Action at a Distance in Quantum

Mechanics
First published Fri 26 Jan, 2007

In the quantum realm, there are curious correlations between the properties of distant
systems. An example of such correlations is provided by the famous Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen/Bohm experiment. The correlations in the EPR/B experiment strongly suggest that
there are non-local influences between distant systems, i.e., systems between which no
light signal can travel, and indeed orthodox quantum mechanics and its various
interpretations postulate the existence of such non-locality. Yet, the question of whether
the EPR/B correlations imply non-locality and the exact nature of this non-locality is a
matter of ongoing controversy. Focusing on EPR/B-type experiments, in this entry we
consider the nature of the various kinds of non-locality postulated by different
interpretations of quantum mechanics. Based on this consideration, we briefly discuss the
compatibility of these interpretations with the special theory of relativity.

• 1. Introduction
• 2. Bell's theorem and non-locality
• 3. The analysis of factorizability
• 4. Action at a distance, holism and non-separability
o 4.1 Action at a distance
o 4.2 Holism
o 4.3 Non-separability
• 5. Holism, non-separability and action at a distance in quantum mechanics
o 5.1 Collapse theories
o 5.2 Can action-at-a-distance co-exist with non-separability and holism?
o 5.3 No-collapse theories
• 6. Superluminal causation
• 7. Superluminal signaling
o 7.1 Necessary and sufficient conditions for superluminal signaling
o 7.2 No-collapse theories
o 7.3 Collapse theories
o 7.4 The prospects of controllable probabilistic dependence
o 7.5 Superluminal signaling and action-at-a-distance
• 8. The analysis of factorizability: implications for quantum non-locality
o 8.1 Non-separability, holism and action at a distance
o 8.2 Superluminal signaling
o 8.3 Relativity
o 8.4 Superluminal causation
o 8.5 On the origin and nature of parameter dependence
• 9. Can there be ‘local’ quantum theories?
• 10. Can quantum non-locality be reconciled with relativity?
o 10.1 Collapse theories
 o 10.2 No-collapse theories
o 10.3 Quantum causal loops and relativity
• Bibliography
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Introduction
The quantum realm involves curious correlations between distant events. A well-known
example is David Bohm's (1951) version of the famous thought experiment that Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen proposed in 1935 (henceforth, the EPR/B experiment). Pairs of
particles are emitted from a source in the so-called spin singlet state and rush in opposite
directions (see Fig. 1 below). When the particles are widely separated from each other,
they each encounter a measuring apparatus that can be set to measure their spin
components along various directions. Although the measurement events are distant from
each other, so that no slower-than-light or light signal can travel between them, the
measurement outcomes are curiously correlated.[1] That is, while the outcome of each of
the distant spin measurements seems to be a matter of pure chance, they are correlated
with each other: The joint probability of the distant outcomes is different from the
product of their single probabilities. For example, the probability that each of the
particles will spin clockwise about the z-axis in a z-spin measurement (i.e., a
measurement of the spin component along the z direction) appears to be ½. Yet, the
outcomes of such measurements are perfectly anti-correlated: If the left-hand-side (L-)
particle happens to spin clockwise (anti-clockwise) about the z-axis, the right-hand-side
(R-) particle will spin anti-clockwise (clockwise) about that axis. And this is true even if
the measurements are made simultaneously.

Figure 1: A schematic illustration of the EPR/B experiment. Particle pairs in the spin
singlet state are emitted in opposite directions and when they are distant from each other
(i.e., space-like separated), they encounter measurement apparatuses that can be set to
measure spin components along various directions.

The curious EPR/B correlations strongly suggest the existence of non-local influences
between the two measurement events, and indeed orthodox ‘collapse’ quantum
mechanics supports this suggestion. According to this theory, before the measurements
the particles do not have any definite spin. The particles come to possess a definite spin
only with the first spin measurement, and the outcome of this measurement is a matter of
chance. If, for example, the first measurement is a z-spin measurement on the L-particle,
the L-particle will spin either clockwise or anti-clockwise about the z-axis with equal
chance. And the outcome of the L-measurement causes an instantaneous change in the
spin properties of the distant R-particle. If the L-particle spins clockwise (anti-clockwise)
about the z-axis, the R-particle will instantly spin anti-clockwise (clockwise) about the
same axis. (It is common to call spins in opposite directions ‘spin up’ and ‘spin down,’
where by convention a clockwise spinning may be called ‘spin up’ and anti-clockwise
spinning may be called ‘spin down.’)

It may be argued that orthodox quantum mechanics is false, and that the non-locality
postulated by it does not reflect any non-locality in the quantum realm. Alternatively, it
may be argued that orthodox quantum mechanics is a good instrument for predictions
rather than a fundamental theory of the physical nature of the universe. On this
instrumental interpretation, the predictions of quantum mechanics are not an adequate
basis for any conclusion about non-locality: This theory is just an incredible oracle (or a
crystal ball), which provides a very successful algorithm for predicting measurement
outcomes and their probabilities, but it offers little information about ontological matters,
such as the nature of objects, properties and causation in the quantum realm.

Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935) thought that quantum mechanics is incomplete and
that the curious correlations between distant systems do not amount to action at a distance
between them. The apparent instantaneous change in the R-particle's properties during the
L-measurement is not really a change of properties, but rather a change of knowledge.
(For more about the EPR argument, see the entry on the EPR argument, Redhead 1987,
chapter 3, and Albert 1992, chapter 3. For discussions of the EPR argument in the
relativistic context, see Ghirardi and Grassi 1994 and Redhead and La Riviere 1997.) On
this view, quantum states of systems do not always reflect their complete state. Quantum
states of systems generally provide information about some of the properties that systems
possess and information about the probabilities of outcomes of measurements on them,
and this information does not generally reflect the complete state of the systems. In
particular, the information encoded in the spin singlet state is about the probabilities of
measurement outcomes of spin properties in various directions, about the conditional
probabilities that the L- (R-) particle has a certain spin property given that the R- (L-)
particle has another spin property, and about the anti-correlation between the spins that
the particles may have in any given direction (for more details, see section 5.1). Thus, the
outcome of a z-spin measurement on the L-particle and the spin singlet state (interpreted
as a state of knowledge) jointly provide information about the z-spin property of the R-
particle. For example, if the outcome of the L-measurement is z-spin ‘up,’ we know that
the R-particle has z-spin ‘down’; and if we assume, as EPR did, that there is no curious
action at a distance between the distant wings (and that the change of the quantum-
mechanical state of the particle pair in the L-measurement is only a change in state of
knowledge), we could also conclude that the R-particle had z-spin ‘down’ even before the
L-measurement occurs.
How could the L-outcome change our knowledge/ignorance about the R-outcome if it has
no influence on it? The simplest and most straightforward reply is that the L- and the R-
outcome have a common cause that causes them to be correlated, so that knowledge of
one outcome provides knowledge about the other.[2] Yet, the question is whether the
predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics, which have been highly confirmed by
various experiments, are compatible with the quantum realm being local in the sense of
involving no influences between systems between which light and slower-than-light
signals cannot travel (i.e., space-like separated systems). More particularly, the question
is whether it is possible to construct a local, common-cause model of the EPR/B
experiment, i.e., a model that postulates no influence between systems/events in the
distant wings of the experiment, and that the correlation between them are due to the state
of the particle pair at the source. In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen believed that this
is possible. But, as John Bell demonstrated in 1964, this belief is difficult to uphold.

2. Bell's theorem and non-locality

In a famous theorem, John Bell (1964) demonstrated that granted some plausible
assumptions, any local model of the EPR/B experiment is committed to certain
inequalities about the probabilities of measurement outcomes, ‘the Bell inequalities,’
which are incompatible with the quantum-mechanical predictions. When Bell proved his
theorem, the EPR/B experiment was only a thought experiment. But due to technological
advances, various versions of this experiment have been conducted since the 1970s, and
their results have overwhelmingly supported the quantum-mechanical predictions (for
brief reviews of these experiments and further references, see the entry on Bell's theorem
and Redhead 1987, chapter 4, section 4.3 and ‘Notes and References’). Thus, a wide
consensus has it that the quantum realm involves some type of non-locality.

The basic idea of Bell's theorem is as follows. A model of the EPR/B experiment
postulates that the state of the particle pair together with the apparatus settings to measure
(or not to measure) certain spin properties determine the probabilities for single and joint
spin-measurement outcomes. A local Bell model of this experiment also postulates that
probabilities of joint outcomes factorize into the single probabilities of the L- and the R-
outcomes: The probability of joint outcomes is equal to the product of the probabilities of
the single outcomes. More formally, let λ denote the pair's state before any measurement
occurs. Let l denote the setting of the L-measurement apparatus to measure spin along the
l-axis (i.e., the l-spin of the L-particle), and let r denote the setting of the R-measurement
apparatus to measure spin along the r-axis (i.e., the r-spin of the R-particle). Let xl be the
outcome of a l-spin measurement in the L-wing, and let yr be the outcome of a r-spin
measurement in the R-wing; where xl is either the L-outcome l-spin ‘up’ or the L-
outcome l-spin ‘down,’ and yr is either the R-outcome r-spin ‘up’ or the R-outcome r-
spin ‘down.’ Let Pλ l r(xl & yr) be the joint probability of the L- and the R-outcome, and Pλ
l(xl) and Pλ r(yr) be the single probabilities of the L- and the R-outcome, respectively;
where the subscripts λ, l and r denote the factors that are relevant for the probabilities of
the outcomes xl and yr. Then, for any λ, l, r, xl and yr:[3]
Factorizability
Pλ l r(xl & yr) = Pλ l(xl) · Pλ r(yr).

(Here and henceforth, for simplicity's sake we shall denote events and states, such as the
measurement outcomes, and the propositions that they occur by the same symbols.)

The state λ is typically thought of as the pair's state at the emission time, and it is
assumed that this state does not change in any relevant sense between the emission and
the first measurement. It is (generally) a different state from the quantum-mechanical
pair's state ψ. ψ is assumed to be an incomplete state of the pair, whereas λ is supposed to
be a (more) complete state of the pair. Accordingly, pairs with the same state ψ may have
different states λ which give rise to different probabilities of outcomes for the same type
of measurements. Also, the states λ may be unknown, hidden, inaccessible or
uncontrollable.

Factorizability is commonly motivated as a locality condition. In non-local models of the

EPR/B experiment, the correlations between the distant outcomes are accounted for by
non-local influences between the distant measurement events. For example, in orthodox
quantum mechanics the first spin measurement on, say, the L-particle causes an
immediate change in the spin properties of the R-particle and in the probabilities of future
outcomes of spin measurements on this particle. By contrast, in local models of this
experiment the correlations are supposed to be accounted for by a common cause—the
pair's state λ (see Fig. 2 below): The pair's state and the L-setting determine the
probability of the L-outcome; the pair's state and the R-setting determine the probability
of the R-outcome; and the pair's state and the L- and the R-setting determine the
probability of joint outcomes, which (as mentioned above) is simply the product of these
single probabilities. The idea is that the probability of each of the outcomes is determined
by ‘local events,’ i.e., events that are confined to its backward light-cone, and which can
only exert subluminal or luminal influences on it (see Figure 3 below); and the distant
outcomes are fundamentally independent of each other, and thus their joint probability
factorizes. (For more about this reasoning, see sections 6 and 8-9.)

Figure 2: A schematic common-cause model of the EPR/B experiment. Arrows denote

causal connections.
Figure 3: A space-time diagram of a local model of the EPR/B experiment. The circles
represent the measurement events, and the cones represent their backward light cones,
i.e., the boundaries of all the subluminal and luminal influences on them. The dotted lines
denote the propagation of the influences of the pair's state at the emission and of the
settings of the measurement apparatuses on the measurement outcomes.

A Bell model of the EPR/B experiment also postulates that for each quantum-mechanical
state ψ there is a distribution ρ over all the possible pair states λ, which is independent of
the settings of the apparatuses. That is, the distribution of the (‘complete’) states λ
depends on the (‘incomplete’) state ψ, and this distribution is independent of the
particular choice of measurements in the L- and R-wing (including the choice not to
measure any quantity). Or formally, for any quantum-mechanical state ψ, L-settings l and
l′, and R-settings r and r′:

λ-independence
ρψ l r(λ) = ρψ l′ r(λ) = ρψ l r′(λ) = ρψ l′ r′(λ) = ρψ(λ)

where the subscripts denote the factors that are potentially relevant for the distribution of
the states λ.

Although the model probabilities (i.e., the probabilities of outcomes prescribed by the
states λ) are different from the corresponding quantum-mechanical probabilities of
outcomes (i.e., the probabilities prescribed by the quantum-mechanical states ψ), the
quantum mechanical probabilities (which have been systematically confirmed) are
recovered by averaging over the model probabilities. That is, it is supposed that the
quantum-mechanical probabilities Pψ l r(xl & yr), Pψ l(xl) and Pψ r(yr) are obtained by
averaging over the model probabilities Pλ l r(xl & yr), Pλ l (xl) and Pλ r(yr), respectively: For
any ψ, l, r, xl and yr,

Empirical Adequacy
Pψ l r(xl & yr) = ∫λ Pλ l r(xl & yr) · ρψ l r(λ)
Pψ l(xl) = ∫λ Pλ l(xl ) · ρψ l(λ)
Pψ r(yr) = ∫λ Pλ r(yr) · ρψ r(λ).[4]

The assumption of λ-independence is very plausible. It postulates that (complete) pair

states at the source are uncorrelated with the settings of the measurement apparatuses.
And independently of one's philosophical view about free will, this assumption is
strongly suggested by our experience, according to which it seems possible to prepare the
state of particle pairs at the source independently of the set up of the measurement
apparatuses.

There are two ways to try to explain a failure of λ-independence. One possible
explanation is that pairs' states and apparatus settings share a common cause, which
always correlates certain types of pairs' states λ with certain types of L- and R-setting.
Such a causal hypothesis will be difficult to reconcile with the common belief that
apparatus settings are controllable at experimenters' will, and thus could be set
independently of the pair's state at the source. Furthermore, thinking of all the different
ways one can measure spin properties and the variety of ways in which apparatus settings
can be chosen, the postulation of such common cause explanation for settings and pairs'
states would seem highly ad hoc and its existence conspiratorial.

Another possible explanation for the failure of λ-independence is that the apparatus
settings influence the pair's state at the source, and accordingly the distribution of the
possible pairs' states λ is dependent upon the settings. Since the settings can be made after
the emission of the particle pair from the source, this kind of violation of λ-independence
would require backward causation. (For advocates of this way out of non-locality, see
Costa de Beauregard 1977, 1979, 1985, Sutherland 1983, 1998, 2006 and Price 1984,
1994, 1996, chapters 3, 8 and 9.) On some readings of John Cramer's (1980, 1986)
transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics (see Maudlin 1994, pp. 197-199), such
violation of λ-independence is postulated. According to this interpretation, the source
sends ‘offer’ waves forward to the measurement apparatuses, and the apparatuses send
‘confirmation’ waves (from the space-time regions of the measurement events) backward
to the source, thus affecting the states of emitted pairs according to the settings of the
apparatuses. The question of whether such a theory can reproduce the predictions of
quantum mechanics is a controversial matter (see Maudlin 1994, pp. 197-199, Berkovitz
2002, section 5, and Kastner 2006). It is noteworthy, however, that while the violation of
λ-independence is sufficient for circumventing Bell's theorem, the failure of this
condition per se does not substantiate locality. The challenge of providing a local model
of the EPR/B experiment also applies to models that violate λ-independence. (For more
about these issues, see sections 9 and 10.3.)

