EDWIN A. ACEBEDO, petitioner, vs. EDDIE P.

ARQUERO,
re spondent.

person baptized. It merely attests to the fact which gave rise to its
issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the fact of the administration of
the sacrament on the date stated, but not the truth of the
statements therein as to the parentage of the child baptized.

Courts; Court Personnel;Administrative Complaints; Once

administrative charges have been filed, the Supreme Court may not
be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth
thereof.While complainant appears to have lost interest in the
prosecution of the present case, the same does not ipso
facto warrant its dismissal. Once administrative charges have been
filed, this Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to
investigate and ascertain the truth thereof. For it has an interest
in the conduct of those in the service of the Judiciary and in
improving the delivery of justice to the people, and its efforts in
that direction may not be derailed by the complainants desistance
from prosecuting the case he initiated.

Same; Same; Marriage;Marriage is an inviolable social

institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation.Respondents justification
fails. Being an employee of the judiciary, respondent ought to have
known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on
the validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife.
Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. It is
an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules
established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the
stipulation of the parties.

Same; Same; Baptismal Certificates; A canonical certificate is

conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in conformity
with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the
child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and
statements contained therein which concern the relationship of the
person baptized.On the merits of the case, the entry of
respondents name as father in the baptismal certificate of Desiree
May I. Arquero cannot be used to prove her filiation and, therefore,
cannot be availed of to imply that respondent maintained illicit
relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo. A canonical certificate is
conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in conformity
with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized
the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and
statements contained therein which concern the relationship of the

Same; Same; Immorality;There is no dichotomy of morality

court employees are also judged by their private morals; A court
employees act of having illicit relations with the wife of another is a
disgraceful and immoral conduct.Although every office in the
government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an
individual than in the judiciary. That is why this Court has firmly
laid down exacting standards of morality and decency expected of
those in the service of the judiciary. Their conduct, not to mention
behavior, is circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility,
characterized by, among other things, propriety and decorum so as
to earn and keep the publics respect and confidence in the judicial
service. It must be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with
respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also to their

A.M. No. P-94-1054. March 11, 2003.

behavior outside the court as private individuals. There is no

dichotomy of morality; court employees are also judged by their
private morals. Respondents act of having illicit relations with
complainants wife is, within the purview of Section 46 (5) of
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987, a disgraceful and
immoral conduct.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.

Immorality.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

By his Answer of October 6, 1994, respondent vehemently

denied the charge of immorality, claiming that it is just a
(sic) mere harassment and a product of complainants hatred
and extreme jealousy to (sic) his wife. Attached to the
answer
were
the
September
27,1987 affidavit
of
desistance executed by complainant in favor of his wife with
respect to an administrative complaint he had much earlier
filed against her, and complainants sworn statement dated
September 13, 1994 acknowledging paternity of a child born
out of wedlock, which documents, respondent claims, support
his contention that the complaint filed against him is but a
malicious scheme concocted by complainant to harass him.
5

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
By letter-complaint dated June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo
charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Brookes Point, Palawan for immorality.
1

Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo,

a former stenographer of the MTC Brookes Point, and
respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as
husband and wife at Bancudo Pulot, Brookes Point, Palawan
as a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, was
born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to the lettercomplaint was the girls Baptismal Certificate reflecting the
names of respondent and Dedje Irader as her parents. Also
attached to the letter-complainant was a copy of a marriage
contract showing that complainant and Dedje Irader
contracted marriage on July 10, 1979.
2

By Resolution of September 7, 1994, this Court required

respondent to file an answer to the complaint.

Additionally, respondent claimed that sometime in 1991,

complainant likewise instituted a criminal complaint against
him for adultery which was, however, dismissed after
preliminary investigation.
Finally, respondent claimed that complainant himself had
been cohabiting with another woman.
By Resolution of February 6, 1995, this Court referred the
case to then Executive Judge Filomeno A. Vergara of the
Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan for
investigation, report and recommendation. Judge Vergara
having retired during the pendency of the investigation, the
case was referred to Executive Judge Nelia Y. Fernandez who
9

was, by Resolution of August 16, 2000, directed by this Court

to (1) verify the authenticity of the marriage certificate and
baptismal certificate submitted by complainant; (2) conduct
an investigation as to the information contained in the said
baptismal certificate and the circumstances under which it
was issued, and such other verifiable matters relevant to the
charge; and (3) submit her report and recommendation
thereon.
10

In her Investigation Report of February 12, 2001, Judge

Fernandez recommends that the complaint be dismissed for
failure to adduce adequate evidence to show that respondent
is guilty of the charge. The report focuses on the nonappearance of complainant and Dedje Irader Acebedo, thusly:
11

By Resolution of April 25, 2001, this Court referred the case

to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
By Memorandum of December 12, 2001, the OCA,
disagreeing with the recommendation of the Investigating
Judge that the case should be dismissed, recommends that
respondent be held guilty of immorality and that he be
suspended from office for a period of one (1) year without
pay. Thus the OCA ratiocinates:
13

. . . [R]espondent admitted the fact that for eight (8) to nine

(9)months, he a single man maintained relations with Dedje

Irader Acebedo, wife of herein complainant, attended with

sexual union (TSN dated 23 November 2000, pp. 14-15). Based

xxx

on his testimony, we observed that respondent justified his

Having appeared that the complainant Edwin Acebedo and

Dedjie Irader who per reliable information cannot be notified for
reason that subject persons are no longer residing in their given
address and their whereabouts is unknown as shown by the return
of the subpoena dated November 7, 2000, and the inadmissibility of
the baptismal certificate alleging therein that the father of Desiree
Arquero is the respondent herein, and for the reason that the same
had not been testified to by Dedje Irader who is the informant of
the entries contained therein, this Court had not received adequate
proof or relevant evidence to support a conclusion that respondent
herein could be held liable of the charge imputed against him,
hence, he should be absolved from any liability.

written document purportedly a Ka-

x x x (Quoted verbatim).

having a relationship with Dedje I. Acebedo solely on the

_______________
10

Id., at p. 69.

11

Report and Recommendation at p. 3.

12

Id.

13

Memorandum at p. 6.

14

12

SUPREME COURT
3

REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acebedo vs. Arquero

sunduan or agreement entered into by complainant and his

wife, consenting to and giving freedom to either of them to

seek any partner and to live with him or her. Being a court
employee respondent should have known that said agreement was
void despite it having been notarized. Even granting that Dedjie I.
Acebedo was separated from her husband during their short lived
relation, to hold on to said scandalous agreement and enter an
immoral relationship with a very much married woman and a cocourt-employee at that is highly improper. It is contrary to the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and
Employees which provides that public employees of which
respondent is one, x x x shall at times (sic) respect the rights of
others, andshall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and
public interest. Moreover, respondent cannot seek refuge and sling
mud at complainant for having executed an Affidavit dated
September 13, 1994, acknowledging that he bore a woman other
than his wife, a child. It would seem that respondent would want
to apply the principle of in pari delicto in the instant case.
Respondent would have it appear that a married man with an
extra-marital relation and an illegitimate child is precluded from
complaining if his wife enters into a relationship with another
man.
Second, the records show that an Affidavit of Desistance was
executed by herein complainant. However, a cursory reading of said

document reveals that it favors only Dedje Irader Acebedo and not
herein respondent. Interestingly, the date of said affidavit is 2
September 1987. Respondent had the temerity to claim it as
evidence in his favor when the instant complaint was only filed
sometime in 1994.
Third, when respondent was asked by the investigating judge if
he attended the baptism of the daughter of Dedje Irader Acebedo,
his former co-employee and ex-intimate friend, he answered, I did
not. Im not sure the child is mine. From his answer, we could
infer that respondent did not categorically rule out the possibility
that said child might be her (sic) daughter, only that he is doubtful
of her paternity.
x x x (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original).
14

While complainant appears to have lost interest in the

prosecution of the present case, the same does not ipso facto
warrant its dismissal. Once administrative charges have
been filed, this Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to
investigate and ascertain the truth thereof. For it has an
interest in the conduct of those in the service of the Judiciary
and in improving the delivery of justice
15

_______________
14

Id., at pp. 4-5.

15

Imbing v. Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690, 702 (1994).

15

VOL. 399, MARCH 11,

2003

15

Q
:

During the formal offer of

the possible nature of your
testimony before the Court
by your counsel, did the
Court get it correct that there
has been a short lived
relation between you and
Dedgie Irader, am I correct
in my impression?

A
:

During that time that I have

heard she and her husband
have parted ways already, I
jokingly informed her that
she is now being separated,
she is now single and is free
to have some commitment.
So, I courted her and she
accepted me, so we have a
short lived relation and after
that we parted ways.

Q
:

For how long was this short

lived relation you made
mention a while ago?

A
:

May be (sic) about eight (8)

to nine (9) months.

When you said you have

Acebedo vs. Arquero

to the people, and its efforts in that direction may not be
derailed by the complainants desistance from prosecuting
the case he initiated.
16

On the merits of the case, the entry of respondents name

as father in the baptismal certificate of Desiree May I.
Arquero cannot be used to prove her filiation and, therefore,
cannot be availed of to imply that respondent maintained
illicit relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo. A canonical
certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism
administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic
Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not
prove the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained therein which concern the relationship of the
person baptized. It merely attests to the fact which gave rise
to its issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the fact of the
administration of the sacrament on the date stated, but not
the truth of the statements therein as to the parentage of the
child baptized.
17

18

By respondents own admission, however, he had anillicit

relationship with complainants wife:

(sic) a short lived

relationship from 8 to 9
months, you mean to tell the
Court that you have (sic) a
sexual union with this
woman?

A
:

Yes maam. (Emphasis and

italics supplied).
19

into a settlement with respect to their marriage which was

embodied in a Kasunduan,the pertinent portions of which
are reproduced hereunder:

Kami, EDWIN AGUINALDO ACEBEDO at DEDJE IRADER

ACEBEDO, may sapat na taong gulang, mag-asawa, Filipino, at
kasalukuyang nakatira sa Poblacion, Brokes (sic) Point, Palawan,
ay malayang nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:

_______________
16

Id.

17

Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73, 84-85 (1980).

18

Fortus v. Novero, 23 SCRA 1330, 1340 (1968).

19

TSN, November 23, 2000 at pp. 14-15.

x x x (Italics supplied).

16

1
6

1. Na, yayamang hindi kami magkasundo bilang mag-asawa, at

magiging miserable lamang ang aming mga buhay kung aming
ipagpapatuloy pa ang aming pagsasama bilang mag-asawa, kami
ay malayang nagkasundo ngayon na maghiwalay na bilang magasawa, at ang bawat isa sa amin ay may kalayaan na humanap na
ng kaniyang makakasama sa buhay bilang asawa at hindi kami
maghahabol sa isat isa sa alin pa mang hukuman;
20

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acebedo vs. Arquero

Respondent justified his pursuing a relationship with

complainants wife with the spouses having priorly entered

Respondents justification fails. Being an employee of the

judiciary, respondent ought to have known that
theKasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the
validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife.
Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.
6

It is an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules

established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the
stipulation of the parties.

Acebedo vs. Arquero

21

Republic Act 6713, otherwise known as the Code of

Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, enunciates the States policy of promoting a high
standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public
service.
22

Although every office in the government service is a public

trust, no position exacts a greater demand for moral
righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in
the judiciary. That is why
23

_______________
Rollo at p. 106.

21

Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the

Philippines, Vol. 1, 1990 ed., at pp. 222-223.

Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, A.M. No. OCA-01-5, August 1,

2002, 386 SCRA 1 (citation omitted).

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

22

this Court has firmly laid down exacting standards of

morality and decency expected of those in the service of the
judiciary. Their conduct, not to mention behavior, is
circumscribed
with
the
heavy
burden
of
responsibility, characterized by, among other things,
propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the publics
respect and confidence in the judicial service. It must be free
from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their
duties in the judicial branch but also to their behavior
outside the court as private individuals. There is no
dichotomy of morality; court employees are also judged by
their private morals.
Respondents act of having illicit relations with
complainants wife is, within the purview of Section 46 (5) of
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, a
disgraceful and immoral conduct.

Legaspi v. Garrete, 242 SCRA 679, 701 (1995).

17

VOL. 399, MARCH 11,

2003

17

Under Rule IV, Section 52A (15) of the Revised Uniform

Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, an
immoral conduct is classified as a grave offense which calls
for a penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day
to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal is imposed
for the second offense.
7

Since the present charge of immorality against respondent

constitutes his first offense, his suspension for six (6) months
and one (1) day is in order.

house do not prove that he is the father. (Fernandez vs. Court

of Appeals, 230 SCRA 130[1994])

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Eddie P.

Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court of
Brookes Point, Palawan, GUILTY of immorality, for which he
is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months and one (1) day
without pay with a STERN WARNING that commission of
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with severely.

A baptismal certificate constitutes independent proof

corroborating the testimony of the victim and her mother.
The testimony of a person as to her age, although hearsay, is
admissible as evidence of family tradition, but cannot be
considered proof of age beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs.
Pagdayawon, 351 SCRA 643[2001])

Notes.Photographs of a person at baptism and in the

o0o
Let a copy of this decision be filed in the personal record of
respondent.

SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman),Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez an
d Corona, JJ.,concur.

Respondent suspended for six (6) months and one (1) day
without pay for immorality with stern warning against
repetition of similar acts.
8

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.

A.C. No. 9081.October 12, 2011.*
RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO,
complainants, vs. ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA, respondent.

Family Law; Conjugal Partnership; Extrajudicial dissolution

of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.This
case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial
dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is
void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not
facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by
encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially
dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaa
did in this case.
Notary Public; A notary public is personally responsible for the
entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of
this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or any
member of his staff.We cannot accept Omaas allegation that it
was her part-time office staff who notarized the contract. We agree
with the IBP-CBD that Omaa herself notarized the contract.
Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who notarized
the contract, it only showed Omaas negligence in doing her
notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally
responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not
relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his
secretaries or any member of his staff.

Disbarment.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Dwight M. Galarrita for complainants.

Hercules P. Guzman for respondent.

CARPIO,J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by
Rodolfo A. Espinosa (Espinosa) and Maximo A. Glindo
(Glindo) against Atty. Julieta A. Omaa (Omaa).
The Antecedent Facts
Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaa with
violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross
misconduct in office.
9

Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa

and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaas
legal advice on whether they could legally live separately and
dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaa
then prepared a document entitled Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay (contract) which reads:
REPUBLIKA
BAYAN
LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON

NG
NG

PILIPINAS
GUMACA

KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY
KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga
Filipino, may sapat na gulang, dating legal na mag-asawa,
kasalukuyang naninirahan
3at

may pahatirang sulat sa Brgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon,

at COMELEC, Intramuros, Manila ayon sa pagkakasunod-sunod,
matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay nagpapatunay ng
nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:

1.Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng

aming mga buhay ng walang pakialaman, kung kayat bawat isa sa
amin ay maaari ng humanap ng makakasama sa buhay;
2.Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa, 14 na
taong gulang; Aiza Espinosa, 11 taong gulang at Aldrin Espinosa,
10 taong gulang ay namili na kung kanino sasama sa aming
dalawa. Si Ariel John at Aiza Espinosa ay sasama sa kanilang

ama, Rodolfo Espinosa, at ang bunso, Aldrin Espinosa at sasama

naman sa ina na si Elena;

3.Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipag-aral sa

kasalukuyan sila ay pansamantalang mananatili sa kanilang ina,
habang tinatapos ang kanilang pag-aaral. Sa pasukan sila ay
maaari ng isama ng ama, sa lugar kung saan siya ay naninirahan;

4.Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa

aming dalawa tuwing may pagkakataon;

5.Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama

kay Aldrin at ang kakulangan sa mga pangangailangan nito ay
pupunan ng ina;

6.Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V., gas

stove, mga kagamitan sa kusina ay aking (Rodolfo) ipinagkakaloob
kay Elena at hindi na ako interesado dito;

7.Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin

dalawa sa mga panahong darating ay aming mga sari-sariling pagaari na at hindi na pinagsamahan o conjugal.

10

BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito

ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon.
(Sgd)

(Sgd)

ELENA MARANTAL

RODOLFO ESPINOSA

Nagkasundo

Nagkasundo

PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong

ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon
ATTY.

JULIETA
A.
Notary
PTR
No.
3728169;
Gumaca, Quezon4
Doc.
Page
Book
Series of 1997.

No.
No.
No.

OMAA
Public
1-10-97

482;
97;
XI;

Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully

convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their
marriage, started implementing its terms and conditions.
However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their
children and took possession of most of the property they
acquired during their union.
Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee,
complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him that
the contract executed by Omaa was not valid. Espinosa and

Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint

against Omaa before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
Omaa alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not
personally know Espinosa. She denied that she prepared the
contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and
requested for the notarization of the contract but she told
him that it was illegal. Omaa alleged that Espinosa
returned the next day while she was out of the office and
managed to persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the
document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized
the contract. Omaa presented Marantals Sinumpaang
Salaysay (affidavit) to support her allegations and to show
that the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Omaa further
presented a letter of apology from her staff, Arlene Dela
Pea, acknowledging that she notarized the document
without Omaas knowledge, consent, and authority.
Espinosa later submitted a Karagdagang Salaysay
stating that Omaa arrived at his residence together with a
girl whom he later recognized as the person who notarized
the contract. He further stated that Omaa was not in her
office when the contract was notarized.5
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation1 dated 6 February
2007, the IBP-CBD stated that Espinosas desistance did not
put an end to the proceedings. The IBP-CBD found that
11

Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaa had failed to
exercise due diligence in the performance of her function as a
notary public and to comply with the requirements of the law.
The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense of
Omaa who first claimed that it was her part-time staff who
notarized the contract but then later claimed that it was her
former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD found:

The sole issue in this case is whether Omaa violated the

Canon of Professional Responsibility in the notarization of
Marantal and Espinosas Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.

Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still

disclaimed its authorship, thereby revealing much more her
propensity to lie and make deceit, which she is deserving [of]
disciplinary sanction or disbarment.

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBPCBD.

The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaa be suspended for

one year from the practice of law and for two years as a
notary public.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board
of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of
the IBP-CBD.
Omaa filed a motion for reconsideration.
In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors denied Omaas motion for reconsideration.
The Issue

_______________
1 Signed by Atty. Salvador B. Hababag, Commissioner.
6

The Ruling of this Court

This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the
extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without
judicial approval is void.2 The Court has also ruled that a
notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the
spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership,3 which is exactly what Omaa did in this case.
In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number
of cases where the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing
similar documents as the contract in this case, such as:
notarizing a document between the spouses which permitted
the husband to take a concubine and allowed the wife to live
with another man, without opposition from each
other;5 ratifying a document entitled Legal Separation
where the couple agreed to be separated from each other
12

mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and

obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and
renouncing any action that they might have against each
other;6preparing a document authorizing a married couple
who had been separated for nine years to marry again,
renouncing the right of action which each may have against
the other;7 and preparing a document declaring the conjugal
partnership dissolved.8
We cannot accept Omaas allegation that it was her parttime office staff who notarized the contract. We agree with
the IBP-CBD that Omaa herself notarized the contract.
Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who
notarized the contract, it only showed Omaas negligence in
doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a
_______________
2 Selanova v. Judge Mendoza, A.M. No. 804-CJ, 159-A Phil. 360; 64 SCRA
69 (1975).
3 Albano v. Mun. Judge Gapusan, A.M. No. 1022-MJ, 162 Phil. 884; 71
SCRA 26 (1976).
4 Supra, note 2.
5 Panganiban v. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367 (1933).
6 Biton v. Momongan, 62 Phil. 7 (1935).
7 In re: Atty. Roque Santiago, 70 Phil. 66 (1940).
8 Balinon v. De Leon, 94 Phil. 277 (1954).

7notary

public is personally responsible for the entries in his

notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this
responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries 9 or any
member of his staff.
We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing
and notarizing a void document, Omaa violated Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Omaa knew fully
well that the Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay has no legal
effect and is against public policy. Therefore, Omaa may be
suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics
of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.10
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaa
from the practice of law for ONE YEAR. We REVOKE Atty.
Omaas notarial commission, if still existing, and SUSPEND
her as a notary public for TWO YEARS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaas
personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy
of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the
land.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Sereno, Reyes andPerlas-Bernabe,** JJ., concur.
13

Atty. Julieta A. Omaa suspended from practice of law for

one (1) year, her notarial commission revoked and is
suspended as notary public for two (2) years.
Note.A notary public must demand that the document
for notarization be signed in his presence. (Williams vs. Icao,
575 SCRA 347 [2008])
o0o

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173540

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,

vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.

