REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

COURT OF APPEALS AND MAXIMO

WONG
G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992, SECOND
DIVISION, REGALADO, J.
While it is true that the statutory fiat under
Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must
nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the
surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather
than the object of adoption proceedings.
Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of
Maximo Alcala, Sr., and Segundina Y. Alcala.
When he was but two and a half years old and
then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister
Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they
were, with the consent of their natural parents and
by order of the court in Special Case No.
593] issued on September 9, 1967, adopted by
spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong,
both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now
deceased, was an insurance agent while
Concepcion Ty Wong was a high school teacher.
They decided to adopt the children as they
remained childless after fifteen years of marriage.
The couple showered their adopted children with
parental love and reared them as their own
children.
Upon reaching the age of twenty-two,
respondent, by then married and a junior
Engineering student at Notre Dame University,
Cotabato City, filed a petition to change his
name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. He averred that the
use of surname Wong embarrassed and isolated
him from his relatives and friends, as the same
suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in
fact he is aMuslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, and he wants to erase any implication
whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being
ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus
hampering his business and social life; and that his
adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to

revert to his former surname. RTC granted the

petition and CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
1) Are the reasons given by private
respondent in his petition for change
of name valid, sufficient and proper
to warrant the granting of said
petition? Yes
2) Will the change of name affect his
status as an adopted child? No
HELD:
It bears stressing at this point that to
justify a request for change of name, petitioner
must show not only some proper or compelling
reason therefor but also that he will be prejudiced
by the use of his true and official name.[24] Among
the grounds for change of name which have been
held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the
change will avoid confusion;[25] (d) Having
continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her
alien parentage;] (e) A sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all
in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody;[27] and (f) When the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.
In granting or denying petitions for
change of name, the question of proper and
reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of
the court. The evidence presented need only be
satisfactory to the court and not all the best
evidence available.[29] Summarizing, in special
proceedings for change of name, what is involved
is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance
of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the
sufficiency and propriety of the justifications

advanced in support thereof, mindful of the

consequent results in the event of its grant and
with the sole prerogative for making such
determination being lodged in the courts.
While it is true that the statutory fiat
under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect
that an adopted child shall bear the surname of
the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind
that the change of the surname of the adopted
child is more an incident rather than the object of
adoption proceedings.[30] The act of adoption fixes
a status, viz., that of parent and child. More
technically, it is an act by which relations of
paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally
existing between persons not so related by nature.
It has been defined as the taking into one's family
of the child of another as son or daughter and heir
and conferring on it a title to the rights and
privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption
proceeding is to effect this new status of
relationship between the child and its adoptive
parents, the change of name which frequently
accompanies adoption being more an incident
than the object of the proceeding.[31] The welfare
of the child is the primary consideration in the
determination of an application for adoption. On
this point, there is unanimous agreement.]
It is the usual effect of a decree of
adoption to transfer from the natural parents to
the adoptive parents the custody of the child's
person, the duty of obedience owing by the child,
and all other legal consequences and incidents of
the natural relation, in the same manner as if the
child had been born of such adoptive parents in
lawful wedlock, subject, however, to such
limitations and restrictions as may be by statute
imposed.[33] More specifically under the present
state of our law, the Family Code, superseding the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and of the
Child and Youth Welfare Code on the
matter,[34] relevantly provides in this wise with
regard to the issue involved in this case:

"Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following

effects:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be
deemed to be the legitimate child of the adopters
and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including the right of the adopted to use
the surname of the adopters;" (Emphasis
supplied.)
xxx
A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed
under our law only by way of exception to the
mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the use
of surname. The law fixes the surname that may
be used by a person, at least inceptively, and it
may be changed only upon judicial permission
granted in the exercise of sound discretion.
Section 1 of Rule 103, in specifying the parties
who may avail of said remedy, uses the generic
term "persons" to signify all natural persons
regardless of status. If a legitimate person may,
under certain judicially accepted exceptional
circumstances, petition the court for a change
of name, we do not see any legal basis or logic
in discriminating against the availment of
such a remedy by an adopted child. In other
words, Article 365 is not an exception, much
less can it bar resort, to Rule 103.
"Rule 103 of the Rules of Court has its primordial
purpose which (State) is to give a person an
opportunity to improve his personality and
provide his best interest (Calderon vs. Republic,
19 SCRA 721). In the instant case, the court a quo
found the petition of Maximo Wong for change
of name justifiable after due hearing, thus its
factual findings and appreciation of testimonies
count heavily and need not be disturbed unless for
strong and cogent reasons because the trial court
is in a better position to examine real evidence as
well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying in the case (Baliwag Transit, Inc.
vs. CA, 147 SCRA 82). Moreover, the trial court
could take judicial notice of other existing factors

