CANON 6

1. GENERAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY

(GBTC); WORLDWIDE INSURANCE AND
SURETY COMPANY (WORLDWIDE); MIDLAND
INSURANCE CORPORATION (MIDLAND); AND
STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC.
(STANDARD) v. THE OMBUDSMAN; OMB-GIO
RAUL E. TOTANES AND ASSISTANT
SOLICITOR GENERAL MAGDANGAL M. DE
LEON
G.R. No. 125440, January 31, 2000, THIRD
DIVISION, (GONZAGA-REYES, J.)
To be liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the five
aforementioned elements must concur. In the absence of proof that
respondent ASG de Leon acted with manifest partiality in pursuing
the official stand of the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R.
CV No. 39939, respondent ASG de Leon cannot be liable under
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Thus, the failure of petitioners to prove
the fifth element is fatal to their cause.
General Bank and Trust Company (GBTC),
Worldwide Insurance and Surety Company (Worldwide),
Midland Insurance Corporation (Midland) and Standard
Insurance Co., Inc. (Standard) filed a complaint against
respondent ASG de Leon for violating Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
What prompted petitioners to file a complaint against
respondent ASG de Leon with the Ombudsman is the
alleged "inconsistent position" of said respondent in Spec.
Proc. No. 107812 and in Civil Case No. 0005 filed with
Sandiganbayan.
Civil Case No. 0005 is an ill-gotten wealth case
filed by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) through the OSG on July 17, 1987.
This case was instituted against Lucio Tan, former
President Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, et. al.
Petitioners point out that in Civil Case No. 0005,
the first of the causes of actions therein as stated in Par. 14
(a)-(1) to (3) alleges that:
(A)The Marcos-dominated Central Bank Closure of GBTC
under MB Resolution, March 25, 1977 ;
(B) The LUCIO TAN'S (sic) takeover of GBTC under MB
Resolution, March 29, 1977 ;
are illegal, fraudulent and arbitrary, made thru conspiracy
with and taking advantage of the close relationship
between the LUCIO TAN Group and the deposed
President and Wife, other CB officials, with the help and
manipulation of then CB Governor Gregorio S. Licaros
and former PNB President Panfilo O. Domingo xxx.
The charge that respondent ASG de Leon
espoused conflicting interests rests on the contention of
petitioners that said respondent's act of defending the
legality of the Central Bank closure of GBTC amounts to
defending the interest of Lucio Tan and the Central Bank.
Petitioners maintain that the position taken by the OSG

represented by respondent ASG de Leon in Spec. Proc.

No. 107812 is "against the 'interest of the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines' ". Petitioners wrote
respondent ASG de Leon that he inhibit himself from
appearing in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 and to defend the
interest of the Government of the Philippines as against
the interest of Lucio Tan in Civil Case No. 0005. When
respondent ASG de Leon for OSG continued to represent
the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No. 107812, petitioners
then filed the complaint against respondent with the
Office of the Ombudsman. On investigation of the
Ombudsman, it was dismissed. The Motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
ISSUE:
Is ASG De Leon liable for violating RA 3019 for
representing conflicting interest?
RULING:
No
We affirm the finding that respondent ASG de
Leon cannot be held criminally liable for violating Section
3 (e) of RA 3019. In defending the Central Bank,
respondent was performing his legal duty to defend the
interest of the Government and was merely pursuing the
position taken by it. Whatever legal services respondent
ASG de Leon rendered in favor of the Central Bank in
Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 were
made in his official capacity as a member of the legal staff
of the OSG. We note that in all of the pleadings filed by
the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No.
39939, the signature of respondent ASG de Leon appeared
therein as Solicitor and later on as Assistant Solicitor
General. However, it must be noted that these pleadings
also bore the signatures of the Solicitor General and other
members of the legal staff of the Office of the Solicitor
General.
Hence, the acts of respondent ASG de Leon had
the imprimatur of the OSG which had consistently
defended the interest of the Central Bank in Spec. Proc.
No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939. Four Solicitor
Generals, Estelito Mendoza, Sedfrey Ordoez, Frank
Chavez and Raul I. Goco have maintained the policy of
defending the closure of GBTC by the Central Bank and
respondent ASG de Leon merely acted with the other
officials of the OSG in representing the State.
To be liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the
five aforementioned elements must concur. In the absence
of proof that respondent ASG de Leon acted with
manifest partiality in pursuing the official stand of the
OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939,
respondent ASG de Leon cannot be liable under Section 3
(e) of RA 3019. Thus, the failure of petitioners to prove
the fifth element is fatal to their cause.
2. LORENZO JOSE v. CA AND THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-38581, March 31, 1976, FIRST DIVISION

(Muoz-Palma, J.)
Key Doctrine: A prosecuting officer, as the representative of a
sovereignty whose obligation and interest in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done, has the
solemn responsibility to assure the public that while guilt shall not
escape, innocence shall not suffer.
Jose was arrested by the local police leading to the
filing of several criminal cases against him to wit: illegal
discharge of firearm, robbery and illegal possession of
explosives. These 3 cases were jointly tried after which
Hon. Honorio Romero acquitted accused Lorenzo Jose of
illegal discharge of firearm and robbery, but convicted him
for illegal possession of the handgrenade that was found
on his person at the time of his arrest. Jose appealed and 9
days thereafter he filed a motion praying that the case be
reopened to permit him to present, pursuant to a
reservation he had made in the course of the trial, a permit
to possess the handgrenade in question. The trial court
denied the motion mainly on the ground that it had lost
jurisdiction over the case in view of the perfection of the
appeal. The records were then elevated to the CA where
Jose raised the issues of (1) an erroneous conviction for
illegal possession of explosives when there was no proof
of an essential element of the crime, and (2) erroneous
denial of his motion to reopen the case for the reception
of his permit to possess the handgrenade. Jose prayed for
his acquittal or in the alternative for the remand of the case
back to the trial court for a new trial. The CA affirmed the
conviction and declaring that no reversible error was
committed by the latter when it denied the reopening of
the case as the court had lost its "power to change, modify,
or alter its decision. A motion for reconsideration was filed
by Jose to review the ruling of CA. The Solicitor General
opposed the granting of the foregoing motion for
reconsideration claiming that there was neither a denial of
"substantial justice nor error of any sort on the part of
respondent Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment of
conviction," and that it being admitted by petitioner that
the evidence sought to be introduced by him at the new
trial is not newly discovered evidence, the denial of the
new trial "visibly appears as correct".
A manifestation was submitted by the Solicitor
General informing the Court that in view of the
"persistence of Jose both before this Honorable Court and
CA as to his alleged existing appointment as PC Agent
and/or authority to possess handgrenade," in the interest
of justice, he was constrained to make pertinent inquiries
from the PC Chief, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos who in reply sent

his letter stating that Jose was appointed as a PC Agent of

the Pampanga Constabulary Command with Code
Number P-36-68 and Code Name "Safari" with expiration
on December 31, 1968, the pertinent portion of which We
quote: "This Headquarters will, from time to time, provide
you firearms and such other equipment which it may deem
necessary for your personal protection on the need basis
which will be covered by separate written authority."
ISSUE:
May the case of Jose be reopened given the
circumstance that he was appointed as a constabulary?
HELD:
YES. At the outset, We give due credit to the
Solicitor General and his staff for upholding the timehonored principle set forth in perspicuous terms by this
Court in Suarez vs. Platon, et al., that a prosecuting
officer, as the representative of a sovereignty whose
obligation and interest in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be
done, has the solemn responsibility to assure the
public that while guilt shall not escape, innocence
shall not suffer. The Solicitor General now concedes
that the interests of justice will best be served by
remanding this case to the court of origin for a new
trial.
We do not question the correctness of the
findings of the Court of Appeals that the evidence sought
to be presented by Jose do not fall under the category of
newly-discovered evidence because the same his alleged
appointment as an agent of the Philippine Constabulary
and a permit to possess a handgrenade were supposed to
be known to petitioner and existing at the time of trial and
not discovered only thereafter.
Surely, the Rules of Court were conceived and
promulgated to aid and not to obstruct the proper
administration of justice, to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hands
that dispense justice, for otherwise, courts will be mere
slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion.
Thus Jose was facing a criminal prosecution for
illegal possession of a handgrenade in the court below. He
claimed to be an agent of the Philippine Constabulary with
a permit to possess explosives such as the handgrenade in
question. However, he found himself in a situation where
he had to make a choice reveal his identity as an
undercover agent of the Philippine Constabulary assigned
to perform intelligence work on subversive activities and

