Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14534

February 28, 1962

MERARDO L. ZAPANTA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

Pedro M. Santos and Jorge C. Salonga for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General, Romulo L. Chua and Dewey G. Soriano for
respondents.

DIZON, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition filed by Merardo L. Zapanta against the Hon. Agustin
P. Montesa, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fernando A. Cruz,
Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and Olimpia A. Yco, to enjoin the former from
proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 3405 pending the final determination
of Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.

Upon complaint filed by respondent Olimpia A. Yco on May 20, 1958, an information
for Bigamy was filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal against petitioner in the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan (Criminal Case No. 3405), alleging that the latter, having
previously married one Estrella Guarin, and without said marriage having been
dissolved, contracted a second marriage with said complainant.

On June 16, 1958, petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga Civil
Case No. 1446 against respondent Olimpia A. Yco for the annulment of their
marriage on the ground of duress, force and intimidation. On the 30th of the same
month respondent Yco, as defendant in said case, filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint upon the ground that it stated no cause of action, but the same was
denied on July 7 of the same year. 1wph1.t

On September 2, 1958, petitioner, in turn, filed a motion in Criminal Case No. 3405
to suspend proceedings therein, on the ground that the determination of the issue
involved in Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga was a
prejudicial question. Respondent judge denied the motion on September 20, 1958
as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and ordered his arraignment. After
entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner filed the present action.

We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal (People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L5930, February 17, 1954). The prejudicial question we further said must be
determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be
lodged in another court (People vs. Aragon, supra). These requisites are present in
the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending
in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to
the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force
and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis
of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan. Thus, the issue involved in the action for the annulment of
the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime
of bigamy. On the other hand, there can be no question that the annulment of
petitioner's marriage with respondent Yco on the grounds relied upon in the
complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga is within the jurisdiction of
said court.

In the Aragon case already mentioned (supra) we held that if the defendant in a
case for bigamy claims that the first marriage is void and the right to decide such
validity is vested in another court, the civil action for annulment must first be
decided before the action for bigamy can proceed. There is no reason not to apply
the same rule when the contention of the accused is that the second marriage is
void on the ground that he entered into it because of duress, force and intimidation.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in the petition is hereby granted. Without costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-48157

March 16, 1988

RICARDO QUIAMBAO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ADRIANO OSORIO, ZENAIDA GAZA BUENSUCERO, JUSTINA GAZA BERNARDO,
and FELIPE GAZA, respondents-appellees, LAND AUTHORITY, intervenor-appellant.

FERNAN, J.:

This case was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals as one involving pure
questions of law pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The antecedents are as follows:

In a complaint for forcible entry filed by herein private respondents Zenaida Gaza
Buensucero, Justina Gaza Bernardo and Felipe Gaza against herein petitioner
Ricardo Quiambao before the then Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal, docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 2526, it was alleged that private respondents were the
legitimate possessors of a 30,835 sq. m. lot known as Lot No. 4, Block 12, Bca 2039

of the Longos Estate situated at Barrio Longos, Malabon Rizal, by virtue of the
Agreement to Sell No. 3482 executed in their favor by the former Land Tenure
Administration [which later became the Land Authority, then the Department of
Agrarian Reform]; that under cover of darkness, petitioner surreptitiously and by
force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered into a 400 sq. m. portion thereof,
placed bamboo posts "staka" over said portion and thereafter began the
construction of a house thereon; and that these acts of petitioner, which were
unlawful per se, entitled private respondents to a writ of preliminary injunction and
to the ejectment of petitioner from the lot in question.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and upon denial thereof, filed his
Answer to the complaint, specifically denying the material allegations therein and
averring that the Agreement upon which private respondents base their prior
possession over the questioned lot had already been cancelled by the Land
Authority in an Order signed by its Governor, Conrado Estrella. By way of affirmative
defense and as a ground for dismissing the case, petitioner alleged the pendency of
L.A. Case No. 968, an administrative case before the Office of the Land Authority
between the same parties and involving the same piece of land. In said
administrative case, petitioner disputed private respondents' right of possession
over the property in question by reason of the latter's default in the installment
payments for the purchase of said lot. Petitioner asserted that his administrative
case was determinative of private respondents' right to eject petitioner from the lot
in question; hence a prejudicial question which bars a judicial action until after its
termination.