In any case, as Bell's theorem demonstrates, factorizability, λ-independence and

empirical adequacy jointly imply the Bell inequalities, which are violated by the
predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics (Bell 1964, 1966, 1971, 1975a,b). Granted
the systematic confirmation of the predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics and the
plausibility of λ-independence, Bell inferred that factorizability fails in the EPR/B
experiment. Thus, interpreting factorizability as a locality condition, he concluded that
the quantum realm is non-local. (For further discussions of Bell's theorem, the Bell
inequalities and non-locality, see Bell 1966, 1971, 1975a,b, 1981, Clauser et al 1969,
Clauser and Horne 1974, Shimony 1993, chapter 8, Fine 1982a,b, Redhead 1987, chapter
4, Butterfield 1989, 1992a, Pitowsky 1989, Greenberger, Horne and Zeilinger 1989,
Greenberger, Horne, Shimony and Zeilinger 1990, Mermin 1990, and the entry on Bell's
theorem.)
3. The analysis of factorizability
Following Bell's work, a broad consensus has it that the quantum realm involves some
type of non-locality (for examples, see Clauser and Horne 1974, Jarrett 1984,1989,
Shimony 1984, Redhead 1987, Butterfield 1989, 1992a,b, 1994, Howard 1989, Healey
1991, 1992, 1994, Teller 1989, Clifton, Butterfield and Redhead 1990, Clifton 1991,
Maudlin 1994, Berkovitz 1995a,b, 1998a,b, and references therein).[5] But there is an
ongoing controversy as to its exact nature and its compatibility with relativity theory. One
aspect of this controversy is over whether the analysis of factorizability and the different
ways it could be violated may shed light on these issues. Factorizability is equivalent to
the conjunction of two conditions (Jarrett 1984, 1989, Shimony 1984):[6]

Parameter independence. The probability of a distant measurement outcome in the

EPR/B experiment is independent of the setting of the nearby measurement apparatus. Or
formally, for any pair's state λ, L-setting l, R-setting r, L-outcome xl and R-outcome yr:
PI
Pλ l r(xl) = Pλ l(xl) and Pλ l r(yr) = Pλ r(yr).
Outcome independence. The probability of a distant measurement outcome in the
EPR/B experiment is independent of the nearby measurement outcome. Or formally, for
any pair's state λ, L-setting l, R-setting r, L-outcome xl and R-outcome yr:
Pλ l r(xl / yr) = Pλ l r(xl) and Pλ l r(yr / xl) = Pλ l r(yr)

Pλ l r(yr) > 0 Pλ l r(xl) > 0,

or more generally,
OI
Pλ l r(xl & yr) = Pλ l r(xl) · Pλ l r(yr).

Assuming λ-independence (see section 2), any empirically adequate theory will have to
violate OI or PI. A common view has it that violations of PI involve a different type of
non-locality than violations of OI: Violations of PI involve some type of action-at-a-
distance that is impossible to reconcile with relativity (Shimony 1984, Redhead 1987, p.
108), whereas violations of OI involve some type of holism, non-separability and/or
passion-at-a-distance that may be possible to reconcile with relativity (Shimony 1984,
Readhead 1987, pp. 107, 168-169, Howard 1989, Teller 1989).

On the other hand, there is the view that the analysis above (as well as other similar
analyses of factorizability[7]) is immaterial for studying quantum non-locality (Butterfield
1992a, pp. 63-64, Jones and Clifton 1993, Maudlin 1994, pp. 96 and 149) and even
misleading (Maudlin 1994, pp. 94-95 and 97-98). On this alternative view, the way to
examine the nature of quantum non-locality is to study the ontology postulated by the
various interpretations of quantum mechanics and alternative quantum theories.[8] In
sections 4-7, we shall follow this methodology and discuss the nature of non-locality
postulated by several quantum theories. The discussion in these sections will furnish the
ground for evaluating the above controversy in section 8.
4. Action at a distance, holism and non-separability
4.1 Action at a distance

In orthodox quantum mechanics as well as in any other current quantum theory that
postulates non-locality (i.e., influences between distant, space-like separated systems),
the influences between the distant measurement events in the EPR/B experiment do not
propagate continuously in space-time. They seem to involve action at a distance. Yet, a
common view has it that these influences are due to some type of holism and/or non-
separability of states of composite systems, which are characteristic of systems in
entangled states (like the spin singlet state), and which exclude the very possibility of
action at a distance. The paradigm case of action at a distance is the Newtonian
gravitational force. This force acts between distinct objects that are separated by some
(non-vanishing) spatial distance, its influence is symmetric (in that any two massive
objects influence each other), instantaneous and does not propagate continuously in
space. And it is frequently claimed or presupposed that such action at a distance could
only exist between systems with separate states in non-holistic universes (i.e., universes
in which the states of composite systems are determined by, or supervene upon the states
of their subsystems and the spacetime relations between them), which are commonly
taken to characterize the classical realm.[9]

In sections 4.2 and 4.3, we shall briefly review the relevant notions of holism and non-
separability (for a more comprehensive review, see the entry on holism and
nonseparability in physics and Healey 1991). In section 5, we shall discuss the nature of
holism and non-separability in the quantum realm as depicted by various quantum
theories. Based on this discussion, we shall consider whether the non-local influences in
the EPR/B experiment constitute action at a distance.

4.2 Holism

In the literature, there are various characterizations of holism. Discussions of quantum

non-locality frequently focus on property holism, where certain physical properties of
objects are not determined by the physical properties of their parts. The intuitive idea is
that some intrinsic properties of wholes (e.g. physical systems) are not determined by the
intrinsic properties of their parts and the spatiotemporal relations that obtain between
these parts. This idea can be expressed in terms of supervenience relations.

Property Holism. Some objects have intrinsic qualitative properties and/or relations that
do not supervene upon the intrinsic qualitative properties and relations of their parts and
the spatiotemporal relations between these parts.

It is difficult to give a general precise specification of the terms ‘intrinsic qualitative

property’ and ‘supervenience.’ Intuitively, a property of an object is intrinsic just in case
that object has this property in and for itself and independently of the existence or the
state of any other object. A property is qualitative (as opposed to individual) if it does not
depend on the existence of any particular object. And the intrinsic qualitative properties
of an object O supervene upon the intrinsic qualitative properties and relations of its parts
and the spatiotemporal relations between them just in case there is no change in the
properties and relations of O without a change in the properties and relations of its parts
and/or the spatiotemporal relations between them. (For attempts to analyze the term
‘intrinsic property,’ see for example Langton and Lewis 1998 and the entry on intrinsic
vs. extrinsic properties. For a review of different types of supervenience, see for example
Kim 1978, McLaughlin 1994 and the entry on supervenience.)

Paul Teller (1989, p. 213) proposes a related notion of holism, ‘relational holism,’ which
is characterized as the violation of the following condition:

Particularism. The world is composed of individuals. All individuals have non-relational

properties and all relations supervene on the non-relational properties of the relata.

Here, by a non-relational property Teller means an intrinsic property (1986a, p. 72); and
by ‘the supervenience of a relational property on the non-relational properties of the
relata,’ he means that ‘if two objects, 1 and 2, bear a relation R to each other, then,
necessarily, if two further objects, 1′ and 2′ have the same non-relational properties, then
1′ and 2′ will also bear the same relation R to each other’ (1989, p. 213). Teller (1986b,
pp. 425-7) believes that spatiotemporal relations between objects supervene upon the
objects’ intrinsic physical properties. Thus, he does not include the spatiotemporal
relations in the supervenience basis. This view is controversial, however, as many believe
that spatiotemporal relations between objects are neither intrinsic nor supervene upon the
intrinsic qualitative properties of these objects. But, if such supervenience does not
obtain, particularism will also be violated in classical physics, and accordingly relational
holism will fail to mark the essential distinction between the classical and the quantum
realms. Yet, one may slightly revise Teller's definition of particularism as follows:

Particularism*. The world is composed of individuals. All individuals have non-

relational properties and all relations supervene upon the non-relational properties of the
relata and the spatiotemporal relations between them.

In what follows in this entry, by relational holism we shall mean a violation of

particularism*.

4.3 Non-separability

Like holism, there are various notions of non-separability on offer. The most common
notion in the literature is state non-separability, i.e., the violation of the following
condition:

State separability. Each system possesses a separate state that determines its qualitative
intrinsic properties, and the state of any composite system is wholly determined by the
separate states of its subsystems.
The term ‘wholly determined’ is vague. But, as before, one may spell it out in terms of
supervenience relations: State separability obtains just in case each system possesses a
separate state that determines its qualitative intrinsic properties and relations, and the
state of any composite system is supervenient upon the separate states of its subsystems.

Another notion of non-separability is spatiotemporal non-separability. Inspired by

Einstein (1948), Howard (1989, pp. 225-6) characterizes spatiotemporal non-separability
as the violation of the following separability condition:

Spatiotemporal separability. The contents of any two regions of space-time separated

by a non-vanishing spatiotemporal interval constitute two separate physical systems.
Each separated space-time region possesses its own, distinct state and the joint state of
any two separated space-time regions is wholly determined by the separated states of
these regions.

A different notion of spatiotemporal non-separability, proposed by Healey (see the entry

on holism and nonseparability in physics), is process non-separability. It is the violation
of the following condition:

Process separability. Any physical process occupying a spacetime region R supervenes

upon an assignment of qualitative intrinsic physical properties at spacetime points in R.

5. Holism, non-separability and action at a distance in

quantum mechanics
The quantum realm as depicted by all the quantum theories that postulate non-locality,
i.e., influences between distant (space-like separated) systems, involves some type of
non-separability or holism. In what follows in this section, we shall consider the nature of
the non-separability and holism manifested by various interpretations of quantum
mechanics. On the basis of this consideration, we shall address the question of whether
these interpretations predicate the existence of action at a distance. We start with the so-
called ‘collapse theories.’

5.1 Collapse theories

5.1.1 Orthodox quantum mechanics

In orthodox quantum mechanics, normalized vectors in Hilbert spaces represent states of

physical systems. When the Hilbert space is of infinite dimension, state vectors can be
represented by functions, the so-called ‘wave functions.’ In any given basis, there is a
unique wave function that corresponds to the state vector in that basis. (For an entry level
review of the highlights of the mathematical formalism and the basic principles of
quantum mechanics, see the entry on quantum mechanics, Albert 1992, Hughes 1989,
Part I, and references therein; for more advanced reviews, see Bohm 1951 and Redhead
1987, chapters 1-2 and the mathematical appendix.)
For example, the state of the L-particle having z-spin ‘up’ (i.e., spinning ‘up’ about the z-
axis) can be represented by the vector |z-up> in the Hilbert space associated with the L-
particle, and the state of the L-particle having z-spin ‘down’ (i.e., spinning ‘down’ about
the z-axis) can be represented by the orthogonal vector, |z-down>. Particle pairs may be
in a state in which the L-particle and the R-particle have opposite spins, for instance
either a state |ψ1> in which the L-particle has z-spin ‘up’ and the R-particle has z-spin
‘down,’ or a state |ψ2> in which the L-particle has z-spin ‘down’ and the R-particle has z-
spin ‘up.’ Each of these states is represented by a tensor product of vectors in the Hilbert
space of the particle pair: |ψ1> = |z-up>L |z-down>R and |ψ2> = |z-down>L |z-up>R; where
the subscripts L and R refer to the Hilbert spaces associated with the L- and the R-
particle, respectively. But particle pairs may also be in a superposition of these states, i.e.,
a state that is a linear sum of the states |ψ1> and |ψ2>, e.g. the state represented by

|ψ3> = 1/√2 (|ψ1> − |ψ2>) = 1/√2 (|z-up>L |z-down>R − |z-down>L |z-up>R).

In fact, this is exactly the case in the spin singlet state. In this state, the particles are
entangled in a non-separable state (i.e., a state that cannot be decomposed into a product
of separate states of the L- and the R-particle), in which (according to the property-
assignment rules of orthodox quantum mechanics) the particles do not possess any
definite z-spin (or definite spin in any other direction). Thus, the condition of state
separability fails: The state of the particle pair (which determines its intrinsic qualitative
properties) is not wholly determined by the separate states of the particles (which
determine their intrinsic qualitative properties). Or more precisely, the pair's state is not
supervenient upon the separable states of the particles. In particular, the superposition
state of the particle pair assigns a ‘correlational’ property that dictates that the outcomes
of (ideal) z-spin measurements on both the L- and the R-particle will be anti-correlated,
and this correlational property is not supervenient upon properties assigned by any
separable states of the particles (for more details, see Healey 1992, 1994). For similar
reasons, the spin singlet state also involves property and relational holism; for the above
correlational property of the particle pair also fails to supervene upon the intrinsic
qualitative properties of the particles and the spatiotemporal relations between them.
Furthermore, the process that leads to each of the measurement outcomes is also non-
separable, i.e. process separability fails (see Healey 1994 and the entry on holism and
nonseparability in physics).

This correlational property is also ‘responsible’ for the action at a distance that the
orthodox theory seems to postulate between the distant wings in the EPR/B experiment.
Recall (section 1) that Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen thought that this curious action at a
distance reflects the incompleteness of this theory rather than a state of nature. The EPR
argument for the incompleteness of the orthodox theory is controversial. But the orthodox
theory seems to be incomplete for a different reason. This theory postulates that in non-
measurement interactions, the evolution of states obeys a linear and unitary equation of
motion, the so-called Schrödinger equation (see the entry on quantum mechanics),
according to which the particle pair in the EPR/B experiment remains in an entangled
state. This equation of motion also dictates that in a spin measurement, the pointers of the
measurement apparatuses get entangled with the particle pair in a non-separable state in
which (according to the theory's property assignment, see below) the indefiniteness of
particles’ spins is ‘transmitted’ to the pointer's position: In this entangled state of the
particle pair and the pointer, the pointer lacks any definite position, in contradiction to
our experience of perceiving it pointing to either ‘up’ or ‘down.’

The above problem, commonly called ‘the measurement problem,’ arises in orthodox no-
collapse quantum mechanics from two features that account very successfully for the
behavior of microscopic systems: The linear dynamics of quantum states as described by
the Schrödinger equation and the property assignment rule called ‘eigenstate-eigenvalue
link.’ According to the eigenstate-eigenvalue link, a physical observable, i.e., a physical
quantity, of a system has definite value (one of its eigenvalues) just in case the system is
in the corresponding eigenstate of that observable (see the entry on quantum mechanics,
section 4). Microscopic systems may be in a superposition state of spin components,
energies, positions, momenta as well as other physical observables. Accordingly,
microscopic systems may be in a state of indefinite z-spin, energy, position, momentum
and various other quantities. The problem is that given the linear and unitary Schrödinger
dynamics, these indefinite quantities are also endemic in the macroscopic realm. For
example, in a z-spin measurement on a particle in a superposition state of z-spin ‘up’ and
z-spin ‘down,’ the position of the apparatus’s pointer gets entangled with the indefinite z-
spin of the particle, thus transforming the pointer into a state of indefinite position, i.e., a
superposition of pointing ‘up’ and pointing ‘down’ (see Albert 1992, chapter 4, and the
entry on collapse theories, section 3). In particular, in the EPR/B experiment the L-
measurement causes the L-apparatus pointer to get entangled with the particle pair,
transforming it into a state of indefinite position:

|ψ4> = 1/√2 (|z-up>L |z-down>R |up>LA − |z-down>L |z-up>R |down>LA)

where |up>LA and |down>LA are the states of the L-apparatus pointer displaying the
outcomes z-spin ‘up’ and z-spin ‘down,’ respectively. Since the above type of
indefiniteness is generic in orthodox no-collapse quantum mechanics, in this theory
measurements typically have no definite outcomes, in contradiction to our experience.

