Theoretical, Information Processing, and Situational Factors Affecting Attribution Theory

Models of Organizational Behavior

Author(s): Robert G. Lord and Jonathan E. Smith
Source: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Jan., 1983), pp. 50-60
Published by: Academy of Management
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?Academy of Management Review 1983, Vol. 8, No. 1, 50-60

Theoretical, Information
Processing, and
Attribution
Factors
Situational
Affecting
of
Models
Behavior1
Theory
Organizational
ROBERT G. LORD
JONATHAN E. SMITH
University of Akron
Attributional theories used to explain organizational behavior are overly
restrictive. A ttributional processes may vary with the type of attributional
question addressed and with the level of information processing consistent
with situational or motivational factors. Several attributional principles
are organized into a typology involving type of attributional question and
level of information processing. Boundary conditions affecting the use of
particular principles are identified and the importance of differences
among attributional processes are discussed.
useful to consider several factors that affect these
applications of attributional theories. These restrictive factors can be analyzed using a framework that
focuses on both the type of attribution being made
and the level of information processing compatible
with constraints of the situation and the attributor.
In this paper two dimensions will be used-type of
attribution and level of information processing-to
develop a typology of principles for forming attributions.

Attribution theory recently has been applied to

several topics of concern to organizational researchers. For example, Mitchell and his associates (Green
& Liden, 1980; Green & Mitchell, 1979; Ilgen &
Knowlton, 1980; Knowlton & Mitchell, 1980;
Mitchell, Green, & Wood, 1981; Mitchell & Wood,
1980) have used supervisors' causal attributions to
explain their reactions to subordinates' performance. Other researchers have relied on attributions and implicit theories to explain the effects of
bogus performance feedback on a variety of perceptions. Binning and Lord (1980) and Staw (1975)
found that performance affected perceptions of
numerous group processes. Several researchers
(Lord, Binning, Rush, & Thomas, 1978; Mitchell,
Larson, & Green, 1977; Rush, Thomas, & Lord,
1977; Staw & Ross, 1980) have shown that performance feedback affects leadership ascriptions or
perceptions of leader behavior. Finally, several
researchers concerned with motivation have linked
attributions to internal factors to intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1975; Fisher, 1978; Phillips & Lord,
1980). Such works represent fruitful applications of
social psychological theories to applied topics. It is

Type of Attribution
The type of attribution is important because
several distinct questions have been explored by attribution theory research. In particular, attribution
theory may be applied to understanding causality
for a specific event (Kelley, 1973), to assessing responsibility for a particular outcome (Hamilton,
1980), or to assess the personal qualities of persons
involved in the event being considered (Jones & Davis, 1965).
Attributions concerning causal assessments involve producing explanations for unexpected or
puzzling events. Attributors typically are viewed as
following logical or quasi-scientific processes
through which they assign relative priority to poten-

'An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual

meeting of the Academy of Management, San Diego, 1981.

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amount of information processing they assume. Indeed, conceptually, one might employ a continuum
that ranges from the assumption that attributors are
highly active, involved information processors to an
assumption that they are passive and limited information processors as one describes differences in attributional theories. Recent research on cognition
and social judgment supports such an approach.
Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) and Shiffrin and
Schneider (1977) argue that a stimulus can evoke
either a controlled cognitive process in which the individual consciously processes information (stimuli)
as he or she makes decisions or an automatic process that does not require conscious monitoring of
stimuli. Evidence from encoding information into
memory also suggests that the process varies in regard to energy or attentional requirements (Hasher
& Zacks, 1979). Encoding may be relatively
automatic and use little energy from the attentional
mechanism, or it may be highly effortful and
elaborate. Finally, this distinction also can be recognized in the area of attribution theory (Feldman,
1981). Kelley (1973), Jones and Davis (1965), and
Weiner (1972) postulate that attributions occur as a
result of individuals seeking explanations for
behavior. They emphasize a rational or effortful
process in which the individual weighs or considers
multiple pieces of information in a conscious attempt to explain situations or understand individuals. However, recent research points out that
sometimes one responds to cues in a "mindless"
manner (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) or one responds
via an established pattern or script (Abelson, 1976).
In these instances, the attributional process requires
little effort. Moreover, as Lowe and Kassin (1980)
have recently argued, attributions in everyday situations may be guided as much by perceptual factors
as by the cognitive factors emphasized in experimental studies. These two dimensions-type of
attribution and level of information processing-are used to develop the typology of attributional principles presented in Table 1. The principles associated with a high level of information
processing have received widespread attention and,
therefore, will not be discussed further. However,
the attributional principles associated with a low
level of information processing have not received
sufficient consideration.

