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Structuralism,Hermeneutics,
and Contextual Meaning
Elizabeth StruthersMalbon
erhaps one should begin by defining one's terms. But, were I to
attempt to define "structuralism" and "hermeneutics" carefully,
completely, and in a way that would satisfy all-or even moststructuralists or hermeneuticists, I fear I would never move beyond this
beginning. Thus, although I shall not begin entirely in mediis rebus, I
must assume some experience of the workings of structuralism and of
hermeneutics. I regard structuralism and hermeneutics as approaches to
meaning, as ways of investigating the significance of "things"-from
individual texts to whole cultures-and the significance of significance.
My present task is to compare and contrast these two approaches to
meaning-structuralism and hermeneutics-by
considering especially
their goals, or end points, and their presuppositions, or beginning points.
Although my references will be chiefly to approaches to meaning in
biblical studies, I wish to understand in a more general way the contexts
in which structuralism and hermeneutics seek meaning and seek to make
meaning.
Relations between structuralism and hermeneutics are often implied
in the characterization of either structuralism or hermeneutics. For
example, Robert Culley, in characterizing structuralism, presents a
model of the three focal points of scholarly approaches to biblical texts:
author, text, reader./1/ According to this model, the author is the shared
focal point of source criticism; the text is the focus of rhetorical criticism
and structural analysis; the reader is the focus of biblical hermeneutics
(167-69). Thus Culley's model indicates a fundamental difference
between structuralism and hermeneutics. A model presented by Robert
Polzin, on the other hand, suggests a fundamental similarity between
structuralism and hermeneutics: self-conscious awareness of the role of
Elizabeth StruthersMalbon (Ph.D., Florida State University)is AssistantProfessor of Religion at Virginia Polytechnic Instituteand State University.She is the
author of articles in Semeia, Catholic Biblical Quarterly, and New Testament
Studies. This paper was first presentedto the AmericanAcademy of Religion at
its annualmeeting in 1981.
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Malbon: Structuralism
209
function manifest in every tale, he did find the order (syntagm) of the
functions in the narratives to be invariable. Propp's "important contribution" was, in the words of Susan Wittig, "his typically Formalist proposal
that the description of a tale's invariant structural features is a more
appropriate mode of analysis than the description of the variable content
which manifests the structure" (152).
Whereas Propp serves as a representative of syntagmatic structural
analysis, the "champion of paradigmatic structural analysis is Claude
Levi-Strauss" (Dundes:xii). It is the contemporary French cultural
anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss who is generally regarded as the
"father" of structuralism (Bovon:8; Pettit:68), "the archetypal high priest
of structuralism" (Polzin:41). To Levi-Strauss goes as well the dubious
honor of being "perhaps the best-known and least understood structuralist" (Polzin:17). His work is heralded as "the most extended and systematic application of structuralist methods and the structuralist vision to
human phenomena" (Lane:12). Levi-Strauss's work may be interpreted
as both an extension of Saussure and a "correction" of Propp. Following
Saussure, Levi-Strauss insists upon "the primacy of relations between
terms" (Culler:23). These relations are underlying or implicit relations
through which things can function as signs or as language and which the
structuralist aims to make explicit (Culler:25). Yet the "language" to
which Levi-Strauss applies this central concept is not natural language
(the linguistic phenomenon of langue) but the "language" of kinship
(Le"vi-Strauss,1969) or the "language" of myth (1969-81). These cultural
languages, like langue itself, have two dimensions: the syntagmatic and
the paradigmatic. Against Propp, Levi-Strauss argues for (1) the greater
significance of the paradigmatic dimension of narratives (tales, myths)
over their syntagmatic dimension and (2) the importance of the ethnographic context of narratives to their overall significance and clarity (see
Wittig:153-58).