in the community where herein respondent which

it considers material in its judicious determination
of the case. x x x.
"Additionally, herein respondent is already of age
and as such he can decide what is best for him.
His experience with regards (sic) his social and
business dealings is personal and it is only him
(sic) who can attest to the same. Finding his
predicament's proper remedy is solely through
legal process, herein respondent accordingly filed
a petition pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court which was granted by the Court a quo."
It is not fair to construe the desired
reversion of private respondent to the use of the
name of his parents by nature as crass ingratitude.
To go by the Solicitor General's suggestion that
private respondent should have his adoption
revoked if he wants to use the surname of his
natural father would be to exact too dear a toll for
making use of an appropriate and valid remedy
available under the law.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

HON. ZENAIDA ELEPANO & CORAZON
PUNSALAN
G.R. No. 92542, October 15, 1991, SECOND
DIVISION (Paras, J.)
Key Doctrine: In an adoption case which involves the
status of a person, there is no particular defendant to speak
of since the action is one in rem. Jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is a non-essential condition for the taking
of a deposition.
Corazon Punsalan filed a verified petition
for adoption praying that after due notice and
hearing, Pinky Punsalan, the daughter of her full
blood brother, and Ellyn Mae Urbano, the
daughter of her full blood sister, be declared her
daughters by adoption. Corazon filed a motion for
taking deposition on the ground that she received
an urgent call from the United Nations requiring

her to report for work so she will not be able to

testify at the hearing of her petition yet to be
scheduled. Judge Elepano granted the motion and
ordered that notice of the taking of the deposition
be furnished to the OSG (the only known
oppositor). The judge issued an order setting the
hearing for the petition for adoption and directed
the publication of the said order. A copy of said
order as well as a copy of the said petition for
adoption was likewise sent to the OSG. Corazon's
deposition was taken. Despite notice, no
representative from the OSG appeared to oppose
the taking of the deposition. The OSG filed an
opposition to the deposition averring that Section
1 of Rule 24 of the Rules of Court allows
deposition by leave of court after jurisdiction has
been obtained over any defendant or property
subject of the action. Since the jurisdictional
requirement of publication has not been complied
with, the OSG contends that the court has no
jurisdiction over the defendant but the judge
denied the opposition. After the notice of the
hearing had been duly published, the counsel for
Corazon presented evidence. Despite notice, the
OSG failed to appear in the said hearing and all
other hearings. The judge granted the petition.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of
the decision but the judge denied.
ISSUES:
Are depositions not allowed in adoption
proceedings until publication has been complied
with?
HELD:
No. The rule cited by the OSG is
inapplicable. While it is true that in an action in
personam, personal service of summons within the
forum or voluntary appearance in the case is
essential for the court to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, in an adoption case
which involves the status of a person, there is no
particular defendant to speak of since the action is
one in rem. In such case, jurisdiction over the

person of the defendant is a non-essential

condition for the taking of a deposition for the
jurisdiction of the court is based on its power over
the res, to render judgment with respect to such
"thing" (or status, as in this case) so as to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an
objection against the right so established.
Publication of the scheduled hearing for
the petition for adoption is necessary for the
validity of a decree of adoption but not for the
purpose merely of taking a deposition. In taking a
deposition, no substantial rights are affected since
depositions may or may not be presented or may
even be objected to when formally offered as
evidence at the trial of the main case later on. Due
to urgent and compelling reasons beyond her
control, Corazon could not be present to testify at
the trial of the main case for adoption. The OSG,
was notified of the scheduled taking of the
deposition, as well as of all the hearings of the
petition for adoption, but the OSG chose not to
attend ALL the said hearings, without explanation.
Finally, the philosophy behind adoption statutes is
to promote the welfare of the child and every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote that objective. The record shows that
Corazon's adoption of the minors shall redound
to the best interests of the latter.

