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By the same token, the petitioner should be given the same treatment
in the Philippines as we make available to our own citizens. We are obligated
to assure to nationals of countries of the Union an effective protection
against unfair competition in the same way that they are obligated to
similarly protect Filipino citizens and firms.
A review of the grounds invoked by Hemandas in his motion to quash
the search warrants reveals the fact that they are not appropriate for
quashing a warrant. They are matters of defense which should be ventilated
during the trial on the merits of the case. For instance, on the basis of the
facts before the Judge, we fail to understand how he could treat a bare
allegation that the respondents trademark is different from the petitioners
trademark as a sufficient basis to grant the motion to quash.
True, the lower court should be given the opportunity to correct its
errors, if there be any, but the rectification must, as earlier stated be based
on sound and valid grounds. In this case, there was no compelling
justification for the about face.
One may be declared an unfair competitor even if his competing
trademark is registered.
Superior Commercial Enterprises, Inc. v. Kunnan Enterprises, G.R.
No. 169974, April 20, 2010
Thus, we have previously held that the cancellation of registration of a
trademark has the effect of depriving the registrant of protection from
infringement from the moment judgment or order of cancellation has
become final.
In McDonalds Corporation v. L.C. Big Mak, Burger, Inc., we held that
there can be trademark infringement without unfair competition such as
when the infringer discloses on the labels containing the mark that he
manufactures the goods, thus preventing the public from being deceived
that the goods originate from the trademark owner.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc. 233 F. 3d 456 (2000)
Prozac vs. Herbrozac In assessing the likelihood of consumer
confusion, we generally consider seven factors: (1) the similarity between
the marks in appearance and suggestion, (2) the similarity of the products,
(3) the area and manner of concurrent use of the products, (4) the degree of
This court has already found that there is convincing evidence that the
parties did not reach any world-wide agreement on the concurrent use of
KOPPERS. It know finds there is insufficient evidence of record to support a
finding that plaintiff acquiesced in defendants use of KOPPERS in the United
States. The record is replete with references to plaintiffs prompt objection to
defendants proposed use of KOPPERS in the United States. While defendant
charges plaintiff with imaginative ambiguity, the record merely shows the
parties working hand in hand to fulfill their mutual expectations under their
various licensing agreements. Thus, this court finds defendants proffered
defenses of laches, acquiescence, and estoppels to be unsubstantiated by
the record.
Injunctive relief requires the moving party to show it will be irreparably
injured if the preliminary injunction is not granted. Oburn v. Shapp. A finding
of irreparable injury ordinarily follows when a likelihood of confusion or
possible risk to reputation appears. Tefal, S.A. v. Products.
Morgenstern Chemical Company v. G.D. Searle & Company 253 F. 2d 390
(1958)
Some facts: Both Micturin and Mictine are derived from or based upon
the same Latin root and are intended to suggest urination. They are,
however, prescribed for radically different conditions and for different uses
and desired effects. There was evidence that it was extremely unlikely that a
physician would prescribe or a pharmacist dispense the product of one of the
parties for the treatment of a condition for which the product of the other
was indicated.
Nonetheless, the court found obvious similarity in derivation,
suggestiveness, spelling, and sound in careless pronunciation between
Micturin and Mictine as applied to pills to be taken by mouth for therapheutic
purposes and stated that if the two names had been employed to designate
medicinal tablets designed for the alleviation or cure of the same or closely
related human ailments, it would have no difficulty in finding a confusing
similarity between them. However, since the pills are not designed for the
same ailments, the district court concluded that there was no confusing
similarity in the two names and that the plaintiffs trade-name was not
infringed. Accordingly, the court refused to enjoin the defendants use of the
trade-name Mictine.
registration and use of such identical mark for its edible oil which, like
soy sauce, also belonged to Class 47;
(b) in Philippine Refining Co., Inc. vs. Ng Sam and Director of Patents, 25 we
upheld the Patent Directors registration of the same trademark CAMIA
for Ng Sams ham under Class 47, despite Philippine Refining Companys
prior trademark registration and actual use of such mark on its lard,
butter, cooking oil (all of which belonged to Class 47), abrasive
detergents, polishing materials and soaps;
(c) in Hickok Manufacturing Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Santos Lim
Bun Liong, we dismissed Hickoks petition to cancel private respondents
HICKOK trademark registration for its Marikina shoes as against
petitioners earlier registration of the same trademark for handkerchiefs,
briefs, belts and wallets.