We turn now from this briefest of looks at structuralism's foundation
on the concern for relations, or networks of relations, to a systematization
of several important goals of structuralism's "adherents" or "practitioners."/3/ I employ the two terms "adherents"and "practitioners"advisedly,
for structuralism in its broadest sense may aim toward either ideology or
methodology. These two basic directions are not unique to structuralism,
but common to intellectual movements generally; they represent what
Michael Lane (13) refers to, although with somewhat different labels, as
the two categories of "the means that men employ to order their
universe."/4/ By ideology-or philosophy if its connotations are less
meant "any more or less consistent system of beliefs and
abrasive/5/-is
values which describes and accounts for the relations of men to one
another, and to the material, and not infrequently the immaterial, universe" (13)./6/ Structuralism as an ideology or philosophy is, in the words
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210
of Robert Scholes, "a way of looking for reality not in individual things
but in relationships among them" (4). By way of an example, LeviStrauss's desire to understand the structure of the human mind from an
examination of its cultural products, his discovery of "vast homologies"
(Bovon:11), represents an ideological (or philosophical) goal of
structuralism. By methodology is meant "any set of rules or regulations
which describes and prescribes the operations to be performed upon any
matter . . . with the purpose of ordering it and understanding its
working" (Lane:13). Most structuralists view structuralism as a methodology, although they may recognize that its basic presuppositions are
philosophical (Lane:13,17; Patte, 1976:14,19; Bovon:6-7; Ehrmann:ix;
Via:1; Gardner:10). I offer this distinction between ideology and methodology as a descriptive one,/7/ not as an evaluative one, although "ideology," or its equivalent, generally serves as the negatively valued pole
among commentators on structuralism./8/ In fact, neither ideology nor
methodology is manifest concretely in total isolation-in structuralism or
in any intellectual movement (Lane:13).
But, speaking abstractly, structuralism as a methodology may be said
to focus upon either theory or analysis./9/ Structuralism as theory may
be directed to various issues: a theory of Russian fairy tales (Propp), a
theory of kinship or of myth (Levi-Strauss), a theory of narrativity (Greimas). In the field of literature, theoretical structuralism approaches not
so much the meaning of individual works of literature as the meaning of
meaning, that is, the presuppositions that enable literature to be written
and to be read; theoretical structuralism seeks not so much to tell the
meaning as to recreate the process of meaning (cf. Spivey:185; Culler:
30-85). From this description, the reverberations between theory and
ideology should be loud and clear; in somewhat simplistic terms, ideology may be understood as theory (or theories) further abstracted and
further generalized.
In the other direction, theory is resonant with analysis, for analysis is
applied theory. In the field of literature, structuralism as analysis focuses
upon the meaning of individual works, although this meaning must be considered (theoretically) as a subset of the meaning of meaning. Structuralism as analysis is concerned not just with the what of individual meaning,
but with the how of individual meaning. Observers have noted that structuralism as theory appears dominant over structuralism as analysis (e.g.,
Lane:38; Culler:34; Jacobson:157; Detweiler:118); some commentators
have even identified structuralism as theory with structuralism per se./10/
Since theoretical hypotheses offer starting points for analysis, theoretical
dcminance may be a mark of structuralism's youth; if so, signs of maturation (or aging, depending upon the point of view) may be discerned in an
increasing number of analytical studies. However, theory and analysis, like
ideology and methodology, are separable only in the abstract./11/
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Malbon: Structuralism
Just as structuralism as methodology bifurcates into theory and analysis, so structuralism as analysis subdivides into structural exegesis and
narrative hermeneutics. In relation to philosophy (or ideology), both
theory and analysis are forms of methodology./12/ In relation to theory,
both structural exegesis and narrative hermeneutics are forms of analysis.
As theory is, in a sense, applied philosophy, so structural exegesis is theory applied to an "object" (a text) and narrative hermeneutics is structural exegesis applied to a "subject" (a reader). /13/ Edgar McKnight's
book on the interrelationships of hermeneutics and structuralism, from
which I have borrowed the term "narrative hermeneutics," well represents this goal of structuralism. Structural exegesis as a goal of structuralism has been the aim of much of my research (Malbon, 1979; 1980;
1982; 198?).