After hearing, the municipal court denied the motion to dismiss contained in
petitioner's affirmative defenses. It ruled that inasmuch as the issue involved in the
case was the recovery of physical possession, the court had jurisdiction to try and
hear the case.

Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XII, Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-1576 a petition for certiorari with
injunction against public respondent Judge Adriano Osorio of the Municipal Court of
Malabon and private respondents, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering respondent judge to suspend the hearing in the ejectment case
until after the resolution of said petition. As prayed for, the then CFI of Rizal issued a
restraining order enjoining further proceedings in the ejectment case.

In his answer, respondent municipal judge submitted himself to the sound discretion
of the CFI in the disposition of the petition for certiorari. Private respondents, on the
other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the petition, maintaining that the
administrative case did not constitute a prejudicial question as it involved the
question of ownership, unlike the ejectment case which involved merely the
question of possession.

Meanwhile, the Land Authority filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil
Case No. C-1576 alleging the pendency of an administrative case between the same
parties on the same subject matter in L.A. Case No. 968 and praying that the
petition for certiorari be granted, the ejectment complaint be dismissed and the
Office of the Land Authority be allowed to decide the matter exclusively.

Finding the issue involved in the ejectment case to be one of prior possession, the
CFI dismissed the petition for certiorari and lifted the restraining order previously
issued. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order, adopted in
toto by Intervenor Land Authority was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal
filed by petitioner Quiambao and intervenor Land Authority with the Court of
Appeals, and certified to Us as aforesaid.

The instant controversy boils down to the sole question of whether or not the
administrative case between the private parties involving the lot subject matter of
the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question which would operate as a bar
to said ejectment case.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the

resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. 1 The doctrine of prejudicial
question comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are
pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that
an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action
can proceed. Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in
the criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final determination
of the former.

The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5, Rule

111 of the Revised Rules of Court are: [a] the civil action involves an issue similar or

intimately related to the issue in the criminal action; and [b] the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in
character, it is obvious that technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of.
Equally apparent, however, is the intimate correlation between said two [2]
proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of private respondents to eject
petitioner from the disputed portion depends primarily on the resolution of the
pending administrative case. For while it may be true that private respondents had
prior possession of the lot in question, at the time of the institution of the ejectment
case, such right of possession had been terminated, or at the very least, suspended
by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in their
favor. Whether or not private respondents can continue to exercise their right of
possession is but a necessary, logical consequence of the issue involved in the
pending administrative case assailing the validity of the cancellation of the
Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award of the disputed portion to petitioner. If
the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award to petitioner
are voided, then private respondents would have every right to eject petitioner from
the disputed area. Otherwise, private respondent's light of possession is lost and so
would their right to eject petitioner from said portion.

Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial court to
have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a
determination of the administrative case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not
jurisprudence, dictate such move. To allow the parties to undergo trial
notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's right of possession being upheld in the
pending administrative case is to needlessly require not only the parties but the
court as well to expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to be a sheer
exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us:

The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion,
upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to
abide the outcome of another pending in another court, especially where the parties
and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control
the disposition of causes on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself,
for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights parties to the second action cannot
be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled the
second action should be stayed. 2

While this rule is properly applicable to instances involving two [2] court actions, the
existence in the instant case of the same considerations of Identity of parties and
issues, economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels and the parties as
well as the need to resolve the parties' right of possession before the ejectment
case may be properly determined, justifies the rule's analogous application to the
case at bar.