HERBERT CANG v. COURT OF APPEALS

and SPOUSES RONALD CLAVANO and
MARIA CLARA CLAVANO
G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998, Romero,
J.
The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable
for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the
requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the
parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is
insane or hopelessly intemperate.
FACTS.
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie
Clavano, who were married on January 27, 1973,

begot three children, namely: Keith, Charmaine,

and Joseph Anthony. During the early years of
their marriage, Cang couples relationship was
undisturbed until Anna Maria learned of her
husbands alleged extramarital affairs with Wilma
Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos. Thereafter,
Anna Maria filed a petition for legal separation
with alimony pendente lite with the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Cebu which
rendered a decision approving the joint
manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that
they agreed to live separately and apart or from
bed and board. They further agreed that the
children shall be entitled to a monthly support of
P1,000 and that Anna Maria shall be entitled to
enter into any contract or agreement with another
without the written consent of her husband or any
undertaking or acts that ordinarily requires
husbands consent. Petitioner then left for the
United States where he sought a divorce from
Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District
Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued
the divorce decree that also granted sole custody
of the three minor children to Anna Marie,
reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times
and places to petitioner.
Meanwhile, private respondent spouses
Ronald Clavano and Maria Clara Clavano,
respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna
Maria filed a Special Proceeding for the adoption
of the three minor Cang children. The petition
bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith
signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie
likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that
her husband had evaded his legal obligation to
support his children; that her brothers and sisters
including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping
her in taking care of the children; that because she
would be going to the United States to attend to a
family business, leaving the children would be a
problem and would naturally hamper (her) jobseeking venture abroad; and that her husband had
long forfeited his parental rights over the children
for the following reasons:

1. The decision in the Civil Case No.

JD-707 allowed her to enter into any
contract without her husbands
written consent;
2. Her husband had left the Philippines
to be an illegal alien in the US; and
3. Her husband had divorced her.
Upon learning of the petition for
adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto,
alleging that, although private respondents Ronald
and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable
of supporting the children while his finances were
too meager compared to theirs, he could not in
conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his
parental authority over his beloved children.
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption,
petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his
children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred
to the United States thereby leaving custody of
their children to private respondents.
RTC of Cebu City Branch 19 rendered an
order finding that Anna Maria had, in effect,
relinquished custody over her children and
therefore such custody should be transferred to
the father. The RTC of Cebu City Branch 14
issued a decree of adoption, taking into
consideration among others the fact that the Cang
children had since birth developed close filial ties
with the respondents and that they had substantial
assets and income to support the children. The
RTC also quoted with approval the evaluation and
recommendation of the RTC Social Worker in her
Child Study Support that abandonment of a child
by its (sic) parent is commonly specified by statute
as a ground for dispensing with his consent to its
(sic) adoption. The CA affirmed the decree of
adoption.

ISSUE.
Can minor children be legally adopted without the
written consent of a natural parent on the ground
that the latter has abandoned them?
HELD.
YES. Article 188(2) of the Family Code
provides that the written consent of the parents by
nature of the child x x x shall be necessary.
Notably, such requirement is also embodied in
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. The written
consent of the natural parent is indispensable for
the
validity
of
the
decree
of
adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of
written consent can be dispensed with if the
parent has abandoned the child or that such
parent is insane or hopelessly intemperate. The
court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even
without the written consent of the parents or one
of the parents provided that the petition for
adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant
exemption from compliance therewith. This is in
consonance with the liberality with which this
Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
In the instant case, records disclose that
petitioners conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims over his children as
to constitute abandonment.
Physical
estrangement alone, without financial and
moral desertion, is not tantamount to
abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was
physically absent as he was then in the United
States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal
obligations of love, care and support for his
children. He maintained regular communication
with his wife and children through letters and
telephone. He used to send packages by mail and
catered to their whims.
The liberality with which this Court treats matters
leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the

beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights

and privileges of the adopted child arising
therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount
consideration is the overall benefit and interest of
the adopted child, should be understood in its
proper context and perspective. The Courts
position should not be misconstrued or
misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond
the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. The
discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not
to be anchored solely on best interests of the child
but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights
of the parents over the child.
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna
Marie by virtue of the decree of legal separation
did not, of necessity, deprive petitioner of parental
authority for the purpose of placing the children
up for adoption.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE R.
HERNANDEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 158, PASIG CITY AND
SPOUSES VAN MUNSON Y NAVARRO
AND REGINA MUNSON YANDRADE,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 117209, February 09, 1996, SECOND
DIVISION, Regalado, J.