tial causal agents such as actors, situations, or circumstances. The key issue in assessing causality involves deciding whether the event in question would
have occurred without the presence of a particular
agent (Hamilton, 1980). Thus, necessary factors are
assigned highest causal priority. For example, Kelley's (1973) covariation principles can be viewed as
describing rules for determining whether an event
would have occurred in the absence of particular actors, entities, or circumstances (time) because
events would covary only with necessary factors.
Attributions concerning responsibility assessments involve a somewhat different issue-whether
sanctions should be administered to a particular actor (Hamilton, 1980). Although responsibility generally is assigned to causally predominant sources,
responsibility assessments may be mitigated by factors such as foreseeability, intention, and justification (Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; Heider, 1958).
Moreover, responsibility sometimes may be assigned to sources of low priority in causal explanations. Here the key issue is whether an actor could
have produced a different outcome by behaving differently (Hamilton, 1980). Thus, even if most leaders would behave similarly in a given situation,
leading to similarly bad outcomes and yielding causal assessments to entities and circumstances, each
would be held responsible if by behaving otherwise
she/he could have produced different outcomes. It
is to be noted that leadership positions often may
involve responsibility for outcomes even though
leaders may not be causally important (Pfeffer,
1977).
Attribution of personal qualities emphasizes a
third issue-determining the qualities of individuals
that generalize across situations and time. Thus, the
key question involves determining how to characterize a particular social stimulus. Although personal qualities may be inferred from behaviors or
their outcomes (Jones & Davis, 1965), such generalizations also may be based on characteristics such as
race, sex, cultural background, or appearance.
Thus, implicit theories and social stereotypes also
are related to attributions of personal qualities.

Level of Information Processing

Level of information processing appropriate to
the attributor or situation also is important because
alternative theoretical explanations differ in the
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Tablel
Principles Used by Attribution Theories
Type of Attribution

Level of
of
Level
Information
Processing

Causality

High

Covariation
Configuration

Low

Salience
Temporal proximity
Spatial proximity

Responsibility
Intent
Control
Justification
Formal role

Personal
Characteristics
Correspondence
Prototype fit
Critical feature fit
Context

tional performance often is attributed to immediately prior management decisions rather than
to events in the more distant past (i.e., the development of inferior products).
In short, it is argued that causality often may be
assessed by either a passively (salience) or heuristically (proximity) directed search for the first sufficient cause for an outcome. In other words, once a
sufficient cause has been identified, search for or
evaluation of other possible causes should be terminated. Because salient or proximal causes (such
as people) tend to be considered first and often are
plausible explanations, they should predominate as
explanations of causality. Such processes should
place limited demands on the human information
processing system. The present authors feel that
these may be better descriptions of humans' typical
causal assessments than the quasiscientific models-associated with a high level of information
processing in Table 1.

Causality
The amount of information processing needed to
make causal assessments can be minimized in several ways. The foremost is that people generally
may be satisfied with the first "satisfactory" causal
explanation that comes to mind (Taylor & Fiske,
1978). Thus, if there were some mechanism by
which more plausible explanations would be considered first, very few (and frequently only one)
plausible explanations would be considered in most
situations. Taylor and Fiske argue that, for the
most part, attention is such a mechanism and that
it, in turn, is directed to a large extent by salience.
Accordingly, people attend to and "see causality
in" salient sources. To Taylor and Fiske, such
salience arises either from distinctive qualities of the
social stimulus or from the centrality of a particular
cause in an attributor's memory schema.
Their point seems well taken, but there may be
factors other than salience that direct attention to
plausible causes. One may be a tendency to look for
causes that are physically proximal to an effect; this
would be particularly important when visual search
for causes predominate. For example, equipment
breakdowns often are attributed to the operator
rather than defective materials or poor maintenance. Another factor, temporal proximity or
closeness in time, would seem to be particularly important when searching memory for possible
causes. Because common sense suggests that causes
must precede results, one may merely search backward from the event in question to the first plausible cause when making causal attributions. If, as
Hasher and Zacks (1979) argue, temporal information is automatically encoded or if temporal order
can be inferred from well learned scripts (Schank &
Ableson, 1977), such a limited search should be
quite feasible and may not be consciously directed
or monitored. For example, a change in organiza-