_______________
9 Lingan v. Calubaquib and Baliga, 524 Phil. 60; 490 SCRA 526 (2006).

January 22, 2014

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

10 Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, 19 February 2008, 546 SCRA 209.
** Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1114 dated 3 October
2011.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule

45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31 August 2005
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
79444, which reversed the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a
complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage
docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.
The Facts
This case involves a contest between two women both
claiming to have been validly married to the same man, now
deceased.

14

Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11

In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got

November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of

married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which

Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido

marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being

(Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife

bigamous an action she sought to protect the rights of her

of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her

children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.

complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was

solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites
officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to
her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage
Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World
War II, records were destroyed. Thus, only a
Certification3 was issued by the LCR.

On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the

complaint with counterclaim,4 essentially averring that she
is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22
September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having been
celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao
City. She also contended that the case was instituted to
deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and
as an heir of Eustaquio.

During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquios union, they

Trial ensued.

begot four (4) children, namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born on

30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August
1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio
H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952. Sometime in

Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence

consisting of:

1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not

1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina),

known. In 1958, Tecla and her children were informed that

Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla herself to

Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by

substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid

the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977

marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;

without any issue.

2) Documentary evidence such as the following:

15

a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of

h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio

Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by the Office

Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish Priest of

of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon,

Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;12

Bohol;5

i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to

b. Certification of Submission of a copy of

1944 were destroyed by Second World War

Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the Civil

issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar

Registrar General, National Statistics Office

of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as

(NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6

requested a true transcription from the Register

c. Certification that Civil Registry records of

of Birth of Climaco Avenido;13

births, deaths and marriages that were actually

j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating

filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General,

that he was born on 30 March 1943 to spouses

NSO Manila, started only in 1932;7

Eustaquio and Tecla;14

d. Certification that Civil Registry records

k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract

submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar

between Eustaquio and Peregrina.15

General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of

1945, were totally destroyed during the
liberation of Manila;8
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido,
Jr.;10
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11

On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her

marriage to Eustaquio that took place in Davao City on 3
March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of
Eustaquio when he already had poor health, as well as her
knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a
common law wife of Eustaquio.16Peregrina likewise set forth
documentary evidence to substantiate her allegations and to
prove her claim for damages, to wit:

16

1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late

On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying

Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on 3 March

Teclas petition, as well as Peregrinas counter-claim. The

1979;

dispositive portion thereof reads:

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985

For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF

declaring himself as single when he contracted

NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by petitioner TECLA

marriage with the petitioner although he had a

HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA

common law relation with one Tecla Hoybia with

MACUA is hereby DENIED.

whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco,

Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed
Avenido;18
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002,
addressed to the Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P.
Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil Registrar of
Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20

The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA

MACUA against petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is
hereby DISMISSED.22
Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the
trial courts alleged disregard of the evidence on the existence
of her marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of
Tecla by declaring the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio,
while pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between

In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred

Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and

that the case was initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of

void. The CA ruled:

the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of

Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to damages and attorneys
fees.

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it

disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of
EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the
wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and
17

[Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco],

3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by

the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that

the church has a probative value to prove the existence

his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO,

of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the

and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence

same being presented to the witness stand.26

mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due

Our Ruling

execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both

constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction
of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very
evidence the trial court has disregarded.24
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error,
among others, the failure of the CA to appreciate the validity
of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), in its Memorandum25 dated 5 June
2008, raises the following legal issues:
1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the
"presumption of marriage" to overturn the validity of a
subsequent marriage;
2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be
considered and/or taken cognizance of, without proof of
the execution or existence and the cause of the
unavailability of the best evidence, the original
document;
and

Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the

evidence presented during the trial proves the existence of
the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Teclas claim of her prior
valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on Teclas failure to
present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without
such certificate, the trial court considered as useless the
certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon,
Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the
period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as regards the
Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of
Manila. The trial court observed:
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar
General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit
"B") stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally
destroyed during the liberation of Manila on February 4,
18

1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from

appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in

the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila

accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of

verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy
of the records of marriage between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla],
alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in
Talibon, Bohol.27
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did
not give credence to the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses
as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions.
Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could
not even produce her own copy of the said proof of marriage.
Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove
the existence of the first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a
presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio
as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot
four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by
documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications
disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial
evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created,
according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage.
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the CA found that its

We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial

court. Quite recently, in Aonuevo v. Intestate Estate of
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary
evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and
exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that
the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the
marriage between his parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the
marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be
accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court
of Appeals.29 Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of
the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua
non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They
have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and
loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v.
Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:
19

x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that

Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be

parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred.

prove[n] by other competent evidence.

The court confounded the execution and the contents of the

document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven
by secondary evidence when the

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the

parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who
saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by

instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not

those to whom the parties have previously narrated the

dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document,

execution thereof. The Court has also held that "[t]he loss

and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due

may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss,

execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for

or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a

the inroduction of secondary evidence of the contents.

sufficient examination in the place or places where the

xxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last
analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally
consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when
the document is actually produced, its authencity is not
necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its
contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to
produce the document, when available, to establish its
execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but
not the admissibility of such evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to
justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v.

document or papers of similar character are usually kept by

the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has
been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the
instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the
testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the
marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the
event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and
the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as
relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence

20

testimonial and documentarymay be admitted to prove the

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it

fact of marriage.30

disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of

As correctly stated by the appellate court:

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between
[Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial
evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present
during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a
living witness to the event. The loss was shown by the
certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol.
These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since
the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were
clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence
testimonial and documentary may be admitted to prove
the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any
competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the
parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the

EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the

wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and
[Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco],
the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that
his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO,
and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence
mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very
evidence the trial court has disregarded.31
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this
Court has elucidated on the rationale behind the
presumption:

marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is

marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is

that of marriage.1wphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not

also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of

only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in

marriage."

the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.

xxxx

Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward

legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter21

presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact

married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by
our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage
was completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and
Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by
the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of
Talibon, Bohol.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is
AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina
Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is
hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 198780.October 16, 2013.*

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, respondent.

petitioner, vs.

Civil Law; Marriages; Limited Purpose Marriages; Words

and Phrases; In the United States, marriages where a couple
marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific
benefits, have been referred to as limited purpose marriages. A
common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the
legitimization of a child. Another is for immigration
purposes.The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant
benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the
sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States,
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular
purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as
limited purpose marriages. A common limited purpose marriage
is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child. Another,
which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration
purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention
of the couple at the time of their marriage, and it attempts to filter
out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.
Same; Same; Same; A marriage is a sham if the bride and
groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they
were married.In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service, established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases.
It ruled that a marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not
intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.
This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires
the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage wasnot
entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the
22

United States. The focus, thus, shifted from determining the

intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention
of evading immigration laws. It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore,
does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a
marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for
consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. Under Article 2 of the Family
Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite
shall render a marriage void ab initio. Under said Article 2, for
consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A freely given consent requires
that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into
the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious
or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be
affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
Same; Same; Marriages in Jest; A marriage in jest is a
pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with
no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and
with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound;
Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or
unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.In
ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA
characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A

marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered

into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual
marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties
would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. It is a pretended
marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create
any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are voidab initio, not for vitiated,
defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of
consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have
absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any
purpose.586

5
86

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Albios

Same; Same; A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or

voidable under the grounds provided by law; There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than
what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of
foreign citizenship; Therefore, so long as all the essential and
formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared
valid.The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the
Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family
life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no
real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to
nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The
23

same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and

incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other
than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition
of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and
formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void
or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared
valid.
Same; Same; Marriages entered into for other purposes,
limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money,
status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, are equally valid.Motives for entering into a marriage
are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on
the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to
privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right
to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their
marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live
apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not,
and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited
or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status,
and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,
are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a
marriage.587

VOL. 707, OCTOBER

16, 2013

87

Republic vs. Albios

Same; Same; No other misrepresentation or deceit shall
constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage.
Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading
immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed
circumstances.Neither can their marriage be considered voidable
on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code.
Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code
may constitute fraud, namely, (1) nondisclosure of a previous
conviction involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of
a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit
shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading
immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed
circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of
fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the
present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer
both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Same; Same; No less than our Constitution declares that
marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State; The Supreme Court
cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered
into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
24

nullified when no longer needed.No less than our Constitution

declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It
must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the
contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the
parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Albert T. Villaseca for respondent.
588

588

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Albios

MENDOZA,J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the September 29, 2011
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No.
95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008 Decision 2 of the

Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC), declaring the

marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent
Liberty Albios (Albios) as void from the beginning.
The Facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and
Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City
(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with
Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition
for declaration of nullity4 of her marriage with Fringer. She
alleged that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they
never really had any intention of entering into a married
state or complying with any of their essential marital
obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest
and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his
answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set
case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC
ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an
investiga_______________

25

1 Rollo, pp. 26-32; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and
concurred in by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Associate Justice
Florito S. Macalino of the Fifth Division, Manila.
2 Id., at pp. 38-39.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and
Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a
necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner
shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never
acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression
that she remains the wife of respondent.

3 Id., at p. 37.
4 Id., at pp. 33-35.
589

VOL. 707, OCTOBER 16,

2013

In its April 25, 2008 Decision, 5 the RTC declared the

marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

589

xxxx
SO ORDERED.

Republic vs. Albios

tion and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2,
2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that
she could not make a determination for failure of both parties
to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the
prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing
despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial,
hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each
other for convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony
of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that
in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States
and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn,
she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed
her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 38-39.
6 Id., at p. 39.

26

590

590

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Albios

marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the

establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce
and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order,7 dated February
5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained
that the marriage was declared void because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had
no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

consequence of getting married and that their case was

similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the
parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract
and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for
personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship,
and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION
OF LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE
CONTRACTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING
FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONE
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 48-49.
591

VOL. 707, OCTOBER 16,

2013

591

Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA
affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the
parties clearly did not understand the nature and

Republic vs. Albios

IN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OF CONSENT.

27

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to
acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid
$2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the
marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that
marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being
bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be
distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential
to the validity of marriage.

_______________
8 Id., at p. 13.
9 Id., at pp. 61-71.
10 Id., at pp. 89-95.
592

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall
within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to
acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

592

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment 9 to the

petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar
to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the
beginning.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, it shall first

examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes
of immigration.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply 10 reiterating its
arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of
law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00,
voidab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Albios

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant
benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud
for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the
United States, marriages where a couple marries only to
achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have
been referred to as limited purpose marriages. 11 A common
limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the
legitimization of a child.12Another, which is the subject of the

The Court resolves in the negative.

28

present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is

usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time
_______________
11 Abrams,

Kerry. Marriage

(2012);

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956. Lutwak

v.

Fraud.

100

Cal.

L.

Rev.

United States, 344 U.S. 604, 612-613 (U.S. 1953).

12 Abrams,

Kerry. Marriage

Fraud.

100

Cal.

L.

Rev.

(2012);

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956; citing Schibi v.

Schibi, 69 A.2d 831 (Conn. 1949) (denying annulment where parties married
only to give a name to a prospective child); Bishop v. Bishop, 308 N.Y.S.2d 998
(Sup. Ct. 1970);Erickson v. Erickson, 48 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding
similarly to Schibi); Delfino v. Delfino, 35 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1942)
(denying annulment where purpose of marriage was to protect the girls name
and there was an understanding that the parties would not live together as
man and wife); Bove v. Pinciotti, 46 Pa. D. & C. 159 (1942); Campbell v.
Moore, 189 S.E.2d 497 (S.C.1939) (refusing an annulment where parties
entered marriage for the purpose of legitimizing a child); Chander v.
Chander, No. 2937-98-4, 1999 WL 1129721 (Va. Ct. App. June 22, 1999)
(denying annulment where wife married husband to get his pension with no
intention to consummate marriage because husband knew that was the
purpose of the marriage).
593

VOL. 707, OCTOBER 16,

2013
Republic vs. Albios

593

of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use

marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case ofBark v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service,15established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration
cases. It ruled that a marriage is a sham if the bride and
groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married. This standard was modified with the
passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of
1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead
demonstrate that the marriage was not entered into for the
purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States. The focus, thus, shifted from determining the
intention to establish a life together, to determining the
intention of evading immigration laws. 16 It must be noted,
however, that this standard is used purely for immigration
purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal
validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage
declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of
immigration is also legally void and inexistent. The early
cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States
made
_______________
13 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91
Minn.

L.

Rev.

1625

(2007);

http://www.minnesotalawreview.

29

org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing Immigration and

Nationality Act (INA), 237(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(G) (2000).
14 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91
Minn.

L.

Rev.

1625

(2007);

http://www.minnesotalawreview.

org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing 132 CONG. REC.

27,012, 27,015 (1986) (statement of Rep McCollum) (promoting the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986).
15 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).
16 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91
Minn.

L.

Rev.

1625

(2007);

http://www.minnesotalawreview.

org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf.
594

594

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married

at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no
matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through
indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in
fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no
exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at
all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent
consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the
outside world and with the understanding that they will put
an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive,
they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must
assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood,
and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or
cover, to deceive others.
18

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Albios

no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of United

States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to
allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed
to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce
within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand,
ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent
permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there
being no consent, to wit:

(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case

ofMpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19which declared as valid a
marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to
the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be
avoided merely because the marriage was entered into for a
_______________
17 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
18 United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
19 Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), affd,
440 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).

30

595

VOL. 707, OCTOBER 16,

2013

595

Republic vs. Albios

limited purpose.20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of
McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham
marriage was intrinsically different from a nonsubsisting
one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of
consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic. The
problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit,
a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United States
courts have generally denied annulments involving limited
purpose marriages where a couple married only to achieve a
particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as
valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC
ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose
other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its

inception. In its resolution denying the OSGs motion for

reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to
freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties
_______________
20 Abrams,

Kerry. Marriage

Fraud.

100

Cal.

L.

Rev.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956;

(2012);

citing Mpiliris

v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), affd, 440 F.2d 1163
(5th Cir. 1971).
21 Matter of McKee, 17 I. & N. Dec. 332, 333 (B.I.A. 1980).
22 Lynn D. Wardle and Laurence C. Nolan, Family Law in the USA, (The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2011) p. 86.
23 Abrams,

Kerry. Marriage

Fraud.

100

Cal.

L.

Rev.

(2012);

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956.
596

596

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Albios
31

clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of

getting married. As in theRubenstein case, the CA found the
marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that
the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition
of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never
intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the
parties supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the
Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage.
Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any
essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1)
freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing
officer. A freely given consent requires that the contracting
parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence.24 Consent must also
be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both
the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. 25 Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between
Albios and Fringer. In fact, there wasreal consent because it

_______________
24 Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines,
(Quezon City, Philippines: Joer Printing Services, 2005), p. 4.
25 Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr.,Persons and Family Relations Law,
(Quezon City, Philippines: Rex Printing Company, Inc., 2010), Fifth Edition,
p. 121.
26 Arturo M. Tolentino,Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, (Manila, Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc.,
2004), Volume I, p. 231.
597

VOL. 707, OCTOBER 16,

2013

597

Republic vs. Albios

was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of
consent. Their consent was alsoconscious and intelligent as
they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such
plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter
into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
32

requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a

full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of
consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by
way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal
in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of
entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The
ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose
to enter into such a relation. 27 It is a pretended marriage not
intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal
ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent.
Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective,
or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of
consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties
have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for
any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a
marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an undeniable
intention to be bound in order to create the very bond
necessary to
_______________
27 Arturo M. Tolentino,Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, (Manila, Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc.,
2004), Volume I, p. 231; citing McClurg v. Terry, 21 N.J. 225.

598

598

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Albios

allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a

genuine consent to be married would allow them to further
their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can
properly support an application for citizenship. There was,
thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage
status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose.
Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the
Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and
family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage
might have no real intention to establish a life together is,
however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into
in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the
nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage
may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a
marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than
what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition
of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential
33

and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is

not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it
shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and
complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of
life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate
their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy
and would raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right
to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their
marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or
live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another
or not, and so on.30Thus, marriages entered into for other
_______________
28 Article 4, Family Code.
29 Bark v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201
(9th Cir. 1975).
30 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91
Minn. L. Rev. 1625 (2007); http://www.minnesotalawreview.
599

VOL. 707, OCTOBER 16,

2013
Republic vs. Albios

599

purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,

companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites, 31 are equally valid. Love,
though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not
the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not
precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents
attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, it cannot
declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondents
marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the
purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues
to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the
ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only
the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code
may constitute fraud, namely, (1) nondisclosure of a previous
conviction involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the
wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a
sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug
addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a
ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a
marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws
does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may
only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the
present case, there is no injured party because Albios and
Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
34

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred

institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer
to be declared void would only further trivialize this
inviolable insti_______________
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf;

citing McGuire

v.

McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 337 (Neb. 1953). Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485-86 (1965).

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as

an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs
of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer
needed.

31 Article 4, Family Code.

600

WHEREFORE,

600

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

the

petition

is GRANTED.

The

September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 113406 isDISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

Republic vs. Albios

tution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the
event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits,
after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no
further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be
allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent
schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to
enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be
allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
situation.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco,
Jr.
(Chairperson),
**
***
Castro, Brion and Peralta, JJ., concur.

Leonardo-De

Petition granted, judgment annulled.

35

Notes.Annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial

question in criminal case for parricide. (Pimentel vs.
Pimentel, 630 SCRA 436 [2010])
_______________
32 Const. (1987), Article XV, Section 2.
** Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Marvic Mario
Victor F. Leonen, per Special Order No. 1570 dated October 14, 2013.
*** Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A.
Abad, per Special Order No. 1554 dated September 19, 2013.
601

VOL. 707, OCTOBER 16,

2013

601

Republic vs. Albios

Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes
a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality
provided it is valid according to his/her national law. (Vda. de
Catalan vs. Catalan-Lee, 665 SCRA 487 [2012])
o0o

G.R. No. 201061.July 3, 2013.*

SALLY
GO-BANGAYAN,
petitioner, vs.
BANGAYAN, JR., respondent.

BENJAMIN

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Postponements; It is wellsettled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is
not a matter of right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial
court.It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or
postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court. In this case, Sallys presentation of
evidence was scheduled on 28 February 2008. Thereafter, there
were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11
September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008.
They were all made at Sallys instance. Before the scheduled
hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in
case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be
submitted for decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing,
despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on
presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day.
Sallys counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the
priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial courts
prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally
could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to
36

present her evidence because all the postponements were at her

instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would
submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her
evidence on 28 November 2008.
Same; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; The certification
from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance
of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the
certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. On the purported marriage of
Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration
Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that
there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally.
Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to
6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage
License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued for the month.
Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City
did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally.
The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove
the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious
circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being issued
by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Clearly, if indeed
Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage
was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.
Civil Law; Marriages; Void Marriages; Marriage License;
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized
without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no
license is necessary, shall be void from the beginning. We see no
inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under

Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a

license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is
necessary, shall be void from the beginning. In this case, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a
license. It was duly established that no marriage license was
issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not
match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil
registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case
clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their
marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally
was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or
inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts
which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are inexistent and
void from the beginning. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the trial courts ruling that the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; For bigamy to exist, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for
validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. For bigamy to
exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior
marriage. In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage.
Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract
without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not
exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Civil Law; Marriages; Property Relations; Void Marriages;
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage.
Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual
37

joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by

them
in
common
in
proportion
to
their
respective
contributions.Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the
benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by
Sally which were given by Benjamins father to his children as
advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the petition before the trial
court even admitted that Benjamins late father himself conveyed
a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses
which included Sally.

Administrative Law; Judges; Inhibition of Judges; The issue of

voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge. We have ruled that the issue of
voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge. To justify the call for inhibition,
there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith,
malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may
be inferred from the decision or order itself. In this case, we have
sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err in
submitting the case for decision because of Sallys continued
refusal to present her evidence.

Same; Same; Same; Land Registration; The words married

to preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil
status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove coownership.As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule
that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the
evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722
was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses. The
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of
Benjamin with the descriptive title married to Sally. The
property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in
the name of Sally with the descriptive title married to Benjamin
while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were
registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have
ruled that the words married to preceding the name of a spouse
are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.
Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual
contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no coownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.706

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Leny L. Mauricio for petitioner.
Marissa V. Manalo for respondent.