In order to solve this problem, the orthodox theory postulates that in measurement
interactions, entangled states of measured systems and the corresponding measurement
apparatuses do not evolve according to the Schrödinger equation. Rather, they undergo a
‘collapse’ into product (non-entangled) states, where the systems involved have the
relevant definite properties. For example, the entangled state of the particle pair and the
L-apparatus in the EPR/B experiment may collapse into a product state in which the L-
particle comes to possess z-spin ‘up,’ the R-particle comes to possess z-spin ‘down’ and
the L-apparatus pointer displaying the outcome z-spin ‘up’:

|ψ5> = |z-up>L |z-down>R |up>LA.

The problem is that in the orthodox theory, the notions of measurement and the time,
duration and nature of state collapses remain completely unspecified. As John Bell
(1987b, p. 205) remarks, the collapse postulate in this theory, i.e., the postulate that
dictates that in measurement interactions the entangled states of the relevant systems do
not follow the Schrödinger equation but rather undergo a collapse, is no more than
‘supplementary, imprecise, verbal, prescriptions.’

This problem of accounting for our experience of perceiving definite measurement

outcomes in orthodox quantum mechanics, is an aspect of the more general problem of
accounting for the classical-like behavior of macroscopic systems in this theory.

5.1.2 Dynamical models for state vector reduction

The dynamical models for state-vector reduction were developed to account for state
collapses as real physical processes (for a review of the collapse models and a detailed
reference list, see the entry on collapse theories). The origin of the collapse models may
be dated to Bohm and Bub's (1966) hidden variable theory and Pearle's (1976)
spontaneous localization approach, but the program has received its crucial impetus with
the more sophisticated models developed by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber in 1986 (see
also Bell 1987a and Albert 1992) and their consequent development by Pearle (1989)
(see also Ghirardi, Pearle and Rimini 1990, and Butterfield et al. 1993). Similarly to
orthodox collapse quantum mechanics, in the GRW models the quantum-mechanical
state of systems (whether it is expressed by a vector or a wave function) provides a
complete specification of their intrinsic properties and relations. The state of systems
follows the Schrödinger equation, except that it has a probability for spontaneous
collapse, independently of whether or not the systems are measured. The chance of
collapse depends on the ‘size’ of the entangled systems—in the earlier models the ‘size’
of systems is predicated on the number of the elementary particles, whereas in later
models it is measured in terms of mass densities. In any case, in microscopic systems,
such as the particle pairs in the EPR/B experiment, the chance of collapse is very small
and negligible—the chance of spontaneous state collapse in such systems is cooked up so
that it will occur, on average, every hundred million years or so. This means that the
chance that the entangled state of the particle pair in the EPR/B experiment will collapse
to a product state between the emission from the source and the first measurement is
virtually zero. In an earlier L-measurement, the state of the particle pair gets entangled
with the state of the L-measurement apparatus. Thus, the state of the pointer of the L-
apparatus evolves from being ‘ready’ to measure a certain spin property to an indefinite
outcome. For instance, in a z-spin measurement the L-apparatus gets entangled with the
particle pair in a superposition state of pointing to ‘up’ and pointing to ‘down’
(corresponding to the states of the L-particle having z-spin ‘up’ and having z-spin
‘down’), and the R-apparatus remains un-entangled with these systems in the state of
being ready to measure z-spin. Or formally:

|ψ6> = 1/√2 (|z-up>L |up>AL |z-down>R − |z-down>L |down>AL |z-up>R) |ready>AR

where, as before, |up>AL and |down>AL denote the states of the L-apparatus displaying the
outcomes z-spin ‘up’ and ‘down’ respectively, and |ready>AR denotes the state of the R-
apparatus being ready to measure z-spin. In this state, a gigantic number of particles of
the L-apparatus pointer are entangled together in the superposition state of being in the
position (corresponding to pointing to) ‘up’ and the position (corresponding to pointing
to) ‘down.’ For assuming, for simplicity of presentation, that the position of all particles
of the L-apparatus pointer in the state of pointing to ‘up’ (‘down’) is the same, the state |
ψ6> can be rewritten as:

|ψ7> = 1/√2 (|z-up>L |up>p1 |up>p2 |up>p3 … |z-down>R −

|z-down>L |down>p1 |down>p2 |down>p3 … |z-up>R) |ready >AR

where pi denotes the i-particle of the L-apparatus pointer, and |up>pi (|down>pi) is the state
of the i-particle being in the position corresponding to the outcome z-spin ‘up’ (‘down’).
[10]
The chance that at least one of the vast number of the pointer's particles will endure a
spontaneous localization toward being in the position corresponding to either the
outcome z-spin ‘up’ or the outcome z-spin ‘down’ within a very short time (a split of a
micro second) is very high. And since all the particles of the pointer and the particle pair
are entangled with each other, such a collapse will carry with it a collapse of the
entangled state of the pointer of the L-apparatus and the particle pair toward either

|z-up>L |up>p1 |up>p2 |up>p3 … |z-down>R

or

|z-down>L |down>p1 |down>p2 |down>p3 … |z-up>R.

Thus, the pointer will very quickly move in the direction of pointing to either the
outcome z-spin ‘up’ or the outcome z-spin ‘down.’

If (as portrayed above) the spontaneous localization of particles were to a precise

position, i.e., to the position corresponding to the outcome ‘up’ or the outcome ‘down,’
the GRW collapse models would successfully resolve the measurement problem.
Technically speaking, a precise localization is achieved by multiplying |ψ7> by a delta
function centered on the position corresponding to either the outcome ‘up’ or the
outcome ‘down’ (see the entry on collapse theories, section 5 and Albert 1992, chapter
5); where the probability of each of these mutually exhaustive possibilities is ½. The
problem is that it follows from the uncertainty principle (see the entry on the uncertainty
principle) that in such localizations the momenta and the energies of the localized
particles would be totally uncertain, so that gases may spontaneously heat up and
electrons may be knocked out of their orbits, in contradiction to our experience. To avoid
this kind of problems, GRW postulated that spontaneous localizations are characterized
by multiplications by Gaussians that are centered around certain positions, e.g. the
position corresponding to either the outcome ‘up’ or the outcome ‘down’ in the state |ψ7>.
This may be problematic, because in either case the state of the L-apparatus pointer at
(what we characteristically conceive as) the end of the L-measurement would be a
superposition of the positions ‘up’ and ‘down.’ For although this superposition
‘concentrates’ on either the outcome ‘up’ or the outcome ‘down’ (i.e. the peak of the
wave function that corresponds to this state concentrates on one of these positions), it
also has ‘tails’ that go everywhere: The state of the L-apparatus is a superposition of an
infinite number of different positions. Thus, it follows from the eigenstate-eigenvalue
link that the position observable of the L-apparatus has no definite value at the end of the
measurement. But if the position observable having a definite value is indeed required in
order for the L-apparatus to have a definite location, then the pointer will point to neither
‘up’ nor ‘down,’ and the GRW collapse models will fail to reproduce the classical-like
behavior of such systems.[11]

In later models, GRW proposed to interpret the quantum state as a density of mass and
they postulated that if almost all the density of mass of a system is concentrated in a
certain region, then the system is located in that region. Accordingly, pointers of
measurement apparatuses do have definite positions at the end of measurement
interactions. Yet, this solution has also given rise to a debate (see Albert and Loewer
1995, Lewis 1997, 2003a, 2004, Ghirardi and Bassi 1999, Bassi and Ghirardi 1999, 2001,
Clifton and Monton 1999, 2000, Frigg 2003, and Parker 2003).

The exact details of the collapse mechanism and its characteristics in the GRW/Pearle
models have no significant implications for the type of non-separability and holism they
postulate—all these models basically postulate the same kinds of non-separability and
holism as orthodox quantum mechanics (see section 5.1.1). And action at a distance
between the L- and the R-wing will occur if the L-measurement interaction, a supposedly
local event in the L-wing, causes some local events in the R-wing, such as the event of
the pointer of the measurement apparatus coming to possess a definite measurement
outcome during the R-measurement. That is, action at a distance will occur if the L-
measurement causes the R-particle to come to possess a definite z-spin and this in turn
causes the pointer of the R-apparatus to come to possess the corresponding measurement
outcome in the R-measurement. Furthermore, if the L-measurement causes the R-particle
to come to possess (momentarily) a definite position in the R-wing, then the action at a
distance between the L- and the R-wing will occur independently of whether the R-
particle undergoes a spin measurement.

The above discussion is based on an intuitive notion of action at a distance and it

presupposes that action at a distance is compatible with non-separability and holism. In
the next section we shall provide more precise characterizations of action at a distance
and in light of these characterizations reconsider the question of the nature of action at a
distance in the GRW/Pearle collapse models.

5.2 Can action-at-a-distance co-exist with non-separability and holism?

The action at a distance in the GRW/Pearle models is different from the Newtonian
action at a distance in various respects. First, in contrast to Newtonian action at a
distance, this action is independent of the distance between the measurement events.
Second, while Newtonian action is symmetric, the action in the GRW/Pearle models is
(generally) asymmetric: Either the L-measurement influences the properties of the R-
particle or the R-measurement influences the properties of the L-particle, depending on
which measurement occurs first (the action will be symmetric when both measurements
occur simultaneously). Third (and more important to our consideration), in contrast to
Newtonian action at a distance, before the end of the L-measurement the state of the L-
apparatus and the R-particle is not separable and accordingly it is not clear that the
influence is between separate existences, as the case is supposed to be in Newtonian
gravity.

This non-separability of the states of the particle pair and the L-measurement apparatus,
and more generally the fact that the non-locality in collapse theories is due to state non-
separability, has led a number of philosophers and physicists to think that wave collapses
do not involve action at a distance. Yet, the question of whether there is an action at a
distance in the GRW/Pearle models (and various other quantum theories) depends on
how we interpret the term ‘action at a distance.’ And, as I will suggest below, on a natural
reading of Isaac Newton's and Samuel Clarke's comments concerning action at a distance,
there may be a peaceful coexistence between action at a distance and non-separability
and holism.

Newton famously struggled to find out the cause of gravity.[12] In a letter to Bentley, dated
January 17 1692/3, he said:

You sometimes speak of Gravity as essential and inherent to Matter. Pray do not ascribe
that Notion to me, for the Cause of Gravity is what I do not pretend to know, and
therefore would take more Time to consider it. (Cohen 1978, p. 298)

In a subsequent letter to Bentley, dated February 25, 1692/3, he added:

It is inconceivable that inanimate Matter should, without the Mediation of something

else, which is not material, operate upon, and affect other matter without mutual
Contact…That Gravity should be innate, inherent and essential to Matter, so that one
body may act upon another at a distance thro’ a Vacuum, without the Mediation of any
thing else, by and through which their Action and Force may be conveyed from one to
another, is to me so great an Absurdity that I believe no Man who has in philosophical
Matters a competent Faculty of thinking can ever fall into it. Gravity must be caused by
an Agent acting constantly according to certain laws; but whether this Agent be material
or immaterial, I have left to the Consideration of my readers. (Cohen 1978, pp. 302-3)

Samuel Clarke, Newton's follower, similarly struggled with the question of the cause of
gravitational phenomenon. In his famous controversy with Leibniz, he said:[13]

That one body attracts another without any intermediate means, is indeed not a miracle
but a contradiction; for 'tis supposing something to act where it is not. But the means by
which two bodies attract each other, may be invisible and intangible and of a different
nature from mechanism …

And he added:

That this phenomenon is not produced sans moyen, that is without a cause capable of
producing such an effect, is undoubtedly true. Philosophers therefore can search after and
discover that cause, if they can; be it mechanical or not. But if they cannot discover the
cause, is therefore the effect itself, the phenomenon, or the matter of fact discovered by
experience … ever the less true?

Newton's and Clarke's comments suggest that for them gravity was a law-governed
phenomenon, i.e., a phenomenon in which objects influence each other at a distance
according to the Newtonian law of gravity, and that this influence is due to some means
which may be invisible and intangible and of a different nature from mechanism. On this
conception of action at a distance, there seems to be no reason to exclude the possibility
of action at a distance in the quantum realm even if that realm is holistic or the state of
the relevant systems is non-separable. That is, action at a distance may be characterized
as follows:

Action at a distance is a phenomenon in which a change in intrinsic properties of one

system induces a change in the intrinsic properties of a distant system, independently of
the influence of any other systems on the distant system, and without there being a
process that carries this influence contiguously in space and time.

We may alternatively characterize action at a distance in a more liberal way:

Action* at a distance is a phenomenon in which a change in intrinsic properties of one

system induces a change in the intrinsic properties of a distant system without there being
a process that carries this influence contiguously in space and time.

And while Newton and Clarke did not have an explanation for the action at a distance
involved in Newtonian gravity, on the above characterizations action at a distance in the
quantum realm would be explained by the holistic nature of the quantum realm and/or
non-separability of the states of the systems involved. In particular, if in the EPR/B
experiment the L-apparatus pointer has a definite position before the L-measurement and
the R-particle temporarily comes to possess definite position during the L-measurement,
then the GRW/Pearle models involve action at a distance and thus also action* at a
distance. On the other hand, if the R-particle never comes to possess a definite position
during the L-measurement, then the GRW/Pearle models only involve action* at a
distance.

5.3 No-collapse theories

5.3.1 Bohm's theory

In 1952, David Bohm proposed a deterministic, ‘hidden variables’ quantum theory that
reproduces all the observable predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics (see Bohm
1952, Bohm, Schiller and Tiomno 1955, Bell 1982, Dewdney, Holland and Kyprianidis
1987, Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì 1992a, 1997, Albert 1992, Valentini 1992, Bohm and
Hiley 1993, Holland 1993, Cushing 1994, and Cushing, Fine and Goldstein 1996; for an
entry level review, see the entry on Bohmian mechanics and Albert 1992, chapter 5).
In contrast to orthodox quantum mechanics and the GRW/Pearle collapse models, in
Bohm's theory wave functions always evolve according to the Schrödinger equation, and
thus they never collapse. Wave functions do not represent the states of systems. Rather,
they are states of a ‘quantum field (on configuration space)’ that influences the states of
systems.[14] Also, particles always have definite positions, and the positions of the
particles and their wave function at a certain time jointly determine the trajectories of the
particles at all future times. Thus, particles’ positions and their wave function determine
the outcomes of any measurements (so long as these outcomes are recorded in the
positions of some physical systems, as in any practical measurements).

There are various versions of Bohm's theory. In the ‘minimal’ Bohm theory, formulated
by Bell (1982),[15] the wave function is interpreted as a ‘guiding’ field (which has no
source or any dependence on the particles) that deterministically governs the trajectories
of the particles according to the so-called ‘guiding equation’ (which expresses the
velocities of the particles in terms of the wave function).[16] The states of systems are
separable (the state of any composite system is completely determined by the state of its
subsystems), and they are completely specified by the particles’ positions. Spins, and any
other properties which are not directly derived from positions, are not intrinsic properties
of systems. Rather, they are relational properties that are determined by the systems’
positions and the guiding field. In particular, each of the particles in the EPR/B
experiment has dispositions to ‘spin’ in various directions, and these dispositions are
relational properties of the particles— they are (generally) determined by the guiding
field and the positions of the particles relative to the measurement apparatuses and to
each other.