Responsibility
Although it is comforting to believe that responsibility assessments are guided by logical principles
such as assessment of intent, control, or justification (and in legal proceedings they are), it is suspected that in many situations (or for many people)
cognitively simpler, albeit less logical, principles
predominate. For example, perceivers may assign
responsibility for role related outcomes to role occupants (Hamilton, 1980), assuming that these individuals, through different actions, could have
produced different outcomes. In administering
sanctions, mitigating circumstances may not even
be considered. Thus, leaders may be replaced when
their subordinates perform poorly, or employees
may be sanctioned for failure to attain goals
without extensive analysis on the part of the sanctioner. Such sanctions may be administered even
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BoundaryConditions

when recipients lack control over outcomes for

which they are held responsible because sanctioners
use cognitively simple rules for determining responsibility or because organizational policy determines
sanctioning (Green & Mitchell, 1979).

The model, as presented in Table 1, argues that

attributional processes differ in the type of information processing that is used. Among the potential
determinants of this difference in effortfulness or
consciousness of information processing are such
factors as situational
the
characteristics,
attributor's motives, and individual differences
among attributors. Whether the attributor engages
in an active, conscious effort to understand his
world or whether she/he expends little energy,
passively processing information may be determined by such boundary conditions. It is believed
that analysis of such boundary conditions can be
best accomplished by assuming a minimum level of
information processing and then articulating the
factors that should increase the amount of processing capacity allocated to attributional questions. In
other words, it is believed that attributional questions generally are described by the passive, unconscious processes described in the bottom row of
Table 1; the less common, controlled processes
should occur only under the specific circumstances
noted below. However, due to their more conscious
nature, controlled processes should predominate in
memory for or description of attributional processes.
There are several situational or contextual factors
that should increase the level of information processing involved in forming attributions. One concerns the extent to which the actions or outcomes
being evaluated are consistent with past impressions
of an actor. Actions that are inconsistent with prior
expectations should lead attributors to conscious
assessment of causality (Feldman, 1981; Wong &
Weiner, 1981). A second factor concerns norms or
cues inherent in a situation. For example, a performance evaluation context would probably produce
more systematic, consciously directed attributions
than occur in the day to day interactions between
superiors and subordinates. Along these lines, Wilson, Hull, and Johnson (1981) reported that reasoning primes were required before subjects consciously attended to attributional questions associated
with the intrinsic interest of a task. A third factor
concerns the informational context to which an attributor is exposed. When attributionally relevant
information is easily available and is in a form consistent with conscious, reflective processes (e.g.,

Personal Characteristics
Sometimes trait or personal characteristic assessments may reflect quasi-logical inferences from
behavior as suggested by Jones and Davis (1965).
However, it is suggested that less conscious and less
demanding means of forming impressions of others
may predominate. In many situations, attention
and information processing capacity is directed at
task, situational, or self-related factors while interaction takes place, thereby precluding elaborate
or consciously controlled assessments of personal
qualities. Nevertheless, trait assessments still seem
to be formed in these situations, suggesting more
automatic processes.
How might such processing proceed? On the simplest level, people might be classified by the fit of
their behavior, appearance, dress, and so on with
category prototypes (Cantor & Mischel, 1979;
Lord, Foti, & Phillips, 1982). Alternatively, there
may be critical features that map social stimuli into
contrasting sets, as with sex. Also, people may use
context as a means of assessing traits (people in
libraries are intellectual). Such principles would
equate the perceptual organization that makes stimuli meaningful with trait ascriptions. That is, trait
ascriptions would result from processes by which
people recognize stimuli, not from logical analysis.
On a somewhat more sophisticated level, subjects
may generalize from ascribed traits to other traits.
Thus, they may base inferences on implicit theories
or stereotypes that are thought to be generally applicable. Again, such inferences may not be conscious, may not use much information processing
capacity, and often may not be logical (or correct).
A more cognitively demanding means to assess
personal qualities would incorporate information
on intent, reliability (consistency), or personal versus situational determinism. At this level, one
would expect conscious awareness of an attributional process and a need to devote a substantial
portion of one's controllable processing capacity to
the attributional task.
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written or graphic information), more cognitive