Fortich-Celdran, et al. vs. Celdran, et al., 19 SCRA 502, provides another analogous
situation. In sustaining the assailed order of the then Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental ordering the suspension of the criminal case for falsification of
public document against several persons, among them the subscribing officer
Santiago Catane until the civil case involving the issue of the genuineness of the
alleged forged document shall have been decided, this Court cited as a reason
therefor its own action on the administrative charges against said Santiago Catane,
as follows:

It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed in this Court
against Santiago Catane upon the same charge was held by Us in abeyance, thus:

"As it appears that the genuineness of the document allegedly forged by

respondent attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77 [Richard Ignacio Celdran vs.
Santiago Catane, etc., et al.] is necessarily involved in Civil Case No. R-3397 of the
Cebu Court of First Instance, action on the herein complaint is withheld until that
litigation has finally been decided. Complainant Celdran shall inform the Court
about such decision." 3

If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature of a prejudicial

question to an administrative case, We see no reason why the reverse may not be
so considered in the proper case, such as in the petition at bar. Finally, events
occuring during the pendency of this petition attest to the wisdom of the conclusion
herein reached. For in the Manifestation filed by counsel for petitioner, it was stated
that the intervenor Land Authority which later became the Department of Agrarian
Reform had promulgated a decision in the administrative case, L.A. Case No. 968
affiriming the cancellation of Agreement to Sell No. 3482 issued in favor of private
respondents. With this development, the folly of allowing the ejectment case to
proceed is too evident to need further elaboration.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Civil Case No. 2526 of the
then Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No Costs.

MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS

July 28, 2012 Leave a comment

MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS
July 31, 2000 (G.R. No. 138509)

PARTIES:
Petitioner: IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS
Respondent: ISAGANI D. BOBIS

FACTS:
October 21, 1985, first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Not annulled,
nullified or terminated
January 25, 1996, second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis
Third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez
February 25, 1998, Imelda Bobis filed bigamy
Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration
of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without
a marriage license
Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration
of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage
*After petitioner sued for bigamy, its just when the respondent filed a declaration of
absolute nullity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy

HELD:
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.3It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Its two essential elements are:7
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed

In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly
entered into the second marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though
void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again;
otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a
judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In
the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.

Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent
entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a
decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge.
It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question

*Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the
validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second
marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy (Landicho v. Relova)

Case Digest: G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995

Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Leonilo Jacalan, petitioners, vs. Hon. Rumoldo R.
Fernandez, Hon. Celso V. Espinosa, And Sps. Felixberto Tigol, Jr. And Rosita Taghoy
Tigol, respondents

Facts: This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside orders of respondent
Judge Romuldo Fernandez of RTC, Branch 54 of Lapu-Lapu City denying petitioners
motion for suspension of arraignment and motion for reconsideration in a criminal
case filed against them. Petitioners anchor their claim on a prior case regarding
ownership. Petitioners allege that the civil case filed in 1990 seeking declaration for
nullity of land title of the owner which had been filed three years before May 27,
1993 when the criminal case for squatting was filed against them constitutes a
prejudicial question.

Issue: Whether the question of ownership is a prejudicial question justifying the

suspension of the criminal case against petitioners.

Ruling: Petition to suspend Criminal Case No. 012489 based on the prejudicial
question presented was granted on basis that;
the prejudicial question is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.
elements of prejudicial question - (1) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (2) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
the criminal case alleges that petitioners squatted without the knowledge and
consent of the owner, which, in 1994 the civil case rendered the nullity of the title of
the owner and declared both petitioners and respondents as co-owners of the land.
respondents argue that owners can be ejected from his property only if for some
reason, that is, he has let it to some other person. However, both case of
respondents and petitioners are based on ownership.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22677

February 28, 1967

PEDRO III FORTICH-CELDRAN, JESUS, MANUEL, MIGUEL and VICENTE, all surnamed
FORTICH-CELDRAN;
SANTIAGO CATANE and ABELARDO CECILIO, petitioners,
vs.
IGNACIO A. CELDRAN and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

San Juan, Africa & Benedicto and Eduardo B. Sinense for petitioners.
Casiano U. Laput for respondents.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

A suit for annulment of an extrajudicial partition of properties and for accounting

was filed on February 3, 1954 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civil Case No.
3397-R).