CARPIO,J.:
The Case

38

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17

August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution 3 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

3 Id., at p. 52. Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan with

Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring.
707

The Antecedent Facts

On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin)
filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that
on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena)
in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn,
Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with
Sally Go-Bangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto
parts and supplies business owned by Benjamins family. In
December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of
America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived
together as husband and wife. Sallys father was against the
relationship.
_______________
1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2 Rollo, pp. 29-40. Penned by Associate Justice (now Supreme Court
Associate Justice) Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe with Associate Justices
Bienvenido L. Reyes (now also a Supreme Court Associate Justice) and
Samuel H. Gaerlan, concurring.

VOL. 700, JULY 3, 2013

707

Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.

On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally
brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where
they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing
Benjamins marital status, assured him that the marriage
contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children,
Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation,
they acquired the following real properties:
(1)property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses;
(2)properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
registered in the name of Benjamin, married to Sally;
(3)properties under Condominium Certificate of Title
(CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the name of
Sally, married to Benjamin; and
39

(4)properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681

registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.

merated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37

properties in her answer.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994

when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley
with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and
falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using
their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in
turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the
trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was
bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid
marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the
partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in
accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his
appointment as administrator of the properties during the
pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and
Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered
properties became the subject of the partition before the trial
court. Aside from the seven properties enu-

After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a

demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed
a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also
denied. Sally filed a petition forcertiorari before the Court of
Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of
Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any
evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her
petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave
Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28
February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11
September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28
November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial
court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting
the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.

708

708

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled
in favor of Benjamin. The trial court gave weight to the
certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil
Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only
Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were
issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported
Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin
and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
40

Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to

Benjamins subsisting marriage with Azucena.
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 107-123. Penned by Presiding Judge Roy G. Gironella.
5 Records, Vol. 2, p. 461.
709

VOL. 700, JULY 3, 2013

709

Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.

The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the
second marriage was void not because of the existence of the
first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the
lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed
in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the
legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were
not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sallys claim for
spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin.
The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and
Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for
support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally
could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as

part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial

court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin.
Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were
owned by Benjamins parents who gave the properties to
their children, including Benjamin, as advance inheritance.
The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers
and the phrase married to Sally Go was merely descriptive
of Benjamins civil status in the title. As regards the two lots
under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that
they were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that
Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money,
property or industry in their purchase. The trial court found
that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by
TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two
condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However,
the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and
the two condominium units were purchased from the
earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the
properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and
CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal
partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to
Benjamins right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena
in a separate proceeding.710

710

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.

41

The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith
because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena.
Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court
forfeited Sallys share in the properties covered under TCT
Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley
while Benjamins share reverted to his conjugal ownership
with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY,
the
marriage
of
BENJAMIN
BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at
Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and
VOIDAB INITIO. It is further declared NON-EXISTENT.
Respondents claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the
thirty-seven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723,
17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila,
TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621,
194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628,
194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635,
194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210,
206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr.,
Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B.
Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of Sally Go
Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and
Manila are directed to delete the words married to Sally Go
from these thirty[-]seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860,
CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from

petitioners money without contribution from respondent,

hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful
wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator
of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit
an accounting of her collections of income from these five (5)
properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except
for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed
within
711

VOL. 700, JULY 3, 2013

711

Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.

thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and
surrender control and possession of these properties
including the documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N253681, these properties are under co-ownership of the
parties shared by them equally. However, the share of
respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go
Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the
petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with
Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution
of these two (2) properties shall be further processed
pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15,
2003.

42

Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later

proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondents claim of spousal support, children support
and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, no declaration of the status of the parties children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their
counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the
Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.

Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition

with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27
August 2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally
appealed the trial courts decision before the Court of
Appeals.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals
partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the trial
_______________

6 Id., at pp. 122-123.

7 Id., at pp. 124-128.
712

712

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.

court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The
Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the
case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial
reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present
her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be
deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the
warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence. She
insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and
was not subpoenaed despite the presence of her other
witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys allegation that
Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity
of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamins
action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there
was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved
before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally.
43

The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed no

error in declaring Benjamins marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of
Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective
contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37
properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to
Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties,
the Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties under
TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of
Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to
establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656
and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were
exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of
Benjamins actual contribution in their purchase. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be
owned by them in
713

VOL. 700, JULY 3, 2013

713

Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.

common, to be shared equally. However, the share of
Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his
existing marriage with Azucena while Sallys share shall
accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of
bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to
present clear and convincing evidence that would show bias
and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify
his inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated
March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No.
04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification
declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively
owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties under
TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as [CCT] Nos. 8782
and 8783 shall be solely owned by the respondent-appellant.
On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them
and common and to be shared equally but the share of the
petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership
under his first marriage while the share of respondentappellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
44

SO ORDERED.

The Ruling of this Court

Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of

Appeals decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court
of Appeals denied her motion.

The petition has no merit.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1)Whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming the trial courts ruling that
Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2)Whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming the trial courts decision
declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
null and void ab initio and non-existent; and
(3)Whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming with modification the trial
courts decision regarding the property relations of
Benjamin and Sally.

Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming

the trial courts ruling that she waived her right to present
her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present
evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court
abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance
or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to
the discretion of the trial court. 9 In this case, Sallys
presentation of evidence was scheduled on 28 February 2008.
Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July
2008, 4 and
_______________
9 See Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219, 28 May 2004, 430
SCRA 353.
715

45

VOL. 700, JULY 3, 2013

715

Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.

11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November
2008. They were all made at Sallys instance. Before the
scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court
warned Sally that in case she still failed to present her
evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the
date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other
available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin
who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sallys counsel
insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the priority
of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial courts
prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case.
Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her
right to present her evidence because all the postponements
were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court
that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail
to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal
to present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her
right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, Sallys continued failure to present her evidence
despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her
lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear
that Sally was delaying the case because she was waiting for

the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition

questioning the trial courts denial of her demurrer to
evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not
issue any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for.
Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect
marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court
also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the
deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties.10
_______________
10 Id.
716

716

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.

Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a
marriage could not be non-existent and, at the same time,
null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were
allowed to present her evidence, she would have proven her
marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin,
Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real
46

properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he

was married to her; that Benjamin was the informant in
their childrens birth certificates where he stated that he was
their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family
and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there
was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin
and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the
informant in the birth certificates of his children with
Azucena.
First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September
1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by
a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time
Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7
March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena
was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally,
Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the
Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no
valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros
confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to
6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982.
Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series
issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local
civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License
No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certifica717

VOL. 700, JULY 3, 2013

717

Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.

tion from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious
circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being
issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a
marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning
for lack of a marriage license.12
It was also established before the trial court that the
purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B.
Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig; 13Teresita R. Ignacio,
Chief of the Archives Division of the Records Management
and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and
the Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil
Registration Department of the National Statistics
Office.15 The documentary and testimonial evidence proved
that there was no
_______________
11 Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario, 403 Phil. 861; 351 SCRA 127 (2001).

47

12 Article 35 of the Family Code states:

Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.

Art.35.The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1)Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with
the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform
marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties
believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to
do so;
(3)Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the
preceding Chapter;
(4)Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article
41;
(5)Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the
identity of the other; and
(6)Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
13 Records, Vol. 2, p. 458.
14 Id., at p. 459.
15 Id., at p. 460.
718

718

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the

trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
made only in jest16 and a simulated marriage, at the
instance of [Sally], intended to cover her up from expected
social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the
society especially from her parents seen as Chinese
conservatives.17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth
certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that
Benjamin was the informant in Bernices birth certificate
which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8
March 198218while Sally was the informant in Bentleys birth
certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally were
married on 8 March 1982.19Benjamin and Sally were
supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not match
the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same
time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a
marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered
by Article 34 where no license is necessary, shall be void
from the beginning. In this case, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was
duly established that no marriage license was issued to them
48

and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the
marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of
Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly
falls under Section 3 of Article 35 20 which made their
marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on
_______________
16 Rollo, p. 112.
17 Id.
18 Records, Vol. 1, p. 65.
19 Id., at p. 66.
20 Supra note 12.
719

VOL. 700, JULY 3, 2013

719

Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.

void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious
are inexistent and void from the beginning. 21Thus, the
Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial courts

ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was

null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of
properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the
trial courts decision and ruled that [t]he rest of the decision
stands.22While the Court of Appeals did not discuss
bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive
portion of the decision declaring that [t]he rest of the
decision stands that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial
courts discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally is not bigamous. The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous
under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or
former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of
the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is
valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no
trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their
marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void
not because of the existence of the first marriage but for
other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was
not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it
was held that what was committed was contracting marriage
against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but
Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the
marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because
_______________

49

21 Article1409.The following contracts are inexistent and void from the

beginning:
xxxx
(2)Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the

local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In
short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not
exist. They lived together and represented themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

xxxx
22 Rollo, p. 40.

Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally

720

720

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property

relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of
the Family Code which states:
Art.148.In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.

Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.

there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated
stand of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner
cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her
marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same
would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be
invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner
and Azucena.
23

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage

must have all the essential requisites for validity except for
the existence of a prior marriage. 24 In this case, there was
really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just
signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage

_______________
23 Id., at pp. 112-113.
24 See Nollora, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 191425, 7 September 2011, 657 SCRA
330.
721

50

VOL. 700, JULY 3, 2013

721

Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or
her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even
if both parties are in bad faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of

marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties
being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamins father
to his children as advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the
petition before the trial court even admitted that Benjamins
late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his
children and their respective spouses which included Sally
x x x.25

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that

the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with
the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No.
61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
were in the name of Benjamin 27with the descriptive title
married to Sally. The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782
and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the
descriptive title married to Benjamin while the properties
under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the
name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the
_______________
25 Records, Vol. 1, p. 50.
26 Id., at p. 23.
27 Id., at pp. 24-26.
28 Id., at pp. 27-28.
722

722

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.

51

words married to preceding the name of a spouse are

merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered
owner.29Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof
of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can
be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30

writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his

prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in
deciding the case that would justify the call for his voluntary
inhibition.
_______________
29 Acre v. Yuttikki, 560 Phil. 495; 534 SCRA 224 (2007).

Inhibition of the Trial Judge

Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella
(Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case.
She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her
in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge
Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his
decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of
Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is
primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the
part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there
must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith,
malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error
which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. 32 In
this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella
did not err in submitting the case for decision because of
Sallys continued refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while
Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in

30 Id.
31 Kilosbayan Foundation v. Janolo, Jr., G.R. No. 180543, 27 July 2010,
625 SCRA 684.
32 Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 173057-74, 27 September 2010,
631 SCRA 312.
723

723
VOL. 700, JULY 3, 2013
Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.

WHEREFORE, weAFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision

and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
52

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Bersamin,** Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.

Judgment and resolution affirmed.

Notes.In a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the

property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148
of the Family Code. (Dio vs. Dio, 640 SCRA 178 [2011])

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following

elements must be present: (1) The man and the woman must
be capacitated to marry each other; (2) They live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife; and (3) Their union is
without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
(Ibid.)
o0o

G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000.

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of

the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE
NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA
BAYADOG, respondent.
Civil Law; Family Code;Marriages; A valid marriage license is
a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
53

Article 80 (3) in relation to Article 58.A valid marriage license is

a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58. The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. This
interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Specifically,
the Constitution considers marriage as an inviolable social
institution, and is the foundation of family life which shall be
protected by the State. This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as a special contract of permanent union and case law
considers it not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment.

riage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided

in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in
such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame
and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation
of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending
the marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the
source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the
law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from
that requirement.

Same; Same; Same; There are several instances recognized by

the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with.
There are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
mar-

Same; Same; Same; The five-year common-law cohabitation

period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage,should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage.Working on the assumption that Pepito
and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years
without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as husband and wife
where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to
validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be
the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should
be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivitymeaning
no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuitythat is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year

________________
*

FIRST DIVISION.

123

VOL. 328, MARCH

14, 2000
Nial vs. Bayadog

23

54

cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the

parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as
such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use
the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nul124

1
24

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nial vs. Bayadog

lify their marriage. There should be no exemption from

securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license
is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about
to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar.
Same; Same; Same; Any marriage subsequently contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void.
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present,

absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the

same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage
subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse
shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of
absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of
extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and
concubinage and adultery. The law sanctions monogamy.
Same; Same; Same; The subsistence of the marriage even
where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse
with any third party as being one ashusband and wife.Even
assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each
other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that
their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union
that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the
absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage
at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance
of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
husband and wife.
Same; Same; Same; Void marriages can be questioned even
after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death
of either, in
55

125

VOL. 328, MARCH

14, 2000

25

Nial vs. Bayadog

which case the parties and their offspring will be left: as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid.The Code is silent as to who
can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and
void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is
valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage
that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally
ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the
other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can
be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage.
Same; Same; Same; No judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage.Jurisprudence under the Civil
Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to

establish the nullity of a marriage. A void marriage does not

require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original
rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good
order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained
and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Other than for purposes of remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action
is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of decla126

1
26

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nial vs. Bayadog

ration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than

to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code
56

connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Roldan R. Mangubat for petitioners.
Daryll A. Amante for private respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or
on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997,
Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage
was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed

under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the

second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among
the persons who could file an action for annulment of
marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.
127

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2000

127

Nial vs. Bayadog

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after
finding that the Family Code is rather silent, obscure,
insufficient to resolve the following issues:
1. (1)Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against
defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with
her specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
2. (2)Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs
deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;

57

3. (3)Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the

validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due
to their fathers death.

128

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed
the action to declare null and void their fathers marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47
of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. Hence, this petition for review with this Court
grounded on a pure question of law.
2

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance

with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
and because the verification failed to state the basis of
petitioners averment that the allegations in the petition are
true and correct. It was thus treated as an unsigned
pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule
7, of the 1997 Rules. However, upon motion of petitioners,
this Court
3

________________

128

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nial vs. Bayadog

reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for

review.
4

The two marriages involved herein having been

solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC),
the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initiopursuant to Article
80(3) in relation to Article 58. The requirement and issuance
of marriage license is the States demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. This
interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the
State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic
5

The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998 issued by

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Branch 59, Toledo

City, reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants motion to
dismiss is hereby granted and this instant case is hereby ordered dismissed
without costs. (p. 6; Rollo, p. 21).
2

__________________

Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.

4

Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50.

Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584(1998).

Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.

58

Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized

unless all the requisites are complied with:

1. (1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely

autonomous
social
institution. Specifically,
the
Constitution considers marriage as an inviolable social
institution, and is the foundation of family life which shall
be protected by the State. This is why the Family Code
considers marriage as a special contract of permanent
union and case law considers it not just an adventure but a
lifetime commitment.
10

11

given;
2. (2)Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

12

13

3. (3)A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

7

Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages shall be

void from the beginning:

However, there are several instances recognized by the

Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one
of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in
such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicants name for a marriage license.
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such
14

xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of

exceptional character.
xxx
8

xxx

xxx

Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in

Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under article 76, no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of
the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
9

Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97(1975).

________________

129
10

VOL. 328, MARCH 14,

2000

129

Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G.R. No.

126010, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 76; See also Tuason v. CA, 256 SCRA
158 (1996).
11

Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.

Nial vs. Bayadog

59

12

Article 1, Family Code provides: Marriage is a special contract of

permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance

with law for the establishment of conjugal or family life. x x x.
13

Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 at 35(1995); 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil.

21, 41 (1995).
14

Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be

necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority
and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the
ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no
legal impediment to the marriage.
130

130

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nial vs. Bayadog

persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in

the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the
publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement.
15

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father

to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that
they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other. The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to
what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76
of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year
period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both
parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which
impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
sometime during the cohabitation period?
16

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have

lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed
on the basis of a cohabitation as husband and wife where
the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to
validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the
60

marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation

characterized
_______________
15

Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.

16

Rollo, p. 29.

131

every single requirement and later use the same missing

element as a preconceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within
the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are
about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is
aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of
the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. The
Civil Code provides:
17

VOL. 328, MARCH 14,

2000

131

Nial vs. Bayadog

by exclusivitymeaning no third party was involved at any
time within the 5 years and continuitythat is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements
must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based
on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with

Article 63: x x x. This notice shall request all persons having

knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local
civil registrar thereof. x x x.
Article 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to
the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Article 17 provides in part: x x x. This notice shall request all
persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x.
_______________
17

Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code;Articles 17 and 18, Family Code.

132

132

SUPREME COURT
61

other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains
that their five-

REPORTS ANNOTATED

_______________

Nial vs. Bayadog

18

Article 18 reads in part: x x x.In case of any impediment known to

the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note
down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. x x x.

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present,
absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages
by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the
first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements
the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages
and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. The law
sanctions monogamy.
18

Article 83, Civil Code provides Any marriage subsequently contracted

by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
1. (1)the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
2. (2)the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years . . .
Article 41 of the Family Code reads: A marriage contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years . . .
19

Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.

133

19

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents

marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and respondent had started living with each

VOL. 328, MARCH 14,

2000

133

Nial vs. Bayadog

year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only
62

by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a

subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from
his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even
where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either
spouse with any third party as being one as husband and
wife.
Having determined that the second marriage involved in
this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of
a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence
of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their fathers marriage
void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the
Family Code cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions
20

_________________
20

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the

following persons and within the periods indicated herein:

1. (1)For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose
parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years
after attaining the age of twenty-one; or by the parent or guardian
or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such
party has reached the age of twenty-one;

2. (2)For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane

spouse, who had no knowledge of the others insanity; or by any
relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at
any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse
during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
3. (3)For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured
party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud;
134

134

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nial vs. Bayadog

for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for

annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows the sane spouse to file an annulment suit at any
time before the death of either party is inapplicable. Article
47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file
an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is
valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initiois considered as having never
to have taken place and cannot be the source of rights. The
first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
21

63

ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally

except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be
attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for
nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where
the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage
can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except
those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged
spouses, regarding co-ownership (4) For causes mentioned in
number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years
from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence
disappeared or ceased; For causes mentioned in numbers 5
and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years
after the marriage.
22

___________________
21

Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998); People v. Retirement

Board, 272 111. App. 59 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 271.
22

In re Conzas Estate, 176 111. 192;Miller v. Miller, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac.

394 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 271.

135

VOL. 328, MARCH 14,

135

2000
Nial vs. Bayadog
or ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect
on the children born to such void marriages as provided in
Article 50 in relation to Articles 43 and 44 as well as Articles
51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the
property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate.
23

Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of

petitioners father extinguished the alleged marital bond
between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous
and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a
marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should
be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if
it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished
nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. A void marriage does not require a judicial decree
to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
24

64

expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be

ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction. Under ordinary circumstances, the
effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of
legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal
purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding
in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct
or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any
time, whether before or after the death of either or both the
husband and the wife, and upon mere proof
25

______________
23

Articles 148-149, Family Code; Article 144, Civil Code.

24

Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338(1977); Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA

of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be

disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts. It is not
like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the
lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made goodab
initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into
a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based
only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if
the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action
or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.
26

27

28

29

499 (1986); People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10) 4767 cited
inPeople v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749.
25

35 Am. Jur. 219-220.

136

136

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nial vs. Bayadog

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no

judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or
a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if
the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
65

void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such

final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
__________________

Pardo, J., On official business abroad.

Petition granted, order reversed and set aside. Case
ordered reinstated.

26

18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am Jur. 221.

27

Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511(1997); 268 SCRA 47 (1997); Atienza v.

Judge Brillantes, Jr., 243 SCRA 32(1995); 60 SCAD 119; 312 Phil. 939(1995).
28

Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572(1993).

29

Article 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and 227, s. 1987 and

further amended by R.A. No. 8533 dated February 23, 1998.

Note.Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though

void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any
party thereto can marry again; otherwise, the second
marriage will also be void. (Apiag vs. Cantero, 268 SCRA
47 [1997])
o0o

137

VOL. 328, MARCH 14,

2000

concur.

Davide, Jr. (C.J.,Chairman), Puno andKapunan, JJ.,

137

Heirs of Alberto Suguitan vs.