modes of attributions should be elicited (Lowe &
Kassin, 1980).
A final situational factor is the available processing capacity that can be allocated to the attributional task. Hasher and Zacks (1979) have argued
that controlled or effortful processing involves a
limited capacity conscious system, whereas automatic processing is relatively independent of such
contraints. Thus, other cognitive tasks that also require use of this limited "attentional capacity"
would interfere with controlled processing but not
with automatic processing. Therefore, it is argued
that people will use controlled processes only when
there is available capacity-that is, capacity not being used by task, self, or socially related cognitive
activities.
Motivational factors also may serve to increase
the level of information processing directed to attributional questions. For example, the level of information processing may be dependent on the involvements of the observer. This "contingency" aspect of information processing has been suggested
in several decision contexts (Chaiken, 1980; Langer,
Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978; McAllister, Mitchell, &
Beach, 1979). Research that has manipulated prospect of future interaction (Berscheid, Graziano,
Monson, & Dermer, 1976) also lends some limited
support to the notion that involvement may be a determinant of the extent of information processing.
Persons who anticipate future interactions (involvement) attend more to the other and remember more
about the other than do persons who anticipate no
interaction-suggesting that they differ in information processing. In a related vein, Jones and Davis
(1965) argue that hedonic relevance leads to dispositional attributions. Perhaps hedonic relevance, personal importance or involvement, also increases attentional energy or the effort expended in information processing. An individual who depends on
another for rewards probably engages in conscious
efforts to understand that other individual.
Another constraint related to involvement might
focus on the need for control. Kelley (1971) postulates that one not only seeks to understand the
world but also seeks to control it. Wong and Weiner's (1981) assertion that individuals do not think
in terms of attributions unless confronted with
failure or unexpected events would be consistent
with Kelley's argument. Faced with failure or sur-

prised by unanticipated results, individuals might

search for ways to avoid future failures or unpleasant surprises. Such an argument has implications
regarding information processing. In situations in
which individuals feel in control, they may process
information automatically. However, in situations
in which individuals perceive a need to establish
control of the environment, they probably engage
in controlled or effortful processing. Thus, when
introduced to new co-workers, others should actively attend to the new workers' behaviors and attempt
to "size them up."
Still another motivational constraint may be the
need for cognitive consistency. Festinger's (1957)
theory of cognitive dissonance postulates that people find cognitive dissonance stressful and seek to
be cognitively consonant. When dissonance does
occur, it can be reduced by changing a cognition,
adding new cognitions, or reducing the importance
of a cognition. These cognitive changes can occur
unconsciously; however, in situations of extreme
stress and when both cognitions are important, the
individual may have to engage in an active search or
review of information to reduce the dissonance.
The vast body of research on individual differences in information processing is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, the boundary condition or moderating effect of individual differences
upon the extent of required information processing
must be recognized. For example, field dependence
(Witkin & Goodenough, 1977), repression-sensitization (Byrne, 1964), and self-esteem (Weiss &
Knight, 1980) are just three of the many areas that
may have implications for the effortfulness of information processing related to attributional questions.