Appearing therein as plaintiffs were: Jose, Francisco, Pedro, Jr., Ignacio, all surnamed
Abuton-Celdran (children of the deceased Pedro Celdran by the first nuptial) and, as
the administratrix of Francisco Celdran (another brother), Modesta Rodriguez.
Defendants were: Pablo Celdran (child of the deceased by the first marriage who
refused to join as plaintiff), Josefa Vda. de Celdran (spouse of the deceased by the
second marriage), Manuel, Antonio, Pedro III, Jesus, Vicente and Miguel, all
surnamed Fortich Celdran (children of the deceased by the second nuptial.

After the defendants answered on May 28, 1954, a motion to withdraw as co-

plaintiff was filed on May 24, 1957. It was signed "Ignacio Celdran. This motion has
been marked as Exhibit B-Josefa.1wph1.t

Subsequently, with leave of court, the plaintiffs (excluding Ignacio) filed an

amended complaint impleading Ignacio Celdran as defendant. Ignacio Celdran filed
an answer with counterclaim and cross-claim.

After trial but before judgment, Ignacio Celdran had the document Exh. B-Josefa
(the motion to withdraw) examined by the Police Department of Cebu City. The
police were of the view that the same (signature therein) was falsified. Alleging
newly discovered evidence, Ignacio Celdran asked for new trial, which the court
denied.

All the parties, except Ignacio Celdran, thereafter entered on May 6, 1959 into an
amicable settlement, recognizing as valid the aforementioned extrajudicial partition.
Regarding Ignacio Celdran, the court rendered judgment on July 19, 1961, declaring
the same extrajudicial partition as valid for having been ratified by him (Ignacio).
Specifically, the court found among other things that Ignacio signed the motion to
withdraw (Exh. B-Josefa) after he received P10,000 of the agreed P20,000 and two
residential lots to be given to him in return for his aforesaid ratification of the
partition.

Said decision was later amended to require Pedro III, Antonio, Jesus, Miguel and
Vicente, all surnamed Fortich-Celdran, to pay Ignacio the balance of P20,000
aforestated and to deliver to him the promised two parcels of land.

Ignacio Celdran appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals. And said appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 30499-R, shown in the record before Us as still pending.

Now on March 22, 1963, at the instance of Ignacio Celdran, an information for
falsification of a public document that is, Exh. B-Josefa or the abovementioned
motion to withdraw in the civil case was filed by the City Fiscal of Ozamis in the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental. Accused therein were: Pedro III,
Antonio, Manuel, Vicente, Miguel, and Jesus, all surnamed Celdran (defendants in
the civil case); Santiago Catane, as subscribing officer; Abelardo Cecilio, as the
person who filed the motion.

As private complainant, however, Ignacio Celdran on December 12, 1962, moved

before trial to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case on the ground of
prejudicial question. The reason given in support thereof was that the alleged
falsification of the same document is at issue in the civil case pending in the Court
of Appeals.

Declaring that there was no pre-judicial question, the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental denied on January 28, 1963 the motion to suspend the
prosecution. It ruled that the alleged forgery was not an issue in the civil case.

Assailing the above ruling, Ignacio Celdran filed in the Court of Appeals on February
21, 1963, a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. No. 31909-R)
to enjoin the CFI of Misamis Occidental and the City Fiscal of Ozamis from
proceeding with the prosecution of the criminal case.

On February 18, 1964 the Court of Appeals decided said petition for certiorari,
ordering the suspension of the criminal case due to pre-judicial question.

Pedro III, Jesus, Manuel, Miguel and Vicente, all surnamed Fortich-Celdran; Santiago
Catane and Abelardo Cecilio accused in the criminal suit and respondents in the
petition for certiorari appealed to Us from the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 18, 1964.

Appellants would contend that there is no pre-judicial question involved. The record
shows that, as aforestated, the Court of First Instance ruled that Ignacio Celdran
ratified the partition agreement; among the reasons cited by the trial court for said
ruling is that Ignacio Celdran received P10,000 and signed the motion to withdraw
as plaintiff in the suit. Disputing this, Celdran assigned as error in his appeal the
finding that he signed the aforementioned motion (Exh. B-Josefa) and maintains
that the same is a forgery. Since ratification is principal issue in the civil action
pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, and the falsification or genuineness of the
motion to withdraw presented and marked as evidence in said civil case is
among the questions involved in said issue, it follows that the civil action poses a
pre-judicial question to the criminal prosecution for alleged falsification of the same
document, the motion to withdraw (Exh. B-Josefa).