City of Mandaluyong
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch
59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
66

G.R. No. 175581.March 28, 2008.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JOSE A.
DAYOT, respondent.
G.R. No. 179474.March 28, 2008.*
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT,
respondent.
Marriages; Marriage License; A marriage performed without
the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more
than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the
license is the essence of the marriage contract, in stark contrast to
the old Marriage Law, whereby the absence of a marriage license
did not make the marriage void; The rationale for the compulsory
character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the
authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the
proper government official has inquired into their capacity to
contract marriage.Article 58 makes explicit that no marriage
shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local
civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage
performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this
being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from
the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.

This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law, whereby the

absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The
rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under
the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the
contracting parties, after the proper government official has
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.
Same; Same; Ratification of Marital Cohabitation; The reason
for the law on ratification of marital cohabitation, whereby no
marriage license is required, is that the publicity attending a
marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a
state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.The instant case
pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76
of the Civil Code, which provides: ART. 76. No marriage license
shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained
the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall
also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages
and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage. The reason for the law,
as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity
attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who
have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.
Same; Same; Same; The falsity of an affidavit of marital
cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the
minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.It is not contested
herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without
a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit
67

declaring that they have attained the age of maturity; that being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to
marry each other. One of the central issues in the Petition at bar
is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum fiveyear requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license. We answer in the affirmative.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Marriages of
exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on
the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license,
and under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a
general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to
the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a
marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction,
exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably
construed. They extend only437

VOL. 550, MARCH

28, 2008

37

Republic vs. Dayot

so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should
be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
exception. Where a general rule is established by statute with
exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter
by implication. For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine

qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained
the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A strict but reasonable construction
of Article 76 of the Civil Code leaves the Court with no other
expediency but to read the law as it is plainly writtenthe
exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to
those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and desire to marry each other.A strict but reasonable
construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to
read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage
license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to
marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a
minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No
other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article
76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation
is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a
marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact
cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a
directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory
character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes
that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths;
and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Same; Same; Same; The question as to whether they satisfied
the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature.It is
noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the
68

minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact

arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of
the alleged facts. Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not
subject to this Courts review. It is already well-settled that: The
general rule438

4
38

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot

is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding

on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the
Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the
administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the
exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of
Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this
Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on
substantial evidence.
Same; Same; Same; The rule that persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married
does not apply to a case which does not involve an apparent
marriage.Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of
marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to
the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of
marriage, it is with reference to the prima faciepresumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have

entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Restated more

explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs
to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually
entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence,
compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant
consolidated Petitions.
Same; Same; Same; The solemnization of a marriage without
prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could
be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to
prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid
marriage.The declaration of the Civil Code that every
intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage
will not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from the
effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was
entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance
with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional
circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior
license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be
used, at least, for the439

VOL. 550, MARCH

28, 2008

39

Republic vs. Dayot

69

perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties,

which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by
making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. The
protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the
defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid
one as well. To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a
marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If
this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we
must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures
set forth in our laws.
Same; Same; Same; The falsity of the allegation in the sworn
affidavit relating to the period of the parties cohabitation, which
would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity,
for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to
be deposed and attested to by the parties under oathif the
essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere
scrap of paper, without force and effect.We are not impressed by
the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license
is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated
statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as
required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with
reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the
absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit
relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which
would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity,
for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required
to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the

essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere

scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was
no affidavit at all.
Same; Same; Same; Equity; Equity finds no room for
application where there is a law.In its second assignment of
error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity,
Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication,
and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced
invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for
application where there is a law. There is a law on the ratification
of marital cohabitation,440

4
40

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot

which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil

Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the
declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice
to their criminal liability.
Same; Declaration of Nullity; Prescription; An action for
nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.The Republic further avers
in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license.
It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to
1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina
Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years
70

before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set

in. This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a
marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it
is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage
does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Same; Same; Common-Law Cohabitation Period; To settle all
doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year
common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year
period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and
refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.To settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the
rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under
Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years
immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivitymeaning no third party was involved at any time
within the five yearsand continuity that is unbroken.

PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the amended decision

of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Public Attorneys Office for Felisa Tecson-Dayot.
Urbano C. Victorio, Sr. for Jose A. Dayot.
441

VOL. 550, MARCH 28,

2008

441

Republic vs. Dayot

CHICO-NAZARIO,J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581
and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines
and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both
challenging the Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals,
dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which
declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa
void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and
Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage
was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. 2 In lieu of a
marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn
affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of
them had attained the age of maturity, and that being
unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint 4 for Annulment
and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended
that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage
71

ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not

execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had
lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his
consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which
led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was
introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he
came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being
his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to
accom_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate Justices
Mario L. Guaria III and Santiago Javier Ranada, concurring;Rollo (G.R. No.
175581), pp. 65-70;Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 156-161.
2 Records, p. 170.
3 Id.
4 Id., at pp. 1-8.
442

442

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot

pany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim
a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At
the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa,
a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them.
They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that
the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused
to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his
refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had
learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the
pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately
left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had
contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a
piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas
house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was
a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he
confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses
allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She
declared that they had maintained their relationship as man
and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of
1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with
him on account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief,
Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was
subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain
Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993,
Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently,
she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the
Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both
employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating
72

Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable

for disgraceful
_______________
5 The marriage contract shows that at the time of the celebration of the
parties marriage, Jose was 27 years old, while Felisa was 37.
6 The Administrative complaint before the Administrative Adjudication
Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman was docketed as OMB-ADM-0-930466; Records, pp. 252-258.
443

VOL. 550, MARCH 28,

2008

443

Republic vs. Dayot

and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of
suspension from service for one year without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing
the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the
evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds
that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED
with costs against [Jose].
9

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence

presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa
on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses version of
the story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any
attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose]
could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as
they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it
[was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of
the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put
him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told
him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers.
And yet it took him, more or less, three months to discover that
the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the
marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as
perceived by this Court, to be taken in for a ride by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied
by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he
wrote [Felisas] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and
liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered
the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false.
[Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the
person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not
believe that the only reason why her name was written in his com_______________
7 Id., at p. 257.
8 Id., at pp. 313-323.

73

10 Id., at pp. 321-322.

9 Id., at p. 323.

11 ART.87.The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced

444

by the parties and within the periods as follows:

444

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

(1)For causes mentioned in Number 1 of Article 85, by the party whose

parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within four years after
attaining the age of twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be; or by the
parent or guardian or person having legal charge, at any time before such

Republic vs. Dayot

party has arrived at the age of twenty or eighteen years;

(2)For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who

pany I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but
a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully
wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.

has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by either spouse of the

When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath,
she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to
the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25,
November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature
appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his
[sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
(page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was
asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa
Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The
testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his
consent was procured through fraud.

who had no knowledge of the others insanity; or by any relative or guardian

subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other;

(3)For causes mentioned in Number 3 of Article 85, by the sane spouse,
of the party of unsound mind, at any time before the death of either party;
(4)For causes mentioned in Number 4, by the injured party, within four
years after the discovery of the fraud;
(5)For causes mentioned in Number 5, by the injured party, within four
years from the time the force or intimidation ceased;
(6)For causes mentioned in Number 6, by the injured party, within eight
years after the marriage.

10

445

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that

Joses action had prescribed. It cited Article 87 11 of the New
Civil

VOL. 550, MARCH 28,

2008

445

_______________

74

12 Records, p. 322.

Republic vs. Dayot

13 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 125.

Code which requires that the action for annulment of

marriage must be commenced by the injured party within
four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent
was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations,
he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he
discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did
not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x
x x.

14 ART.86.Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud

referred to in number 4 of the preceding article:
(1)Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2)Nondisclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime
involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for
two years or more;
(3)Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage,
she was pregnant by a man other than her husband;

12

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC

Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11
August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be
without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

446

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot

13

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the

marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court
observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a
ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86 14 of the
Civil Code
_______________

446

did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it

ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the
ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period
provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Joses
appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was
employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action
75

for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4)

and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of
marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained
by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party
within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within
four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased.
Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within
which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was
only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of
his marriage to Felisa.

that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses

assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for
lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was
solemnized under Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of
exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit
of marriage

between man and woman who have lived together as husband

and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that
Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for
the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of
the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled
by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the
Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of
the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The
appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said
affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing
officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and
other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no
legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa
was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza
belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56 17 of
the Civil Code did not require that either one of the
contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the

contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

447

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Republic vs. Dayot

15

_______________
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity
shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment
of marriage.
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 122.
16 ART. 76.No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a
woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried,
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official,
priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit

76

solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The prescription

was established only
_______________
17 ART.56.Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1)The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;
(2)The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of Appeals;
(3)Judges of the Courts of First Instance;
(4)Mayors of cities and municipalities;
(5)Municipal judges and justices of the peace;
(6)Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denomination, church,
religion or sect, duly registered, as provided in Article 92; and
(7)Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military commanders, and consuls
and vice-consuls in special cases provided in Articles 74 and 75.
448

448

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed

a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition
was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the
Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In
particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and
the woman must have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially,
he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation
executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for
Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered
an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005
isRECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring
the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab
initio.
_______________

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot

18 ART.7.Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1)Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction;
(2)Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly
authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar
general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted him by his

in Article 7 of the Family Code which does not govern the

parties marriage.
18

church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties
belongs to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect;

77

(3)Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases mentioned in Article
31;
(4)Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the
absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases
mentioned in Article 32; or
(5)Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article
10.
449

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449

Republic vs. Dayot

Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasay City.
19

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on

the ruling of this Court in Nial v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned
that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a
marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of
their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that
being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years
and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court
ruled as follows:

x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation

period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivitymeaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuitythat is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the
parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as
such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use
the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license
is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about
to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar.
_______________
19 CA Rollo, p. 279.
20 384 Phil. 661; 328 SCRA 122 (2000).

78

450

450

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage

solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch
as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore,
void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.
21

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision,

but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a
Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for
Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the
Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006
be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and
subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review,
docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the
appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this
Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest
of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought
before it for resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following
arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION
OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN
HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM
HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
_______________
21 CA Rollo, pp. 278-279.
22 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 173-174.

79

23 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 180.

451

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451

Republic vs. Dayot

III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE
LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE
LICEN[S]E.
24

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of

Appeals misapplied Nial.25She differentiates the case at bar
from Nial by reasoning that one of the parties therein had
an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not
obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces
that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after
a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had
been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa
surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage
would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between
Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we
shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by
petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several

circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa
echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling
inHernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion,
the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and
Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the
Republics position that the falsity of the statements in the
affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the
essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the
solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to
whether the said affida_______________
24 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 44-45.
25 Erroneously cited as Nio v. Bayadog; Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 18.
26 377 Phil. 919; 320 SCRA 76 (1999).
452

452

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot
80

vit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a

marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that
the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not
be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a
fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as
husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the
Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states
that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the
Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their
witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of
marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces
the following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote
Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993
issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24
of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived
together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses
company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name
as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on
the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of
the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa
was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their
union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential
requisites of marriage as a contract:

ART.53.No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these

requisites are complied with:
(1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2)Their consent, freely given;
(3)Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4)A

marriage

license,

except

in

marriage

of

exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)

453

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453

Republic vs. Dayot

Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local
civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under
Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear
that a marriage performed without the corresponding
marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the
legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license
is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark
contrast to the old Marriage Law, 31 whereby the absence of a
81

marriage license did not make the marriage void. The

rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license
under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the
State to the contracting parties, after the proper government
official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32
_______________
27 ART.58.Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in
Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of
the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
28 ART.75.Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be
solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of the Republic of the Philippines. The
duties of the local civil registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or
mayor with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by such
consuls and vice-consuls.
29 ART.80.The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3)Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character.
30 People v. De Lara, No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079, 4082.
31 The Marriage Law, otherwise known as Act No. 3613, requires the
following essential requisites: (1) legal capacity of the contracting parties; and
(2) their mutual consent.
32 Report of the Code Commission,pp. 79-80; see also Ambrosio
Padilla,Civil Code Annotated, 1956 Edition, Vol. I, p. 195.

454

454

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character

are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to
79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages inarticulo
mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2)
marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages, 33 (3)
ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification
of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages,
and (6) mixed marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital
cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ART.76.No marriage license shall be necessary when a man
and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
82

The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code

Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage
license may
_______________
33 Must be read with Article 58 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART.58.Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized
in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage
shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local
civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides.

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and

Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu
thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that they have
attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry
each other.37One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is
thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital
cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of
the minimum
_______________

34 Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (1984

Eleventh Ed.), pp. 302-310.

which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man

and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other

35 In Nial v. Bayadog (supra note 20 at pp. 668-669; pp. 129-130), this

Court articulated the spirit behind Article 76 of the Civil Code, thus:
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code
wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of

as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least

five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required
in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their

455

status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and

suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip

VOL. 550, MARCH 28,

2008

455

arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
36 The Report of the Code Commission states that No marriage license

Republic vs. Dayot

shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of
majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years desire to marry each other. In such case, the publicity

discourage such persons who have lived in a state of

cohabitation from legalizing their status.36

attending a marriage license may discourage such persons from legalizing

their status, Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.

83

37 Records, p. 49. The affidavit was denominated by the parties as an

Affidavit on (sic) Marriage Between Man and Woman Who Haved (sic) Lived
Together as Husband and Wife for at Least Five Years.
456

456

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot

five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage

void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the

exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be
strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They extend only so far
as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute
with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add
to the latter by implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to
apply, it is asine qua non thereto that the man and the
woman must have attained the age of majority, and
that, being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us
with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly
written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76
applies only to those who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other.
The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum
period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other
reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article
76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of
cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of
the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be
valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is
embodied in the law not as
_______________

84

38 Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 722, 744; 364 SCRA 334, 357
(2001).
39 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 130,
137; 303 SCRA 508, 515 (1999).
40 Id.
41 Id. citing Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, 25 November
1986, 145 SCRA 654, 659.
457

VOL. 550, MARCH 28,

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Republic vs. Dayot

sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic

admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in
June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas
testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor,
Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after
the EDSA Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisas
own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose
commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether
they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in
nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to
decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.46 Under
_______________
42 The first part of Article 76 states, No marriage license shall be

a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a

mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76
also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the
requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no
legal impediment to the marriage.

necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not

lived together for five years at the time they executed their

27 January 2006, 480 SCRA 504, 508.

and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other x x x.
43 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), p. 38.
44 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 158, citing TSN (Civil Case No. B-4143), 15
April 1999.
45 Id., at p. 159.
46 First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Pearanda, G.R. No. 166616,

458

85

458

meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they

should have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a
marriage license.

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot

Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this

Courts review.47 It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this
rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this
case the administrative body, make contradictory findings.
However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the
Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body
disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain
conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence.

Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of

marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no
applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of
a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima
facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband
_______________
47 Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30 September
2005, 471 SCRA 589, 605.
48 Id.

48

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November

1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the
requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the
falsity of the statements in the parties affidavit will not
affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and
formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves
scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa

459

VOL. 550, MARCH 28,

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459

Republic vs. Dayot

and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.49Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the
86

case, to be in fact married. 50 The present case does not involve

an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to
be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually
entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986,
hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which
spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51that
every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of
marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate
them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of
Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite
marriage license or compliance with the stringent
requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a
clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at
least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law
sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for
a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine
union but the expo_______________
49 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 708; 312 SCRA 772,
787 (1999).
50 Id.

51 ART. 220.In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of

the family. Thus, every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of
children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of
parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the
family in case of unlawful aggression.
52 People v. De Lara, supra note 30 at p. 4083.
460

460

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Dayot

sure of an invalid one as well.53To permit a false affidavit to

take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric
of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive
schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the
Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated
by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must
a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that
the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required
by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference
to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the
absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
87

Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn

affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as
an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential
fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and
attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter
in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of
paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no
affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth
the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied
relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot
thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced
invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for
application where there is a law.54 There is a law on the
ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise
terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the
authorities are
_______________
53 Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 407 Phil. 583, 588; 355 SCRA 285, 288 (2001).
54 Salavarria v. Letran College, 357 Phil. 189, 196; 296 SCRA 184, 191
(1998); Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 96,
108; 331 SCRA 82, 93 (2000).
461

VOL. 550, MARCH 28,

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Republic vs. Dayot

consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties
marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability. 55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error
that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of
his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that
Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990,
notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina
Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years
before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel
had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated
sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached
except that it is voidab initio. In this case, the right to
impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be
raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down
the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period
under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back
from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a
88

period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a

marriage.57 It covers
_______________
55 Supra note 33 at p. 306. Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in A Handbook on the
Family Code of the Philippines (1995 Ed., p. 38) wrote that If the parties
falsify their affidavit in order to have an instant marriage, although the truth
is that they have not been cohabiting for five years, their marriage will be
void for lack of a marriage license, and they will also be criminally liable.
Article 76 of the Civil Code is now Article 34 of the Family Code, which reads:
ART. 34.No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state
under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
56 Nial v. Bayadog, supra note 20 at p. 134.
57 Id., at pp. 130-131.
462

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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage,

characterized by exclusivitymeaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five yearsand continuity
that is unbroken.58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot
to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez (Acting Chairperson), Tinga,** Velasco,
Jr.*** and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petitions denied, amended decision affirmed.
Notes.Secret marriage is a legally non-existent phrase
but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated
without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of
either or both of the contracting parties. (Republic vs. Court
of Appeals, 236 SCRA 257 [1994])
A marriage license is a formal requirement, and its
absence renders the marriage void ab initio. (Sy vs. Court of
Appeals, 330 SCRA 550 [2000])

Republic vs. Dayot

o0o
_______________

89

58 Id.
** Per Special Order No. 497, dated 14 March 2008, signed by Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno designating Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga to
replace Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, who is on official leave
under the Courts Wellness Program and assigning Associate Justice Alicia
Austria-Martinez as Acting Chairperson.
*** Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was designated to sit as additional
member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 12
September 2007.

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC

OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A.
TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Certiorari; An application for certiorari is an
independent action which is not part or a continuation of the trial
which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of.
Estrellita argues that the trials court prematurely issued its
judgment, as it should have waited first for the resolution of her
Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this
Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ailed that
the pendency of a petition forcertiorari does not suspend the
proceedings before the trial court. An application for certiorari is
an independent action which is not part or a continuation of the
trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained
of.
Same; Answer; Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to
present her evidence were attributable only to herself and she
should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the
prejudice of the other party.Her failure to file an answer and her
refusal to present her evidence were attributable only to herself
and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory
tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the
trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its
Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to
present her side of the story.

G.R. No. 169766.March 30, 2011.*

Civil Law; Marriages; The Civil Code governs their personal

status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their
marriage.Even granting that there was registration of mutual
consent for the marriage to be considered as one contracted under
90

the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between

Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are
Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and
Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code
governs their personal status since this was in effect at the time of
the celebration of their

be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the
children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is
likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he
and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit.

_______________

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.

* FIRST DIVISION.
638

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Laura Love Pearanda-Guevarra for petitioner.

6
38

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

marriage. In view of Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which

subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent
marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Family Code; Marriages; In a void marriage, any interested
party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage.While the Family Code is silent with
respect to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held
that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and
cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may

Carmina S. Abbas for private respondents.

DEL CASTILLO,J.:
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past.
Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage laws, no vested
rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the
legitimate union of a married couple.
This petition for review oncertiorari assails the Decision1
_______________
1 CA Rollo, pp. 129-142; penned by Associate Justice Aurora SantiagoLagman and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Alino-Hormachuelos
and Rebecca do Guia-Salvador.
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Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution 2 dated
September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89
declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llaves (Estrellita)
marriage to Sen. Mamintal AJ. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as
voidab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married
Estrellita twiceinitially under the Islamic laws and
tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3 and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC
Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. 4 In their
marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status was indicated
as divorced.
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the
whole world as Sen. Tamanos wife, and upon his death, his
widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri
Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A.

Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest

of Sen. Tamanos legitimate children with Zorayda,5 filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for
being bigamous. The complaint6alleged, inter alia, that Sen.
Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites,
and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married
Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:
_______________
2 Id., at pp. 205-210.
3 Records, p. 103.
4 Id., at p. 13.
5 Namely Jamila, Jacob, Amina, Macapanton, Ysmael, Soraya, Adel and
Aquil.
6 Rollo, pp. 54-60.
640

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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

11.The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda,
having been celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore
92

governed by this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family Code,

the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with
Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted the same
while his prior marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still
subsisting, and his status being declared as divorced has no
factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced
Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly
done so because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;
11.1Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have
divorced Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D.
1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for
the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with
Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to
have been one contracted under Muslim law as provided under Art.
186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and Complainant
Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus covered by
this law;

Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws

of the
_______________
7 Id., at p. 57.
8 Records, pp. 14-15, 25-26.
9 Id., at pp. 25-26.
10 Id., at pp. 17, 29.
11 Id., at pp. 32-38.
12 Id., at pp. 38-40.
641

Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19,

1994. She then asked from the court for an extension of 30
days to file her answer to be counted from January 4,
1995,8and again, another 15 days9 or until February 18, 1995,
both of which the court granted.10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed
a Motion to Dismiss11 on February 20, 1995 where she
declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims
who were married under the Muslim rites, as had been
averred in the latters disbarment complaint against Sen.
Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the case because under Presidential

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Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving
Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of Sharia courts.
The trial court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted its
jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity. 13 Thus,
Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with
93

this Court questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss.

On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the
CA14which was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC
continued to try the case since there can be no default in
cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the
respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to
participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented
their evidence. When it was Estrellitas turn to adduce
evidence, the hearings set for such purpose 15 were postponed
mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March 22,
1996, suspended the proceedings16 in view of the CAs
temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996,
enjoining it from hearing the case.17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse
to Estrellita in its Decision dated September 30,
1996.18Estrellita then elevated the appellate courts judgment
to this Court by way of a petition for review
on certioraridocketed as G.R. No. 126603.19
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the
RTC ordered Estrellita to present her evidence on June 26,
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 109-111, 123.
14 Id., at p. 143.
15 Id., at pp. 151, 153, 173. 174.

16 Id., at p. 213.
17 Id., at p. 176.
18 Id., at pp. 230-236.
19 Tamano v. Hon. Ortiz, 353 Phil. 775; 291 SCRA 584 (1998).
342

342

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

1997.20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing
was reset to July 9, 1997. 21 The day before this scheduled
hearing, Estrellita again asked for a postponement.22
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case,
Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case for
decision,23reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying
the case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not
yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R.
No. 126603.24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Quezon City,25 stating as one of the reasons that as Sharia
courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction
in cases of marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code
94

and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, is

not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In
our Resolution dated August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellitas
motion for reconsideration27 with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998,
the RTC rendered the aforementioned judgment declaring
Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.28

28 Rollo, pp. 77-82; penned by Judge Elsa de Guzman.

643

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Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen. Tamanos subse_______________
20 Records, p. 237. The trial court erred in stating that let reception of
plaintiffs evidence herein be set on June 26, 1997 x x x when in fact, it was
already defendants turn.
21 Id., at p. 240.
22 Id., at pp. 242-244.
23 Id., at pp. 315-318.
24 Id., at pp. 319-322.

quent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being

bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the
Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.29 The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately
shows that the second marriage of the late Senator with
[Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of his first
marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage
void from the very beginning. The fact that the late Senator
declared his civil status as divorced will not in any way affect the
void character of the second marriage because, in this jurisdiction,
divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an acceptable method
of terminating the effects of a previous marriage, especially, where
the subsequent marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or
Family Code.
30

25 Rollo, pp. 69-76.

26 Records, p. 367.
27 Id., at pp. 354-362.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her
right to be heard as the RTC rendered its judgment even
95

without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the

Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the
RTC should have required her to file her answer after the
denial of her

REPORTS ANNOTATED
Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

_______________
29 FAMILY CODE, Article 35. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning:
xxxx
(4)Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article
41;
xxxx
New Civil Code, Article 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person
other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
xxxx
30 Rollo, p. 80.
31 CA Rollo, pp. 17-41.
644

644

SUPREME COURT

motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is

capacitated to marry her as his marriage and subsequent
divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code.Lastly,
she highlighted Zoraydas lack of legal standing to question
the validity of her marriage to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17,
2004;32 the CA held that Estrellita can no longer be allowed to
file her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be
heard but simply ignored it by asking for numerous
postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse
of around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed
by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her
pending petition forcertiorari with the higher courts since, as
an independent and original action, it does not interrupt the
proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged
that Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initiofor
being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and
Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not
provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first
nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the
subsequent Muslim celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda
96

then, according to the CA, had the legal standing to file the
action as she is Sen. Tamanos wife and, hence, the injured
party in the senators subsequent bigamous marriage with
Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution, 33 the CA denied
Estrellitas Motion for Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration where it debunked the additional errors
she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the
public prosecutors report on the existence of collusion in
violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court34
_______________
32 Rollo, pp. 34-46.
33 Id., at pp. 48-53.
34 Rules of Court, Rule 9, Section 3(e) Where no defaults allowed.If the
defending party in an action for annulment or decla645

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Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

had been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion.

Assuming that the issues have not been joined before the
RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellitas refusal to file an
answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellitas allegation
that the trial court erroneously rendered its judgment way
prior to our remand to the RTC of the records of the case
ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the issue on
the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of
the validity of Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo,
Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in upholding the
RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued,
depriving her of the opportunity to file an answer and to
present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the
validity of her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v.
Macias36laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to
dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to file an
answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to
suspend proceedings
_______________
ration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court
shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion
between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the

and Article 48 of the Family Code35 will not invalidate the

trial courts judgment as the proceedings between the parties

State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.

35 Family Code, Article 48.In all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney

97

or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent

collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be
based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
36 457 Phil. 463; 410 SCRA 365 (2003).
646

646

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality. She
maintains that she merely participated in the RTC hearings
because of the trial courts assurance that the proceedings
will be without prejudice to whatever action the High Court
will take on her petition questioning the RTCs jurisdiction
and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an
adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months before the
records of GR. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on
November 11, 1998.37She also questions the lack of a report of
the public prosecutor anent a finding of whether there was
collusion, this being a prerequisite before further proceeding
could be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a
suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage

with the late senator is valid as the latter was already
divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her.
She asserts that such law automatically applies to the
marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of
registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties
are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim
law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives
under Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the
siblings of the deceased.38
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no
legal standing to file suit because only the husband or the
wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-1110-SC.39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen)
defends the CAs reasoning and stresses that Estrellita was
never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an
_______________
37 Rollo, p. 217.
38 Id., at pp. 133, 135.
39 Inadvertently referred to as A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC.
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Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting for

the
Supreme
Courts
final
resolution
of
her certioraripetition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet
filed her answer and thus was denied due process; and c) the
public prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation
whether there was collusion;

original action for certioraridoes not stay the proceedings of

the main action before the RTC.

2.Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late

Sen. Tamano was bigamous; and

As regards the alleged lack of report of the public

prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol Gen says that this is
no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of
Estrellita in the suit that obviously shows the lack of
collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents
legal standing to challenge the validity of Estrellitas
purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any
proper interested party may attack directly or collaterally a
void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right to file
the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital
union.

3.Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to

have Estrellitas marriage declared void ab initio.

Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any
comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1.Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts
judgment, even though the latter was rendered prematurely

Our Ruling
Estrellitas
refusal
to
file
an
answer
eventually
led to the loss of her right to answer; and her
pending petition for certiorari/review on certio648

648

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

rari
questioning
the
denial
of
the
motion
to
dismiss before the higher courts does not at all

99

suspend
the
trial
proceedings
suit before the RTC of Quezon City.

of

the

principal

Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived

of her right to due process. She was never declared in default,
and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her
interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the
suspension of the period to file an answer and of the
proceedings in the trial court until her petition
for certiorariquestioning the validity of the denial of her
Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said
case, we affirmed the following reasoning of the CA which,
apparently, is Estrellitas basis for her argument, to wit:

Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we

pronounced therein is that the trial court is mandated to
suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss
that is filed before it. Nothing in the above excerpt states that
the trial
_______________
40 Supra note 36.
41 Id., at p. 468; 369.
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649

However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to

Dismiss? instead of filing an Answer to the complaint. The
filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her
Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by
the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the
Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on
the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its
Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the Petitioner. Under
Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now
Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for
in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days
computed from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the
Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the complaint
x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
41

Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

court should suspend its proceedings should the issue of the
propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised
before the appellate courts. InMacias, the trial court failed to
observe due process in the course of the proceeding of the
case because after it denied the wifes motion to dismiss, it
immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present
evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste
even when, under the rules of procedure, the wife still had
time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no
time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to
dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by the
100

trial court after she filed motions for extension of time to file
an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trials court prematurely issued
its judgment, as it should have waited first for the resolution
of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently,
before this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA
correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition
forcertiorari does not suspend the proceedings before the trial
court. An application forcertiorari is an independent action
which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted
in the rendition of the judgment complained of. 42Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that [t]he petition
shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent
from further proceeding in the case.43 In fact, the trial court
respected the CAs temporary restraining order and only after
the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again require
Estrellita to present her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way
of Rule 45, we never issued any order precluding the trial
court from proceeding with the principal action. With her
_______________
42 Sps. Diaz v. Diaz, 387 Phil. 314, 334; 331 SCRA 302. 320 (2000).
43 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Section 7.

650

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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

numerous requests for postponements, Estrellita remained
obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her
evidence when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the
trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No.
126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to
present her evidence were attributable only to herself and
she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory
tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer,
the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and
rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have
waived her right to present her side of the story. Neither
should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No.
126603 to become final and executory, nor should it wait for
its records to be remanded back to it because G.R. No.
126603 involves strictly the propriety of the Motion to
Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as to the non-existence
of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9,
Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on Declaration of
101

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) 44 also requires the
participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void
marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit
his investigation report to determine whether there is
collusion between the parties:
Sec. 9.Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1)
Within one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in
paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall
submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in
collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their
respective counsels, if any.
_______________
44 Dated March 4, 2003, with an effectivity date of March 15, 2003.
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Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

651

(2)If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall

state the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their
respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten days
from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report
for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it
shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists,
the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the
public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.

Records show that the trial court immediately directed the

public prosecutor to submit the required report, 45 which we
find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City
Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated
March 30, 1995,46 wherein he attested that there could be no
collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence
because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private
respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at
bar. Even assuming that there is a lack of report of collusion
or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we
held inTuason v. Court of Appeals,47the lack of participation
of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial
court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of
marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether
collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioners vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion
102

that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation

by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any
of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that
the nonintervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of
collusion
_______________
45 Records, p. 30.
46 Id., at p. 56.
47 326 Phil 169; 256 SCRA 158 (1996).
652

652

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda

was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim
rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage relationships
between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code
of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can
exist at any given time.50 Under the marriage provisions of
the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of
during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior
marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce
under PD 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim personal laws.
However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article
13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to marriage and
divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only
the male
_______________

Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

48 Id., at p. 181; 169.

between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the

proceedings in the trial court.
48

The
Civil
Code
governs
the
marriage
of
Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen.
Tamanos
subsequent
marriage
to
Estrellita
is
void ab initio.

49 Supra note 12, where Zoraydas disbarment complaint stated that the
marriage was conducted under both rites.
50 Malang v. Judge Moson, 398 Phil. 41; 338 SCRA 393 (2000).
51 An Act Authorizing For A Period Of Twenty Years Divorce Among
Moslems Residing In Non-Christian Provinces In Accordance With Moslem
Customs and Practices (approved on June 18, 1949), Section 1 of which
provides:

103

Section 1.For a period of twenty years from the date of the approval of
this Act, divorce among Moslems residing in non-Christian provinces shall be
recognized and be governed by Moslem customs and practices.

It has been held that:

52 Under Articles 45-57.

653

VOL. 646, MARCH 30,

2011

or operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred

thereby.

653

Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that

all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is
clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied;
accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the
retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the
general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied
prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a preexisting body of law, specifically, the Civil Codein respect of civil
acts that took place before the Muslim Codes enactment.
54

party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in

accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines. But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that
Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where
the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. 53

An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code

is Article 186(2) which states:

Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4,

1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil
Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage
of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided
for the prospective application of its provisions unless
otherwise provided:

_______________

Art. 186 (1).Effect of code on past acts.Acts executed prior

to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force
at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as
otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality

A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity

of this Code in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be consid-

53 Tamano v. Ortiz, supra, note 19 at p. 781; 589.

54 Malang v. Judge Moson, supra note 50 at p. 57; 409.
654

654

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

104

Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

ered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses
register their mutual desire to this effect.

Even granting that there was registration of mutual

consent for the marriage to be considered as one contracted
under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent
between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as
both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both
civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled,
the Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in
effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view
of Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which subsisted at the time
Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is
correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.

Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have

the legal personalities to file the declaration of
nullity
of
marriage.
A.M.
No.
02-11-10-SC,
which limits to only the husband or the wife
the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective
in application and does not shut out the prior
spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.

Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the

Philippines,55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under
Section 2(a)56 thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the
exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may
directly attack the validity of their own marriage.
_______________
55 Executive Order No. 209, which took effect on August 3, 1988.
56 Sec.2.Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
(a)Who may file.A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
655

VOL. 646, MARCH 30,

2011

655

Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a

void marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of

marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy.

105

In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the

spouses may file the petition to the exclusion of compulsory or
intestate heirs, we said:

Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the aggrieved or injured
spouse. If Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable

Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a)
in the following manner, viz.:

_______________

(1)Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file

petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs
of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3,
paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor,
and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.
57

57 Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad CatliMedinaceli, G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 418, 429, citing
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional
Orders.
656

656

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely,
this is not what the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take
action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial
period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the
conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to
declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the
injured spouse who should be given a legal remedy is the
106

one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly

the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of
the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the
disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by
the Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the
son from impugning the subsequent marriage. But in the
case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to
file an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court
Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the Family
Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to
cases already commenced before March 15, 2003.58
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of
Estrellitas marriage in November 1994. While the Family
Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in
which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source
of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage di-

657

VOL. 646, MARCH 30,

2011

657

Juliano-Llave vs. Republic

rectly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed
even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib,
as one of the children of the deceased who has property
rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party
in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both
of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit.60

Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a

couple, they should be interpreted in a way that would
preserve their respective rights which include striking down
bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly
rendered.

_______________
58 Carlos v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA
116, 132 citing Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad
Carli-Medinaceli, supra note 57 at 428.

107

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed

August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR.
CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued on
September 13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De

Castro and Perez, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Note.The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot

be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment. (Carlos vs. Sandoval,
574 SCRA 116 [2008])
o0o

G.R. No. 145226. February 6, 2004.

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Bigamy;Elements; In Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis,
the elements of bigamy were laid down.In Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis we laid down the elements of bigamy thus: (1) the offender
has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been
legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he
108

contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage

would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum

to six (6) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor as maximum.
Also assailed in this petition is the resolution of the appellate
court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for
reconsideration.
3

Same; Same; Same;Declaration of the first marriage as void ab

initio retroacts to the date of the celebration of the first marriage.
There was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of
nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words,
for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the
celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes
of the law, never married.

The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as

follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the

house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for
a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jordan M. Pizarras andJoselito T. Lopez for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People.

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost
contact with each other.

QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the
decision dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment dated
August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol,
Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found
herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison
1

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from

Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an
exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for

Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication.
109

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an

Information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with
the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
5

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to

petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get
married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia
de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in

Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court

(General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which
was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on
February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria
Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran
City, Bohol.
4

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial

declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic)
among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took
place.

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on

the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his
marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently
denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution.
When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty
to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its
judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds
accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months ofPrision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day
ofPrision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted

petitioners claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null
and void ab initio. FollowingDomingo v. Court of Appeals, the
trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is
not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage
8

110

should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void

even if such be the fact but must
_______________
5

The accusatory portion of the charge sheet found in Records, p. 1, reads:

That, on or about the 4th day of October, 1992, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being
previously united in lawful marriage with Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 and
without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Maria Jececha Limbago to
the damage and prejudice of Lucia Barrete in the amount to be proved during trial.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.

10

Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of

Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.

Rollo, pp. 38-40.

Records, p. 119.

G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572.

379

VOL. 422, FEBRUARY 6,

2004

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial

court cited Ramirez v. Gmur, which held that the court of a
country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in
which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose
of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the
matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted
by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere.
Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the
second
marriage,
the
trial
court
stressed
that
following People v. Bitdu, everyone is presumed to know the
law, and the fact that one does not know that his act
constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from
the consequences thereof.

379

Morigo vs. People

first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.

Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No.

20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the
marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no
marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken
from this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the
same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

11

111

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the

appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of
nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020
could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to
be punished by Article 349 of
12

_______________
9

42 Phil. 855, 863 (1918).

10

58 Phil. 817 (1933).

11

Rollo, p. 43.

12

ART. 349. Bigamy.The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon

any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
380

380

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Morigo vs. People

the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second

marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence,
the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from
the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce

decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not
be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article
15 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to
public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17 of the
Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered
ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign
jurisdiction.
13

14

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate

courts decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v.
People, allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such
as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good
faith.
15

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the

motion for lack of merit. However, the denial was by a split
vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined
in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis.
The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly
declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to
speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of
the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes
of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy.
16

_______________

112

13

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,

condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
14

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public

instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the
solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
15

G.R. Nos. 89983-84, 6 March 1992,207 SCRA 85.

16

Rollo, p. 51.

381

A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED
UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS
AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL
INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58
PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY
CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
17

VOL. 422, FEBRUARY 6,

2004

381

Morigo vs. People

The present petition raises the following issues for our
resolution:

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not

petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of
good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for
relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario
court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second
marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon
committing bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner
113

further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a

conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of
bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised
Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of
criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He
stresses that there is a difference between the intent to
commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence,
it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a
second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit
bigamy.

Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and

lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether all
the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In MarbellaBobis v. Bobis we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
20

1. (1)the offender has been legally married;

2. (2)the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not
been judicially declared presumptively dead;
3. (3)he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)

submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient
but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our
ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, which held that bigamy
can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements
concur, stressing that under Article 40 of the Family Code, a
judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may remarry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said
Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know
the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention that
he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree
of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case
No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lucia.
18

19

4. (4)the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it

not been for the existence of the first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that

during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of
Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil
Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol
and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to
effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
_______________
18

G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752-753.

114

19

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for

purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such

previous marriage void.
20

Supra.

383

VOL. 422, FEBRUARY 6,

2004

383

from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020,
hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the
accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under
the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared
void ab initio, the two were never married from the
beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal
effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for

Morigo vs. People

_______________

SO ORDERED.

21

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage

ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere
signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held
that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with
Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As the dissenting
opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This
simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and
that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the
first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes,
reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first
marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the
first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law,
never married. The records show that no appeal was taken
22

21

CA Rollo, p. 38.

22

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

1. (1)Authority of the solemnizing officer;
2. (2)A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
3. (3)A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the

23

contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal

declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
23

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall

render the marriage void ab initioexcept as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as
provided in Article 45.

24

115

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
24

Rollo, p. 54.

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary

before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters
into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characterized by statutes as void.
26

384

384

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Morigo vs. People

legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the

time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The
existence and the validity of the first marriage being an
essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that
a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there
is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce
be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be

distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case, the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was
likewise obtained after the second marriage was already
celebrated. We held therein that:
25

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first

marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice:
first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly
issued and then again six months later before a priest in
religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage
appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab
initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all

was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage
and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held
liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration
of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

116

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to

liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and
weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of
innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has
not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not
tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith
or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

Petition granted, judgment and resolution set aside.

Note.A judge ought to know that a subsisting previous

marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the
subsequent marriage null and void. (Borja-Manzano vs.
Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1 [2001])
o0o

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of
the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein
petitioners motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that
his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.

SO ORDERED.

Puno (Chairman),Austria-Martinez, Callejo,

Sr.and Tinga, JJ., concur.

117

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JUAN

LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and
EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA, respondents.
Civil Law; Conflict of Laws; Nationality Rule; The Civil Code
continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine
laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, although living abroad.The first marriage between
Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the
Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of
the solemnization was theSpanish Civil Code, which adopted the
nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the nationality
rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living
abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed
this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having
remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997
terminated their marriage.