Ordering of Attributional
and Behavioral Processes
Up to this point, the analysis has avoided the
question of how attributions tie into behavior or attitude change. In most typical attributional models,
attributional assessments precede behavior. For example, the Green and Mitchell (1979) model depicts
leaders' causal attributions as preceding their
behavior toward subordinates. This is fully consistent with the logical, cognitive emphasis found in
the attributional models associated with a high level
of information processing in Table 1. However,
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Implications of Attributional Typology

there may be many instances in which behavior is

contrained or determined by external factors, and
in those situations attributions may follow
behaviors as part of a justification or rationalization process (Staw, 1980). Experimental evidence illustrating such ordering has been provided by
Strickland (1958) in the area of monitoring
behavior and more recently by Wilson, Hull, and
Johnson (1981) in assessing the relationship of overjustification to intrinsic motivation. Kipnis,
Schmidt, Price, and Stitt (1981) also found that
behavioral differences in the leadership styles and
influence tactics of managers of experimental work
crews induced managers to make different attributions concerning workers' motivation and different
evaluations of workers' performance.
A somewhat more complex picture of ordering
emerges when one considers the relations among the
various types of attributional principles presented
in Table 1. For example, consider the question of
whether an individual possesses leadership qualities. Highly cognitive models explaining leadership
perceptions (Calder, 1977) might build on Jones
and Davis's (1965) principles of correspondent inference to explain attributional processes, whereas
less cognitive models might rely on principles such
as the match of the stimulus person in question to
the perceiver's leadership prototype (Lord et al.,
1982). Recent experimental studies now suggest that
this latter more automatic process may precede the
former, more controlled, process in explaining
leadership perceptions (Cronshaw & Lord, 1982;
Phillips & Lord, 1981).
These results are consistent with an information
processing model in which social information is encoded and organized via automatic processes that
required minimal processing capacity and minimal
conscious attention. If subsequent causal assessments were made, they would be based on the information input and organized by such automatic processes. This model also is consistent with recent
work by Wilson et al. (1981) and Wong and Weiner
(1981) that used unobtrusive methodologies that did
not force subjects to think in attributional terms.
They found that subjects did not think in attributional terms unless induced to do so by inconsistencies of results with expectations, failures, or experimenter provided reasoning primes that engage
inferential processes.

It has been argued that researchers often have

failed to distinguish adequately among different attributional questions and among the various informational processes by which these questions could
be addressed by attributors. Moreover, attributional processes usually have been considered antecedents to associated cognitive or behavioral processes of attributors. The possibility that attributions follow related cognitions or behaviors, as they
may in rationalization or reconstructive processes,
rarely has been considered.
Theoretical Implications
One obvious implication of this typology is that
no single model of attributional processes seems
adequate for describing the thought processes
grouped under the rubric of attribution theory.
Humans seem quite eclectic in the principles they
can use to form attributions. In order to describe attributional processes accurately, therefore, researchers must be equally eclectic. Further, they
must be careful in generalizing models of attributional processes developed in a particular context to
other types of attributional questions or other situations.
The potential for overgeneralization can easily be
illustrated by considering superiors' attributions
concerning their subordinates. Superiors' responses
to poor performing subordinates might best be described by principles related to causality if their
focus is on understanding poor performance or on
generating remedial responses (e.g., training programs). Alternatively, if the emphasis is on administering sanctions to poor performing employees,
superiors may be described better by the principles
related to responsibility attributions in Table 1.
Finally, if superiors are required to predict future
subordinate behavior, it would be expected that
principles pertinent to assessing personal qualities
would be most descriptive.
The problem of overgeneralization becomes more
severe if one simultaneously considers both dimensions of Table 1, for superiors may address some attributional questions in a conscious, logical fashion
while using more automatic processes for other
questions. For example, personal qualities (traits)
may be continually assessed during normal interactions with subordinates using fairly automatic pro55