face possible reprisals or even liquidation at the hands of

the dissidents considering that Floridablanca, the site of
the incident, was in the heart of "Huklandia", or ride on
the hope of a possible exoneration or acquittal based on
insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution. Without
revealing his identity as an agent of the Philippine
Constabulary, he claimed before the trial judge that he had
a permit to possess the handgrenade and prayed for time
to present the same. The permit however could not be
produced because it would reveal his intelligence work
activities. Came the judgment of conviction and with it the
staggering impact of a five-year imprisonment. The
competent authorities then realized that it was unjust for
this man to go to jail for a crime he had not committed,
hence, came the desired evidence concerning petitioner's
appointment as a Philippine Constabulary agent and his
authority to possess a handgrenade for the protection of
his person, but, it was too late according to the trial court
because in the meantime the accused had perfected his
appeal.
CANON 7
1. ATTY. AILEEN R. MAGLANA v. ATTY. JOSE
VICENTE R. OPINION
B.M. No. 2713, 10 June 2013, Brion, J.

considering that he also ran for Governor and lost in the

immediately preceding term. Atty. Opinion stated that he
received an opinion dated April 2, 2013 from Governor
Vicente M. Joyas, Chairman of the IBP Executive
Committee, pertinently stating that his having lost the
Governorship elections for Eastern Visayas in 2011 does
not disqualify his Chapter from seeking an election for
Governorship. After heated debates on the proper
interpretation of the rotation rule to the present case,
Governor Enage eventually ruled that Atty. Opinion was
disqualified from running for the position. Some delegates
protested and moved for the elections suspension and the
issue be resolved by the IBP BOG. This motion was
however was denied and the election proceeded. Upon
counting the ballots, Atty. Maglana was declared as the
duly elected Governor.
Atty. Opinion filed an election protest with the
IBP BOG, raising among others the point that IBP Samar
Chapter had waived its turn in the rotation when it did not
field a candidate for Governor in the 2007, 2009 and 2011
elections. Atty. Maglana, in her Comment, stated that
Samar Chapter did not waive its turn in the rotation. She
also noted that Bar Matter No. 586 mandates the strict
implementation of the rotation rule. The IBP BOG
granted Atty. Opinions election protest.

Despite the call for strict implementation of the Rotation Rule under
BM No. 586, it admits an exception under Section 39, Article VI
of the IBP amended by-laws, allowing a chapter to waive its turn in
the rotation order, subject to its right to reclaim the governorship at
any time before the rotation is completed.

ISSUE.

FACTS.

HELD.

On May 25, 2013, thirteen delegates of the IBP

Eastern Visayas Region gathered at the Session Hall of the
RTC, Branch 24 in Maasin, Leyte, to elect the Governor of
their region for the 2013-2015 term. Upon a motion duly
seconded, Atty. Maglana - the incumbent President of IBP
Samar Chapter - was nominated for the position of
Governor. Atty. Maglana then moved to declare that only
IBP Samar Chapter was qualifiedto be voted upon for the
position of Governor, to the exclusion of all the other
eight (8) chapters. Atty. Maglana cited the rotation rule
under Bar Matter No. 491 and argued that since 1989 or
the start of the implementation of the rotation rule, only
IBP Samar Chapter had not served as Governor for IBP
Eastern Visayas.

YES. In its Resolution in Bar Matter No. 586the

Court decreed without amending Section 39, Article VI of
the IBP By-Laws that the rotation rule should be strictly
implemented "so that all prior elections for governor in
the region shall be reckoned with or considered in
determining who should be the governor to be selected
from the different chapters to represent the region in the
Board of Governors. This rule, however, admits of an
exception which allows a chapter to waive its turn in the
rotation order, subject to its right to reclaim the
governorship at any time before the rotation is completed.

Atty. Opinion, the candidate of the IBP Eastern

Samar Chapter, thereafter, took the floor and manifested
that before he decided to run for Governor, he sought the
opinion of the IBP if he was still qualified to run

Did the IBP Samar Chapter waived its turn in the rotation
order so that it can no longer claim its right to the
governorship position for the 2013-2015 term?

We cannot sustain Atty. Maglanas arguments,

that: (1) the first rotation cycle in IBP Eastern Visayas
region had not been completed in 2007; and (2) that the
rotation cycle can only be completed once a nominee from
IBP Samar Chapter had served as governor for the 20132015 term, for two reasons.

First, the IBP BOG established x x x[that] Samar

either did not field any candidate from 1989 to 2007 or it
failed to invoke the rotation rule to challenge the
nominations of those candidates whose chapters had
already been represented in the rotation cycle.Because of
this waiver of its turn in the first rotation cycle, we
conclude that the first rotation cycle had been completed
in 2007.

of the IBP Western Visayas Region. The presidents

composing of IBP Western Visayas Region filed their
Comments-in-Intervention, praying for the lifting of the
TRO without prejudice to the resolution on the Urgent
Motion. Atty. Daquilanea espoused the view that upon the
completion of a rotational cycle, elections should be open
to all chapters of the region subject to the exclusionary
rule.

Second, Atty. Maglana cannot simply reclaim IBP

Samar Chapters right to the governorship in the 20132015 term because it is contrary to Section 39, Article VI,
as amended, of the IBP By-Laws. This provision states
that the chapter which has waived its turn in the rotation
cycle may reclaim its right to the governorship at any time
before the rotation is completed. Having been established
that the first rotational cycle had been completed in the
2005-2007 term, the IBP Samar Chapter can no longer
belatedly reclaim its right to the governorship in the 20132015 term as it should have exercised its claim on or
before the completion of the first rotation cycle in 2007.

Issue

2. IN THE MATTER OF THE BREWING

CONTROVERSIES IN THE ELECTIONS OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, December 04, 2012, EN BANC
Key Doctrine: Election through rotation by exclusion is the more
established rule in the IBP. The rule prescribes that once a member of
the chapter would be excluded in the next turn until all have taken
their turns in the rotation cycle. Once a full rotation cycle ends and a
fresh cycle commences, all the chapters in the region are once again
entitled to vie but subject again to the rule on rotation by exclusion.
Facts
This case has its origin in the 2010 resolution of
the same title1. In the 2010 resolution, the court held that
the rotation rule under Sec. 37 and 39 of the IBP ByLaws should be strictly implemented, so that all prior
elections for governor in the region shall be reckoned with
or considered in determining who should be the governor
to be selected from the different chapters to represent the
region in the Board of Governors. Gov. Fortunato of the
IBP Western Visayas Region and Atty. Daquilanea sought
the clarification on the application of the said rule in their
respective regions.
Later on, CJ Corona issued a TRO (pending the
resolution of the motion for clarification) on the election

1
I have included my digest of the 2010 case below.

In the nominations for the Governor of IBPWestern Visayas and the start of a new rotational cycle, is
it a) once again open to all chapters subject to the rule on
rotation by exclusion; or b) limited only to the chapter
first in the previous rotation cycle, following the previous
sequence or rotation by pre-ordained sequence.?
Ruling
The rule should be rotation by exclusion as it is
the more established rule in the IBP. The rule prescribes
that once a member of the chapter is elected as Governor,
his chapter would be excluded in the next turn until all
have taken their turns in the rotation cycle. Once a full
rotation cycle ends and a fresh cycle commences, all the
chapters in the region are once again entitled to vie but
subject again to the rule on rotation by exclusion. This
allows for a more democratic election process. The rule
provides for freedom of choice while upholding the
equitable principle of rotation which assures the every
member-chapter has its turn in every rotation cycle.
On the other hand, rotation by pre-ordained
sequence, or election based on the same order as the
previous cycle, tends to defeat the purpose of an election.
The element of choice which is crucial to a democratic
process is virtually removed. Only one chapter could vie
for election at every turn as the entire sequence, from first
to last, is already predetermined by the order in the
previous rotation cycle. This concept of rotation by preordained sequence negates freedom of choice, which is the
bedrock of any democratic election process2.
The Court takes notice of the predictability of the
rotation by succession scheme. Through the rotation by
exclusion scheme, the elections would be more genuine as