structuralist goals
philosophy
(or ideology)
methodology
theory
analysis
structural
exegesis
narrative
hermeneutics
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Malbon: Structuralism
methodology
philosophy
(or theology)
analysis
theory
biblical
exegesis
existential
understanding
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Malbon:Structuralism
215
sense, and the other on what is involved in the exegesis of linguistic texts,
the hermeneutical problem. These two foci need not be either selfcanceling or absolutely independent, yet they are best held in sufficient
separateness for one to instruct the other" (67). By way of an example, we
noted above that Schleiermacher and Dilthey are to be associated with the
hermeneutical goal of methodology rather than philosophy; methodology,
however, is not a terminal goal within the typology; and both Schleiermacher and Dilthey are to be associated with the theory option of
methodology rather than the analysis option. In Palmer's words, "hermeneutics is true to its great past in Schleiermacher and Dilthey when it takes
its bearings from a general theory of linguistic understanding" (68, my
emphasis). Theory, however, as a goal of hermeneutics, might be
concentrated on a number of areas: a theory of language (Schleiermacher
and Dilthey), a theory of approaches unique to the "human sciences"
(Dilthey), a theory of literary interpretation (Palmer:220-53).
The direct alternative to theory as a hermeneutical goal is analysis.
Analysis, however, does not represent a terminal goal in my typology of
hermeneutical goals but suggests in turn the final option of biblical exegesis or existential understanding. Again my distinction is paralleled-in
overall significance if not in specific terminology-by
a distinction
out
Palmer.
The
I
distinction
see
between
biblical
pointed
by
exegesis
and existential understanding is comparable to the distinction Palmer
observes "between the moment of understanding an object in terms of
itself and the moment of seeing the existential meaning of the object for
one's own life and future" (56). While the most traditional definition of
hermeneutics is probably "the theory of interpretation," the most traditional goal of hermeneuticists in the field of religion throughout the long
history of hermeneutics is probably biblical exegesis. By the opening of
the nineteenth century, as Achtemeier notes, the terms "hermeneutics"
and "exegesis" were often used interchangeably (Achtemeier:14). However, in the twentieth century-to a certain extent with Bultmann and
more fully with the new hermeneutic-the goal of biblical exegesis has
been overwhelmed by the insistent emphasis on existential understanding, on biblical exegesis pro nobis, pro me. As John Cobb notes: "In the
new hermeneutic what is interpreted is ultimately and decisively the
existence of the hearer of the proclamation. The text, rather than being
the object of interpretation, as with Bultmann, becomes an aid in the
interpretation of present existence" (Cobb:229-80; cf. Robinson:52 and
McKnight:77-78).
Bultmann serves as a good reminder, however, that the typology of
hermeneutical goals is not to be viewed as static. Certainly Bultmann
shares much with the philosophical hermeneutics of Heidegger (see
Palmer:48-52; Achtemeier:53-70; Thiselton: especially 227-84; McKnight:
65-71) and with the methodological or theoretical hermeneutics of Dilthey
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Malbon: Structuralism
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218
and of being" (55). For this reason, biblical exegesis in the Bultmannian
tradition is primarily concerned not with the historical past but with the
present and future historicity of human existence; it is not historical
exegesis but exegesis pro nobis; it is, in the words of Ebeling, a "process
from text to sermon"; it is "proclamation" (Ebeling:107; cf. Fuchs:
141)./20/
At least as applied in the field of biblical studies, both structuralism's
focus on the historic and hermeneutics' focus on historicity may be seen
as reactions against the excesses of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries' concern for the historical./21/ Structuralism has challenged traditional historical criticism to respect the integrity of the text and to
appreciate the presuppositions that enable texts to be written and to be
read (e.g., Via). Hermeneutics has challenged traditional historical criticism to bridge the distance between "the two horizons," the horizon of
the ancient text and the horizon of the contemporary reader (e.g.,
Palmer). Structuralism has sometimes accused hermeneutics of ignoring
the interrelations and the constraints of the text as a linguistic product
(e.g., Kovacs). Hermeneutics has sometimes accused structuralism of analyzing the text in isolation from the living process of communication
(e.g., Ricoeur).