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cesses, but more controlled processes may predominate under the infrequent situations in which sanctions are considered. The consequences of this example for researchers concerned with superior attributional processes are straightforward. That is,
one must not only identify attributional principles,
but must also specify the type of questions and
situational factors that determine which principles
are likely to be used.
A second implication for scientific inquiry concerns the chameleon-like nature of human attributors. It is maintained that the type of information
processes used to form attributions varies with the
motivation of attributors, the form and amount of
information presented them, the available processing capacity to devote to attributional questions,
and the primes or cues inherent in particular situations. Such factors, alone or in combination, may
easily determine whether controlled or more
automatic processes are used in forming attributions. Thus, the troublesome problem of demand
characteristics (Orne, 1969) seems particularly germane to studies of attributional processes. As Lowe
and Kassin (1980) point out, experimenters interested in testing more cognitive (controlled)
models of attributional processes can easily induce
such processes by their choice of methodologies.
A related problem concerns the obtrusiveness and
limitations of data collection strategies. Wong and
Weiner (1981) point out that most data on attributional processes are collected via self-report procedures. Such procedures may prime attributional
processes, leading subjects to think in terms of attributional questions they otherwise would not address. Moreover, such measures may be biased in
that the more automatic processes may be less accessible to subjects (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson
et al., 1981) and, therefore, may not be adequately
measured by self-report techniques. There is a clear
need for development of more varied methodologies for measuring attributions. Such methodologies should be designed to tap both perceptual
and more cognitive processes and should not be
based solely on subjects' retrospective insight into
their own information processing.
One potential approach would be to investigate
attributions by analyzing protocols generated by
subjects while performing the behavior in question.
As Ericsson and Simon (1980) note, to be accurate
such verbal reports should be concurrent rather

than retrospective and should describe ongoing processes rather than judgments requiring inferences or
generalizations. Alternatively, one could use openended questions to probe attributions rather than
the more common ratings of several experimenter
provided causal sources (e.g., ability). Ratings of
explicit causal sources are troublesome because
items may prime the causal source being rated and
thereby may affect ratings. One recent study (Kroeck, 1982) compared open-ended responses that
were content analyzed by a procedure based on Elig
and Frieze (1979) to ratings of a list of plausible
causal sources (e.g., effort, ability, luck). Kroeck
found frequent mention of perceptually based information (e.g., appearance) when using an open
format measure of attributions. Moreover, such information was more predictive of rating on some
dimensions (leadership potential and promotability)
than was a structured format in which subjects
rated experimenter provided causes.
A final theoretical concern stems from the potential for what can be labeled hybrid attributional
processes. Such processes would involve combinations of the principles presented in Table 1. Hybrid
processes would seem particularly likely when attributional questions are addressed over a period of
time in which the informational or motivational
perspective of the attributor may change or when
attributional processes are related to other
behavioral or attitudinal processes. One example of
a hybrid process may be when information that is
encoded, stored, and retrieved by automatic processes is evaluated by more controlled processes at
some later point in time. For example, workers may
be categorized as either high or low performer types
over many interactions and with little systematic or
conscious processing by superiors. Later on, superiors may consciously assess subordinates ability, a
process that on the surface resembles a controlled
process. However, as Lingle and Ostrom (1979)
have demonstrated, this latter judgment may be
derived from prior judgments. Futhermore, prior
judgments may lead to selective recall of information consistent with already formed opinions
(Hastie, 1981). The reverse process also may occur.
Once a quality is attributed to an individual by
some conscious, controlled process, this label may
lead to subsequent automatic encoding, storage,
and retrieval of information consistent with such a
label. For example, if good performance is ex56

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plained in terms of leadership (Pfeffer, 1977), one

would expect, during subsequent interactions,
leader relevant information to be automatically
processed because it would be consistent with a
previous attribution. An illustration of such a process in the political realm is provided by Foti,
Fraser, and Lord (1982).
Hybrid attributional processes may be particularly difficult to pin down. The view researchers get
may depend on how or when they interrupt the ongoing attributional process. Such processes also
may be difficult to alter through intervention if
change agents focus on the wrong part of the process. For example, attempts to train superiors to use
controlled, logical processes during performance
evaluation sessions may not be very effective if the
data on which such evaluations are based result
from more automatic processes.