Figure 4. The EPR/B experiment with Stern-Gerlach measurement devices. Stern-

Gerlach 1 is on, set up to measure the z-spin of the L-particle, and Stern-Gerlach 2 is off.
The horizontal lines in the left-hand-side denote the trajectories of six L-particles in the
spin singlet state after an (impulsive) z-spin measurement on the L-particle, and the
horizontal lines in the right-hand-side denote the trajectories of the corresponding R-
particles. The center plane is aligned orthogonally to the z-axis, so that particles that
emerge above this plane correspond to z-spin ‘up’ outcome and particles that emerge
below this plane correspond to z-spin ‘down’ outcome. The little arrows denote the z-spin
components of the particles in the ‘non-minimal’ Bohm theory (where spins are intrinsic
properties of particles), and are irrelevant for the ‘minimal’ Bohm theory (where spins are
not intrinsic properties of particles).

To see the nature of non-locality postulated by the minimal Bohm theory, consider again
the EPR/B experiment and suppose that the measurement apparatuses are Stern-Gerlach
(S-G) magnets which are prepared to measure z-spin. In any run of the experiment, the
measurement outcomes will depend on the initial positions of the particles and the order
of the measurements. Here is why. In the minimal Bohm theory, the spin singlet state
denotes the relevant state of the guiding field rather than the intrinsic properties of the
particle pair. If the L-measurement occurs before the R-measurement, the guiding field
and the position of the L-particle at the emission time jointly determine the disposition of
the L-particle to emerge from the S-G device either above or below a plane aligned in the
z-direction; where emerging above (below) the plane means that the L-particle z-spins
‘up’ (‘down’) about the z-axis and the L-apparatus ‘pointer’ points to ‘up’ (‘down’) (see
Fig. 4 above). All the L-particles that are emitted above the center plane aligned
orthogonally to the z-direction, like the L-particles 1-3, will be disposed to spin ‘up’; and
all the particles that are emitted below this plane, like the L-particles 4-6, will be
disposed to spin ‘down.’ Similarly, if the R-measurement occurs before the L-
measurement, the guiding field and the position of the R-particle at the emission time
jointly determine the disposition of the R-particle to emerge either above the z-axis (i.e.,
to z-spin ‘up’) or below the z-axis (i.e., to z-spin ‘down’) according to whether it is above
or below the center plane, independently of the position of the L-particle along the z-axis.

But the z-spin disposition of the R-particle changes immediately after an (earlier) z-spin
measurement on the L-particle: The R-particles 1-3 (see Fig. 4), which were previously
disposed to z-spin ‘up,’ will now be disposed to z-spin ‘down,’ i.e., to emerge below the
center plane aligned orthogonally to the z-axis; and the R-particles 4-6, which were
previously disposed to z-spin ‘down,’ will now be disposed to z-spin ‘up,’ i.e., to emerge
above this center plane. Yet, the L-measurement per se does not have any immediate
influence on the state of the R-particle: The L-measurement does not influence the
position of the R-particle or any other property that is directly derived from this position.
It only changes the guiding field, and thus grounds new spin dispositions for the R-
particle. But these dispositions are not intrinsic properties of the R-particle. Rather, they
are relational properties of the R-particle, which are grounded in the positions of both
particles and the state of the guiding field.[17] (Note that in the particular case in which the
L-particle is emitted above the center plane aligned orthogonally to the z-axis and the R-
particle is emitted below that plane, an earlier z-spin on the L-particle will have no
influence on the outcome of a z-spin on the R-particle.)

While there is no contiguous process to carry the influence of the L-measurement

outcome on events in the R-wing, the question of whether this influence amounts to
action at a distance depends on the exact characterization of this term. In contrast to the
GRW/Pearle collapse models, the influence of the L-measurement outcome on the
intrinsic properties of the R-particle is dependent on the R-measurement: Before this
measurement occurs, there are no changes in the R-particle's intrinsic properties. Yet, the
influence of the L-measurement on the R-particle is at a distance. Thus, the EPR/B
experiment as depicted by the minimal Bohm theory involves action* at a distance but
not action at a distance.

Bohm's theory portrays the quantum realm as deterministic. Thus, the single-case
objective probabilities, i.e., the chances, it assigns to individual spin-measurement
outcomes in the EPR/B experiment are different from the corresponding quantum-
mechanical probabilities. In particular, while in quantum mechanics the chances of the
outcomes ‘up’ and ‘down’ in an earlier L- (R-) spin measurement are both ½, in Bohm's
theory these chances are either one or zero. Yet, Bohm's theory postulates a certain
distribution, the so-called ‘quantum-equilibrium distribution,’ over all the possible
positions of pairs with the same guiding field. This distribution is computed from the
quantum-mechanical wave function, and it is typically interpreted as ignorance over the
actual position of the pair; an ignorance that may be motivated by dynamical
considerations and statistical patterns exhibited by ensembles of pairs with the same wave
function (for more details, see the entry on bohmian mechanics, section 9). And the sum-
average (or more generally the integration) over this distribution reproduces all the
quantum-mechanical observable predictions.

What is the status of this probability postulate? Is it a law of nature or a contingent fact (if
it is a fact at all)? The answers to these questions vary (see Section 7.2.1, Bohm 1953,
Valentini 1991a,b, 1992, 1996, 2002, Valentini and Westman 2004, Dürr, Goldstein and
Zanghì 1992a,b, 1996, fn. 15, and Callender 2006).

Turning to the question of non-separability, the minimal Bohm theory does not involve
state non-separability. For recall that in this theory the state of a system does not consist
in its wave function, but rather in the system's position, and the position of a composite
system always factorizes into the positions of its subsystems. Here, the non-separability
of the wave function reflects the state of the guiding field. This state propagates not in
ordinary three-space but in configuration space, where each point specifies the
configuration of both particles. The guiding field of the particle pair cannot be factorized
into the guiding field that governs the trajectory of the L-particle and the guiding field
that governs the trajectory of the R-particle. The evolution of the particles’ trajectories,
properties and dispositions is non-separable, and accordingly the particles’ trajectories,
properties and dispositions are correlated even when the particles are far away from each
other and do not interact with each other. Thus, process separability fails.

In the non-minimal Bohm theory[18], the behavior of an N-particle system is determined

by its wave function and the intrinsic properties of the particles. But, in contrast to the
minimal theory, in the non-minimal theory spins are intrinsic properties of particles. The
wave function always evolves according to the Schrödinger equation, and it is interpreted
as a ‘quantum field’ (which has no sources or any dependence on the particles). The
quantum field guides the particles via the ‘quantum potential,’ an entity which is
determined from the quantum field, and the evolution of properties is fully deterministic.
[19]

Like in the minimal Bohm theory, the non-separability of the wave function in the EPR/B
experiment dictates that the evolution of the particles’ trajectories, properties and
dispositions is non-separable, but the behavior of the particles is somewhat different. In
the earlier z-spin measurement on the L-particle, the quantum potential continuously
changes, and this change induces an immediate change in the z-spin of the R-particle. If
the L-particle starts to spin ‘up’ (‘down’) in the z-direction, the R-particle will start to
spin ‘down’ (‘up’) in the same direction (see the little arrows in Fig. 4).[20] Accordingly,
the L-measurement induces instantaneous action at a distance between the L- and the R-
wing. Yet, similarly to the minimal Bohm theory, while the disposition of the R-particle
to emerge above or below the center plane aligned orthogonally to the z-direction in a z-
spin measurement may change instantaneously, the actual trajectory of the R-particle
along the z-direction does not change before the measurement of the R-particle's z-spin
occurs. Only during the R-measurement, the spin and the position of the R-particle get
correlated and the R-particle's trajectory along the z-direction is dictated by the value of
its (intrinsic) z-spin.

Various objections have been raised against Bohm's theory (for a detailed list and replies,
see the entry on Bohmian mechanics, section 15). One main objection is that in Bohmian
mechanics, the guiding field influences the particles, but the particles do not influence the
guiding field. Another common objection is that the theory is involved with a radical type
of non-locality, and that this type of non-locality is incompatible with relativity. While it
may be very difficult, or even impossible, to reconcile Bohm's theory with relativity, as is
not difficult to see from the above discussion, the type of non-locality that the minimal
Bohm theory postulates in the EPR/B experiment does not seem more radical than the
non-locality postulated by the orthodox interpretation and the GRW/Pearle collapse
models.

5.3.2 Modal interpretations

Modal interpretations of quantum mechanics were designed to solve the measurement

problem and to reconcile quantum mechanics with relativity. They are no-collapse,
(typically) indeterministic hidden-variables theories. Quantum-mechanical states of
systems (which may be construed as denoting their states or information about these
states) always evolve according to unitary and linear dynamical equations (the
Schrödinger equation in the non-relativistic case). And the orthodox quantum-mechanical
state description of systems is supplemented by a set of properties, which depends on the
quantum-mechanical state and which is supposed to be rich enough to account for the
occurrence of definite macroscopic events and their classical-like behavior, but
sufficiently restricted to escape all the known no-hidden-variables theorems. (For modal
interpretations, see van Fraassen 1973, 1981, 1991, chapter 9, Kochen 1985, Krips 1987,
Dieks 1988, 1989, Healey 1989, Bub 1992, 1994, 1997, Vermaas and Dieks 1995, Clifton
1995, Bacciagaluppi 1996, Bacciagaluppi and Hemmo 1996, Bub and Clifton 1996,
Hemmo 1996b, Bacciagaluppi and Dickson 1999, Clifton 2000, Spekkens and Sipe
2001a,b, Bene and Dieks 2002, and Berkovitz and Hemmo 2006a,b. For an entry-level
review, see the entry on modal interpretations of quantum theory. For comprehensive
reviews and analyses of modal interpretations, see Bacciagaluppi 1996, Hemmo 1996a,
chapters 1-3, Dieks and Vermaas 1998, Vermaas 1999, and the entry on modal
interpretations of quantum theory. For the no-hidden-variables theorems, see Kochen and
Specker 1967, Greenberger, Horne and Zeilinger 1989, Mermin 1990 and the entry on the
Kochen-Specker theorem.)[21]

Modal interpretations vary in their property assignment. For simplicity, we shall focus on
modal interpretations in which the property assignment is based on the so-called Schmidt
biorthogonal-decomposition theorem (see Kochen 1985, Dieks 1989, and Healey 1989).
Let S1 and S2 be systems associated with the Hilbert spaces HS1 and HS2, respectively.
There exist bases {|αi>} and {|βi>} for HS1 and HS2 respectively such that the state of
S1+S2 can be expressed as a linear combination of the following form of vectors from
these bases:

|ψ8 >S1+S2 = ∑i ci |αi>S1 |βi>S2.

When the absolute values of the coefficients ci are all unequal, the bases {|αi>} and {|βi>}
and the above decomposition of |ψ8 >S1+S2 are unique. In that case, it is postulated that S1
has a determinate value for each observable associated with HS1 with the basis {|αi>} and
S2 has a determinate value for each observable associated with HS2 with the basis {|βi>},
and |ci|2 provide the (ignorance) probabilities of the possible values that these observables
may have.[22] For example, suppose that the state of the L- and the R-particle in the
EPR/B experiment before the measurements is:

|ψ9>= (1/√2+ε) |z-up>L| z-down>R − (1/√2-ε′) |z-down>L| z-up>R

where 1/√2 >> ε,ε′, (1/√2+ε)2+(1/√2-ε′)2 = 1, and (as before) |z-up>L (|z-up>R) and | z-
down>L (| z-down>R) denote the states of the L- (R-) particle having z-spin 'up' and z-spin
'down', respectively.[23] Then, either the L-particle spins ‘up’ and the R-particle spins
‘down’ in the z-direction, or the L-particle spins ‘down’ and the R-particle spins ‘up’ in
the z-direction. Thus, in contrast to the orthodox interpretation and the GRW/Pearle
collapse models, in modal interpretations the particles in the EPR/B experiment may have
definite spin properties even before any measurement occurs.

To see how the modal interpretation accounts for the curious correlations in EPR/B-type
experiments, let us suppose that the state of the particle pair and the measurement
apparatuses at the emission time is:

|ψ10> = ((1/√2+ε) |z-up>L |z-down>R − (1/√2−ε′) |z-down>L |z-up>R) |ready>AL|ready>AR

where |ready>AL (|ready>AR) denotes the state of the L-apparatus (R-apparatus) being
ready to measure z-spin. In this state, the L- and the R-apparatus are in the definite state
of being ready to measure z-spin, and (similarly to the state |ψ9>) the L- and the R-
particle have definite z-spin properties: Either the L-particle has z-spin ‘up’ and the R-
particle has z-spin ‘down,’ or the L-particle has z-spin ‘down’ and the R-particle has z-
spin ‘up,’[24] where the probability of the realization of each of these possibilities is
approximately 1/2. In the (earlier) z-spin measurement on the L-particle, the state of the
particle pair and the apparatuses evolves to the state:

|ψ11>= ((1/√2+ε) |z-up>L|up>AL| z-down>R − (1/√2-ε′) |z-down>L|down>AL| z-up>R) |

ready>AR

where (as before) |up>AL and |down>AL denote the states of the L-apparatus pointing to the
outcomes z-spin ‘up’ and z-spin ‘down’, respectively. In this state, either the L-particle
has a z-spin ‘up’ and the L-apparatus points to ‘up,’ or the L-particle has z-spin ‘down’
and the L-apparatus points to ‘down.’ And, again, the probability of each of these
possibilities is approximately 1/2. The evolution of the properties from the state |ψ10> to
the state |ψ11> depends on the dynamical laws. In almost all modal interpretations, if the
particles have definite z-spin properties before the measurements, the outcomes of z-spin
measurements will reflect these properties. That is, the evolution of the properties of the
particles and the measurement apparatuses will be deterministic, so that the spin
properties of the particles do not change in the L-measurement and the pointer of the L-
apparatus comes to display the outcome that corresponds to the z-spin property that the L-
particle had before the measurement. If, for example, before the measurements the L- and
the R-particle have respectively the properties z-spin ‘up’ and z-spin ‘down’, the (earlier)
z-spin measurement on the L-particle will yield the outcome ‘up’ and the spin properties
of the particles will remain unchanged. Accordingly, a z-spin measurement on the R-
particle will yield the outcome ‘down’. Thus, in this case the modal interpretation
involves neither action at a distance nor action* at a distance.

However, if the measurement apparatuses are set up to measure x-spin rather than z-spin,
the evolution of the properties of the L-particle and the L-apparatus will be
indeterministic. As before, the L-measurement will not cause any change in the actual
spin properties of the R-particle. But the L-measurement outcome will cause an instant
change in the spin dispositions of the R-particle and the R-measurement apparatus. If, for
example, the L-measurement outcome is x-spin ‘up’ and the L-particle comes to posses x-
spin ‘up,’ then the R-particle and the R-apparatus will have respectively the dispositions
to possess x-spin ‘down’ and to display the outcome x-spin ‘down’ on a x-spin
measurement. Thus, like the minimal Bohm theory, the modal interpretation may involve
action* at a distance in the EPR/B experiment. But, unlike the minimal Bohm theory,
here spins are intrinsic properties of particles.

In the above modal interpretation, property composition fails: The properties of

composite systems are not decomposable into the properties of their subsystems.
Consider, again, the state |ψ10>. As ‘separated’ systems (i.e. in the decompositions of the
composite system of the particle pair+apparatuses into the L-particle and the R-
particle+apparatuses and into the R-particle and the L-particle+apparatuses) the L- and
the R-particle have definite z-spin properties. But, as subsystems of the composite system
of the particle pair (e.g. in the decomposition of the composite system of the particle
pair+apparatuses into the particle pair and the apparatuses), they have no definite z-spin
properties.

