People vs.

Baluntong
Facts:
Ferdinand Baluntong set on fire, the house of Celerina Solangon, causing the complete
destruction of the said house and the death of Celerina Solangon and Alvin Savarez, and
inflicting serious physical injuries on Joshua Savarez, thereby performing all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless
do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

The Trial Court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of double
murder and frustrated murder. He is sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but in light of the passage of R.A.
9346, it reduced the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua.

Issue:
Were the courts correct in charging the accused the complex crime of double murder and
frustrated murder?

Held:

The Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW one is rendered
finding appellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Arson
under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
no eligibility for parole and other civil damages modified.

In determining the offense committed by appellant, People v. Malngan teaches:

In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were
perpetrated whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain
the main objective of the malefactor:

(a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or
on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed;
(b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a
building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime
committed is murder only; lastly,
(c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already
done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and
distinct crimes committed homicide/murder and arson.

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, Amending the Law on Arson, reads:

Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua
shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following: (2) Any inhabited house or
dwelling;

The Court finds that there is no showing that appellants main objective was to kill Celerina and
her housemates and that the fire was resorted to as the means to accomplish the goal.

Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire to kill the occupants,
appellant cannot be held liable for double murder with frustrated murder. Celerina was outside
the house at the time it was set on fire. She merely entered the burning house to save her
grandsons.

While the above-quoted Information charged appellant with Double Murder with Frustrated
Murder, appellant may be convicted of Arson. For the only difference between a charge for
Murder under Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code and one for Arson under the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613, lies in the intent in pursuing the act.

As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the occupants of the
house, the crime would only be arson, the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence,
absorbed by arson.

When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense charged is included or necessarily includes the offense proved,

conviction shall be for the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.

Under Section 5 of P.D. 1613, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is imposed when
death results. In the light of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty should be
reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE vs. MURCIA

Facts:
The premise of the petition at hand is the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals affirming
with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, which found appellant Jessie
Villegas Murcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of arson and frustrated homicide.
The above-named accused, motivated by some evil motive, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously set fire and burn a residential house knowing the same to be inhabited
by one Felicidad M. Quilates burning and killing said Felicidad M. Quilates as well as burning
and damaging nine other neighboring houses in the process wherein the charge is qualified by the
resulting death of Felicidad M. Quilates. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both
charges. However as the case proceeded, appellant admitted to the crime of frustrated homicide,
hence the review is limited to the crime of arson but appellant maintains his innocence of the
charge of arson and challenges the credibility of the witnesses who testified against him.
Issue:
Whether appellant is guilty of the crime of arson.
Held:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals further stating that the
testimony of the witnesses having withstood the scrutiny of the lower courts is deemed credible.
The lower courts found appellant liable under Article 320(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7659. It may not be amiss to point out that there are
actually two categories of arson, namely: Destructive Arson under Article 320 of the Revised
Penal Code and Simple Arson under Presidential Decree No. 1316. Said classification is based
on the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage
caused. Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private,
hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. On the other hand, Presidential
Decree No. 1316 covers houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations,
railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments.

People v. Malngan (G.R. No. 170470)

Facts:

On January 2, 2001, Edna, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa Sr. was accused
of setting fire the house of his employer resulted in the destruction of his employers house and
the death of six persons including his employer Roberto Separa Sr., some seven adjoining
residential houses, were also razed by fire.

She was apprehended by the Barangay Chairman and was brought to the Barangay Hall.
She was then identified by a neighbor, whose house was also burned, as the housemaid of the
Separas and upon inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellants bag.
Thereafter, accused-appellant confessed to the Barangay Chairman.

On January 9, 2001, an information was filed before the RTC of Manila, charging the
accused-appellant with the crime of Arson with multiple homicide. The RTC as well as the Court
of Appeals finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson with multiple
homicide.

Issue:
Whether or not Edna Malngan was guilty of the crime of destructive arson or simple
arson?

