradise
bestowed upon the ancestors as something simply given as an object of enjoyment. Certainly, Paradise is a gift of God, but at the same time and from the
beginning Gregory makes clear that it is to be obtained as well, as if it is somehow kept in distance from man. Such a paradoxical state of this gift is conditioned by another gift the gift of freedom. In the following passage he briefly
summarizes ethical motivations for this contrast of gifts:
This being (man) He placed in Paradise, whatever the Paradise may have been, having
honoured him with the gift of free will (in order that good might belong to him as the
result of his choice, no less than to Him who had implanted the seeds of it).2
But in fact Gregorys concern with the lost Paradise has a broad background,
which suggests to us that he was not least interested in the conceptualization
of the biblical accounts. Thus, elsewhere he offers the following general formulation:
This, indeed, was the will of Supreme Goodness, to make the good even our own, not
only because sown in our nature, but because cultivated by our own choice, and by the
motions of our will, free to act in either direction. (Or. 2.17)
As we see, Gregory elucidates what the Paradise may have been for him: it
is intrinsically linked with human nature if not identified with it. Indeed, both
above-quoted passages immediately follow his discussions on the purposes of
2
Toton qeto mn n t paradesw, stiv pot n pardeisov otov, t atezousw timsav, n to lomnou t gaqn ox tton to parasxntov t sprmata
(Or. 38.12). I will mostly quote from the following English translation: Select Orations of
St. Gregory Nazianzen, trans. Charles Gordon Browne and James Edward Swallow, ed. Philip
Schaff (New York, 1893).
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the soul/body division in human nature. For its extreme clarity I quote the
discussion connected to the first passage:
He placed him, great in littleness on the earth; one and the same spirit and flesh;
spirit for grace; flesh for pride; the one that he might continue to live and praise his
Benefactor, the other that he might suffer, and by suffering be put in remembrance, and
be corrected if he became proud of his greatness. (Or. 38.11)
This sophistic play with antitheses, in Reuthers words, characteristic of Gregorys style and here skillfully matched with his expression of Christian theological antitheses3 reveals that the above noticed tension between already and
not yet in the gift of Paradise is in fact nothing else than a tension found in
our very nature a gift of the Creator. This passage tries to discern the moral
motivations in the creation of such tension in human nature: while man with
his spirit participates in the greatness of deifying grace, he obtains the full
awareness of the given-ness of this high status and so gives thanks to his Benefactor. So, while in spirit man feels his closeness to his creator, his body draws
a line of separation between them. It marks a distance from an eternal not yet.
Then if we ask what the function of free will might be, the discussion in the
second oration highlights the place of free will in this tension by giving the
reasons for the creation of body/soul duality:
There are two: one, that it may inherit the glory above by means of a struggle and
wrestling with things below, being tried as gold in the fire by things here, and gain the
objects of our hope as a prize of virtue, and not merely as the gift of God The second
reason is, that it may draw to itself and raise to heaven the lower nature, by gradually
freeing it from its grossness, in order that the soul may be to the body what God is to
the soul, itself leading on the matter which ministers to it, and uniting it, as its fellowservant, to God. (Or. 2.17)
So, Gregory establishes a close correlation between free will and the body,
which has already been noticed by Winslow, who points to the pedagogical
role of the body which plays a decisive role in the dynamics of the realization
of free will.4 But what that scholar failed to notice is the complex character of
this role of the body: he considers the pedagogy acted by God through bodily
suffering a failure, since it did not affect the moral correction of man.5
In fact, Gregorys strong defense of the autonomy of human will represents
the further development of the theological tradition derived from Clement of
Rosemary Radford Reuther, Gregory of Nazianzus: Rhetor and Philosopher (Oxford, 1969),
66.
4
Donald F. Winslow, The Dynamics of Salvation: A Study in Gregory of Nazianzus (Cambridge, 1979), 55.
5
Ibid. 74.