A failure of property composition occurs also in the state |ψ11>, where the L- and the R-
particle have definite z-spin properties both as ‘separated’ systems and as subsystems of
the particle pair (though in contrast with |ψ10>, in |ψ11> the range of the possible
properties of the particles as separated systems and as subsystems of the pair is the same).
For nothing in the above property assignment implies that in |ψ11> the spin properties that
the L-particle has as a ‘separated’ system and the spin properties that it has as a
subsystem of the particle pair be the same: The L-particle may have z-spin ‘up’ as a
separated system and z-spin ‘down’ as a subsystem of the particle pair.

Furthermore, the dynamics of the properties that the L-particle (R-particle) has as a
separated system and the dynamics of its properties as a subsystem of the particle pair are
generally different.[25] Consider, again, the state |ψ10>. In the (earlier) z-spin measurement
on the L-particle, the spin properties that the L-particle has as a separated system follow a
deterministic evolution — the L-particle has either z-spin ‘up’ or z-spin ‘down’ before
and after the L-measurement; whereas as a subsystem of the particle pair, the spin
properties of the L-particle follow an indeterministic evolution — the L-particle has no
definite spin properties before the L-measurement and either z-spin ‘up’ (with
approximately chance ½) or z-spin ‘down’ (with approximately chance ½) after the L-
measurement.

The failure of property composition implies that the quantum realm as depicted by the
above version of the modal interpretation involves state non-separability and property
and relational holism. State separability fails because the state of the particle pair is not
generally determined by the separate states of the particles. Indeed, as is easily shown,
the actual properties that the L- and the R-particle each has in the state |ψ9> are also
compatible with product states in which the L- and the R-particle are not entangled.
Property and relational holism fail because in the state |ψ9> the properties of the pair do
not supervene upon the properties of its subsystems and the spatiotemporal relations
between them. Furthermore, process separability fails for similar reasons.

The failure of property composition in the modal interpretation calls for explanation. It
may be tempting to postulate that the properties that a system (e.g. the L-particle) has, as
a separated system, are the same as the properties that it has as a subsystem of composite
systems. But, as Bacciagaluppi (1995) and Clifton (1996a) have shown, such property
assignment will be inconsistent: It will be subject to a Kochen and Specker-type
contradiction. Furthermore, as Vermaas (1997) demonstrates, the properties of composite
systems and the properties of their subsystems cannot be correlated (in ways compatible
with the Born rule).

For what follows in the rest of this subsection, the views of different authors differ
widely. Several variants of modal interpretations were developed in order to fix the
problem of the failure of property composition. The most natural explanation of the
failure of property composition is that quantum states assign relational rather than
intrinsic properties to systems (see Kochen 1985, Bene and Dieks 2002, and Berkovitz
and Hemmo 2006a,b). For example, in the relational modal interpretation proposed by
Berkovitz and Hemmo (2006a,b), the main idea is that quantum states assign properties
to systems only relative to other systems, and properties of a system that are related to
different systems are generally different. In particular, in the state |ψ10> the L-particle has
a definite z-spin property relative to the R-particle, the measurement apparatuses and the
rest of the universe, but (as a subsystem of the particle pair) it has no definite z-spin
relative to the measurement apparatuses and the rest of universe.[26] On this interpretation,
the properties of systems are highly non-local by their very nature. Properties like
pointing to ‘up’ and pointing to ‘down’ are not intrinsic to the measurement apparatuses.
Rather, they are relations between the apparatuses and other systems. For example, the
property of the L-apparatus pointing to ‘up’ relative to the particle pair, the R-apparatus
and the rest of the universe is not intrinsic to the L-apparatus; it is a relation between the
L-apparatus and the particle pair, the R-apparatus and the rest of the universe. As such,
this property is highly non-local: It is located in neither the L-wing nor any other
subregion of the universe. Yet, due to the dynamical laws, properties like the position of
pointers of measurement apparatuses, which appear to us to be local, behave like local
properties in any experimental circumstances, and accordingly this radical type of non-
locality is unobservable (for more details, see Berkovitz and Hemmo 2006b, sections 8.1
and 9).

Another way to try to explain the failure of property composition is to interpret the
properties of composite systems as holistic, non-decomposable properties. On this
interpretation, the z-spin ‘up’ property that the L-particle has as a subsystem of the
particle pair in the state |ψ9> is completely different from the z-spin ‘up’ property that the
L-particle has as a separated system, and the use of the term ‘z-spin up’ in both cases is
misleading (for more details, see Berkovitz and Hemmo 2006a).[27]

The relational and holistic interpretations of properties mark a radical shift from the
standard interpretation of properties in orthodox quantum mechanics. Other advocates of
the modal interpretation have chosen not to follow this interpretation, and opted for a
modal interpretation that does not violate property composition. While the property
assignment above does not assume any preferred partition of the universe (the partition of
the universe into a particle pair and the rest of the universe is as good as the partition of
the universe into the L-particle and the rest of the universe), proponents of property
composition postulated that there is a preferred partition of the universe into ‘atomic’
systems and accordingly a preferred factorization of the Hilbert space of the universe.
This preferred factorization is supposed to be the basis for the ‘core’ property
assignment: Properties are prescribed to atomic systems according to a property
assignment that is a generalization of the bi-orthogonal decomposition property
assignment.[28] And the properties of complex systems are postulated to be compositions
of the properties of their atomic systems (see the entry on modal interpretations of
quantum theory, section 2, and Bacciagaluppi and Dickson 1999). The challenge for this
atomic modal interpretation is to justify the assumption that there is a preferred partition
of the universe, and to provide some idea about how such factorization should look like.
Finally, while the modal interpretation was designed to solve the measurement problem
and reconcile quantum mechanics with special relativity, it faces challenges on both
accounts. First, in certain imprefect measurements (where there are imprefections in the
coupling between the measured system and the pointer of the measurement apparatus
and/or the pointer and the environment), modal interpretations that are based on the
Schmidt biorthogonal-decomposition theorem (and more generally the spectral
decomposition theorem) fail to account for definite measurement outcomes, in
contradiction to our experience (see Bacciagaluppi and Hemmo 1996 and Bacciagaluppi
2000). For versions of the modal interpretations that seem to escape this problem, see
Van Fraassen (1973, 1991), Bub (1992, 1997), Bene and Dieks (2002) and Berkovitz and
Hemmo (2006a,b). Second, as we shall see in section 10.2, a number of no-go theorems
challenge the view that modal interpretations could be genuinely relativistic.

5.3.3 Everett-like interpretations

In 1957, Everett proposed a new no-collapse interpretation of orthodox quantum

mechanics (see Everett 1957a,b, 1973, Barrett 1999, the entry on Everett's relative-state
formulation of quantum mechanics, the entry on the many-worlds interpretation of
quantum mechanics, and references therein). The Everett interpretation is a no-collapse
interpretation of quantum mechanics, where the evolution of quantum states is always
according to unitary and linear dynamical equations (the Schrödinger equation in the non-
relativistic case). In this interpretation, quantum states are fundamentally relative.
Systems have relative states, which are derivable from the various branches of the
entangled states. For example, consider again |ψ11>.

|ψ11>= (1/√2+ε) |z-up>L|up>AL| z-down>R |ready>AR − (1/√2-ε′) |z-down>L|down>AL| z-up>R

|ready>AR.

In this quantum-mechanical state, the L-apparatus is in the state of pointing to the

outcome z-spin ‘up’ relative to the L-particle being in the state z-spin ‘up,’ the R-particle
being in the state z-spin ‘down’ and the R-apparatus being ready to measure z-spin; and
in the state of pointing to the outcome z-spin ‘down’ relative to the L-particle being in the
state z-spin ‘down,’ the R-particle being in the state z-spin ‘up’ and the R-apparatus being
ready to measure z-spin. Likewise, the L-particle is in the state z-spin ‘up’ relative to the
L-apparatus being in the state of pointing to the outcome z-spin ‘up,’ the R-particle being
in the state z-spin ‘down’ and the R-apparatus being ready to measure z-spin; and in the
state z-spin ‘down’ relative to the L-apparatus being in the state of pointing to the
outcome z-spin ‘down,’ the R-particle being in the state z-spin ‘up’ and the R-apparatus
being ready to measure z-spin. And similarly, mutatis mutandis, for the relative state of
the R-particle and the R-apparatus.

Everett's original formulation left the exact meaning of these relative states and their
relations to observers’ experience and beliefs open, and there have been different Everett-
like interpretations of these states. Probably the most popular reading of Everett is the
splitting-worlds interpretation (see DeWitt 1971, Everett's relative-state formulation of
quantum mechanics, Barrett 1999, and references therein). In the splitting-worlds
interpretation, each of the branches of the state |ψ11> refers to a different class of worlds
(all of which are real) where the states of the L-apparatus, R-apparatus and the particles
are all separable: Class-1 worlds in which the L-particle is in the state z-spin ‘up,’ the R-
particle is in the state z-spin ‘down,’ the L-apparatus is in the state of pointing to the
outcome z-spin ‘up’ and the R-apparatus in the state of being ready to measure z-spin;
and class-2 worlds in which the L-particle is in the state z-spin ‘down,’ the R-particle is
in the state z-spin ‘up,’ the L-apparatus is in the state of pointing to the outcome z-spin
‘down’ and the R-apparatus is in the state of being ready to measure z-spin. More
generally, each term in state of the universe, as represented in a certain preferred basis,
reflects the states of its systems in some class of worlds; where the range of the different
classes of worlds increases whenever the number of the terms in the quantum state (in the
preferred basis) increases (this process is called ‘splitting’).

The splitting-worlds reading of Everett faces a number of challenges. First, supporters of

the Everett interpretation frequently motivate their interpretation by arguing that it
postulates the existence of neither a controversial wave collapse nor hidden variables, and
it leaves the simple and elegant mathematical structure of quantum mechanics intact. But,
the splitting-worlds interpretation adds extra structure to no-collapse orthodox quantum
mechanics. Further, this interpretation marks a radical shift from orthodox quantum
mechanics. A scientific theory is not constituted only by its mathematical formalism, but
also by the ontology it postulates, the way it depicts the physical realm and the way it
accounts for our experience. The many parallel worlds ontology of the splitting-worlds
interpretation and its account of our experience are radically different from the ontology
of the intended interpretation of orthodox quantum mechanics and its account for our
experience. Second, relative states are well defined in any basis, and the question arises
as to which basis should be preferred and the motivation for selecting one particular basis
over others. Third, in the splitting-worlds interpretation each of the worlds in the universe
may split into two or more worlds, and the problem is that (similarly to the collapse in
orthodox collapse quantum mechanics) there are no clear criteria for when a splitting
occurs and how long it takes. Fourth, there is the question of how the splitting-worlds
interpretation accounts for the statistical predictions of the orthodox theory. In the
Everett-like interpretations in general, and in the splitting-worlds interpretation in
particular, all the possible measurement outcomes in the EPR/B experiment are realized
and may be observed. Thus, the question arises as to the meaning of probabilities in this
interpretation. For example, what is the meaning of the statement that in the state |ψ10>
(see section 5.3.2) the probability of the L-measurement apparatus pointing to the
outcome ‘up’ in an earlier z-spin measurement on the L-particle is (approximately) ½? In
the splitting-worlds interpretation the probability of that outcome appears to be 1!
Furthermore, setting aside the problem of interpretation, there is also the question of
whether the splitting-worlds interpretation, and more generally Everett-like
interpretations, can account for the particular values of the quantum probabilities of
measurement outcomes. Everett claimed to derive the Born probabilities in the context of
his interpretation. But this derivation has been controversial. (For discussions of the
meaning of probabilities, or more precisely the meaning of the coefficients of the various
terms in quantum states, in Everett-like interpretations, see Butterfield 1996, Lockwood
1996a,b, Saunders 1998, Vaidman 1998, Barnum et. al 2000, Bacciagaluppi 2002, Gill
2003, Hemmo and Pitowsky 2003, 2005, Wallace 2002, 2003, 2005a,b, Greaves 2004
and Saunders 2004, 2005.)

Other readings of Everett include the many-minds interpretation (Albert and Loewer
1988, Barrett 1999, chapter 7), the consistent-histories approach (Gell-Mann and Hartle
1990), the Everett-like relational interpretation (Saunders 1995, Mermin 1998) and (what
may be called) the many-structures interpretation (Wallace 2005c). While these readings
address more or less successfully the problems of the preferred basis and splitting, except
for the many-minds interpretation of Albert and Loewer the question of whether there
could be a satisfactory interpretation of probabilities in the context of these theories and
the adequacy of the derivation of the Born probabilities are still a controversial issue (see
Deutsch 1999, Wallace 2002, 2003, Lewis 2003, Graves 2004, Saunders 2004, Hemmo
and Pitowsky 2005, and Price 2006).

What kind of non-locality do Everett-like interpretations involve? Unfortunately, the

answer to this question is not straightforward, as it depends on one's particular reading of
the Everett interpretation. Indeed, all the above readings of Everett seem to treat the no-
collapse wave function of the universe as a real physical entity that reflects the non-
separable state of the universe, and accordingly they involve state non-separability. But,
one may reasonably expect that different readings depict different pictures of physical
reality and accordingly might postulate different kinds of non-locality. Thus, any further
analysis of the type of non-locality postulated by each of these readings requires a
detailed study of their ontology (which we plan to conduct in future updates of this
entry).

For example, the question of action at a distance in the EPR/B experiment may arise in
the context of the splitting-worlds interpretation, but not in the context of Albert and
Loewer's many-minds interpretation. Albert and Loewer's interpretation takes the bare
no-collapse orthodox quantum mechanics to be the complete theory of the physical
realm. Accordingly, the L-apparatus in the state |ψ11> does not display any definite
outcome. Yet, in order to account for our experience of a classical-like world, where at
the end of measurements observers are typically in mental states of perceiving definite
outcomes, the many-minds interpretation appeals to a dualism of mind-body. Each
observer is associated with a continuous infinity of non-physical minds. And while the
physical state of the world evolves in a completely deterministic manner according to the
Schrödinger evolution, and the pointers of the measurement apparatuses in the EPR/B
experiment display no definite outcomes, states of minds evolve in a genuinely
indeterministic fashion so as to yield an experience of perceiving definite measurement
outcomes. For example, consider again, the state |ψ10>. While in a first z-spin L-
measurement, this state evolves deterministically into the state |ψ11>, minds of observers
evolve indeterministically into either the state of perceiving the outcome z-spin ‘up’ or
the state of perceiving the outcome z-spin ‘down’ with the usual Born-rule probabilities
(approximately 50% chance for each of these outcomes). Since in this state the L-particle
has no definite spin properties and the L-apparatus points to no definite measurement
outcome, and since in the later z-spin measurement on the R-particle the R-particle does
not come to possess any definite spin properties and the R-apparatus points to no definite
spin outcome, the question of whether there is action at a distance between the L-particle
and the L-apparatus on the one hand and the R-particle and the R-apparatus on the other
does not arise.

6. Superluminal causation
In all the above interpretations of quantum mechanics, the failure of factorizability (i.e.,
the failure of the joint probability of the measurement outcomes in the EPR/B experiment
to factorize into their single probabilities) involves non-separability, holism and/or some
type of action at a distance. As we shall see below, non-factorizability also implies
superluminal causal dependence according to certain accounts of causation.

First, as is not difficult to show, the failure of factorizability implies superluminal

causation according to various probabilistic accounts of causation that satisfy
Reichenbach's (1956, section 19) principle of the common cause (for a review of this
principle, see the entry on Reichenbach's principle of the common cause).