2
EG. if the previous cycle is province A B C, after the
term of C, A would be the one who will be eligible for election as
distinguished from rotation by exclusion where after the term of C, all
of them shall be again qualified to run for a new cycle subject to the
exclusion that after their election, the remaining chapters shall be the
ones eligible. Thus, under the latter, after C, it is A or B that should be
eligible.

the opportunity to serve as Governor at any time is once

again open to all chapters, unless, of course, a chapter has
already served in the new cycle. While predictability is not
altogether avoided, as in the case where only one chapter
remains in the cycle, still, as previously noted by the Court
the rotation rule should be applied in harmony with, and
not in derogation of, the sovereign will of the electorate as
expressed through the ballot.
NB *another issue. Atty. Vinluan, the Executive VP of
the IBP was removed from his position due to the 2010
resolution, IBP Southern-Luzon argued that since the
Court removed its member, Atty. Vinluan, for the 20072009 term, it should not now be prejudiced and disallowed
to vie for the position of Executive Vice-President of the
IBP for the 2011-2013 term as to do so would be a
violation of the rotation rule. Gov. Fortunato however
argues that Atty. Vinluan was actually able to serve his
2007-2009 term as Executive Vice President even if he was
later on disqualified by the Court in December 14, 2010
Resolution. To allow IBP-Southern Luzon to vie for the
position of Executive Vice President of the IBP for the
2011-2013 term would allow said chapter to serve twice as
Executive Vice President. The court ordered the IBP
Board of Governors to file a comment on this issue.
In the matter of the brewing controversies in the
election in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, December 14, 2010, EN BANC,
CORONA, C.J.
Facts
A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC and A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC
originated from three (3) separate Protests filed regarding
the elections for the Regional Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the Greater Manila Region
(hereafter, GMR), Western Visayas, and Western
Mindanao held in April 2007 for a term of two (2) years
starting July 1, 2007.
The GMR Election Protest (Atty. Elpidio Soriano v.
Atty. Manuel M. Maramba)
Atty. Victoria Loanzon, Treasurer of the IBPQuezon City Chapter (IBP-QC Chapter) requested the
office of the IBP President Atty. Feliciano Bautista,
seeking an interpretation of Section 8 on the Chapter ByLaws of Article IV and Sec. 31, Article V of the IBP ByLaws in reference to the qualification of the delegates who
would vote in the election for GMR Governor on April
25, 2009. Through Resolution No. XVIII-2009, the Board
of Governors headed by Atty. Bautista, held that the
additional delegate(s) shall be elected by the Board of

Officers of the Chapter only from among the remaining

duly elected officers and members of the Board. Believing
that the resolution imposed an additional qualification for
the Delegates to be elected by the Board of Officers of
IBP Chapters that are entitled to more than two (2)
delegates the QC chapter requested the recall of
Resolution No. XVIII-2009.
On April 23, 2009, five (5) members of the Board
of Governors headed by Exec. V.P. Rogelio Vinluan
recalled the said resolution and resolved further that the
election of the additional delegate(s) for Chapters entitled
to more than two (2) delegates shall be elected by the
Board of Officers of the Chapter from among the general
membership who are in good standing. The IBP-QC
chapter then nominated Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano III as
candidate for the position of Governor for the Greater
Manila Region (GMR). At the same time, the chapter
elected its Delegates for the election of the IBP Governor
for GMR to be held on April 25, 2009.
On April 25, 2009, GMR Governor Magsino,
acknowledged the Resolution No. XVIII-2009 and
declared declared Atty. Loanzon and Atty. Laqui as
Delegates of the IBP-QC Chapter, entitled to vote in the
election of the GMR Governor. Although his declaration
was challenged, Gov. Magsino defended that the
resolution of Vinluan was void since there was no Quorum
during the special meeting. Thereafter, the elections were
held. Atty. Soriano and Atty. Maramba were nominated for
the position of IBP Governor for GMR. After the casting
of votes and counting of ballots, including those cast by
Loanzon and Laqui (the alleged non-delegates), Atty.
Maramba was declared winner by garnering a vote of 13 as
against Atty. Soriano's 12
The Western Mindanao Region Election Protest
(Atty. Benjamin B. Lanto v. Atty. Nasser
Marohomsalic)
During the April 25, 2009 meeting for the
nomination/election of the candidates for the Regional
Governor of Western Mindanao, Atty. Lanto, from IBPLanao del Sur Chapter, informed the delegates that the
Board of Officers of his Chapter--through a resolution
signed by all its officers except for Chapter President Atty.
Macalawi--officially nominated Lanto for Regional
Governor of Western Mindanao. Despite said resolution,
Macalawi nominated Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic for
Regional Governor of Western Mindanao. The
nomination of Marohomsalic was recognized and accepted
by the presiding officer, outgoing Gov. Carlos L. Valdez

Jr. Lanto and Marohomsalic each received five (5) votes

after the votes were counted.
On April 27, 2009, Lanto filed a Protest
questioning Marohomsalic's nomination and the counting
of votes in his favor and claiming that under Section 6,
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, only one nominee shall
come from any IBP chapter. He asserted that the Chapter's
Board of Officers, not the Chapter President, by a majority
vote shall determine the Chapter's official nominee for
Governor of its region.
The Western Visayas Region Election Protest (Atty.
Cornelio P. Aldon and Atty. Benjamin Ortega v. Atty.
Erwin Fortunato)
Atty. Erwin Fortunato of the IBP-Romblon
Chapter was proclaimed the duly elected Regional
Governor for Western Visayas in the April 25, 2009
elections. In separate protests, Atty. Cornelio P. Aldon of
IBP-Antique Chapter and Atty. Benjamin Ortega of IBPNegros Occidental Chapter claimed they were nominated
by their respective chapters for Governor of Western
Visayas but were not allowed to be elected on account of
the "Rotation Rule" under Sections 37 and 39 of the IBP
By-Laws. Despite their disqualification, Ortega obtained
three (3) votes, Aldon obtained one (1) vote; and
Fortunato, the eventual winner, obtained five votes, with
one (1) delegate opting to abstain. Aldon and Ortega
argued that the rotation rule is merely directory and not
mandatory and claimed a failure of elections, as nominees
from the other chapters were disqualified
Resolutions of the protests (by the Board of
Governors)
In its subsequent resolutions, the protests of Atty.
Fortunato and Soriano III were upheld. Atty. Fortunato
was declared as the duly elected IBP Gov. of Western
Visayas. A new election of the IBP GMR was ordered
where Soriano III won as IBP Governor. In the case of
Atty. Lanto, the protest of Atty. Marohomsalic was denied
and further on declared Atty. Lanto as the duly elected IBP
Governor of the Western Mindanao Region.
Election of the next IBP Executive Vice President
(EVP)
On May 9 2009, two (2) simultaneous elections
for the Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term
was held - one was called and presided over by Executive
Vice President Rogelio Vinluan, while the other election
for the same position was presided over by outgoing IBP
Pres. Feliciano Bautista. GMR Gov. Soriano was elected as
the next Executive vice president during the elections

presided over by Atty. Vinluan while in the meeting

presided by Bautista, Atty. Roan Libarios was elected as
the next IBP EVP.
Because of the disputes relating to the elections
for Governor of the GMR, EVP of the IBP and other IBP
Positions the SC through an En Banc Resolution created a
Special Committee to investigate.
Issue
1. What is the correct interpretation of Section 31, Article
V of the IBP By Laws?
2. Who was validly elected Governor for the Greater
Manila Region?
3. Who was validly elected Governor for Western Visayas
Region?
4. Who was validly elected Governor for Western
Mindanao Region?
5. Who was validly elected IBP Executive Vice President
for the next term?
6. WON Atty. Rogelio Vinluan is guilty under the
administrative complaint for "grave professional
misconduct, violation of attorney's oath, and acts inimical
to the IBP
Ruling
1. There is a manifest intention in Sec. 31, Art. V of the
By-Laws to reserve membership in the House of Delegates
(which is the deliberative body of the IBP) for the elected
officers of the Chapter since they have already received the
mandate of the general membership of the Chapter. Thus,
Attys. Loanzon and Laqui were properly recognized as
delegates of the QC Chapter.
2. Given that Atty. Loanzon and Atty. Laqui were valid
delegates, Atty. Maramba is the duly elected IBP Gov. of
the GMR. Furthermore, Atty. Soriano III is disqualified
under principle of rotation of the governorship (Bar
Matter No. 586, May 14, 1991). Governorship shall rotate
once in as many terms as the number of chapters there are
in the region, to give every chapter a chance to represent
the region in the Board of Governors.1
3. Atty. Erwin Fortunato of the Romblon Chapter was
duly elected as Governor for the Western Visayas Region
not only because he obtained the highest number of votes
among the three (3) candidates for the position, but also
because under the rotation rule, it is now the turn of the
Romblon Chapter to represent the Western Visayas
Region in the IBP Board of Governors.