Evidently, in the responses of structuralism and hermeneutics to
historical criticism and in the responses of structuralism and hermeneutics to each other, we are sometimes dealing with overreactions to overreactions. In order to defuse this situation, it is helpful to remember
Perrin's presentation of the historical, the historic, and historicity as
three dimensions of history, three interrelated-not independent-ways
of conceiving of history. Analogously, various approaches to textual
meaning are to be viewed as interrelated; the focus of traditional biblical
criticism on the historical is better supplemented than supplanted by the
concern of stucturalism for the historic and that of hermeneutics for
historicity./22/
For structuralism, the historic is determined by syntagmatic and
especially paradigmatic inter- and intrarelationships of cultural phenomena, and syntagmatic and paradigmatic are the two dimensions of language. For hermeneutics, the bridge between an historical text and the
historicity of a reader is formed by language. Yet structuralism and
hermeneutics approach language, as they approach history, with different concerns and different presuppositions.
Malbon: Structuralism
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220
Whereas structuralism focuses upon the syntagmatic and paradigmatic dimensions of language (French langue) as opposed to speech
(French parole), hermeneutics, and especially the new hermeneutic, concentrates on language as language-event (German Sprachereignis). And
whereas Saussurean linguistics is foundational for structuralism's view of
language, Heideggerian philosophy is foundational for hermeneutic's
view of language. For Heidegger, "language is the house of being";
"words and language are not wrappings in which things are packed for
the commerce of those who write and speak. It is in words and language
that things first come into being and are" (as quoted by Palmer:135).
Language, then, is insufficiently accounted for as a system of arbitrary
signs. Language originates not with human beings but with Being itself.
Language is, in Achtemeier's paraphrase of Heidegger, "the response to
Being, it is the act of being-open-to Being, of letting-be-manifest in
response to the call of Being" (Achtemeier:48; cf. Robinson:48-49). Thus,
for the new hermeneuticist Ernst Fuchs, "Language is not necessarily
talk. Language is rather primarily a showing or letting be seen, an indication in the active sense" (as quoted by Robinson:54). Language and
reality, word and event, are inseparable, and it is their unity that is indicated by the term "language-event." To approach language as languageevent is to presuppose that, quoting Achtemeier, "event and word are
born together," "that an event needs the words, the language, it calls
forth in order to be itself," and that "the language thus given birth
illumines the reality that summoned it forth" (Achtemeier:90-91; cf.
Robinson:46-48,57-58)./26/ Thus language as language-event is a living
process of communication-or better, of illumination, since the "saving
event" (Bultmann's Heilsgeschehen or Heilsereignis) is a "language
event" (Ebeling's Wortgeschehen or Fuch's Sprachereignis) (Robinson:
57; see also 61-62). By contrast, language as a system of signs is a human
product-though more an unconscious than a conscious one./27/
Structuralism's insistence on the importance of synchronic study of
language, including cultural "languages," correlates with its concern for
history as the historic. Hermeneutics' understanding of language as
language-event correlates with its concern for history as the historicity of
human existence in the world. For the new hermeneutic, language is the
bridge between the historical and historicity. Central to Fuchs's hermeneutical program is the task of "exhibiting the historicness of existence as the
linguisticality of existence" (as quoted by Robinson:55). Language,
explains Achtemeier (91), "contains the possibilities of self-understanding,
and therefore of human existence, as they have found expression in the
past." "Language," summarizes Palmer (207), "is the medium in which the
tradition conceals itself and is transmitted. Experience is not so much
something that comes prior to language, but rather experience itself occurs
in and through language. Linguisticality is something that permeates the
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222
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NOTES
/1/
Compare (1) the model of a literary work (in the broadest sense of the
term) as the interrelation of author, text, reader, world presented in Malbon,
1980:321-22; (2) the model of the "coordinates of art criticism" (work, audience,
universe) presented by Abrams (especially 6); and (3) the "maps" for literary
critics (central point: work; cardinal points: author, reader, information, language) presented by Hernadi.
Polzin defines structuralism as an approach (1) to objects as whole, self/2/
regulating systems of transformations, (2) by means of hypothetical-deductive
models, (3) with self-conscious awareness of the personal, operational structures
of the subject making the approach (see especially 1-2). In his succeeding evaluations of what makes a structural analysis structural, however, Polzin focuses
primarily on the third element, the relationship of the analyzing subject to the
analysis (see especially 38,33-34). Polzin's purpose here-and his model-is "a
structural analysis of structural analysis," not an evaluation of the relationship
between structuralism and hermeneutics.
An earlier version of the following typology of structuralist goals was
/3/
presented in Malbon, 1980:318-21.