Presented as evidence of ratification in the civil action is the motion to withdraw; its
authenticity is assailed in the same civil action. The resolution of this point in the
civil case will in a sense be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in
the criminal suit pending in another tribunal. As such, it is a prejudicial question
which should first be decided before the prosecution can proceed in the criminal
case.

A pre-judicial question is one that arises in a case, the resolution of which is a

logical antecedent to the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal; that is, it is determinative of the case before the court
and jurisdiction to pass upon the same is lodged in another tribunal.1

It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed in this Court
against Santiago Catane upon the same charge was held by Us in abeyance, thus:

As it appears that the genuineness of the document allegedly forged by respondent

attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77 (Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago
Catane, etc., et al.) is necessarily involved in Civil Case No. R-3397 of the Cebu
Court of First Instance, action on the herein complaint is withheld until that litigation
has finally been decided. Complainant Celdran shall inform the Court about such
decision. (Supreme Court minute resolution of April 27, 1962 in Adm. Case No. 77,
Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane, etc., et al.) .

Regarding the procedural question on Ignacio Celdran's right as private offended

party to file through counsel a motion to suspend the criminal case, the same exists
where, as herein, the Fiscal, who had direction and control of the prosecution, did
not object to the filing of said motion. And its filing in this case complied with Sec. 5
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 5. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for the

suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a pre-judicial
question in a civil case, may only be presented by any party before or during the
trial of the criminal action.

Denial of the motion to suspend the prosecution was therefore attended with grave
abuse of discretion; and the issue having been squarely and definitely presented
before the trial court, a motion for reconsideration, which would but raise the same
points, was not necessary. Neither was appeal the remedy available, since the order
denying suspension is interlocutory and thus not yet appealable.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review ordering suspension
of Criminal CASE No. 5719, People vs. Pedro Fortich-Celdran, et al., pending before
the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, until after Civil Case, CA-G.R. No.
30499-R, Pedro A. Celdran, et al. vs. Pedro Fortich-Celdran III, et al., shall have been
decided is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

JIMENEZ v AVERIAPonente: J. DizonMarch 29, 1968RATIO DECIDENDI: Proceedings on

a criminal case for estafa may proceed without first resolving the prejudicial
question, it not being determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.QUICK
FACTS: Jimenez paid Tang and Olanday P20,000 plus P240 agents fee for a fishing
boat. They agreed to return the money should they fail to purchase the said boat.
They misappropriated the money and were charged with estafa. The accused filed a
civil case against Jimenez contesting the validity of the receipt allegedly signed by
them, and later they filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that the
issue involved was a prejudicial question. Court decided that the determination of
the issue raised in the civil case is not necessary for the proceedings in the criminal
case for estafa to proceed.FACTS:Name of Accused: Ofelia Tang and Estefania de la
Cruz OlandayName of victim (if any): Manuel Jimenez Ofelia Tang and Estefania
Olanday received P20,000 from Jimenez with which to purchase for him a fishing
boat known as Basnig. They agreed to return the money in case they should fail to
buy the fishing boat. The two misappropriated the amount to the damage and
prejudice of Jimenez. They were charged with estafa by the CFI of Cavite.
Procedural:o Before arraignment, the accused filed a case against Jimenez in the CFI
of Quezon contesting the validity of a receipt signed by them on Oct. 26, 1962
wherein they acknowledged having received P20,000 from him, with which to
purchase for him a fishing boat and its accessories, and the further sum of P240 as
agents commission, along with the obligation to return the amount if they fail to
buy the boat. They allege that they had never received any amount from him and
that the signatures on the receipt were secured by means of fraud, deceit and
intimidation employed by him.o Several days later, they filed a motion to suspend
proceedings on the ground that the determination of the issue involved was a
prejudicial question. Respondent judge granted the motion.o Hence, this petition for
certiorari, for the issuance of a writ of mandamus praying for this Court to order the
CFI Cavite to proceed with the case and to order CFI Quezon to dismiss the civil
case.ISSUE: WON the determination of the issue raised in the civil case mentioned is