4. It was Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic not Atty. Benjamin

Lanto that is qualified to be elected Governor of Western
Mindanao Region. The special committee reported that the
resolution declaring Atty. Lanto as a delegate cannot be
held valid since there was a withdrawal of nine (9)
signatures from the Resolution, left only four (4) votes in
support of Lanto's nomination - a puny minority of the 14member Board of Officers of the Lanao del Sur Chapter.
5. The elections for the IBP Executive Vice President
separately held on May 9, 2009 by the Vinluan Group were
null and void for lack of quorum. The presence of five (5)
Governors-elect is needed to constitute a quorum of the 9member Board of Governors-elect who shall elect the
Executive Vice President. In the case of Vinluan group,
Atty. Soriano (GMR) and Atty. Lanto (Western Mindanao
Region) were among the six Governors who elected Atty.
Soriano as EVP, but since Soriano and Lanto were not
validly elected IBP Governors the election held was null
and void.
6. The Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that "(a) lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Added
to this, Rule 7.03, Canon 7 requires that "(a) lawyer shall
not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession. Atty. Vinluan who presided the special
meeting on April 23, 2009 violated Sec. 42, Art. VI of the
By-Laws which provides that it is the President who shall
call a special meeting, and it is also the President who shall
preside over the meeting, not Atty. Vinluan, the EVP.
Thus, the resolution of the meeting recalling Resolution
No. XVIII-2009 was null and void since the meeting was
illegal. Furthermore, under Vinluan, a Board Resolution
was passed declaring Pres. Bautista "unfit to preside" over
the election and "designating EVP Vinluan to preside over
the election" in lieu of Pres. Bautista. This resolution
according to the SC, was uncalled and unwarranted, and
caused disunity and disorder in the IBP. The acts of Atty.
Vinluan's Group in defying President Bautista, due to Atty.
Vinluan's desire to propel his fraternity brother, Atty.
Elpidio G. Soriano, to the next presidency of the IBP,
smacked of politicking, which is strongly condemned and
strictly prohibited by the IBP By-Laws and the Bar
Integration Rule.
With the premises considered, Atty. Rogelio
Vinluan et. Al. are all found GUILTY of grave
professional misconduct arising from their actuations in
connection with the controversies in the elections in the

IBP and are hereby disqualified to run as national officers

of the IBP in any subsequent election.
3. ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISA YAS,
REGIONAL OFFICE NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN
PEDRO, ILOILO CITY vs. ATTY. SALVADOR N.
PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE, ANTIQUE
A.C. No. 6732, October 22, 2013, DECISION
(BERSAMIN, J.)
Key doctrine: A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it
as that of a court of law is guilty of the gravest misconduct and
deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.
Facts: On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of
Court of the RTC, received a written communication from
Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United
Kingdom (UK). The letter requested a copy of the
decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael
O. Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In
the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.
Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to
retrieve the records of Special Proceedings Case No. 084
entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rey Laserna. It was then discovered that the
RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084
wherein Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the
court files revealed that Judge Penuela had decided Special
Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria,
whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case
records did not exist,Mr. Hunt sent a letter dated October
12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported
decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 that had been
presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the
UK.
After comparing the two documents and
ascertaining that the document attached to the October 12,
2004 letter was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela
wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of the situation.
In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley
Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4, 2005,wherein
he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the
issuance of the falsified decision in Special Proceedings
No. 084 for a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against

the respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary

Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an affidavit.
The NBI invited the respondent to explain his
side,but he invoked his constitutional right to remain
silent.
After conducting its investigation, the NBI
forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas
the records of the investigation, with a recommendation
that the respondent be prosecuted for falsification of
public document and for violation of Republic Act 3019
(The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).The NBI
likewise recommended to the Office of the Court
Administrator that disbarment proceedings be commenced
against the respondent.
Respondent denied any participation in the
falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his
opinion on Shirleys petition for the annulment of her
marriage; that he had given advice on the pertinent laws
involved and the different grounds for the annulment of
marriage; that in June 2004, Dy Quioyo had gone back to
him to present a copy of what appeared to be a court
decision; and that he had also learned from Atty. Angeles
Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of
Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn
statement before Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit with
the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late
husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible for making
the falsified document at the instance of Dy Quioyo.
In its Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors suspended
the respondent from the practice of law for six years.
Issue: Whether respondent was guilty of misconduct?
Ruling: Yes.
Respondents denial and his implication against
Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation of the falsified decision
are not persuasive. Dy Quioyos categorical declaration on
the respondents personal responsibility for the falsified
decision, which by nature was positive evidence, was not
overcome by the respondents blanket denial, which by
nature was negative evidence.
The respondent relied on the sworn statement
supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that declared that her
deceased husband had been instrumental in the
falsification of the forged decision. But such reliance was
outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife
was rendered unreliable due to its patently hearsay
character. In addition, the unworthiness of the sworn
statement as proof of authorship of the falsification by the

husband is immediately exposed and betrayed by the

falsified decision being an almost verbatim reproduction of
the authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in the real
Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
In light of the established circumstances, the
respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having
authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent
court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at
all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession.
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states
that "a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession." Lawyers are further
required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest
and immoral or deceitful conduct.
WHEREFORE,
the
Court
FINDS
AND
PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him effective
upon receipt of this decision.
CANON 8
SPOUSES WILLIE and AMELIA
UMAGUING, Complainants, vs. ATTY. WALLEN R.
DE VERA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10451, February 4, 2015
Note: Should be under Canon 10, not 8
Mariecris Umaguing, daughter of complainants,
ran for the position of SK Chairman in 2007 but lost to
her rival Bungag by one vote. Because of this,
complainants lodged an election protest and enlisted the
services of Atty. De Vera. On November 7, 2007,
complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his
acceptance fee of P30,000 plus various court appearance
fees and miscellaneous expenses in the amount
ofP30,000.00. According to the complainants, Atty. De
Vera had more than enough time to prepare and file the
case but the former only took action when the November
8, 2008 deadline was looming. Atty. De Vera then rushed
the preparation of the necessary documents and
attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these
attachments are the Affidavits of material witnesses Mark
Anthony Lachica and Angela Almera which were
personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the
aforesaid affidavits were to be signed by Lachica and

Almera, they were unfortunately unavailable. To remedy

this, Atty. DeVera allegedly instructed Abeth Lalong-Isip
and Hendricson Fielding to look for the nearest kin of
Lachica and Almera and ask them to sign over the
names.They were signed by Papin and Almera-Almacen,
respectively. Atty. De Vera then had all the documents
notarized before one Atty. Donato Manguiat. Later,
however, Lachica discovered the falsification and
immediately disowned the signature affixed in the affidavit
and submitted his own Affidavit, declaring that he did not
authorize Papin to sign the document on his behalf.
Lachicas affidavit was presented to the MeTC and drew
the ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo who ruled that
the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were falsified. Judge
Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a
pleading to rectify this error seeking, among others, the
withdrawal of Lachicas and Almeras affidavits, it was
observed that such was a mere flimsy excuse since Atty.
De Vera had ample amount of time to have the affidavits
personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the
election protest with full knowledge that the affidavits at
hand were falsified.
In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the
complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not
appear before the MeTC, although promptly notified, for a
certain December 11, 2007 hearing; and did not offer any
explanation as to why he was not able to attend. Atty. De
Vera explained that he was hesitant in handling the
particular case because of the alleged favoritism of Judge
Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera, Judge Belosillo
received P60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty.
Carmelo Culvera, in order to acquire a favorable decision
for his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only
appear for the case if the complainants would give
him P80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to Judge
Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for Umaguing.
For lack of trust and confidence in the integrity
and competency of Atty. De Vera, as well as his breach of
fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to
withdraw as their counsel and to reimburse them
the P60,000.00 in excessive fees he collected from them,
considering that he only appeared twice for the case.
Atty. De Vera explained that the signing of
Lachicas falsified Affidavit was done without his
knowledge and likewise stated that it was Papin who
should be indicted and charged with the corresponding
criminal offense. He pointed out that along with his
Formal Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, complainants
executed a document entitled "Release Waiver &