Key Doctrine: The change of the surname of

the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to
follow that of the adopter does not lawfully
extend to or include the proper or given name.
*NB this case was decided prior to AM 02-602 SC
Facts
On March 10, 1994, respondent spouses,
filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl
Bartolome Moran, alleging the jurisdictional facts
required by Rule 99 of the ROC. In the very same
petition, respondent spouses also prayed for the
change of the first name of said minor adoptee to

Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with

which he was baptized in keeping with religious
tradition, and by which he has been called by his
adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6,
1993 when he arrived at private respondents
residence.
Petitioner opposed the petition for
change of name on the ground that these petitions
should be conducted and pursued as two separate
proceedings. The trial court ruled in favor of
respondent spouses.
Petitioner argues that a petition for
adoption and a petition for change of name are
two special proceedings which, in substance and
purpose, are different from and are not related to
each other, being respectively governed by distinct
sets of law and rules. On the other hand,
respondent spouses predicated their basis on Sec.
5 Rule 2 of the ROC allowing permissive joinder
of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity
of suits and argues that under the rules, there is
not prohibition against a joinder for adoption and
a change of name.
Issue
Is the lower court erroneous for granting
the prayer for change of name? Is there a lawful
ground for the change of name?
Ruling
No, though the law allows the adoptee, as
a matter of right and obligation, to bear the
surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the
decree of adoption. It is the change of the
adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter
which is the natural and necessary consequence of
a grant of adoption and must specifically be
contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if
not prayed for by petitioner.However, the given or
proper name, also known as the first or Christian
name, of the adoptee must remain as it was
originally registered in the civil register. The
creation of an adoptive relationship does not
confer upon the adopter a license to change the
adoptees registered Christian or first name. The

automatic change thereof, premised solely upon

the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview
of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere
incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption
proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively
inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case,
cannot properly be granted.
Changing the given or proper name of a
person as recorded in the civil register is a
substantial change in ones official or legal name
and cannot be authorized without a judicial order.
The purpose of the statutory procedure
authorizing a change of name is simply to have,
wherever possible, a record of the change, and in
keeping with the object of the statute, a court to
which the application is made should normally
make its decree recording such change.
The official name of a person whose birth
is registered in the civil register is the name
appearing therein, If a change in ones name is
desired, this can only be done by filing
and strictly complying with the substantive and
procedural requirements for a special proceeding
for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or
grounds therefor can be threshed out and
accordingly determined.
A petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the
requirements therefor is indispensable in order to
vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication.
It is an independent and discrete special
proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own
set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by
means of any other proceeding.
ANA JOYCE S. REYES v. JUDGE CESAR
M. SOTERO, et al.
G.R. No. 167405, 16 February 2006, FIRST
DIVISION, (Ynares-Santiago, J.)
It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a
public document required by law to be entered into the
public records, the official repository of which, as well as all

other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of

individuals, is the local civil registrars office as well as the
court which rendered the judgment.
Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration and
settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising before
the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, where it was docketed
as Spec. Proc. No. 204. Chichioco claimed that
she was the niece and heir of Lising who died
intestate on July 31, 1998. The deceased left real
properties located in the municipalities of Ramos
and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted pieces of
jewelry and money which were allegedly in the
possession of Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of
the deceased. Chichioco prayed that she be
appointed administrator of the estate, upon
payment of a bond, pending settlement and
distribution of Lisings properties to the legal
heirs.
Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming
that she was an adopted child of Lising and the
latters husband, Serafin Delos Santos, who died
on November 30, 1970. She asserted that the
petition should be dismissed and that the
appointment of an administrator was unnecessary,
since she was the only heir of Lising who passed
away without leaving any debts. Reyes attachedthe
Certification issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac stating that on page
76, Book No. 01 of the Register of Court Decrees,
Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin
Delos Santos pursuant to a decision rendered in
Spec. Proc. No. 1410 by Judge Julian Lustre of the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac. Reyes also
submitted a Certification issued by the Clerk of
Court of the RTC-Tarlac City, stating that a
judgment was rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410
on December 21, 1968 decreeing Reyess adoption
by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos. She also
presented a copy of Judicial Form No.
43 indicating that the adoption decree was on file
in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City.
Reyes likewise submitted a Decree of Final
Distribution issued by the Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that, upon the
death of Serafin Delos Santos, death benefits were
paid to his widow, Elena Lising, and his
"daughter", Ana Joyce Delos Santos, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of law.

Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before the

Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the
adoption decree docketed as SP No. 53457. They
claimed that no proceedings for the adoption of
Reyes took place in 1968 since the Provincial
Prosecutor of Tarlac and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) had no records of the
adoption case. The CA dismissed SP No. 53457
for failure to comply with the third paragraph of
Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
Chichioco, et al. filed a Comment to the
opposition stating that reasonable doubts have
been cast on Reyess claim that she was legally
adopted due allegedly to certain "badges of fraud."
The CA rendered judgment nullifying the
resolutions of the trial court. It held that the
presiding judge, Judge Cesar M. Sotero, gravely
abused his discretion in appointing his branch
clerk of court as special administrator. Citing
Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez, the CA reasoned that such
act could engender a suspicion that Judge Sotero
and his clerk are in cahoots in milking the
decedents estate. Moreover, Atty. Saguyod failed
to comply with the requirements of a bond and
inventory and could not therefore take control
and possession of any of the decedents
properties.
ISSUE:
Is the CA correct in holding that Reyes had to
prove the validity of her adoption due to
imputations of irregularities in view of section 47
of rule 39?
RULING:
NO. The Court agrees with Reyes that she need
not prove her legal adoption by any evidence
other than those which she had already presented
before the trial court. To recall, Reyes submitted a
certification from the local civil registrars office
that the adoption decree was registered therein
and also a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 and a
certification issued by the clerk of court that the
decree was on file in the General Docket of the
RTC-Tarlac City. Both certifications were issued
under the seal of the issuing offices and were
signed by the proper officers. These are thus
presumed to have been regularly issued as part of
the official duties that said public officers
perform.

Documents consisting of entries in public records

made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. As such, the certifications issued by
the local civil registrar and the clerk of court
regarding details of Reyess adoption which are
entered in the records kept under their official
custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein. These certifications suffice as
proof of the fact of Reyess adoption by the Delos
Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by
sufficient evidence. Mere "imputations of
irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of doubt" on
the adoption decree since the certifications and its
contents are presumed valid until proof to the
contrary is offered.
In this regard, it must be pointed out that such
contrary proof can be presented only in a separate
action brought principally for the purpose of
nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot
be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the
settlement of a decedents estate, as categorically
held in Santos v. Aranzanso. Accordingly,
Chichioco, et al. cannot assail in these proceedings
the validity of the adoption decree in order to
defeat Reyess claim that she is the sole heir of the
decedent. Absent a categorical pronouncement in
an appropriate proceeding that the decree of
adoption is void, the certifications regarding the
matter, as well as the facts stated therein, should
be deemed legitimate, genuine and real. Reyess
status as an adopted child of the decedent remains
unrebutted and no serious challenge has been
brought against her standing as such. Therefore,
for as long as Reyess adoption is considered valid,
Chichioco, et al. cannot claim any interest in the
decedents estate. For this reason, the Court agrees
with Reyes that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be
dismissed.

LANDINGIN v. REPUBLIC (2006)

G.R. No. 164948 | 2006-06-27
KEY DOCTRINES/TOPICS:
Adoption Statutes are Liberally Construed for the
Benefit of the Child; Persons Whose Written
Consent are Needed to the Adoption; Purpose for
the Indispensable Requirement of Consent and