G.R. No. 171914.July 23, 2014.*

Same; Same; Same; Divorce; The nonrecognition of absolute

divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family
Code, even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on
September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between
Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The
nonrecognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained
even under theFamily Code, even if either or both of the spouses
are residing abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital
unions under our laws have been the void and the voidable
marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages
118

have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and

the annulment of the marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The nonrecognition of absolute
divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the
sanc_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
377

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2014

77

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan

Luces Luna
tity of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens.It
is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce
Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia.
Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if
voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between
Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his
death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution,
which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution,
and regards it as a special contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family
life. The nonrecognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a

manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union

especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon
the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided by
law. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos
exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can
ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this
jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Property Relations; Conjugal Partnership
of Gains; Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered
into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September
10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains governed their property relations.Considering that Atty.
Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement
prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their
property relations. This is because theSpanish Civil Code, the law
then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the
property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not
entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the
marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements
agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime.In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are
void, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall
govern the property relations between husband and wife.
378

119

3
78

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan
Luces Luna

Same; Same; Same; Marriages; In the Philippines, marriages

that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void.In the
Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or
incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country,except

bigamous,

polygamous,

or

incestuous

marriages as determined by Philippine law. Bigamy is an

illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent
marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A
bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.
Same; Same; Property Relations; Co-Ownership; Due to the
second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void
ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired
during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on coownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code.Due to
the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being
void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties
acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules
on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code,

viz.: Article144.When a man and a woman live together as

husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is
void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. (n) In such a
situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof
to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it
became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual
contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of
co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would
warrant no relief in her favor.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Arnulfo F. Dumadag for petitioner.
379

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Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces

Luna
Renato G. De la Cruz Law Office for respondents.
BERSAMIN,J.:

120

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the

nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any
settlement of property between the parties of the first
marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a
divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial
approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the
husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.

_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 34-51; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with
Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (later Presiding Justice) and Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr., concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 198-210.
380

The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces
Luna, appeals the adverse decision promulgated on
November 11, 2005,1whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed with modification the decision rendered on August
27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in
Makati City.2The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100
pro indiviso share of the husband in a condominium unit,
and in the law books of the husband acquired during the
second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as
follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner
in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo,
Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was
living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA),

380

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces

Luna
whom he initially married in a civil ceremony conducted by the
Justice of the Peace of Paraaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947
and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in
San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNAs
marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely:
Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L.
Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina
Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2)
decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually
agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed
to separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written
agreement entitled AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT dated November 12, 1975, whereby
they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership of property.
121

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of

his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial
Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First
Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.
Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA
contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD.
Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the
Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm
named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where
ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA
purchased from Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th
Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project (condominium unit)
at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for
P1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for 36 months
starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to be used
as law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of
Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed on July 15,
1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on Au381

VOL. 730, JULY 23, 2014

381

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces

Luna

JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100);

MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100);
GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan
(17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M.
Sison (12/100) x x x
Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of
Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to
Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued
on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100);
MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100);
TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100)
x x x
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the
condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the same
was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties
stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium
unit would be 25/100 share.
ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law
firm with Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz and used a portion of the
office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted
until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium
unit including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found
therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNAs son of
the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100
portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty.

gust 10, 1983, which was registered bearing the following names:
122

Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named

Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.

to preserve and administer the subject properties; and that the

heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorneys fees and costs of
the suit to SOLEDAD.
3

382

Ruling of the RTC

382

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces

Luna
The 25/100 pro indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the
condominium unit as well as the law books, office furniture and
equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD
against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No. 991644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were
acquired during the existence of the marriage between ATTY.
LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they
had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties
upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of 3/4 pro
indiviso share consisting of her 1/2 share in the said properties
plus her 1/2 share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was
bequeathed to her in the latters last will and testament; and that
the heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded
SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The complaint
prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the 3/4 portion of
the subject properties; that the same be partitioned; that an
accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to
the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed

On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after

trial upon the aforementioned facts,4 disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a)The 24/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit
located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate
of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN
(517/100) SQUARE
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 37-39.
4 Id., at pp. 198-210.
383

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Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces

Luna

123

METERS is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna

through his sole industry;
(b)Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept
over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati
with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be
changed from JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna
to JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna;
(c)Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus
Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and
Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit
and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon
as appropriate arrangements have been made for transport and
storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT CONTRIBUTE MONEY
FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
_______________
5 Id., at p. 210.
6 Id., at pp. 211-214.
384

384

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces

Luna

Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to
the RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE
INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO

PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO
HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF
THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS
TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENORAPPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED
PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND
LUNA;
124

V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE

SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF
THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE NAME OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM
UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY CODE NOR ARTICLE
144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE
APPLICABLE;

In contrast, the respondents attributed the following

errors to the trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF
ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF
PLAINTIFFS MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFF PROVED BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
(HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS
FOUND IN ATTY. LUNAS LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT,
ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED
AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.
8

VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT

THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT
HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX. THE
LOWER
COURT
ERRED
IN
NOT
EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION FOR 385

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Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces

Luna
FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING
FEE.

On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed

modified decision,9 holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY.
LUNA until the latters death on July 12, 1997. The absolute
divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the Dominican
Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with
EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens
is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
_______________

125

7 Id., at pp. 217-219.

8 Id., at p. 283.
9 Supra note 1.
10 Rollo, p. 44.
386

386

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces

Luna
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August
27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, is
hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(a)The 25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium
unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby
adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces
Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having
been acquired from the sole funds and sole industry of Juan
Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;

(b)Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as

owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit,
hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the
civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from
JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna to JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna;
(c)Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna
and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) are hereby
declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher
on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal
Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 50-51.
387

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Luna

126

On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioners motion

for reconsideration.13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for
review on certiorari that:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
theAgreement for Separation and Property Settlement
executed by
Luna
and
Respondent
Eugenia
was
unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership was not
dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not
recognizing the Dominican Republic courts approval of
theAgreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof of actual
contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the subject
condominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Petitioner was not entitled to the subject law books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the
contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro
indiviso share in the condominium unit; and to the law books
(i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).

The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court

to ascertain the law that should determine, firstly, whether
the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, sec_______________
12 Id., at pp. 52-53.
13 Id., at pp. 54-65.
14 Id., at p. 17.
388

388

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces

Luna
ondly, whether the second marriage entered into by the late
Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights
in property.
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.

127

1.
Atty. Lunas first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both

Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September
10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization
was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality
rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule,
to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
although living abroad.15Pursuant to the nationality rule,
Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty.
Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death
of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on
September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce
between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The nonrecognition of absolute divorce between
Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code,16 even if
either
_______________
15 Article 15, Civil Code, which is a revision of Article 9.1, Spanish Civil
Code, states:

Article 15.Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,

condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
16 In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas (G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA
266, 277), the Court declares:
389

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Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces

Luna
or both of the spouses are residing abroad. 17 Indeed, the only
two types of defective marital unions under our laws have
been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the
remedies against such defective marriages have been limited
to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the
annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of
Atty. Luna and Eugenia.18Conformably with the nationality
rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained
abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July
12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which
characterizes
marriage
as
an
inviolable
social
128

institution,19and regards it as a special contract of permanent

union between a man and a woman for the establishment of a
conjugal and family life.20 The nonrecognition of absolute
divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for
the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino
citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid
marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either
spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided by law. For as
long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos
exists, no divorce decree
_______________
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void
and voidable marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of
the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the
lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. Our family laws do not
recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.
17 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 446.
18 Rollo, p. 37.
19 Article XV, Section 2, 1987CONSTITUTION.
20 Article 1, FAMILY CODE.
390

390

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces

Luna
dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal
or judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.

2.

The Agreement for Separation and Property

Settlement was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation
and Property Settlement(Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna
and Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection
with the divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo
in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia.
Hence, the CA committed reversible error in decreeing
otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered
into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on
September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains governed their property
relations. This is because theSpanish Civil Code, the law
then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the
129

property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not
entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of
the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so
provides, to wit:
Article119.The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property,
or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other
regime.In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the
same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and
wife.

The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until

terminated for any of various causes of termination
enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz.:

Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1)Upon the death of either spouse;
(2)When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3)When the marriage is annulled;

391

(4)In case of judicial separation of property under

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Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces

Luna
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal
partnership of gains thusly:
Article142.By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the
husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from their work or industry, and
divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage.

Article 191.

The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and

Eugenia did not per se dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a
competent court was still required under Article 190 and
Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Article190.In the absence of an express declaration in the

marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses
during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a
judicial order. (1432a)
130

Article191.The husband or the wife may ask for the

separation of property, and it shall be decreed when the spouse of
the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with
it civil interdiction, or has been
392

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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces

Luna
declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial
approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well
as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for
judicial approval or the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing
to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of
Articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code

concerning the effect of partition stated in Articles 498 to 501 shall

be applicable. (1433a)

But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of

Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient in
dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains
between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no
question that the approval took place only as an incident of
the action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia,
for, indeed, the justifications for their execution of the
Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the action
for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and
enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to
Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the
Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under
Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of
gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of
their marriage.
_______________
21 Id., at pp. 74, 81-82.
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Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces

131

Luna
3.

Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,

was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership

What law governed the property relations of the second

marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Lunas subsequent
marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being
bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce
Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of
Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a

second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is
considered void ab initio.24
_______________
22 Id., at p. 48.
23 Article 83, Civil Code; Sermonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109454,
June 14, 1994, 233 SCRA 155, 158.
24 The Civil Code relevantly states:
394

394

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Court concurs with the CA.

In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil
Code clearly states:
Article71.All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country,except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
marriages as determined by Philippine law.

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces

Luna
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the
petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous,
the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were
governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with
Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz.:
132

xxxx

Article144.When a man and a woman live together as

husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is
void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. (n)

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the

burden of proof to confirm such fact. To establish coownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner
to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of
property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in
her favor. As the Court explained inSaguid v. Court of
Appeals:25

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v.

Fernandez,which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The
claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to
the bigamous and adulterous union is without basis because they
failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money
in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in
_______________
Article80.The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(4)Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 83, number

2;
xxxx
25 G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.
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Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces

Luna
Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the
controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership
absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property.

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party
who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of
the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponents defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the
instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.
133

The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for.

The law gives the defendant some measure of protection as the
plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint.
Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced
that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed,
the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence.
26

The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved

her actual contributions in the purchase of the condominium
unit in the aggregate amount of at least P306,572.00,
consisting in direct contributions of P159,072.00, and in
repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex
Financing and Banco Filipino totaling P146,825.30; 27 and that
such aggregate contributions of P306,572.00 corresponded to
almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
condominium unit amounting to P362,264.00 of the units
purchase price of P1,449,056.00.28
The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid
for solely out of her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna
had even sent her a thank you note; 29 that she had the
financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases;
and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his
own due to the meagerness of the income derived from his
law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the coownership?

In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the

petitioners assertions on her actual contributions through
the following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence
that her own independent funds were used to buy the law office
condominium and the law books subject matter in contention in
this case proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil
Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply as to cases
where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living
together as husband and wife but not married, or under a
marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New
Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was
not readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void
at first because it applied only if the parties were not in any way
incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for
it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there still exists
a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the
man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the
Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in
proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions
and corresponding shares were prima facie presumed to be
equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual
contribution was required. The same rule and presumption was
to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of
the parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the
co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted
in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share
shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of
134

the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties
were in bad faith.

Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of

gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social
institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the
Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case
of Tenchavez vs. Escao, No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15
SCRA 355, thus:
xxxx

As to the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the

condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an
actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to
establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed
used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the
condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the
trial court, viz.:

x x x The first check, Exhibit M for P55,000.00 payable to

Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on January 27, 1977, which
was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement,
Exhibit 7 was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in
the amount of P97,588.89, Exhibit P was payable to Banco
Filipino. According to the plaintiff, this was in payment of the loan
of Atty. Luna. The third check which was for P49,236.00 payable to

PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of
Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit M, for P4,072.00 was dated
December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts
delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the
subject condominium unit. The connection was simply not
established. x x x

SOLEDADs claim that she made a cash contribution of

P100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for
SOLEDADs claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that the same
was acquired through the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:

The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit 9, covering the

condominium unit was in the name of Atty. Luna, together with his
partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear
as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired
for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied
Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were
loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have
evidence to show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761
were in the name of JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L.
Luna was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are
two different acts. It is well-settled that registration does not
confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase
135

married to preceding Soledad L. Luna is merely descriptive of

the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.

WHEREFORE,

AFFIRMS the

decision

Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De

Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Castro,

the

Court

promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the

SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but
logical that SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in
the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove
that she had anything to contribute and that she actually
purchased or paid for the law office amortization and for the law
books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who
bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings
from his practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask
from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed.
30

The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions

by the CA both because they were substantiated by the
records and because we have not been shown any reason to
revisit and undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party
claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of
proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being
evidence,31 did not serve the purpose. In contrast, given the
subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the
properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained.
It should then be justly concluded that the properties in
litis legally pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains
as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership
of the 25/100 pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit, and of the law books pertained to the
respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.

petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Judgment affirmed.

Notes.Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction

on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
(Fujiki vs. Marinay, 700 SCRA 69 [2013])

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a

marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who
obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy; If the foreign judgment is not recognized in
136

the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated

the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse
cannot remarry. (Id.)
o0o

G.R. No. 154380. October 5, 2005.

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, vs.CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, respondent.

Family Code; Marriages;Divorce; The Supreme Court holds

that paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.This
case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a
marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired
alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in
the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as
petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists
137

on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying

for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is
also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage. x x x We hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would
be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of
a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is unanimous in
holding that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No.
209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a
Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.We
are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a
spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry.
Same; Same; Same; The reckoning point is not the citizenship
of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their

citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the

alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.We state the twin
elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry. In this case, when Ciprianos wife was
naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As
fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the
twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino
spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
Civil Procedure; Declaratory Relief; Requisites of a Petition for
Declaratory Relief.The requisites of a petition for declaratory
relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga
del Sur, Br. 23.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
138

The Solicitor General for respondent.

Public Attorneys Officefor respondent.

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph

of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree
obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given
the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

116

IT IS SO ORDERED.

116

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Orbecido III

QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where
one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can
the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the
Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel
question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails
theDecision dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court
of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as

follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady
Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was
blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discov_______________
1

Rollo, pp. 20-22.

Id., at pp. 27-29.

Id., at pp. 21-22.

117

VOL. 472, OCTOBER 5,

2005

117

139

argues there is no law that governs respondents situation.

The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
judicial determination.

Republic vs. Orbecido III

ered that his wife had been naturalized as an American

citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his
wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic,
herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER
ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE
4

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the

Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it
only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The
proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation. Furthermore, the OSG

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not

directly applicable to his case but insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated
_______________
4

Id., at p. 105.

Id., at pp. 106-110.

Id., at p. 110.

118

118

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Orbecido III

her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law

pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
7

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to

remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a

140

petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1,

Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from

RULE 63 DECLARATORY
REMEDIES

receive the support of the Government.

RELIEF

AND

SIMILAR

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a

deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance,
or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for
a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...

of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall

Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay,G.R. No. 137538, 3 September 2001,364

SCRA 281, 286, citing Galarosa v. Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, 11 November
1993, 227 SCRA 729, 737.
119

VOL. 472, OCTOBER 5,

2005

119

Republic vs. Orbecido III

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there

must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the
party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.
8

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of

Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where
one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce
decree,
_______________
7

conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect

and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the

parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State
asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while
respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his
capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for
judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the
validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent?
Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come

and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall

141

about in the first place, and what was the intent of the
legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into
law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article
26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original

Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
120

120

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Orbecido III

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern

the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply
only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later
on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen
while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings on the
Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
9

1. 1.The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those

whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.
These spouses who are divorced will not be able to remarry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce
them abroad can.
142

2. 2.This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of

divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry.
We propose that this be deleted and made into law only
after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to
the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorncase
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
10

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time

of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of

Quita v. Court of Appeals. InQuita, the parties were, as in
this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife
became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained
a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way
ofobiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and
can thus remarry.
11

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and

applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of
a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead
to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.
A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.
12

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid

the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is
143

no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant

case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. 1.There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. 2.A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at

the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenshipat the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would
have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a
valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.

Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this
particular case, not even feasible, considering that the
marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie;
hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still
remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent

evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the
divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It
is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.
13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein

must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law
must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged
and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that
the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be
14

15

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the

proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a

144

no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to

enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209,
as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow
a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to
declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife,
who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration
could only be made properly upon respondents submission of
the aforecited evidence in his favor.

SO ORDERED.

Davide,
Jr. (C.J.,
Chairman), YnaresSantiago,Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, assailed decision and resolution set aside.

Note.The accused who secured a foreign divorce, and

later remarried in the Philippines, in the belief that the
foreign divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy. (Diego vs.
Castillo, 436 SCRA 67 [2004]).
o0o

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the

Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May
15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional
Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are
hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 186571.August 11, 2010.*

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL
STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.
Marriages; Family Code; Husband and Wife; Declaration of
Nullity; Divorce; The Family Code recognizes only two types of
defective marriagesvoid and voidable marriagesand in both
145

cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or

annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage; Divorce contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union
for cause arising after the marriage.The Family Code recognizes
only two types of defective marriagesvoid and voidable
marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage existsbefore or at the
time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.
Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Through the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Executive Order
No. (EO) 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Courts
holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989).Recognizing the
reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino
and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her
legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, enacted
Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family
Code to its present wording, as follows: Art. 26. All marriages
solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Through the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227

effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van

Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and Pilapil v. IbaySomera,174 SCRA 653 (1989). In both cases, the Court refused to
acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a
foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino.
The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already
severed the marital bond between the spouses.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to
the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included
in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent
is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive
right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that
purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize
divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the
Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces
cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the
Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves
146

as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between

the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An action based on
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decreeif the court
finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the
courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated
to contract another marriage.An action based on the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make
a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; Only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Codethe alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the
Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Conflict of Laws;
Recognition of Foreign Judgments; The unavailability of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip such aliens of legal interest to petition the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree
direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an
action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment.
We qualify our above conclusioni.e., that the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens
with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). In other words, the unavailability of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for
the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. * * * To our
mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest
to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less,
that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The
starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is
the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and lawsthe foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect
of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.The starting point
in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
147

acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of

foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country. This means
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the
alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a
party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim
or defense.
Conflict of Laws; Recognition of Foreign Judgments; In the
instant case where the foreigner seeking recognition of the foreign
divorce decree attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree,
as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but
failed to include a copy of the foreign law on divorce, the Court
deems it more appropriate to remand the case to the trial court to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the foreign
divorce law, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and
the Filipina wifes obvious
270

2
70

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

conformity with the petition.In Gerberts case, since both the

foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,

recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be

official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either
by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer
having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official
records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated
by the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert attached to
his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of
the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this
point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting
evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to determine whether the
divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. We
deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given
the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes
(Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the
same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign
judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a
right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state,
every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws
before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the
parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; More than the principle of comity that is served
by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments
between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of
148

divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition

and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms.More
than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations,
the res judicataeffect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as
the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect,
as discussed above, will not
271

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71

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive
rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides.
Same; Same; Civil Registry; While the law requires the entry of
the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission
of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees
registrationthere must first be a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect; The registration
of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the
civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso factoauthorize the decreesregistration.
The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a

judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be

given res judicataeffect. In the context of the present case, no
judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree.
Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn
and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on
the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
requirement of a court recognition, as it cited National Statistics
Office (NSO) Circular No. 4, series of 1982, and Department of
Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982both of which required a
final order from a competent Philippine courtbefore a foreign
judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil
registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree.
For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void
and cannot produce any legal effect.
Same; Same; Same; Cancellation of Entries; The recognition
that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) may extend to a foreign divorce
decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in
the civil registrya petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is
not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court,
for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry; The Rules of
Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the
civil registry may be judicially cancelled or correctedRule 108 of
the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that
272

149

2
72

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the

cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition
that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of
the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign
judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the
Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The
Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which
entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that
the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be
made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for
hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.
As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the
RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The recognition of the foreign

divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact.We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling
should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for
the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry
one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can
be measured and
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Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Br. 11.