Discharge," which, to him, discharges him and his law firm

from all causes of action that complainants may have
against him, including the instant administrative case. The
IBP imposed a suspension of one month for knowingly
submitting a falsified document in court.
Issue: Should Atty. De Vera be held administratively
liable?
Held:
The Court agrees with the IBP in holding that
Atty. De Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified
affidavitbefore the court in his desire to beat the
November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the election protest
of Umaguing. The assertion that Atty. De Vera authorized
the falsification of Almeras affidavit is rendered more
believable by the absence of Atty. De Veras comment on
the same. In his Motion for Reconsideration, no specific
denial was proffered by Atty. De Vera on this score.
Instead, he only asserted that he was not the one who
notarized the subject affidavits but another notary public.
Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the Court views the same
to be a mere general denial which cannot overcome Elsa
Almera-Almacens positive testimony that he indeed
participated in the procurement of her signature and the
signing of the affidavit, all in support of the claim of
falsification.
The final lining to it all is that Almeras affidavit
was submitted to the MeTC in the election protest case.
The belated retraction of the questioned affidavits, does
not, for this Court, merit significant consideration as its
submission appears to be a mere afterthought, prompted
only by the discovery of the falsification. Truth be told, it
is highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in
the dark about the authenticity of the documents he
himself submitted to the court when his professional duty
requires him to represent his client with zeal and within
the bounds of the law. Likewise, he is prohibited from
handling any legal matter without adequate preparation or
allowing his client to dictate the procedure in handling the
case.
On a related point, the Court deems it apt to
clarify that the document captioned "Release Waiver &
Discharge" which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit,
claimed to have discharged him from all causes of action
that complainants may have against him, such as the
present case, would not deny the Court its power to
sanction him administratively. It was held in Ylaya v.
Gacott that:A case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the
facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct has been proven.

All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating

the Lawyers Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified
document before a court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De
Vera is found GUILTY of violating the Lawyer's Oath and
Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED for six
(6) months from the practice of law, effective upon receipt
of this Decision, with a stem warning that any repetition of
the same or similar acts will be punished more severely.
Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to
complainants Spouses Willie and Amelia Umaguing the
amount ofP60,000.00 which he admittedly received from
the latter as fees intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement within ninety (90) days from the finality of
this Decision.
CANON 9
1. ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR.,
PROVINCIAL LEGAL OFFICER, BATAAN
CAPITOL, BALANGA CITY, BATAAN,
COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY,
RESPONDENT. 2014-12003 | A.C. No. 8103
MENDOZA, J.: SECOND DIVISION
DOCTRINES: Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice provides that a Notary Public refers to any
person commissioned to perform o cial acts under these
Rules. A notary publics secretary is obviously not
commissioned to perform the o cial acts of a notary
public.
A person who is commissioned as a notary public
takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial
register. He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by
passing the buck to his secretary. Where the notary public
is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his
shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws
and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.
Notarial commission is a privilege and a
significant responsibility. It is a privilege granted only to
those who are qualified to perform duties imbued with
public interest. As we have declared on several occasions,
It is invested with substantive public interest, such that
only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notary public. The protection of that interest necessarily
requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must
be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts,
and the administrative o ces in general.
FACTS:
Atty. Aurelio (Angeles), Provincial Legal O cer
of Bataan wrote a letter to the Hon. Remigio Escalada,
Executive Judge of RTC Bataan regarding the alleged
notarization by Atty. Renato Bagay of 18 documents from

March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008 when he was out of the

country. These documents were forwarded to the
Provincial Legal O ce by the Provincial Treasurer who
knew that Renato was in Mexico to attend a Prayer and
Life Workshop in Mexico, and accompanied by a davits
of the persons who executed the documents who all
alleged that they did not see Renato notarize them and that
it was either the secretary who signed them or the
documents came out of the o ce already signed.
Verification with the Bureau of Immigration
revealed that Renato was out of the country from March
13, 208 to April 8, 2008. The judge indorsed the letter to
the IBP Bataan, which in turn endorsed it to the IBP
National O ce. It was then referred to the Commission
on Bar Discipline for investigation and report. The IBP
endorsed the letter to the O ce of the Bar Confidant in
view of the manifestation by Atty. Angeles that his letter
was not meant as a compliant but merely to clarify the
status of the documents allegedly notarized by Renato. The
Court then required Renato to comment. In his comment,
Renato averred that it was his secretary who caused the
notarization of the documents without his knowledge and
authority and he had already terminated her services.
The Court referred the matter to the IBP for
investigation and report, and only Renato submitted his
position paper in view of the manifestation of Atty.
Angeles that he be excused from participating in the case.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that
Renato be suspended from the practice of law for two
years, in view of his admission that he employed an o ce
secretary who had access to his o ce, his notarial seal and
records without proper training, thus he failed to live up to
his obligation under the Rules on Notarial Practice. The
IBP adopted the recommendation of the Commissioner.
Renato in his motion for reconsideration argued that his
case should be treated with leniency since he admitted and
owned up to his shortcomings and it was done without
wrong intention. His case should be a case of simple
negligence
ISSUE:
The sole issue to resolve in this case is whether the
notarization of documents by the secretary of respondent
while he was out of the country constituted negligence.
The Court answers in the a rmative.
HELD:
Respondent admitted in his comment and motion
for reconsideration that the 18 documents were notarized
under his notarial seal by his o ce secretary while he was
out of the country. This clearly constitutes negligence
considering that respondent is responsible for the acts of
his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice provides that a Notary Public refers to any
person commissioned to perform o cial acts under these
Rules. A notary publics secretary is obviously not

commissioned to perform the o cial acts of a notary

public.
Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it
was his secretarys act which he did not authorize. He is
responsible for the acts of the secretary which he
employed. He left his o ce open to the public while
leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his notarial seal
and register within the reach of his secretary, fully aware
that his secretary could use these items to notarize
documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence
cannot be countenanced by this Court and it is far from
being a simple negligence. There is an inescapable
likelihood that respondents flimsy excuse was a mere
afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him could
be a conscious act of what his secretary did.
Respondent must fully bear the consequence of
his negligence. A person who is commissioned as a notary
public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his
notarial register. He cannot relieve himself of this
responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary.
As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot
consider it. Respondent claims that for the 21 years that he
has been practicing law, he acted as a notary public
without any blemish and this was his first and only
infraction. His experience, however, should have placed
him on guard and could have prevented possible violations
of his notarial duty. By his sheer negligence, 18 documents
were notarized by an unauthorized person and the public
was deceived. Such prejudicial act towards the public
cannot be tolerated by this Court. Thus, the penalty of
revocation of notarial commission and disqualification
from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years is
appropriate.
Because of the negligence of respondent, the
Court also holds him liable for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). His failure to solemnly
perform his duty as a notary public not only damaged
those directly a ected by the notarized documents but
also undermined the integrity of a notary public and
degraded the function of notarization. He should, thus, be
held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public
but also as a lawyer. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a
graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason
of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no
falsehood or consent to the doing of any
Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which
requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that
allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public,
he allowed an unauthorized person to practice law. By
leaving his o ce open despite his absence in the country
and with his secretary in charge, he virtually allowed his
secretary to notarize documents without any restraint.
Respondent also violated his obligation under
Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer to uphold