Falling under the same categories in the NCL is not the sole and
decisive factor in determining a possible violation of Kolin Electronics
intellectual property right should petitioners application be granted. It is
hornbook doctrine that emphasis should be on the similarity of the products
involved and not on the arbitrary classification or general description of their
properties or characteristics. The mere fact that one person has adopted and
used a trademark on his goods would not, without more, prevent the
adoption and use of the same trademark by others on unrelated articles of a
different kind.
A certificate of trademark registration confers upon the trademark
owner the exclusive right to sue those who have adopted a similar mark not
only in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate, but
also with those that are related thereto.
Issue: whether the products involved are related.
Mighty Corporation is authoritative. There, the Court held that the
goods should be tested against several factors before arriving at a sound
conclusion on the question of relatedness. Among these are:
a) The business (and its location) to which the goods belong;
b) The class of product to which the goods belong;
c) The products quality, quantity, or size, including the nature of the
package, wrapper or container;
d) The nature and cost of the articles;
e) The descriptive properties, physical attributes or essential
characteristics with reference to their form, composition, texture or
quality;
Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-29971, August 31,
1982
The then trademark law definition defines infringement as Implicit in
this definition is the concept that the goods must be so related that there is a
likelihood of confusion of goods or business. But likelihood of confusion is a
relative concept; to be determined only according to the particular, and
sometimes peculiar, circumstances of each case.
It is undisputed that the goods on which petitioner uses the trademark
ESSO, petroleum products, and the product of respondent, cigarettes, are
non-competing. But as to whether trademark infringement exists depends for
the most part upon whether or not the goods are so related that the public
may be, or is actually, deceived and misled that they came from the same
maker or manufacturer. For non-competing goods may be those which,
though they are not in actual competition, are so related to each other that it
might reasonably be assumed that they originate from one manufacturer.
Non-competing goods may also be those which, being entirely unrelated,
could not reasonably be assumed to have a common source. In the former
case of related goods, confusion of business could arise out of the use of
similar marks; in the latter case of non-related goods, it could not.
When a trademark is used by a party for a product in which the other
party does not deal, the use of the same trademark on the latters product
cannot be validly objected to.
Although petitioners products are so numerous, they are of the same
class or line of merchandise which are non-competing with respondents
product of cigarettes, which as pointed out in the appealed judgment is
beyond petitioners zone of potential or natural and logical expansion.
Another factor that shows that the goods involved are non-competitive
and non-related is the appellate courts finding that they flow through
different channels of trade, thus: The products of each party move along
and are disposed through different channels of distribution. The petitioners
products are distributed principally through gasoline service and lubrication
stations, automotive shops and hardware stores. On the other hand, the
cigarettes are sold in sari-sari stores, grocery stores, and other small
distributor outlets. Evidently, in kind and nature of the products of
respondent and of petitioner are poles apart.
jars. The manufacturers of these foodstuffs have equal right to use these
standard tins, bottles and jars for their products.
As pointed out by ABIs counsel, in supermarkets and tiendas, beer is
ordered by brand, and the customer surrenders his empty replacement
bottles or pays a deposit to guarantee the return of empties. If his empties
are SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN, he will get SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN as
replacement. In sari-sari stores, beer is also ordered from the tindera by
brand. The same is true in restaurants, pubs and beer gardens beer is
ordered from the waiters by brand.
Our ruling in Del Monte would not apply to beer which is not usually
picked from a store shelf but ordered by brand by the beer drinker himself
from the storekeeper or waiter in a pub or restaurant.
ABS-CBN Corporation vs. Gozon, G.R. No. 195956, March 11, 2015
The doctrine in Crespo v. Mogul was reiterated in Mayor Balindong v.
Court of Appeals where this court reminded the Department of Justice Secretary to
refrain from entertaining petitions for review when the case is already pending with
this court: In order to avoid a situation where the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the
Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition
for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information
has already been filed in the Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.