Decision:
The crime committed by the accused-appellant is Simple Arson and not Arson with
Multiple Homicide. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no complex crime of Arson with
Multiple Homicide. There are two laws that govern the crime of arson where death results
therefrom Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 5 of Presidential Decree 1613,
quoted hereunder, to wit:
Revised Penal Code
Art. 320. Destructive Arson xxxx If as a consequence of
the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death
results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
Presidential Decree No. 1613
Sec. 5. Where Death Results from Arson if by reason of
or on the occasion of the arson death results, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed.
Both laws provide only one penalty for the commission of arson, whether considered
destructive or otherwise, where death results therefrom. The reason is that arson is itself the end
and death is simply the consequence.
The case falls under simple arson since from a reading of the body of the information it
can be seen that it states that the accused, with intent to cause damage, xxx deliberately set fire
upon the two-storey residential house, xxx that by reason and on the occasion of the said fire, xxx
which were the direct cause of their death xxx. It is clear that her intent was merely to destroy
her employers house through the use of fire.
When fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be in a house and
that objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal Code
declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be

purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to take life.
In other words, if the main object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder.
But if the main objective is the burning of the building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed
by the crime of arson. The latter being the applicable one in this case.
PEOPLE vs. OLIVA
Facts:
On August 23, 1993, at around eleven o'clock in the evening, Avelino and his family were
sleeping in their house. Avelino went out to urinate. He saw the accused-appellant set roof of
their house on fire with a lighted match. One of the neighbors, Benjamin, went to the nearby
river and fetched water with a pail. As Benjamin was helping put out the fire, he was shot by the
accused. The gunshot wound caused Benjamin's death. Information for arson and for murder
was filed separately against the accused and the other three co-accused.
Issues:
Whether accused-appellant is guilty of arson.
Held:
Whether the victim was shot while he was on the street or when he was pouring water on the
burning roof is irrelevant to the crime. The two witnesses on that aspect are not necessarily
inconsistent. The Court agrees with the solicitor general that Benjamin could have been on the
street while pouring water on the burning roof. There is no need to prove that the accused had
actual knowledge that the was burned is inhabited. There was treachery where the victim, while
he was merely acting as good neighbor, innocently helping out the fire, when shot, unaware of
the fatal attack on him.

PEOPLE V. ACOSTA (GR. NO. 126351)

FACTS:
Appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo was a 38-year old mason, married, and a resident
ofBarrio Makatipo, Kalookan City, at the time of the offense charged. He used to be
a goodfriend of Almanzor "Elmer" Montesclaros, the grandson of private
complainant, Filomena M.Marigomen. On February 27, 1996, a few hours before the
fire, Montesclaros, in the belief thatappellant and his wife were the ones hiding his
live-in partner from him, stormed the house ofappellant and burned their clothes,
furniture, and appliances. Montesclaros lived in the houseowned by said
complainant and located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights Subdivision,
BarrioMakatipo, Kalookan City. It was this house allegedly set on fire by appellant.At
about 4:00 to 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, the nephew
ofprosecution witness Mona Aquino called the latter, simultaneously shouting that
appellantRaul Acosta, their neighbor, was carrying a stove and a kitchen knife. She
went out of herhouse and approached appellant who, when asked why he was
carrying a stove and a knife,replied that he would burn the house of complainant
Filomena M. Marigomen.Owing to the fearsome answer of appellant to witness
Aquinos query, she returnedimmediately to her house. A few minutes after closing
the door, she heard the sound of brokenbottles and the throwing of chair inside the
house of complainant. When she peeped throughher kitchen door, she saw
appellant inside complainants house, which was unoccupied at thattime.
Thereafter, appellant poured kerosene on the bed (papag) and lighted it with
cigarettelighter. The fire was easily put off by appellants wife who arrived at the
place.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of arson.

HELD:
In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the following
circumstancestaken together constitute an unbroken chain of events pointing to one
fair and logicalconclusion, that accused started the fire which gutted the house of
private complainant.Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the
arson, we agree with the trialcourt in holding him guilty thereof in the light of the
following circumstances duly proved andon record:First, appellant had the motive to
commit the arson. It is not absolutely necessary, and it isfrequently impossible for
the prosecution to prove the motive of the accused for thecommission of the crime
charged, nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, theexistence or nonexistence of a sufficient motive is a fact affecting the credibility of thewitnesses.
Appellant had every reason to feel aggrieved about the incident and to retaliate
inkind against Montesclaros and his grandmother.Second, appellants intent to
commit the arson was established by his previous attempt to seton fire a bed
("papag") inside the same house (private complainants) which was burned laterin
the night. Prosecution witness Mona Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in the
afternoon ofthe same day, she saw appellant carrying a gas stove and knife.