Here is why. Reichenbach's principle may be formulated as follows:

PCC (Principle of the Common Cause). For any correlation between two (distinct)
events which do not cause each other, there is a common cause that screens them off
from each other. Or formally: If distinct events x and y are correlated, i.e.,

(Correlation) P(x & y) ≠ P(x) · P(y),

and they do not cause each other, then their common cause, CC(x,y), screens them off
from each other, i.e.,

(Screening Off) PCC(x, y)(x/y) = PCC(x,y)(x) PCC(x, y)(y) ≠ 0

PCC(x, y)(y/x) = PCC(x,y)( y) PCC(x, y)(x) ≠ 0.[29]

Accordingly, CC(x,y) renders x and y probabilistically independent, and the joint

probability of x and y factorizes upon CC(x,y):

PCC(x, y)(x & y) = PCC(x,y)( x) · PCC(x, y)(y).

The above formulation of PCC is mainly intended to cover cases in which x and y have
no partial, non-common causes. But PCC can be generalized as follows:

PCC*. The joint probability of any distinct, correlated events, x and y, which are not
causally connected to each other, factorizes upon the union of their partial (separate)
causes and their common cause. That is, let CC(x,y) denote the common causes of x and
y, and PC(x) and PC(y) denote respectively their partial causes. Then, the joint
probability of x and y factorizes upon the Union of their Causal Pasts (henceforth,
FactorUCP), i.e., on the union of PC(x), PC(y) and CC(x,y):
FactorUCP
PPC(x) PC(y) CC(x, y) (x & y) = PPC(x) CC(x, y)(x) · PPC(y) CC(x, y)(y).

Like PCC, the basic idea of FactorUCP is that the objective probabilities of events that do
not cause each other are determined by their causal pasts, and given these causal pasts
they are probabilistically independent of each other. As is not difficult to see,
factorizability is a special case of FactorUCP. That is, to obtain factorizability from
FactorUCP, substitute λ for CC(x,y), l for PC(x) and r for PC(y). FactorUCP and the
assumption that the probabilities of the measurement-outcomes in the EPR/B experiment
are determined by the pair's state and the settings of the measurement apparatuses jointly
imply factorizability. Thus, given this later assumption, the failure of factorizability
implies superluminal causation between the distant outcomes in the EPR/B experiment
according to any account of causation that satisfies FactorUCP (for some examples of
such accounts, see Butterfield 1989 and Berkovitz 1995a, 1995b, section 6.7, 1998b).[30]

Superluminal causation between the distant outcomes also exists according to various
counterfactual accounts of causation, including accounts that do not satisfy FactorUCP.
In particular, in Lewis's (1986) influential account, counterfactual dependence between
distinct events implies causal dependence between them. And as Butterfield (1992b) and
Berkovitz (1998b) demonstrate, the violation of Factorizability involves a counterfactual
dependence between the distant measurement outcomes in the EPR/B experiment.

But the violation of factorizability does not imply superluminal causation according to
some other accounts of causation. In particular, in process accounts of causation there is
no superluminal causation in the EPR/B experiment. In such accounts, causal dependence
between events is explicated in terms of continuous processes in space and time that
transmit ‘marks’ or conserved quantities from the cause to the effect (see Salmon 1998,
chapters 1, 12, 16 and 18, Dowe 2000, the entry on causal processes, and references
therein). Thus, recalling (sections 1, 2, 4 and 5) that none of the interpretations of
quantum mechanics and alternative quantum theories postulates any (direct) continuous
process between the distant measurement events in the EPR/B experiment, there is no
superluminal causation between them according to process accounts of causation.

7. Superluminal signaling
Whether or not the non-locality predicted by quantum theories may be classified as action
at a distance or superluminal causation, the question arises as to whether this non-locality
could be exploited to allow superluminal (i.e., faster-than-light) signaling of information.
This question is of particular importance for those who interpret relativity as prohibiting
any such superluminal signaling. (We shall return to discuss this interpretation in section
10.)

Superluminal signaling would require that the state of nearby controllable physical
objects (say, a keyboard in my computer) superluminally influence distant observable
physical phenomena (e.g. a pattern on a computer screen light years away). The influence
may be deterministic or indeterministic, but in any case it should cause a detectable
change in the statistics of some distant physical quantities.

It is commonly agreed that in quantum phenomena, superluminal signaling is impossible

in practice. Moreover, many believe that such signaling is excluded in principle by the
so-called ‘no-signaling theorem’ (for proofs of this theorem, see Eberhard 1978, Ghirardi,
Rimini and Weber 1980, Jordan 1983, Shimony 1984, Redhead 1987, pp. 113-116 and
118). It is thus frequently claimed with respect to EPR/B experiments that there is no
such thing as a Bell telephone, namely a telephone that could exploit the violation of the
Bell inequalities for superluminal signaling of information.[31]

The no-signaling theorem demonstrates that orthodox quantum mechanics excludes any
possibility of superluminal signaling in the EPR/B experiment. According to this theory,
no controllable physical factor in the L-wing, such as the setting of the L-measurement
apparatus, can take advantage of the entanglement between the systems in the L- and the
R-wing to influence the statistics of the measurement outcomes (or any other observable)
in the R-wing. As we have seen in section 5.1.1, the orthodox theory is at best
incomplete. Thus, the fact that it excludes superluminal signaling does not imply that
other quantum theories or interpretations of the orthodox theory also exclude such
signaling. Yet, if the orthodox theory is empirically adequate, as the consensus has it, its
statistical predictions obtain, and accordingly superluminal signaling will be excluded as
a matter of fact; for if this theory is empirically adequate, any quantum theory will have
to reproduce its statistics, including the exclusion of any actual superluminal signaling.

But the no-signaling theorem does not demonstrate that superluminal signaling would be
impossible if orthodox quantum mechanics were not empirically adequate. Furthermore,
this theorem does not show that superluminal signaling is in principle impossible in the
quantum realm as depicted by other theories, which actually reproduce the statistics of
orthodox quantum mechanics but do not prohibit in theory the violation of this statistics.
In sections 7.2-7.3, we shall consider the in-principle possibility of superluminal
signaling in certain collapse and no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics. But,
first, we need to consider the necessary and sufficient conditions for superluminal
signaling.

7.1 Necessary and sufficient conditions for superluminal signaling

To simplify things, in our discussion we shall focus on non-factorizable models of the

EPR/B experiment that satisfy λ-independence (i.e. the assumption that the distribution of
the states λ is independent of the settings of the measurement apparatuses). Superluminal
signaling in the EPR/B experiment would be possible in theory just in case the value of
some controllable physical quantity in the nearby wing could influence the statistics of
measurement outcomes in the distant wing. And in non-factorizable models that satisfy λ-
independence this could happen just in case the following conditions obtained:

Controllable probabilistic dependence. The probabilities of distant measurement

outcomes depend on some nearby controllable physical quantity.
λ-distribution. There can be in theory an ensemble of particle pairs the states of which
deviate from the quantum-equilibrium distribution; where the quantum-equilibrium
distribution of pairs' states is the distribution that reproduces the predictions of orthodox
quantum mechanics.

Four comments: (i) In controllable probabilistic dependence, the term 'probabilities of

measurement outcomes' refers to the model probabilities, i.e. the probabilities that the
states λ prescribe for measurement outcomes.
(ii) Our discussion in this entry focuses on models of the EPR/B experiment in which
probabilities of measurement outcomes depend only on the pair's state λ and the settings
of the measurement apparatuses to measure certain properties. In such models, parameter
dependence (i.e. the dependence of the probability of the distant measurement outcome
on the setting of the nearby measurement apparatus) is a necessary and sufficient
condition for controllable probabilistic dependence. But, recall (footnote 3) that in some
models of the EPR/B experiment, in addition to the pair's state and the setting of the L-
(R-) measurement apparatus there are other local physical quantities that may be relevant
for the probability of the L- (R-) measurement outcome. In such models, parameter
dependence is not a necessary condition for controllable probabilistic dependence. Some
other physical quantities in the nearby wing may be relevant for the probability of the
distant measurement outcome. (That is, let α and β denote all the relevant local physical
quantities, other than the settings of the measurement apparatuses, that may be relevant
for the probability of the L- and the R-outcome, respectively. Then, controllable
probabilistic dependence would obtain if for some pairs' states λ, L-setting l, R-setting r
and local physical quantities α and β, Pλ l r α β(yr) ≠ Pλ l r β(yr) obtained.) For the relevance
of such models to the question of the in-principle possibility of superluminal signalling in
some current interpretations of quantum mechanics, see sections 7.3 and 7.4.
(iii) The quantum-equilibrium distribution will not be the same in all models of the
EPR/B experiment; for in general the states λ will not be the same in different models.
(iv) In models that actually violate both controllable probabilistic dependence and λ-
distribution, the occurrence of controllable probabilistic dependence would render the
actual distribution of λ states as non-equilbrium distribution. Thus, if controllable
probabilistic dependence occurred in such models, the actual distribution of λ states
would satisfy λ-distribution.

The argument for the necessity of controllable probabilistic dependence and λ-

distribution is straightforward. Granted λ-independence, if the probabilistic dependence
of the distant outcome on a nearby physical quantity is not controllable, there can be no
way to manipulate the statistics of the distant outcome so as to deviate from the statistical
predictions of quantum mechanics. Accordingly, superluminal transmission of
information will be impossible even in theory. And if λ-distribution does not hold, i.e. if
the quantum-equilibrium distribution holds, controllable probabilistic dependence will be
of no use for superluminal transmission of information. For, averaging over the model
probabilities according to the quantum-equilbrium distribution, the model will reproduce
the statistics of orthodox quantum mechanics. That is, the distribution of the λ-states will
be such that the probabilistic dependence of the distant outcome on the nearby
controllable factor will be washed out: In some states the nearby controllable factor will
raise the probability of the distant outcome and in others it will decrease this probability,
so that on average the overall statistics of the distant outcome will be independent of the
nearby controllable factor (i.e., the same as the statistics of orthodox quantum
mechanics). Accordingly, superluminal signaling will be impossible.

The argument for the sufficiency of these conditions is also straightforward. If λ-

distribution held, it would be possible in theory to arrange ensembles of particle pairs in
which controllable probabilistic dependence would not be washed out, and accordingly
the statistics of distant outcomes would depend on the nearby controllable factor. (For a
proof that these conditions are sufficient for superluminal signaling in certain
deterministic hidden variables theories, see Valentini 2002.)

Note that the necessary and sufficient conditions for superluminal signaling are different
in models that do not exclude in theory the violation of λ-independence. In such models
controllable probabilistic dependence is not a necessary condition for superluminal
signaling. The reasoning is as follows. Consider any empirically adequate model of the
EPR/B experiment in which the pair's state and the settings of the measurement
apparatuses are the only relevant factors for the probabilities of measurement outcomes,
and the quantum-equilibrium distribution is λ-independent. In such a model, parameter
independence implies the failure of controllable probabilistic dependence, yet the
violation of λ-independence would imply the possibility of superluminal signaling: If λ-
independence failed, a change in the setting of the nearby measurement apparatus would
cause a change in the distribution of the states λ, and a change in this distribution would
induce a change in the statistics of the distant (space-like separated) measurement
outcome.

Leaving aside models that violate λ-independence, we now turn to consider the prospects
of controllable probabilistic dependence and λ-distribution, starting with no-collapse
interpretations.

7.2 No-collapse theories

7.2.1 Bohm's Theory

Bohm's theory involves parameter dependence and thus controllable probabilistic

dependence: The probabilities of distant outcomes depend on the setting of the nearby
apparatus. In some pairs' states λ, i.e. in some configurations of the positions of the
particle pair, a change in the apparatus setting of the (earlier) say L-measurement will
induce an immediate change in the probability of the R-outcome: e.g. the probability of
R-outcome z-spin ‘up’ will be 1 if the L-apparatus is set to measure z-spin and 0 if the L-
apparatus is switched off (see section 5.3.1). Thus, the question of superluminal signaling
turns on whether λ-distribution obtains.

Now, recall (section 5.3.1) that Bohm's theory reproduces the quantum statistics by
postulating the quantum-equilibrium distribution over the positions of particles. If this
distribution is not an accidental fact about our universe, but rather obtains as a matter of
law, superluminal signaling will be impossible in principle. Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì
(1992a,b, 1996, fn. 15) argue that, while the quantum-equilibrium distribution is not a
matter a law, other distributions will be possible but atypical. Thus, they conclude that
although superluminal signaling is not impossible in theory, it may occur only in atypical
worlds. On the other hand, Valentini (1991a,b, 1992, 1996, 2002) and Valentini and
Westman 2004) argue that there are good reasons to think that our universe may well
have started off in a state of quantum non-equilibrium and is now approaching gradually
a state of equilibrium, so that even today some residual non-equilibrium must be present.
[32]
Yet, even if such residual non-equilbrium existed, the question is whether it would be
possible to access any ensemble of systems in a non-equilbrium distribution.

7.2.2 Modal interpretations

The presence or absence of parameter independence (and accordingly the presence or

absence of controllable probabilistic dependence) in the modal interprtation is a matter of
controversy, perhaps due in part to the multiplicity of versions of this interpretation.
Whether or not modal interpretations involve parameter dependence would probably
depend on the dynamics of the possessed properties. At least some of the current modal
interpretations seem to involve no parameter dependence. But, as the subject editor
pointed out to the author, some think that the no-go theorem for relativistic modal
interpretation due to Dickson and Clifton (1998) implies the existence of parameter
dependence in all the interpretations to which this theorem is applicable. Do modal
interpretations satisfy λ-distribution? The prospects of this condition depend on whether
the possessed properties that the modal interpretation assigns in addition to the properties
prescribed by the orthodox interpretation, are controllable. If these properties were
controllable at least in theory, λ-distribution would be possible. For example, if the
possessed spin properties that the particles have at the emission from the source in the
EPR/B experiment were controllable, then λ-distribution would be possible. The common
view seems to be that these properties are uncontrollable.

7.3 Collapse theories

7.3.1 Dynamical models for state-vector reduction

In the GRW/Pearle collapse models, wave functions represent the most exhaustive,
complete specification of states of individual systems. Thus, pairs prepared with the same
wave function have always the same λ state — a state that represents their quantum-
equilbrium distribution for the EPR/B experiment. Accordingly, λ-distribution fails. Do
these models involve controllable probabilistic dependence?

Recall (section 5.1.2) that there are several models of state reduction in the literature. One
of these models is the so-called non-linear Continuous Stochastic Localization (CSL)
models (see Pearle 1989, Ghirardi, Pearle and Rimini 1990, Butterfield et al. 1993, and
Ghirardi et al. 1993). Butterfield et al. (1993) argue that in these models there is a
probabilistic dependence of the outcome of the R-measurement on the process that leads
to the (earlier) outcome of the L-measurement. In these models, the process leading to the
L-outcome (either z-spin ‘up’ or z-spin ‘down’) depends on the interaction between the
L-particle and the L-apparatus (which results in an entangled state), and the specific
realization of the stochastic process that strives to collapse this macroscopic
superposition into a product state in which the L-apparatus displays a definite outcome.
And the probability of the R-outcome depends on this process. For example, if this
process is one that gives rise to a z-spin ‘up’ (or renders that outcome more likely), the
probability of R-outcome z-spin ‘up’ is 0 (more likely to be 0); and if this process is one
that gives rise to a z-spin ‘down’ (or renders that outcome more likely), the probability of
R-outcome z-spin ‘down’ is 0 (more likely to be 0). The question is whether there are
controllable factors that influence the probability of realizations of stochastic processes
that lead to a specific L-outcome, so that it would be possible to increase or decrease the
probability of the R-outcome. If such factors existed, controllable probabilistic
dependence would be possible at least in theory. And if this kind of controllable
probabilistic dependence existed, λ-distribution would also obtain; for if such dependence
existed, the actual distribution of pairs' states (in which the pair always have the same
state, the quantum-mechanical state) would cease to be the quantum-equilbrium
distribution.