a prejudicial question, in the sense that it must first be resolved before the
proceedings in the criminal case for estafa may proceed - NODECISION: Offended
party (Jimenez) won. Court ordered respondent CFI Cavite to proceed without undue
delay the trial of the Criminal case.HELD: The alleged prejudicial question is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the parties chargedwith estafa, because
even on the assumption that the execution of the receipt whose annulment they
sought in the civil case was vitiated by fraud, duress or intimidation, their guilt
could still be established by other evidence showing, to the degree required by law,
that they had actually received from the complainant the sum of P20,000 with
which to buy for him a fishing boat, and that, instead of doing so, they
misappropriated the money and refused or otherwise failed to return it to him upon
demand. If the Court sanctioned the theory advanced by the accused and
adopted by the respondent judge, estafa cases would no longer be prosecuted
speedily as the accused would just resort to blocking the proceedings through the
filing of an independent civil action against the complainant, raising therein the
issue that he had not received from the latter the amount alleged to have been
misappropriated. A claim to this effect is properly a matter of defense to be
interposed by the party charged in the criminal proceeding.

Te v. Choa, G.R. No. 126446, Nov. 29, 2000 (346 SCRA 327
FACTS: In 1988, Arthur Te and Lilian Choa married in civil rites. Although they did
not live together, they would usually see each other. In 1989, Liliana gave birth to
their daughter. Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting her. In 1990, Arthur contracted
another marriage while still married to Liliana. Hence, Liliana filed a bigamy case
against Te and administrative case for the revocation of his and his mistress
engineering license. Te filed a petition for nullity of marriage. RTC rendered a
decision on the bigamy case even the petition for annulment was pending.

ISSUE: W/N the annulment should be resolved first before the criminal and
administrative case be decided upon.

HELD: NO. Outcome The annulment case had no bearing on Tes guilt in the bigamy
case. The ground cited by Te for the annulment was for voidable marriage. Hence,
he was still validly married when he committed bigamy.

civil actions

Limjoco v. Intestate of Pedro O. Fragante80 Phil. 777Hilado, J. :FACTS: The Public

Service Commission rendered a certificate of public convenience to theestate of the
deceased Pedro Fragante to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San
Juan,Rizal. Petitioner alleged that the granting of the certificate to the estate of
Pedro Fragante whois now dead was a contravention of law.ISSUE: Whether or not
the granting of the certificate is in contrary to law.HELD: No. The certificate of public
convenience once granted as a rule, should descend to hisestate as an asset.
Such certificate would certainly be property, and the right to acquire such
acertificate, by complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the
descendants in hislifetime and survived to his estate and judicial administration
after his death. In the case at bar,Pedro O. Fragantes undoubted right to apply for
and acquire the desired certificate of publicconvenience- the evidence established
that the public needed the ice plant- was under the lawconditioned only upon
requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and
operateservice.It is also stated that unless otherwise provided by law, any action
affecting the property or rightsof a deceased person which may be brought by or
against him if he were alive, may likewise beinstituted and prosecuted by or
against the administrator, unless the action for recovery ofmoney, debt or
interest thereon, unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive because
deathextinguishes the right.Furthermore, a proceeding upon the application for a
certificate of public convenience beforethe Public Service Commission is not an
action. The foregoing provisions and citations go toprove that the descendants
rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go tomake up a part and
parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control
andmanagement of the executor or administrator, cannot be exercised but by him
in representationof the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees,
if any, and the heirs of thedecedent. And if the right involved happens to
consist in the prosecution of an unfinishedproceeding upon an application for
a certificate of public convenience of the deceased beforethe Public Commission, it
is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and entitledin behalf of
the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding.