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Alexandria6 that by no means admits any kind of automatic character of salvation. The sole pedagogy that a body capable of suffering can provide, as we
have seen in the previous passage, is a prevention of pride by means of facing
man with the gap which separates him from the almighty God. Thus, the body
makes man feel the insufficiency of his created nature and the need of work of
his free will in order to rise to heaven. But Gregory shows also insufficiency
of the efforts of human will for that end. He brings into play the notion of the
divine law defined as a prohibition imposed on free will in his work in Paradise
and which is a Commandment as to what plants he might partake of, and
which one he might not touch. On the other hand, Gregory paradoxically considers this very prohibiting law a material for free will to act upon (Or. 38.12).
Moreover, this acting of free will upon this material paradoxically ends with
elimination of the latter:
not, however, because it was evil from the beginning when planted; nor was it forbidden because God grudged it to us But it would have been good if partaken of at
the proper time, for the tree was, according to my theory, Contemplation, upon which
it is only safe for those who have reached maturity of habit (tov tn zin telewtroiv) to enter. (Ibid.)
Let us follow the logical thread of Gregorys thought and attempt to reconstruct
his concept of free will. Here it will be helpful to summarize his accounts of
the dialectically opposed notions: autonomy of human will and heteronomy of
divine intervention. According to Gregory, the first step takes heteronomy
6
On Clements doctrine of human free will see Peter (Panayiotis) Karavites, Evil, Freedom,
and the Road to Perfection in Clement of Alexandria (Leiden, Boston and Kln, 1999). But it is
obvious that Gregorys teaching is under the direct influence of another Alexandrian, Origen, who
does not only have more elaborate doctrine of human free will co-operating with and trained by
divine grace but also the concept of divine pedagogy in which an important role is assigned to
the body (see Joseph Wilson Trigg, Origen: The Bible and Philosophy in the Third-century
Church [London, 1985], 108-15). We can also find a similar providential function of the body in
some Platonists. Thus, according to Augustine, Porphyry states that God put the soul into the
world that it might recognize the evils of matter, and return to the Father, and be forever emancipated from the polluting contact of matter (Augustine, City of God X 30). The roots of this
doctrine seem to go back to Plutarchs daemonology (see his De facie; also John Dillon, The
Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 [London, 1977], 217-8). However,
even if Origens thought is more indebted to the traditional Christian and biblical teaching of
redemption than to the philosophical doctrine of spiritual purification (Jean Danielou, Origne
[Paris, 1948], 265), the human body is still considered by him a secondary form of existence
acquiring its positive function as a tool of correction only after the fall of man (Anders-Christian
Lund Jacobsen, Origen on the Human Body, in L. Perrone (ed.), Origeniana Octava: Origen
and the Alexandrian Tradition I [Leuven, 2003], 651-6). On the contrary, as we have seen, Gregory places the body with its capacity of suffering and correcting free will already in Gods initial
plan of creation without admitting any necessity of fall for its activation. For him the body represents a constituent element of the human being assisting him in the cultivation of the virtue of
free will in the pre-lapsarian state, since divine grace is by definition a prize of virtue and not
merely the gift of God (Or. 2.17).
203
when God creates man and places him in Paradise. But the heteronomy at the
same time steps back when in a body capable of suffering and in a Paradise
requiring work it reveals a lack of sufficiency of the current state of man, thus
creating a space for the activity of the human autonomy. Yet then it intervenes
again in the form of the prohibiting law seemingly constraining the autonomy,
but, in fact, instructing it for its full realization. So, in this complex dynamics
heteronomy intervenes into human life with the aims: 1) to bring about autonomy as such, 2) to prevent it from its self-destruction and lead towards growing
into maturity of habit.