that some individuals (e.g., actors, politicians) are

particularly sensitive to the image they project and
are adept at managing their images. Thus, a manager with a good grasp of the prototypes underlying
traits such as leadership or intelligence may be able
to project an image that will connote effective
leadership or intelligence to most perceivers.
Similarly, skillful subordinates may be able to exert
considerable control over their superior's attributions of causality, responsibility, or personal
characteristics. Recent laboratory research by
Wood and Mitchell (1981) has shown that impression management tactics produce the expected effects on performance evaluations and disciplinary
actions. Such image management generally is
undesirable from an organization-wide perspective,
but it is particularly troublesome if it occurs
through manipulation of automatic processes of
which managers and subordinates are unaware. A
greater understanding of the more automatic attributional processes may help to make such image
management more difficult.
A related issue concerns possible consequences
and causes of inaccurate attributions. Inaccurate attributions may lead to job dissatisfaction, low
motivation, or difficulties in effectively managing
conflict. A better understanding of how attributions are formed could lead to more effective means
to reduce misperceptions. For example, remedial
actions that emphasize cognitive factors such as
logic or information may be effective when inaccurate attributions are produced by controlled processes. When inaccuracies arise from more automatic processes, remedial actions based on other
principles may be more useful. For example, in such
cases inaccuracies may be reduced by altering the
salience of potential causes, by changing perceptions of role responsibilities, or by encouraging
(priming) the use of more appropriate prototypes.

Applied Implications
The typology of attributional principles presented in Table 1 also has several implications with
more direct practical relevance. One concerns the
likely effectiveness of attempts to train or alter attributional processes through instructions. It is
believed that training would be effective only for
the more active, consciously controlled processes.
Training automatic processes should be more difficult because they are overlearned, they may not be
controllable by subjects, and subjects may be unaware of or may even deny the use of automatic
processes. In support of this contention, it is
noteworthy that Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) did
train automatic processes affecting the input of information into short term memory, but such training took 1,500 trials with each subject.
The present authors are pessimistic concerning
the ability to train automatic processing easily or to
alter it through instructions to subjects, but they do
think that there are many means to produce shifts
from automatic to more controlled processing. Motivational factors, information processing parameters, or primes and situational cues may all be used
to induce more controlled or effortful attributional
processes.
An additional consequence of extensive use of
more automatic attributional processes warrants
discussion. This concerns the possibility that skillful
individuals may be able to manipulate or control
the attributions others form. Snyder (1979) argues

Future Research Implications

The typology presented here suggests directions
for future research. Theorists have failed to differentiate adequately among the three attributional
questions of causality, responsibility and dispositionality. Research needs to delineate better the
conditions that lead to each of these types of questions and to identify the mechanisms that produce a
shift from one to another. Also, the recognition
that attributions emerge as the result of complex or
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hybrid processes suggests that such attributions

must be considered as evolving across time rather
than as a momentary phenomena occuring in or at a
single experimental setting. One potentially important question raised by this perspective is whether
attributions formed immediately after observations
of behavior or outcomes would be qualitatively different from delayed attributions. It is suspected that
immediate attributions would be more dependent
on perceptual factors, whereas delayed attributions
may depend primarily on the ease with which attributors can recall information, as is suggested by the
findings of Ross and Sicoly (1979). A related consideration is that attributions that emerge as a
response to novel stimuli may differ from attributions in response to familiar stimuli. Perhaps novel
attributions require a more active mode of information processing than do attributions that only confirm or modify previous assessments.
It has been suggested here that attributions often
may involve various levels of information processing occuring at multiple points in time. This suggestion raises questions concerning the dynamic aspects of attributional processes. More specifically,
do changes in factors such as information load,

perceptual salience, or an attributor's motivation

produce shifts in the level of attributional processes
used in addressing a single attributional question?
Also, if such changes do occur, are attributors
aware that they are using qualitatively different
processes?.
Finally, the methodological issue of how best to
measure attributions deserves attention. Less obtrusive measures than questionnaire based selfreport techniques need to be developed. Moreover,
attention should be directed at the problem of adequate measurement of automatic attributional processes when attributors may not be consciously
aware of their use.
In conclusion, it has been argued that researchers
need to consider both the type of attributional question and the amount of information processing consistent with situational factors or attributor motivation when developing models of attributional processes. A typology of principles organized along
these two dimensions and the research implications
of this typology have been presented. The authors
hope this leads to a more comprehensive view of attributional processes than is typically found in the
applied literature.

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Robert G. Lord is Associate Professor of Psychology in

the Department of Psychology, University of Akron.
Jonathan E. Smith is Assistant Professor of Psychology
in the Department of Psychology, University of Akron.

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