In Elma v. Jacobi, this court ruled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is proper when assailing adverse resolutions of the Department of
Justice stemming from the determination of probable cause. However, grave abuse
of discretion must be alleged.
To be clear, it is the event itself or the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz which is not
copyrightable because that is the newsworthy event. However, any footage created
from the event itself, in this case the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz, are intellectual
creations which are copyrightable. Thus, the footage created by ABS-CBN during the
arrival of Angelo dela Cruz, which includes the statements of Dindo Amparo, are
copyrightable and protected by the laws on copyright.
However, the Code does not state that expression of the news of the day,
particularly when it underwent a creative process, is not entitled to protection.
An idea or event must be distinguished from the expression of that idea or
event.
drawee, maker or issuer. Also, that the check was not intended to be deposited was
really of no consequence to her incurring criminal liability under B.P. 22.
Citing Dico v. Court of Appeals, a notice of dishonor received by the maker or
drawer of the check is thus indispensable before a conviction can ensue. The notice
of dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The notice must
be in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not suffice. The lack
of written notice is fatal for the prosecution.
Citing Lao v. Court of Appeals, it has been observed that the State, under this
statute, actually offers the violator a compromise by allowing him to perform some
act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the
action is abated. In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the
check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense. The
absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives and accused an opportunity to
preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins
that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to
demand and the basic postulate of fairness require that the notice of dishonor be
actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert
prosecution under B.P. 22.
The mere presentment of the two registry return receipts was not sufficient to
establish the fact that written notices of dishonor had been sent to or served on the
petitioner as the issuer of the check. Considering that the sending of the
written notices of dishonor had been done by registered mail, the registry
return receipts by themselves were not proof of the service on the
petitioner without being accompanied by the authenticating affidavit of
the person or persons who had actually mailed the written notices of
dishonor, or without the testimony in court of the mailer or mailers on the
fact of mailing. The authentication by affidavit of the mailer or mailers was
necessary in order for the giving of the notices of dishonor by registered mail to be
regarded as clear proof of the giving of the notices of dishonor to predicate the
existence of the second element of the offense. No less would fulfill the quantum of
proof beyond reasonable doubt, for, as the Court said in Ting v. Court of Appeals:
Aside from the above testimony, no other reference was made
to the demand letter by the prosecution. As can be noticed from the
above exchange, the prosecution alleged that the demand letter had
been sent by mail. To prove mailing, it presented a copy of the demand
letter as well as the registry return receipt. However, no attempt was
made to Id. at 594. Ting v. Court of Appeals, supra note 7, at p. 560.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 177438 show that the demand letter was indeed
sent through registered mail nor was the signature on the registry
return receipt authenticated or identified. It cannot even be gleaned
from the testimony of private complainant as to who sent the demand
letter and when the same was sent. In fact, the prosecution seems to
have presumed that the registry return receipt was proof enough that
the demand letter was sent through registered mail and that the same
was actually received by petitioners or their agents. As adverted to
earlier, it is necessary in cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, that the prosecution prove that the issuer had
received a notice of dishonor. It is a general rule that when
service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that the
notice was served must prove the fact of service (58 Am Jur 2d,
Notice, 45). The burden of proving notice rests upon the party
asserting its existence. Now, ordinarily, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases,
however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, for Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases,
there should be clear proof of notice. Moreover, it is a general rule
that, when service of a notice is sought to be made by mail, it should
appear that the conditions on which the validity of such service
depends had existence, otherwise the evidence is insufficient to
establish the fact of service (C.J.S., Notice, 18). In the instant case,
the prosecution did not present proof that the demand letter was sent
through registered mail, relying as it did only on the registry return
receipt. In civil cases, service made through registered mail is proved
by the registry receipt issued by the mailing office and an affidavit of
the person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 7 of Rule
13 (See Section 13, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). If, in
addition to the registry receipt, it is required in civil cases that
an affidavit of mailing as proof of service be presented, then
with more reason should we hold in criminal cases that a
registry receipt alone is insufficient as proof of mailing. In the
instant case, the prosecution failed to present the testimony, or at
least the affidavit, of the person mailing that, indeed, the demand
letter was sent. xxx Moreover, petitioners, during the pre-trial, denied
having received the demand letter (p. 135, Rollo). Given petitioners
denial of receipt of the demand letter, it behooved the prosecution to
present proof that the demand letter was indeed sent through
registered mail and that the same was received by petitioners. This,
the prosecution miserably failed to do. Instead, it merely presented the
demand letter and registry return receipt as if mere presentation of the
same was equivalent to proof that some sort of mail matter was
received by petitioners. Receipts for registered letters and return
receipts do not prove themselves; they must be properly
authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the
letters (Central Trust Co. v. City of Des Moines, 218 NW 580). Likewise,
for notice by mail, it must appear that the same was served on the
addressee or a duly authorized agent of the addressee. In fact, the
registry return receipt itself provides that [a] registered article must
not be delivered to anyone but the addressee, or upon the addressees
written order, in which case the authorized agent must write the
addressees name on the proper space and then affix legibly his own
signature below it. In the case at bar, no effort was made to show that
the demand letter was received by petitioners or their agent. All that
has heretofore been said, for establishing the presence of actual knowledge of
insufficiency of funds.
Bergonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189151, January 25, 2012
Citing Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division): Case law has
conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or order and an
interlocutory one on the basis of the disposition made. A judgment or order is
considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or
terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available
to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves
incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of
the case, the order is interlocutory and the aggrieved partys remedy is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
Here, the assailed Resolutions issued by the CA had considered the
petitioners appeal below as having been abandoned and, accordingly, dismissed.
Thus, the assailed Resolutions are in the nature of a final order as the same
completely disposed of the petitioners appeal with the CA. Thus, the remedy
available to the petitioners is to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
with this court and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
In a long line of cases, this Court has held that the CAs authority to dismiss
an appeal for failure to file the appellants brief is a matter of judicial discretion.
Thus, a dismissal based on this ground is neither mandatory nor ministerial; the
fundamentals of justice and fairness must be observed, bearing in mind the
background and web of circumstances surrounding the case.
Verily, the petitioners were only able to offer their bare assertion that they
and their counsel did not actually receive a copy of the January 30, 2009 Resolution
and that the person who apparently received the same was not in any way
connected with their counsel. There was no other credible evidence adduced by
petitioners which would persuade us to exculpate them from the effects of their
failure to file their brief.
Nonetheless, the petitioners cite a cacophony of cases decided by this Court
which, in essence, declared that dismissal of an appeal on purely technical ground is
frowned upon and that, as much as possible, appeals ought to be decided on the
merits in the interest of justice and equity.
The petitioners plea for the application of the principles of substantial justice
in their favor deserves scant consideration. The petitioners should be reminded that
technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the
deserving. While the petitioners adverted to several jurisprudential rulings of this
Court which set aside procedural rules, it is noted that there were underlying
considerations in those cases which warranted a disregard of procedural
technicalities to favor substantial justice. Here, there exists no such consideration.
Vitug v. Abuda, G.R. No. 201264, January 11, 2016
Parties who have validly executed a contract and have availed themselves of
its benefits may not, to escape their contractual obligations, invoke irregularities in
its execution to seek its invalidation.
Due process dictates that arguments not raised in the trial court may not be
considered by the reviewing court.
Llenado v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 193279, March 14, 2012
It is an established rule that the remedy of appeal through a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only
questions of law and not questions of fact (the actual receipt of the notice of
dishonor). The issue in the case at bar is clearly a question of fact that rightfully
belonged to the proper determination of the MeTC, the RTC and the CA.
Republic vs. Spouses Florencio de Castro, G.R. No. 189724, February 7, 2011
Section 1, Rule 47 of the 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
remedy of annulment of judgments or final orders/resolutions of a RTC in civil cases
can only be availed of where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.
A petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a remedy granted only
under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part has failed
to avail of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided by law. Such action
is never resorted to as a substitute for a partys own neglect in not promptly
availing of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies.
They could have promptly filed a motion to quash the writ of execution or in
the alternative, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1987 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Exodus International v. Biscocho, G.R. No. 166109, February 23, 2011
In illegal dismissal cases, it is incumbent upon the employees to first
establish the fact of their dismissal before the burden is shifted to the employer to
prove that the dismissal was legal.