7.4 The prospects of controllable probabilistic dependence

In section 7.3.1, we discussed the question of the in-principle controllability of local

measurement processes and in particular the probability of their outcome, and the
implications of such controllability for the in-principle possibility of superluminal
signaling in the context of the CSL models. But this question is not specific to the CSL
model and (more generally) the dynamical models for state-vector reduction. It seems
likely to arise also in other quantum theories that model measurements realistically. Here
is why. Real measurements take time. And during that time, some physical variable, other
than the state of the measured system and the setting of the measurement apparatus,
might influence the chance (i.e., the single-case objective probability) of the
measurement outcome. In particular, during the L-measurement in the EPR/B
experiment, the chance of the L-outcome z-spin ‘up’ (‘down’) might depend on the value
of some physical variable in the L-wing, other than the state of the particle pair and the
setting of the L-measurement apparatus. If so, it will follow from the familiar perfect
anti-correlation of the singlet state that the chance of R-outcome z-spin ‘up’ (‘down’) will
depend on the value of such variable (for details, see Kronz 1990a,b, Jones and Clifton
1993, pp. 304-305, and Berkovitz 1998a, section 4.3.4). Thus, if the value of such a
variable were controllable, controllable probabilistic dependence would obtain.

7.5 Superluminal signaling and action-at-a-distance

If superluminal signaling were possible in the EPR/B experiment in any of the above
theories, it would not require any continuous process in spacetime to mediate the
influences between the two distant wings. Indeed, in all the current quantum theories in
which the probability of the R-outcome depends on some controllable physical variable
in the L-wing, this dependence is not due to a continuous process. Rather, it is due to
some type of ‘action’ or (to use Shimony's (1984) terminology) ‘passion’ at a distance,
which is the ‘result’ of the holistic nature of the quantum realm, the non-separability of
the state of entangled systems, or the non-separable nature of the evolution of the
properties of systems.

8. The analysis of factorizability: implications for

quantum non-locality
In sections 5-7, we considered the nature of quantum non-locality as depicted by theories
that violate factorizability, i.e. the assumption that the probability of joint measurement
outcomes factorizes into the single probabilities of these outcomes. Recalling section 3,
factorizability can be analyzed into a conjunction of two conditions: OI (outcome
independence)—the probability of a distant measurement outcome in the EPR/B
experiment is independent of the nearby measurement outcome; and PI (parameter
independence)—the probability of a distant measurement outcome in the EPR/B
experiment is independent of the setting of the nearby measurement apparatus. Bohm's
theory violates PI, whereas other mainstream quantum theories satisfy this condition but
violate OI. The question arises as to whether violations of PI involve a different kind of
non-locality than violations of OI. So far, our methodology was to study the nature of
quantum non-locality by analyzing the way various quantum theories account for the
curious correlations in the EPR/B experiment. In this section, we shall focus on the
question of whether quantum non-locality can be studied in a more general way, namely
by analyzing the types of non-locality involved in violations of PI and in violations of OI,
independently of how these violations are realized.

8.1 Non-separability, holism and action at a distance

It is frequently argued or maintained that violations of OI involve state non-separability

and/or some type of holism, whereas violations of PI involve action at a distance. For
notable examples, Howard (1989) argues that spatiotemporal separability (see section
4.3) implies OI, and accordingly a violation of it implies spatiotemporal non-separability;
Teller (1989) argues that particularism (see section 4.3) implies OI, and thus a violation
of it implies relational holism; and Jarrett (1984, 1989) argues that a violation of PI
involves some type of action at a distance. These views are controversial, however.

First, as we have seen in section 5, in quantum theories the violation of either of these
conditions involves some type of non-separability and/or holism.

Second, the explicit attempts to derive OI from separability or particularism seem to rely
(implicitly) on some locality conditions. Maudlin (1998, p. 98) and Berkovitz (1998a,
section 6.1) argue that Howard's precise formulation of spatiotemporal separability
embodies both separability and locality conditions, and Berkovitz (1998a, section 6.2)
argues that Teller's derivation of OI from particularism implicitly relies on locality
conditions. Thus, the violation of OI per se does not imply non-separability or holism.
Third, a factorizable model, i.e. model that satisfies OI, may be non-separable (Berkovitz
1995b, section 6.5). Thus, OI cannot be simply identified with OI.

Fourth, Howard's spatiotemporal separability condition (see section 4.3) requires that
states of composite systems be determined by the states of their subsystems. In particular,
spatiotemporal separability requires that joint probabilities of outcomes be determined as
some function of the single probabilities of these outcomes. Winsberg and Fine (2003)
object that as a separability condition, OI arbitrarily restricts this function to be a product
function. And they argue that on a weakened formalization of separability, a violation of
OI is compatible with separability. Fogel (2004) agrees that Winsberg and Fine's
weakened formalization of separability is correct, but argues that, when supplemented by
a certain ‘isotropy’ condition, OI implies this weakened separability condition. Fogel
believes that his suggested ‘isotropy’ condition is very plausible, but, as he
acknowledges, this condition involves a nontrivial measurement context-independence.[33]

Fifth, as the analysis in section 5 demonstrates, violations of OI might involve action at a

distance. Also, while the minimal Bohm theory violates PI and arguably some modal
interpretations do not, the type of action at a distance they postulate, namely action* at a
distance (see section 5.2), is similar: In both cases, an earlier spin-measurement in (say)
the L-wing does not induce any immediate change in the intrinsic properties of the R-
particle. The L-measurement only causes an immediate change in the dispositions of the
R-particle—a change that may influence the behavior of the R-particle in future spin-
measurements in the R-wing. But, this change of dispositions does not involve any
change of local properties in the R-wing, as these dispositions are relational (rather than
intrinsic) properties of the R-particle. Furthermore, the action at a distance predicated by
the minimal Bohm theory is weaker than the one predicated by orthodox collapse
quantum mechanics and the GRW/Pearle collapse models; for in contrast to the minimal
Bohm theory, in these theories the measurement on the L-particle induces a change in the
intrinsic properties of the R-particle, independently of whether or not the R-particle
undergoes a measurement. Thus, if the R-particle comes to possess (momentarily) a
definite position, the EPR/B experiment as described by these theories involves action at
a distance — a stronger kind of action than the action* at a distance predicated by the
minimal Bohm theory.

8.2 Superluminal signaling

It was also argued, notably by Jarrett 1984 and 1989 and Shimony 1984, that in contrast
to violations of OI, violations of PI may give rise (at least in principle) to superluminal
signaling. Indeed, as is not difficult to see from section 7.1, in theories that satisfy λ-
independence there is an asymmetry between failures of PI and failures of OI with
respect to superluminal signaling: whereas λ-distribution and the failure of PI are
sufficient conditions for the in-principle possibility of superluminal signaling, λ-
distribution and the failure of OI are not. Thus, the prospects of superluminal signaling
look better in parameter-dependent theories, i.e., theories that violate PI. Yet, as we have
seen in section 7.2.1, if the Bohmian quantum-equilbrium distribution obtains, then
Bohm's theory, the paradigm of parameter dependent theories, prohibits superluminal
signaling. And if this distribution is obtained as a matter of law, then Bohm's theory
prohibits superluminal signaling even in theory. Furthermore, as we remarked in section
7.1, if the in-principle possibility of violating λ-independence is not excluded,
superluminal signaling may exist in theories that satisfy PI and violate OI. In fact, as
section 7.4 seems to suggest, the possibility of superluminal signaling in theories that
satisfy PI but violate OI cannot be discounted even when λ-independence is impossible.

8.3 Relativity

Jarrett (1984, 1989), Ballentine and Jarrett (1997) and Shimony (1984) hold that
superluminal signaling is incompatible with relativity theory. Accordingly, they conclude
that violations of PI are incompatible with relativity theory, whereas violations of OI may
be compatible with this theory. Furthermore, Sutherland (1985, 1989) argues that
deterministic, relativistic parameter-dependent theories (i.e. relativistic, deterministic
theories that violate PI) would plausibly require retro-causal influences, and in certain
experimental circumstances this type of influences would give rise to causal paradoxes,
i.e. inconsistent closed causal loops (where effects undermine their very causes). And
Arntzenius (1994) argues that all relativistic parameter-dependent theories are impossible
on pain of causal paradoxes. That is, he argues that in certain experimental circumstances
any relativistic, parameter-dependent theory would give rise to closed causal loops in
which violations of PI could not obtain.

It is noteworthy that the view that relativity per se is incompatible with superluminal
signaling is disputable (for more details, see section 10). Anyway, recalling (section 8.2),
if λ-distribution is excluded as a matter of law, it will be impossible even in theory to
exploit the violation of PI to give rise to superluminal signaling, in which case the
possibility of relativistic parameter-dependent theories could not be discounted on the
basis of superluminal signaling.

Furthermore, as mentioned in section 7.1 and 7.4, the in-principle possibility of

superluminal signaling in theories that satisfy PI and violate OI cannot be excluded a
priori. Thus, if relativity theory excludes superluminal signaling, the argument from
superluminal signaling may also be applied to exclude the possibility of some relativistic
outcome-dependent theories.

Finally, Berkovitz (2002) argues that Arntzenius's argument for the impossibility of
relativistic theories that violate PI is based on assumptions about probabilities that are
common in linear causal situations but are unwarranted in causal loops, and that the real
challenge for these theories is that in such loops their predictive power is undermined (for
more details, see section 10.3).

8.4 Superluminal causation

In various counterfactual and probabilistic accounts of causation violations of PI entail

superluminal causation between the setting of the nearby measurement apparatus and the
distant measurement outcome, whereas violations of OI entail superluminal causation
between the distant measurement outcomes (see Butterfield 1992b, 1994, Berkovitz
1998b, section 2). Thus, it seems that theories that violate PI postulate a different type of
superluminal causation than theories that violate OI. Yet, as Berkovitz (1998b, section
2.4) argues, the violation of PI in Bohm's theory does involve some type of outcome
dependence, which may be interpreted as a generalization of the violation of OI. In this
theory, the specific R-measurement outcome in the EPR/B experiment depends on the
specific L-measurement outcome: For any three different directions x, y, z, if the
probabilities of x-spin ‘up’ and y-spin ‘up’ are non-zero, the probability of R-outcome z-
spin ‘up’ will generally depend on whether the L-outcome is x-spin ‘up’ or y-spin ‘up’.
Yet, due to the determinism that Bohm's theory postulates, OI trivially obtains. Put it
another way, OI does not reflect all the types of outcome independence that may exist
between distant outcomes. Accordingly, the fact that a theory satisfies OI does not entail
that it does not involve some other type of outcome dependence. Indeed, in all the current
quantum theories that violate factorizability there are correlations between distant
specific measurement outcomes — correlations that may well be interpreted as an
indication of counterfactual superluminal causation between these outcomes.

8.5 On the origin and nature of parameter dependence

Parameter dependence (PI) postulates that in the EPR/B experiment the probability of the
later, distant measurement outcome depends on the setting of the apparatus of the nearby,
earlier measurement. It may be tempting to assume that this dependence is due to a direct
influence of the nearby setting on the (probability of the) distant outcome. But a little
reflection on the failure of PI in Bohm's theory, which is the paradigm for parameter
dependence, demonstrates that the setting of the nearby apparatus per se has no influence
on the distant measurement outcome. Rather, it is because the setting of the nearby
measurmenent apparatus influences the nearby measurement outcome and the nearby
outcome influences the distant outcome that the setting of the nearby apparatus can have
an influence on the distant outcome. For, as is not difficult to see from the analysis of the
nature of non-locality in the minimal Bohm theory (see section 5.3.1), the setting of the
apparatus of the nearby (earlier) measurement in the EPR/B experiment influences the
outcome the nearby measurement, and this outcome influences the guiding field of the
distant particle and accordingly the outcome of a measurement on that particle.

While the influence of the nearby setting on the nearby outcome is necessary for
parameter dependence, it is not sufficient for it. In all the current quantum theories, the
probabilities of joint outcomes in the EPR/B experiment depend on the settings of both
measurement apparatuses: The probability that the L-outcome is l-spin ‘up’ and the R-
outcome is r-spin ‘up’ and the probability that the L-outcome is l-spin ‘up’ and the R-
outcome is r-spin ‘down’ both depend on (l − r), i.e. the distance between the angles l and
r. In theories in which the sum of these joint probabilities is invariant with respect to the
value of (l − r), parameter independence obtains: for all pairs' states λ, L-setting l, and R-
settings r and r′, L-outcome xl, and R-outcomes yr and yr′:

(PI) Pλ l r(xl & yr) + Pλ l r(xl & ¬yr) = Pλ l r′(xl & yr′) + Pλ l r′(xl & ¬yr′).
Parameter dependence is a violation of this invariance condition.

9. Can there be ‘local’ quantum theories?

The focus of this entry has been on exploring the nature of the non-local influences in the
quantum realm as depicted by quantum theories that violate factorizability, i.e. theories in
which the joint probability of the distant outcomes in the EPR/B experiment do not
factorize into the product of the single probabilities of these outcomes. The motivation
for this focus was that, granted plausible assumptions, factorizability must fail (see
section 2), and its failure implies some type of non-locality (see sections 2-8). But if any
of these plausible assumptions failed, it may be possible to account for the EPR/B
experiment (and more generally for all other quantum phenomena) without postulating
any non-local influences. Let us then consider the main arguments for the view that
quantum phenomena need not involve non-locality.

In arguments for the failure of factorizability, it is presupposed that the distant

measurement outcomes in the EPR/B experiment are real physical events. Recall (section
5.3.3) that in Albert and Loewer's (1988) many-minds interpretation this is not the case.
In this interpretation, definite measurement outcomes are (typically) not physical events.
In particular, the pointers of the measurement apparatuses in the EPR/B experiment do
not display any definite outcomes. Measurement outcomes in the EPR/B experiment exist
only as (non-physical) mental states in observers' minds (which are postulated to be non-
physical entities). So sacrificing some of our most fundamental presuppositions about the
physical reality and assuming a controversial mind-body dualism, the many-minds
interpretation of quantum mechanics does not postulate any action at a distance or
superluminal causation between the distant wings of the EPR/B experiment. Yet, as
quantum-mechanical states of systems are assumed to reflect their physical states, the
many-minds theory does postulate some type of non-locality, namely state non-
separability and property and relational holism.

Another way to get around Bell's argument for non-locality in the EPR/B experiment is to
construct a model of this experiment that satisfies factorizability but violates λ-
independence (i.e., the assumption that the distribution of all the possible pairs' states in
the EPR/B experiment is independent of the measured quantities). In section 2, we
mentioned two possible causal explanations for the failure of λ-independence. The first is
to postulate that pairs' states and apparatus settings share a common cause, which
correlates certain types of pairs' states with certain types of settings (e.g. states of type λ1
are correlated with settings of type l and r, whereas states of type λ2 are correlated with
settings of type l′ and r′, etc.). As we noted, thinking about all the various ways one can
measure properties, this explanation seems conspiratorial. Furthermore, it runs counter to
one of the most fundamental presuppositions of empirical science, namely that in
experiments preparations of sources and settings of measurement apparatuses are
typically independent of each other. The second possible explanation is to postulate
causation from the measurement events backward to the source at the emission time. (For
advocates of this way out of non-locality, see Costa de Beauregard 1977, 1979, 1985,
Sutherland 1983, 1998, 2006 and Price 1984, 1994, 1996, chapters 3, 8 and 9.) Maudlin
(1994, p. 197-201) argues that theories that postulate such causal mechanism are
inconsistent. Berkovitz (2002, section 5) argues that Maudlin's line of reasoning is based
on unwarranted premises. Yet, as we shall see in section 10.3, this way out of non-
locality faces some challenges. Furthermore, while a violation of λ-independence
provides a way out of Bell's theorem, it does not necessarily imply locality; for the
violation of λ-independence is compatible with the failure of factorizability.