To answer the fully justified question, how heteronomy of the divine intervention leads to human autonomy instead of its abolition, first we should
address another question: how Gregory understands the very nature of this
heteronomy in reference to Christs salvific activity. He expresses demand for
it in a striking way: We needed an Incarnate God, a God put to death that we
might live (deqjmen Qeo sarkomnou ka nekromenou); God crucified (Qev stauromenov) (Or. 45.28-9); God capable of suffering (Qev
paqtov) (Or. 30.1, 10). Then, he can find it logically quite tenable to assert
unity of the person of the Savior and at the same time the fullness of human
nature in him even more strongly than his Nicene predecessors had done.7 Such
a kenotic view on the divine activity in relation to the creation sheds light on
the logic of the above portrayed play of the divine activity intervening and at
the same time abstaining from intervention: the only acceptable divine heteronomy is self-sacrificing heteronomy for the sake of human autonomy.
So Gregory envisages the assumption of fallen human will by Christ as corresponding to the primordial state of human freedom. Moreover, the former
reveals at once the formation and the realization of the letter. Gregory offers a
universal Christological-soteriological formula: What [Christ] was he set
aside; what he was not he assumed (Or. 37.2). And in such a radical mode of
assumption of human nature he fully identifies himself with our lack of being
and hence with the will conditioned by the demand to fulfill this lack. Now
Christ can really have a will which desires to escape human suffering and death
which has become fully his own. Indeed, this is how Gregory portrays Christs
agony at the garden of Gethsemane (Or. 30.12) and his forsakenness by God
(Or. 30.5). He provides it with a broad theological reasoning which is worth to
be quoted at length:
As long then as I am disobedient and rebellious, both by denial of God and by my passions (pqesin), so long Christ also is called disobedient on my account. But when all
things shall be subdued unto Him on the one hand by acknowledgment of Him, and on
7
See Christopher A. Beeley, Cyril of Alexandria and Gregory Nazianzen: Tradition and
Complexity in Patristic Christology, JECS 17 (2009), 381-419, 393; Frederick Norris, Faith
Gives Fullness to Reasoning: The Five Theological Orations of Gregory of Nazianzen (Leiden,
1991), 181.
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Z. JASHI
the other by a reformation, then He Himself also will have fulfilled His submission,
bringing me whom He has saved to God. For this, according to my view, is the subjection of Christ: namely, the fulfilling of the Fathers Will. But as the Son subjects all to
the Father, so does the Father to the Son; the one by His Work, the other by His good
pleasure, as we have already said. And thus He Who subjects presents to God that
which he has subjected, making our condition His own. Of the same kind, it appears to
me, is the expression, My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me? It was not He
who was forsaken either by the Father, or by His own Godhead, as some have thought,
as if It were afraid of the Passion, and therefore withdrew Itself from Him in His Sufferings (for who compelled Him either to be born on earth at all, or to be lifted up on
the Cross?). But as I said, He was in His own Person representing us. For we were the
forsaken and despised before, but now by the Sufferings of Him who could not suffer,
we were taken up and saved. Similarly, He makes His own our folly and our transgressions (tn frosnjn mn ka t pljmmelv); and says what follows in the Psalm,
for it is very evident that the Twenty-first Psalm refers to Christ.