Geluz vs CA
TITLE: Geluz vs CA
CITATION: 2 SCRA 801

FACTS:

Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz,
the petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant
some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her
aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz.
She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found it
inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21,
1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion
and the latters daughter Lucida at Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street.
Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to
the provincial board. He doesnt have any idea nor given his consent on the
abortion.

ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could
recover damages from the physician who caused the same.

HELD:

The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death
of a person does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with
personality which trial court and Court of Appeals predicated.

Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an award of moral damages
evidently because Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly
indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections.
Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his
wifes indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not
only he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows that hes after
obtaining a large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and
P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as indemnity claim, which under the
circumstances was clearly exaggerated.

Quimiguing vs Icao
TITLE: Quimiguing vs Icao
CITATION: 34 SCRA 132

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in
Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was
married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under
force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became
pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen
stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and
attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del
Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint
that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled
that no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of
action.

ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law
a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly
provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may
also receive donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent
them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742.

Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an
obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to
children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a
woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of
Carmens rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage
caused.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be

remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision.
Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

CASE DIGEST ON JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO

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CASE DIGEST ON JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO [93 P 257] - F: On 2/6/45, while the battle for
the liberation of Mla. was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. (JN, Sr.) and
Angela Joaquin (AJ), together w/ their 3 daughters and their son Joaquin, Jr. (JN, Jr.)
and the latter's wife, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the
German Club. During their stay, the bldg. was packed w/ refugees, shells were
exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese
started shooting at the people inside the bldg, especially those who were trying to
escape. the 3 daughters were hit and fell on the ground near the entrance; and JN,
Sr. and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer haven. They could
not convince AJ, who refused to join them, and so JN, Sr. and his son, JN, Jr. and the
latter's wife dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came out, JN, Jr. was shot in
the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the
ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the Club,
already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people, presumably including AJ. JN, Sr.,
Mrs. JN, Jr. managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby and stayed there for about 3
days, until they were forced to leave bec. the shelling tore it open. They fled but
unfortunately met Japanese patrols who fired at them, killing the two.
The trial court found the deaths to have occurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro
girls; 2nd. JN, Jr.; 3rd. AJ; 4th. JN, Sr. The CA found that the deaths occurred in the
following order: 1st. The Navarro girls; 2nd. AJ; 3rd. JN, Jr.; 4th JN, Sr.

HELD: Where there are facts, known or knowable, from w/c a rational conclusion can
be made, the presumption (in the Rules of Court) does not step in, and the rules of
preponderance of evidence controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record from w/c reasonable inference of
survivorship bet. AJ and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' (the sole witness)

testimony competent and sufficient for the purpose?

It is our opinion that the testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the
problem of survivorship bet. AJ and JN, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of
the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and
reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that JN, Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it
must be noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more
rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around. JN, Jr., was
killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters from the Club. Still in the prime of
life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in 5 seconds or less, and so died
w/in that interval from the time he dashed out of the bldg. AJ could have perished
w/in those 5 or fewer seconds, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote.
According to Lopez' testimony, the collapse of the club occurred about 40 minutes
after JN, Jr. died, and it was the collapse that killed AJ. The CA said that the interval
bet. JN, Jr.'s death and the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes." Even so, it
was much longer than 5 seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that AJ was
still alive when her son expired.
The CA mentioned several causes, besides the bldg's collapse, by which AJ could
have been killed. All these causes are speculative. xxx Nor was AJ likely to have
been killed by falling beams bec. the bldg. was made of concrete and its collapse,
more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous
death; certainly, not w/in the brief space of 5 seconds bet. her son's departure and
his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Sec. 69
(ii) of R 123 does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the
presumption therein provided be certain. It is the "particular circumstances from w/c
it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by the
rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for
"inference is never certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact."
In conclusion, the presumption that AJ died before her son is based purely on
surmises, speculations, or conjectures w/o any sure foundation in evidence. The
opposite theory is deduced from established facts w/c, weighed by common
experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the
doctrine of preponderance of evidence by w/c civil cases are decided, this inference
ought to prevail.