150

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court

Gilbert U. Medrano for petitioner.
Michael P. Mejia for private respondent.
BRION,J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11,
elevatedvia a petition for review oncertiorari2 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen
who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization
on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert
married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in
Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned
to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise
Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed,
Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce.
The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005.
The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8,
2006.5
_______________

1 Dated October 30, 2008, penned by Judge Perla B. Querubin; Rollo, pp.
24-31.
2 Id., at pp. 3-20.
3 Id., at p. 27.
4 Marriage Certificate, id., at p. 37.
5 Certificate of Divorce, id., at p. 38.
274

274

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has
found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new
Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate.
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of
the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that
the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
151

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial

recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of

marriage as dissolved(petition) with the RTC. Although

summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but
submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the
trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition
and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself
but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances.
She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-ininterest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied

Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert

was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino
spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Fam_______________
6 Id., at pp. 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982, states:
It would therefore be premature to register the decree of
annulment in the Register of Annulment of Marriages in Manila,
unless and until final order of execution of such foreign judgment is
issued by competent Philippine court.
7 Supra note 1.

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Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

ily Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under
Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art.26.All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the

legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by
the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was
enacted to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.11

275

152

The Petition
From the
petition.13

RTCs

ruling,12Gerbert

filed

the

present

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is

essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed
inOrbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his
rights un_______________
8 Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6, 1987.
9 Rollo, p. 31.
10 G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114.
11 Id., at p. 121.
12 Gerberts motion for reconsideration of the RTCs October 30, 2008
decision was denied in an order dated February 17, 2009; Rollo, p. 32.
13 Supra note 2.
276

der the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that
the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien
spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the
doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the
petition only to the Filipino spousean interpretation he
claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a
proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute
the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted
for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him,
would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of
the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,14 both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.
The Courts Ruling

276

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

The

alien

under
Article

spouse

the
26

substantive

can

claim

no

right

paragraph

of

Code

as

the

establishes

is

in

second
of
right

the

Family
it

favor of the Filipino spouse

153

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the

legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code.
_______________
14 Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively.
277

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2010

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Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in

marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers
under the Freedom Constitution,19enacted Executive Order
No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows:
Art. 26.All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective

marriagesvoid15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the
basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens.18

him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise

have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
15 The void marriages are those enumerated under Articles 35, 36, 37, 38,
40, 41, 44, and 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code.
16 The voidable marriages are those enumerated under Article 45 of the
Family Code.
17 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 452.
18 Ibid. See A. Tolentino,Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, Volume One, with the Family Code of the
Philippines (2004 ed.), p. 262.
19 Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996.

154

spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after

obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
settling
the
doubts
created
by
the
divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26

278

278

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a

substantive right to have his or her marriage to the

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this
Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to
acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights
after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and
the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign
divorce had already severed the marital bond between the
spouses. The Court reasoned inVan Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino
spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien
spouse] and still subject to a wifes obligations x x x cannot
be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to

conjugal

property. She

should

not

be

discriminated against in her own country if the ends of

justice are to be served.

22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in

the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino

alien spouse considered as dis_______________

20 G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
21 G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
22 Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at p. 144.
23 Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at p. 121.
280

280

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

solved, capacitating him or her to remarry. 24 Without the

second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a
proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related
155

issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the

Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides
that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by
judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or
her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition
of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse
(other than that already established by the decree), whose
status
_______________
24 The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on
whether the foreign divorce decree capacitated the alien spouse to do so.
25 See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the Civil Code:
Art. 15.Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
xxxx

Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or

property, and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.
280

280

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

and legal capacity are generally governed by his national

law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and
the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the
alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The

foreign

divorce

presumptive

evidence

clothes

party

the

petition

for

its

of
with

a
legal

recognition

decree

is

right

that

interest
in

to
this

jurisdiction
156

We qualify our above conclusioni.e., that the second

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights
in favor of alienswith the complementary statement that
this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts
petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity
and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly
proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for
the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC.48.Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.

The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of

_______________

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled

by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

26 Parenthetically, we add that an aliens legal capacity to contract is

evidenced by a certificate issued by his or her respective diplomatic and
consular officials, which he or she must present to secure a marriage license
(Article 21, Family Code). The Filipino spouse who seeks to remarry, however,
must still resort to a judicial action for a declaration of authority to remarry.
281

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2010
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

281

a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the

judgment or final order is as follows:

(a)In case of a judgment or final order upon a

specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b)In case of a judgment or final order against

a person, the judgment or final order is

presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the

foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for
the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained
by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national
law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
157

judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera

explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country.28 This means that the foreign judgment and
its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or her_______________
27 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at p. 447; citing Van Dorn v.
Romillo,supra note 20.
28 Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007 ed.), p. 529.
282

282

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

self.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted

specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim
or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity
to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign

authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes

into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are
not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by
a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a
copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates
proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce.31Under this situation, we can, at
this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to
remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the
divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of
action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and
the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the
petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other inter_______________
29 Republic v. Orbecido III, supranote 10 at p. 123 and Garcia v.
Recio,supra note 17 at p. 448; see also Bayot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
155635, November 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472.
30 Rollo, pp. 38-41.

158

31 The foreign divorce decree only stated that the marriage between
Gerbert and Daisylyn was dissolved by the Canadian court. The full text of
the courts judgment was not included.
283

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Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

ested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws
before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the
parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by

the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments
between nations, theres judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending
judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse
bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will
not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provides.
_______________
32 Literally means a thing adjudged, Blacks Law Dictionary (5th ed.), p.
1178; it establishes a rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
their privies in all later suits, on points and matters determined in the
former.Supra note 28 at p. 462.
33 See Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
103493, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110, where the Court said:
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign
judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds
allowed under the law. It is not necessary for this purpose to initiate a
separate action or proceeding for enforcement of the foreign judgment.
What is essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. This
is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party
and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
284

159

284

Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration

of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sec.1.Civil Register.A civil register is established

for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

be entered:

Considerations
recognition

beyond
of

the

the

foreign

divorce

decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that
the Pasig

City

Civil

Registry

Office

has

already

recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns

marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of

the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally

improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and
the bar to what had been done.Article 407 of the Civil Code
states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a
persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his
personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his
being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a
foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status that
must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on

(a)births;
(b)deaths;
_______________
34 On the face of the marriage certificate, the word DIVORCED was
written in big, bold letters; Rollo, p. 37.
35 Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, 537 SCRA 373,
390, citing Beduya v. Republic, 120 Phil. 114; 11 SCRA 109 (1964).
285

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2010

285

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

(c)marriages;
(d)annulments of marriages;
(e)divorces;
160

(f)legitimations;
(g)adoptions;
(h)acknowledgment of natural children;
(i)naturalization; and
(j)changes of name.
xxxx
Sec.4.Civil Register Books.The local registrars shall
keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in
which they shall, respectively make the proper entries
concerning the civil status of persons:
(1)Birth and death register;
(2)Marriage register, in which shall be entered not

judgment before it can be givenres judicata effect. In the

context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce
decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the
strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware
of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO
Circu286

286

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

only the marriages solemnized but alsodivorces and

dissolved marriages.

(3)Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of

name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree
in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree
by
themselves
do
not ipso factoauthorize
the
decreesregistration. The law should be read in relation

lar No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion

No. 181, series of 198237both of which required a final order
from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment,
dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry,
but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For
being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently
void and cannot produce any legal effect.

with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign

161

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the

recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce
decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the
entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated
under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the
civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial
order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the
Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated
in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the
verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located; 38 that the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings;39 and that the time
and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of
general
circulation.40 As
these
basic
jurisdictional
requirements have not
_______________
36 Rollo, pp. 47-50.
37 Id., at p. 51.

38 Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court.

39 Section 3, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
40 Section 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
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Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition
Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should
not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for
the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil
registryone for recognition of the foreign decree and
another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself,
as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108
of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or
right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign
judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
162

jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,

collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review
oncertiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as
its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the
case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance
with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales
(Chairperson),
Abad** and Villarama, Jr., concur.

Bersamin,

MINORU FUJIKI, petitioner,vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA

MARINAY,
SHINICHI
MAEKARA,
LOCAL
CIVIL
REGISTRAR
OF
QUEZON
CITY,
and
THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF
THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Foreign Judgments; Conflict
of Law; For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the
foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court.For
Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the
_______________

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

41 When the entry sought to be corrected is substantial (i.e., the civil

status of a person), a Rule 108 proceeding is deemed adversarial in nature.

70

See Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, 423
SCRA 420, 430.
** Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the
retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, per Special Order No. 843 dated

7
0

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

May 17, 2010.

Fujiki vs. Marinay

G.R. No. 196049.June 26, 2013.

Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign

judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b)
of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family
163

Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a

certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country
such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in
Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is
not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other
mandatory laws.A foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic.
To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.
Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that [l]aws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad. This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a
foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises
personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A petition to recognize a foreign
judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage.A petition to recognize a

foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require

relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts
cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on
the status,
71

VOL. 700, JUNE 26,

2013

Fujiki vs. Marinay

condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under
the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Once a foreign judgment is
admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled
on grounds external to its merits, i.e., want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a
foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title. Moreover, Section 48
of the Rules of Court states that the judgment or final order may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus,
Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments.
164

Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign

judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a
Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its
merits, i.e., want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. The rule on
limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection
of party expectations, as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Law; Divorce; While the
Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may,
however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce
decree abroad.Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil.
43 (1922), Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are
successfully proven under the rules of evidence. Divorce involves
the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the
Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may,
however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a
divorce decree abroad.72

7
2

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay

Same; Same; Same; Same; Since the recognition of a foreign

judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that [a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status,
a right, or a particular fact.Since the recognition of a foreign
judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that [a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact. Rule 108 creates a remedy to
rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts
of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the
State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266 (2010), this
Court declared that [t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court)
is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact.
Civil Law; Marriages; Parties; When Section 2(a) states that
[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage; The husband or the
wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
165

personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of

void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of
a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent
marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section
2(a) states that [a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife
it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage.
Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are
void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage
are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband
or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.73

VOL. 700, JUNE 26,

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Fujiki vs. Marinay

Criminal Law; Bigamy; Parties; Bigamy is a public crime.
Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any
citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.
If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration
of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
marriage.Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares
bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy.
Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for

bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and

prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action which
leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is
more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife
of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in
the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Correction of Entries; A
petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.To be sure, a petition for
correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards
are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and
children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be
filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil
registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot

166

dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry

of marriage in the civil registry. However, this does not
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Fujiki vs. Marinay

apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil

registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment
annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of
the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither
can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Civil Law; Conflict of Law; Marriages; Annulment of
Marriage; Foreign Judgments; Divorce; Article 26 of the Family
Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of
a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing
trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine

courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provides that [w]here a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. InRepublic v. Orbecido,
472 SCRA 114 (2005), this Court recognized the legislative intent
of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse under the laws of his or her country. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount
to trying a case for divorce.
Same; Same; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Divorce;
Foreign Judgments; The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code
applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who
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Fujiki vs. Marinay

167

obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the

ground of bigamy; If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the
Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated the foreign
spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.The
principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The
Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage
void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the
foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage,
is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If
the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the
Filipino spouse will be discriminated the foreign spouse can
remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Same; Same; Same; Bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as
expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a
situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover,
notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not
contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the
case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as
expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo

full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage

under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy
available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage,
without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Conflict of Law;
Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to
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REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay

repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of

notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public
policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the
comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
states that the foreign judgment is already presumptive evidence
168

of a right between the parties. Upon recognition of the foreign

judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves
as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil
registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry.
Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition
of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in
the Philippines.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Foreign Judgments; Conflict of Law;
The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.The recognition of a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without
prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of
criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal
Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, [t]he
term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when
the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the order of the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 107.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Lorenzo U. Padilla for petitioner.
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Fujiki vs. Marinay

CARPIO,J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the
Order1dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed
the petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage) based on improper
venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki,
to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national
who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
169

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi

Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May
2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay
to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki.3
_______________
1 Penned by Judge Jose L. Bautista Jr.
2 In Pasay City, Metro Manila.

filed a petition in the RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of

Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage). Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court
judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the
Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
National Statistics Office (NSO).6

3 See Rollo, p. 88; Trial Family Court Decree No. 15 of 2009, Decree of

_______________

Absolute Nullity of Marriage between Maria Paz Galela Marinay and

Shinichi Maekara dated 18 August 2010. Translated by

Yoshiaki Kurisu, Kurisu Gyoseishoshi Lawyers Office (see Rollo, p. 89).

4 Id.

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5 FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES(E.O. No. 209 as amended):

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Art.35.The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

Fujiki vs. Marinay

(4)Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to

reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan
which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki

41;
xxxx
Art. 41.A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive

170

Sec.4.Venue.The petition shall be filed in the Family

Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to
the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent,
where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of
the petitioner. x x x

years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
6 Rollo, pp. 79-80.
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Fujiki vs. Marinay

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the

petition was in gross violation of the above provisions. The
trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC which provides that [f]ailure to comply with any of
the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate
dismissal of the petition.8Apparently, the RTC took the view
_______________

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC
immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and
withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC
cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec.2.Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
(a)Who may file.A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife.
xxxx

7 The dispositive portion stated:

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED and
WITHDRAWN from the active civil docket of this Court. The RTC-OCC,
Quezon City is directed to refund to the petitioner the amount of One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to be taken from the Sheriffs Trust Fund.
8 Rollo, pp. 44-45. Section 5 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10SC) provides:
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REPORTS ANNOTATED

171

If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification

Fujiki vs. Marinay

against forum shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer

of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or

that only the husband or the wife, in this case either

Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their
marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued
that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil
actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage.
Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for
recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact, 9 and
_______________
Sec.5.Contents and form of petition.(1) The petition shall allege the
complete facts constituting the cause of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the
parties and specify the regime governing their property relations, as well as

consular agent in said country.

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the
petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or
Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit
to the court proof of such service within the same period.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a
ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.
9 RULES

OF

COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c). See Rollo, pp. 55-56 (Petitioners

Motion for Reconsideration).

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Fujiki vs. Marinay

the properties involved.

If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the
parties, the petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal support,
custody and support of common children, visitation rights, administration of
community or conjugal property, and other matters similarly requiring urgent
action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum
shopping. The verification and certification must be signed personally by the
petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorneyin-fact.

not a civil action which is for the enforcement or protection

of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. 10 In other
words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the
status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the
Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of
bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese
judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family
172

Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore

entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-1110-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13Thus,
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife. To apply Section 2(a)
in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties
would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, [i]t is not,
of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in
having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the
husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage.14 Fujiki had
_______________
10 RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(a).
11 FAMILY CODE (E.O. No. 209 as amended), Art. 35. The following
marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(4)Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article
41;
xxxx
12 Rollo, p. 56.
13 FAMILY CODE, Art.36.A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with

the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if

such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
14 Rollo, p. 68.
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REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay

material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a

bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is
applicable. Rule 108 is the procedural implementation of
the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15in relation to Article
413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty
on the successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of
marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the
local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or
annulled marriage was solemnized. 17 Section 2 of Rule 108
provides that entries in the civil registry relating to
marriages, judgments of annulments of marriage and
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning are
subject to cancellation
_______________

173

15 Enacted 26 November 1930.

Fujiki vs. Marinay

16 CIVIL CODE, Art.413.All other matters pertaining to the registration
of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
17 Act No. 3753, Sec.7.Registration of marriage.All civil officers and
priests or ministers authorized to solemnize marriages shall send a copy of
each marriage contract solemnized by them to the local civil registrar within
the time limit specified in the existing Marriage Law.
In cases of divorce and annulment of marriage, it shall be the duty of the
successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of
the final decree of the court to the local civil registrar of the municipality
where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized.
In the marriage register there shall be entered the full name and address
of each of the contracting parties, their ages, the place and date of the
solemnization of the marriage, the names and addresses of the witnesses, the
full name, address, and relationship of the minor contracting party or parties
or the person or persons who gave their consent to the marriage, and the full
name, title, and address of the person who solemnized the marriage.
In cases of divorce or annulment of marriages, there shall be recorded the
names of the parties divorced or whose marriage was annulled, the date of
the decree of the court, and such other details as the regulations to be issued
may require.

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83

or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others)

to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on
the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also
asserted that the trial court gravely erred when, on its own,
it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki
stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue
with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of
jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own.
Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court 19which
held that the trial court cannot preempt the defendants
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue
bymotu proprio dismissing the case.20 Moreover, petitioner
alleged that the trial court should not have immediately
dismissed the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners
motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated
that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in
effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21The
trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of
personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a)
and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as
_______________

174

18 RULES

OF

COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2.Entries subject to cancellation or

correction.Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil
register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d)
legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss
or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
19 273 Phil. 1; 195 SCRA 641 (1991).
20 Id., at p. 7; p. 646. See Rollo, pp. 65 and 67.
21 Rollo, p. 47.
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Fujiki vs. Marinay

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the

petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan
City,
Negros
Occidental.25 The
Court
inBraza ruled that [i]n a special proceeding for correction of
entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages x x x.26 Braza emphasized that the
validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a]
petition [for correction of entry] x x x.27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on
the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The
trial court held that this is a jurisdictional ground to
dismiss the petition.28Moreover, the verification and
certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC.
_______________

a third person22 in the proceeding because he is not the

husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized,
x x x.23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its
ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that [a]lthough
the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal
of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other
ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x.24

22 Id., at p. 46.
23 Id., at p. 48.
24 Id.
25 G.R. No. 181174, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 638.
26 Id., at p. 641.

175

27 Id., at p. 643.
28 See Rollo, p. 49.
29 Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states in part:
Contents and form of petition.x x x
xxxx

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed

that the RTCs pronouncement that the petitioner failed to
comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside
and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as
the
_______________

85

(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum

shopping. The verification and certification must be signed personally by the

VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013

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Fujiki vs. Marinay

petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorneyin-fact.

If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification
against forum shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer
of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or

Hence, this also warranted the immediate dismissal of the

petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay
and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file

their comment on the petition for review.30 The public
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
participated through the Office of the Solicitor General.
Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion.31

consular agent in said country.

xxxx
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a
ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.
30 Resolution dated 30 May 2011.Rollo, p. 105.
31 Under Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz.
32 Rollo, p. 137. The Conclusion and Prayer of the Manifestation and
Motion (In Lieu of Comment) of the Solicitor General stated:
In fine, the court a quospronouncement that the petitioner failed to
comply with the requirements provided in A.M.

176

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to

recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made
in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 InCorpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this
Court

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SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

_______________

Fujiki vs. Marinay

No. 02-11-10-SC should accordingly be set aside. It is, thus, respectfully

prayed that Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 be reinstated for further proceedings.

spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue

to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void. The Solicitor General citedJuliano-Llave v.
Republic33which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this
Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action
if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period
that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the
conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to
declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance,
the injured spouse who should be given a legal remedy is
the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not
only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent
marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the
spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
34

Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed
for.
33 G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637.
34 Id., at p. 656. Quoted in the Manifestation and Motion of the Solicitor
General, pp. 8-9. See Rollo, pp. 132-133.
35 Rollo, p. 133.
36 G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266.
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Fujiki vs. Marinay

held that [t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
177

Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party

or a particular fact.37 WhileCorpuz concerned a foreign
divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family
Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

37 Id., at p. 287.
38 Rollo, p. 133.
39 G.R. No. 160172, 13 February 2008, 545 SCRA 162.
40 384 Phil. 661; 328 SCRA 122 (2000).

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules

of Court is the procedure to record [a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons in the civil
registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other
words, [t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a
persons legal capacity and status x x x.38 The Japanese
Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a
Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under
Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Nial v.
Bayadog40 which declared that [t]he validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked.41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the
Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on
the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from
him the fact that she was previously married to
Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of
violence on

41 De Castro v. De Castro, supranote 39 at p. 169.

42 Supra note 30.
43 See Rollo, p. 120.
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REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay

Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no

reason to oppose the petition.45She would like to maintain her
silence for fear that anything she say might cause
misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

_______________

178

(1)Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity

of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2)Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can
file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3)Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the
foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.

46 Id.
47 Supra note 33.
89

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Fujiki vs. Marinay

tion of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the

reason behind the petition is bigamy.48

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover,
in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declara_______________

89

I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of
Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b)
of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese
Family Court
_______________

44 Id.
45 See Rollo, p. 146.

48 Supra note 33 at p. 655.

179

49 Rules of Court, Rule 132, Sec. 24.Proof of official record.The record of

public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is
kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office.
Sec.25.What attestation of copy must state.Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Rule 39, Sec48.Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect
of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order, is as follows:

the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign

country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial
court and the parties should follow its provisions, including
the form and contents of the petition,51the service of
summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor, 53 the
setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial
court.56This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It
will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments,
which is to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
issues.57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case
_______________
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

90

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment

9
0

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and

their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of

Fujiki vs. Marinay

judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of

a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear

mistake of law or fact.
50 See RULES

OF

COURT, Rule 132, Secs. 24-25. See also Corpuz v. Santo

Tomas, supra note 36 at p. 282.