As found by the Labor Arbiter, there was no evidence that respondents were
dismissed nor were they prevented from returning to their work. It was only
respondents unsubstantiated conclusion that they were dismissed. As a matter of
fact, respondents could not name the particular person who effected their dismissal
and under what particular circumstance.
In Machica v. Roosevelt Services Center, Inc. this Court sustained the
employers denial as against the employees categorical assertion of illegal
dismissal. In so ruling, this Court held that: The rule is that one who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it; thus, petitioners were burdened to prove their
allegation that respondents dismissed them from their employment. It must be
stressed that the evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive and convincing.
The rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds
no application here because the respondents deny having dismissed the petitioners.
It is the employer who has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment without any intention
of returning. It is therefore incumbent upon petitioners to ascertain the respondents
interest or non-interest in the continuance of their employment. However,
petitioners failed to do so.
In cases where there is no evidence of dismissal, the remedy is reinstatement
but without backwages.
People v. Balasa, G.R. Nos. 106357 and 1099601-02, September 3, 1998
It has been held that where one states that the future profits or income of an
enterprise shall be a certain sum, but he actually knows that there will be none, or
that they will be substantially less than he represents, the statement constitutes
actionable fraud where the hearer believes him and relies on the statement to his
injury.
What appellants offered the public was a Ponzi scheme, an investment
program that offers impossibly high returns and pays these returns to early
investors out of the capital contributed by later investors.
The fact that the buyer makes an independent investigation or inspection has
been held not to preclude him from relying on the representation made by the seller
where the seller has superior knowledge and the falsity of such representation
would not be apparent from such examination or inspection, and, a fortiori, where
the efforts of a buyer to learn the true profits or income of a business or property
are thwarted by some device of the seller, such efforts have been held not to
preclude a recovery.
Denials of an accused cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than
the positive declarations of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
Spouses Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159746, July 18, 2012
In Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., however, the Court has interpreted the
proscription against appealing the order denying a motion for reconsideration to
refer only to a motion for reconsideration filed against an interlocutory order, not to
a motion for reconsideration filed against a judgment or final order, to wit: The
denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is not
an interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts an end to the particular
matter resolved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, and nothing is
left for the trial court to do other than to execute the order. Not being an
interlocutory order, an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of
dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself.
Of the four, the one compelling test of compulsoriness is the logical relation
between the claim alleged in the complaint and that in the counterclaim. Such
relationship exists when conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the
parties would entail substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties and the
court; when the multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues; or when
the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the parties. If these
tests result in affirmative answers, the counterclaim is compulsory.
The four tests are affirmatively met as far as the Makati case was concerned.
The Makati case had the logical relation to the Manila case because both arose out
of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted to secure the
payment of petitioners credit purchases under the distributorship agreement with
Shell. Specifically, the right of Shell to demand the deficiency was predicated on the
validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure, such that there would not have been a
deficiency to be claimed in the Manila case had Shell not validly foreclosed the
mortgage. As earlier shown, Ramons cause of action for annulment of the
extrajudicial foreclosure was a true compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case.
Thus, the Makati RTC could not have missed the logical relation between the two
actions.
The identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity; otherwise, a
party may easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the
action or the relief sought. The test to determine whether the cause of action are
identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain the actions, or
whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the actions.
If the same facts or evidence will sustain the actions, then they are considered
identical, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.
Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 191215, February 3, 2014
In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc. we had occasion to settle the
seeming conflict on various jurisprudence touching upon the issue of whether the
period for filing a petition for certiorari may be extended. In said case we stated
that the general rule, as laid down in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
is that a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of
judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in
accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no
provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists,
unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule 65 which allowed the filing of such a motion
but only for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days. Under exceptional
cases, however, and as held in Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the
Sandiganbayan, the 60-day period may be extended subject to the courts sound
discretion. In Domdom, we stated that the deletion of the provisions in Rule 65
pertaining to extension of time did not make the filing of such pleading absolutely
prohibited. If such were the intention, the deleted portion could have simply been
reworded to state that no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted.
Absent such a prohibition, motions for extension are allowed subject to the courts
sound discretion.