Lane expresses these two categories not as ideology and methodology but
/4/
as "theories" and "methods"; but note Lane's use of the terms "philosophies and
methods" (17) and "ideology" (18).
I do not mean by this to ignore the possible distinctions between ideology
/5/
and philosophy, but rather to refer, in general and with neutrality, to what
Robert Scholes identifies and Robert Polzin affirms as "structuralism as a movement of mind" (Scholes:1; Polzin:iv,1).
Lane is here describing what he terms a "theory" as opposed to a
/6/
"method." See note 4 above.
Cf. Scholes's discussion of "structuralism as a movement of mind" and
/7/
"structuralism as a method" (1-12). See also Culley:169.
For example, Ehrmann:viii; Lane:17-18; Patte, 1976:19; Spivey:144;
/8/
Wilder, 1974:11. Among the more positive, or at least neutral, discussions of
structuralism as an ideology are Scholes:1-7; Gardner:213-47; McKnight:
295-312; Detweiler:202-4,207.
This distinction between theory and analysis is paralleled by, for exam/9/
ple, Patte and Patte's distinction between "theory" and "practice" or "fundamental research" and "applied research" (1); Patte's distinction between the search
for "universal structures" and the search for "structures which characterize each
specific narrative" (1980a:7); Detweiler's distinction between "theory" and
"application" (3-4,103,124); Barthes's distinction between "poetics" and "criticism," as discussed by Culler (30-35).
/10/
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Barthes):30-all of whom are commenting in the context of literary structuralism. Cf. also Calinescu:5,9,16, on "poetics" (see note 28 below).
See Polzin:34. Patte's discussion of "five types of structuralist research"
/11/
(1980a:7-9) may be understood as a development of the various relationships
between theory and analysis: analysis in disregard of theory (Patte's type 1),
theory in isolation from analysis (type 2), analysis for the sake of theory, whether inductive or deductive (types 3 and 4), and analysis in the light of theory
(type 5, "structural exegesis").
The term "methodology" is somewhat problematic. Whereas methodol/12/
ogy does seem an appropriate term in opposition to ideology, that which subdivides into theory and analysis might more appropriately be labeled
methodology/method.
Cf. Patte, 1976:3-6, on "exegesis" and "hermeneutic." See also Patte and
/13/
Patte:vii,94; and Patte, 1980a:22.
/14/
My diagram of goals, although developed independently of Pettit's tree
of options (54), may be fruitfully compared with it. However, Pettit's tree of
options serves as an evaluative tool (54-64): according to Pettit, theory failsgenerative theory more drastically so than descriptive theory, and straight analysis is uncontrolled, thus only systematic analysis is workable; there is only one
real option for structuralism.
See Glucksmann's five levels of the "problematic," or conceptual frame/15/
work, of structuralism-or of any theoretical system, listed according to
"descending levels of abstraction rather than a hierarchy of determinacy" (10):
(1) epistemology [cf. structuralism as an approach to meaning], (2) philosophy
[cf. philosophy (or ideology)], (3) theory [cf. theory], (4) methodology [cf. analysis], (5) description [cf. structural exegesis]. Glucksmann stresses that "each coherent thought system includes the five mentioned in some form" (10).
See Patte and Patte's diagram of "the path taken by Levi-Strauss" and
/16/
the path they follow to the "semantic universe" (15-16).
As an analogous example we note that, although Daniel Patte shares with
/17/
Edgar McKnight the structuralist goal of "narrative hermeneutics," Patte
(1980b) underscores a fundamental difference in their philosophical and theological presuppositions: McKnight, according to Patte, affirms the reality of the
world as an extralinguistic reality and revelation as immanent, while Patte, following Greimas, affirms the reality of the world as a linguistic reality and revelation as transcendent.
Robinson (52), Cobb (229-30), and McKnight (77-78) would, presum/18/
ably, consider existential understanding the ultimate goal of the new hermeneutic but biblical exegesis the ultimate goal of Bultmann. To be sure, exegesis of
the text is more central (and essential) for Bultmann than for Ebeling and
Fuchs, but Bultmann's approach to the text is motivated by his concern for the
reader's (or hearer's) existential appropriation of it, and for Bultmann biblical
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