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STUDIA PATRISTICA
PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE SIXTEENTH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON PATRISTIC STUDIES
HELD IN OXFORD 2011
Edited by
MARKUS VINZENT
Volume 1
STUDIA PATRISTICA LIII
FORMER DIRECTORS
Gillian Clark, Bristol, UK
60 Years (1951-2011) of the International Conference on Patristic
Studies at Oxford: Key Figures An Introductory Note....................3
Elizabeth Livingstone, Oxford, UK
F.L. Cross..............................................................................................5
Frances Young, Birmingham, UK
Maurice Frank Wiles...........................................................................9
Catherine Rowett, University of East Anglia, UK
Christopher Stead (1913-2008): His Work on Patristics.....................17
Archbishop Rowan Williams, London, UK
Henry Chadwick...................................................................................31
Mark Edwards, Christ Church, Oxford, UK, and Markus Vinzent,
Kings College, London, UK
J.N.D. Kelly..........................................................................................43
ric Rebillard, Ithaca, NY, USA
William Hugh Clifford Frend (1916-2005): The Legacy of The
Donatist Church...................................................................................55
William E. Klingshirn, Washington, D.C., USA
Theology and History in the Thought of Robert Austin Markus.......73
Volume 2
STUDIA PATRISTICA LIV
BIBLICAL QUOTATIONS IN PATRISTIC TEXTS
(ed. Laurence Mellerin and Hugh A.G. Houghton)
Table of Contents
Volume 3
STUDIA PATRISTICA LV
EARLY MONASTICISM AND CLASSICAL PAIDEIA
(ed. Samuel Rubenson)
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Volume 12
STUDIA PATRISTICA LXIV
ASCETICA
Kate Wilkinson, Baltimore, USA
Gender Roles and Mental Reproduction among Virgins....................3
David Woods, Cork, Ireland
Rome, Gregoria, and Madaba: A Warning against Sexual Temptation.9
Alexis C. Torrance, Princeton, USA
The Angel and the Spirit of Repentance: Hermas and the Early
Monastic Concept of Metanoia............................................................15
Lois Farag, St Paul, MN, USA
Heroines not Penitents: Saints of Sex Slavery in the Apophthegmata
Patrum in Roman Law Context...........................................................21
Nienke Vos, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Seeing Hesychia: Appeals to the Imagination in the Apophthegmata
Patrum..................................................................................................33
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Volume 16
STUDIA PATRISTICA LXVIII
FROM THE FIFTH CENTURY ONWARDS (GREEK WRITERS)
Anna Lankina, Gainesville, Florida, USA
Reclaiming the Memory of the Christian Past: Philostorgius Mis
sionary Heroes......................................................................................3
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Volume 17
STUDIA PATRISTICA LXIX
LATIN WRITERS
Dennis Paul Quinn, Pomona, California, USA
In the Names of God and His Christ: Evil Daemons, Exorcism, and
Conversion in Firmicus Maternus........................................................3
Stanley P. Rosenberg, Oxford, UK
Nature and the Natural World in Ambroses Hexaemeron.................15
Brian Dunkle, S.J., South Bend, USA
Mystagogy and Creed in Ambroses Iam Surgit Hora Tertia.............25
Finbarr G. Clancy, S.J., Dublin, Ireland
The Eucharist in St Ambroses Commentaries on the Psalms............35
Jan den Boeft, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Qui cantat, vacuus est: Ambrose on singing......................................45
Crystal Lubinsky, University of Edinburgh, UK
Re-reading Masculinity in Christian Greco-Roman Culture through
Ambrose and the Female Transvestite Monk, Matrona of Perge........51
Maria E. Doerfler, Durham, USA
Keeping it in the Family: The law and the Law in Ambrose of Milans
Letters...................................................................................................67
Camille Gerzaguet, Lyon, France
Le De fuga saeculi dAmbroise de Milan et sa datation. Notes de
philologie et dhistoire..........................................................................75
Vincenzo Messana, Palermo, Italia
Fra Sicilia e Burdigala nel IV secolo: gli intellettuali Citario e Vit
torio (Ausonius, Prof. 13 e 22).............................................................85
Edmon L. Gallagher, Florence, Alabama, USA
Jeromes Prologus Galeatus and the OT Canon of North Africa.......99
Christine McCann, Northfield, VT, USA
Incentives to Virtue: Jeromes Use of Biblical Models.......................107
Christa Gray, Oxford, UK
The Monk and the Ridiculous: Comedy in Jeromes Vita Malchi......115
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Volume 18
STUDIA PATRISTICA LXX
ST AUGUSTINE AND HIS OPPONENTS
Kazuhiko Demura, Okayama, Japan
The Concept of Heart in Augustine of Hippo: Its Emergence and
Development.........................................................................................3
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