Notice to the Natural Parents; The Petitioner

Should Have Adduced the Written Consent of the
Legal Guardian; Abandonment Should Evince a
Settled Purpose to Forego all Parental Duties;
When Amelia Left for Italy, She Did Not Intend
to Abandon her Children; The Affidavit of
Consent of Petitioners Presented are Inadmissible
as Evidence; The Financial Capacity of the
Prospective Parents Should be Carefully
Evaluated.
FACTS:
Petitioner Diwata Landingin was an
American citizen of Filipino parentage. She filed a
petition for the adoption of 3 minors, who were
all the natural children of Manuel Ramos, Diwatas
brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her
petition that when her brother died, the children
were left to their paternal grandmother because
Amelia, their biological mother went to Italy, remarried there and had 2 children by her second
marriage and no longer communicated from the
time she left up to the institution of the adoption.
After the paternal grandmother passed away, the
minors were being supported by the petitioner.
Her children abroad gave their written consent for
their adoption.
A Social Worker of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development submitted a
Report recommending for the adoption and narrated
that Amelia had been consulted with the adoption
plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption
to her children, she voluntarily consented.
Petitioner failed to present the social
worker as witness and offer in evidence the
voluntary consent of Amelia to the adoption.
Petitioner also failed to present any documentary
evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the
adoption. Despite such, the trial court granted the
petition. When the Republic appealed before the
Court of Appeals, the appellate court reversed the
assailed decision.

ISSUES & RULINGS:

A. Adoption Statutes are Liberally Construed
for the Benefit of the Child
1. It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to
the liberal concept that adoption statutes, being
humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare
of the child to be of paramount consideration and
are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned
children and give them the protection of society
and family in the person of the adopter as well as
to allow childless couples or persons to experience
the joys of parenthood and give them legally a
child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts.
2. Every reasonable intendment should thus be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.
B. Persons Whose Written Consent are
Needed to the Adoption
3. The written consent of the following to the
adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known,
or the legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality which has legal custody of the
child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten
(10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and
adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years
of age or over, of the adopter, if living with said
adopter and the latter's spouse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be
adopted.

C.
Purpose
for
the
Indispensable
Requirement of Consent and Notice to the
Natural Parents
4. The general requirement of consent and notice
to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the
child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
5. The written consent of the biological parents is
indispensable for the validity of a decree of
adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to
his child requires that his consent must be
obtained before his parental rights and duties may be
terminated and re-established in adoptive parents.
D. The Petitioner Should Have Adduced the
Written Consent of the Legal Guardian
6. When Landingin filed her petition with the trial
court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect.
Section 9 thereof provides that if the written
consent of the biological parents cannot be
obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian
of the minors will suffice.
7. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological
mother of the minors had indeed abandoned
them, she should, thus have adduced the written
consent of their legal guardian.

10. Merely permitting the child to remain for a

time undisturbed in the care of others is not such
an abandonment. To dispense with the
requirement of consent, the abandonment must
be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
F. When Amelia Left for Italy, She Did Not
Intend to Abandon her Children
11. When Amelia left for Italy, she had not
intended to abandon her children, or to
permanently sever their mother-child relationship.
She was merely impelled to leave the country by
financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she
did not surrender or relinquish entirely her
motherly obligations of rearing the children to her
mother-in-law.
12. The adoption of the minors will have the
effect of severing all legal ties between the
biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and
that the same shall then be vested on the adopter.
13. It would thus be against the spirit of the law if
financial consideration were to be the paramount
consideration in deciding whether to deprive a
person of parental authority over his/her children.
G. The Affidavit of Consent of Petitioners
Presented are Inadmissible as Evidence

E. Abandonment Should Evince a Settled

Purpose to Forego all Parental Duties

14. Petitioner failed to offer in evidence the

DSWD Report and of the Joint Affidavit of
Consent purportedly executed by her children; the
authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove.

8. Abandonment by a parent to justify the

adoption of his child without his consent, is a
conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego
all parental duties.

15. the Rules of Court in the same way as a

document notarized in this country, it needs to
comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103, which
was not done by the petitioner.

9. The term means neglect and refusal to perform

the filial and legal obligations of love and support.
If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity
to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and
maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the
child.

16. As the alleged written consent of petitioner's

legitimate children did not comply with the law,
the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a
private document whose authenticity must be
proved either by anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or by evidence of the

genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the

makers.
17. No further proof was introduced by petitioner
to authenticate the written consent of her
legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in
evidence.
H. The Financial Capacity of the Prospective
Parents Should be Carefully Evaluated
18. Since the primary consideration in adoption is
the best interest of the child, it follows that the
financial capacity of prospective parents should
also be carefully evaluated and considered.
Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to
support the would-be adopted child or children, in
keeping with the means of the family.
19. Given the facts of the case, it is indeed
doubtful whether petitioner will be able to
sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing
the three children in the United States. She only
has a part-time job, and she is rather of age.
From: MyLegalWhiz (edited for the digest pool)