180

51 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 5.

52 Id., Sec. 6.
53 Id., Sec. 9.
54 Id., Secs. 11-15.
55 Id., Secs. 17-18.
56 Id., Secs. 19 and 22-23.
57 Mijares v. Raada, 495 Phil. 372, 386; 455 SCRA 397, 412 (2005)
citingEUGENE SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 916 (2nd ed., 1982).
91

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Fujiki vs. Marinay

on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court explained
that [i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable
on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her
original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation.59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the

Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign

judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other
mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that
[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. This
is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus,
the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises
personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and
legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a
marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their
judgment on the status,
_______________
58 Id.
59 Id., at p. 386.
60 CIVIL CODE, Art.17.x x x
xxxx

181

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those

which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
92

of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or

clear mistake of law or fact. The rule on limited review
embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party
expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.62
_______________

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2

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

61 Mijares v. Raada, supra note 57 at p. 386; p. 412. Otherwise known

as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting
from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants,

Fujiki vs. Marinay

to insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of

the same disputes, and in a larger sense to promote what Lord Coke in

condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is

under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact
according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a
foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title. Moreover,
Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that the judgment or
final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, Philippine courts exercise
limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed
to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., want

the Ferrers Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: rest and quietness.
(Citations omitted)
62 Mijares v. Raada, supra note 57 at p. 382; pp. 407-408. The rules of
comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among
civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different countries. (Citations omitted)
93

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Fujiki vs. Marinay

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine
courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven
182

under the rules of evidence.64Divorce involves the dissolution

of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 0211-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines
does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a
Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse
obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply
prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce
law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of
the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
_______________
63 43 Phil. 43 (1922).
64 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA
266, 280; Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723; 366 SCRA 437 (2001); Adong v.
Cheong Seng Gee, supra.

65 FAMILY CODE, Art.26.x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
94

9
4

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay
II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires

proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section
3 of the Rules of Court provides that [a] special proceeding is
a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact. Rule 108 creates a remedy to
rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These
are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage,66which the State has an interest in recording. As
noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this
Court declared that [t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
183

object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the

Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of
a party or a particular fact.67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
_______________
66 Act No. 3753, Sec.1.Civil Register.A civil register is established for
recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered: (a) births; (b)
deaths; (c) marriages; (d) annulments of marriages; (e) divorces; (f)
legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h) acknowledgment of natural children; (i)
naturalization; and (j) changes of name.
Cf. RULES

OF

COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2.Entries subject to cancellation or

correction.Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil
register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d)
legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss
or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
67 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, supra note 36 at p. 287.
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VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013

Fujiki vs. Marinay

95

Sec.1.Who may file petition.Any personinterested in

any act, event, order or decreeconcerning the civil status
of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the

Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of
the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to
protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage. 69 These property interests
in marriage include the right to be supported in keeping

184

with the financial capacity of the family 70 and preserving the

property regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected
by the Constitution,72 but a spouses right in a marriage
extends
_______________
68 FAMILY CODE, Arts. 35-67.
69 FAMILY CODE, Arts. 74-148.
70 FAMILY CODE, Art. 195 in relation to Art. 194.
71 See supra note 69.
72 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1: No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law x x x.
96

9
6

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay

maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any case, Section

2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right
by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife
of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a
spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the
contrary, when Section 2(a) states that [a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filedsolely by the husband or the wife75 it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article
35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from
the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are
neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband
or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who
has the personality to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous
marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Arti_______________
73 FAMILY CODE, Arts. 68-73.

further to relational rights recognized under Title III

(Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife) of the
Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot diminish,
increase, or modify the substantive right of the spouse to

74 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
xxxx

185

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. x x x
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is

violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is
therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. 79 JulianoLlave ruled that the prior spouse is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of
_______________

75 Emphasis supplied.

76 REVISED PENAL CODE (Act No. 3815, as amended), Art. 349. Bigamy.

97

The penalty of prisin mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has

VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013

97

been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

Fujiki vs. Marinay

cle 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes bigamy.
Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate
prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in
the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file
a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a
bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting
his marriage.

77 See III RAMON AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE (1997), 518.
78 RULES

OF

COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1.Institution of criminal and civil

actions.(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
xxxx
79 Cf. RULES

OF

COURT, Rule 3, Sec.2.Parties in interest.A real party

in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment

in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.

186

98

9
8

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay

all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. 80Being

a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose,
he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a
fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel
the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a

recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an
entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards
of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage,83support pendente lite of the spouses
and chil_______________
80 Juliano-Llave v. Republic, supranote 33.

III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental, this Court held that a trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.81Thus, the validity of marriage[] x x x can be
questioned only in a direct action to nullify the
marriage.82 The RTC relied onBraza in dismissing the
petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral
attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

81 Supra note 25.

82 Supra note 25.
83 See supra note 68.
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Fujiki vs. Marinay

187

dren,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the

properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for decla_______________
84 FAMILY CODE, Art.49.During the pendency of the action and in the
absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses,
the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and
support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount
consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their
choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title
IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 61.
85 FAMILY CODE, Art.50.The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3),
(4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases
to marriages which are declaredab initio or annulled by final judgment under

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec.19.Decision.(1) If the court renders a

decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of
absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under
the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
xxxx
86 FAMILY CODE, Art.48.In all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed.
100

100

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

Articles 40 and 45.

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,

Fujiki vs. Marinay

partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated,
shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and
129.

ration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary

to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act
No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. 87 In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage
by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry.
188

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or

cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition
of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards
of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of
Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign
judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a
foreign
_______________
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be
based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 9.Investigation report of public prosecutor. (1)
Within one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3)
of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court
stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the
parties and their respective counsels, if any.
(2)If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the
basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on
the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report.
The court shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are
in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court
shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to
appear for the State at the pre-trial.
87 RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 1.

101

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Fujiki vs. Marinay

judgment, which presupposes a case which was already
tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
that [w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. InRepublic v. Orbecido,88 this
Court recognized the legislative intent of the second
paragraph of Article 26 which is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
189

married to the Filipino spouse89 under the laws of his or her

country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of
a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines
does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case
on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for
divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective
measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage
between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a
foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly
consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of
his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the
Phil_______________
88 509 Phil. 108; 472 SCRA 114 (2005).
89 Id., at p. 114; p. 121.
102

102

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fujiki vs. Marinay

ippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is

already effective in the country where it was rendered. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared
that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a
marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who
obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition
abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy.
The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to
remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino
spouse will be discriminated the foreign spouse can
remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation
where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover,
notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy.
A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce
decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
190

marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of

marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as
expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option
to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under A.M. No.
_______________
90 223 Phil. 357; 139 SCRA 139 (1985).
91 Id., at p. 363; p. 144.
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Fujiki vs. Marinay

02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him
or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without
prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts
are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case
was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the
family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and
legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the

question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment

in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country,
Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to
the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed
in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1)
whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether
any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of
the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court states that the foreign judgment is already
presumptive evidence of a right between the parties. Upon
recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes
conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status,
right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry.
Otherwise, there will be an
_______________
92 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c).

191

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been

104

instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found

104

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment
is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the
merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the
offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying

Fujiki vs. Marinay

the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in

the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal
action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the

inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the

foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability
under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, [t]he
term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run
when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago.
_______________
93 See RULES

OF

witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the
parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil
actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of
prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose
proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
105

VOL. 700, JUNE 26, 2013

105

COURT, Rule 72, Sec.2.Applicability of rules of civil

actions.In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in

ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special

Fujiki vs. Marinay

proceedings.
Rule III, Sec.2.When separate civil action is suspended.x x x

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no

longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and
the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
192

WHEREFORE, we GRANTthe petition. The Order dated

31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil
Case No. Q-11-68582 areREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional

Trial

isORDERED to REINSTATEthe

Court

petition for further proceedings in accordance with this

Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Perezand Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, order reversed and set aside.
Notes.Resort to foreign jurisprudence is proper only if
no local law or jurisprudence exists to settle the controversy.
(Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation vs. Stockholders of
Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., 608 SCRA 215 [2009])
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under
our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself. (Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266
[2010])
o0o

193

G.R. No. 183805.July 3, 2013.*

194

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES and SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI,
respondents.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Elements of.Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as
follows: Art. 349. Bigamy.The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings. The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are:
(1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not
been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
444

4
44

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Capili vs. People

Same; Same; Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that

the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if
there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the
second marriage was celebrated.It is undisputed that a second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid
first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili
contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo
City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage
between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent
judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in
nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of
bigamy. Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the
accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if
there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when
the second marriage was celebrated.
Same; Same; He who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.The Court recently upheld the ruling in
the aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person
criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first
marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is
that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second

195

marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage

assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Same; Same; Extinguishment of Criminal Liability; It is a
settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender
upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability
appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.It is a
settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender
upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability
appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. It is clear
then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from
the time he contracted the second marriage with private
respondent. Thus, the
445

VOL. 700, JULY 3,

2013

Marcelo Rempillo, Jr. for private respondent.

PERALTA,J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution 2 dated July
24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime
of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City
in an Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being
previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. MedinaCapili and without said marriage having been legally
dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

45

Capili vs. People

finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners
second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for
bigamy against him.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Virgilio M. Capili for petitioner.

_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate
Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp.
44-54.
2 Id., at pp. 56-57.
446

196

446

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Capili vs. People
Contrary to law.

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend

Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for
declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC
of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the
event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would
exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the
pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the
second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the
instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by
the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion to
Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a
decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the
second marriage between petitioner and private respondent
on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the
husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the
beginning.

Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation

and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the
criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that
the second marriage between him and private respondent
had already been declared void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City
granted petitioners Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to
wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case
should be dismissed as a decision dated December 1, 2004
had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled:
Karla Medina-Capili versus James Wal_______________
3 Records, p. 1.
4 Rollo, p. 58.
447

VOL. 700, JULY 3, 2013

447

Capili vs. People

ter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo, a case for declaration of
nullity of marriage) nullifying the second marriage between
197

James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said

decision is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the
motion, it was stated, among others, that the issues raised in
the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the
issue in this above-captioned case and that the resolution of
the issues in said civil case would not determine whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue
and arguments of the parties, this Court is of the humble
opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by
the accused as it appears that the second marriage between
James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had already
been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of
Antipolo City which has declared the voidness, non-existent
or incipient invalidity of the said second marriage. As such,
this Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the

CA.
Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA
reversed and set aside the RTCs decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07
July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSEDand SET
ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

_______________
5 Id., at pp. 44-54.
6 Id., at p. 52. (Emphasis in the original)
448

448

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Capili vs. People

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against

said decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution 7 dated
July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review
on certiorari alleging that:
1.THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO
DISREGARD EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER
DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.
128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF
BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF
THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF
THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE

198

CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION

CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO

WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON

APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.

RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE

MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND

3.THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF.

PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND

IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING

VOID.

DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE

ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE

2.THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION

AMOUNTING

TO

LACK

OF

JURISDICTION

GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS

IN

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS

HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

FOR ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE

BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G.

INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF

TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,

MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE

BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON

4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

THE GROUND THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE

ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH FINDINGS OR FACTS ON

4.THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT

THE USE BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME
CAPILI IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE

_______________

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL

CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE

7 Id., at pp. 56-57.

BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD

LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF

449

THE SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED

VOL. 700, JULY 3,

2013

IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN

449

Capili vs. People

THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE

NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.8

_______________
8 Id., at p. 20.

WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID

450

DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR

DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER,

450

SUPREME COURT

WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE

199

REPORTS ANNOTATED
Capili vs. People
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent
declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and
penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:
Art.349.Bigamy.The penalty of prision mayorshall
be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the

offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not
been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according
to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.9

In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the

crime of bigamy were present when the Information was filed
on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner
and private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999
during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between
petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on
September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself
declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage
between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the
subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for
being bigamous in nature
_______________
9 Mercado v. Tan, 391 Phil. 809, 818-819; 337 SCRA 122, 127 (2000).
451

VOL. 700, JULY 3, 2013

451

Capili vs. People

does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the
accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if
200

there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second

marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting
when the second marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accuseds
conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is
consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage
without the previous one having been judicially declared null
and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity

obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab

initio, the point is, both the first
_______________
10 G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009, 601 SCRA 236.
452

452

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to

the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only
delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a
prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow
that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of
petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had no
bearing

upon

the

determination

of

petitioners

innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,

because all that is required for the charge of bigamy
to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at
the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually

Capili vs. People

and the second marriage were subsisting before the first
marriage was annulled.
11

In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the

aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person
criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first
marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.12
201

Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability

attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense,
and from that instant, liability appends to him until
extinguished as provided by law.13 It is clear then that the
crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time
he contracted the second marriage with private respondent.
Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioners second marriage does not impede the filing of a
criminal charge for bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE,

premises

considered,

the

petition

isDENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and

Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 30444 are herebyAFFIRMED.
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 245-246. (Emphasis in the original.)

SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza and Leonen,
JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.Where

the

absolute

nullity

of

previous

marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a

second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. (Teves vs.
People, 656 SCRA 307 [2011])
The finality of the judicial declaration of the nullity of
previous marriage of the accused cannot be made to retroact
to the date of the bigamous marriage. (Ibid.)
o0o

12 Merlinda Cipriano Montaez v. Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano, G.R. No.

181089, October 22, 2012, 684 SCRA 315.
13 Teves v. People, G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 307, 314.
453

VOL. 700, JULY 3, 2013

453

Capili vs. People

202

SUSAN NICDAO CARIO,

CARIO, respondent.

petitioner, vs. SUSAN

YEE

Civil Law; Family Code;Marriages; Property; For purposes

other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity.Under Article 40 of the Family
Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001.

Same; Same; Same; Same;Court is clothed with sufficient

authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this
case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is
rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the deceased.It
is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority
203

to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the
same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled
to the subject death benefits of the deceased.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.Under the Civil
Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence
thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab
initio.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Considering that the two marriages
are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be
absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather,
be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family
Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao
does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence,
the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
likewise, void ab initio. One of the effects of the declaration of
nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses
according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the
two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime
would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of
property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147
and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions
Without Marriage.

Same; Same; Same; Same;Under Article 148 of the Family

Code, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.Under Article
148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a
state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are
married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married
man,x x x In this property regime, the properties acquired by the
parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the
co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to
him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care
of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral
inspiration, are excluded in this regime.
129

VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 2,

2001

129

Cario vs. Cario

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Gancayco, Balasbas and Associates for petitioner.
Agapito P. Oquindo, Jr.for respondent.
204

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the
validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased
SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the
subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he
married.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari
seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in totothe
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.

Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI,

PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM,
_______________
1

Rollo, pp. 43-47.

Rollo, pp. 49-55.

130

During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario,

he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969,
with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as
Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely,
Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on November
10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter
referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in
their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and
bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary
tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under
the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the
deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan

130

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cario vs. Cario

[and] Pag-ibig, while respondent Susan Yee received a total

of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial
(SSS).
3

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the

instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner
Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered
to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six
thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as
death benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite
service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer,
prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
205

Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the

deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without
first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the
marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however,
claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage
and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the
deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as
the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of
sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is void ab initiobecause the same
was solemnized without the required marriage license. In
support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage
certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no
marriage license number; and 2) a certification dated March
9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, which reads
5

This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license

of the spouses SANTIAGO CARIO (Sic) and SUSAN NICDAO,
who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we
cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage
License number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee
Cario for whatever legal purpose it may serve.
6

_______________
3

Exhibit F, Records, p. 38.

Ibid.

Exhibit D-1, Records, p. 36.

Exhibit E, Records, p. 37.

131

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2001

131

Cario vs. Cario

On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of
respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in
the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago
S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and
costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter

affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the
instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT
206

VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE

CASE AT BAR.

132

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF
THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY
CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS.
GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN
ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE.
8

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a

previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring
________________
7

Rollo, p. 55.

Rollo, p. 18.

Cario vs. Cario

the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but
not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death
of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as
it is essential to the determination of the case. In such
instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not
be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void.
9

10

11

It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with

sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two
marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject
death benefits of the deceased.

132

207

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of

exceptional character;
xxx

xxx

xxx

12

13

14

_________________
9

10

Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993].

Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000, 328 SCRA

122.
11

12

Domingo v. Court of Appeals,supra.

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are

complied with:
1. (1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
2. (2)Their consent, freely given;
3. (3)Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
4. (4)A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

133

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133

Cario vs. Cario

In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage
license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their
marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no
marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate
to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the
certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to
keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.
15

13

ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in

Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of
the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
14

ART.80.The following marriages shall be void from the begin- ning:

xxx

xxx

xxx

208

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage

of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome.
It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their
marriage is valid and that they secured the required
marriage license. Although she was declared in default before
the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue
and explained the absence of a marriage license in her
pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain
from pursuing an argument that will put her case in
jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage
cannot stand.

marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is

undoubtedly void ab initio.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between

petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not
being one of the

Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity

of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner
Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the
deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that
their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a
judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab
initio.

_______________
15

236 SCRA 257, 261-262; citing the Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 29.

134

134

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cario vs. Cario

It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however,

that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny
would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate,
under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of
remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of
the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.

One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage

is the separation of the property of the spouses according to
the applicable property regime. Considering that the two
marriages are void
16

_______________

209

16

Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of

Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages

which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles
40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the

preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as

the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net
135

of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without

Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the
property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubine,
relationships where both man and woman are married to
other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man,

17

. . . [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through

their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions . . .

In this property regime, the properties acquired by the

parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to
the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in
the form of care of the home, children and household, or
spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.
18

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2001

135

Cario vs. Cario

ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be
absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but
rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148

Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee

and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been
solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage
then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
_______________
profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall
be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children

210

of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the

innocent spouse;
xxx

xxx

xxx

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith,
said marriage shall be void ab initioand all donations by reason of marriage
and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked
by operation of law.
17

Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 233-

234 (1995).
18

Id., p. 234.

136

136

SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cario vs. Cario

The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit

Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and
PCCUI, are clearly remunerations, incentives and benefits
from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a
police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to
the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary
benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent
and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and

respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By

intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased
shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the
legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This
article applies to unions of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other
reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of
the Family Code reads
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained
by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxx

xxx

xxx

211

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith,

the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants,
each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take
place upon termination of the cohabitation.
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137

Cario vs. Cario

In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages
and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation
shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be
divided equally between them, even if only one party earned
the
wages
and
the
other
did
not
contribute
thereto. Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits
were earned by the deceased alone as a government
employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect
thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As
there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both
parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith.
Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny
shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime,
19

and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children
with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of
Appeals relied on the case ofVda. de Consuegra v.
Government Service Insurance System, where the Court
awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to
the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding
that:
20

. . . [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or

declared void the conjugal partnership established by that
marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished
her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil
Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she
survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still
subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in
the husbands share in the property here in dispute . . . And with
respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab
initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity.
And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second
marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity,
[t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to
recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in
the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the
other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage.
21

212

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is

premised on the rule which requires a prior and separate
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason
why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the
parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, however, the Court,
construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a
prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an
all important condition precedent only for purposes of
remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married
wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain
first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before
he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the
second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if
the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not
free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity of
their marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry,
like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored
on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate
judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party
has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary,
that would prove that the marriage from which his or her
rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material
to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the
status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the
rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws
and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, the Court
explained:
22

23

[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need
arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even
if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article
40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not
be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of
P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
JJ., concur.

Jr. (C.J.,

Chairman), Kapunan andPardo,

**

Puno, J., On official leave.

Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Complaint dismissed.
Note.Burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage rests upon petitioner and any doubt should be
213

resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (Hernandez

vs. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 76[1999])
o0o

214