at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

The people who came into his o ce while he was away,
were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being
conducted therein. They expected that their documents
would be converted into public documents. Instead, they
later found out that the notarization of their documents
was a mere sham and without any force and e ect. By
prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized
by an unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession was eroded.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the
case, an additional penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for three (3) months is in order.
Respondent should remember that a notarial
commission is a privilege and a significant responsibility. It
is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified to
perform duties imbued with public interest. As we have
declared on several occasions, notarization is not an
empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notary public. The
protection of that interest necessarily requires that those
not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from
imposing upon the public, the courts, and the
administrative o ces in general
It must be underscored that notarization by a
notary public converts a private document into a public
document, making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries
public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of
public instruments would be undermined
Let this serve as a reminder to the members of
the legal profession that the Court will not take lightly
complaints of unauthorized acts of notarization, especially
when the trust and confidence reposed by the public in our
legal system hang in the balance.
WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ADOPTED with
MODIFICATION. Finding Atty. Renato C. Bagay grossly
negligent in his duty as a notary public, the Court
REVOKES his notarial commission and DISQUALIFIES
him from being commissioned as notary public for a
period of two (2) years. The Court also SUSPENDS him
from the practice of law for three (3) months e ective
immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a
similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.
The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date
of his receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to
determine when his suspension shall take e ect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to O ce
of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Renato C.
Bagays personal record; the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines; and all courts in the country for their

information and guidance.
2. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR
UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA &
VICTORIANO TENAZAS,
PETITIONERSVS.BINALBAGAN ISABELA
SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING,
RESPONDENTS.
[ G.R. No. L-23959, November 29, 1971; J. JBL Reyes ]
KEY DOCTRINE.
The Rules on compensation of attorneys
agreement as to fees implies existence of an attorneyclient relationship as a condition to the recovery of
attorney's fees. Therefore, non-lawyers cannot collect
attorneys fees.
FACTS.
The petitioners were complainants in a labor case,
which ordered with finality the reinstatement of
complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. The
Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) rendered the following
attorneys fees to be taken from the back wages: Atty
Cipriano Cid and Associates (10%), Quintin Muning (10%)
and Atty. Atanacio Pacis (5%). The award of 10% to
Quintin Muning, who is not a lawyer according to the
order, is sought to be voided in the present petition.
ISSUE:
Can a non-lawyer collect attorneys fees?
RULING:
No. The permission for a non-member of the bar
to represent or appear or defend in the said court on
behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the
representative
to
compensation
for
such
representation.Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court,
providing for compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees
implies the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a
condition to the recovery of attorney's fees. Such a
relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative
in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one,
he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with
Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU,
and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly
public policy demands that legal work in representation of
parties litigant should be entrusted only to those
possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to
observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well
as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the
protection of courts, clients and the public.
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal
profession should not be violated; that acting as an
attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court,
which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, and
the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit

of an act or an act done in violation of law; and that if

were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the
public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case
of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition,
aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to
disciplinary measures.
3. Tapay v. Bancolo (March 20, 2013)
Canon 10
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU
INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS & EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-NATU, AND INSULAR LIFE
BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU
v. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.,
FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES AND
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
G.R. No. L-25291, January 30, 1971, (RUIZ CASTRO,
J.)
Two of the lawyers of the Unions (The Insular
Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-NATU,
FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees
Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees
Association-NATU) under FFW, then were Felipe Enaje
and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretarytreasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular
Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees
Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular
issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the
members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW
and joining the National Association of Trade Unions
(NATU), to no avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured
employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the
Department of Justice. Thereafter, the respondent
Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as
assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their
Legal Department while Enaje was hired on or about
February 19, 1957 as personnel manager of the
Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the
negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective
bargaining with the Unions. The Unions voted to declare a
strike in protest against what they considered the
Companies' unfair labor practices. A fist fight ensued
between the strikers and Garcia. Thereafter, several
criminal complaints were filed against the strikers. Those
with no criminal charges were allowed to return to work.
The CIR prosecutor filed unfair labor practice against the
companies. The CIR dismissed the complaint of the
Unions.
ISSUE:
RULING:
It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners'
submission of proposals for an amended renewal of their

respective collective bargaining agreements to the

respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon
Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, as
personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary,
respectively, with attractive compensations. After the
notice to strike was served on the Companies and
negotiations were in progress in the Department of Labor,
the respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors
without increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect
compelling these employees to resign from their unions.
And during the negotiations in the Department of Labor,
despite the fact that the petitioners granted the
respondents' demand that the former drop their demand
for union shop and inspite of urgings by the conciliators of
the Department of Labor, the respondents adamantly
refused to answer the Unions' demands in toto.

criminal charges who were readmitted were Generoso

Abel la, Enrique Guidote, Emilio Carreon, Antonio
Castillo, Fedcrico Barretto, Manuel Chuidian and Nestor
Cipriano. And despite the fact that the fiscal's office found
no probable cause against the petitioning strikers, the
Companies adamantly refused admission to them on the
pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the interest
of the respondents," without stating specifically the
inimical acts allegedly committed. They were soon to
admit, however, that these alleged inimical acts were the
same criminal charges which were dismissed by the fiscal
and by the courts.

Incidentally, Enage was the chairman of the

negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective
bargaining between the former and the Unions. After the
petitioners went on strike, the strikers were individually
sent copies of Exhibit A, enticing them to abandon their
strike by inducing them to return to work upon promise of
special privileges. Two days later, the respondents, thru
their president and manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes,
brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others,
escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight
entrances to the three buildings occupied by the
Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two
meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket
line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life
Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the
picketers and the strike-breakers. Then the respondents
brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three
of which were not dismissed, and these three only for
slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions,
the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the
court of first instance restraining the strikers from
stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful
use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and
the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from,
out and in, of the Companies' buildings.

1. SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD,

et al. v. HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, et al. IN
RE: CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
ATTYS. VICENTE SANTIAGO, JOSE BELTRAN
SOTTO, GRACIANO REGALA AND ASSOCIATES,
ERLITO UY, JUANITO CALING; AND MORTON
MEADS

On the same day that the injunction was issued,

the letter, Exhibit B, was sent again individually and by
registered special delivery mail to the strikers,
threatening them with dismissal if they did not report for
work on or before June 2, 1958. But when most of the
petitioners reported for work. the respondents thru a
screening committee of which Ramon Garcia was a
member refused to admit 63 members of the Unions
on the ground of "pending criminal charges." However,
when almost all were cleared of criminal charges by the
fiscal's office, the respondents adamantly refused
admission to 34 officials and union members. It is not,
however, disputed that all non-strikers with pending
criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough
incident of May 23,1958 were readmitted immediately by
the respondents. Among the non-strikers with pending

*There was no connection with Canon 10 in

relation to the lawyers.
Canon 11

G.R. No. L-27072, January 9, 1970, RESOLUTION

(Sanchez, J.)
Key Doctrine: A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like
the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts
to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice." Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to
preserve.
The first contempt proceeding arose from the
third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago, who pictures petitioners as "vulturous
executives". He speaks of this Court as a "civilized,
democratic tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest that
it is not. In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph
categorizes the Courts decision as "false, erroneous and
illegal" in a presumptuous manner. He there charges that
the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case
prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the
joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two
justices of the Court for being interested in the decision of
this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his
brother is the vice president of the favored party who is
the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary
of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the
President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968
was rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that