A third way around non-locality is to ‘exploit’ the inefficiency of measurement devices

or (more generally) measurement set-ups. In any actual EPR/B experiment, many of the
particle pairs emitted from the source fail to be detected, so that only a sample of the
particle pairs is observed. Assuming that the observed samples are not biased, it is now
generally agreed that the statistical predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics have
been vindicated (for a review of these experiments, see Redhead 1987, section 4.5). But if
this assumption is abandoned, there are perfectly local causal explanations for the actual
experimental results (Clauser and Horne 1974, Fine 1982b, 1989a). Many believe that
this way out of non-locality is ad hoc, at least in light of our current knowledge.
Moreover, this strategy would fail if the efficiency of measurement devices exceeded a
certain threshold (for more details, see Fine 1989a, Maudlin 1994, chapter 6, Larsson and
Semitecolos 2000 and Larsson 2002).

Finally, there are those who question the assumption that factorizability is a locality
condition (Fine 1981, 1986, pp. 59-60, 1989b, Cartwright 1989, chaps. 3 and 6, Chang
and Cartwright 1993). Accordingly, they deny that non-factorizability implies non-
locality. The main thrust of this line of reasoning is that the principle of the common
cause is not generally valid. Some, notably Cartwright (1989) and Chang and Cartwright
(1993), challenge the assumption that common causes always screen off the correlation
between their effects, and accordingly they question the idea that non-factorizability
implies non-locality. Others, notably Fine, deny that correlations must have causal
explanation.

While these arguments challenge the view that the quantum realm as depicted by non-
factorizable models for the EPR/B experiment must involve non-locality, they do not
show that viable local, non-factorizable models of the EPR/B experiment (i.e., viable
models which do not postulate any non-locality) are possible. Indeed, so far none of the
attempts to construct local, non-factorisable models for EPR/B experiments has been
successful.

10. Can quantum non-locality be reconciled with

relativity?
The question of the compatibility of quantum mechanics with the special theory of
relativity is very difficult to resolve. (The question of the compatibility of quantum
mechanics with the general theory of relativity is even more involved.) The answer to this
question depends on the interpretation of special relativity and the nature of the exact
constraints it imposes on influences between events.
A popular view has it that special relativity prohibits any superluminal influences,
whereas theories that violate factorizability seem to involve such influences.
Accordingly, it is held that quantum mechanics is incompatible with relativity. Another
common view has it that special relativity prohibits only certain types of superluminal
influence. Many believe that relativity prohibits superluminal signaling of information.
Some also believe that this theory prohibits superluminal transport of matter-energy
and/or action-at-a-distance. On the other hand, there is the view that relativity per se
prohibits only superluminal influences that are incompatible with the special-relativistic
space-time, the so-called ‘Minkowski space-time,’ and that this prohibition is compatible
with certain types of superluminal influences and superluminal signaling (for a
comprehensive discussion of this issue, see Maudlin, 1994, 1996, section 2).[34]

It is commonly agreed that relativity requires that the descriptions of physical reality (i.e.,
the states of systems, their properties, dynamical laws, etc.) in different coordinate
systems should be compatible with each other. In particular, descriptions of the state of
systems in different foliations of spacetime into parallel spacelike hyperplanes, which
correspond to different inertial reference frames, are to be related to each other by the
Lorentz transformations. If this requirement is to reflect the structure of the Minkowski
spacetime, these transformations must hold at the level of individual processes, and not
only at the level of ensembles of processes (i.e., at the statistical level) or observed
phenomena. Indeed, Bohm's theory, which is manifestly non-relativistic, satisfies the
requirement that the Lorentz transformations obtain at the level of the observed
phenomena.

However, satisfying the Lorentz transformations at the level of individual processes is not
sufficient for compatibility with Minkowski spacetime; for the Lorentz transformations
may also be satisfied at the level of individual processes in theories that postulate a
preferred inertial reference frame (Bell 1976). Maudlin (1996, section 2) suggests that a
theory is genuinely relativistic (both in spirit and letter) if it can be formulated without
ascribing to spacetime any more, or different intrinsic structure than the relativistic
metrics.[35] The question of the compatibility of relativity with quantum mechanics may
be presented as follows: Could a quantum theory that does not encounter the
measurement problem be relativistic in that sense?

10.1 Collapse theories

The main problem in reconciling collapse theories with special relativity is that it seems
very difficult to make state collapse (modeled as a real physical process) compatible with
the structure of the Minkowski spacetime. In non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the
earlier L-measurement in the EPR/B experiment induces a collapse of the entangled state
of the particle pair and the L-measurement apparatus. Assuming (for the sake of
simplicity) that measurement events occur instantaneously, state collapse occurs along a
single spacelike hyperplane that intersects the spacetime region of the L-measurement
event—the hyperplane that represents the (absolute) time of the collapse. But this type of
collapse dynamics would involve a preferred foliation of spacetime, in violation of the
spirit, if not the letter of the Minkowski spacetime.
The current dynamical collapse models are not genuinely relativistic, and attempts to
generalize them to the special relativistic domain have encountered difficulties (see, for
example, the entry on collapse theories, Ghirardi 1996, Pearle 1996, and references
therein). A more recent attempt to address these difficulties due to Tumulka (2004) seems
more promising.

In an attempt to reconcile state collapse with special relativity, Fleming (1989, 1992,
1996) and Fleming and Bennett (1989) suggested radical hyperplane dependence. In their
theory, state collapse occurs along an infinite number of spacelike hyperplanes that
intersect the spacetime region of the measurements. That is, in the EPR/B experiment a
collapse occurs along all the hyperplanes of simultaneity that intersect the spacetime
region of the L-measurement. Similarly, a collapse occurs along all the hyperplanes of
simultaneity that intersect the distant (space-like separated) spacetime region of the R-
measurement. Accordingly, the hyperplane-dependent theory does not pick out any
reference frame as preferred, and the dynamics of the quantum states of systems and their
properties can be reconciled with the Minkowski spacetime. Further, since all the
multiple collapses are supposed to be real (Fleming 1992, p. 109), the predictions of
orthodox quantum mechanics are reproduced in each reference frame.

The hyperplane-dependent theory is genuinely relativistic. But the theory does not offer
any mechanism for state collapses, and it does not explain how the multiple collapses are
related to each other and how our experience is accounted for in light of this multiplicity.

Myrvold (2002b) argues that state collapses can be reconciled with Minkowski spacetime
even without postulating multiple different collapses corresponding to different reference
frames. That is, he argues with respect to the EPR/B experiment that the collapses
induced by the L- and the R-measurement are local events in the L- and the R-wing
respectively, and that the supposedly different collapses (corresponding to different
reference frames) postulated by the hyperplane-dependent theory are only different
descriptions of the same local collapse events. Focusing on the state of the particle pair,
the main idea is that the collapse event in the L-wing is modeled by a (one parameter)
family of operators (the identity operator before the L-measurement and a projection to
the collapsed state after the L-measurement), and it is local in the sense that it is a
projection on the Hilbert space of the L-particle; and similarly, mutatis mutandis, for the
R-particle. Yet, if the quantum state of the particle pair represents their complete state (as
the case is in the orthodox theory and the GRW/Pearle collapse models), these collapse
events seem non-local. While the collapse in the L-wing may be said to be local in the
above technical sense, it is by definition a change of local as well as distant (spacelike)
properties. The operator that models the collapse in the L-wing transforms the entangled
state of the particle pair—a state in which the particles have no definite spins—into a
product of non-entangled states in which both particles have definite spins, and
accordingly it causes a change of intrinsic properties in both the L- and the R-wing.

In any case, Myrvold's proposal demonstrates that even if state collapses are not
hyperplane dependent, they need not be incompatible with relativity theory.
10.2 No-collapse theories

Recall (section 5.3) that in no-collapse theories, quantum-mechanical states always

evolve according to a unitary and linear equation of motion (the Schrödinger equation in
the non-relativistic case), and accordingly they never collapse. Since the wave function
has a covariant dynamics, the question of the compatibility with relativity turns on the
dynamics of the additional properties —the so-called ‘hidden variables’— that no-
collapse theories typically postulate. In Albert and Loewer's many-minds theory (see
section 5.3.3), the wave function has covariant dynamics, and no additional physical
properties are postulated. Accordingly, the theory is genuinely relativistic. Yet, as the
compatibility with relativity is achieved at the cost of postulating that outcomes of
measurements (and, typically, any other perceived properties) are mental rather than
physical properties, many find this way of reconciling quantum mechanics with relativity
unsatisfactory.

Other Everett-like interpretations attempt to reconcile quantum mechanics with the

special theory of relativity without postulating such a controversial mind-body dualism.
Similarly to the many-minds interpretation of Albert and Loewer, and contrary to Bohm's
theory and modal interpretations, on the face of it these interpretations do not postulate
the existence of ‘hidden variables.’ But (recalling section 5.3.3) these Everett-like
interpretations face the challenge of making sense of our experience and the probabilities
of outcomes, and critics of these interpretations argue that this challenge cannot be met
without adding some extra structure to the Everett interpretation (see Albert and Loewer
1988, Albert 1992, pp. 114-5, Albert and Loewer 1996, Price 1996, pp. 226-227, and
Barrett 1999, pp. 163-173); a structure that may render these interpretations incompatible
with relativity. Supporters of the Everett interpretation disagree. Recently, Deutsch
(1999), Wallace (2002, 2003, 2005a,b) and Greaves (2004) have suggested that
Everettians can make sense of the quantum-mechanical probabilities by appealing to
decision-theoretical considerations. But this line of reasoning has been disputed (see
Barnum et al. 2000, Lewis 2003b, Hemmo and Pitowsky 2005 and Price 2006).

Modal interpretations constitute another class of no-collapse interpretations of quantum

mechanics that were developed to reconcile quantum mechanics with relativity (and to
solve the measurement problem). Yet, as the no-go theorems by Dickson and Clifton
(1998), Arntzenius (1998) and Myrvold (2002) demonstrate, the earlier versions of the
modal interpretation are not genuinely compatible with relativity theory. Further, Earman
and Ruetsche (2005) argue that a quantum-field version of the modal interpretation
(which is set in the context of relativistic quantum-field theory), like the one proposed by
Clifton (2000), would be subject to serious challenges. Berkovitz and Hemmo (2006a,b)
develop a relational modal interpretation that escapes all the above no-go theorems and to
that extent seems to provide better prospects for reconciling quantum mechanics with
special relativity.

10.3 Quantum causal loops and relativity

Recall (section 8) that many believe that parameter-dependent theories (i.e. theories that
violate parameter independence) are more difficult or even impossible to reconcile with
relativity. Recall also that one of the lines of argument for the impossibility of relativistic
parameter-dependent theories is that such theories would give rise to causal paradoxes. In
our discussion, we focused on EPR/B experiments in which the measurements are distant
(spacelike separated). In a relativistic parameter-dependent theory, the setting of the
nearby measurement apparatus in the EPR/B experiment would influence the probability
of the distant (spacelike separated) measurement outcome. Sutherland (1985, 1989)
argues that it is plausible to suppose that the realization of parameter dependence would
be the same in EPR/B experiments in which the measurements are not distant from each
other (i.e. when the measurements are timelike separated). If so, relativistic parameter-
dependent theories would involve backward causal influences. But, he argues, in
deterministic, relativistic parameter-dependent theories these influences would give rise
to causal paradoxes, i.e. inconsistent closed causal loops.

Furthermore, Arntzenius (1994) argues that all relativistic parameter-dependent theories

are impossible on pain of causal paradoxes. In his argument, he considers the
probabilities of measurement outcomes in a setup in which two EPR/B experiments are
causally connected to each other, so that the L-measurement outcome of the first EPR/B
experiment determines the setting of the L-apparatus of the second EPR/B experiment
and the R-measurement outcome of the second EPR/B experiment determines the setting
of the R-apparatus of the first EPR/B experiment. And he argues that in this experiment,
relativistic parameter-dependent theories (deterministic or indeterministic) would give
rise to closed causal loops in which parameter dependence would be impossible. Thus, he
concludes that relativistic, parameter-dependent theories are impossible. (Stairs (1989)
anticipates the argument that the above experimental setup may give rise to causal
paradoxes in relativistic, parameter-dependent theories, but he stops short of arguing that
such theories are impossible.)

Berkovitz (1998b, section 3.2, 2002, section 4) argues that Arntzenius's line of reasoning
fails because it is based on untenable assumptions about the nature of probabilities in
closed causal loops—assumptions that are very natural in linear causal situations (where
effects do not cause their causes), but untenable in causal loops. (For an analysis of the
nature of probabilities in causal loops, see Berkovitz 2001 and 2002, section 2.) Thus, he
concludes that the consistency of relativistic parameter-dependent theories cannot be
excluded on the grounds of causal paradoxes. He also argues that the real challenge for
relativistic parameter-dependent theories is concerned with their predictive power. In the
causal loops predicted by relativistic parameter-dependent theories in Arntzenius's
suggested experiment, there is no known way to compute the frequency of events from
the probabilities that the theories prescribe. Accordingly, such theories would fail to
predict any definite statistics of measurement outcomes for that experiment. This lack of
predictability may also present some new opportunities. Due to this unpredictability,
there may be an empirical way for arbitrating between these theories and quantum
theories that do not predicate the existence such causal loops in Arntzenius's experiment.
Another attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of certain relativistic quantum theories
on the grounds of causal paradoxes is advanced by Maudlin (1994, pp. 195-201).
(Maudlin does not present his argument in these terms, but the argument is in effect based
on such grounds.) Recall (sections 2 and 9) that a way to try to reconcile quantum
mechanics with relativity is to account for the curious correlations between distant
systems by local backward influences rather than non-local influences. In particular, one
may postulate that the correlations between the distant measurement outcomes in the
EPR/B experiment are due to local influences from the measurement events backward to
the state of the particle pair at the source. In such models of the EPR/B experiment,
influences on events are always confined to events that occur in their past or future light
cones, and no non-locality is postulated. Maudlin argues that theories that postulate such
backward causation will be inconsistent. More particularly, he argues that a plausible
reading of Cramer's (1980, 1986) transactional interpretation, and any other theory that
similarly attempts to account for the EPR/B correlations by postulating causation from
the measurement events backward to the source, will be inconsistent.

Berkovitz (2002, section 5) argues that Maudlin's argument is, in effect, that if such retro-
causal theories were true, they would involve closed causal loops in which the
probabilities of outcomes that these theories assign will certainly deviate from the
statistics of these outcomes. And, similarly to Arntzenius's argument, Maudlin's argument
also rests on untenable assumptions about the nature of probabilities in causal loops (for a
further discussion of Maudlin's and Berkovitz's arguments and, more generally, the
prospects of Cramer's theory, see Kastner 2004). Furthermore, Berkovitz (2002, sections
2 and 5.4) argues that, similarly to relativistic parameter-dependent theories, the main
challenge for theories that postulate retro-causality is not causal paradoxes, but rather the
fact that their predictive power may be undermined. That is, the probabilities assigned by
such theories may fail to predict the frequency of events in the loops they predicate. In
particular, the local retro-causal theories that Maudlin considers fail to assign any definite
predictions for the frequency of measurement outcomes in certain experiments. Yet,
some other theories that predicate the existence of causal loops, such as Sutherland's
(2006) local time-symmetric Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics, seem not to
suffer from this problem.

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