"it would seem that the principles thus established [the

moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial
authority] by the Honorable Supreme Court should first
apply to itself." He puts forth the claim that lesser and
further removed conditions have been known to create
favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a
belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief
Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender
favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause or
party." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could
make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the
motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only
were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did
arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their
judgment. He points out that courts must be above
suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of
confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should
not be allowed to happen in our country, "although the
process has already begun.
Another contempt proceeding is with regard to
Atty. Sotto who accuses petitioners of having made "false,
ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to
prejudice the courts against MacArthur." He brands such
efforts as "scattershot desperation". He describes a
proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying
bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners."
He charges petitioners with opportunistically changing
their claims and stories not only from case to case but
from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such language
is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of
contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before
which it is made. It is no excuse to say that these
statements were taken out of context.
ISSUE:
Are Attys. Santiago and Sotto guilty of contempt?
HELD:
YES. It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted
paragraph 6 which contained language that is as
disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact that it has been
made. He explained that he deleted this paragraph in his
rough draft, which paragraph was included in the motion
filed in this Court only because of mere inadvertence. This
explanation does not make much of a distinguishing
difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it was
belatedly made but also because his signature appeared on
the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this
paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our judicial

authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen

messengers of God in all matters that come before them,
and that no matter what the circumstances are, their
judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity."
It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of considering that
any emanation from their mind or pen could be the
product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or
favoritism for a party or an issue." After citing acts of two
judges of first instance, he paused to ask: "What is the
explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty?
Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral
comprehension? Or is it that many of our government
officials are just amoral?"
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's
accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur made
is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It
sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For,
inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices
who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly
from any of the petitioners or any members of any board
petitioner or their agents or principals, including the
President."
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing
gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts
much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not
an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to
create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus
called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as
follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have
become commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any
valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section
20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms,
spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As
explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces
that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the
Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon,
as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers
to support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.'
And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a
conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity x x x to the
courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney
to the courts 'can only be maintained by rendering no
service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which
he is bound to uphold.'"

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the

court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends
of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority
of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the
courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine
the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of
government and to the attainment of the liberties of the
people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an
officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help
build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice." The precepts, the teachings, the
injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And
yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a
style that undermines and degrades the administration of
justice. The stricture in Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the
Rules - against improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice - is thus transgressed. Atty.
Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
As to Atty. Sotto:
We have analyzed the lines surrounding said
statements. They do not in any manner justify the
inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings, It has
been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession." It is
Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged." It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor
General or his assistants may not be considered offended
parties in this case. This Court may motu propio start
proceedings of this nature. There should be no doubt
about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt
under the circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the
power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct
of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any
manner connected with a case before it, in every manner
appertaining thereto." We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose
Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3(a), Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in the
performance of his official duties; and that he too has
committed, under Section 3(d) of the same rule, improper
conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice.
He is, therefore, guilty of contempt.
2. HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN,
Presiding Judge, MTC, San Mateo, Rizal v. ATTY.
RODOLFO FLORES

A.C. No. 8954, 13 November 2013, Del Castillo, J.

A lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the context of the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised
responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom
with responsibility.
FACTS.
During the proceedings of Civil Case No.
1863,where Atty. Flores was counsel for defendant, Judge
Manahan issued an Order3 where she voluntarily inhibited
from said case in view of the administrative complaint it
filed against Atty. Flores. Upon investigation, it was found
that during the preliminary conference in Civil Case No.
1863, Atty. Flores entered his appearance and filed his PreTrial Brief without proof of MCLE compliance hence it
was expunged from the records.
The preliminary
conference was reset several times for failure of Atty.
Flores to appear and submit his Brief indicating his MCLE
compliance. He was given a last chance to submit his
Brief with the stern warning that failure to do so shall be
considered waiver on his part. Meanwhile, respondent
Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court dated
September 14, 2010 stating among others, the following
allegations:
4. When you took your oath as member
of the Bar, you promised to serve truth,
justice and fair play. Do you think you are
being truthful, just and fair by serving a
cheater?
5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one
for which reason even Erap was
convicted
by
the
Sandiganbayan.1wphi1But even worse is
a lawyer who violates the law.
6. Last but not the least, God said Thou
shall not lie. Again the Philippine
Constitution commands: Give every
Filipino his due. The act of refusal by the
plaintiff is violative of the foregoing
divine and human laws.

3

More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical

actuations, his traits of dishonesty and discourtesy not only to
his own brethren in the legal profession, but also to the bench
and judges, would amount to grave misconduct, if not a
malpractice of law, a serious ground for disciplinary action of a
member of the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.

Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief

bearing an MCLE number which was merely
superimposed without indicating the date and place of
compliance. Thereafter it filed a Letter stating as follows:
If only to give your Honor another
chance to prove your pro plaintiff
sentiment, I am hereby filing the attached
Motion which you may once more assign
to the waste basket of nonchalance.
With the small respect that still remains, I
have asked the defendant to look for
another lawyer to represent him for I am
no longer interested in this case because I
feel I cannot do anything right in your
sala.
The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed
to give due respect to the court by failing to obey court
orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with
the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
requirement, and for using intemperate language in his
pleadings. The Investigating Judge recommended that
Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of law for one
year
ISSUE.
Should Atty. Flores be held liable for its failure to give due
respect to the court and for using intemperate language in
his pleadings?
HELD.

enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive

or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Atty.
Flores failed in this respect.
At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent
that:While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of
his client full devotion to his client's genuine interest and
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's
rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability, he must do so only within the bounds of law. A
lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the
context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech which must be exercised responsibly. After all,
every right carries with it the corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom from
responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The
lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at
the expense of truth and orderly administration of
justice. It must be done within the confines of reason
and common sense.
However, we find the recommended penalty too
harsh and not commensurate with the infractions
committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the
first infraction committed by respondent. Also, we are not
prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty of oneyear suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent
manifested before this Court that he has been in the
practice of law for half a century. Thus, he is already in his
twilight years. Considering the foregoing, we deem it
proper to fine respondent in the amount of P5,000.00 and
to remind him to be more circumspect in his acts and to
obey and respect court processes.

YES. There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to

obey the trial courts order to submit proof of his MCLE
compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities
given him. "Court orders are to be respected not because
the judges who issue them should be respected, but
because of the respect and consideration that should be
extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is
absolutely essential if our Government is to be a
government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had
not because of the incumbents to the positions, but
because of the authority that vests in them. Disrespect to
judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branchof
Government to which they belong, as well as to the State
which has instituted the judicial system."

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo

Flores is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00 with STERN
WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely.

Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language

in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is
expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Canon 15
DARIA O. DAGING, COMPLAINANT,VS.ATTY.
RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS, RESPONDENT.

Canon 12
1. Zualo v. CFI
2. Figueras v. Victoria
Canon 13
Royong v. Oblena
Canon 14
Areola v. Mendoza

[ A.C. No. 9395, November 12, 2014; J. Del Castillo]

KEY DOCTRINE
The prohibition against conflicting interests is
absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer has acted in
good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting
interests.
FACTS
This is a complaint for disbarment of Atty. Davis.
Complainant (Daging) was the owner and operator of
Nashville Country Music Lounge. She leased the space for
the lounge from a certain Benjie Pinlac along Otek St. in
Baguio City. Meanwhile, Daging received a Retainer
Proposal from Atty. Davis which eventually resulted in a
Retainer Agreement with Davis firm. Having been
delinquent in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac terminated
the lease and made a certain Novie Balageo take over the
operation of the bar. Atty. Davis allegedly because a
business partner of Balageo in operating the bar under a
new name, Amarillo Music Bar. When Daging filed an
ejectment case against Pinlac and Bagaleo, Atty. Davis
represented Bagaleo in spite of the existence of the
Retainer Agreement between them. Hence, this complaint.
ISSUE
Did Atty. Davis represent conflicting interests in
handling the ejectment case?
RULING
Yes. Atty. Davis transgressed Rule 15.03 of Canon
15 of the CPR, which provides that a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The prohibition against conflicting interests is absolute and
the rule applies even if the lawyer has acted in good faith
and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.
This is to encourage clients to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers. Atty. Davis act brings the law profession into
public disrepute and suspicion and undermines the
integrity of justice.
As to both parties being clients of the law firm of
Atty. Davis, he could have simply advised both to engage
the services of another laywer.
The penalty for representing conflicting interests
may either be a reprimand or suspension from the practice
of law ranging from six months to two years. Here, the
Court adopted IBPs recommendation of 6-months
suspension from the practice of law from the respondents
receipt of the Resolution.
2. Foronda v. Alvarez
3. JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA,
MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY ANGELYN OROLABELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP,
AND KAREN OROLA, COMPLAINANTS, VS.
ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS, RESPONDENT.
A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent

interests of two or more opposing parties.
In the settlement of Trinidad Laserna-Orolas
(Trinidad) estate, the Heirs of Trinidad were represented
by Atty. Villa while Atty. Azarraga represented Maricar,
Karen, and the other heirs of the late Antonio (son of
Trinidad) with respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos as
collaborating counsel. In the course of the proceedings,
the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio moved for
the removal of EmilioOrola, the husband of Trinidad, as
administrator and, in his stead, sought the appointment of
Manuel Orola, which the RTC granted. Subsequently,
respondent filed an Entry of Appearance as collaborating
counsel for Emilio in the same case and moved for the
reconsideration of the RTC Order.
Due to the respondents new engagement,
complainants (Heirs of Trinidad and Karen) filed a
disbarment complaint before the IBP, claiming that he
violatedRule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook to
represent conflicting interests in the subject case, and
Section 20, Rule 138 as he breached the trust and
confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of
Antonio. Complainants claimed that while Maricar, the
surviving spouse of Antonio and the mother of Karen,
consented to the withdrawal of respondents appearance,
the same was obtained only on October 18, 2007, or after
he had already entered his appearance for Emilio on
October 10, 2007. In this accord, respondent failed to
disclose such fact to all the affected heirs and, as such, was
not able to obtain their written consent as required under
the Rules.
In his defense, respondent contended that he
never appeared as counsel for the Heirs of Trinidad or for
the Heirs of Antonio. He averred that he only
accommodated Maricar's request to temporarily appear on
her behalf as their counsel of record could not attend the
scheduled June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings and that his
appearances thereat were free of charge. In fact, he
obtained Maricars permission for him to withdraw from
the case as no further communications transpired after
these two hearings. Finally, he clarified that his
representation for Emilio in the subject case was more of a
mediator, rather than a litigator, and that since no
settlement was forged between the parties, he formally
withdrew his appearance on December 6, 2007. In support
of his assertions, respondent submitted the affidavits of
Maricar and Atty. Azarragarelative to his limited
appearance and his consultation with Maricar prior to his
engagement as counsel for Emilio.

The IBP found respondent guilty of representing

conflicting interests only with respect to Karen. The
Investigating Commissioner observed that while
respondent's withdrawal of appearance was with the
express conformity of Maricar, respondent nonetheless
failed to obtain the consent of Karen, who was already of
age and one of the Heirs of Antonio, as mandated under
Rule 15.03 of the Code.On the other hand, the
Investigating Commissioner held that there was no
violation of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules as
complainants themselves admitted that respondent did
not acquire confidential information from his former client
nor did he use against the latter any knowledge obtained in
the course of his previous employment. A penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for six months was
imposed
against
respondent.
ISSUE: Is respondent guilty of representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code?
RULING: YES. The Court agrees with the IBPs finding
that respondent represented conflicting interests and,
perforce, must be held administratively liable therefor. (3month suspension)
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a
lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same
action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is
founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.
It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery
and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which
is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer
represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf
of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an
issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the
other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for
the other client. This rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict

of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will

require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any
knowledge
acquired
through
their
connection.(Hornilla v. Salunat)
It must, however, be noted that a lawyers
immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers
employment with the client.
In this case, when respondent proceeded to
represent Emilio, who was removed for committing acts
prejudicial to the interest of the heirs, for the purpose of
seeking his reinstatement as administrator in the same case,
he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of
Antonio particularly, Karen in violation of the abovestated rule.Respondent's justification that no confidential
information was relayed to him cannot fully exculpate him
for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of
interests, as enunciated in Hornilla, provides an absolute
prohibition from representation with respect to opposing
parties in the same case. That respondents previous
appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was
only a friendly accommodation cannot equally be given
any credence since the aforesaid rule holds even if the
inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if the
lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to
represent conflicting interests.
Neither can respondent's asseveration that his
engagement by Emilio was more of a mediator than a
litigator and for the purpose of forging a settlement among
the family members render the rule inoperative. In fact,
even on that assertion, his conduct is likewise improper
since Rule 15.04, Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires
the lawyer to obtain the written consent of all concerned
before he may act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in
settling disputes. Irrefragably, respondent failed in this
respect as the records show that respondent was remiss in
his duty to make a full disclosure of his impending
engagement as Emilios counsel to all the Heirs of Antonio
particularly, Karen and equally secure their express
written consent before consummating the same.
Canon 16
CESAR A. ESPIRITU, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
JUAN CABREDO IV, RESPONDENT.
Adm. Case No. 5831, January 13, 2003

Money or other trust property of the client coming into the possession
of the lawyer should be reported by the latter and accounted for
promptly and should not, under any circumstances, be commingled
with his own or be used by him.

RULING: Yes. Respondent is administratively liable for

his failure to account for P51, 161.00 received from his
client and to restitute it without any reason; he should be
suspended for one year.

Two promissory notes were issued by Esphar

Medical Center, (Esphar) Inc. and its president Cesar
Espiritu and a certain John Doe, obligating themselves to
pay solidarily, in favor of Gencars and Citimotors. The
PNs were secure by two separate chattel mortgage on two
vehicles. Espharet al. defaulted in their obligation and
consequently, BPI-FSB, as holder of the said promissory
note, sought to foreclose the two mortgage. The BPI
Family Savings Bank Inc. filed two complaints for replevin
and damages against Esphar, Espiritu and John Doe.
Subsequently, Espiritu engaged the services of
Atty. Cabredo, herein respondent, to represent him in the
two civil cases. While the cases were pending in court,
Atty. Cabredo advised Esphar to remit money and update
payments to BPI-FSB through the trial court. Accordingly,
Esphars representative, delivered a total of P51,161.00 to
Atty. Cabredos office. Later on, when Atty. Cabredo failed
to appear at a hearing of the civil cases, the management of
Esphar found out that he did not deliver the sum of
P51,161.00 to the court or BPI-FSB. The management of
Esphar then agreed to settle the cases amicably. For this
reason, a joint motion to dismiss was filed by the parties,
and the cases were dismissed. Thereafter, Espiritu filed a
complaint against Atty. Cabredo for fraud.

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN

TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF
HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.

In his answer, respondent Cabredo admitted that

his secretary, Rose Tria, had indeed received P51,161.00
from Esphar, but claimed that Tria failed to inform him
about it. It was only when he read Esphars first demand
letter dated that he learned for the first time about the
receipt of the money. Respondent claimed that he failed to
get complainants subsequent demand letters because of
lapses on the part of his staff. He thus shifted the blame
on his staff.
Acting on the complaint, the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline scheduled a hearing. However, the
respondent failed to appear five times despite notice thus,
making the case submitted for resolution based on the
pleadings submitted by the parties. Respondent was found
guilty of violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended that the latter be
suspended from the practice of law for three months and
ordered to return the amount of P51,161.00 to Esphar.
ISSUE: Is respondent administratively liable for his failure
to account for the money he received from his client?

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is

highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity and
good faith. Hence, in dealing with trust property, a lawyer
should be very scrupulous. Money or other trust
property of the client coming into the possession of
the lawyer should be reported by the latter and
accounted for promptly and should not, under any
circumstances, be commingled with his own or be
used by him.
In this case, respondent claims that he did not
know about the receipt by his secretary on the amount of
P51,161.00 received from Esphar until he read the first
demand letter of the company. However, even after
receiving this notice and two other demand letters,
respondent never returned the money of complainant nor
paid it to the bank. Indeed, it is improbable that
respondents secretary failed to inform complainant about
the receipt of such a substantial sum of money. In failing
to account for the money of his client, respondent violated
not only the Code of Professional Responsibility but also
his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his
clients. Like judges, lawyers must not only be proper
but they must also appear to be so. This way, the
peoples faith in the justice system would remain
unshaken.
It appears that respondent, while now a practicing
lawyer, was a former judge. Thus, he should have known
the ethical precepts guiding lawyers who handle money
given to them in trust by their clients and the necessary
consequences for violation thereof.From the evidence
presented by complainant, which respondent failed to
rebut, it is clear that the breach of trust committed by
respondent amounted to deceit, as well as a violation of his
oath, for which he should be penalized with either
disbarment or suspension.